A social coastal fisheries policy for South Africa? Subsistence fisheries co-management for sustainable livelihoods and poverty alleviation

Moenieba Isaacs

The history of subsistence fishing dates back to the coastal indigenous strandloper people of South Africa. Later, limited amounts of subsistence fishing were allowed under provincial government control (Boyd et al. 2000). The Marine Living Resources Act defines a subsistence fisher as ‘a natural person who regularly catches fish for personal consumption or for the consumption of his or her dependants, including one who engages from time to time in the local sale or barter of excess catch, but does not include a person who engages on a substantial scale in the sale of fish on commercial basis’. The Subsistence Fisheries Task Group further elaborated on this definition by stating ‘subsistence fishers are poor people who personally harvest marine resources as a source of food or sell them to meet the basic needs of food security; they operate on or near to the shore or estuaries, live in close proximity to the resource, consume or sell the resources locally, use low-technology gear (often as part of long-standing community-based or cultural practice) and the kinds of resources they harvest generate only sufficient returns to meet the needs of food security’ (SFTG 2000:iii).

The Task Group admitted this definition ‘excludes an important group of people who might previously have been considered subsistence fishers or artisanal fishers, but who would prefer to gain commercial rights’ (SFTG 2000:21). For this reason, it was recommended that a separate subcategory should be established to accommodate small-scale commercial fishers. This is particularly relevant to the West Coast fishers in South Africa who are more able to harvest west coast rock lobster and sell and export this than fishers in the subsistence sector are able to do. In the words of the SFTG: ‘Small-scale fisheries should be seen as a specific opportunity of uplifting poor people who already have the skills and experience required for fishing, simply as another way of allowing well-to-do investors entrance into the fishing industry’ (SFTG 2000:21).

The discourse on subsistence fishers is based on the SFTG report, even though the process excluded poor communities from having a say on policy and quota allocation (see Van Sittert 2002:299). For example, because the main intention of fishing communities in Hondeklipbaai on the West Coast was to acquire fishing rights and sell their catches, they were excluded from allocations intended for subsistence fishers. With the singular exception of KwaZulu-Natal, many fishers in coastal communities have been struggling to gain access to commercial fishing rights.

Fishing ‘communities’

Many coastal settlements depend on harvesting marine resources for sale and for personal consumption. A number of company towns were established along the West Coast in the early 1900s around the fish processing industry using the lure of free housing and food in return for labour. Van Sittert (2003) asserts that ‘community’ in the context of the fishing industry:

was the modern creation of fishery and factory owners seeking to counter the centrifugal pull on labour of mining-led industrialisation and immobilised it permanently at the coast... Power in the fisheries was with those who owned the land which included the state, church, farmers, merchants or industrialists that demanded some return
from their ownership from fishing. The state, churches and most farmers were with fishers paying rent whilst the other farmers and all the merchants of the factory owners demanded labour as their price for access to the sea (Van Sittert 2003:210).

Due to the segregation policies of the apartheid regime, these settlements rarely possess the homogenous qualities normally associated with the term ‘fishing communities’ around the world (Isaacs 2003). Apartheid no longer exists and the common interests of people in a specific locale are managed through democratic representative organs, but the legacy of the past remains entrenched in spatial separation. MCM tries to implement fisheries coastal management and a sustainable livelihoods approach using terms such as ‘community’, implying the existence of homogenous group in a geographical location, but this is clearly a contested concept which fails to deal with the real issues faced by the poor residents of fishing settlement: income through fishing and fishing industry-related work.

**Fisheries co-management**

According to Jentoft (2004:112):

> Co-management means that some or all management responsibilities are formally shared between government management agencies and user-organisations as well as other stakeholder groups, such as the scientific community.

It is widely known that:

- **bottom-up approaches** are successful largely because people support them so that enforcement costs are lowered. When people devise their own rules, they will formulate ones they consider sensible, effective, and low-cost. They will also frame rules that embody local knowledge, that are designed to be adapted to local conditions, and that avoid conflicting with basic norms. They are far more likely to obey such rules than those imposed by outside authorities, which, all too often, are framed in ways that impose high economic costs on users, promote conflict, and are seen as ineffective in helping to maintain the resource (Acheson 2003:231).

According to Hauck and Sowman (2003) the space for bottom-up approaches like co-management is enshrined in the Constitution through its provision for equitable and sustainable access to natural resources. The involvement of local communities in resource management and partnership between communities, local and national authorities and stakeholders is entrenched the legislative framework. One of the key elements informing the policy arena was the undertaking of the Reconstruction and Development programme to ensure ‘the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities through improved access to the marine resources’ (ANC 1994:104).

**MCM’s fisheries co-management initiative**

In South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, the term co-management is frequently used to refer to involvement of fishers in management of their fisheries in order improve their livelihoods. However, there is no clear and universally accepted definition of co-management, even though it continues to be seen as a panacea for resolving problems of inequitable, undemocratic and inefficient fisheries management (Isaacs et al. 2005). Experience so far indicates that existing co-management arrangements have primarily focused on conservation management of fish resources rather than using these as a mechanism for facilitating economic development within fishing communities, let alone as an instrument for poverty alleviation (Hauck & Sowman 2003; Hara & Raakjær-Nielsen 2003). Ensuring the sustainability of the fish resource is a key condition for both wealth generation and sustainable livelihoods for poor coastal communities (Isaacs 2003; SFTG 2000). Outside the example of KwaZulu-Natal where responsibility for fisheries management has been delegated to provincial government, the national line agency MCM has generally not taken its responsibility for collaborative management seriously (Hauck & Sowman 2003). In addition, one cannot expect poor communities to buy into the co-management concept if they cannot see how it will contribute towards improving their livelihoods. For example, in Hondeklipbaai fishers said ‘we are not interested in another structure without any voice and how can we establish co-

**Figure 1: Co-management continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government driven co-management</th>
<th>Consultative co-management</th>
<th>Co-operative co-management</th>
<th>Delegated co-management</th>
<th>User group-driven co-management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government has the most power and control</td>
<td>Government consults with user groups often but makes all decisions</td>
<td>Government and user groups work together and make decisions jointly (equal powers and responsibilities)</td>
<td>Government delegates significant powers and responsibilities to organised user groups (government is only consulted on decisions made)</td>
<td>User groups have the most power and control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from McConney et al. 2003 in Hauck & Sowman 2005:4*
management without any access rights? They asked about the role of MCM in the proposed co-management initiative, the kind of relationship they could expect, and whether MCM would continue to make all the decisions.

Various academic departments operating in the fishing and coastal sectors are concerned with the state of the environmental resources and with implementing co-management arrangements, as well as in the socio-economic circumstances of fishers (e.g. Isaacs et al. 2005; Hara & Raakjaer-Nielsen 2003; Hauck & Sowman 2003; Van Sittert 2003; Hersoug & Isaacs 2001). Without more buy-in from MCM and genuine attempts by government to cede control and to allow people to play a meaningful role in managing the resources, co-management initiatives in South Africa are likely to remain isolated and generally unsatisfactory experiments (see also Van Sittert 2003).

Sinclair (1990:44) says:

*Co-management seems to work best when fishers have responsibility for distributing their share of the quota and determining the rules of access to fishing grounds in situations where conflict of interest can be resolved in such a way that all groups can survive. When a situation has deteriorated to the point that each group (fixed and mobile gear fishers in this case) feels it cannot give any ground, it is unlikely that a viable strategy can be reached in a co-management forum.*

According to Jentoft (2004:114) ‘co-management works at the crossroads of state, market and civil society and draws on the capacities of each’. He also says: ‘to sustain the livelihoods of fishing people, two things are fundamental. Their natural resources must be conserved and their fishing community must be secured’ (Jentoft 2004:93).Co-management in South Africa is at the crossroads, not with regard to the state, the market and civil society, but with regard to how to reconcile the goals of conservation, sustainable livelihoods and poverty alleviation.

**Sustainable coastal livelihoods**

The sustainable livelihoods framework has taken various forms, but the most commonly known one is that developed by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (Figure 2).

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (adapted from Chambers and Conway 1992 as stated in DFID 1999 and Carney 1998). The livelihoods approach enhances the understanding of poverty in highlighting that well-being is not only about increased income but addressing food insecurity, social inferiority, physical assets, and vulnerability. Furthermore, household poverty is determined by many factors, particularly access to assets and the influence of policies and institutions. In addition, one should be wary that livelihood priorities vary and outsiders cannot assume knowledge of the objectives of a given household or group (Ashley & Hussein 2000:14).

The livelihood framework organises the various factors which either constrain or provide opportunities to the poor and to show how these relate to each other. It recognises

---

**Figure 2: Sustainable livelihoods framework**

![Sustainable livelihoods framework diagram](image-url)
multiple actors, acknowledges multiple livelihood strategies, and emphasises multiple livelihoods outcomes. Ideally, households should become resilient to external shocks and stresses, not depend on external support, maintain the long-term sustainability of the resources they depend upon, and not engage in activities which compromise the livelihoods of others. Sustainability is necessary to ensure poverty reduction over time.

**DEAT’s sustainable coastal livelihoods programme**

In 1997, DEAT and DFID entered into a funding agreement to the tune of £4.76 million over a period of three years to initiate participation in coastal management, focusing on institutional support and reform processes. The partnership had a strong pro-poor focus by stimulating integrated and sectoral approaches to sustain and optimise allocation of coastal resources (Marumo et al. 2003). The agreement had a two parallel approaches: 1) capacity-building to implement institutional reforms; and 2) establishing demonstration projects to address poverty alleviation and coastal poverty.

The 12 demonstration projects implemented in KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Western Cape were suppose to result in poverty alleviation along the coast, but poor people did not participate directly in any of them. The projects were mainly consultancy-driven or pet projects of groups which were looking for funding – for example, the Western Cape fishing community was allocated R750 000 for the South African Fisheries Living Museum. It is difficult to understand how this project was selected as a demonstration project to alleviate poverty and provide sustainable livelihoods. Other examples include hiking trails, crafts, infrastructure, farming, kelp and mussel harvesting and rehabilitation programmes. Poor community involvement was made virtually impossible by a stringent government tenure process which had relatively high-level technical requirements, for example, a business plan.

The DFID programme identified some constraints at state level that needs to be addressed. One was the need for a deeper and broader understanding of development, poverty reduction and sustainable livelihood objectives because, without this, there would be insufficient capacity and common purpose in MCM to realise the objective of sustainable coastal livelihoods or to ensure the survival of the initiative once donor support had come to an end. Another constraint was MCM’s struggle to move from its preoccupation with natural resource management and regulation to an approach which was more broadly in line with the government poverty alleviation agenda. Without this, coastal management would lose its credibility and legitimacy in the new South Africa, and would become marginalised.

Davies and Hossain (1997:9) remind us that: marginalized people deal with associational life as a function of the state, social incoherence and economic decline, and many civil organisations are a mirror image of the predatory state by not embracing formal civil society but by developing strategies which generated alternative economic opportunities and an alternative society, with parallel social and religious institutions (the constantly evolving informal civil society).

According to Toner (2002:13), a critical examination of the livelihoods concept and assumptions shows these are: are too simplistic, and attempt to codify complexity to a large degree. It is also the case that a concentration on the sustainability of individual livelihoods overvalues the developmental possibilities of production at the expense of and adequate consideration of redistribution.

Furthermore, the livelihoods approach suggests that the poor possess the necessary agency to help themselves out of poverty through possessing the assets and capitals to create a sustainable livelihood (see Du Toit 2004). Van Sittert (2003) reminds us that coastal settlements were established on cheap labour, free housing and food, so the people are asset- and capital-poor, they have low rates of access to productive resources, they do not have enough resources for household food production, and they have a high degree of cash-dependence. Being asset poor and cash-dependent exacerbates the weak position of people in coastal communities with low levels of education, particularly given the lack of long-term employment opportunities for unskilled labour.

**Poverty alleviation**

Bénét (2004:15) warns us: Although people may use them indistinctively, it is important to keep in mind the difference between ‘poverty alleviation’, ‘poverty prevention’ and ‘poverty reduction’. Failure is likely to lead to confusion, inappropriate policies and unwanted outcomes.

Bénét (2004) uses the term ‘poverty alleviation’ in the fishing context as an inclusive concept that encompasses poverty reduction and poverty prevention. ‘Poverty reduction’ in this view refers to wealth generation and capital accumulation through investment in fishing; whereas ‘poverty prevention’ refers to the role of fisheries in helping people maintain a minimum acceptable standard of living. Poverty reduction aims to lift people out of poverty while poverty prevention aims to prevent people from falling deeper into poverty. The former should lead to economic growth and capital accumulation while the latter aims to mitigate the impact of poverty and reduce vulnerability.

The poverty reduction function of this framework applies to the fisheries through the number of new entrants from 1994 to 2006 at the small-scale level. The rationale for including small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) is to lift people out of poverty by enabling them to accrue capital and generate wealth. The intention of the redistribution process was to create entrepreneurs within fishing communities who could in turn create jobs in fishing communities in line with government’s poverty alleviation strategies. Thus the allocation of fishing rights to new entrants was a necessary step to start addressing the legacy of political and economic apartheid in order to lift people permanently out of poverty (poverty reduction function) (Isaacs 2003; Sowman & Hauck 2003). With the unemployment rate running up to 60% in fishing communities, it had been hoped that the establishment of new SMMEs through re-distribution of rights would create
new jobs, thereby start to reduce the high unemployment rates in fishing communities.

The poverty prevention function of coastal and marine resources is mainly through providing safety net mechanisms in terms of jobs. The established (large and small) companies, the new entrants (SMMEs) and the limited commercial right holders (private entities and individual holders) were supposed to play a key role in providing secure and quality jobs based on government’s minimum wage regulatory framework. In addition, rights holders could contribute towards capital accumulation and wealth generation within fishing communities.

DEAT’s Poverty Relief Programme

Launched in 1999, the Poverty Relief Programme funded more than 400 projects, disbursing nearly R1 billion by the beginning of 2003. DEAT says that over 1.5 million temporary jobs were created (as against the planned 5.2 million) and 2 100 permanent jobs had been created through the programme. About 350 SMMEs were established. Finally, a total 626 000 person days had been achieved for training in literacy, life skills, managerial skills, vocational and task-related skills, leadership and other adult basic education and training (ABET) (DEAT 2002). One of the ‘target development areas’ of the programme is South Africa’s coastline through ‘promoting leadership in tourism’, ‘protecting the coastline’, ‘abalone and crayfish farming’ and ‘sustainable kelp collection’ (DEAT 2002). A number of poverty relief projects have been implemented in Western Cape coastal communities.

DEAT claims its Poverty Relief Programme is:

- part of a broader Government strategy for alleviating poverty amongst South Africa’s poorest communities. Where possible, the programme seeks to do this in a manner that should create long-term sustainable work opportunities among South Africa’s poorest communities through investment that could activate stranded assets (DEAT 2002).

Many of the programmes along the coast i.e. Working for the Coast, are providing work for a few people at a time and often not sustainable. Furthermore:

- DEAT’s Poverty Relief Programme is underpinned by three interdependent goals, namely, growing tourism market share and investment, protecting and conserving South Africa’s environment and building the nation. Additionally, poverty relief projects are meant to benefit communities rather than individuals. Some of the important micro-criteria are; training and capacity building, targeting women for a larger percentage of jobs created and promotion of SMMEs (DEAT 2002).

The people in Hondeklipbaai and Elandsbaai say that they are tired of all the training – they want jobs and cannot eat pieces of paper [training qualifications]. They say training takes place for one week, then the trainers leave, and the jobs are reserved for the few who are politically and socially connected.

MCM’s attempt to mainstream its poverty alleviation programmes through SMMEs and downstream job creation does not take the sustainable livelihood perspective into consideration. Communities derive a livelihood from the resource in two ways – by consuming part of what they sell, and by selling the rest. Current research on poverty and fisheries indicates that the SMMEs are survivalist in nature and they are experiencing problems with access to credit, infrastructure, management skills, and understanding the operations of processing and marketing of their fishing rights. On the subject of job creation, there had been shift towards casualisation and seasonal labour, short-time and few permanent quality jobs.

Challenges

The three frameworks presented here are based on the tenets of participation, people-centredness, partnership and good governance, but there is a disjuncture between good intentions and actual implementation. For these frameworks to impact on poverty alleviation, MCM will have to refine its understanding of the notion of community access to marine resources, situating this within the a broader understanding of the reason why people are impoverished, and improving coordination between various programmes which aim to reduce coastal poverty.

Understanding ‘community’

Both the co-management framework and sustainable livelihood framework view ‘community’ as a homogenous group of people with shared goals, norms and values. But local

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Two dimensions of poverty alleviation*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty reduction</strong> (Lifts people out of poverty) through:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- capital accumulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- wealth generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- leading to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- capital accumulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In South Africa’s fishing industry, these would represent the new small fishing quota holders from early 1990s to 2001; limited commercial quota holders from 2002 to 2005; and SMMEs in 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Poverty prevention** (prevents people from falling deeper into poverty) through: |
| - safety mechanisms |
| - welfare function |
| - leading to: |
| - poverty impact mitigation |
| - reduction of vulnerability. |
| In the case of South Africa’s fishing industry: a) employment in established companies and small and medium enterprises (smaller established companies, small quota holders) b) getting rights in the limited commercial sector. |

* Adapted from Béné 2004
elites which tend to embrace private entrepreneurship tend to monopolise power structures. They tend to be the recipients of fishing quotas and local economic development at the expense of marginalised poor fishers. They act as gatekeepers, excluding the poor from actively participating in the local initiatives. These coastal settlements are not communities in the homogenous sense; they are groups characterised by internal heterogeneity, economic differentiation, socio-political factionalism and elite control of the structures of power.

For any of these frameworks to stand a chance of success, the implementing authorities will have to find an effective way of dealing with economic exclusion, social marginalisation, class exploitation and political disempowerment (see Béné 2003). Findings of current research indicate that the fishers in coastal settlements are economically, socially and politically excluded from mainstream government initiatives and donor programmes. They lack the agency that the sustainable livelihood framework tends to assume, they do not possess the necessary human, financial, physical capital to even make a start, and this leaves them inherently vulnerable. Furthermore, the inability of these frameworks to address conflicts and tension over resources, opportunities and power structures within coastal settlements could lead to further marginalisation.

Co-management, sustainable livelihood, and poverty alleviation frameworks are technically-driven development discourses which all seem to assume a high level of agency among the poor to help themselves while simultaneously de-emphasising the role of the state (also see Du Toit 2004). The state has limited engagement or no engagement at all with local power structures, elites and intra-community conflict. This is exacerbated by a blindness to the historical marginalisation of poor people by colonialism and apartheid.

**Access to marine resources**

For any of the three frameworks to stand a chance of success, there must be equitable access to marine resources. A territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) system which provides space for communal rights would complement co-management and sustainable livelihoods imperatives, as will critical engagement with how the rights allocation process operates and who in a community has been allocated fishing rights.

Co-management aims to create a legitimate structure for the community to assist in the protection of the resource. Long-term sustainability of the resource is important for both co-management and sustainable livelihoods.

**Improving training**

People feel that they are over-trained with no jobs, no access to the resources, and a lack of livelihood opportunities. The role of the Provincial Coastal Committee9 is to co-ordinate all the training activities in communities, but it is not clear to what extent training and capacity building initiatives have improved the lives of communities like Hondeklipbaai. Training has been provided by DEAT's co-management, Coast Care and poverty alleviation initiatives, as well as ABET programmes; public works programmes and Transport Education and Training Authority (TETA) courses (also see Petersen 2005).

Petersen (2005) says that work on co-management tries to combine training on environmentally sustainable resource management and monitoring with giving communities increased control over the marine resources. Co-management tends to involve mutual information and knowledge exchange, which is invaluable. However, in practice, a high level of control over critical decision-making remains with government. More crucially still, co-management in South Africa has only been associated with subsistence (or survivalist) marine resources and resource allocation, which do not provide fishers with an adequate source of livelihood.

**Conclusion**

In his article *When poverty rhymes with fisheries*, Béné (2003:957) presents the circular logic of the old paradigm as two pillars of an argument: ‘they are fishermen because they are poor’ and ‘they are poor because they are fishermen’. Béné (2004) warns us to understand the concepts of poverty alleviation before mainstreaming it into policies. Cunningham and Neiland (2005) have linked poverty alleviation in fisheries to wealth-based approaches, which redistribute resource rent to the poor. But in fisheries, as is argued by Bailey and Jentoft (1990), it is never easy to achieve all the development goals without contradiction.

One of the contradictions is MCM’s compromise between transformation and poverty alleviation. With the advent of democracy in 1994, transformation was high on the political agenda, making space for black economic empowerment (BEE) businesspeople to enter into agreements with established companies at the expense of mass redistribution of fishing rights to coastal communities. Urban jobs in processing refocused the support of fishing industry trade unions on maintaining stability in the established companies. The transformation process was not successful in addressing coastal poverty and MCM says this is not its responsibility anyway.

Cunningham and Neiland (2005) say that, although there are many calls to improve the lot of small-scale fishers, little work if any, is underway to design management systems that enable fishers to express their competitive advantage within national and international economies. For this to happen:

- **MCM needs to deepen and broaden its understanding of development, poverty and sustainable livelihoods and co-management concepts and approaches.**
- **MCM needs to assume responsibility for building the necessary human capacity, centrally and throughout the coastal provinces, to take forward devolution of management responsibilities if it is serious about making a success of co-management.**
- **MCM needs to take responsibility for ensuring that the concepts of people-centred, poverty-focused development are sufficiently well understood and supported within its staff so that coastal management properly reflects the ‘new paradigm’ of creating opportunity for poor coastal communities and improving environmentally sound...**
access to coastal resources for the purposes of promoting sustainable livelihoods.

- MCM needs to interface with poor communities as partners in the development process.

Poverty alleviation strategies must be mainstreamed into co-management arrangements, having thus far been largely absent from policy deliberations on equitable transformation of the fishing industry. More research and investigation is required on how poverty alleviation can be explicitly integrated into fisheries co-management and sustainable livelihoods frameworks.

Endnotes

1. The SFTG consisted of two groups, the core group of 17 members with divergent areas of expertise, and the consultative group of 20 members who provided information and support to the core group. According to the detailed survey of the SFTG, there were 143 fishing communities along the entire coast, comprising of approximately 20 000 households with some 30 000 subsistence fishers. Of these, only 30 communities were located in the Western Cape, the majority being in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape (Isaacs 2003).

2. Some farmers and all merchants transformed fishing labour into debt labour by such practices as providing free housing, credit and alcohol (Van Sittert 2003:210).

3. Lemon 1991 has characterised three main phases in this: the ‘settler-colonial’ period from the time of white settlement in 1652 until the early years of the Union after 1910; the beginning of formal urban segregation under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923; and a more rigid period of segregation under the Group Areas Act of 1950.

4. The fisheries co-management programme subsidised by Norway under a bilateral programme.

5. References to this community come from the author’s experience of running awareness-raising workshops and training and capacity-building in Hondeklipbaai from March 2004–August 2006. The long-term allocations of 2006 gave no subsistence fisher any access rights, although after an appeal four fishers were granted rights to catch 500kg of commercial west coast rock lobster.

6. It has been alleged by the Food and Allied Workers’ Union (FAWU), the most active trade union in the sector, that job losses have increased and the quality of employment in the industry has declined. The most vulnerable of these workers seem to be women as they are the ones who have traditionally worked in the post harvest sector (i.e. processing) as contract and seasonal workers.

7. PLAA is currently part of a multi-country research on the relationship between governance structures, sustainable livelihoods and reducing poverty in coastal communities in South Africa.

8. The established companies include Oceana, I&J, Sea Harvest, Premier Fishing and Marine Products/Foodcorp.

9. The PCC is a governance structure initiated through the Sustainable Livelihood Coastal Project, funded by DFID with DEAT being the lead agent. The Northern Cape PCC acts as a functional co-management body with representation of national, provincial, and local authorities, mining houses, regional authorities of economics, tourism, housing, and welfare.

References


Du Toit, A. 2004. *Forgotten by the highway: Globalisation, adverse incorporation and chronic poverty in a commercial farming district*. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. (Chronic poverty and development policy series; no. 4.)


Hersoug, B & Isaacs, M. 2001. ‘It’s all about money!’: Implementation of South Africa’s new fisheries policy. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. (Policy brief; no. 16.)


---

**Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies**

School of Government, University of the Western Cape

Private Bag X17, Bellville 7535, Cape Town, South Africa

Tel: +27 21 959 3733; Fax: +27 21 959 3732

plaas@uwc.ac.za

www.plaas.org.za

**PLAAS** engages in research, policy support, post-graduate teaching, training and advisory and evaluation services in relation to land and agrarian reform, community-based natural resource management and rural development.