RHODESIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

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It should be noted that, as the Institute is precluded by its Constitution from itself expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs, opinions expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.
I am not a constitutional lawyer, but I have all my life been a lawyer and naturally I take an interest in constitutional matters. The main purpose of a constitutional lawyer is to put into words the results of a settlement that has been reached by politicians representing different interests. But there is another purpose that a constitutional lawyer can serve: he can think ahead and he can put into words what he thinks the results of a possible future constitutional settlement might look like, so that those who are engaged in attempting to reach that settlement can look at the possible results of that settlement in black and white.

This is what I attempted to do in January 1975, when I was approached by certain African nationalist leaders whom I have known for some time and asked if I would set out - not in the form of a draft constitution, but in simple language - as accurately as possible what an exact fifty-fifty settlement between the ruling Rhodesian Front and the African National Council (representing African nationalist interests) would look like. This was rather a tall order, but I sat down and produced my "Plan for the Sharing of Power in Rhodesia" as I entitled it. I presented it to the African nationalist leaders who had consulted me and I also - with their consent, of course - gave a copy to the Prime Minister's advisers. I had a suspicion - perhaps an unworthy one - that one reason, at least, why they had consulted me was because they were about to embark on constitutional talks with the Rhodesian government in January 1975 and they had absolutely no idea what they were going to ask for. I may do them a great injustice but this was the impression that I received at the time.

Of course, I made it clear when handing over my draft to them that I was not suggesting that this is what they should ask for, because one never asks - any lawyer knows this - for a fifty-fifty settlement to start with; one always asks for everything, the other side asks for everything and after a decent interval of haggling you arrive somewhere near a fifty-fifty settlement. This is what we all hoped might happen, but things turned out otherwise. It will be remembered that the African National Council at that time - united on paper, but rather tenuously united - arranged to meet Mr. Smith and some of his colleagues in railway coaches supplied by the South African Railways and Harbours, poised over the thundering waters of the Zambezi, just below the Victoria Falls. They met, they talked and they parted and the whole scheme fell apart. There were no further discussions - we need not rehearse now why that happened; it is past history.

Then the African National Council split once again into what the newspapers referred to as the Sithole faction and the Nkomo faction. Both these gentlemen were very incensed by being called faction leaders; it does not matter what one calls them, they were two different branches of the previously tenuously united African National Council. The Nkomo branch then instituted its own talks with the Rhodesian government and these carried on for some time and then broke down; again it is not necessary to rehearse, after this lapse of time, just why that happened. The talks broke down and the general feeling in Rhodesia - I think I could speak on this occasion on behalf of pretty nearly all Rhodesians - was one of absolute flatness. Considerable hopes had been built on these constitutional talks and when it became clear that they were irrevocably finished there was a vacuum; nobody made any very constructive remarks except "what a pity" and "what happens next?" And I decided then that it might be helpful if I pub-
lished the suggestion for an exact fifty-fifty agreement that I had handed in confidence to both sides something over a year before.

In outline, my suggestion for what a fifty-fifty settlement would look like was along these lines: that we should appreciate that to experiment with an entirely untried constitutional scheme would be unlikely to succeed. When I say entirely untried, I mean entirely untried by us Rhodesians who are amateurs in the game of life; amateurs perhaps in both senses of the word - we enjoy life. Therefore I recommended that we should not try and copy the United States Constitution or the Swiss Constitution, but we should keep as close as possible to what we normally refer to as the Westminster type of constitution - a House of Parliament, a Cabinet and all the trappings that we have inherited from our English ancestors. But we should recognise that with this type of constitution it is very, very difficult indeed to achieve an exact fifty-fifty sharing of power, because the whole basis of British constitutional thinking is that the political party that has 51 percent of the seats in Parliament wields 100 percent of the power and the party that has 49 percent of the seats in Parliament wields zero percent of the power. This, incidentally, has spilled over from English constitutional law into English company law and there is many a businessman who has found to his surprise that the ownership of 49 percent of the shares in a private company gives him a nil return, unless he keeps on very good terms with his associates who own that extra 2 percent which gives them full control.

Therefore, if we are going to stick to the Westminster type of constitution, we have to think how - within the framework of such a constitution - one can achieve a sharing of power so that one can truly say that the government is by the consent of both competing groups - which in Rhodesia happen to be racial groups. The only way that this has ever been done under a Westminster type constitution is by a coalition. One can look back over English history and one can find a number of coalitions which have come into existence when neither party has been in a strong enough position to command a majority in the House and therefore to appoint the whole Cabinet; and so, by agreement, a composite Cabinet is made up, resulting in a coalition or a power-sharing between two competing parties.

My recommendation was that we should impose a compulsory coalition between the party commanding the majority of European votes, the Rhodesian Front, and the party that then commanded the majority of African votes (or obviously would have commanded the majority of African votes if it had been put to the test), the then ANC as it was in its united form. In order to make this coalition work on an exact fifty-fifty basis, I recommended that we should abandon our previous ideas, which had been much bandied around ever since the Whaley Commission reported in 1968 - our previous ideas of working up to parity in the House of Assembly. This was the recommendation that came out of the Constitutional Commission report in 1968: we start with the European majority in the House; after a term of years - be it 10, 50, 100 years - we have an equal number of African representatives. My comment on this was that once you have an equal representation of each race in the same House, then there is going to be some hard bargaining. You only have to bribe one member of the opposition and you have the magical 51 percent. So I rejected and I still reject that idea as impractical and my suggestion was - and still is - that if one wants to achieve parity one should go back into the history of England, Rome and a number of other countries that have been faced with this basic problem of representation of the haves and the have-nots, and we should have a predominantly European Senate and a predominantly African House of
Assembly, and they should each be responsible for the choice of half the coalition Cabinet.

This means it does not matter which party rules in the other House; there is no advantage in bribing one member of the Opposition because each House is responsible for the appointment of half the Cabinet. Whatever happens within that House, the majority party in that particular House has the choice of half the Cabinet. This means that you have a built-in deadlock in the Cabinet. And so to break the deadlock, my suggestion was that we should again go back into English constitutional history and we should resuscitate the residual power which in England still, in legal theory, resides in the Queen, to rule the country if her Parliament cannot do it. That we should expressly vest that power in our President (or call him a Governor-General if the British like to come in on the scheme, it does not matter), so that when there is a deadlock and you cannot get legislation through by agreement in this coalition Cabinet, and by a majority vote in both your Houses - one basically White and the other basically Black - then the problem should be laid on the desk of your President. He will have the debates in both Houses to refer to; he will have his own Cabinet to advise him; he will have any of his own constitutional advisers he wishes to consult and he will then decide whether to pass the Bill, throw it out or pass it in an amended form. And that means that even if there is complete deadlock on every piece of legislation, at least legislation can be passed by a method that would be very much more democratic (despite the intervention of the President), than the method of legislation that operates today in the majority of countries in the world.

There are all sorts of details of the scheme which I would not bore you with. I recommended that the upper House should not be purely White - on a White voters' roll - and the lower House should not be purely Black - on a Black voters' roll - but that there should be a higher roll and a lower roll, so that Africans achieving the higher roll qualification would have a vote for members of the upper House, and Europeans being unable to rise to the heights of the voters' roll for the upper House would have a vote for membership of the lower House. You might therefore get a few Black faces in the upper House, a few White faces in the lower House and eventually one would hope to achieve majority rule by the appearance of more and more and more Black faces in the upper House; but by that time they would be welcome to it because they would have earned their places in the upper House. This is my plan and it is still there on the table.

It would not be on the table if things had not turned out the way they have. I therefore want to review some recent events, shortly, in order to show why I consider that any scheme - not necessarily mine, there may be many better - that operates in the area of a fifty-fifty settlement must be taken seriously. The recent events that I wish to review can be divided into those concerned with defence, economics and pure politics - and I would like to deal with these three separately.

First the defence situation. Be clear that I am not an authority on military matters. My not very exalted position in the armed forces of Rhodesia is that I hold a commission at the very lowest level. I salute almost everything that moves; but I do get around the country and I can speak to some extent from personal experience. And I think pretty nearly everyone who wears a uniform in Rhodesia would agree with me that the solution to the present war can never be a purely military one. I think
most Rhodesian servicemen - whether full-time, or part-time (like myself) - would agree with a proposition something along these lines: that all that can be done militarily is the building of a platform from which the politicians can operate. I think it is also a proposition that would receive general acceptance in military circles in Rhodesia, that the war in its present form can be continued for an indefinite period; we do not face military defeat. And short of a massive intervention by some power entirely outside the present conflict, it is difficult to visualise how we can be militarily defeated, but it is almost equally difficult to see how, militarily, we can win.

What is the nature of this conflict in which we have been engaged now, in fact, for something like eleven years, although little publicity was given to the early encounters? The people we are fighting are terrorists - and I call them terrorists rather than freedom fighters, or guerrillas, or insurgents, because they consciously and intentionally use terror as a weapon. When I say terror, I mean that psychological state of fear which they induce in our African population in order to further their own military success. In my travels around the country, I have seen and spoken to numbers of Africans - of both sexes and of varying ages - who have been so terrorised that they will bear the physical and mental scars for the remainder of their tragically shortened lives. I fly an ambulance, amongst other things, and I have had people die in my ambulance, in the air, as a result of what has been done to them. When I say people, I mean children, women, old men - and this has been done not just in the casual way in which one shoots people, but it is being done with deliberate and devilish ingenuity, so as to cause the maximum psychological effect on the people to whom it is done, the witnesses and those who hear about it later. That is why I call our enemies terrorists. It is a true description and I tend to be a stickler for accuracy in the use of the English language.

What are these terrorists achieving? You may sometimes have seen maps in the newspapers with large arrows pointing towards certain spots in Rhodesia. This is a shorthand way of showing that there has been a terrorist incident at the place to which the arrow points. But do not misunderstand these arrows on the maps - terrorists do not and never have controlled any territory in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian government has not given up one square mile of territory; it has no intention of doing so. The terrorists operating within the country come into the country now almost exclusively from Mozambique - previously also from Zambia - and the moment they cross the border they become fugitives. I have spoken to some of them, some of the prisoners we have taken, and they described their lives as being the lives of hunted animals from the moment they cross the border. They do not walk into an area which is under their control; they live in caves or in riverbeds; they spend an occasional night at a kraal and then move on to another one, frequently after cruelly torturing or killing one or more members of the kraal, to discourage them from reporting to the security forces; they are on the run from the moment they enter until the moment they either make good their escape or are killed or captured.

How many of them are there? Current estimates are that within the borders of Rhodesia there are between 1 000 and 1 300: something like 600 in the north-east around Mount Darwin and Mtoko where it has been going on for some time; something like 400 up and down the eastern border from Inyanga to Umtali down towards Chipinga - they tend to come and go very quickly over the Mozambique border - and something like 200 in the Lowveld
on the Transvaal border, trying to destroy our rail and road links with South Africa. Those are the approximate numbers. They operate in groups of eight to 12; they come over the border, often in large groups (and groups often amalgamate), but each group operates as a communist cell, an inward-looking cell, concerned only with its own part in the war and not knowing anything about what the others are doing, not having any interest.

This has two effects. First, it makes them difficult to catch because they do not cross in large battalions and pitch camps and advertise their presence; small groups like that are as difficult to find as a needle in a haystack. When you fly over the country as I do, you realise how much of it there is and how few people in it: 1,000 to 1,300 people, standing behind a tree or sheltering behind a rock, just cannot be seen.

Second, if one is fortunate enough to make contact with a group and destroy it, the other groups never know, so the psychological effect on them is nil. We advertise we have killed 30, 35, 40, 50 terrorists in the last week or so (which we have, because our figures are genuine - and there is no question of inflating the figures, because all the people in the Services are in the know; so you cannot claim you have killed somebody unless you have actually got the body lying there in front of you). That encourages us, but it in no way discourages them, because they do not listen to the radio; they do not buy the newspaper; they do not know that the cell next door has been blotted out - so their morale is not bad. The worst injury that we can cause to their morale tends to be when we exercise our undoubted right of hot pursuit over the Mozambique border, and we chase them back to a base camp and eradicate them and others in the base camp, because that produces evidence that they can all see - and that we do periodically.

What about the threatened opening of a new front on the Zambian border? One might feel, when looking at the map, that we are already operating in three areas: the north-east, the east and south-east; and if we are going to have to operate all along the north-western border, we cannot cope. Well, again, as a very lowly performer in the anti-terrorist operations, I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying we can cope. We have the organisation; we have the manpower; we have the equipment to do the same job on that side of the country as we are already doing from the north-east to the south-east. It means we will be spread a bit more thinly and so we will miss more opportunities - as it is, we catch one, miss one; we do not succeed every time by any means; we have our methods, sometimes they are successful, sometimes they are not. If we have to operate on a larger front, we will probably kill more terrorists but they will probably chalk up more successes.

What are our methods of dealing with terrorism? Here, I am afraid, I cannot go into details. I know certain things, I do not know other things. I am not at liberty to say anything specific, but what I can say is that as a sort of outsider coming fairly fresh to the business of anti-terrorist warfare, I am very impressed with some of the methods that we have evolved. We have a lot of skill and a lot of experience, and we are always evolving new methods. We work on the basis that all our security forces contribute their own specialist skills. Almost every unit that we have is a specialist unit dealing with the particular type of warfare with which we are faced. That applies to our Army, it applies to our Air Force and it applies perhaps more specifically to our Police Force. We have always in Rhodesia - everyone who has ever been in Rhode-
sia will know - been very proud of our police force which is in time co-
existent with the history of our country; the Pioneer Column that went up
to Salisbury in 1890 was largely made up of the Police which still bear
the honoured title, the British South Africa Police. African policemen
outnumber European policemen, and their loyalty and skill are second to
none.

That brings me to the question of manpower. The last point I want to
refer to on the general question of defence. We face manpower problems
when we are considering the purely military conduct of affairs in Rhodesia.
We have recently introduced a very comprehensive call-up of Whites. The
general effect of this is that young Whites are now in one of the uniform-
ed services for an indefinite period. They are removed from the univer-
sity, from their jobs or whatever it may be; they are taken out of produc-
tive work and they are put into uniform. Older men, such as myself, spend
varying amounts of time according to what unit we belong to. This, of
course, creates the difficulty that the economic life of the country must
be disrupted (I will deal in a moment with the economic problems that face
us). That is the first difficulty that we face as a result of the presen-
tce of large numbers of Whites in our armed forces.

The second difficulty that faces us, and which becomes a political
difficulty, is that these young Rhodesians vary in their attitude to mili-
tary service. I think it would be true to say that the overwhelming ma-
jority of them are happy and proud to do their bit in defence of the
country, but I think it will also be true to say that the overwhelming
majority of them ask the question, sometimes pointedly, sometimes less
pointedly: What is it that we are trying to achieve? We know we are
fighting communism; we know what we are fighting against, but what are we
fighting for? If I have heard this question asked by a young serviceman
once, I have heard it asked a hundred times. And that question has to be
answered.

Then, let us consider the political difficulties that face us as a
result of the employment of large numbers of Africans in the armed forces.
I do not know the figures - if I did know them, I suppose I would not be
authorised to release them anyway - but there is no doubt that we have
more Africans fighting for us than Whites; I do not know how many more,
whether it is one and a half times as many or twice as many. I know in
the Police it is about three and a half times as many; in the Army I
think it is about twice as many; in the Air Force it is rather the other
way around; but what the overall figure is, I do not know, except that
it can certainly be said that there are more Black faces in Rhodesian uni-
forms than White faces. Now, one thing that one cannot expect an African
in uniform to do is to give his life in order to preserve a White paradise.
Many Africans, like many other people, do their duty unthinkingly, but you
cannot expect them all to go on doing it unthinkingly without asking that
same question that the young Whites in uniform ask: What are we trying to
achieve?

In World War II, before Churchill came to power in 1940, he set up a
committee to draw up a statement of war aims, because he calculated that
it would be impossible to conduct the war successfully without giving the
British a clear goal at which they were aiming - what is post-war Britain
going to be like? Well, that committee never produced a report, or if it
did produce one it was never published, because Churchill surprised him-
self and everybody else by uniting the country by the mere power of his
oratory and leadership, and so nobody cared what they were fighting for.
They were fighting for "Good Old Winnie". I do not think Ian Smith even hopes that he can do the same; it would be foolish of him if he did. We have not yet had a clear statement of war aims and it is essential for both the young Whites who are fighting - and some of the older ones too - who, if they are not convinced that they are fighting for something worthwhile, are not going to stay in the country; and equally important for the Africans who, if not convinced that they are fighting for is worthwhile, cannot be expected to continue to fight.

Do not get the impression that we are on the brink of disaster. One tries to see these things ahead of time, and I am by no means alone in having seen the necessity for a statement of war aims and a clear picture of the Rhodesia that we hope will emerge from the sacrifices that are being made. I can balance this uncertainty about the future by saying, from my own personal experience, that one of the real advantages that we have gained as a country - from having to fight - is the almost unbelievable comradeship that has developed between Black and White servicemen. There are units which are entirely Black or entirely White and there are people in those units who were the cause of unfortunate incidents. But you can balance incidents like that with dozens of incidents where quite unconsciously they have displayed a comradeship that, to my observation, did not exist in Rhodesia previously.

Now on to the economic scene. I am not an economist and so what I will say on the economics of the country will be, at the best, superficial. But some of it is so important and so obvious that even an ignorant lawyer like myself can see it.

Firstly, we are assured by Ministers that we can pay for the war in the sense that the troops in the field are not suddenly going to find on pay-day that they are told they cannot be paid - the cash is there for the manpower and the hardware that we are expending. This one can believe, because our financial wizards are remarkably clever in finding cash from somewhere and especially in a closed and carefully controlled economy like ours, it is by no means impossible. So I personally have no hesitation in accepting the assurance that I have received from Ministers and others that we can sustain the present level of defence expenditure, or even an increased level, indefinitely.

But that is only part of the picture: there is more to it than that. It is not only the troops' pay and the fact that the rations and ammunition are being paid for; and the fuel also seems to be paid for somehow. The fact is that the machinery of the country in mechanical terms, and in human terms, is being put to considerable strain. In any usually energetic and buoyant country operating in peace-time conditions - as we used to be in Rhodesia - there is a lot of slack; there is a lot of reserve in both your capital equipment and your human resources. So any reasonably efficient, buoyant country can enter upon a war and can sustain it for a long time. But - as Britain found during the last war, and as we are finding in Rhodesia - the machinery shows signs of wear. When I refer to the machinery, I mean not only the lathes in the machine shop need replacing and we cannot get them because we do not have the foreign exchange, but the man who minds the lathe is not properly trained because the person who should be doing it is out in the bush. We are therefore straining our manpower and so all the various jobs that people of different ages, and sexes, and races have to do, are not being done, by and large, as efficiently as they should be. The mistakes thus begin to accumulate and the whole economy begins to show signs of strain. So al-
though we can sustain indefinitely, we will be injuring ourselves, progressively, by doing so.

To reduce this strain on our mechanical equipment and on our human resources we must clearly spread the burden of military service as widely as possible. Instead of keeping youngsters in uniform for 45 days and then out for 10 days, we must use the individual a bit less; we must give him more time, or at least some time, to get on with the job - whether it is minding the lathes or attending the university. He has things to do other than fighting a war and he wants to get on with them and it is in the national interest that he should get on with them. So we want to be in a position to ease the burden on Whites, because if we do not we will be losing them steadily all the time. In such an event we will have to work those few harder and harder and it will be a vicious circle. So, if you do not leave the burden squarely on the shoulders of Whites, on whom do you put the burden? You spread it to Africans, and statements by Ministers have been made recently indicating that it would be desirable that all African school leavers should be required to perform some form of national service. Our Government thus recognises this necessity to spread the burden of the call-up to the Africans. But that takes us at once from the sphere of economics to the sphere of pure politics, because if you are going to call up Africans and make them perform some form of national service - whether in uniform or not, it does not matter - you are not going to get very good results unless, in the sort of jargon that I do not like using, they are motivated. If we cannot expect Africans serving in the regular uniformed forces to go on fighting indefinitely to maintain a White paradise in Rhodesia, we certainly cannot expect Africans whose sympathies might well lie on the other side, to do anything very effective. So, this brings us to pure politics.

How do we produce a statement of war aims and peace aims that will motivate our White and our African population and produce the result which many of us in Rhodesia believe to be the objective truth (but not yet widely accepted), namely that this is not a war of Black against White, but a war of Black and White Rhodesians against Communism? How do we convince the overwhelming majority of Black and White Rhodesians that we are fighting for national survival, for a nation that will be worth preserving?

Let us go back shortly over the history of pure politics in Rhodesia in recent years. It has been obvious for a long time that some accommodation between White and Black politicians is necessary. It may be recollected that in 1971 Mr. Smith reached an agreement with Sir Alec Douglas-Home. This was put to the test of acceptance by the majority of the people in Rhodesia - the test being applied by a commission under Lord Pearce. The Pearce Commission Report was thumbs down. Then in 1973 Mr. Smith reached an agreement on generally similar terms with Bishop Muzorewa, who was then the titular head of the united ANC. This, incidentally, is always a dangerous thing to do in African politics, because African leadership generally tends to come from below rather than above; that is to say, the traditional African leader expresses the wishes of his followers rather than imposing his own personal wishes upon his followers. So the fact that an agreement was reached with Muzorewa, not unpredictably led to a rejection of that agreement by his followers. Then followed the abortive attempts to reach a settlement on the Victoria Falls bridge, and afterwards with Joshua Nkomo and his branch of the ANC.

My own contribution to the vacuum was to put forward - for what they
were worth - proposals for what a fifty-fifty settlement would look like, if anybody managed to reach it. But of course, greater minds than mine were at work and the Rhodesian government, after the breakdown of the constitutional talks with Joshua Nkomo, started upon what Mr. Smith christened his "new initiative".

This new initiative broadly has two prongs to it. First, after the breakdown of the constitutional talks, the Government appointed the Quénéet Commission to look into racial discrimination and make recommendations for the ending of discrimination where it was proper to do so. It had been one branch of the Smith/Home Agreement in 1971 that such a commission should be appointed and should report as soon as possible. The appointment was delayed while the talks with Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo were in train, because quite obviously these African leaders wanted to be able to claim - if there was a settlement - that they had forced Mr. Smith into appointing the commission and they were responsible for the ending of racial discrimination. Mr Smith went along with this request because he had to give them as many selling points as he possible could for any settlement that they would reach. So he held his hand while the talks were on, but when the talks irrevocably broke down he appointed the commission as a unilateral act of the Government.

The commission reported and its recommendations were published. The report broadly recommends that most of what the Rhodesian Front government has done in the way of racially discriminatory legislation since it came to power in 1962 should be dismantled. Mr. Smith, in a broadcast heralding the publication of the report, said that he and his Cabinet have read the report; they found it a sound and well-balanced report and he had no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the recommendations would be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Rhodesians. In fact, he has committed his Government to acting on the majority, if not the overwhelming majority, of the recommendations of this report. This is perhaps one of the most significant political statements that has been made in Rhodesia since UDI in 1965.

The other prong, or branch, of the new initiative that the Government embarked upon after the breakdown of the constitutional talks, was the bringing of Africans into the Government. This resulted in the creation of 10 new ministerial posts: four posts for Ministers who will be members of the Cabinet, and six posts for Deputy Ministers - all of whom would be Africans. The four Cabinet posts were filled by chiefs; three of the six Deputy Ministerial posts were filled by African members of Parliament who are not, and never have been, members of the Rhodesian Front, and who have been critical of the ruling party ever since they have been in Parliament. The other three planned posts for Deputy Ministers remain vacant and Mr. Smith has explained that he is holding them in order to see whether other Africans of calibre will get off the fence and be prepared to take their part in governing the country in this "new coalition, which is a true sharing of power". I do not claim any copyright to these two phrases - coalition and sharing of power - but it is significant that on more than one occasion Mr. Smith and other Ministers have stressed that this idea of bringing Africans into the Cabinet is a coalition and that it is a true sharing of power.

The critics will say - and have said of course - that the chiefs are on the Government side anyway, and so it is not a coalition if you merely bring some of your own supporters of a different colour into the Cabinet. They also say that it is not a sharing of power because these people are
appointed by the Government and can be dismissed by the Government. That
criticism has some weight, but it is not quite correct. Think of the
position that Mr. Smith would be in if he did dismiss any of these people
he had appointed. He will be cutting the ground from under his own feet.
He has put them in his Cabinet - he has to leave them there; and the
more nuisance they make of themselves in his Cabinet, the more they will
justify his decision to put them there. If they start making a nuisance
of themselves and he sacks them, his whole case that this is a coalition
and a sharing of power, falls about his ears. So, he has committed his
Government to something on which, to my mind, it cannot go back.

It is also worth noting the point which has been said, sotto voce
by more than one person on the Government side, that not all members of
the ruling party are of one mind in some of these matters, and it is not
easy to persuade some of the more right-wing members of the Rhodesian
Front to accept the appearance of Black faces in the Cabinet. But if
these Black faces are the faces of chiefs who are well-known to them as
decent, old-fashioned and reliable personalities, then this is the foot
in the door; once they accept them, then the chiefs - if necessary - can
in future be replaced by people with different talents and different
abilities. And this may well happen.

So the position that we are in at present is that the Rhodesian Front
is committed to implementing most, possibly even all, of the Quéné Report.
It is therefore committed to getting rid of some of the foundations of its
own political philosophy up to now. It will be broadly true to say that
the Rhodesian Front has always been committed to the maintenance of stan-
dards; of Western civilisations; of the European way of life - no
forced integration between the races, and so on. It is in accordance with
these fundamental policies that various items of discriminatory legisla-
tion have been passed, such as the Land Tenure Act which divides the
country much more severely than it has been divided in the past into a
White area and an African area. These bits of legislation have been pas-
sed over the last ten years or so in accordance with this political philo-
sophy. The Quéné Report has condemned the Land Tenure Act, not root and
branch, but to such an extent that what would remain of it - if the Quéné
Report recommendations are put into effect - would be a very, very pale
shadow. There would be continued segregation in residential areas, but no
segregation at all in business areas; no segregation at all in farming
areas, but continuance of the Tribal Trust Lands for the tribal Africans.
This is a far cry from the basic Rhodesian Front policy, which gave birth
to the Land Tenure Act simultaneously with the Rhodesian Front's 1969 Con-
stitution.

The other way in which the Rhodesian Front now seems to me committed
is to the maintenance of Africans in the Cabinet. At present their duties
are confined to African interests. There are three posts vacant and it is
generally regarded in Rhodesia as correct to assume that these three
posts are being kept open in the hope that three leading African national-
ists will accept appointment. This is generally thought to be the ambition
of the present Government: to get some of its old opponents into the
Cabinet - at least into its Deputy Ministerial posts - so that there can
be a real coalition. They will be in a position to find out from these
people - who will now be their colleagues - what it is that Africans really
want in political matters.

If I were an African nationalist politician, I would take the oppor-
tunity and get into the Cabinet. I would wait until the full publicity
treatment had been given to my appointment and it had been made clear to the world that this was at last a settlement of long-standing disputes, and that this leading African politician was now working hand in hand with the previously entirely White Government. I would wait until the full impact of that had sunk in and I would then say to Mr. Smith: "I am not satisfied with my present job; I want full membership of the Cabinet, and I want the portfolio of Education," or the portfolio of Internal Affairs, or whatever it is that I want. Mr. Smith would find it very difficult to handle that situation. If he sacked me, his whole publicity build-up would react most adversely against him - both within and without the country. If he did not sack me, he would have me there in the Parliament, in the caucus and in the Cabinet viciously criticising his every move.

Because the Government has got itself into this position - not unintentionally - then it seems to me that we must look ahead to the time when African politicians demand a good deal more than just the crumbs of three posts as Deputy Ministers responsible for contour ridging in the Seki Reserve and the drains in Highfield Township. We must look forward to the time when they, from within the Government, present a demand for more and more real power. Mr. Smith has said, and I think he can be believed on this, that he will never give way to majority rule in the sense that it is White rule today and Black rule tomorrow, i.e. he will never give way, on the old Westminster pattern, to the handing over of 51 percent of the votes and therefore all the power to African nationalists. And I think African nationalists accept that he will never give way that far. But I have no doubt that if they do decide that they have all been rejected by the Communists who are fighting the guerrilla war, their only future lies in legitimate politics; and if their future - as they see it - lies in legitimate politics, they can be expected to come into the Cabinet and push Mr. Smith as far as they can push him. And the furthest they can push him is to an exact fifty-fifty settlement.