Blue Helmets for Africa: India’s Peacekeeping in Africa

Frank van Rooyen
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ABSTRACT

For the past 60 years, the United Nations has been keeping foes apart in strife-torn parts of the world, and rebuilding countries and communities afterwards. In the UN’s peace operations in Africa, India has been an active partner since its peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960. In this paper, all references to ‘the Congo’ denote the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and not the Republic of Congo (or Congo-Brazzaville).

This paper explores India’s peacekeeping efforts in Africa over the last five decades. It analyses the reasons for India’s engagement in African peace missions, and finds that different motives and incentives appear to be driving India’s peacekeeping. Some of these can be explained along Cold War fault lines.

A chronological account of India’s peacekeeping actions in Africa illustrates that country’s commitment to securing peace, the depth of involvement, the fatalities bravely borne and the hardships endured. Even more important, the record shows that India continues to use the experience that has been gained to refine its approach to peacekeeping.

In conclusion, the paper offers a forecast of what form India’s commitments to Africa’s peacekeeping requirements are likely to take in the future. India may well develop criteria that require a greater return on investment than has been the case over the last half-century. A more tempered approach — particularly in view of India’s global aspirations — seems likely.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CUNPK</td>
<td>Centre for UN Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Indian Air Force</td>
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<td>ID/OIOS</td>
<td>United Nations Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operation</td>
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<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council (of the United Nations)</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force (in Somalia)</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOMISIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping has been defined by the United Nations (UN) as a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace.\(^2\) Over more than 60 years, UN peacekeeping interventions have evolved into the means most favoured by the international community to address complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas, and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have been party to. Such support comes in many forms, because it has moved well beyond simply monitoring cease-fires. Today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political aspect of the peace process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation; to protect civilians; to assist in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; to support the organisation of elections; to preserve and promote human rights; and to help restore the rule of law.

Since achieving its independence in 1947, India has continually participated in UN peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world, and in various capacities. A significant number of these commitments have been undertaken in Africa, where, during that continent’s post-colonial period, interventions by the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and lately, the African Union (AU), have been needed to create the stability that is a prerequisite for peace and development. As India is on the threshold of its fifth decade as a major contributor to the UN it is appropriate, therefore, to review the history of its peacekeeping exercises in Africa under the UN flag.

The paper starts by describing the politico-conceptual milieu that shaped India’s involvement in peacekeeping, both globally and in the particular case of Africa. The UN missions are listed briefly to provide a more comprehensive appreciation of peace operations in general. A chronological overview of Indian peacekeeping participation in Africa (divided between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras) records these operations in terms of the nature and extent of each successive or parallel intervention. These include India’s participation in civilian, troop and police activities on the continent. A record is also supplied of the hazardous aspects of peacekeeping, including high-risk conditions, service performed ‘beyond the call of duty’, and the deaths of Indian peacekeeping personnel. This is succeeded by an analysis of the lessons learned by the Indian peacekeepers from their participation in African UN-flagged peace missions, and the incremental implementation of this knowledge across a wide range of operations, not only at national but at the regional and international levels as well. However, although supplementary efforts, such as India’s conducting UN-approved training for African peacekeeping forces, are noted, the question to be asked in the present is: Are the policy benefits of African peace missions sufficiently tangible to justify India’s continued allegiance to this continent? The paper concludes by assessing the changes that have occurred in India’s outward-looking policies, which suggest that any involvement in peacekeeping in the future will be required to bring in more substantive benefits, such as a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR INDIA’S PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA

There are various reasons for India’s significant commitment to peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The foundational premises that have led India to participate in UN (and lately, hybrid-type) PKOs can be bifurcated along Cold War lines. One commentator notes that India in the period immediately after gaining its own independence attempted to apply the criteria of honour and fidelity to its foreign policy dealings with the world. Accordingly India ‘… viewed every development through the rigid prisms of non-alignment, third-worldism and the Cold War.’ This involved measuring international conduct by stereotypical yardsticks, which may have limited its ability to meet new diplomatic challenges effectively. Among those who have attempted to analyse India’s rationale for its involvement in UN PKOs are a group of prominent Indian military officers who have served on UN missions themselves. They argue that Indian participation has served the country's geo-strategic interests. This is most notable in the case of various East and South-East Asian missions, which were all acknowledged in Indian foreign policy as essential to preserving both regional stability and international order. The same reasons (ensuring the continued stability of the Middle East) were put forward to justify India's PKO participation in that region. Other important factors are the need to maintain energy security by ensuring the unimpeded flow of oil and gas supplies in particular, and free passage for seaborne trade via international waterways and canals past potential maritime choke points in general. In this context, Somalia, with its pivotal position on the Horn of Africa and close political and economic connections with West Asia, can also be considered of geo-strategic importance to India.

For most observers, India's African PKOs are much more difficult to explain. What were the reasons for committing capabilities, capacities and resources to demanding yet stimulating ventures, when a valid argument could be made that India’s domestic priorities should have ranked higher? What direct strategic purpose has been served by its participation in missions in African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone, remains cryptic, and is therefore open to theorising. Parakatil and others explain the sub-continent's commitment to these operations as an expression of 'solidarity with non-aligned countries'. This has some resonance with India's well-known anti-colonial position in world affairs. For example, India viewed the conflicts in the Congo and Indonesia as hostile actions that primarily responded to situations foisted on them by a colonial power's mismanagement of perceived grievances about legitimate struggles; in these cases Belgium and the Netherlands. Some analysts believe that India continues to regard most of the recent African wars as attributable to the ongoing and destructive legacy of the colonial past. Another convincing reason offered for India's participation is its interest in humanitarian operations, such as those it assisted in Rwanda and Somalia.

India's army, comprising about one and half million service personnel, ranks fourth-largest in the world. Although the sheer weight of numbers might indicate otherwise, military analysts are confident that the Indian armed forces are professionally trained and directed. Having demonstrated their prowess in two world wars (which included service in Africa), and the Korean War, India's forces are well qualified to intervene in a wide range of conflict situations. PKOs give India's armed forces invaluable exposure to a variety of
scenarios, including integration at international military level — which is often difficult or prohibitively expensive to simulate or include in military exercises. Some detractors have noted that India may use these acquired skills in regional conflict resolution on the subcontinent, but the result could be conflict escalation in that volatile neighbourhood.  

Also, India, like other countries, appreciates the revenue to be earned by participation in PKOs. Payment by the UN assists a number of nations to maintain large permanent military forces for strategic reasons. It is also important to bear in mind that an important element of India’s peace operation participation is inter-regional rivalry for global approval. If India is to fulfil its ambition to become a permanent member of an enlarged UNSC, it needs to be perceived as a major force in regional and world affairs. The higher its profile, the greater its advantage when competing with other regional and developing nations that are jostling for position in the international arena.

India and United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

Not only has UN peacekeeping grown in size, but its nature has become increasingly complex. In order to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented scale and scope of today’s missions, peacekeeping now has to be distinguished from both peacebuilding and peacemaking. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas, and assist ex-combatants to implement the steps these processes involve. The various tasks undertaken by peacekeepers include introducing confidence-building measures, encouraging power-sharing arrangements, providing electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and fostering economic and social development. Accordingly, UN peacekeepers (often referred to as ‘blue berets’ because of their light blue berets or helmets) can include soldiers and other civilian personnel, among them police officers.

The UN Charter gives the UNSC the power and responsibility to take collective action when required, to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the UNSC to authorise peacekeeping operations. Most of these operations are initiated and implemented by the UN itself, with troops serving under UN operational control. In these cases, peacekeepers remain members of their respective armed forces, and do not constitute an independent ‘UN army’. (The UN does not have such a force.) In cases where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council delegates authority to regional organisations such as the AU, or coalitions of willing countries, or combinations of the two, to undertake peacekeeping or peace-enforcement tasks.

Sierra Leone (1999–end of 2000). The sections below describe those interventions that took place on African soil.

**United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**
**July 1960 to June 1964**

The Congo became independent on 30 June 1960. Soon after, the ‘Congo crisis’ developed. At various stages of this unstable period, the crisis took on the characteristics of an anti-colonial struggle, a war of secession (with the province of Katanga attempting to assert its independence), a UN PKO, and a Cold War proxy encounter between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union. Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, abbreviated ONUC, was launched after the UNSC resolution 143 of 14 July 1960, was passed. An infantry brigade group (comprising two to five battalions) represented the Indian armed forces that formed part of the UN force. In one of the most difficult and violent of PKOs the UN had faced, ONUC was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance. This operation marked the first occasion on which the UN authorised the use of force by a PKO to prevent civil war, and was also the first time the UN undertook an intervention in an intra-state, rather than an inter-state, conflict. Although India had participated in UN PKOs in other conflict zones, ONUC was also notable for being the first UN mission in Africa in which Indian peacekeepers took part.

The functions undertaken by ONUC were subsequently expanded to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo; preventing the occurrence of civil war; and securing the removal of all mercenaries and foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under UN command. In addition to a peacekeeping force that comprised nearly 20,000 officers and men at peak strength, the mission included an important civilian operations component. In terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved, ONUC marked a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping.

The enactment of peace enforcement by the UN allowed ONUC to contribute to the eventual reunification of the Congo. The casualties suffered by the Indian brigade over the period of its involvement amounted to 147 (including 39 peacekeepers killed in action), and Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria, serving as a UN peacekeeper, earned India’s highest military award for courage, the Param Vir Chakra.

Although India was involved in numerous PKOs elsewhere in the interim, Indian peacekeepers returned to the African continent only in 1989 to assist Namibia, which had become the world’s newest democracy, and shortly afterwards became involved in stabilising the volatile situation in Angola after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. However, as previously noted, the only PKO it undertook before 1991, when the Cold War came to an end, was ONUC.

On 31 January 1992, the UNSC met at the level of heads of government for the first time. The meeting marked the dawn of a new era for the Security Council (SC), one in which Cold War politics were being replaced by a forum in which the permanent members could agree to work together on issues relating to international peace and security. The member states also showed a definite willingness, even determination, to use the UN to its
full potential. The prime minister of the United Kingdom, John Major, who was chairing the heads of government meeting, articulated those feelings when he said,\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{quote}
The world now has the best chance for peace, security and development since the founding of the United Nations. I hope, like the founders of the United Nations themselves, that we can today renew the resolve enshrined in the Charter — the resolve to combine our efforts to accomplish the aims of the Charter in the interests of all the people we are privileged to represent.
\end{quote}

India was at the forefront of the nations that continued to take their international obligations seriously.

\textbf{United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)}
May 1989 to May 1991

This UN PKO spanned the period when the Cold War era was coming to an end, ushering in a time of unipolarity and uncertainty. The UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was faced with the mammoth task of implementing UN Resolution 435 of 1978 within a time frame scheduled to begin on 1 April 1989 and to be completed within 12 months. It had taken 10 years for the parties to the dispute to give formal assent to UNTAG’s undertaking. The high point of the transition operation was to be the organisation of an election, to be held in November 1989. The military component of the task-force, which was eventually trimmed down to 4 500 soldiers from 21 states, commanded by an Indian general and deployed in 200 locations, monitored the fragile cease-fire and attempted to demobilise reservists and irregulars. Military observers from India, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan and Kenya were flown into the area,\textsuperscript{18} a notable example of international co-operation.

Lieutenant General Prem Chand of India was the force commander. The soldiers and civilian personnel under his command were responsible for the smooth withdrawal of foreign troops, elections and the subsequent handing over of authority to the government.\textsuperscript{19} Other tasks undertaken by the UNTAG forces were curbing the infiltration of armed men from across the country’s borders, and overseeing the phased withdrawal of 30 000 South African Defence Force personnel. This involved ensuring that most of them, apart from 1 500 who were to make up a basic security group confined to specified camp areas, returned to South Africa.

Civilian personnel working for UNTAG were responsible for a range of duties. Namibia was divided into 23 electoral areas, and UN staff manned widely-dispersed information points, where over 700 000 Namibians had to be registered as voters.\textsuperscript{20} To a great extent this required effective collaboration between the UN and a small staff of South African administrators. Before the election, UNTAG launched a multimedia campaign to give potential voters unbiased information. Liaison between UN volunteer staff and representatives from specialised UN agencies arranged transport, reception and rehabilitation for 42 000 Namibians returning to their villages from exile. Those who were suspected of arms-bearing or of involvement in terrorist activity were scrutinised and offered amnesty when allegations proved to be unfounded.
The whole UNTAG programme, an intensive transition operation, depended on the commitment and improvisation of some 8,000 people from more than 109 states (including, for the first time, Switzerland). The cost of the whole exercise was $383 million. On 10 November 1989, the UN supervisor, Martti Ahtisaari, announced the Namibian election results to a joyful crowd. Independence Day followed on 21 March 1990. The transition of Namibia had required a peacekeeping element, but the year-long enterprise, which was unprecedented in the annals of the UN, had gone smoothly and enabled a new nation to emerge.

This ‘constructive engagement’ throughout 1989 has been described as one of the most cleverly engineered diplomatic achievements of recent years. An operation to bring about political calm had begun with carefully safeguarded demilitarisation, and proceeded through elections supervised by the UN to a full, equitable and final settlement. The full co-operation of all of the parties concerned suggested a way forward for the resolution of intransigent disputes, and the UN acknowledged the leverage that others had provided. Mr B Dayal of India, as UN commissioner for Namibia over the period 1982 to 1987, also made valuable contributions to the peace process in Namibia.21 UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar expressed the wider significance of the successful transition when he declared that ‘the international community has played an unprecedented role in the establishment of your state. The struggle of your people has been our struggle’.22 UNTAG disbanded, having achieved its objectives.

Peacekeeping and political transition are legitimate platforms for international collaboration. The Namibian enterprise was a success story; yet the Angolan venture remained unresolved. The making of new nations relies to a significant degree on learning from past mistakes,23 but the protagonists in Angola’s civil war proved unruly pupils.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) 
June 1989 to May 1991

By being involved in both Namibia and Angola at the same time, India was committing itself to parallel missions to bring peace and stability to Africa’s southwest. Because the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) intervention came at a time when Cold War rivalries were declining but still affected ideologies and loyalties in these countries, they continued to exert an influence on political arrangements throughout the region. This was an important, though not the only, aspect of the intricate international negotiations required in Angola.

The first of two missions, UNAVEM I was established by SC Resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988 at the request of the governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards, and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola, in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two governments. India supplied eight of the 70 military observers for UNAVEM I. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991, more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the secretary-general reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out its mandate.24
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)
May 1991 to February 1995

The force that replaced the first mission, UNAVEM II, was the second of a total of four UN missions deployed to Angola during the course of that country’s civil war — the longest-running conflict in modern African history. The mission’s original mandate, which was outlined in UNSC Resolution 696 (1991), passed on 30 May 1991, was to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire, and to oversee the Angolan police during the ceasefire period. A subsequent resolution, 747 (1992), passed on 24 March 1992, altered the mandate to include electoral monitoring duties. The candidates for election included members of both of the rival factions in the civil war, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the de facto government’s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which had controlled Luanda and most of the country since Angola’s independence in 1975. India contributed a chief of staff and eight military observers to UNAVEM II.25

During the country’s pre-election period, 400 UN electoral observers were deployed, along with the rest of the UNAVEM II personnel, to carry out the mandate of ‘observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections in Angola’. The mandate was again altered by a series of SC resolutions passed in 1993, which were intended to encourage more stringent adherence to the ceasefire by both the government of Angola and UNITA, after the resumption of hostilities. The responsibilities included helping the two sides involved in the conflict to reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process; implementing the ceasefire at national and local level; observing and verifying the elections; demobilising troops and establishing a joint armed force for Angola; monitoring the police and making efforts to improve humanitarian aid for the Angolan population. These tasks were evaluated as being ‘far more complex responsibilities faced by the new generation of Peacekeeping Operations in the post-cold war era’, involving the participants ‘in a dangerous and complex conflict situation requiring flexibility and innovation’.26

Finally, in late 1994, with the sanction of SC Resolutions 952 (1994) and 966 (1994), UNAVEM II began observation and verification of the Lusaka Protocol of 20 November 1994, and prepared to make way for the new mission.27

United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)
February 1995 to June 1997

After the signing of the new peace accord, the Lusaka protocol, which both the government and UNITA committed themselves to respecting and implementing, the UN launched UNAVEM III in February 1995. Its mandate covered four broad areas; political, military, humanitarian and electoral:

- political: to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka protocol;
- military: to supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and monitor the ceasefire; to help establish quartering areas and the demobilisation of UNITA forces, and supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; to monitor the amalgamation of MPLA and UNITA soldiers into a single joint national defence force; and to verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan national police;
EMERGING POWERS AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES PROGRAMME

- humanitarian: to co-ordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process; and

- electoral: to ensure that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of the presidential election were fulfilled, and then monitor and verify the election process.

India supported the UNAVEM III mission by providing guards, field and mechanised companies, staff officers and military observers. The Indian army was active in clearing road intersections and ensuring logistic security, and also became involved for the first time in the detection and removal of landmines. However, UNAVEM III was scaled down when the peace process, with the agreement it was founded upon, collapsed.

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)
July 1997 to July 1999

In his report on the situation in Angola dated 14 April 1997, the UN secretary-general observed that the peace process in Angola had been proceeding at a disappointingly slow pace, and that the implementation of the Lusaka protocol was still woefully behind schedule. Entrenched mistrust and lack of political will to take decisive measures had prevented the parties from honouring their commitments. However, both the MPLA government and UNITA had agreed on a new timetable to move the peace process forward. Accordingly, and in order to provide some continuity of effort, the UN authorised MONUA (the UN Observer Mission in Angola), which was a small observer mission, to assist the parties to the strife make progress towards peace. India seconded a chief of staff and two force commanders.

In the successive phases of the UN missions in Angola, India was constructively involved. The Indian military’s construction and engineer company was deployed in the construction of camps for refugees. It repaired and undertook the reconstruction of war-damaged bridges on the Conga, Quisaju, Mugige and Nhia rivers; and built an airfield at Londuimbali. As noted above, the high-risk task of demining the important road connecting Lobito and Huambo was completed before the 60-kilometre section of road could be repaired.

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
December 1992 to October 1994

Again, India’s overlapping commitments in Africa are demonstrated by its assumption of peacekeeping duties in another war-ravaged area of Southern Africa, Mozambique. The UN established ONUMOZ (the UN Operation in Mozambique) in December 1992 to restore peace at the end of a long civil war. In addition, ONUMOZ was mandated to ensure the full withdrawal of all foreign forces (including private armed groups), and to separate the two factions geographically. India provided a company-strength contingent of staff officers, military observers, engineering and logistics personnel; and also provided independent headquarters. The Indian peacekeepers assisted in the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire between the two main protagonists, Frelimo (Liberation Front of Mozambique) and Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance). Indian peacekeepers also carried out
the collection, storage and destruction of arms and ammunition after overseeing the disarmament of the two warring factions. They established and maintained security along a transport route that had been constructed, and also secured other critical infrastructure sites. They rendered humanitarian aid, and assisted in the conduct of elections. The operation ended successfully. The then United Nations secretary, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, commended the Indian effort, and said, ‘… by virtue of their superior training and high standards of discipline and sense of responsibility, [Indian peacekeepers] have had a significant contribution in ensuring the early return of peace in Mozambique.’

United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II)
April 1992 to December 1994

The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is considered one of the most difficult and challenging operations that the UN has ever attempted. The mission's activities in Somalia started in April 1992, with efforts to provide humanitarian and food aid to those most affected by the civil war and famine. From this initial mandate, the mission was widened to stop the conflict and rebuild the basic institutions of a functional state. In December 1992, the UN established a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which consisted of three ships carrying forces mandated to create a safe environment in which humanitarian aid and food relief could be supplied to the people of Somalia. Although UNITAF was under US command, India contributed a naval task force under Commodore Sampat Pillai. This was the first-ever Indian naval participation in a UN mission. Indian ships and navy personnel were involved in patrol duties off the Somali coast, in humanitarian assistance on shore, and also in the transportation of men and material for the UN.

In May 1993, India contributed an extensive contingent to UNOSOM II, comprising an infantry brigade group; a mechanised infantry battalion; a light battery; air support to carry out reconnaissance and observation flights; armed helicopters from the Indian Air Force (IAF); a veterinary corps; and a logistics unit. The UNOSOM II operation involved peace enforcement, as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the objective was humanitarian relief, the Indian contingent successfully combined the often conflicting roles of coercive disarmament and humanitarian relief to the civilian population. The Indian brigade had operational responsibilities for one-third of Somalia, an area of 1 730 000 square kilometers, the largest ever controlled by any contingent. In spite of the huge geographical extent covered by the Indian area of responsibility, there were few civilian casualties. The Indian contingent dug a large number of wells to provide an adequate level of water security, and constructed schools and mosques. It operated mobile dispensaries and relief camps that also provided veterinary care. The peacekeepers, therefore, gave medical and humanitarian assistance not only to large numbers of Somalis, but to their livestock. They also managed the rehabilitation and resettlement of thousands of refugees, and helped to repatriate them to their homes. In spite of suffering casualties, the Indian contingent exercised the required restraint in defending themselves, and played a vital role in reviving the political process by holding reconciliation talks between the warlords and the rival factions. The last remaining units of the Indian contingent boarded Indian navy ships at Kismayo port in southern Somalia in December 1994. During its involvement in this PKO, India demonstrated its capacity to provide an integrated force that comprised not only land and naval forces but air support.
As recent history has shown, India’s experiences in Somalia, like those of the US and other leading participants, led to a serious reappraisal of the future of UN peacekeeping within the former’s political and military circles. On 23 August 1994, several opposition members of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian parliament) tabled a motion demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops following the news that seven Indian lives had been lost in Somalia the previous day. India was highly critical of the withdrawal of the US from Somalia following that nation’s well-publicised casualties in Mogadishu, and appeared to agree with the general international consensus that the US had failed to carry out its responsibilities in the region, and had left managing the situation to developing countries like India and Pakistan.32

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
September 1993 to September 1997

The civil war in Liberia displaced more than 700,000 people, many of them refugees from neighbouring countries. The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was the first UN peacekeeping mission to be undertaken in co-operation with a PKO already set up by another organisation, in this case the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The object of the collaboration was to assist the Liberians to establish peace in their country. Authorised in September 1993 by UNSC Resolution 866, UNOMIL was mandated to work with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for an initial period of seven months. The military arm of ECOWAS, ECOMOG was a formal arrangement through which the separate armies of countries in the region could work together. Nigeria, which supplied the bulk of the ECOMOG armed forces and financial resources, was its dominant component, but other ECOWAS members — Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and others — contributed sub-battalion strength units to the mission in Liberia. Although the general purpose of the combined operation was to ensure that the terms of the Cotonou Peace Agreement were implemented, UNOMIL’s task was to disarm and demobilise the combatants, investigate and report human rights violations, and observe and verify the election process. India took part in UNOMIL, and also sent military observers to Liberia in 1994. Owing to the collective efforts of all those involved, the Liberian peace process was successfully concluded with the holding of elections in July 1997 and the subsequent formation and installation of a new government.

United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL)
July 1998 to December 2005

In the recent past PKOs have tended to become multidimensional, in that they have also involved civilian police monitors and election observers. This represents a more holistic approach, in which greater inclusivity allows for the involvement of non-governmental and aid organisations. India has contributed to various of these expanded undertakings, providing police observers not only for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), but for the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.33
The conflict in Sierra Leone commenced in March 1991, when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks to overthrow the government. In spite of joint peace efforts by a UN Special Envoy, the OAU and ECOWAS, armed hostilities continued unabated. Although a peace agreement known as the Abidjan Accord was signed between the RUF and the government in 1996, a military coup in May 1997 derailed the peace process. In October 1997, the UNSC imposed an oil and arms embargo on the country and authorised ECOWAS (represented primarily by Nigeria) to oversee its strict implementation. In late October, negotiations between the warring parties culminated in a second peace plan, which was to be monitored by ECOMOG. This force ensured the security of most of Sierra Leone through military action.

The UN lifted the oil and arms embargo, and assembled an observer mission (UNOMSIL), to which India contributed several military observers and medical personnel under Brigadier SC Joshi, in July 1998.

The peace process broke down again soon afterwards. Rebel forces entered the capital, Freetown, on 6 January 1999, and attacked the UNOMSIL premises. The Indian military observers stationed there volunteered to stay behind until all the others in the headquarters had escaped or been evacuated, with Joshi supervising the evacuation of civilian staff while the building was under attack.

In October 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1270 creating its peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). It was charged with the general mandate of co-operating with the government and the other protagonists in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement; but it also had a range of specific tasks: helping to carry out the government’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration plan; monitoring adherence to the ceasefire agreement; and protecting UN personnel and establishing ‘a presence at key locations’. India was the only country with a functional, professional army that was willing to contribute troops to UNAMSIL.

On 7 February 2000, the Council revised UNAMSIL’s mandate. It also expanded its size, which it did again on 19 May 2000 (and once more, a year later, on 30 March 2001). Even before the Indian Army sent a battalion (which included armoured personnel carriers and attack helicopters) to Sierra Leone in December 1999, Indian doctors and military observers had been operating a hospital there for almost a year.34 In addition, India also contributed police officials. Between 1 and 6 May 2000, about 500 peacekeeping troops and military observers from India and another 13 countries were captured and held hostage by the rebel RUF, which renounced the ceasefire. That this situation had been allowed to occur was the source of severe criticism of UNAMSIL in the Indian parliament, media and civil society. Many Indians queried the very presence of the Indian contingent in Sierra Leone, and raised doubts about its military integrity. The last of the captured Indian personnel were released only on 29 June 2000.35

Dissension between ECOMOG and the UN force arose. The force commander and chief military observer, Vijay Kumar Jetley from India, had been experiencing increasing difficulty dealing with army officials and diplomats from Nigeria, whose conduct he viewed as insubordinate. This troubled relationship came into the open after the international press published several official documents he had submitted to UN headquarters in New York, which had allegedly been removed without permission from his computer in Freetown. The Nigerian authorities strongly denied all the charges Jetley had made against their officers, and claimed that they had found Jetley remote and unapproachable.
India officially announced that India’s presence in Sierra Leone had been part of a ‘routine rotation so as to give other member states a chance to participate in the mission’, and removed its troops. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee personally took the decision to pull out the Indian contingent. He was motivated by two considerations: he wished to pre-empt a move by Nigeria to unseat Jetley; and he was facing increasing criticism from members of parliament and some leading members of the armed forces over India’s continuing participation in the mission. Although after the release of its captured peacekeepers in June 2000 India had become involved in more robust activities in Sierra Leone, which some commentators had compared favourably with the assertive role it had played in the Congo during the early 1960s, observers have noted that the country did not favour participation in peace enforcement missions.

The UNAMSIL mandate came to an end in December 2005. Although the mission had been tested severely, it was still regarded as having achieved its aims, and as having demonstrated that the UN could respond to the needs and demands of countries in conflict in a rapidly-changing global environment. It was also seen as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding. The Indian contingent made a valuable contribution during their commitment in Sierra Leone, having helped the war-ravaged country to make impressive gains towards peace. Over the course of its mandate, the UN disarmed tens of thousands of ex-fighters, assisted in holding national elections, helped to rebuild the country’s police force, and contributed towards rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing government services to local communities. In a historic first, the UN also helped the Sierra Leonean government to stop the illicit trading in diamonds and regulate the industry. (During the war, the rebels had used money from ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds to buy weapons, which had prolonged the conflict.)

In December 2005, UNAMSIL was succeeded by a new mission — the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone.

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR, UNAMIR II), October 1993 to March 1996**

The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a mission instituted by the UN to aid the implementation of the Arusha Accords, which had been signed in August 1993. The Accords had been designed to end the Rwandan civil war, fought largely between the Hutu-dominated Rwandese government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). India provided a contingent comprising one infantry battalion and support elements to UNAMIR, to help ensure the security of the refugees, and to create conditions in which free and fair elections could be held. The Indian battalion was assigned the responsibility of safeguarding UN installations, manning security posts, and denying ‘marauding irregulars and armed bandits’ access to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. A second mission, UNAMIR II, largely dedicated to stabilising the situation in the country in the aftermath of the genocide, was formed in November 1994. India supplied medical, engineering and communications specialists to this mission.

The role of UNAMIR has attracted much adverse attention, most of which relates to the limitations on its rules of engagement, which prevented it from intervening during the Rwandan genocide. Not only the UN but a number of (Western) nations came under fire for their lack of positive action, for their failure to use their knowledge of the atrocities
being committed to prevent them, and for their unilateral withdrawal of UN forces. Gerald Caplan, the author of *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, calls this ‘shameful’ period a ‘multitude of betrayals’.

The mandate of UNAMIR II extended into the period after the RPF had overthrown the government, and continued into the Great Lakes refugee crisis. It is therefore not surprising that this mission is viewed as one of the UN’s peacekeeping failures.

India was one of a number of countries that maintained peacekeeping troops in Rwanda throughout the crisis. After the successful completion of the Indian contingent’s assignment, they were repatriated in April 1996.

**United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) from November 1999**

Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and five regional states, the UNSC passed Resolution 1279 (1999), which established the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). Its initial mandate was to observe the ceasefire; ensure the disengagement of all forces; and maintain close liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Through a series of subsequent resolutions, the UNSC expanded MONUC’s area of responsibility to include supervising the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and to performing multiple additional tasks.

India has committed both police officials and military personnel to MONUC. By December 2009 the number of personnel (4,421) in the Indian contingent represented the highest proportion contributed by any member state. The intention of the mission was to maintain a presence in ‘key areas of volatility in order to re-establish confidence and discourage violence that threatens the political process’. This mission has become the UN’s largest PKO, with the time frame of the most recent resolution setting a terminus on 31 May 2010, but with an option to extend the deadline by another year. Reports in late 2009 indicated that the government of the DRC wished for an earlier withdrawal of UN forces, largely to counter perceptions that it was relying on the UN to bolster its authority.

India’s participation, together with that of a few other countries, has become controversial, to the extent that it is likely to have a deleterious effect on the reputation of UN peacekeepers. A report in the *Africa Research Bulletin* notes that confidential reports by the UN contained 44 allegations against the Indian battalion based in North Kivu province. Other charges of misconduct had also been levelled at Pakistani and Bangladeshi peacekeepers. The main report described issues that range from ivory, arms and gold smuggling, to drug dealing, to fraternising with the rebel forces. The UN’s Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (ID/OIOS) investigated these charges, but because the allegations ‘may have the potential to damage the reputation of the Indian military and the United Nations, … other avenues which fall outside the purview of the ID/OIOS investigations’ were pursued. India’s defence minister ordered an inquiry, although this did not cover the allegations that force members had been involved in illegal arms dealing. However, the issues under investigation appear to have disappeared off the radar screens. The UN’s OIOS states, under the heading ‘Access to OIOS Reports’ that, according to General Assembly Resolution 59/272, the reports may be requested by
member states (only), and that ‘for reasons of confidentiality or the risk of violating … rights of individuals involved … the report may be modified, or withheld’. Indications are that, in respect of most of the charges, the allegations could not be substantiated. Obtaining full access to these reports remains a challenge. MONUC has repatriated more than 70 peacekeepers for sexual abuse and exploitation, but UN officials acknowledge that they rarely find out whether an offending peacekeeper has been punished by his government. Alan Doss, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy, said in July 2009 that ‘a very small number of peacekeepers have abused the trust of the Congolese people in the past, and the overwhelming majority who serve with honor in this mission resent the image/damage that a few individuals can do to the credibility of peacekeeping.’

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from March 2000

In June 2000, after two years of fighting concerning a border dispute, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a cessation of hostilities agreement following proximity talks, or direct dialogue, led by Algeria and the OAU. In July, the SC set up the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to maintain liaison between the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire. In September 2000, the Council authorised UNMEE to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments. India, which sent an infantry battalion that arrived in June 2001, was tasked with keeping the two nations apart. Three years later, the same country provided UNMEE’s force commander, who served in this capacity from July 2004 to March 2006. The Indian contingent affected the lives of the local inhabitants in many positive ways. Their doctors and dentists gave free access to their clinics to the people of their host nations, and during the period of the mission, the Indian medical battalion attended to well over 7,000 medical and 1,100 dental cases. Working with Kenyan peacekeepers, the Indians ran high-quality field hospitals in Barentu and Assab, ensuring that local inhabitants received free consultations and treatment. Especially during the dry season communities rely heavily on dam-fed water, and the Indian Construction Engineer Company embarked on a number of water conservation projects, constructing five dams between May 2004 and the last quarter of 2006 in villages that depended on this system. In addition, they dug wells and laid water pipes to schools and orphanages. The engineers also built roads and carried out essential maintenance work, especially on rebuilding roads that link distant farms to the main regional town of Barentu. These projects were instrumental in improving the lives of communities in both countries.

The humanitarian crisis in both countries presented UNMEE with additional duties. Estimates published in March 2000 calculated that over 370,000 Eritreans and approximately 350,000 Ethiopians had been affected by the war. The humanitarian situation in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by a severe drought that led to a major food crisis, which affected almost eight million people. The UN’s humanitarian agencies prepared programmes for both countries that were aimed at mobilising international resources for multi-sector emergency interventions.

On 30 July 2008, the SC abruptly terminated the mandate of UNMEE, with effect from the following day. This decision came in response to harsh conditions and restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE, which included the cutting off of fuel supplies. These
constraints had made it impossible for the operation to continue carrying out its mandated
tasks, and set the safety and security of UN personnel at risk. Leaving a departing
diplomatic message via Resolution 1827, the UN called on the two Horn of Africa
countries ‘to show maximum restraint and refrain from any threat or use of force against
each other and to avoid provocative military activities’. At present it appears that this
request is not being heeded.

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
from July 2004

The SC, through Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, decided to send a UN mission
(UNMIS) to Sudan. The main objective was, and remains, to support the implementation
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the government of Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005. The mission
was also mandated to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance and
the protection and promotion of human rights. Although the protection of civilians is
the responsibility of the sovereign government of Sudan, the UNMIS military has been
authorised to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence as far as the
capability of the force allows. The mission also provides assistance to the disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration process, and supports the activities of other UN
programmes. For example, according to its mission statement, ‘UNMIS police shall
significantly facilitate the transformation of Sudan police into a professional, efficient,
community oriented police service capable of ensuring safety and security of the common
citizen of Sudan.’

Since January 2006, India has provided military personnel as well as civilian police
officials to this mission. The initial military contingent consisted of an infantry battalion,
and also the famous Gorkha Rifles regiment. Its veterinary contingent made a significant
contribution, in collaboration with the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, by
initiating a campaign to eradicate a debilitating fever that was threatening to wipe out
Sudan’s indigenous cattle. Yet again, the engineers carried out road rehabilitation and
maintenance. India’s Brigadier Moinuddin has also taken a turn at the deputy force
commander position, and Rajesh Dewan is the UNMIS police commissioner. From
February 2010, the mission was to be headed by an Indian army officer, Major General
JS Lidder.

Police monitors and election observers for United Nations International
Police Task Forces

As already noted, recent PKOs have tended to be multidimensional, and to include police
monitors and election observers. India has contributed police personnel and election
observers to the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola;
provided 123 police personnel to the UN mission in Haiti (Phase II); and police observers
for the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL) and Western Sahara (MINURSO).
FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM PEACEKEEPING FUNCTIONS: APPLICATION OF INDIAN EXPERTISE IN AFRICA

As an adjunct to peacekeeping, India, like many other participating countries, has gained invaluable experience in related fields. Often, such countries choose to specialise in certain functional arenas, and become well-established as experts. There are two of these related fields in which India has become an acknowledged leader.

Demining, removal of anti-personnel mines, disposal of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices

India has considerable experience in demining activities, and has made significant contributions to the work in this field in various missions, notably those in Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola and Cambodia, where it generated mine awareness, trained local communities to clear mines, and initiated rehabilitation programmes for amputees. Experienced Indian Army engineers have been employed to train selected personnel from the host countries to carry out mine clearance programmes, and also to generate awareness of the problem among the local people. The Indian Army has also undertaken mine clearance projects in support of the repatriation and rehabilitation programmes undertaken by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.56

Establishment of the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK)

The Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), which conducts training for military personnel, was set up by India in 2000. Situated near New Delhi, CUNPK aims to transfer the skills learned from India’s experiences during its extensive peacekeeping activities to the peacekeepers of the future. Many of the lessons learned have come at the cost of peacekeepers’ lives, and therefore the training provided seeks to remedy failures of foresight. Special emphasis is placed on respect for human rights, as well as the need to factor local customs and community traditions into peacekeeping. The Centre is also supportive of India’s commitment to assign more women to peace missions, something that the UN has consistently called on its member states to do. Participants from Africa comprise an important element of CUNPK’s trainees; 18 of the continent’s states have sent personnel there for training as peacekeepers. This interaction has added another dimension to relations between India and Africa.

PEACEKEEPING: QUO VADIS INDIA?

Having had extensive experience of peace operations for more than half a century, and not only in Africa, India can have little doubt that its commitment to peace is internationally recognised. However, most of the world’s countries are re-evaluating both their regional and international roles in the context of the security structures and peace-preserving regimes in the era that has followed the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on the US of 9/11. At this juncture, as the world recalls the significance and symbolism of the fall of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago, India’s ambitions have undergone important paradigm shifts.
What path is India likely to seek that will create an equilibrium between that country's national interests and the founding principles of solidarity with other countries that suffered colonial occupation that it embraced on independence?

India has given assistance to the UN's peacekeeping efforts throughout the world, and made substantive contributions in Africa's zones of insecurity over a long period. But it has been pointed out that India's peacekeeping role appears paradoxical, in that at regional level it maintains an intransigent and belligerent position with respect to the disputed territory of Kashmir, and that the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan has maintained a small presence in the area since 1948. In addition, India's defiantly independent stance in respect of maintaining nuclear weapons status has tended to compromise its claim to a seat at the international high table.

Prior to 1989, participation in UN PKOs represented a significant means by which India could earn credit in the developing world by demonstrating its commitment to furthering non-alignment, by joining the crusade against what were perceived as the vestiges of colonialism, and pursuing its commitment to the ideals of the UN. The Indian objective, which was to promote a solidarity founded on altruism, was a product of the bipolar, post-colonial world order. India's aspirations then appear to have been supplanted by a yearning for global recognition; a wish to have India recognised as a significant power on the world stage. While India's continued participation in twenty-first century UN peacekeeping is not motivated solely by its global ambitions, it is worth noting that there are considerable rewards associated with peacekeeping, particularly with respect to the enactment of its foreign policy.

However, there are signs that the 'peacekeeping dividend' has not earned India the benefits it most desires, especially in terms of its ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC. Having served as a non-permanent member six times appears to have whetted India's appetite for grand affairs of state. Its former Minister of External Affairs, Jyotindra Nath Dixit suggested that ‘by being active in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf conflict international situation [India] could consolidate and improve [its] claim to a permanent membership of the Security Council’. Yet this same line of reasoning has led to increasing competition from at least two other states who use the same doctrine to justify their global aspirations — namely Japan and Germany.

One may deduce that India's continued participation in UN peacekeeping will no longer be an automatic reflex, especially as concerns commitments to Africa's quasi-permanent peacekeeping requirements. India's posture in the years to come is 'likely to be tempered by a more cost-effective approach on a case-by-case basis in the light of the operational difficulties of post-Cold War missions'. In addition, a number of other factors, such as regional dynamics, the war against terrorism and balance of power considerations in South-East Asia, will impact on her commitment to future peacekeeping missions. Therefore it seems likely that decisions with respect to future commitments to peacekeeping in Africa will see India seek an equilibrium between historical, solidarist and altruistic factors on one hand, and assertive, dividend-seeking foreign policy elements on the other — with a bias in favour of the latter.
ENDNOTES

3 Ibid., p. xvii.
5 Ibid., p. 199.
6 Ibid.
11 In the armies of the Commonwealth nations, infantry battalions are tactical units within regiments. The typical battalion is a unit of 800–900 soldiers, divided into a headquarters company and three rifle companies; two to five battalions form the combat elements of a tactical brigade.
16 In November 1961 the UNSC moved to prevent hostile activities by Katangese troops in the Congo. This caused Tshombe, the Katanga secessionist leader, to step up attacks on UN troops. On 5 December 1961, an Indian UN company, supported by 3-inch mortars, attacked a Katangese roadblock between the Katangese headquarters and the Elisabethville airfield. A Gurkha platoon attempted to link up with the company and reinforce the roadblock, but ran into opposition near the old airfield. The platoon attack on the rebel position, which was manned by about 90 Katangese troops, was led by Indian Captain Salaria. Despite having only 16 soldiers and being outgunned, Captain Salaria and his Gurkha soldiers fought with a ferocity that overwhelmed the enemy, who fled. In this engagement, Captain Salaria was shot in the neck, but continued to fight until he succumbed to his injuries. Due to his selfless act of courage, the UN Headquarters in Elisabethville was saved from encirclement. Rakshak B, undated, ‘Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria’, http://www.bharat.rakshak.com/heroism/salaria.html, retrieved 13 May 2009. Also see Shorey A, April 2004, ‘Captain Courage’, http://www-bharat-rakshakcom/army/history/1950s/Courage.html, retrieved 13 May 2009.
18 ‘Preparing the ground for independence’, UN Chronicle, 26, 2, June 1989, p. 10.
22 Whittaker DJ, op. cit., p. 212.
23 Whittaker DJ, op. cit., p. 211.
30 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is entitled ‘Action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’. It contains Articles 39 to 51, which describe the conditions under which peace enforcement can and should be planned and executed.
31 Ibid.
32 Bullion AJ, op. cit., p. 204.
38 Ibid., p. 106.
40 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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