What Does the Future Hold for SACU? From Own Goal to Laduma! Scenarios for the Future of the Southern African Customs Union

Tanja Hichert, Peter Draper and Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott
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ABSTRACT

A group of Southern African Customs Union (SACU) experts and interested parties recently participated in a scenario-planning exercise on the future of SACU. This paper gives an account of the scenarios developed, which range from SACU collapsing to a scenario where it deepens into a common market.

The exercise first mapped out the key certainties and uncertainties that SACU is facing. These range from the certainty that SACU will be impacted by the global economic slowdown to the uncertainty over whether an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) will be concluded and what the final content and configuration of this agreement will be. The impact of these circumstances (and others) will shape the future of SACU.

The key certainties and uncertainties identified were then used to map the likelihood of these elements transpiring and what their potential impact will be on SACU. They constitute the gameboard of the scenarios. On the gameboard four quadrants are envisaged, each representing a different future for SACU. SACU’s current position is noted on the board, as well as its ideal future. Driving forces are identified that would either move SACU towards or away from this ideal future.

The group envisaged four possible futures for SACU and named them ‘Laduma!’, ‘Wild Card’, ‘Own Goal’ and ‘Red Card’, with ‘Laduma!’ representing the quadrant in which SACU’s ideal future lies. The key driving forces that would move SACU towards this goal include the conclusion of the EPA negotiations and a strong role for the SACU heads of state. Driving forces for a ‘Red Card’ scenario – a potential future in which South Africa no longer supports Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland and in which SACU collapses – are equally strong and plausible, with South African political instability emerging as the strongest potential driving force.

It is hoped that these scenarios will assist policymakers in their strategic prioritisation over the coming months and years.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BLNS countries</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLS countries</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IEPA</td>
<td>Interim Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) celebrates its centenary this year (2010). As the oldest customs union in the world, it should have many successes to celebrate, but, ironically, the celebrations are clouded by an uncertain future for the organisation.

Several developments over recent months/years have brought a number of contentious issues to the fore. Key among these is the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, which have caused a rift between Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS countries), on the one hand, and South Africa and Namibia, on the other. In addition, the 2008–10 global financial crisis has highlighted the precarious position of the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) and their reliance on the revenue pool for the bulk of their fiscal income. It has been reported that the pool has shrunk by as much as 40% as a result of the crisis.1 In addition, the inauguration of the Zuma administration in South Africa has consolidated thinking on the preferred content and structure of regional integration in Southern Africa. The current minister of trade and industry, Dr Rob Davies, has expressed his preference for ‘production-led’ regional economic integration over ‘market-led’ integration,2 which is understood as a preference for the development of regional public goods rather than focusing on tariff liberalisation. This could mean the downgrading of the importance of the customs union and formal tariff arrangements or the actual downgrading of the customs union to a free trade agreement, in favour of building network infrastructure (transport, communications, and energy).

The difficult issues include South Africa’s desire to engage other countries in trade agreements as it sees fit. Currently, all negotiations are hampered by different intra-SACU interests, which results in inaction. Consensus decision making is perhaps desirable, but neither effective nor efficient. Political will to make consensus decision making work is a key element – whereas it might have been present during the SACU–European Free Trade Area negotiations, it is now lacking. South Africa’s economic profile differs sharply from the BLNS countries, which might seek special treatment in trade agreements that would be unavailable to South Africa. Reaching agreement that would be applicable to SACU as an entity is, therefore, complicated and time consuming. Furthermore, SACU is currently based on a revenue-sharing formula according to which South Africa transfers the bulk of customs revenue collections to the smaller countries. These transfers represent substantial components of the BLNS countries’ budget revenue, particularly Lesotho and Swaziland. South Africa has, however, over recent years been indicating that the current formula is becoming too expensive for its fiscus to maintain. In addition, the Zuma administration has ambitions of playing a development partner role in Southern Africa and the revenue pool has been mooted as a potential source of funding. This is sensitive, as it would jeopardise the BLNS countries’ current automatic revenue transfers. Finally, while some degree of common industrial and trade policies may be necessary in order to deliver a common vision for the organisation, they will be very difficult to agree on, as the industrial profiles of the five member states differ vastly and therefore their trade policies necessarily differ as well.

To gain some clarity on these developments and issues, and where these might lead SACU, the South African Institute of International Affairs hosted a scenario-planning
workshop in May 2010. The scenario-planning process is useful in reducing complex phenomena to manageable analytical units that are forward looking and can accordingly inform strategic decision making.³ Our purpose in this paper is to offer an account that cuts through the many complexities associated with SACU’s future and offer realistic potential futures for the organisation. This is inevitably high level and strategic, with emphasis being on analytical clarity and user friendliness rather than being detailed and empirical. Accordingly, it is hoped that policymakers and decision makers in Southern Africa can use the results documented here to plan a desirable future for SACU.⁴

**SETTING THE GAME BOARD**

Driving forces are those underlying and impacting factors that set the pattern of events and determine outcomes in SACU – the forces that make things happen. They shape the parameters within which SACU operates and how its future will unfold. They can constitute a number of phenomena: the state of the economy, political and/or policy decisions, global events and trends, legal precedents, technological drivers, the outcomes of trade negotiations, etc. Driving forces can be both certain and uncertain, as long as they are key drivers. First we outline the key certainties identified during our workshop, then we turn to the key uncertainties that form the basis for the scenarios.

**Key certainties for SACU**

Key certainties, for ease of use, are often referred to as ‘rules of the game’. They are the factors that are more known and predictable, i.e. agreed long-term trends and ‘givens’. They can be descriptive (the nature of the institution/the environment it operates in), normative (ethically and governance oriented) or aspirational (the rules needed to be successful). These key certainties can change over time and sometimes the ‘rules of the game’ can be ‘rewritten’ to gain competitive advantage.

SACU’s ‘rules of the game’, as identified by workshop participants, are as follows:

- The recent involvement of the SACU heads of state at summit level in the affairs of the organisation will have an impact, albeit the directions of impact are uncertain.
- National interests drive SACU. However, national interests reflect the inequalities between South Africa and the BLNS countries and as such are causes of conflict in the organisation. These acute inequalities between South Africa and the BLNS countries will endure.
- The South African political landscape dominates decision making, both political and economic, in Southern Africa.
- Political instability in South Africa, specifically the lack of a political centre in the African National Congress (ANC) and the presence of two ideological frameworks/economic models⁵ is a strong driving force that will shape the future of SACU.
- There will be lower global economic growth in Southern Africa for the foreseeable future than previously anticipated, owing to the ongoing impact of the global financial crisis, financial deleveraging in the West, and the sovereign debt crisis emerging in the
region’s main export market – the European Union. This will have an adverse effect on
the size of the revenue pool and the contributions the BLNS countries receive toward
their budgets.

• Therefore, the South African National Treasury will drive a review of the SACU revenue-
sharing formula. Nonetheless, given the BLNS countries’ dependencies on South Africa,
the redistributive element between South Africa and these countries is likely to endure.

• SACU will continue to be generally uncompetitive compared to the global economy,
a factor that provides some impetus to continued economic integration in the region.
Furthermore, since traders find that SACU works as a customs union to facilitate trade,
there is some ‘glue’ holding SACU together.

• Food insecurity and climate change will put stress on/stimulate SACU, sharpening the
need for common agricultural policy approaches.

• Nonetheless, the broader regional dynamic will continue to impact on and shape
SACU’s future. Specifically, the African Union (AU) and the tripartite process involving
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) will continue to discount
SACU. Furthermore, based on its strong political legitimacy, if SADC achieves its trade
objectives, this will diminish SACU.

• SACU is caught up in a range of regional and global geopolitical complexities and
issues, and this confusion is set to continue. While this argues for a stronger role for
the SACU Secretariat, it is likely that it will remain an administrative post box, since
South Africa is reluctant to cede real power to it.6

• Non-state actors, particularly business, will be more positively engaged (in SACU’s
future) as the debate sharpens.

Key uncertainties for SACU

Key uncertainties are the ‘known unknowns’ and can include ‘wild cards’, risks (and
opportunities) and possible trend breaks. They are the key factors that may emerge
and shape the future, but we do not know the directions of change. What is important,
however, is their impact and the lack of knowledge we have about them. These
uncertainties drive the design of possible scenarios. Issues of fundamental disagreement
are also treated as uncertainties.

SACU’s key uncertainties, as identified by workshop participants, are as follows:

1. Will countries leave SACU, and therefore
2. Will SACU break up?
3. Will there therefore be a:
   a. concluded SACU EPA? or
   b. different EPAs (i.e. the status quo is locked in)?
4. How exactly will other external trade groupings in Eastern and Southern Africa
   impact on SACU?
5. Will there be an outcome of the Doha Round, and if so what will the implications for
   SACU be?
6. Will the SACU member states remain politically and economically stable?
Could South African politics fracture, and, if so, in what direction(s)?

What is the future of the revenue pool? Will it continue to decline due to a global growth slump, or could South Africa pull the plug and initiate an exit, or could the revenue-sharing formula change towards being used for a development fund?

The revenue pool will diminish in the short-to-medium term as European economic growth moderates, which in turn will impact on South African growth, but by how much?

What are the likely contours of change in the revenue pool (the South African decision to use the revenue pool for a development fund or for domestic purposes)?

Could Zimbabwe join the common monetary area in order to consolidate its evolving post-hyperinflation monetary arrangements?

a. Zimbabwe joining SAGU? Once political stability returns to Zimbabwe, economic recovery programmes might look towards SACU for Harare’s future stability and role within Southern Africa.

Could the rand be pegged? Recent voices from within the South African governing alliance and business quarters have raised the possibility of a pegged rand to alleviate the strengthening currency and the accompanying decrease in competitiveness of South African exports; the questions are whether this is likely and, if so, what the impacts might be?

Will the current apparent South African consensus (Department of Trade and Industry, Presidency, National Treasury, Department of International Relations and Cooperation) on the urgent need to resolve the problems presented by SACU remain in place?

What will be the direction of the Botswana–South Africa relationship? If South Africa and Botswana are at loggerheads regarding decision making in SACU, it might drive the organisation into deeper divisions.

What will be the direction and extent of state support for sector strategies in South African industrial policy? Where will the funding come from and how will it impact on industrial policies in the BLNS countries?

Will there be a systemic global crisis? As things currently stand, this would represent a direct threat to the revenue-sharing arrangements in SACU; however, every crisis also carries the seeds of opportunity, so it is possible that this would strengthen the organisation by focusing attention on the need for reform and the benefits of integration. Which way will this force evolve?

Will the heads of state provide leadership? SACU heads of state have traditionally played a weaker role in SACU than in other regional organisations, like SADC, for instance. However, the heads of state met for the centenary celebrations and have agreed to meet again in July 2010 in order to resolve SACU’s pressing problems. It is not clear how effective these meetings will be, nor what impact they may have on the organisation.

How will the regional institutional landscape (SADC, tripartite, AU) evolve?

Will the common negotiating mechanism have a positive impact on current and future negotiations, or will it founder in the wake of a potentially divisive EPA outcome?

Assuming that it resolves its problems, could SACU favour expansion and invite Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola or even Zambia to join as a building block initiative towards SADC integration?
21 How bad will the effects of climate change be? If global warming impacts on water scarcity and food security in Southern Africa, SACU will have to work closely on finding solutions to these crises in the region.

Impact/uncertainty chart

All the key uncertainties were plotted on an ‘impact/uncertainty chart’ in order to prioritise those uncertainties that the participants had the least knowledge about (i.e. those that are least predictable) and that will have the greatest impact on SACU. It is important to remember that ‘high uncertainty’ does not mean ‘high (im)probability’; high uncertainty simply means ‘not having a clue’. The impact/uncertainty chart can also act as a radar screen on which key uncertainties and their movement can be monitored, as this could be an indication of changing unfolding futures.

Two sets of key uncertainties, the ‘SACU breaks up’ set (key uncertainties 1 and 2) and the ‘revenue pool’ set (key uncertainties 8 and 10) shaped the most helpful and realistic scenarios for SACU’s next 10 years. They were then expressed as descriptive opposite
extremes (‘SACU deepens’ vs ‘SACU fractures’; and ‘South Africa (SA) is Santa’ vs ‘SA is Scrooge’) to provide the framework for four possible scenarios (with their descriptive titles), as is shown next.

### Scenarios

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SACU deepens</th>
<th>SACU fractures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WILD CARD</td>
<td>LADUMA!</td>
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<tr>
<td>RED CARD</td>
<td>OWN GOAL</td>
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**‘Laduma!’**: SACU deepens and South Africa continues to play Santa

In this scenario, 10 years from SACU’s centenary, the organisation is going from strength to strength: neighbours are queuing up to join; and a virtuous global economic growth cycle driven by the Chinese locomotive and a reinvigorated US economy underpins its success. How did this happy state of affairs come about?

Shortly after the successful conclusion of a SADC–EU EPA, which managed a full harmonisation and review of the SA–EU Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement, the SACU heads of state set out a timetable for deeper SACU integration. The agenda was deemed ambitious by most, but, surprisingly, deadline after deadline was
met by all SACU member states, leading firstly to the addressing of all outstanding issues of the 2002 SACU Agreement and secondly towards a common market, implemented in 2015. The economic spin-off from the FIFA World Cup and a quick global economic recovery saw several billion dollars worth of investment streaming into South Africa. Tourism tripled, creating numerous new jobs, and the service industry in South Africa saw the fastest global growth in the years immediately following the FIFA World Cup. Basking in the afterglow of the successful tournament, the ANC buried its differences and a ‘national growth coalition’ emerged. With the resultant deeper pockets and galvanised by the impressive commitment shown by the BLNS countries, South Africa agreed to a revenue-sharing formula that maintained contributions to the BLNS countries’ budget via a structural development fund targeted at numerous regional infrastructure projects, boosting trade facilitation in the region.

‘Own Goal’: South Africa continues to play Santa, but SACU fractures

In this scenario, 10 years since the collapse of SACU analysts are asking whether the end of SACU was an own goal for South Africa. South Africa still dominates possession of the ball on the Southern African pitch and gains little from the game by way of partnership or integration in the region. However, Pretoria seems to prefer a one-sided game, although it comes at a high cost to the National Treasury. How did we end up here? Did the final whistle blow for SACU once the FIFA World Cup came to an end in South Africa?

The collapse of the EPA negotiations was a death sentence for SACU. The BLS countries went ahead and implemented the initial Interim EPAs (IEPAs), which they fleshed out into free trade agreements covering both goods and services, while South Africa’s relationship with the EU deteriorated. Once the IEPAs were implemented, South Africa signalled its withdrawal from SACU. The customs union collapsed, new border controls had to be introduced and staff in Windhoek were sent home.

However, as with ‘Laduma!’ the economic spin-off from the FIFA World Cup combined with global economic recovery saw several billion dollars worth of investment streaming into South Africa and new jobs created in tourism and services. Domestically, South Africa made huge inroads into service delivery to poor areas, which eased political tensions in the country and eased the pressure on the National Treasury for further domestic spending. With the resultant deeper pockets, South Africa could afford a comprehensive development fund, which both allows for budgetary contributions to the BLNS countries, as well as the funding of large infrastructure projects in the region. Furthermore, Pretoria realised that the BLNS countries could not survive without the revenue transfers that formed the bulk of their budgets, so South Africa remains committed to supporting its neighbouring states in an effort to avoid political and economic collapse on its borders.

‘Red Card’: SACU fractures and South Africa plays Scrooge

In this scenario, Southern Africa is at the brink of collapse. The past 10 years has been a decade of rapid economic decline, good governance has been given the red card, and the regional integration agenda is all but dead.

South Africa’s early exit from the 2010 FIFA World Cup precipitated a sombre post-World Cup mood in the country that saw few captains of industry making use of the
opportunity to lure investment to South Africa. The country could not wait for the final whistle to blow and for the tourists to leave. Globally, the economic recovery remained anaemic, especially in South Africa’s biggest export market – the EU. During the same period, South Africa’s relationship with the BLS countries and the EU rapidly declined as they were intent on implementing the IEPAs regardless of South Africa’s objections. Once implemented, South Africa withdrew its membership of SACU and, in a huff, asked the EU to withdraw its ambassador from South Africa. Politically and economically, the relationship has never recovered.

The collapse of SACU also meant that the red card was shown to the revenue pool. The South African National Treasury had previously argued that it was becoming too expensive to maintain, and with the global financial crisis and lack of economic spin-offs from the FIFA World Cup, South Africa was feeling the pinch at home. There was a short adjustment period of five years during which transfers to the BLNS countries were steadily decreased. Currently the BLNS countries are in severe budgetary crisis and are unable to secure loans from international lending agencies, as there is little prospect of them ever being able to repay their mounting debts. The four countries have become utterly reliant on aid and, in a self-defeating move to replace foregone revenues, they imposed import tariffs on goods coming from South Africa. Regional trade was choked, along with growth prospects. SADC is still trying to implement its free trade agreement, but prospects are not good. The tripartite process was dealt a blow by South Africa’s evident lack of confidence in regional integration.

‘Wild Card’: South Africa plays Scrooge and SACU deepens

This scenario is as follows: Who could even have imagined a Southern African Common Market that operates effectively and efficiently without the current generosity in the South Africa-underwritten revenue pool as the glue that binds the team together? Developments over the last decade have surprised most analysts and have given the Southern African integration agenda the extra time it needed to score goal after goal.

The first goal came when South Africa, the BLNS countries and the EU concluded an EPA that satisfied all parties. Building on the EPA, the BLNS countries developed a strong partnership with the EU through which alternative revenue sources, particularly for budget support, were identified and developed. This was combined with a regional industrial policy that saw the development of regional value chains. The BLNS countries relied on South African budget support for another 10 years, at which point alternative revenue streams were sufficiently developed to take over.

The second goal was scored through the redirection of South African revenue transfers to massive investment in regional infrastructure. Public–private partnerships blossomed in the rail and road industries, which in turn facilitated intra-regional trade. The benefits accrued to all members of SACU, which set the organisation on the road to deeper integration, with the anticipation of even greater economic returns. In light of strong economic growth, job creation and investment in Southern Africa, the issue of sovereignty, which dogged SACU a decade ago, seems to have given way to more mature states that rely as much on regional structures as domestic developments for nation building.
SACU started off as a customs union in 1910, and since has not made any attempts at deepening the integration among the five member states. SACU is therefore currently at the mid-point between breaking up and deepening. According to the newly formulated SACU vision, the ‘preferred future for SACU’ is a significant deeper level of integration. Our placement of this preferred future takes account of the strong likelihood that South Africa will contribute less to the revenue pool, but will not withdraw support altogether. This contrasts with our sense of where SACU is now – at a mid-point between ‘Laduma!’ and ‘Own Goal’, with relatively generous South African financial transfers to SACU.

The driving forces that would determine whether SACU moves in any given direction were identified as follows:

Towards Laduma!

The successful conclusion of the EPA negotiations could push SACU’s future towards further integration. If this is combined with positive economic growth consequent on
recovery from the global economic crisis, this could lead to positive talks around the revenue-sharing formula. Currently, the South African National Treasury’s stance on the revenue pool is seen to be pushing SACU’s future more towards ‘SA is Scrooge’, and therefore either ‘Wild Card’ or ‘Red Card’. A strong and positive role by the SACU heads of state could also drive the integration agenda, as has been the case in the East African Community. If business, particularly traders, are accorded an increased role, this could also bode well for SACU achieving its vision, principally if regional business elites coalesce around a competitiveness agenda. Finally, a sustained international resource crunch associated with harsh climate change impacts could play an integrative role, albeit SADC is probably better placed to manage this.

Towards ‘Own Goal’

The driving forces identified for ‘Own Goal’ were seen as severe BLNS political and economic instability, as well as a weak leadership role by the heads of state. While the latter is a distinct possibility, as things currently stand, serious BLNS instability seems unlikely. Furthermore, we think it unlikely that South Africa would continue to foot the SACU bill without a concurrent strong relationship with the BLNS countries in some form of regional integration organisation.

Towards ‘Red Card’

Strong driving forces were identified that would make ‘Red Card’ the most likely outcome for SACU if it continues down the path it is currently on. The immediate push comes from the EPA negotiations, the South African National Treasury’s desire to decrease fiscal transfers to the BLNS countries, and South Africa’s industrial policy ambitions combined with protectionist business interests. Political instability in South Africa would further drive Pretoria towards increasing spending at home, for which it would need to use the current revenue pool. The global financial crisis has already proven to have an adverse impact on the size of the revenue pool and therefore on South Africa’s pocket depth.

A driving force that could well mean the end of SACU is a SADC that works. If SADC were to implement a customs union, SACU would no longer be needed. For a customs union of 15 member states, the revenue-sharing arrangement would differ markedly, which would mean that South Africa would in all likelihood not underwrite the organisation. This would free Pretoria up to focus on spending priorities at home.

The heads of state have an important driving role, both in terms of achieving the SADC agenda or not and in how it reacts to instability in South Africa and beyond. Furthermore, South Africa’s foreign policy ambitions could see Pretoria playing a development partner role on the continent. It could use the revenue pool funds towards this purpose.

Towards ‘Wild Card’

The forces pushing SACU towards ‘Laduma!’ also operate to push it towards ‘Wild Card’. Perhaps the key difference in this scenario is that business recognises the benefits that the customs union brings in terms of trade facilitation particularly and lobbies strongly for retaining and extending these benefits.
However, in this scenario the South African National Treasury opts to continue its restructuring of the SACU revenue arrangements, responding to intensifying interest in South African foreign policy circles to ‘broaden the net’ of countries that Pretoria extends assistance to. However, this foreign policy thrust is tempered by the realisation that the disintegration of SACU would create many foreign policy headaches for Pretoria, particularly in Africa.

So, while the forces driving SACU towards ‘Red Card’ also operate – albeit not as strongly and with primary impact on the revenue-sharing arrangements and Pretoria’s willingness to underwrite SACU – the key difference between ‘Wild Card’ and ‘Red Card’ is that the positive forces outweigh the negative. These negative forces promote a stronger sense of national interest in Pretoria with the attendant rationalisation of resource transfers to the BLNS countries – but not enough to destabilise them.

Participants also considered ‘Wild Card’ to be a plausible outcome.

ENDNOTES

4 The authors wish to thank the participants in this session for giving freely of their time and opinions. The views and opinions expressed here take these opinions into account, but are the sole responsibility of the authors.
7 This was the subject of a joint SAIIA-Mail & Guardian roundtable on 23 March 2010. For the presentations and a summary of the proceedings, see http://www.saiia.org.za/development-through-trade-events/promoting-dialogue-on-trade-reform-in-south-africa-trade-industrial-policies-and-the-exchange-rate-march-2010.html.
8 For the benefit of the uninitiated, in the gameboard, ‘Laduma!’ is the word used by South African football TV and radio commentators to indicate that a goal has been scored and expresses triumph (it comes from the isiZulu term meaning ‘to thunder’ or ‘to be famous’); a ‘Red Card’ is shown by a football referee to a player who has committed an unpardonable foul and who has been sent off the field and can take no further part in play (a negative action from which it is impossible for the player concerned to recover); an ‘Own Goal’ is a goal scored by a member of a team against itself (a self-inflicted injury); and a ‘Wild Card’ is a term taken from poker to refer to a card that can be designated to have the value of any other card in the pack (a range of possibilities).
9 Namibia decided to side with South African and Angola in not signing an EPA.
SAIIA’S FUNDING PROFILE

SAIIA raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. Our work is currently being co-funded by AusAid, the Bradlow Foundation, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the European Commission, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, INWENT, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank.

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