Preparing for peace:
The AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA in Central Africa

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After more than 27 years of protracted atrocities instigated by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has marauded and pillaged communities and abducted, maimed, displaced and killed civilians, the African Union (AU) regional cooperation strategy to mitigate the activities of the LRA can be viewed with optimism. Numerous initiatives over the decades have not brought the envisaged peace dividends, nor created conditions for the consolidation of negative and/or positive peace. Theatres of violence shift across state borders, leaving behind them deep scars of fear, underdevelopment, poverty and despondent communities. The current AU initiative is a flexible and original mechanism to promote collective security by pooling the resources and capacities of the countries of the region to address the LRA problem. The strategy is designed to be responsive to the dynamics and shifting needs of the conflict and enable the wished-for whole-of-society recovery. This brief provides a narrative of the status of the operationalisation of the strategy. It concludes with considerations of policy issues.

The LRA in Central Africa

Central Africa is a region plagued by countless conflicts that are contagious, respecting neither political nor territorial boundaries. The LRA conflict initially started as a national political issue in Uganda; it has spread to become a terrorist and nomadic phenomenon, crossing border margins and penetrating areas of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan. Figure 1 illustrates the key areas of LRA operation in the region. The current activity has been concentrated around three major fronts: (i) the border limits between the DRC and South Sudan; (ii) the south-eastern margins of CAR, with concentrations along the boundary towards the DRC; and (iii) the expanse around the Zemongo Forest in CAR, extending north along South Sudan and reaching the southern tip of Darfur in Sudan.

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Act of 2009, Public Law 111 172. Essentially, the policy encourages support for the stabilisation of northern Uganda and countries affected by the LRA by developing a regional strategy to protect civilians, eliminate the LRA threat, and authorise funds for, among others, humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation and transitional justice. In November 2011, the AU also declared the LRA a terrorist group, in line with relevant AU instruments and the international community security paradigm.

Designating the LRA as a terrorist group is important in many ways, allowing affected governments to: (i) enact regulations and legislation that would outlaw the activities of the LRA on their national territories; (ii) restrain support for rebel activities and, accordingly, induce LRA elements to forsake terrorism; and (iii) increase public awareness and knowledge of the LRA elements and networks, and improve efficiency of early-warning systems and peace support operations to eliminate the LRA.

The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army

The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) is a comprehensive regional policy mechanism of the AU authorised by its Peace and Security Council.

**Terror Campaign**

The marauding rebels ‘generate major drawbacks to progress towards attainment of peace, good governance and better livelihoods’. In many cases the result is wider regional conflict systems across boundaries, including displacement, flows of refugees, wandering militias and criminal networks, abduction of young girls and boys, disruption of farming activities and livelihoods, looting of food crops and health centres and erosion of psychosocial capital. These dynamics generate complex barriers which impede efforts to build peaceful communities and prevent violence. In addition, political violence motivated by the LRA undermines the ability of the governing leadership of affected countries to undertake core responsibilities for their territories and citizens. Furthermore, destabilisation holds back socio-economic development activities and derails measures to realise the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating poverty, which is one of the major hindrances to peace in Africa.

In 2001, after the tragedy of 9/11, the United States (US) government included the LRA in its terrorist exclusion list (TEL). In 2010 President Barack Obama signed into law the enactment of the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery

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**Figure 1:** The Areas of LRA Operation (as at February 2013)

Source: Maphosa, S.B (2013)
(PSC) in November 2011. Officially launched in March 2012 at a ceremony held in Juba, South Sudan, the strategy was a culmination of extensive consultations involving the AU, affected member states, the United Nations (UN) and its presences in affected regions, and friendly governments like those of the US and European Union (EU) to help mitigate and eradicate the LRA problem in CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda. The strategy established the components of the initiative as a Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), a Regional Task Force (RTF) and a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) as the headquarters of the RTF.

Broadly, the strategy outlined five strategic objectives: (i) implementation of the AU-led RCI-LRA; (ii) enhancement of efforts to promote the protection of civilians; (iii) expansion of current disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegratiion activities to cover all LRA-affected margins; (iv) promotion of a coordinated humanitarian and child-protection response; and (v) provision of support to affected member states in peace building, human rights, rule of law and development, to enable them to establish whole-state authority.

On the basis of this motivation, the principal mandate of the operation is to: (i) build the operational capacities of the countries affected by the atrocities of the LRA; and (ii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected areas.

The AU special envoy on the RCI-LRA, Francisco Madeira, works in close cooperation with the UN emissary on the issue, Abou Moussa, to: (i) provide overall political and strategic coordination of the operation, in consultation with affected countries and all AU bilateral and multilateral partners; and (ii) assist in mobilising assistance for the victims of LRA violence, the rebuilding of shattered communities and rehabilitation of affected areas.

The domains of operation

The purpose of this typology is to facilitate the design and implementation of the RCI-LRA strategy on conflict intervention. This analysis demonstrates the interconnected and hierarchical relationships necessary at all levels of the operation to ensure coherence between strategic and tactical activities of intervention. Furthermore, it provides insights that could enable analysts and potential third parties, including the AU, UN, friendly governments and civil-society actors, to see the LRA menace from various angles and thereby enhance the likelihood of a more effective response.
Analysis of operationalisation of the AU RCI-LRA

From December 2011, when the RCI-LRA was authorised, significant and ongoing hard work has been undertaken in four key areas of interaction to implement the initiative. As demonstrated in Figure 4, the special emissaries have undertaken notable actions geared toward the realisation of the goals of the mandate. The activities include interaction with:

Figure 3: Levels and approaches of operationalisation

Source: Maphosa, S.B. (2013)

Figure 4: Implementing the RCI-LRA

Source: Maphosa, S.B. (2013)
Affected member states and neighbouring countries

- Bangui, CAR; Juba, South Sudan; Kampala, Uganda; Kinshasa, DRC
- Headquarters of the RTF in Yambio, including the Nzara sector command centre, deployed by Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) troops, in South Sudan
- Political authorities in Kinshasa, DRC, including the Dungu sector command centre (to be deployed with FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) troops)
- Political authorities in Bangui, CAR, including the Obo sector command centre (to be deployed with FACA (Forces Armées Centrafricaines) troops)
- President Idriss Deby Itno and political authorities in N’djamena, Chad, have articulated their readiness to support and cooperate fully with the RCI-LRA efforts.
- The Khartoum regime in Sudan, in contrast, is not cooperating freely with the special emissaries of the RCI-LRA. This reluctance continues to buttress the assertion that the Khartoum regime often meets Joseph Kony and his senior leadership and also supports the destabilising activities of LRA in the region.

Partners

There is significant and iterative interaction and consultation between the AU and key international actors in the operationalisation of the RCI-LRA, including:

- The UN system of continued engagement by, inter-alia, encouraging the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), in coordination with the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), to engage with UN presences, the AU and member states in affected margins to develop a regional strategy for: providing international humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance in LRA-affected areas; enhancing cross-border mechanisms to improve the protection of civilians, early-warning capacity, humanitarian access and response; and providing appropriate reintegration support for those returning from displacement, abductees and ex-combatants; as well as strengthening the overall capacity of affected countries to extend their authority throughout their respective countries.11
- Since 2010 the EU has provided financial support to, inter alia, the AU efforts as well as the operationalisation of the RCI-LRA, by enabling the AU to set up the RTF headquarters in Yambio and providing resources like cars, office furniture and computers to lead efforts to eliminate the LRA menace.12
- There has been continued US support for increasing and comprehensive efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the LRA threat to civilians and regional stability, including the US work with the governments of affected countries, the UN and local actors to reduce the vulnerability of communities, increasing the capacity of communities to make decisions related to their human security concerns.13 The US also has repeated consultations at high level with affected member states, the UN Security Council and the AU on the importance of military efforts to eliminate the LRA, and has provided significant monetary support for those efforts, including over US$40 million since 2008 in critical logistical support, equipment and training to regional militaries.14
- The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public Law 111 172, was a milestone in support of international community endeavours to mitigate LRA violence. The Act delineates the US support in four broad areas: increasing protection of civilians; apprehension and/or removal of Kony and senior LRA leaders; promotion of defection and disarmament of LRA militias; and increasing humanitarian access to affected margins.15 Accordingly, the dispatch of 100 military advisors to the affected region, at an estimated cost of US$4.5 million per month,16 has given aid to militaries in the region by bolstering intelligence gathering and sharing to enhance coordination and planning, and improve the overall effectiveness of military operations.17 Furthermore, the US government provides the largest humanitarian support to affected populations, with more than US$18 million provided in 2011 to support food security, health and livelihood initiatives.18

Establishing key components of the RCI-LRA

The key components of the RCI-LRA have been established, including the JOC. The JOC is made
up of the RTF headquarters and is located in Yambio, South Sudan. Its utility is to coordinate the operations of three sector command centres located in Obo, Dungu and Nzara, and buttress intelligence gathering and sharing between affected communities. Currently, the RTF headquarters is operational, with a deployment of 30 elements led by Col. Dick Prit Olum (UPDF) and Col. Gabriel Ayor Akouk (Sudan People’s Liberation Army or SPLA) as Deputy Commander.19

In addition, the AU has established the secretariat of the JCM in Bangui, CAR. It is led by Lt. Col. Benjamin Bongoma (FARDC) and Lt. Col. Adolf Dobgrue Balfour (FACA) as deputy commander. The JCM is supported by the AU Liaison Office in Bangui (AULOB).

In addition, the three RTF command centres in Obo, Nzara and Dungu are now established, although not to full operational capacity. In a demonstration of political will and to mark an important milestone towards implementation of Communique PSC/PR/COMM (CCXXCIX) [PSC/PR/2(CCXXI)] of 22 November 2011, affected member states have in progress transferred 67 per cent of the total national contingent of 5 000 troops to the RTF command. The handover was composed as follows: 350 FACA (CAR) troops, 2 000 UPDF (Uganda) troops and 500 SPLA (South Sudan) troops (as of September 2012), plus 500 FARDC (DRC) light-infantry battalion (as of February 2013), increasing the total strength to 3 350 elements. These are current figures on the ground but may be added to and changed at any time.20

Furthermore, in support of regional efforts, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) supports the RTF by collaborating closely with key UN ancillary bodies, including the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), UNOCA, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UNOAU in implementing a coordinated hybrid peace support operation. MONUSCO set up a Joint Information and Operations Centre (JIOC) in Dungu, DRC, to monitor and verify LRA attacks and harmonise operations with neighbouring UN presence in CAR and South Sudan.21 In addition, MONUSCO distributes leaflets and airs a regional FM radio programme in local languages of affected frontiers on Coming home, to sensitize community understanding of the LRA as well as encourage LRA militias to defect and join rehabilitation centres. As a result of these endeavours, MONUSCO has recovered and repatriated more than 130 LRA elements to CAR, South Sudan and Uganda.22

Of notable significance is the invaluable and overlapping role played by the US military personnel as advisors, providing intelligence, advice and capacity enhancement to the RTF. This role is particularly important for an AU test case of regional cooperation strategy on this scale. It allows for the different elements of the complex operation to relate to each other in iterative loops of trajectory, geared towards achieving common goals of eliminating the LRA. Efforts and different actors need to be coordinated and synchronised to leverage each other; the US military presence fills that gap.

Meeting of the Joint Coordinating Mechanism (JCM)

On several occasions the ministerial meetings of the JCM have been held under the chairmanship of the Commissioner for Peace and Security and in the presence of defence ministers and chiefs of staff of affected member states. The series of meetings with the JCM have been important for interdepartmental coordination within the AU PSC and to better monitor the implementation of the RCI-LRA, giving it apposite support.

Existing military operations against the LRA

Figure 5 displays existing military operations aiming to mitigate and eliminate the LRA in affected countries of Central Africa. It shows the distribution and location of military assets, including: the RTF headquarters and RTF command sectors; the national armies of affected countries on the LRA issue; the UN peacekeeping presence; US Africa Command (AFRICOM) military advisors; and the location of Combined Operations Fusion Centres (COFCs).

Towards whole-of-society operation

On the basis of the principal mandate of the operation, to: (i) build the operational capacities of the countries affected by the atrocities of the LRA; (ii) establish an environment conducive to the stabilisation of the affected areas freed from the atrocities of the LRA; and (iii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected areas, the AU RCI-LRA represents a flexible and original mechanism to promote collective security by pooling resources and capacities of
the countries of the region to address common problems and achieve the desired whole-of-society regeneration. This peace support model highlights the multifarious presence of collaboration and regional cooperation which necessitates a shared understanding and assessment of the deep-seated causes of the problem, shared understanding of how to address the problem with shared planning, and unambiguous mandates of operation, with clear coordination of military and non-military utilities.

To sum up: as briefly observed earlier, in 2009 the foreign ministers of the four affected countries met in Bangui and sought to consult with the AU and highlight the fact that the LRA problem had become a regional threat. When in August 2009 and July 2010 the AU held special sessions of its Assembly in Tripoli and Kampa...
respectively, the meetings, among other issues, urged the four affected countries to renew their efforts, including military action, to neutralise the LRA and its destabilising activities. With support from the international community and friendly governments, the four set out the modalities and established the RCI. In June 2011, at a second regional ministerial meeting of the affected countries in Addis Ababa, the AU defined the strategic objective of the proposed regional initiative as ‘the elimination of LRA, leading to the creation of a secure and stable environment in the affected countries’.

There are also major ongoing external missions in the region. Although they do not have a mandate to conduct joint operations in the hunt for the LRA, the missions have a Protection of Civilian (PoC) authorisation in relation to the LRA menace in affected countries. In addition, the missions provide basic support with a view to enhancing military and civilian information sharing and coordination with the AU-RTF implementing the RCI-LRA. They include MONUSCO, UNMISS, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in Central Africa Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), UNOCA, BINUC and UNOAU.

Furthermore, current humanitarian and development work supported by friendly governments and civil society, with positive community relationships, contributes in many ways to leverage prevention of violence. Friendly governments and organisations include the US, United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, Japan, Northern Ireland, EU countries such as Germany, Italy, and Denmark, and the World Bank. Civil society organisations include the Red Cross, Oxfam, Enough Project, Save the Children, Invisible Children, and numerous faith and community-based initiatives such as the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) of northern Uganda, and the Arrow Boys of Yambio in South Sudan.

Notionally, therefore, the idea of a whole-society approach in complex peace-support operations denotes a collective and iterative peacebuilding model. The approach consists of vertical and horizontal efforts of agencies (including international, regional, national and/or community-based agencies) that could not only leverage the absence of direct violence (negative peace), but also address deep-rooted structures, attitudes and transactional drivers of violence and enablers of social resilience (positive peace). In conflict contexts with cross-border dynamics, the shared efforts become strategic when they can integrate and look ‘beyond’ the state to explore the potential of regional agency and cooperation, and, also look ‘below’ the state to recognise the invaluable initiatives of community-led reconciliation and resilience.

Figure 6: The AU RCI-LRA Whole-of-Society Regeneration Peace Model

Source: Maphosa, S.B. (2013)
**Policy issues**

Firstly, this overview has highlighted the increasing role of political missions in managing regional crises by pooling resources and capacities of the countries of the region to address common security setbacks. For effective cooperation and implementation on the affected populations, the operation needs to identify means that would be in harmony with peace support operation mandates and the nature of collaboration between the AU, affected member states, and the international community. This discussion shows the need for continued shared efforts if the AU RCI-LRA is to achieve its goals. In security terms, there is a need for deeper analysis of the use of special RTF and US military expert contingents in the operation, which differs from standard peacekeeping. Accordingly, the following framework can direct the kinds of relationships that ought to exist between local and external utilities.

Increasing confidence and synergy between local and international community tools is important to establish a shared understanding between the various elements of the complex operation to support a coordinated action. In particular, the emphasis here ought to embrace the ability to listen to diverse local dictates before assuming the ‘we-know-best’ attitudes, and thus steer clear of the hazard of outsider ‘blueprints’, which are often inappropriate to mitigating LRA violence.

Secondly, why can’t we find Joseph Kony? Why has Kony not been captured in 27 years? Kony and the LRA continue to pillage and terrorise communities, abducting, maiming, displacing and killing civilians. Given the difficult political and geographic terrain, typified by impenetrable forest regions, and absent state authority coupled with weak government forces, apprehending Kony and eliminating the LRA have proved a huge challenge. To counter this menace, which...
has now been operating for close on three decades, there are choices we have to make, and sometimes those choices overlap conventions. In military operations, good crisis management is characterised by quick response, decisive action, and flexibility to adapt to changing situations.26 Therefore, investing in artificial intelligence (AI) for planning and logistics functions in complex operations such as the RCI-LRA might be the ‘best game in town’.

Historically, AI has been used to enhance design of complex military interventions in peace support operations since the early 1960s. Advances in a range of study fields are continuously adapted for military purposes, and indeed, militaries with better technology exert decided advantages over their adversaries. Even though this is no assurance of absolute negative peace and/or positive peace, improved military hardware can make remarkable differences to the outcomes of conflict. Accordingly, combat and non-combat drone systems like the Skycam and more high-tech lethal ‘predator’ and ‘silver fox’ hardware could make invaluable inroads for effective operationalisation of the mission through data processing and pattern recognition, and aid decision-making for the RTF commander.

However, and importantly, great caution must be exercised to understand the previous assertion, in that AI would not be a silver bullet for the elimination of the LRA and/or al-Qaeda militias in Africa. But in many significant ways AI could complement and leverage existing mediation and peacekeeping efforts. Specifically, AI could help the RTF commandant (including the JCM, the JIOC centre in Dungu and the three sector command centres in Obo, Nzara, and Dungu) to: (i) understand better the nature of the LRA threat; (ii) identify who might be involved in facilitating LRA threats; and (iii) go out and eliminate the target with precision and suddenness. Despite the casualties of civilians killed unintentionally by drone attacks from Afghanistan to Palestine, it would be naive to think that drone attacks kill more civilians than the security threats they are designed to eliminate. Given that AI in military operations would not work without good human intelligence on the ground, the micro- and macro-dynamics of affected states and communities become very important components of the keys that can unlock and eradicate the LRA problem.

Third, the AU RCI-LRA offers a case of useful precedents for the AU PSC when debating and mandating deployments to complex conflict axes. The AU’s adoption of a locally-led strategy, pooling resources and capacities of the affected countries to leverage on multilateral presence (including MONUSCO, BINUCA, UNMISS, UNOCA, UNICEF and UNOAU) in implementing a coordinated hybrid peace support operation is arguably a good model for future interventions. The AU PSC should carefully review the lessons that arise as the operation unfolds, mainly as regards both flexibility and directed mandates, and basing and security planning.

A fourth priority is to ensure that financial and intrusive political issues do not complicate the implementation of the mission. As this overview has noted, the current status of the AU-RCI does not allow it access to sufficient start-up funds and infrastructure to speed up the initial operation. Member states have not handed over the troop contingents they pledged to support the RTF, citing financial conditions to support the battalions. The RTF command centres are not yet at optimal level for achieving the mission goals because of limited ancillary base structures, including transport and communication. It is therefore urgent to reinforce the fiscal, political and operational mechanisms to effectively support the AU-RCI.

Furthermore, this brief has noted the challenge to deploying full cross-border military actions posed by suspicions and disagreements between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda over allegations of supporting rebel militias and M23 in the DRC. Therefore a fifth and urgent priority ought to be to reinforce defence diplomacy in the region and consolidate a range of activities for these neighbours to engage in, so that they become confident that each understands the true actions and/or intentions of the others. This would reduce the possibility that one would misinterpret the other’s actions as hostile, and reduce the reliance on potential military actions. Importantly, the kinds of activity to comprise confidence-building measures would be tailored with care and responsive to the fundamental concerns of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. These could take the form of: (i) declarations; (ii) notifications of military drills and movements; (iii) invitations to observe military utilities; and (iv) multilateral information sharing and exchange visits – to bring about openness and transparency.

**Conclusion**

There is no single project or actor that can do everything in peacekeeping operations. An important ‘lesson learned’ in this argument is the prudence to establish linking, bridging, and bonding affect between different actors and
strategies, to harmonise efforts and leverage peace writ large. According to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, ‘making peace ultimately requires the firm commitment and extraordinary courage, on the part of all sides, to ensure a permanent end to violence, [requiring] the determination and imagination of all parties to seek solutions, and build trust between communities who have been at loggerheads for decades.’

Therefore, preventing violence and consolidating regional security requires that many people work at many levels (social, political, and economic), in many different ways.

Notes and References

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2 ‘Central Africa’ in this brief delineates the four countries affected by the LRA activities and mentioned in the Regional Cooperative Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) mandate: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Uganda.


5 Ibid.

6 See Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CCXXIX) of the 299th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 22 November 2011, on the Lord’s Resistance Army (PSC/PR/2(CCXXIX)).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


10 See Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CCXXIX), op. cit.

11 See the UN Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2011/21 dated 14 November 2011, reaffirming the importance of promoting justice, the rule of law, including respect for human rights. See also letter dated 25 June 2012 from the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2012/481 (12-38842), p.6.

12 Interview with AU-RTF deputy commander Col. Gabriel Ayor Akouk (SPLA), 10 to 25 November 2012; Interview with MONUSCO, UPDF and US advisors in Yambio and Nara, South Sudan, 10 to 25 November 2012. Also see the UN Security Council 6796th meeting S/PV.6796, dated Friday, 29 June 2012, New York.

13 Such efforts include, for example, US government and USAID project funding to help communities in the DRC develop protection plans and bolster early-warning capabilities using high-frequency radios and mobile phone towers. See Factsheet: U.S. support to regional efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army. Available at: http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/8652/"http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175523.htm

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 According to interviews with AU-RTF deputy commander, RTF Headquarters in Yambio, Col. Gabriel Ayor Akouk (SPLA), in Juba, South Sudan, 10 to 25 November 2012, there are 30 assets at the RTF headquarters in Yambio, comprising: 6 officers from CAR, 7 from DRC, 9 from South Sudan and 8 from Uganda. In addition, the RTF is resourced by funding from the EU for three cars, office space and computers.


21 Interview with AU-RTF deputy commander, RTF Headquarters in Yambio, Col. Gabriel Ayor Akouk (SPLA), in Juba, South Sudan, 10 to 25 November 2012. Interview with MONUSCO, UPDF and US advisors in Yambio and Nara, South Sudan, 10 to 25 November 2012. Also see Factsheet on what MONUSCO is doing to address LRA. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco

22 Ibid.

23 See Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CCXCIX), [PSC/PR/2(CCXCIX)], op. cit.


25 The strategy was developed and implemented by the AU (including the four affected countries) with the UN and friendly governments, in particular the US government. The US had taken the initiative by (a) downgrading the LRA as a terrorist rebellion, and (b) enacting the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.

26 Refer to the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA. Available at: http://www.au.org See also letter dated 25 June 2012 from the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon addressed to the President of the Security Council, op. cit., p.6.

27 The pursuit of building whole and peaceful communities increasingly embraces multidimensional and multifunctional initiatives that address and transform structures (i.e., basic systems and institutions), attitudes (i.e., widely-held attitudes, beliefs and behaviours) and transactional dynamics (i.e., redefining how key actors and drivers in a conflict interact).

29 Address by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in October 2011 to the Basque Summit in Spain, organised by Conciliation Resources.
