THE CONSERVATIVE VICTORY AND ITS PROBABLE EFFECT ON BRITISH AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

Seamus Cleary
Mr Seamus Cleary is a Research Assistant at the South African Institute of Race Relations, in Johannesburg. Previously he taught political science at the Universities of Rhodes, Cape Town and Natal.

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The South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
P.O. Box 31596
2017 BRAAMFONTEIN
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The recent fall of the Labour government in Britain and the resounding majority of the United States Senate vote in favour of sending observers to Zimbabwe in time for the recent April 20 elections, has resulted in a situation which calls for a re-evaluation of the future relationship between the white-controlled Southern African states\(^1\) and the United States and Britain.

There is a slight possibility, that the Conservative Government in Britain and the United States Administration will recognise the new black Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. This suggests a similar possibility that these countries, in addition to others in the West, will recognise a Namibian Government emerging from elections sponsored by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance-dominated Assembly in Namibia, from which elections SWAPO will be excluded; either by its own actions (i.e. SWAPO might, and probably will, refuse to take part in elections held without United Nations supervision); or by the Assembly (i.e. the Assembly might decide to exclude SWAPO from participation because of that organisation's insistence on the United Nations' plan for the Territory).

However, various factors argue against the bestowal of such recognition. Briefly, these may be summarised under the following headings:

(i) the attitude of the Front Line States,

(ii) the internal policies of the South African Government,

(iii) the internationally agreed illegal status of the Rhodesian regime and the international unacceptability of the Namibian legislative assembly,

(iv) the foreign policies of the United States\(^1\) and British Governments presently applied to the region and

(v) the position in which the United States finds itself in relation to the competition with the Soviet Union for power and influence in Africa, particularly in the sub-continent.

Some comments and observations of these factors follow:

On balance it will be argued that it is unlikely that any significant overt change of British and American policy will take place. Thus despite the expressed hopes of black nationalists who are parties to the internal settlement in Zimbabwe, it is unlikely that the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will receive international recognition, although the Carter Administration might come under intense Congressional pressure to lift sanctions in accordance with the legislation passed by Congress early this year. Any attempt to win United Nations agreement to the abandonment of sanctions is likely to fail due to African opposition and a Soviet veto. For this reason it is also unlikely that the 'internal' Namibian elections will result in the Territory's becoming

\(^1\) South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia
internationally acceptable. Nevertheless, the change of Government in Britain could lead to a clash of interests between British and American policy-makers although the upper level of Conservative Party policy-makers have been careful to keep themselves distanced from the dispute in Zimbabwe. This careful approach towards Zimbabwe has been repeated to a large extent with regard to Namibia, and it suggests that there will be little change in British Southern African policy, however sympathetic the new Conservative Government might be towards the three territories.

(i) The Attitude of the Front Line States

This is a factor of concern to British and United States policy-makers. No proposed settlement of the region's disputes can succeed without, at least, the acquiescence of the Front-Line Presidents. Three leaders, Neto of Angola, Machel of Mozambique, and Kuanda of Zambia; are of particular importance here since their countries border on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and SWA/Namibia, and they are actively assisting guerrillas operating against the present regimes in the two territories.

Any agreement which fails to win the endorsement of the Front-Line Presidents will, therefore, continue to be threatened by guerrilla groups, i.e. the Patriotic Front and SWAPO, operating from bases in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. While it is debatable whether these organisations will be able to overthrow the (new) Governments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and SWA/Namibia militarily, the uncertainty and dissatisfaction generated amongst the local population by the continuing guerrilla war will probably exacerbate political instability in the territories. Since the alleviation of existing unstable conditions in the sub-continent is one of the stated reasons for the British and American policies up to now, it appears unlikely that they will actively support solutions which are likely either to perpetuate such instability or even fuel it.

The importance of the Front-Line Presidents stems mainly from acceptance by the Organisation of African Unity of the desirability of the OAU's Southern African policy being formulated by those most concerned with events in the region, (i.e. the Front-Line Presidents). This arrangement came into being during South Africa's detente exercise in 1974-5 and has been continued since then. It has now become sufficiently entrenched to make a change of OAU policy in this regard highly unlikely. Any change in policy on the part of the United States and Britain towards the region which was perceived by the Front-Line Presidents as being more supportive of the white ruled sub-continent, would result in a greater loss of British and American influence with African states.

2 e.g. Conservative shadow Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, refused an invitation to observe the April 20 elections but suggested instead that a more junior foreign policy spokesman should go. The Conservative Party agreed to this. Star, 29/3/79

3 Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania.

4 A population has a right to expect that its rulers will protect it. If the rulers are unable to do this confidence in them will decrease and political instability may increase correspondingly. This occurred in Rhodesia between 1969 and 1973 in the north-eastern area of the country.
Since one of the basic aims of a state's foreign policy is to accrue influence with other states, it is unlikely that a policy having the opposite effect will be adopted. Two factors, however, will affect such a decision:

(i) the perceived importance of such influence and
(ii) the level and degree of the Second World's (primarily the Soviet Union's) influence in African states.

The latter point will be dealt with at a later stage.

Factors influencing the first point are, for example, the balance of trade, the supply of energy resources and strategic raw materials, and the perceived importance of the African states in the international competition with the Soviet Union. As the situation is perceived by British and American policy-makers at present, African states north of the Zambesi are of growing importance to the developed world. The balance of trade has shifted northwards from the white-ruled South, and the world-wide shortage of energy resources, particularly oil, has re-inforced this shift. Those states supplying oil to First World countries are now more influential with British and American policy-formulators than they were in the past.

The attitude of the Front-Line Presidents, however, is difficult to ascertain. On one level they appear to be staunch supporters of the Patriotic Front and SWAPO, as is illustrated by their frequent statements of support and their recent meeting to discuss SWAPO's stand on the Waldheim proposals for Namibia.

On the other hand, the Front-Line Presidents are facing increasing economic and political difficulties. While the internal challenge to Samora Machel's Government in Mozambique is not apparently serious as yet, its existence must be worrying to the Maputo Government. Similarly, the continued survival of Savimbi's Unita movement in Angola is probably a cause for concern in Luanda. Most concerned of all, is probably President Kaunda. Zambia's economic plight has been recently highlighted and has led to the re-opening of the rail link with South Africa via Rhodesia. The reported financial loss suffered by the Tan-Zam rail link, and the inefficiency in cargo handling at Dar-es-Salaam underline the economic difficulties facing the Zambian Government. In addition, reports of the dissatisfaction of white Zambian farmers with the presence of Patriotic Front guerillas on their farms and their reported attacks on white farmers, under the impression that

6 The visits of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, to Nigeria and Tanzania during 1977 as well as United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visits to Africa in 1977 indicate this.
7 The Front-Line Presidents supported SWAPO's position that external bases were not to be monitored and that SWAPO was to be allowed to establish bases in Namibia. South Africa and Rhodesia were condemned for incursions into Angola, Zambia and Mozambique and support for the Patriotic Front was re-affirmed.
the farmers were Rhodesian spies, threatens both the production of food in Zambia\(^{10}\) and the Zambian Government's ability to control the guerrillas\(^{11}\).

In these circumstances it is possible that the Front-Line Presidents, particularly Kaunda, may recognise the black majority Government in Zimbabwe, emerging from the recent April 20 elections, in order to improve the economic situation in their own countries, and to reduce the numbers of Rhodesian guerrillas based there, to more manageable proportions. (In this last connection it is interesting to note that during the recent Rhodesian raids into Zambia, the inhabitants of one of the camps - one of the first to be attacked - were unarmed. Although arms were available to the guerrillas, they were locked in the armory. This could have been due to Kaunda's reluctance to have large numbers of armed Rhodesian guerrillas roaming around Zambia).

On balance, however, it appears unlikely that the Front-Line Presidents will change their policy. It is possible after the recent elections, that if one of the leaders of the Patriotic Front (i.e. either Mugabe or Nkomo) accepts an invitation to return to the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to take part in the government of the country\(^{12}\), the Front-Line Presidents' attitude might change. That such a possibility exists is revealed by the assurances of Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau that such an invitation would be extended, and by Mugabe's recent assurance that should Muzorewa wish to join the Patriotic Front he would be welcomed like a "prodigal son".\(^{13}\)

(ii) South Africa's Internal Policies

As has been argued before the major aim of South African policy-makers is to maintain political power in white hands in South Africa\(^ {14}\). Given this aim and the disapproval with which it is viewed internationally, and more specifically by the British and American Governments, it is inevitable that South Africa's internal policies will affect the formulation of British and American policy towards the region.

Two factors make this the case:

(i) South Africa's apartheid policy is internationally reprehensible and Western states do not wish to be identified as being supportive of the South African Government to any greater degree than at present.

(ii) African states are totally opposed to the system of racial political stratification as it exists in South Africa, and Western nations do not wish to alienate African states unnecessarily or to attract increased international censure in organisations, such as the United Nations. On the contrary, they are probably desirous of lowering the level of existing censure.

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\(^{10}\) There have been reports that white Zambian farmers have threatened to leave their farms unless they are protected from guerilla attacks. Star, 18/3/79.

\(^{11}\) Reportedly earlier this year Rhodesian guerrillas in Zambia shot down a Zambian air-force plane which was circling over a guerilla camp and they fought a pitched battle with Zambian police.


\(^{13}\) Rand Daily Mail, 29/3/79.
For these reasons it appears unlikely that, in the existing international situation, Western nations, particularly the United States and Britain, will noticeably alter their present policies towards the white-controlled Southern African states. Present policies can be described in terms of the carrot and the stick. United States relations with South Africa have been described by US Deputy-Ambassador to the United Nations, Don McHenry, as consisting of dragging the South African Government, protesting vigorously, from one concession to the next. The threats in this process consist of the consequences of any refusal to grant more concessions, while the rewards come in different guises - e.g., continued protection for South Africa against economic sanctions in the United Nations and the continued availability of foreign credit.15

To a large extent the United States Administration is the major actor in the process of offering rewards and threatening punishments. This is mainly because it is the United States which has the economic muscle to carry out the rewards and the threats16, and not because there is any greater commitment to the policy in Washington than in London. Now that the Conservative Party has won the May 3 general election in Britain, the balance of commitment might swing towards Washington, but because of the closely linked British and American policy towards the region, it is unlikely that sentiment, (or more accurately the Conservative's traditionally more lenient approach to white Southern Africa), will bring about any actual change in British policy.

What, therefore, can be expected of Anglo-American policy towards the white-controlled states in Southern Africa in the near future? First, disinvestment is not likely to occur, although pressure on British and American firms operating in the region to adopt as non-racial and non-discriminatory an employment policy as is legally possible in the South African situation, will continue.17 Secondly, the British and American Governments will continue to encourage South Africa to move away from racial discrimination at an ever increasing pace.18 Thirdly, the British and American Governments will continue to assist in the search for peaceful settlements in the region's trouble-spots - Zimbabwe and Namibia - and to pressure the South African Government to assist in this search. This might entail the mounting of a

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15 The continued availability of foreign credit to South Africa is important for the continued wellbeing of the South African economy, since the country does not generate sufficient capital internally to finance its own development.


17 e.g. The present EEC Code of Employment Practices is an example of such encouragement presently being applied.

18 There are various ways in which this might be done; e.g. the US and the British Governments might argue that in order to continue offering South Africa protection in international forums, progress towards the ending of racial discrimination must be seen to be made.
new attempt in Zimbabwe, now that the elections are over, and the
continuation of the present Namibian effort, or else the continuation of
the present proposals in respect of both territories. Finally, it is seen
as unlikely that the present Anglo-American policy of protecting South
Africa from international action, such as economic sanctions in the
United Nations, will be abandoned. While not as important a trading
partner as in the past, South Africa is still the major supplier of
strategic raw materials from the African continent to both the United
States and Britain, and it is unlikely that policy-designers in these
countries will deny their countries these supplies.

(iii) The Illegal Status of the Rhodesian Regime and the Unacceptability
of the Namibian Legislative Assembly

If the British and American Governments were to recognise the new
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and a Government resulting from a Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance-sponsored election in Namibia, such recognition would entail the
rejection of the internationally accepted illegal status of Rhodesia,
sponsored by Britain on 12 November, 1965, and supported by the United
Nations. Further, the view of the international unacceptability of the
current South African political supremacy in Namibia, which has also been
condemned by the United Nations in terms of Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), would have to be revised. Such decisions would have serious
repercussions on British and American relations with African states and
with the United Nations, and would also make these two countries vulnerable
to still greater censure in international forums; viz. the United Nations
and the Organisation of African Unity.

Any reversal of the international position of the Rhodesian regime and the
Namibian Assembly requires a UN Security Council reversal of the existing
international position of the two territories. Such a reversal would
require either an abstention from voting or an affirmative vote from the
permanent members of the Security Council. At present it is unlikely that
either the Soviet Union or China would either abstain from voting or vote
in favour of such a proposal, unless the draft resolution recommending
admission to the United Nations19 was sponsored by, or received substantial
support from, the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations.

For the reasons outlined above it appears unlikely that the Afro-Asian bloc
would either sponsor or substantially support such a draft resolution
at present. Speculation on the possibilities of a change of attitude by
the Front-Line Presidents, and therefore the Afro-Asian bloc, while interest-
ting, is not likely to influence the formulation of British and American
policy towards the region, unless there is a significant prospect of such
a shift in attitude occurring. Since there is little likelihood of this
at present, British and American policy-designers will be faced with a
classic costs/benefits equation. In other words, they will be forced to
consider whether the benefits of recognising the Government of Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia and a Government emerging from a DTA-sponsored election in
Namibia, will outweigh the possible costs of such recognition.

19 This would be a sure indication of the international acceptability of the two
territories.
Briefly the benefits can be summarised as follows:

(a) Western nations will probably have significant investment opportunities in the two territories,

(b) in all probability they will have a marked degree of influence with the Governments of the two territories,

(c) access to raw materials produced there will be assured, and

(d) the Governments of the two territories will probably be pro-West and anti-communist.

The costs of recognising the future Governments of the territories would include:

(a) a significant loss of prestige and influence with independent African states - Western nations would be perceived as supporting and propagating neo-colonial solutions to the region's problems and would also be seen as supporting South African-sponsored solutions in the region and, therefore, South Africa itself.

(b) there would probably be a concommitant growth of Soviet influence in the region and in Africa generally - the Soviet Union would try to make use of the loss of US and British influence to try to increase its own, and

(c) the guerilla war in the region would be unlikely to come to a halt simply because of US and British recognition of the two territories' independence, although the guerillas might face noticeable setbacks if substantial British and/or American aid was delivered to the Governments in question.

It is important to remember that even if the British and American Governments do not recognise the new Governments of the two territories, they are not likely to be denied access to the raw materials produced by Zimbabwe and Namibia unless it is by their own actions - e.g. the revocation of the Byrd Amendment in the case of Rhodesia - nor will they lose a significant degree of influence with the new Governments. In fact, it is arguable whether they will lose any influence at all as Britain and America could adopt a posture similar to the present one: they could offer to continue assisting in the search for a negotiated settlement which would be satisfactory to all parties.

British and American policy-makers are, therefore, in the position of being able to continue to sit on the fence, thereby enjoying the best of both worlds. Since it is unlikely that African states would break off economic and diplomatic relations with the US and Britain, even if the latter two did recognise the new Governments of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia, it is even more unlikely that they would do so if Britain and the United States continued their present policy of non-recognition while working for suitable and satisfactory negotiated settlements.

The failure of African states to sever such relations with Britain after the resumption of talks with the Smith regime in 1966, 1968 and 1970-71, despite an OAU resolution in favour of such action argues for this, as does the economic position of African states vis-à-vis the developed world.
At the same time such a tactic would win time for British and American foreign policy-formulators and enable them to await events in both the Front Line States and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Namibia, before formulating policies towards the latter states which could significantly harm their position and influence with independent African states. For these reasons it is thought likely that the solutions suggested above will be the ones adopted by Western policy-designers.

(iv) Existing British and United States Policies Towards the Region

The existing British and American policies towards the region have already been outlined, for that reason the intention now is only to summarise them briefly.

British and American policy may be said to be one of continuing contact with the South African Government and the Governments of the Front Line States so as to:

(i) bring about a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe and Namibia which is acceptable to international opinion, and

(ii) to bring about the improvement of the socio-economic-political status of blacks in South Africa.

Obviously the aim of this policy, along with those aimed at African states in particular, (e.g. the provision of financial and technical aid to African countries), is to maintain and increase, if possible, British and American influence with African states at the expense of Second World countries, without too great a cost to Britain and America.21

British and American policy appears to be achieving its broad aims. There does not seem to have been any significant loss of Anglo-American influence with African states since the Angolan Civil War in 1975-6. African Heads of State and the Front-Line Presidents continue to look primarily to the US Administration22, but also to the British Government, to assist in finding a solution to the region's problems. While the actual achievements of British and American policy-makers in finding negotiated solutions might be minimal, the continued recognition by the Front-Line Presidents of the role the British and American Governments have played, and can continue to play, indicates that the overall aim of the policy is, at least, partially successful.

It is unlikely that Anglo-American policy-makers will change a policy that has proved to be reasonably successful unless one that is more certain to achieve their aims can be found. Given the same aims as pertain now, it is unlikely that Anglo-American policy towards the region in question will change significantly. Any change which will improve the prospects of greater influence with African states might harm Anglo-American trade with South

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21 This would appear to be defined as the severing of economic ties with South Africa among other factors, such as a massive increase in aid to African states.

Africa, yet without the compensation of dramatically improved economic and political relations with African states. Similarly, any change which significantly improves Anglo-American economic and political relations with South Africa will probably harm political relations with African states. Of course, there might be a significant re-evaluation of the foreign policy aims of the British and American Governments in the future but this does not seem likely at present.

(v) U.S./Soviet Competition for Power and Influence

The international competition for power and influence between the US and the Soviet Union goes a long way towards explaining the motivation of US policy towards the sub-continent. The loss of prestige suffered by America during the Angolan Civil War, through its alleged acquiescence of South African involvement, which resulted in the US being perceived as attempting, unsuccessfully, to interfere in the internal affairs of an African state, as well as the eventual victory of the MPLA, caused a setback for American policy in Africa as a whole and in the Southern region in particular.

The last year of the Ford Administration (1976) and the first years of the Carter Administration (1977-8), were characterised by attempts on the part of US policy-makers to improve American standing with African states by greater involvement in the search for solutions to the region's problems and consultations on the subject with African leaders. The new (and tougher) policy adopted by the US Administration towards the South African Government after Carter's presidential election victory in 1976, should also be seen in the light of the loss of American prestige.

It is unlikely that American policy towards Africa will be changed while there is concern over Soviet gains on the continent. For this reason, while it is unlikely that the American Administration will materially assist the guerilla movements, it is equally unlikely that a policy more sympathetic to white Southern Africa will be adopted. The effect of the adoption of a more sympathetic policy would make African states less sympathetic to American aims and this would represent a gain for the Second World and a concomitant decline of the First World's influence.

American concern to maintain its own influence, thereby preventing the Soviet Union from winning the international competition for influence, will, therefore, obviate any significant change of policy in favour of the white-rulled sub-continent. However, any marked change of policy in favour of the Patriotic Front and SWAPO, is also ruled out. First, as has been pointed

23 e.g. Henry Kissinger's attempt in 1976 to settle the Rhodesian dispute, and more recent Anglo-American attempts to find a solution for Zimbabwe - (the September 1977 Anglo-American settlement proposals) - and Namibia.

24 Visits were made to African states by US Secretary of State, Kissinger, (1976), Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young (1977) and other American officials e.g. Don McHenry (1978).

25 Zbigniew Brzezinski has expressed American concern in this regard.

26 US public philosophy opposes the violent overthrow of governments although US policy-makers may be sympathetic to the aims of these organisations.

27 US public philosophy is equally opposed to racism and the denial of human rights as espoused by the UN Charter. Where such a denial can be opposed without detriment to US interests, it will be opposed.
out, American public philosophy opposes material assistance to groups fighting to overthrow the status quo by violence, although the American Administration might be sympathetic to some or all of the organisations' aims. In the case of SWAPO and the Patriotic Front, their Marxist orientation might also be a factor discouraging greater US assistance to them. Secondly, the US is unlikely to alter a policy which is reasonably successful. Present American policy towards Southern Africa provided the American Administration with a means of increasing its influence with African states - (by pressuring South Africa to make greater concessions in Namibia and to encourage the Smith regime to reach a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe) - while ensuring that the US still had continued access to the strategic raw materials produced by the region.

Provided, therefore, that America does not alter its aims and that the benefits of the present policy continue to outweigh the costs, it is highly unlikely that American Southern African policy will be changed.

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis has set out to show that there is little prospect of a change in British and American foreign policy towards white-controlled Southern Africa in the near future. This is of particular relevance bearing in mind the British Conservative Party's recent electoral victory. The Conservative Party has traditionally adopted a more sympathetic approach towards the white-ruled states of Southern Africa and has stressed the importance of the sub-continent in the defence of Western European trade routes. However, it is unlikely that these traditional sympathies will be important enough to outweigh the perception of where present-day British interests lie, and how these will best be fulfilled. Unless there is a major re-orientation of British foreign policy aims in the region - (and in any event these would take a considerable period of time to formulate) - it is unlikely that British policy will be significantly altered. Possibly the new Conservative Government will not align itself so closely with American policy towards the region. However, given the Conservative Party's traditional concern to oppose the spread of Soviet influence, this, too, is not likely since this is the major aim of American policy in the region.

US policy is equally unlikely to change. The American House of Representatives' Sub-Committee on Africa recently unanimously voted against sending observers to Zimbabwe for the April 20 elections, despite Senator George McGovern's warning that, if this occurred, the Senate would probably vote to lift sanctions. This support for the

28 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and a DTA-sponsored election winner in Namibia would be seen as falling into such an area.

29 These were most clearly revealed by Edward Heath at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore in 1970, and in the 1971 Home-Smith settlement proposals, but have been a feature of all Conservative Government and Conservative Party spokesmen's statements on Southern Africa, such as the most recent attacks on SWAPO by a Conservative foreign policy spokesman.

30 There have been unsubstantiated rumours that British policy-makers are dissatisfied with what they perceive as American naivety in regard to the US Administration's Africa policy.


32 Star, 30/3/79.
Carter Administration's policies with regard to Zimbabwe will probably result in renewed Administration confidence in the policy to such an extent that, should the Senate lift sanctions unilaterally, the use of a Presidential veto cannot be ruled out. The growing confidence of the Carter Administration (as a result of the successful attainment of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty) makes the use of the veto even more likely.

The continued efforts of the Western negotiators to win South African and Namibian acceptance of the Waldheim proposals for a settlement in the latter territory, also argue against US policy towards the region undergoing significant changes. The latest assurances to the Namibian Legislative Assembly's delegation and the South African Government by the Western negotiators, namely that SWAPO guerillas would be confined to two bases in the Territory; that external bases would be monitored by the Front-Line States and civilian members of UNTAG, and that SWAPO members not in the Territory at the time of the announcement of the cease fire, would be prevented from crossing en masse into the Territory; indicates a determination on the part of American policy-designers not to re-negotiate the principles of the proposals with the South African Government and the Namibian delegation.

All these factors, therefore, argue strongly in favour of a continuation of the present policies applied by the British and American Governments towards the region. Any change in these policies would represent a major shift in thinking on the way perceived to be the most effective to achieve British and American foreign policy aims in the sub-continent - i.e., the limiting of Soviet influence and the maximising of, specifically, British and American influence but, generally, Western influence in the region and in Africa.