The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) formally ended war between the Khartoum
government and the insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Africa’s longest civil
conflict. Yet as SPLM Chairman John Garang was sworn
in as 1st Vice-President on 9 July, implementation lags
badly. The main obstacles are the old regime’s lack of
will to embrace genuine power sharing and elections, and
ultimately allow a southern self-determination referendum
after the six-year interim period and lack of capacity in
the South to establish and empower basic structures of
governance. To keep the accords on track, the international
community must focus on broadening participation and
transparency, particularly handling of oil revenues,
promote SPLM dialogue with the government-allied
militias and quickly deploy the UN peace support mission,
whose monitoring operations will be key to breaking the
links between Khartoum and those southern proxies.
The peace deal poses a real threat to many groups
associated with the National Congress Party (NCP)
regime, which signed the CPA under some duress both
to deflect international pressure over Darfur and to
strengthen its domestic power base by securing a
partnership with the SPLM. Most members recognise
the free and fair elections required in 2009 would likely
remove them from power. Many also fear the selfdetermination
referendum will produce an independent
South, thus costing Khartoum much of its oil and other
mineral wealth. There are signs the NCP seeks to undercut
implementation through its use of the militias (the South
Sudan Defence Forces, SSDF), bribery, and through the
tactics of divide and rule. It actively encourages hostility
between southern groups, with the hope that intra-south
fighting will prove sufficiently destabilising that the
referendum can be postponed indefinitely without its
being blamed. These tactics will likely intensify if
pressure over Darfur diminishes.
