PORTUGUESE DIPLOMACY in Southern Africa 1974-1994

Moises Venancio and Stephen Chan

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Contents

FOREWORD vi

INTRODUCTION 1

PART ONE : PORTUGAL, AFRICA AND EUROPE

Chapters:

1 : Portugal and the Contemporary Need for Africa 5
2 : The Decolonisation 12
3 : A Post-Revolutionary Choice 31
4 : Luso-Mozambican Relations, 1982-91 50
5 : Luso-Angolan Relations, 1982-91 61

PART TWO : BICESSE AND POST-BICESSE

6 : The Bicesse Agreement 74
7 : After Bicesse 98
8 : Bilateral Economic Co-operation and Portugal's Euro-African Dimension 104
9 : The European Community, Portugal and Lusophone Africa 110

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

GLOSSARY 123
Foreword

Although much has been written on the foreign policies of the United Kingdom (UK), France and other great metropolitan powers towards Africa, very little has appeared in English on Portuguese foreign policy. It is often assumed that, after the 1974 Portuguese revolution, sudden de-colonisation was accompanied by a sudden loss of interest in Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth, and this book is an attempt to redress the lack of knowledge in English on the subject. Based on first hand author interviews conducted by Moises Venancio, and on other Portuguese sources, it offers a sympathetic, though critical account of a twenty year history often overlooked in the hegemony of Anglophonic knowledge.

Most of the material here was first drafted by Moises Venancio. It has been edited and added to by Stephen Chan, who was also Venancio's first supervisor in the origins and prototypes of the current project - initially at the University of Kent and then under a US Institute of Peace grant that led to the volume, Mediation in Southern Africa (eds. Chan and Vivienne Jabri. London: Macmillan, 1993). The contribution of the US Institute of Peace is gratefully acknowledged here since the spillover of research for the above-mentioned volume has been useful in the present work.

Moises Venancio, however, continued his research into Portuguese foreign policy on his own account, first at Cambridge, then with the Lisbon-based Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais. He should very much be regarded as the senior author here. Both authors, of course, accept responsibility for the faults of the work presented here.
Introduction

The Portuguese colonial adventure had phases associated with the prosperity or otherwise of the metropole. A developing country within Europe, it was also excluded from the United Nations until 1955 because of its poor democratic record. Opinion varies as to whether Portugal was a true fascist or proto-fascist regime, but it severely regulated and suppressed dissent, manipulated the media, and built up a privileged officer class based on rewards for service in the African colonies. When the colonies brought prosperity to Portugal, the regime was sustained. When it no longer supplied income but, instead, drained the resources of the metropole, dissatisfaction increased. It would be wrong, however, to view the history of it all in such balance sheet terms. The thoughtful nature of much of the liberation struggle in the African territories greatly impressed a younger generation of Portuguese soldiery. Cabral's writings, for instance, 'were seen to have relevance to Portugal itself'.

There is, therefore, an intellectual as well as political and economic history to Portuguese foreign policy towards Southern Africa. We have tried to capture this in what follows. Poor as Portugal was in 1973, the idea of giving up the colonies seemed to many powerful Portuguese as a further diminution of an already diminished country. Since Vasco da Gamma and Henry the Navigator, Portugal contained an idea of itself as international. It seemed to be an even more powerful example of the French syndrome with Algeria - except that the idea of settler influence on the metropole should not be seen in exclusive terms. In the 1960s, almost as many Portuguese lived 'in the shanty slums of Paris and elsewhere in France as in all the Portuguese colonies combined'. We have here a beginning point of tradition based on the Vasco da Gamma foundation to nationalism, the fact of Portuguese poverty at home and throughout Europe, and the competing currents of thought emerging from Africa - the powerful lobby of the settlers, who formed an alliance with the metropolitan right wing which had taken it upon itself to safeguard the Lusophone world inaugurated by Vasco da Gamma; and the progressive ideologies that came from African liberation and catalysed the ideas of the European left that had survived suppression in Portugal. Within the left, however, bitter divisions grew that, as we shall see, continue to this day, and are most exercised when it comes to policy towards Southern Africa.

Added to this were military reverses in Mozambique and military stalemate in Angola. A Portuguese officer no longer grew rich in the colonial campaigns, so that even the right-wing within the military was able to form a coalition with the left that meant a militarily unopposed revolution in 1974. From that
moment, Portugal entered a twentieth century, particularly a modern Europe, in which it had to make up for a late start, and in which it sought to lay foundations based on new policies towards Africa. What these were are the subject of what follows.

**Endnotes**


PART ONE: PORTUGAL, AFRICA AND EUROPE
Portugal and the Contemporary Need for Africa

We seek in this chapter to explain both the importance of Africa, and the idea of an 'international presence' to traditional Portuguese foreign policy, while explaining how post-revolutionary Portugal having adapted to its changing international reality, has begun to define a new relationship with the world, its former colonies and Europe. In essence, Portugal has attempted to forge a dynamic inter-relationship between three main lines of foreign policy action: those of the Atlantic, Europe and Africa to create a new role for Portuguese foreign policy. The main aim of this is to safeguard the country's autonomous voice and national identity, at the international level, and particularly within the European Community.

Two decades ago, however, the intransigence of the Lisbon regime in finding a political solution to the colonial wars galvanised an exhausted military in the form of the 'Movement of the Armed Forces' (MFA), to carry out the April revolution that ended nearly fifty years of authoritarian dictatorship in Portugal. The regime's insistence on its policy of 'proudly alone' in preserving what was seen as the country's 'secular vocation', that of its African presence had ironically become the focal point of hostility against the regime both at home and abroad. At the international level a growing isolation of the country had been underway since the early sixties, which would have profound consequences for the decolonisation process.

Although the regime's colonial relationship with Africa saw the withering away of Salazar's foreign policy dictum of 'proudly alone' into the hollow reality of 'shamefully alone', the regime's insistence on the preservation of its overseas territories cannot merely be viewed as a simple nationalistic attempt to preserve past glories. However anachronistic Salazar's and Caetano's policy seemed to the realities of the post-Second World War system of international relations, four important considerations underlay their policy.

First, they both realised that Portugal's own backward economic development prevented the easy imposition of a neo-colonial model of post-independence relations similar to that practised by developed metropoles such as France and the United Kingdom. Secondly, Lisbon realised that one of the major implications of colonial independence implied an opening of the colonial markets to the economic forces of other more powerful countries with which
Portugal was hardly in a position to compete. This worry was particularly acute in relation to the vast potential wealth of Angola.

Thirdly, the relationship with Africa represented a fundamental tenet of Portuguese foreign policy that had dominated Lisbon elites since the times of the discoveries - that the nation's continued independence and survival is associated with an international presence/role that seeks to overcome the natural limitations of the country's size, economic development, and geo-strategic position. Portugal's international dimension has given rise to alliances such as those with the UK, and the more recent NATO/US axis, which are viewed by Lisbon as crucial to the nation's security and identity; particularly within the context of the Iberian peninsula where the country faces only one neighbour which is five times larger. As the Secretary of State in 1990, Durrao Barroso, continued to claim, it is doubtful whether Portugal would have survived as an independent nation had it not been for its overseas dimension. Lastly the regime had also known for a long time that any form of decolonisation would have internal political repercussions in the form of greater demands for democratisation.

With decolonisation Portugal was forced to redefine its relationship to the world and to its colonies, while finding a new vehicle of internationalisation that continued to guarantee the nation an autonomous voice and identity within the international community. During the period between 1974 to 1976, a number of foreign policy options were discussed ranging from pro-communist stances to notions of a particular relationship with the Third World. The confusion in the field of foreign policy and the particular choice of any one of the options, as we shall see later, was closely tied to the internal political power struggles that characterised the immediate post-revolutionary period in Portugal.

However with the termination of the most turbulent phase of the Portuguese post-revolutionary process and the election of the first constitutional government in 1976, under the Premiership of Mario Soares, the future Portugal was soon linked to membership of the European Community based on a series of political, economic, cultural and geo-strategic factors.

Yet, as one of the countries with the oldest established borders in the world, Portugal has learnt that a small nation requires a very active and responsive foreign policy in the pursuit of its national interest. This reality, with Portugal's official request for European Community membership in 1977, led to a new pre-occupation among Lisbon's foreign policy elite. Essentially they wanted a policy that safeguarded Portugal's 'autonomous voice and independent' identity within an association that was composed of more powerful nations. In order to avoid the danger of being swallowed in a European amalgam, a growing consensus has emerged in Lisbon which believes in the need for Portugal to
'behave' with 'its very own strategy' within the European Community, if it is to retain the capacity to 'maximise the advantages of such a relationship'. Again quoting Secretary of State for Co-operation, Durrao Barroso, 'it is important for Portugal, if it does not want to become a mere European region, to pursue a diplomacy which in some way individualises it and allows the country a more unique contribution within the European concert'.

The need for such a policy in the European Community clearly reveals a continuing attempt by the Portuguese to remove the negative aspects of Portugal's peripheral European position. Portugal's desire to overcome the limitations of its geo-strategic position on the European continent had historically led the country, unable to be a European power, to turn to the seas in search of influence and wealth. However, as a consequence of Community membership, Portugal was actually joining a geo-political structure that accentuated the country's peripheral position in Europe. The result of this has been to force an urgent reappraisal of the relationship between the country’s traditional foreign policy pillars, the Atlantic and Africa, with the new force in Portugal's international reality - the European Community.

As early as the Socialist Party congress in December 1974, Mario Soares, future Prime Minister and President, defined the new role that Portuguese diplomacy would attempt to play:

Portugal, a European country situated in the Atlantic, and with important interests in this geographical area also left deep roots in Africa, which one must know how to value, and, by virtue of its own underdevelopment and location is naturally a country close [to] and associated with the Third World. That double or triple condition makes Portugal a place to meet, and a place of dialogue - a line of possible union between Europe and Africa.

Fifteen years later, Secretary of State Durrao Barroso states that, 'beyond the European space, which is our first priority - because it is there that the future of the country is played - from a diplomatic point of view we have erected Africa, and especially the Portuguese-speaking space as our most important domain'. According to Durrao Barroso, Portugal's 'African policy is part of a Portuguese dream which is in turn part of our history ... but which brings with it dividends whether it be in the economic sphere, or in Portugal’s relative position in the European concern'.

In essence, Portugal has attempted to develop a new synthesis in foreign policy between its historical African presence and its present membership of the European Community, in a manner that aims to provide Portugal with the diplomatic specificity that the Portuguese decision-makers wanted in order to hallmark their national identity. In a European Community that is increasingly seen as centrifugal and heading for closer unity 'a country like Portugal in order
to preserve its specificity and independent nature ... requires external support points. And those Portuguese external support points besides including a closer relationship with the US pass through Africa.  

Moreover, Portugal's African policy has become an increasingly important tool with the specialisations that are envisaged by Lisbon as a direct result of the new momentum acquired by the processes of European integration. The Portuguese envisage closer European integration as heralding a specialisation by various community states in the politico-diplomatic sphere, or in other words, 'a Distribution of Diplomatic ties between the twelve'. Since Lisbon believes the weight it carries on African issues is superior to the weight it carries on other matters within the Community, the Portuguese have increased their diplomatic activity particularly in a clear effort to reinforce their position in Brussels. A similar view is held in Lisbon in relation to the effects of closer European integration on the single market, which believes that the integration agreed from 1992 will foster a growing specialisation in determined sectors or segments of the market. For Portugal this means it will have to play with specific weapons, one of which is Africa. Therefore viewing Portugal as a bridge between Europe and Africa can only help to increase national influence. Evidently this specificity can only benefit Portuguese economic groups in relation to their European competitors.

Portugal, still not possessing the economic means with which to impose a neo-colonial pattern of relations on the Portuguese-speaking African nations (PALOPs), has been forced to redefine its relations with those newly independent countries in a unique fashion. In order to create a contemporary sphere of interest in its traditional areas of influence, Portugal has attempted to create a sui generis sphere of privileged relations that placed Portugal as an intermediary between the developing PALOPs and the advanced financial economic institutions of the north. As we shall later see, this role has been particularly developed in relations with Angola. Furthermore, Portugal's role has now taken on new importance in the PALOPs themselves, by coming at a crucial time when these nations like so many of their African counterparts are attempting transitions to free market economies and multi-party democracies. More importantly, the feeling of abandonment by Europe, which the changes in Eastern Europe have provoked in Africa, has been another reason behind the move for closer Luso-PALOPs relations since the late 1980s. In essence, along with the strong cultural, linguistic and historical ties, it is this role played by Portugal that allows the country a stronger presence on the African continent; which in turn allows Portugal the formulation of an international diplomatic specificity in the form of its African policy.

Portugal's role as intermediary can take on a number of functions, 'whether it
be through direct official aid, or by exerting influence close to international entities, or by the mobilisation of its economic agents. This role is based on the notion of ‘mutually advantageous benefits’ accruing to all the countries involved; for Portugal, along with the politico-diplomatic gains involved, Lisbon expects a privileged treatment of Portuguese companies operating in Africa especially when it comes to allocating contracts. In essence, Portugal’s role is also an instrument designed to counter some of the problems Portuguese companies face in competing with more powerful economic groups that operate in those markets.

The role of intermediary is not confined to the economic sphere, as the Secretary of State, Durrao Barroso, stated:

We are not going to pretend we are a great power, but when it comes to African issues ... Portugal’s voice is heard and respected. Therefore African nations come to us and ask us to activate a contract of solidarity between Europe and Africa.

Furthermore as Cavaco Silva stated: ‘it is well known that the European countries and the USA along with Francophone and Anglophone African nations, recognise Portugal as an invaluable “interlocuteur” in African issues and particularly in Southern African matters.’ He was referring particularly to the active diplomatic involvement Portugal had carried out in the Southern African context since 1988, in the search for a solution to the region’s conflicts. Although Portugal has been more active in the resolution of the Angolan war it has also played a role in the Mozambican peace process. The attempt to settle the Angolan conflict - the most important international act by Portugal since it joined the European Community - also displays how Lisbon’s African policy is intended to allow Portugal an increased presence and voice within the international community. Moreover, it testifies to the effort that successive Portuguese governments, particularly under Cavaco Silva, have made to better relations with Lusophone Africa.

The resolution of the Angolan conflict also reveals another important consideration in Portuguese foreign policy. This is the country’s relationship with the US, where African policy is also allocated an important role.

Viewing a diversified foreign policy as the best guarantee of greater autonomy on the international scene, Lisbon views Africa as an important means of widening Washington’s relationship with Portugal away from solely NATO security considerations. The main aim behind strengthening Portugal’s relationship with Washington is naturally to strengthen the general state of Lisbon’s international political alliances. The US is of course also viewed as a useful support factor in Portugal’s relations with Africa. As the US presence is
downgraded both in Europe as a whole, and even more specifically in Portugal with the recent American decision to leave the strategic Azores base, Portugal hoped that its African policy might become an even more important support link in both Washington and Brussels.

The fact that Spain has become the fifth-ranking Community power serves to galvanise, not only a stronger relationship with Africa, but also Portugal’s international diplomacy in order to prevent any growing dependence on its neighbour.

This book will concentrate much of its attention on Portuguese relations with Angola and Mozambique, from the hour before the revolution to those hours after the failed elections in Angola in 1992. The reason for choosing Angola and Mozambique is because it has been with these two former colonies that the greatest political friction has occurred; and with them Portugal has had to formulate a clearer international diplomacy as to whether to retain its economic presence, or to carry out a more general role in the politics of Southern Africa. Moreover, the state of relations with these two former colonies has defined Portugal’s post-colonial relationship with Lusophone Africa as a whole.¹⁶

The prospect of peace in this region of the world is an urgent priority for Lisbon, since it will create greater economic possibilities for Portuguese companies in their traditional area of operations; while strengthening two nations which can become stronger diplomatic allies in international politics. In the case of the smaller former colonies of Guinea-Bissau (GB), Sao Tomé e Príncipe (STP) and Cape Verde (CV), their relationship with Portugal has been significantly easier for a number of reasons. Firstly, because they soon realised that not having the political and strategic importance of Angola, Communist bloc aid was far from sufficient to meet their development needs. And, secondly, because the overriding majority of the retornados, who left behind valuable economic concerns in Africa came from Angola and Mozambique; and, as we shall see, it would be the activities of certain elements from this community that would strain Luso-Angolan and Mozambican relations, sometimes very heavily indeed.

Endnotes

1. Interview with Portuguese Secretary of State for Co-operation and Foreign Affairs in Política International, 2. Lisbon: Trimestral, June 1990, p.73.


10. The PALOPs have met annually since 1981. These meetings aim to increase their co-operation in various sectors from culture to economic development. The presidency of these meetings rotates on an annual basis among the PALOPs. However, the PALOPs' geographical disparity and economic problems have made regional co-operation extremely difficult.


The Decolonisation

For Portugal defining a new post-colonial relation with Africa has involved a long process of overcoming the ‘traumatic’ legacy of decolonisation. It is in this revolutionary act that lie the problems which have characterised post-1975 Luso-African relations. The resolution of such problems Lisbon deemed imperative if Portugal was to be allowed a return to her traditional sphere of influence, and to boast an international dimension to her membership of the European Community. Having found her national identity, independence and international presence tied to Africa for longer than any other European power would have been reason enough to make decolonisation a painful process for Portugal. However, adding to this were the wounds of thirteen years of colonial wars, and the arrival in Portugal of 600,000 Portuguese who fled the colonies, leaving many with a bitter taste of resentment and anger, feelings which were directed primarily against those responsible for the decolonisation and the new regimes that emerged in the former colonies.

This chapter will concentrate on three main areas. Firstly we shall see how Africa, once Portugal’s crowning glory, soon became the country’s Achilles heel in both national and international politics. Moreover, it was the regime’s continuing intransigence on the African issue that led to a convergence of the forces of opposition which ultimately undermined it. Decolonisation was not a product of the April revolution, as some imply. Rather, it was the revolution’s linchpin, providing the opposition and particularly the military with the cohesive strength necessary to carry out the revolution. Secondly, we shall see that decolonisation was probably the single most important factor that both conditioned and was conditioned by the revolution. This ideological struggle over the future of Portugal and the country’s position in the world soon polarised the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) - the politicised wing of the military that had carried out the revolution - into two distinct camps; pitching Spinola and his conservatives against the forces of the left. Lastly, we shall look at the actual process of decolonisation in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. It was pointed out by some that in the world it had been Portugal, second only to the Soviet Union, that created, or allowed to be created, the greatest number of communist countries. Such simplistic views on decolonisation assume the whole process was both unitary, and directed from the centre, negating the paralysis that ideological power struggles had imposed on the Portuguese state which, overtaken by events, was left to do little more than sign de jure declarations of de facto independence. Until Spinola’s ousting in September there was no decolonisation policy in Lisbon that was responsible
for the events which were taking place in the colonies, although different political sectors possessed radically opposed ideas. Rather, the agenda for decolonisation appears to have been dictated by the actions of the local MFAs in each of the war torn territories according to the realities they faced. As the possibility of real military control exhausted itself in the theatre of operations, so certain sectors of the MFA intensified their battle for political power against the conservative Spinola. The main aim was to allow Lisbon at least a semblance of control in the decolonisation process by aligning Lisbon’s posture with events in the colonies. However, it is here that Marxist ideology and military practicality forged an alliance that became the intrinsic hallmark of Portuguese decolonisation. For those sectors that most readily responded to events in the colonies were those that wished to carry out a Marxist decolonisation free from any neo-colonial arrangements. The ideological alliance between the colonialist officer corps and their opponents, gave an unquestionable impulse to Portuguese foreign policy and to the calendar for the decolonisation of Portuguese Africa. It was in the battle over Angola that the correlation of political forces in Lisbon allowed the left increasingly to consolidate their power, and so strengthen their control over decolonisation. Unlike other European decolonisations, Marxism was to play a significant role in facilitating the hand-over of power to the liberation movements.

The End of the Regime

Opposition to the regime’s African policy was visible even before the onset of the colonial wars in 1961. In the late 1950s, two of the country’s bastions of political resistance - the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and Humberto Delgado - publicly stated the need for Portugal to alter her relationship with the overseas territories. While the PCP called for outright independence, Delgado spoke of a form of confederation. The advent of colonial warfare, while widening the gap between the regime and legitimacy, heralded a new phase of increased vocal criticism against the government’s African policy. This lead to the emergence of a multiplicity of views on the overseas question by the early 1970s, in which two main currents of thinking were discernible. The first was the ‘integrationalist’, comprised mostly of the regime’s followers; this school defended the need for a continued Portuguese presence in the colonies to secure the survival of a secular and unitary Portugal. The ‘federalists’, on the other hand, espoused an association with the more liberal sectors of society and advocated a federal solution to the overseas problem.

Marcello Caetano, taking over the reins of power following Salazar’s death, attempted to carry out a ‘Prague spring’, walking a political tightrope between the two schools of thought. However, as the regime once again rigged the elections in 1973, the opposition - sensing the cosmetic nature of any changes - began to radicalise its position.
Meanwhile, a parallel process was developing within the military establishment with rumblings of discontent increasingly heard in Angola. Officers began to state ‘we saw that we could not win in the colonies’. Although the military had for long wanted to alter the political situation they did not have the conditions to unite the officers. When Caetano told Spinola that he preferred a military defeat to political concessions in Guinea-Bissau in 1973, he placed the regime on a crash course with the armed forces. This time the military was not prepared to see a repetition of the events in Goa during 1961, when Salazar used the armed forces as a scapegoat for his political ineptitude. Guinea-Bissau was to be the detonating device that would bring the regime crashing to its knees. The economic and social situation also worsened as the colonial wars sucked up nearly 50% of GNP, while conscription forced many of the country’s young men to emigrate.

Throughout the sixties and early seventies Portugal’s African policy increasingly became the fundamental reason for a growing international isolation of the country, reducing its status to that of a pariah state. Relations with Scandinavia deteriorated rapidly as these countries increased their support for the liberation movements. While lodging formal complaints with Sweden, Portugal even recalled the country’s ambassador from Denmark. Portugal also recalled her ambassador to the Vatican for a brief period after the Pope received the leaders of the three liberation movements in a public act aimed at finally disavowing the Catholic Church from Lisbon’s colonial policy. While the OAU cut diplomatic relations with Portugal in 1963, the country became the subject of numerous resolutions passed in the UN with the Security Council urging Portugal to stop ‘all acts of aggression’ in November 1972. Portugal, under pressure to do so, resigned from UNESCO, and became the target of a number of expulsions from an array of multilateral forums such as the World Health Organisation’s regional commission for Africa. However, Portugal could count on the support of countries such as France, West Germany and on renewed support from the US with the arrival of the Nixon administration. These saw Portuguese policy in Africa in terms of regional stabilisation.

In February 1974, the publication of General Spinola’s book Portugal and the Future, which condemned the colonial wars and held them responsible for Portugal’s backwardness, lit the spark of revolutionary consciousness. Two months later the regime, with little or no support left, fell quietly and swiftly in the military coup d’etat of 25 April. On the 26th General Spinola - at the head of a junta of national salvation - presented the programme of the Movement of the Armed Forces to the nation. In its opening paragraph he declared that after 13 years of colonial wars, ‘the present political system has not been able to define concretely and objectively an overseas policy which would lead to peace’. Such a policy, he declared, could only be achieved by a ‘purging’ of the regime and its institutions. The MFA programme clearly
recognised that the solution to the overseas question was political, while promising to develop a policy which would lead to peace. As it had done for 500 years, Africa continued to exert a profound influence on the development of the Portuguese nation. Moreover, Portugal's future relationship with its colonies now fuelled the ideological dynamics of a power struggle among the revolutionary leadership.

Spinola's plans towards the colonies clothed the defence of Portuguese economic interests in the overseas territories with an appeal to the messianic nature of Portuguese history. He called on the creation of a vast 'Lusitanian community', organised on the basis of a political federation as the best means of achieving an 'authentic national unity'. Spinola wanted to create a 'pluri-continental state', that encompassed a 'common motherland from Minho (a province in Northern Portugal) to Timor'. The federation would be achieved through the progressive self-determination of the overseas populations, who in this way would find themselves free from the neo-colonial settlements that plagued so many of their neighbours. Moreover, Spinola cautioned against any decisive turn to the European Community, since it 'carried the risk of compromising national solutions to the overseas problem by annulling the substratum of economic integration within the Portuguese space ...'. The General restricted any future relationship with the European Community to commercial accords, which in essence allowed Portugal continued privileged access to the raw materials in the colonies.

Following the coup, Spinola began to pursue a strategy propitious to the creation of his Lusitanian commonwealth, which rested on the consolidation of three objectives. Firstly, he would maintain the Portuguese troops in the colonies on active duty until he obtained a cease-fire from the liberation movements; while, secondly, fomenting the creation of indigenous political forces that would compete with the liberation movements for electoral victory. Lastly, he would hold a referendum in the overseas territories that he expected would give a resounding victory to the idea of a pluri-continental Lusitania.

Ideologically, the left-wing MFA presented Portuguese foreign policy with an option diametrically opposed to Spinola's intentions. The MFA led a decolonisation that imposed a complete break with the past. It was to possess an anti-imperialist, non-neo-colonial character that represented the liberation of the colonised peoples. In attempting to impose his scheme Spinola slowly lost his grip, with the balance of power turning towards the left-wing faction within the MFA. This swing in the pendulum of revolutionary power owed as much to the left's bid for power as it did to the necessity of responding to events in the colonies. Although Portugal's military position varied with the colony, the disunity of the Portuguese colonial troops left Lisbon without the main instrument through which it could impose its will and considerably reduced Portugal's room for manoeuvre in the subsequent negotiations for independence.
The Portuguese state was to have its position vis-à-vis the liberation movements weakened even further during the process of decolonisation by another crucial factor. The April regime, with its need to secure international legitimacy, now needed to adopt a favourable stance on the very issue that had been responsible for the country’s international isolation-decolonisation. Aware of this, the appointment by the junta of the well-connected socialist exile, Mario Soares, as foreign minister, was intended as an international guarantee of Lisbon’s intentions. Soares was well known for his pro-independence stance, and became a leading exponent of the left-wing MFA’s ideas on decolonisation. Before taking up his government post Soares began a European tour that took him in early May to the UK, West Germany, Holland, Belgium and Denmark where he met representatives of other Scandinavian nations. While securing recognition for the revolutionary regime he also met the leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, and arranged for a meeting with the leader of the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau, Aristides Pereira. Lisbon also began to feel a growing pressure from the UN and the OAU to increase the pace of its decolonisation, with both organisations threatening to step up support for the liberation movements until Portugal clarified its position on the colonial question. With Spinola in power, the liberation movements were still unsure of Portugal’s intentions, and Lisbon knew that any action taken against the movements might undermine the regime’s new international standing. Spinola’s intransigent determination to pursue his plans, in a similar fashion to Salazar and Caetano, would both radicalise the left-wing MFA into further action, and terminate 500 years of Portuguese history with a legacy of resentment and humiliation. Like Caetano, it was Africa that would topple him from power. It is to the actual processes of decolonisation in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola that we now turn, in order to show how the above-mentioned factors interacted to produce the unique process of Portuguese decolonisation.

**Guinea-Bissau**

It was Guinea-Bissau which defined the context of the decolonisation, insisting the Portuguese government recognise publicly the right of the overseas people to total independence, forcing in this way a clarification of the political concepts and the balance of power in the heart of the new regime and precipitated the subsequent struggle between the conservatives and radicals within the MFA.

Spinola, aware of the desperate military situation the Portuguese faced in Guinea-Bissau, attempted a two-front solution to the problem while governor of the province until 1973. Internally he carried out a series of political and social measures aimed at bettering the welfare of the population, with the clear aim of undermining popular support for the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). Internationally, between 1971 and 1972, he
began to use the good offices of President Senghor of Senegal as a channel of communication with the PAIGC leadership. The result of these contacts was a series of three face-to-face meetings between Spinola and the PAIGC’s leader, Cabral, to discuss the eventual independence of the colony. The Portuguese regime’s intransigence over colonial independence had already been loosened by events in the overseas territories, with the military increasingly taking matters into their own hands. The result of the Spinola/Cabral meeting was an agreement that envisaged the colony’s progressive independence during a period of 10 years within the context of a Luso-African community, with Amilcar Cabral as the undisputed leader of the nation. However, Caetano refused the agreement, regarding a cease-fire as a victory to the PAIGC. It was also at this meeting that Caetano expressed his preference for a military defeat over a political solution. The refusal by Lisbon to negotiate a face-saving formula with the PAIGC at this stage was to cause Portugal the eventual undignified end to its presence in Africa. The military situation deteriorated quickly for the Portuguese during 1973, as the PAIGC successfully persuaded Moscow that they could operate two-man Sam-7 missile systems in the jungle. The Portuguese quickly lost their uncontested superiority of the skies. Moreover, the PAIGC, controlling most of the territory, formally issued a declaration of independence at the inaugural session of the People’s National Assembly on 24 September 1973. The Portuguese had lost not only the military battle, but their international position was also beginning to border on the ridiculous. The United Nations had already recognised the PAIGC in 1972 as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Guinea-Bissau and by November 1973, 2 months after the PAIGC’s declaration of independence, around 80 countries had recognised the new state of Guinea-Bissau. Lisbon’s intransigence, on what was now only a formal acceptance of the independent status of Guinea-Bissau, was a clear recognition that events in this overseas territory would set a destabilising precedent for the situation in the more valuable colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

With the April revolution an opportunity presented itself to resolve the country’s diplomatic disaster with Guinea-Bissau, and the international community at large. Spinola’s first move was to send a close and loyal aide, the then Major Fabiao, to Paris for an urgent meeting with President Senghor. The purpose of Fabiao’s mission was to reactivate the Spinola/Senghor pact that had been agreed with Cabral for the independence of Guinea-Bissau. However, Senghor, obviously more in tune with international opinion than Spinola, made it clear that it was too late to make the pact a feasible reality. Senegal’s president added that he and the OAU were prepared to collaborate with Portugal in the decolonisation of the other territories if, as a sign of goodwill, Portugal recognised the independence of Guinea-Bissau, and added provocatively that it should take the same course of action towards the other colonies. The document Senghor produced added that if Portugal wanted a cease-fire, then two further
conditions had to be met. All Portuguese troops would have to gather at regional assembly points, and all acts of aggression had to cease immediately. A secret meeting was then arranged, using once again the good offices of President Senghor, at the Ngor Hotel near Dakar in May 1974. At the meeting Portugal's socialist foreign minister asked for an unconditional cease-fire before any negotiations could begin. The PAIGC delegation, aware of its military advantage, pointed to the conditions outlined in the 6 May document, while Soares pointed to the 'difficulties' at home. In essence, the difficulties that Soares highlighted referred to the fact that Spinola was still in power with strong support within the MFA, and unrealistically intent on a decolonisation agreement that favoured the creation of his Luso-African community. Soares later commented that Spinola’s intransigence at this point meant that Portugal later signed an independence agreement on less favourable terms. It is possible that by difficulties Soares was also alluding to possible pressure exerted on Lisbon by Pretoria for Portugal to show caution on Guinea-Bissau, clearly aware of the repercussions this would have on the two countries that shared its borders in Southern Africa. As a result of the meeting Pereira recommended a temporary cease-fire and the holding of a referendum. However, the ideological sympathies of the socialist Soares and the PAIGC demonstrated themselves clearly at the negotiations; as Soares stated ‘we embraced and sat around the table like friends who have a common problem’. During the talks Portugal refused to recognise the state of Guinea-Bissau as this would have removed the need for Spinola’s referendum. The next round of talks on Algeria once again ended in failure as the PAIGC had been infuriated by Spinola’s television speech of 11 June. In the speech he reiterated the offer of a referendum to the peoples of the colonies as a means of deciding their future, intent still on undermining popular support for the liberation movements.

Many officers, whether ideologically sympathetic or not to the PAIGC, realised that Spinola’s proposals would be unacceptable in Africa. Around the time of the Algiers talks in mid-June it was clear that the disunity which had seized the colonial troops in Guinea-Bissau prevented Lisbon from continuing any form of warfare. The physical and psychological effects of an unwinnable war, coupled with the ideological sympathies of many officers in the local MFA, lay behind the collapse of military discipline in the overseas territory.

The local MFA in Guinea-Bissau, exhausted with the slow progress in Lisbon, began to take matters into its own hands shortly after the meeting in Senegal by developing its own contacts with the PAIGC. As the diplomatic impasse continued so the local MFA consolidated its grip on the decolonisation of Guinea-Bissau by removing Bethencourt Rodrigues as the Commander-in-Chief/Governor of the territory.

Moreover, it would be the actions of the local MFA that prevented the PAIGC from putting into practice its threat to restart the war in the face of continuing
diplomatic intransigence from Lisbon. The PAIGC, realising that progress could not be made with the Portuguese in Lisbon, sought progress with them in Bissau. These ‘two sites of negotiations’ formed a single PAIGC strategy. In mid-May Spinola had sent his trusted Fabiao as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to Guinea-Bissau in an attempt to control the actions of the military. Fabiao had a reputation as a liberal, having denounced an attempted right-wing coup by Kaulza de Arriaga some months before the April coup in favour of Spinola. He was not a formal member of the MFA before the revolution, but had come to the conclusion, while working during the early seventies in Guinea-Bissau with Spinola, that the war in the colony was a lost cause. Fabiao, assessing local realities on arrival, both endorsed and stimulated local contacts with the PAIGC. With the new governor the MFA strengthened its grip over the administrative structures in Guinea-Bissau, even allowing the PAIGC access to local radio in order to carry out its programme of political mobilisation. Such acts were also designed as confidence-building measures to secure the trust of the PAIGC and prevent danger of renewed warfare.

On 1 July, in a clear demonstration of how Marxist ideology and military practicality played a prominent role in the Portuguese process of decolonisation, Fabiao chaired a meeting of officers of all ranks. It proved fundamental to the independence of Guinea-Bissau. He called on Portugal to overcome ‘all obstacles placed in its path by reactionary and neo-colonial forces ...’ and, in accordance ‘with pertinent United Nations resolutions recognise the Republic of Guinea and the right of the people of the Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence, the only course which will lead to true peace’. He called on all those who intended to remain in Guinea to ‘collaborate with the people of Guinea, contributing in this way to the payment of the historical debt engendered by Portuguese colonialism’. Fabiao claimed this declaration was forced ‘by the systematic refusal of the junta of national salvation to admit the political realities of Guinea’. The meeting proved instrumental in securing the trust of the PAIGC, leading to a secret meeting in the Medjo forest on 13 July between Fabiao and PAIGC representatives. The agreement reached after two days was to serve as the basis for the final negotiations on decolonisation between the PAIGC and Portugal, arranged for the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops and for the orderly transfer of all areas of administration to the PAIGC.

Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the MFA (particularly its more left-wing sectors) began to consolidate their power with the appointment of the second provisional government under the pro-Communist Vasco Goncalves. On assuming office Goncalves committed himself to a ‘just process of decolonisation without ambiguities’, that did not lead to neo-colonialism. Spinola, undermined by the increasing power of the left in Lisbon and by events in the colonies, particularly in Guinea, issued a historical declaration on 27 July. The speech formally
recognised the colonies’ right to independence ‘with all its consequences’, and stated that Lisbon would begin an immediate transfer of power in the overseas provinces. On 26 August an agreement was signed between Portugal and the PAIGC that set Guinea’s date of independence for 10 September. Spinola had lost the battle to create his pluri-continental state of Lusitania. It was the PAIGC in Guinea which had defeated Spinola and not the left. The MFA and its ruling ideology had only catalysed events, and in doing so may have prevented a further national humiliation.

Mozambique

As Lisbon witnessed the capitulation of Guinea, so events in Mozambique began to take a turn for the worse. However, Portugal was nowhere near the same military desperation that characterised its position in Guinea at the time of the April revolution. Between 1971 and 1972, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), with the support of Zambia and Malawi, began a new front which by 1974, equipped with the SAM-7 missile, allowed the movement’s penetration into Manica and Sofala provinces. From there FRELIMO threatened to disrupt communications with Rhodesia, and penetrate also into Tete province. Meanwhile, growing attacks on the white settler population provoked growing resentment against both FRELIMO and the Portuguese military for what was viewed as inadequate protection. The situation was particularly acute in Vila Pery, Zambezia and Beira.

At the time of the April coup in Lisbon, Machel - although clearly aware that he did not possess military superiority - realised that time was on his side. Deeply mistrustful of the Spinola-led junta’s intentions to carry out decolonisation, Machel used the political chaos in Lisbon to his advantage by calling for a general offensive on 8 May 1974. The express aim of his initiative was to force Lisbon into recognising the independence of Mozambique. Moises Samora Machel clearly rejected any of Spinola’s plans for the colonies, especially the idea of a referendum, arguing that there was no such concept as ‘democratic colonialism’. On Spinola’s plans for a federation, Machel answered by stating that FRELIMO was not fighting for the Mozambicans to ‘become Portuguese of black skin’. The disintegration of the armed forces along similar lines to that which had taken place in Guinea-Bissau altered the military balance of power in favour of FRELIMO. This state of affairs, as in Guinea, reduced Lisbon’s bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations for independence. By July 1974, troops had abandoned a number of barracks and in many instances refused to fight. It was in the north of the colony that this situation was particularly evident, as troops pulled out to the chagrin of the local white population. Ideological sympathies may have caused some to exploit the disintegration of the armed forces; but overall it was the ‘Milicianos’/conscripts
who, with the prospects of returning home instilled in their hearts by the April coup, refused to go on sacrificing themselves at Lisbon’s colonial altar.

In response to Kenneth Kaunda’s prompting for a negotiated settlement since early May, and the visibly deteriorating conditions in the colony, Costa Gomes, the junta’s number two, arrived in Mozambique for a three day visit. The purpose of his trip was a dual one: to assess the situation on the ground and to strengthen pro-MFA forces in the army and the administration. Speaking in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), he urged the rebels to transfer their headquarters from Tanzania to Mozambique, and operate freely as a political party in forthcoming elections; while proposing immediate negotiations without a symbolic surrender of arms. Gomes’ invitation for FRELIMO to become a political party was a clear attempt by Spinola to disarm FRELIMO and have it compete on an equal footing with the other political parties that had begun to emerge. The parties varied greatly, from the multi-racial appeal of GUMO, to tribally-inspired initiatives such as UNIPOMO, and the white settlers’ own party ‘FICO’ (I STAY). The announcement by Almeida Santos, Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordination, in May, that the referendum would take place in a year, galvanised support for the various parties, with the whites - already unsettled by Gomes’ speech - flocking to FICO.

However, since FRELIMO was not prepared to meet Spinola’s demands and continued to wage an increasingly successful war, it was with FRELIMO that the Portuguese had to bargain, not with other political forces. The fact of the matter was that neither the political parties nor Spinola had the power to influence developments to the same extent that FRELIMO could.

In the first week of June the first exploratory talks began between Lisbon and FRELIMO. The talks appear to have been facilitated by a meeting held between the rebel movements in the Portuguese territories and the Presidents of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia, respectively Julius Nyerere, Mobutu and Kenneth Kaunda. The leaders of these countries, realising the importance of Mozambique and Angola in the Southern African context and the consequences of their independence for the region, attempted to attain a peaceful transition to independence. With the resignation of governor Henrique Soares de Melo in mid-July it was clear that the local MFA was consolidating its power within the administrative structures, as it had done in Guinea. In a parallel process, reminiscent of the MFA’s actions in Guinea, the local MFA was consolidating its power while simultaneously developing its contacts with the FRELIMO leadership. The MFA’s will to end the war (ideologically and non-ideologically motivated), along with its dual-strategy, secured the trust of FRELIMO, causing the movement to declare a cease-fire on 3 August. The other instrumental factor behind the decision to cease hostilities concerned developments in Lisbon. Spinola’s declaration of independence in July removed any further hesitation
Machel may have had surrounding Portugal’s real intentions towards the colonies. It was also clear that with a military reluctant to fight, Portugal was in no position to hold the fort while a third force appeared on the political landscape. In essence, all that Melo Antunes and Soares could do at Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka was negotiate a face-saving formula for the Portuguese withdrawal. Militarily, Portugal could have held the situation by sending more troops to Mozambique, but that option was non-viable for a number of converging reasons. Firstly, various political forces, particularly on the extreme left, vocalised a feeling that lay behind many a mother’s tears, ‘not one more soldier to the colonies’. This sentiment was also shared by many conscript soldiers at home, as a conscript rebellion in Lisbon later displayed. Moreover, with the MFA increasingly holding the reins of power and dominated by Marxist internationalism, the deployment of more troops to reinforce Portugal’s military presence in the colonies would have severely dented the regime’s internationalist credentials.

As Soares stated to Machel at the June talks in Lusaka ‘we were and are objectively allied ... we two have enemies common to us both’. An agreement for the independence of Mozambique was signed in Lusaka on 7 September, that set the date for independence in June 1975. Along with a cease-fire, it was agreed that a joint transitional government would rule the territory until FRELIMO formed its government on independence. Ideological sympathies between those in Lisbon and FRELIMO surfaced clearly at the talks. Kenneth Kaunda’s ‘protocole a l’anglaise’ was completely sent into disarray at the Lusaka negotiations, with the Portuguese delegations rushing around the table embracing their opposite numbers. If the Portuguese state could have defended any interests in the colonies, then the ideological alliance between the MFA and the left-wing political forces prevented any settlements that could be tainted with the appearance of neo-colonialism. Spinola had sent Otleo Saraiva de Carvalho to Lusaka with the mission of restraining his socialist foreign minister; however, Carvalho, a leading figure of the MFA, told Soares to hand Mozambique over to FRELIMO unconditionally! There was little Lisbon could do to impose an agreement with the military in tatters. As Spinola points out, the Lusaka agreement had his consent ‘after the chief of the armed forces had informed the council of the state of the real situation in Mozambique’, with other units threatening to follow the surrender of one unit to FRELIMO unless a cease-fire was agreed.

With the signing of the Lusaka agreement the white population, feeling abandoned by the Portuguese government to the mercy of FRELIMO, whose attacks on the settlers had done little to secure their trust, decided to take their own action. An angry revolt by the white settlers attempted to take control of Lourenço Marques, killing thousands of blacks in the process, with similar skirmishes in the northern city of Beira. On 10 September, a group of whites
calling themselves 'dragons of death' took control of the radio station calling
on South Africa to invade. Pretoria did not risk taking any action that might
tarnish even further her international image; moreover, Pretoria did not seem
to have any initial reservations concerning a black government in Mozambique.
FRELIMO did not intervene, but told the Portuguese military that unless it took
action to quell the riot it would take up arms against the settlers. The riot was
promptly controlled.

Jorge Jardim, a powerful Mozambican businessman and a friend of the late
Salazar, negotiated a deal with FRELIMO through the good office of Kenneth
Kaunda in 1974. The agreement envisaged a settler-FRELIMO government
governing the country on independence. However, Caetano rejected the deal as
he had rejected Spinola's attempts for a compromise in Guinea, and thereby
made Portugal's end in Africa a more radical one. In his book Mozambique-
Scorched Land, he later branded the more intransigent in the regime as 'those
truly responsible for the later events in Africa'. However, Jardim's agreement
found no following in Lisbon as it smacked of neo-colonialism. Even if Lisbon
had accepted the agreement as a basis of negotiation it is hard to imagine that
it would have succeeded, bearing in mind the military reluctance in Lisbon, and
the international position on Portuguese decolonisation. After all, not even
Pretoria was prepared to intervene against the formation of a black government
on its borders. Feeling abandoned by Portugal, afraid and uncertain about the
future, a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers began until the colony's
independence. FRELIMO made little effort to persuade the settlers to stay on
and soon found itself trying to govern a nation with no governors. The
Portuguese, with a bitter sense of resentment, left the country destroying
property and bringing the Mozambican economy to a grinding halt.

Angola

Angola was to be the most difficult overseas province to decolonise. In the
process Spinola would be ousted from power with the left-wing MFA
establishing itself as the motor and guiding light of the Portuguese revolution,
while the liberation movements in their quest for power turned the colony into
a superpower military backyard.

Following the pattern in the other colonies, the MFA began to consolidate its
power in the colony soon after the April coup, with the forced resignation of
the Governor-General Santos e Castro. The MFA believed he was in collusion
with powerful economic interests in the colony that prevented the winds of
change in Lisbon from reaching the colony. The local MFA also established its
office which was to co-ordinate the movement's activities, while a number of
officers suspected of preparing a right-wing counter-coup were sent packing to
Lisbon with Santos e Castro.
On 5 May the new Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Soares Carneiro, ceased all operations and offered the rebel movements a cease-fire. However, Neto, like Machel and Pereira, did not accept this offer believing that Spinola's presence in the junta demonstrated Lisbon's intentions of perpetuating exploitation under a revolutionary banner. On a European tour following the April coup, Neto, the most internationally respected liberation leader in Angola, dismissed the cease-fire as meaningless without Portugal's acknowledgement of Angola's right to complete an immediate independence. Neto also rejected Spinola’s ideas on a referendum stating that Portugal must 'purely' and 'simply' leave Angola. A growing dispute also began to emerge among the three liberation movements as to which one of them should be the sole and legitimate interlocutor with the Portuguese authorities in any independence talks. While Mobutu began trying to weaken international support for Agostinho Neto’s Movemento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), so the first wave of Chinese military advisors began to arrive in Kinshasa during June 1974. Chinese support for a right-wing regime highlighted the fact that power, not ideologies, had begun to characterise the internationalisation of the civil war. Although a number of political parties began to emerge, the liberation movements were unanimous in their rejection of the right of any of these to political legitimacy. For Spinola, these were 'live forces' that he hoped, as in the other colonies, would contest political power with the liberation movements, preparing the ground for his referendum.

The battle for the decolonisation of Angola had begun as Spinola, after a visit by Santos (Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordination), appointed Silivino Silverio Marques as the colony’s new governor. Marques had a reputation for being a hard-line supporter of the previous regime’s African policy and his nomination provoked animosity among many in the MFA. Spinola, on the other hand, thought Marques would keep the colony’s left-wing MFA under control. The appointment of Marques did display that Spinola and his conservative followers still dominated the MFA at this stage of the revolutionary process. Marques also appears to have had a clear mission from Spinola, consisting in developing contacts with local whites and blacks favourable to the resurrection of the people’s congress in Angola, while at the same time looking to fan the natural mistrust between the liberation movements, sending their common anti-Portuguese front up in smoke.

The new governor proved inept at managing the growing racial violence, particularly in Luanda’s predominantly black 'musseques'/shantytowns. Here one incident had provoked a violent white backlash on the black population. These events played into the hands of those within the MFA unhappy with Marques’ presence and catalysed a struggle between the governor and the MFA. The MFA, furious at the governor’s refusal to allow MFA officers into the defence council, called an emergency meeting which took place on 17 July. In
that meeting a document was approved - and subsequently sent to the junta in Lisbon - informing it that the MFA would ‘take the necessary measures’ within 72 hours needed to bring the situation under control if Lisbon did not act. While the MFA restructured the military hierarchy in order to consolidate its power over the armed forces, Lisbon answered what had in essence been an ultimatum of the local MFA by advising caution.

Following a flying visit by a Lisbon delegation, the MFA won its first victory with the recall of Marques to Lisbon. With the second provisional government in power Spinola suffered another defeat, with the sending of Rosa Coutinho - the red admiral - to Angola by the new military junta on 24 July, the new junta having been established the previous day. Following Spinola’s historic speech of 27 July he told his Vasco Goncalves executive, ‘I know this is what you wanted, but now, Angola is my affair’. The war that now began to intensify between the left-wing MFA and Spinola would remove what little ability the Portuguese state still possessed to control the issue of Angolan decolonisation. In essence Nero fiddled while Rome burnt. In Angola Coutinho followed a strategy that aimed to favour the MPLA in the struggle for power between the three movements. He provided the MPLA with discreet amounts of military equipment and arranged the transport of MPLA leaders to the movement’s Lusaka congress in August 1974. Coutinho was essentially aiming to help the MPLA overcome the weaknesses that resulted from the movement’s internal divisions. Although, like many left-wing officers in the MFA, he may have sympathised with a transfer of power to the MPLA and helped the movement to survive at a particularly crucial phase of its existence, his actions would have little direct effect on the movement’s later assumption of power. The whites, aware of the red admiral’s views on decolonisation, began to rally to the Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola (FNLA) of Holden Roberto and Dr. Jonas Savimbi’s Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), failing to organise themselves in a separate political entity that defended their interests in the process of Angola’s decolonisation. As in the other colonies, the MFA had developed its own informal contacts with the MPLA which, stimulated by the arrival of Coutinho and Spinola’s declaration of independence, led to a cease-fire between the Portuguese troops and the MPLA. UNITA had already signed a cease-fire with the Portuguese on 14 June. Militarily the weakest, UNITA was eager to see the battle for power in Angola transferred to the political sphere, where counting on the support of the largest tribe in Angola (the Ovimbundo) it was the most likely candidate to win any elections; although it is unknown whether such a clear tribal basis for power would have produced any long-term peace results. Moreover UNITA had a long record of good relations with the Portuguese, having been instrumental to their counter-intelligence activities as both Spinola and Kaulza de Arriaga have recently admitted. Such action was forced by its weak military position and instrumental to the organisation’s survival. A cease-fire with the FNLA, which was
essentially a Zairean grab for power over the rich potential of Angola, was finally signed through the good offices of the FNLA’s mentor and protector President Mobutu on 12 October. Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA, was in fact Mobutu’s brother-in-law. At this stage only the MPLA and the FNLA were recognised as liberation movements by the OAU. The MFA was not alone in favouring the MPLA as Angola’s future government, because Neto’s movement was internationally recognised to be the only one with the personnel and policies capable of governing an independent country. Neto’s recognised international prestige lay behind Savimbi’s and Roberto’s decision to have him speak for the three liberation movements at the Alvor independence talks. Contrary to what many have stated, the MPLA was not a simple Soviet agent; far from it, in the two years before the April revolution it was Scandinavia – particularly Sweden – that played the role of Neto’s principal international supporter. However, the MPLA’s anti-imperialist propaganda sent chills of terror through those with economic interests in the colony while confirming to others the movement’s pro-Soviet nature. But the MPLA – unlike UNITA, and especially the FNLA – was not tainted with the racist violence that characterised the actions of the other two.

Meanwhile, Spinola, seeing his position increasingly undermined at home and in the colonies, began pursuing a diplomatic strategy that sought international support for the creation of his Luso-African community. For Spinola, fighting the MFA’s ideas on decolonisation, and preventing the victory of the liberation movements in the colonies was a question of preventing Soviet and communist encroachment. Moreover, Spinola – supported by some of Portugal’s leading industrialists – sought to defend Portuguese economic interests in the colony. In June, after a secret meeting with Nixon in the Azores, Spinola claimed that there was a ‘total identity in spirit between Nixon and Portugal’. If Nixon had promised to help Spinola both at home and in his plans for the colonies, then Washington took little direct action in aiding him, and in Angola the US soon began following its own objectives. In August, Kurt Waldheim – then UN Secretary-General – arrived in Portugal for talks with Spinola. Waldheim appears to have been worried about Portugal’s ability to decolonise, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. One of the issues agreed at the meeting was that Portugal should undertake to ‘fully insure the unity and integrity of each of the territories’ and declare itself ‘against any separatist attempts to divide them, whatever the source’. It is unclear as to what ‘separatist attempts’ the agreement referred, but it could well have been a warning for Spinola not to accept any form of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in the colonies, or any intervention by South Africa or Zaire to impose puppet regimes in either colony. Waldheim may also have been giving Spinola a clear indication that a possible division of Mozambique under separate ideologically-different regimes, as Nixon had once suggested, was not acceptable.
In September Spinola recalled Rosa Coutinho to Lisbon and informed the admiral of his continued intention to oversee personally the decolonisation of Angola. On 10 September Spinola made a highly controversial television speech which, in a clear reference to the left and their allies in the MFA, criticised what he viewed as a flippant ‘transfer of power to partisan organisations’, throwing the African territories into the hands of ‘new enslavement’ contrary to ‘democratic ideology’. He further warned against the ‘hasty abandonment of the colonies to satellisation by third parties’. Intent on forming a transitional government with white participation until the holding of elections, Spinola met Mobutu in Cape Verde to work out the shape of the future Angolan government. The details of the meeting have never been disclosed but it seems that Spinola intended to prevent Zairean intervention in Angola by agreeing to a puppet regime under the tutelage of both Spinola and Mobutu. The agreement aimed at appeasing Mobutu while defending Spinola’s political and economic objectives. Zairean-backed FNLA forces did indeed begin to move into northern Angola by late September.

In Portugal, the left and their allies within the MFA could not tolerate such a blatantly neo-colonial settlement which marginalised the MPLA. At the end of October, Spinola was forced to resign in an event that steered the revolutionary process in Portugal towards the left. As Spinola later stated, it was the battle over the decolonisation of Angola that prompted his downfall. Political and economic chaos in Portugal was another factor behind Spinola’s downfall. From here on Lisbon would possess a clear policy on decolonisation that reflected the internationalist ideology dominant within the MFA. Portuguese foreign policy had in the space of six months gone from a radical position on colonialism to an ‘internationalist’ stance on decolonisation. Portugal was to begin a redefinition of its relationship with both the world and Africa.

Having attained a cease-fire with all the liberation movements by late 1974, Soares and Antunes carried out a diplomatic offensive that finally resulted in an agreement at Mombasa in January 1975, between all three movements, to negotiate independence from Portugal under a common platform. Portugal had begun to show the world that it could indeed decolonise in complex circumstances without accusations of political partiality. After various Portuguese appeals the OAU finally recognised UNITA. It was thought in Lisbon that UNITA might be indispensable in forming an alliance with the MPLA against the Zairean-backed FNLA. Angolan independence was finally agreed at Alvor in January 1975, setting the colony’s independence for 11 November 1975, while establishing a transitional government and the creation of a single army. One important factor was missing in this agreement - international guarantees. Lisbon had forgotten to secure vital international assurances from all those interested in the process of Angolan independence to uphold the Alvor peace accord.
Portugal’s insistence on negotiating with the three movements on equal terms led to a dispute between the three as to who would be in the most advantageous position on the date of independence. Without international guarantees committed to Alvor, there was no one to restrain their actions, with skirmishes quickly escalating to full-scale civil war. In February 1975 the MPLA launched its first battle for Luanda. The movements invalidated the very independence agreement they had signed. Following Alvor, Coutinho had been replaced by a new High Commissioner, Silva Cardoso, through whom Portugal now pursued a policy of ‘active neutrality’, which as its name suggests involved greater impartiality towards the warring factions. As the situation worsened in the colony, both Melo Antunes (by then Foreign Minister) and the Zambian leadership began asking Washington for help in containing the violence; but US policy at that point meant rebuffing repeated appeals from both countries.

The MPLA, following a brief truce, restarted its battle for Luanda in June, successfully expelling both the FNLA and UNITA from the capital by August. Soviet support for the MPLA had been reluctant until the movement had patched its internal divisions, and as the CIA, China and Zaire began supporting the FNLA in July 1974, so the MPLA began receiving small supplies of armaments from Moscow.

The US had little intention of helping Portugal from the beginning; even as Alvor was being signed Kissinger obtained US$300,000 from the 40 committee for covert CIA aid for the FNLA. The US with its own interests in mind failed Portugal just as the UK had done over Goa in 1961. In retaliation for American support to the FNLA, the MPLA began to receive much larger arms supplies by March 1975, which gave it the confidence to expel the other movements from Luanda. In July 1975 a frustrated Kissinger, unable to obtain congressional support for his plans against what he narrowly interpreted as a projection of Soviet power, obtained a further US$14 million for covert aid. This money was to be primarily for the FNLA, but a small amount was to be used for UNITA. Washington had no desire to see a peaceful transition in Angola; had it done so, it could have channelled its aid to UNITA and supported the holding of elections as was laid down by the independence agreement. As had already been stated, UNITA - due to the size of its tribal support - could have won any scheduled elections, allowing the US a clearly pro-western regime. However, Washington chose the militarily more powerful FNLA, in what was intended to be a display of American strength and Kissinger’s commitment to contain Moscow. It failed. Meanwhile Zaire prepared to invade Angola in support of the FNLA in the north, while South Africa prepared to do the same with UNITA in the south. Savimbi was later to find out that Pretoria had no intention of placing him in power, preferring the leader of the FNLA. The MPLA with its support from the communist bloc was to maintain itself in power. Although Cuban troops began arriving in Angola
by early October, it was not until the South African-Zairean invasion that, in a meeting with Sekou Toure of Guinea-Conarky, Neto asked Fidel Castro for troops on the scale of those which began to arrive in Operation Carlota on 2 November 1975.

Amidst a superpower struggle Portugal had totally lost control over events. Melo Antunes, having promised more troops to help with the evacuation and bring the situation under control, soon found that the conditions in Portugal did not permit such a course of action. A week after the Portuguese High Commission resigned, the transitional government collapsed with only the MPLA ministers refusing to leave their desks. The Portuguese troops, keeping out of the war, concentrated on evacuating those Portuguese who wanted to leave the war-torn country, while suspending Alvor at the end of August. The President of Portugal interestingly stated that it was necessary to prevent the occupation of the MPLA-controlled capital by the Zairean-backed FNLA. The exact purpose of this statement remains unknown. The day before the victorious MPLA proclaimed its independence on 11 November, the Portuguese withdrew. Angola was no longer its concern, since those with whom Portugal had negotiated the colony’s independence, chose to decide their own future amidst a war that crippled the new-born nation. Half a million Portuguese settlers returned home paying the price of a tardy decolonisation and Kissinger’s ‘realpolitik’. Kissinger had always stated that peace was not the objective of ‘realpolitik’, only a possible consequence.

In conclusion, it seems that conspiratorial explanations negate the most fundamental characteristic of the decolonisation process - the fact that the agenda for decolonisation was set in each individual territory according to the local politico-military situation, and not by a centrally-planned course of action in Lisbon. Even by September, when the left-wing forces, ousting Spinola, began to define a coherent policy on decolonisation characterised by ‘Marxist internationalism’, the independence of all Guinea and Mozambique had already been agreed. In Angola, although Coutinho enabled the MPLA to survive in a decisive phase of its existence, Lisbon negotiated the colony’s independence with all three politically different liberation movements. Even the role of ideology has been overstated. While those on the left claim to have been the architects of an exemplary decolonisation, as in the rhetoric of people like Soares, in Africa the ideology of the left was only instrumental in facilitating the handover of power to the liberation movements. Their contribution was to align Lisbon’s position with the liberation movements’ refusal to accept Spinola’s ideas, when it was they and not Spinola who had the advantage. The right, on the other hand, must accept that it was its intransigent policies that led to the debacle of decolonisation. It was the disintegration of the armed forces, provoked by the lack of allegiance to an illegitimate regime at home and an unwinnable war in Africa. Moreover, it was Spinola’s initial intransigence in
pursuing a political utopia that was refused by the liberation movements, who increasingly had the advantage, that radicalised the decolonisation process - the price of which was paid by those who poured back to Portugal. Salazar and Caetano's intransigence to part with 500 years of history, along with the revolutionary power struggle that followed the April coup and the international pressures on Portugal to decolonise all played a part in the chaos of decolonisation.

Portugal's refusal to recognise the MPLA government in Angola ushered in a new period of separation from Africa. It would take a long while before Africa and Portugal healed the wounds left by decolonisation. While the former colonies withdrew behind communist curtains, a shattered Portugal began a fumbling relationship with the world.
A Post-Revolutionary Choice

As we saw in the last chapter, a turbulent history accompanied the April revolution. This chapter begins by giving it a thematic context, then proceeds to discuss the history of Portuguese/African links under the presidency of Eanes up to 1982 - by which time the 'revolution' had accounted for eight years of often turbulent foreign policy.

Goncalves' Communist Foreign Policy Option

Following the April revolution a power struggle broke out between the conservatives and moderates led by Spinola, and the more radical Marxist elements of the MFA. The arrival of Vasco Goncalves in power by September 1975 clearly signalled the increasing victory of the latter, and initiated a subsequent growth in the power of the staunchly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party (PCP).

At the international level the growth of communist power in Portugal led to fears, particularly among NATO partners, that Lisbon was on the verge of defecting to the Soviet bloc. The more radical phase which the Portuguese revolutionary process began in March 1975 further fuelled such fears. While rumours circulated about Kissinger's plans to annex the Azores and invade Portugal with Spanish troops, NATO carried out exercises off the Portuguese coast in February 1975 designed to intimidate those planning a communist take-over. The exercises had been prompted by what was believed to be a Soviet request to use Portuguese ports for its fishing fleet. Throughout 1975 as NATO increased its pressure on Portugal to curb communist power, Goncalves made strident efforts to prove that Portugal was not a 'Trojan' horse within the alliance. Even the radical Council of the Revolution issued a declaration in the spring of 1975 stressing Portugal's commitment to NATO. Prime Minister Goncalves had, however, made it clear that the Americans could not use the Azores base for any action against the Arab states. This was hardly communism bearing in mind that Portugal and Greece had been the only two European countries which had permitted Washington refuelling facilities in the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. This attitude was also symptomatic of the importance the Arab states were to acquire in post-revolutionary Portuguese foreign policy.

Goncalves' foreign policy orientation towards the west, whether in relation to the Arab states, or in relation to the use of Portuguese ports by Soviet
commercial interests, was more closely linked to the non-aligned ideas of Third Worldism than any strategic designs by Moscow. As Coral Bell points out, it is doubtful that there was even an active Soviet strategy towards the Portuguese revolution. 'The Russians ... according a high priority to the avoidance of anything that might damage détente in advance' of Helsinki, had good reasons to restrain any actions of support for the PCP.⁴

Furthermore, the MFA's commitment in July 1975 to build a system of populist political power further undermines notions surrounding Goncalves' personal sympathies for a communist take-over. In fact, communist party leader, Alvaro Cunhal, in a secret speech to his party during August 1975 - and not revealed until many years later - actually criticised Goncalves for what he termed as the Prime Minister's 'radical' populist policies. Although the Communists had a strong presence in the government during the 'hot summer' of 1975, the anarchical situation throughout the country and the MFA's populist tendencies were clearly contrary to their political aims.⁵

Decolonisation

It has been Goncalves' role as Prime Minister during the process of decolonisation which has evoked the greatest accusations of pro-communist sympathies. However, Lisbon was not in control of the decolonisation process; as discussed above, the independence of the colonies depended more on the specific politico-military conditions found in each of the Portuguese territories during the period 1973-1975. Lisbon was to do little more than sign de jure declarations of de facto independence. In Guinea-Bissau, Portugal had not only lost the war, but by November 1973, ten months before Portugal granted Guinea-Bissau independence, eighty countries had already recognised the country's independent status.⁶ The disintegration of the Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique meant that Portugal would have only been able to increase its bargaining position in that country's independence negotiations by reinforcing its military position with a fresh consignment of forces.⁷ However, such a move was not possible both due to the revolutionary power struggles in Lisbon and also because of the criticism it would have provoked among the international community. After all, decolonisation was not simply an internally motivated factor, but one that was also designed to terminate the international isolation to which Portugal had been subject because of its colonial policy.

In Angola, Kissinger's desire to confront Soviet expansion and the will of the three liberation movements to internationalise the growing civil war had deprived Lisbon of any significant control in that colony's independence process by mid-1975. Even taking into consideration that men such as Admiral Rosa Coutinho and other pro-Marxist MFA elements had helped the MPLA to
survive in an early phase of the independence process, by the spring of 1975 the MPLA’s fate was clearly in the hands of Moscow. Moreover, had the Americans wanted to support a peaceful transition to independence in this country their military aid would have been channelled to UNITA and not to the FNLA. UNITA’s strong following among Angola’s largest tribe, the Ovimbundo, would have possibly secured the movement a victory in the elections envisaged by the independence agreement; permitting at least a semblance of a pro-western and democratic post-independence regime, despite the fact that the MPLA was at the time of independence recognised as possessing the best credentials for governing an independent Angola. Neither was the MPLA the Soviet agent which American propaganda implied. As late as 1977 the MPLA leadership demonstrated its desire for independence from Moscow by quenching an attempted pro-Soviet coup d’état. The MPLA was only forced to draw closer to the Soviet Union as a consequence of the isolation imposed upon it in the west, led principally by the US.

The fact that the Soviets, with the exception of Angola, displayed little interest in the regimes which emerged in the former Portuguese colonies undermines any theory that Moscow was instrumental in bringing about their independence through its control of the revolutionary Marxist elite in Portugal. Although Goncalves, along with other MFA elements, may have entertained sympathies for the appearance of Marxist regimes in the former colonies, the international context of Portuguese decolonisation and the backcloth of revolutionary power struggles in Lisbon left the Prime Minister and his allies little more to do than facilitate the inevitable independence of Lusophone Africa. In fact, along with Sweden and China, Goncalves had actually refused to provide the MPLA with military support in its quest for power in late 1974, early 1975.8

However, the turbulent process of Portuguese decolonisation was to leave deep wounds in both Portugal and Africa. The Portuguese settlers who returned to Portugal for fear of black communist rule, returned with a bitter resentment against those governments. The ‘retornados’ also viewed men such as Goncalves and Soares as traitors who had abandoned them and their interests during the decolonisation process. Conservative sectors in Portugal also viewed those responsible for decolonisation as traitors who sold the Portuguese empire for five red flags. In essence, decolonisation had become a highly sensitive national issue which has had significant repercussions for foreign policy. In Africa the colonial exodus and the wake of destruction it left behind produced a great deal of anger and resentment against the Portuguese.

Goncalves was not, however, following a pro-Soviet foreign policy as a means of affirming Portugal’s post-revolutionary position in the world. The revolutionary leadership in their attempt to attain ‘a true national independence’ was on the other hand following a foreign policy option that was to be known
as Third Worldism. This revolutionary foreign policy was to have a lasting influence on Portugal's future Euro-African dimension.

The 'Third Worldism' Option

Third Worldism is strongly associated with the foreign policy that its founder, Melo Antunes, pursued as Foreign Minister in the IV and VI provisional governments. Yet, during the period 1974-1975, it is difficult to differentiate between the policies of Soares [Socialist] and Ruivo [Communist] when foreign ministers themselves, from Melo Antunes' Third Worldist foreign policy. Third Worldism had been the dominant view of the MFA during the period of decolonisation, and the main reason behind its insistence on a transfer of power to the liberation movements free from neo-colonial arrangements. The MFA's idea was that since the Third World was to become Portugal's primary diplomatic priority, then an 'exemplary' decolonisation was viewed as instrumental in facilitating Portugal's close ties with this group of nations. The MFA also viewed its role as that of a Third World liberation movement aiming to eradicate the institutions which perpetuated foreign capitalist exploitation in Portugal.

Third Worldism rested on the notion that Portugal's backwardness in Europe 'gave rise to incidents of colonialism', which seriously compromised the nation's political and economic independence. In order to break what was essentially a relationship of dependence vis-à-vis the more economically powerful nations, Portugal needed to strengthen its ties with the less developed countries of the Third World. The result of this, it was hoped, would be a more equal relationship free from the constraints of subservience. According to Third Worldism, Portugal's political solidarity with the Third World was a logical consequence of the country's economic state of development. As Rosa Coutinho stated, Third Worldism aimed at preventing the Portuguese from becoming the 'lackeys' of Europe'.

In the political sphere, Melo Antunes' concept advocated a close association with the non-aligned as a means of strengthening Portugal's position in the world. According to Antunes the 'demand and fight for an authentic national independence [political and economic] implied adopting a foreign policy 'appropriate to our historical, cultural and geo-political realities'. His foreign policy principles were clearly outlined in the 'document of the nine':

* the opening of relations with every country in the world, on the basis of equality ... bearing in mind the need for independence with regard to the great powers;
* the maintenance of our connections with Europe, reinforcing and deepening of our relationships with certain economic groups [the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)];

* the frank opening of our relationships with the Third World [in particular with our previous colonies] and the Arab countries;

* the deepening of our relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe;

* the development of our strategy in the Mediterranean area, in conjunction with all interested countries, European and Arab alike.

As the above quote suggests, Third Worldism did not imply Portugal's isolation from the west, but only the development of economic ties which reduced the weight of western interests in the country. However, if Third Worldism had remained the cornerstone of foreign policy it would have faced the daunting task of overcoming the fact that 80% of Portugal’s trade took place with the nations of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Third Worldist foreign policy notions were not solely associated with the more radical left-wing revolutionary vanguard. To a certain extent Third Worldist themes permeated the ideas of the main political parties in 1974. While the Socialist Party called on Portugal to follow a clear policy of non-alignment, both the centre-right PPD and the more conservative CDS carried allusions to non-alignment and the need for Portugal to diversify its relations, particularly with the Third World, in their party manifestos.\(^{14}\)

Commenting on Portugal's relationship with the Third World, Mario Ruivo, Portugal’s communist Foreign Minister during the summer of 1975, gave an excellent account of the practical implementation of Third Worldism:\(^ {15} \)

> In relation to the Third World there are two aspects to be considered: firstly what I call complementary co-operation. We are an underdeveloped country, but on the other hand we have certain sectors in which we are developed in relation to other countries, as is the case of the metal transforming industry, ship building, civil construction ... etc. Therefore we have the possibility of contributing to less developed countries with assistance in these areas. On the other hand, we can benefit from the primary materials, or even, maybe, from specialisations that some countries have and are complementary to ours.

The Minister added that political co-operation was the other important field in relations with the Third World. 'In the end lots of ties and co-operation with the
Third World can balance the politics of the great powers from whom we progressively want to become more independent so as to decide our own destiny. The minister pointed to the pro-Third World stance Lisbon had taken in the then recent UN Conference on the Law of the Sea as an example of things to come. 

Relations with the Arab states were given a key role in foreign policy by Third Worldism because they represented an example of the mutually-beneficial relationship which Portugal could establish with the Third World on the basis of its intermediate technology. As a consequence, huge amounts of construction material which had left Lusophone Africa with decolonisation soon found itself transferred to the construction boom markets of the Arab nations. Arab relations have continued to be an important priority for successive Portuguese governments to the present day.

Lisbon also attempted to diversify its economic links with the Eastern bloc, although these never became a significant expression of total Portuguese trade. Third Worldism was clearly more than simply an ideologically-motivated approach to the realities of the country’s politico-economic conditions and their relationship to the international system. However, Mario Soares’ pro-American foreign policy throughout the late-1970s and early-1980s overlooked the fact that Third Worldist guidelines could provide an important diplomatic support to Portugal’s weak position vis-à-vis the west in general.

As a consequence of Third Worldism, Portugal participated in the 1978 Sri Lanka Non-Aligned Meeting, an organisation in which Portugal was to hold observer status. According to Medeiros Ferreira, even as late as 1979, the presence of Third Worldism could be felt in the foreign policy orientation of the fifth constitutional government.

Third Worldism was to leave its most profound legacy in Portugal’s membership of the European Community, although the European Community signalled a closer identification of Portugal with the first world. The relationship which Third Worldism advocated between the country’s economic level of development and its external relations was to become an important part of Portugal’s Euro-African dimension, with the Portuguese attempting to promote Portugal as a special north-south and Euro-African link, on the basis of the country’s economic state of development which places Portugal between the advanced north and the underdeveloped south.
The European Option

The European Community (EC) was to become post-colonial Portugal's primary international dimension. A number of national and international factors lay behind Lisbon's decision to apply for Community membership. A 'common European destiny' and not the Third World was to become the Socialists' answer to the national identity crisis which beset the country in the years following decolonisation. The Soares administration's decision to apply for Community membership also displayed a strong desire to link Portugal's economic and political development with the West as opposed to the Third World. Soares' decision to move closer to the West through Community membership was also an effort to detach himself from the negative overtones which Third Worldism invoked due to its revolutionary association with communist and decolonisation.

Portugal's membership of the Community, the Portuguese parliament was later told, was not the only possible alternative, but it was the one that most readily answered the country's post-revolutionary aspirations. Membership of the European Community was also to serve as a guarantee against the possible recurrence of a left-wing or right-wing dictatorship.

Along with domestic socio-political factors, economics also played a significant role in Portugal's decision to join the EC. As Braga de Macedo highlights, Portugal's integration into the Community was also a direct result of the economic realities which 40 years of a slow but progressive integration into the wider European economy had produced. The sudden and abrupt end of Portugal's privileged economic ties with the colonies also emphasised the need for a redefinition of Portugal's international economic integration. This situation was further accentuated by the recession of the early-1970s and the temporary wilting of EFTA following the departure of the United Kingdom.

Importantly, membership of the Community was also viewed as a geo-political and geo-economic internationalisation which it was hoped would safeguard Portugal's national identity and sovereignty from any encroachment by Spain. This was particularly important bearing in mind the ongoing opening of the Portuguese economy which the revolution had initiated. The increased links between the European Community and Lusophone Africa following decolonisation was another significant factor behind Lisbon's decision to apply for Community membership. On this point the first constitutional government declared:

... any pretension of privileged relations which occur only at the bilateral level appears difficult to sustain as we witness a tendency by those governments to join the Lomé Convention. Herein lies one of the principal reasons for
Portugal to become a member of the European Community, since until that occurs, Portugal will be relegated to the position of a third country, impotent to do little more than witness the establishment of privileged relations between the new PALOP states and the EEC.

The decision of Guinea-Bissau to join Lomé I in 1975 and that of Cabo Verde and Sao Tomé e Principe in 1977 made this point particularly clear to Lisbon. In essence Community membership was correctly assessed as a factor that could play an important role in Portugal’s post-colonial relations with Lusophone Africa. By 1979, under the centre-right government of Sa Carneiro, Europe became the ‘priority of priorities’.

Europe and Africa

In May 1978, the Commission’s opinion stated that Portugal’s membership, by virtue of the country’s openness to the exterior, ‘and her traditional ties to South America, Africa and the Extreme Orient’, would strengthen the Community’s presence in those areas. Lisbon quickly realised that if the nation’s identity and relevance to Brussels was to be reinforced, then Portugal had to strengthen its relationships with those areas with which it was recognised as having privileged links. While the European Community was to be post-colonial Portugal’s primary international dimension, it has been in the country’s relationship with Africa - as was highlighted in the preceding chapter - that Lisbon has sought a means of strengthening the country’s international relevance and national identity in Brussels. As a consequence, Prime Minister Sa Carneiro initiated a new phase in Portugal’s rapprochement with Lusophone Africa. However, President Eanes had already undertaken a significant number of efforts designed to establish closer relations with the PALOPs since his mandate began in 1976.

President Eanes and the Early Years of Luso-PALOPs Relations

Believing that Portugal had an international dimension which extended beyond Europe and the Iberian peninsula, President Eanes introduced a new dynamism to Portuguese foreign policy, especially in relations to Lusophone Africa. The Third Worldist idea that a diversification of Portugal’s links with the world would increase the country’s international position remained constant throughout his foreign policy. Furthermore, the President acknowledged the benefits which closer relations with the former colonies could have for Portugal both politically and economically. In his diplomatic offensive there was to be no room for the ‘protests that came from wounded conservative circles’. Yet the national and international problems facing President Eanes’ desired rapprochement with Africa were to be considerable.
Angola

The political sensitivities which the new PALOPs regimes provoked in Portugal as a consequence of decolonisation is well illustrated by the state of Luso-Angolan relations upon the independence of that former colony. Portugal's decision to transfer sovereignty to the people of Angola and not the MPLA, as the latter proclaimed Angolan independence on 11 November 1975, was to introduce a great deal of friction between the two countries. Yet, underlying the Council of the Revolution's decision was a fear that recognition for the MPLA would bring with it renewed accusations against the Portuguese leadership both nationally and internationally of harbouring pro-communist and pro-Soviet sympathies.

The mere fact that this decision on Angolan independence was taken by the Council of the Revolution, highlighted the hesitation which the political parties in the coalition government displayed on the question of post-colonial relations with Africa. 1976 was election year and none of the main political parties wanted to risk votes by ignoring the political sensitivities evoked by the new communist regimes in the former colonies. Even the Communist Party (PCP) displayed a certain reluctance in actively seeking Lisbon's recognition for the MPLA. The main reason for this was that, while Portugal did not recognise the MPLA, the PCP acted as Luanda's unofficial ambassador in Lisbon, allowing the party one of few positions of relevance it held in post-revolutionary Portuguese society.27

The lack of any official Portuguese representation at the celebrations for Angolan independence, together with the fact that Portugal was the last country to recognise the MPLA - with the exception of the US, South Africa and Israel - further aggravated post-colonial relations between Luanda and Lisbon. Initially, a mission of three military officers had been planned to attend the independence ceremonies in Luanda. However, the rifts which Angolan independence caused both within the government and the Council of the Revolution led to the cancelling of the mission just before it was scheduled to depart.

The tardy recognition of the MPLA caused Lisbon to lose what little political and economic influence it had left in Angola. Other countries, not only those from the Soviet bloc, were quick to exploit the vacuum of influence that Portugal's withdrawal from Africa had left behind. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Angola had always been the 'jewel in the crown' of the Portuguese Empire.

Aside from the prevalent attitude amongst the international community, Lisbon's decision finally to recognise the MPLA on 26 February 1976 also reflected the
effects which Portugal’s stance towards the new regime in Luanda was having on Portuguese operating in Angola. The MPLA increasingly hampered the operation of these companies by imposing the criterion of ‘political selectivity’ in relation to business contracts. The most favoured companies were those originating in countries deemed friendly to the MPLA. Feelings in Portugal against the regimes in the former colonies ran so high that Portuguese companies that managed to continue operating in those countries were viewed by some extremists as simply pro-communist.

However, the greatest difficulty in Luso-Angolan relations stemmed from the personal actions of Mario Soares who, although not then in government, began to lobby Washington against recognising the MPLA. Soares’ main resentment was that the MPLA had come to power outside the Alvor independence agreement which he had been instrumental in negotiating. Whether or not Soares was responsible for America’s continuing non-recognition for the MPLA remains unknown. But Soares’ actions may have been a key factor which tipped the US administration’s decision towards the non-recognition position advocated by its National Security Council.

The legacy of resentment which decolonisation had left in Portugal led the MPLA to sever diplomatic ties with Lisbon in May 1976. One of the main reasons was the bombing of the Angolan consulate in Oporto, although it is unclear whether Soares’ actions in Washington were another consideration behind the MPLA’s decision.

Luanda and Maputo increasingly began to base good relations with the former colonial power on the condition that Lisbon took steps to curb the growing support in Portugal for movements that opposed those regimes. This was to be a recurring theme in Luso-African relations. Yet no government in Portugal could take that course of action without risking alienation from large sectors of Portuguese society. Furthermore, in a nation that was only beginning to consolidate pluralist democratic structures, any attempt to control areas of public life such as the media would have seriously questioned the democratic credibility of any government. The PALOPs regimes failed to realise that if opposition movements existed in Portugal, then they themselves shared a degree of responsibility for their existence and emerging popularity. Diplomatic relations between Portugal and Angola were finally restored in September following a meeting of the respective foreign ministers. In June 1976, with Melo Antunes as Foreign Minister, Portugal supported the entry of Angola into the United Nations as a gesture of goodwill towards the MPLA.

The arrival of the Soares administration in July 1976 brought renewed problems in relations between Portugal and the PALOPs by recognising the existence of a contencioso with regard to Angola and Mozambique. This contencioso
referred to a series of Portuguese economic assets which had been left in Africa upon decolonisation, and for which Lisbon now demanded compensation. A large part of the *contencioso* consisted of Portuguese economic concerns that the MPLA and FRELIMO had nationalised. Since Portugal had nationalised the parent companies of these African subsidiaries the problem was now one of intergovernmental debt. Socialist internationalism was clearly not a simple question of internal Marxist orientations. The government's position on the issue clearly appeased many in Portugal who had lost their livelihood in Africa as a consequence of decolonisation.

The Socialist Party was also aiming to distance itself from the unpopular consequences of the so-called 'exemplary' decolonisation, a process in which Soares had actually played a prominent role. Yet, what Soares' government failed to realise was that Portugal had no means at its disposal to enforce any economic deal with the former overseas territories. The inability of Soares to adopt 'realism' and not 'traumatism' as the hallmark of his African foreign policy only further weakened Portugal's economic and political presence in Africa.

President Eanes, on the other hand, held a more realistic assessment of the situation, and personally initiated Portugal's *rapprochement* with Africa. Eanes' central role in foreign policy was made possible by the powers bestowed on the presidency by the 1976 constitution. In addition to which, the presence of men such as Melo Antunes in the Council of the Revolution guaranteed a different approach to Africa by the presidency. President Eanes' decision to interfere directly in Portugal's African foreign policy followed the conclusions of an in-depth study of the situation. The study analysed both the French and Dutch decolonisations and the subsequent post-colonial relationships of the two countries with their former colonies. The report concluded that the French experience was the closest to Portugal's own problematic decolonisation and present state of relations with the former overseas territories. As a consequence, the study urged the President to follow Paris' example in establishing ties of co-operation with the newly independent nations as the best means of developing a positive post-colonial relationship.

While attempting to build a consensus with the main political parties on the question of *rapprochement* with Africa, Eanes carried out another move intended to strengthen the domestic political legitimacy of his African diplomacy. In a press conference the President assumed full responsibility for the decolonisation while stating the need for closer relations with the former colonies. Moreover, the President emphasised the necessity to separate communism from Portugal's diplomacy in Africa, declaring that it was not for Portugal to pass judgement on the political system of those newly independent nations. Rather, Portugal's relations with those countries should be conducted
within internationally recognised norms such as respect for national sovereignty and independence.

Underlying Eanes’ foreign policy was the notion that Portugal’s economic and political presence in Africa could best be achieved through the establishment of a mutually beneficial relationship with the PALOPs. Eanes was also particularly aware of the difficulties which Portuguese companies continued to face in Angola. It seems that these companies had begun to lobby Lisbon for a change in Portugal’s relations with the MPLA following the political difficulties which emerged with Angolan independence.

President Eanes’ foreign policy approach also aimed to protect the national interest by distancing the Portuguese state from the incompetence of Soares. In the process Eanes was to reap his own political dividends as public support for the President’s diplomacy contributed to his re-election. Eanes’ objective in moving closer to Africa received a new boost with the signals that Aristides Pereira, leader of Cabo Verde, began transmitting to Lisbon. It appears that, through Pereira, Eanes may have received messages from the MPLA demonstrating Luanda’s readiness to accept a rapprochement. Encouraged by the results of Pereira’s good offices, President Eanes carried out a political and diplomatic masterstroke in 1977. Taking advantage of the pro-Soviet coup attempt in Angola, Eanes sent a personal emissary to President Neto assuring him of Portugal’s support for his leadership. Eanes also rightly believed that friendlier relations with the MPLA would encourage Angola to draw closer to the west. As the emissary left Luanda, a cargo of medical supplies arrived from Portugal as a further goodwill gesture from Eanes.

As a result of Eanes’ move, and through the good offices of both Pereira and Guinea-Bissau’s Luis Cabral, the Presidents of Portugal and Angola met in the famous Bissau summit of June 1978. The fact that Sa Machado, the CDS’s Foreign Minister in the second constitutional government, had been instrumental in arranging Bissau, demonstrated the growing consensus among the right that Eanes’ foreign policy was the best form of defending Portugal’s interests in Africa. Both presidents had good reasons in wanting to develop closer ties between their two countries. Neto urgently needed Portuguese-speaking technicians in an administration that lacked the qualified personnel to govern the country. In Angola – as was the growing case in other PALOPs – Russians, Cubans and others were increasingly seen as more distant and incapable of adapting to African realities than their previous colonial masters.

On the other hand, President Eanes’ main objective was to facilitate Portugal’s economic presence in Angola. There seems also a desire by him to take a more active involvement in the politics of Southern Africa. Already in October 1977 the question of Namibia and Zimbabwean independence had dominated talks between Eanes and Tito.
The two-tiered structure of the Bissau negotiations reflected the personal efforts both presidents made to develop closer relations between the two nations. At one level, there were the personal talks between the two heads of state. After separate audiences with Cabral, the Presidents of Angola and Portugal finally met for a two hour meeting which had been scheduled for only thirty minutes. On the second level there were the talks between the two delegations representing the interests of their respective states. It was a feat in itself arriving at this stage since the MPLA had constantly refused to discuss the contencioso. The delegation talks soon broke down as Portugal demanded compensation for the contencioso, while the MPLA demanded compensation for the damage caused by the Portuguese exodus in 1975.

The summit was on the brink of failure until President Eanes once again took matters into his own hands at a dinner given by Luis Cabral that night. In a daring speech Eanes criticised the MPLA for chasing away Portuguese technicians as well as for Angola’s economic chaos. The MPLA leadership actually admired Eanes’ military frankness, and Neto requested a renewed meeting with Eanes the following day. At 8:00 a.m. the two leaders discussed the controversial subject of political prisoners, and by 12:00 p.m. all the existing problems were resolved. The official contencioso was forgotten, while Neto did not submit the Bissau agreement to the MPLA Central Committee, fearing that neo-colonial sensitivities within the party might prevent the development of a mutually beneficial relationship with Lisbon. President Eanes’ realism was increasingly becoming the key to safeguarding Portuguese interests in Africa. The ‘spirit of Bissau’ was also to stimulate Lisbon’s role as a ‘bridge’ between communist Lusophone Africa and the west.

Mozambique

Along with the recognition of a contencioso, relations with Mozambique deteriorated quickly as the legacy of the decolonisation made its presence increasingly felt. The growing association between the actions of former settlers such as Jorge Jardim and the appearance in Mozambique of a guerrilla movement aimed at overthrowing FRELIMO, hampered Portugal’s rapprochement with this former colony. While on a visit to Portugal in 1976 Mozambican Foreign Minister Chissano declared:

We reaffirmed our reciprocal desire to improve our co-operation but ... there are many in Portugal who still do not understand that Mozambique is independent and ... our relations are still very difficult. We can only establish good relations with Portugal on a clear basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty. For our part we will make the effort, closing our eyes to the many anti-Mozambican activities in Portugal. The Portuguese Foreign Minister should make possible the same determination in his country.
In 1978 the execution of a Portuguese citizen accused of anti-FRELIMO activities and the subsequent police harassment of Mozambican diplomats in Lisbon further strained relations between the two countries. It was once again President Eanes who took the lead in developing a new post-colonial relationship with Mozambique and, in December 1978, Eanes sent an envoy, Sousa Meneses, to initiate a new understanding between the two countries. The President’s diplomacy was all the more urgent since other countries such as Italy, France, Sweden and the UK began to establish close ties with the Maputo regime. Eanes realised that anachronistic sectoral interests were damaging what could be Portugal’s privileged economic and political ties with this former colony. The letter which President Machel sent to Eanes, expressing Mozambique’s solidarity with Portugal during the country’s heavy floods, reflected the growing friendship that Eanes inspired in Maputo. During Eanes’ visit to Mozambique in 1981, Machel made it clear that the growing friendship between the two countries was due to Eanes’ personal efforts.

President Machel’s letter had also signalled Mozambique’s willingness to seek better relations with Portugal. As a result, Eanes sent another envoy and this time it was to be the well-known Third Worldist, Melo Antunes. The sending of Melo Antunes was designed to stress in Maputo that Portugal was not simply a source of neo-colonialism but also one of mutually advantageous co-operation. Yet the contencioso continued to strain relations between the two countries until the arrival in power of Sa Carneiro’s centre-right administration in 1979. In 1980 Sa Carneiro finally broke the economic impasse which had blocked closer relations between the two countries since 1975. In a personal letter to Mozambican President Moises Samora Machel, Sa Carneiro cancelled the controversial demands associated with the contencioso. Interestingly, Vasco Goncalves had earlier written the same letter, but in his case it raised accusations of communism not realism.

The alignment in foreign policy between the Presidency and the centre-right led governments of Sa Carneiro and Balsemao ended the institutional dichotomy which had characterised African foreign policy during the Soares administration. Sa Carneiro’s diplomacy, however, did aim to take the initiative away from the President and his Third Worldist advisers in the Council of the Revolution on the issue of African foreign policy.34

The growing political rapprochement between Portugal and Mozambique was clearly reflected in the financial agreement signed in October 1980 between the two countries. The agreement on the management of Cabora Bassa and the opening of a US$30 million credit line by Portugal in 1981 for Mozambique’s Nacala railway project marked the dawning of a new post-colonial relationship between the two nations. Portugal’s financial commitment to the railway project
was also designed to establish close ties with the Front-line States of Southern Africa since the project was important for the SADCC transport network.

The European Community added a further impulse to Portugal’s *rapprochement* with Africa. As Sa Carneiro stated in Bonn during his 1980 visit: ‘The positive evolution which relations with our former colonies have experienced is appreciated by our other European allies. The countries of the EEC view with great interest our African policy and the efforts we have undertaken, but which can be built on ...’.

The pressure which the European Community was exerting on Lisbon to better relations with Angola and Mozambique stemmed from a desire to strengthen its ties with the Front-line States of Southern Africa. Portugal’s privileged links with those two former colonies also provided the Community with a reinforced presence in two countries not institutionally linked to Brussels through the Lomé Convention.

Portugal’s African dimension was viewed as an indispensable ‘bridge’ between communist Lusophone Southern Africa and Brussels, a point which the Community’s Roy Jenkins and Lorenzo Natali stressed on a number of occasions. As a consequence, Sa Carneiro increasingly linked strong ties with Lusophone Africa to a strengthening of Portugal’s presence in Brussels. This linkage was to find a more significant expression in Portuguese foreign policy from 1985 onwards.

The highlight of Portugal’s *rapprochement* with Mozambique came in 1981 with a visit to the former colony by President Eanes. His visit was followed with a trip to Mozambique by Portuguese Prime Minister, Pinto Balsemao, which Samora Machel viewed as the ‘crown’ in the establishment of good relations between the two countries. Balsemao’s visit was particularly important at a time when RENAMO began to emerge under South African tutelage, and with strong signs of Portuguese sectoral involvement. Balsemao, reflecting Lisbon’s strong desire to align itself with the Front-line States and Brussels, ‘unequivocally’ condemned ‘all violations’ of the territorial integrity of the countries within the region. In October 1982, the agreement on military co-operation signed between Portugal and Mozambique was to act as evidence of the Portuguese government’s commitment not only to Mozambique, but also to the Front-line’s war against apartheid. In Brussels this agreement was intended to demonstrate Portugal’s willingness to co-operate with the EC on the issue of Southern Africa.

Yet the increasing use of Lisbon as a propaganda headquarters by UNITA and RENAMO, brought renewed strains in Portugal’s relations with the PALOPs. The final communiqué of a PALOPs meeting in October 1982 issued a veiled
warning to the Portuguese. It stated that countries who tolerated ‘and supported
the preparation of subversive and terrorist acts against us ...’ would be seen as
guilty of ‘complicity with those who attack our people’. 38

The sectoral aims were jeopardising not only Portugal’s economic interests in
Africa, but they were all the more serious as they came at a time when Lisbon’s
African policy was allowing the country to play an increased international role
as an interlocuteur privilégié between the regimes of Angola and Mozambique
and the American administration. This role coincided with Lisbon’s desire to
strengthen the country’s African dimension, and as a consequence, its
international relevance in Brussels.

In 1982 US envoy Carlucci arrived in Lisbon with the objective of giving Pinto
Balsemao the role of ‘general manager’ in Washington’s relations with Southern
Africa. Washington realised that Portugal’s good relations with Angola and
Mozambique provided a channel of disguised communication with two
communist regimes and that this would prevent the Reagan administration from
appearing soft on communism. Through Portugal, the US aimed to convince the
MPLA of the need to accept the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers
from Angola and the independence of Namibia. The result of Portugal’s ‘good
offices’ was the first public meeting between Angolan and South African
delegations in 1982. 39

Portuguese diplomacy also provided a channel of communications between
Maputo and Washington. President Machel declared, in 1981, that Portugal was
playing an instrumental role in the country’s rapprochement with the west. 40
Portugal’s role was particularly important to Mozambique at a time when
Machel, having been refused membership of COMECON, sought to reorient the
country’s foreign policy towards the west. Machel’s desire for closer relations
with Portugal also reflected his acknowledgement that Portuguese co-operation,
by virtue of the country’s own economic weakness, did not carry as many
conditions as co-operation with other countries. 41

During 1982 Lisbon was the venue for a secret meeting between South Africa’s
Secretary of State, Du Plessis and Mozambique’s Defence Minister, Chipenda. 42
Portugal’s ‘good offices’ had also enabled the MPLA and FRELIMO to
communicate with Pretoria without compromising their revolutionary foreign
policy in the eyes of their people and the world.

Although France and Nigeria attempted to play a greater role in Southern
Africa, Portugal’s inability to influence the outcome of the negotiations or the
conflicts involved, was instrumental in securing trust for the country’s role as
an interlocuteur privilégié. Further credibility was added to Portuguese
diplomatic efforts by the fact that Portugal’s interests in the area dictated a
genuine desire for peace in Southern Africa. Peace in the region would not only consolidate the prosperity of nations with whom Portugal hoped to have privileged relationships, but it also facilitated the operation of Portuguese economic interests such as Cabora Bassa and the security of Portuguese citizens working in Southern Africa.

By 1983 some observers in Lisbon had become increasingly aware of Portugal’s growing linkage between African and European foreign policies. They viewed a rumoured attempt by Mario Soares to establish an organisation to institutionalise Portugal’s relationship with Brazil and Africa as a further move to strengthen the country’s international relevance in Brussels. However, if the rumours were true, little became of the attempt itself; it seems that Portugal’s post-colonial relations with the PALOPs had not yet reached the state of friendliness which such a move required.

Yet Portugal’s increased links with Lusophone Africa and particularly its growing involvement in the politics of Southern Africa, nonetheless permitted a strengthening of the country’s Euro-African dimension. The intermediary role played by Portugal between Lusophone Africa and the West was to become increasingly important to Portuguese foreign policy during the eighties and early nineties. In essence, it was in Africa that Lisbon was to attempt a reinforcement of its position in the geo-politics of Europe.

In the meantime, the arrival of the Soares administration quickly destroyed all that Eanes, Sa Carneiro and Balsemao had achieved. Both political and economic relations with Angola and Mozambique were to deteriorate rapidly. Moreover, the legacy of decolonisation was leading to a growing struggle over the control of Portugal’s African policy between the conservative visions of a part of the right, and those who saw the African arena as one of the key ingredients in the pressing challenges of Portugal’s new international reality. It was in this area of foreign policy that the last battle between the country’s past and future was to be fought. This struggle was to infuse Portugal’s African foreign policy with a new and contradictory dualism.

Endnotes


3. The result of Portugal’s action led to a crippling oil embargo by the Arab States.


8. Diplomatic source.

9. The dates of the IV and VI provisional governments are respectively - 26 March 1975 to 8 August 1975, and 19 August 1975 to 26 July 1976.


12. Quoted from the *Document of the Nine*. This document was attributed principally to Melo Antunes and was signed by nine moderate Marxist officers on 6 August 1975 and was a criticism of the Communist Party’s growth in power. It also signalled the end of the radical phase of the Portuguese revolution. The English version used is in Ferreira G & Marshall, *Portugal’s Revolution: 10 Years On*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.264.


14. 1974 Party Manifestos of the PS, PPD and CDS.

15. Interview with Dr. Mario Ruivo on Portuguese television (RTP), 26 April 1975. Lisbon: Ministry of Social Communication, p.110.


17. Portuguese diplomatic source involved in this process.

18. Relations with the Arab States have been a constant feature in successive government programmes since 1974.

19. Soares’ wish to align himself closely with Washington led to the imprisonment of a Portuguese diplomatic mission in Libya during 1977, when the Prime Minister made an untimely declaration recognising the state of Israel. Diplomatic source.


27. Diplomatic source.


29. This was particularly important, bearing in mind Portugal's economic weaknesses and inability to impose a post-colonial relationship on the former colonies similar to those practised by Paris and London.


31. Portuguese diplomatic source present at Bissau.


34. Antunes JF, op.cit., p.117.

35. Ibid., p.117.

36. Angola and Mozambique were the only two SADCC states not to be Lomé members.

37. Antunes JF, op.cit., p.117.


41. Interview with Portuguese co-operation source, April 1990.

42. Ibid.

43. Moita L, Diario de Lisboa, 17 December 1983, p.3. See also Diario de Lisboa, Diplomacia Portuguesa joga forte em Africa, 25 November 1983. This article also refers to the intermediate role played by Portugal between Mozambique and South Africa.
Post-1975 Luso-Mozambican relations serve to demonstrate how the legacy of decolonisation continues to hamper the development of closer relations between Portugal and the PALOPs. In this chapter, we will see how throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the control of Portugal's foreign policy towards Mozambique in particular has been the subject of a fierce struggle between sectoral interests, and the need for a foreign policy that recognises the realities of post-colonial Portugal. The most immediate result of this struggle has been a further loss in influence by Portugal in a country with which it could otherwise have developed privileged relations. Unlike the Angolan case, relations with Mozambique have done little to further Lisbon's desire to use close relations with Africa as a means of strengthening Portugal's international profile in the world, and the country's international relevance in Brussels. The problematic nature of Luso-Mozambican relations did not aid Cavaco Silva in his effort to promote Portugal as a leading Euro-African link.

The resignation of Pinto Balsemao in 1982, and the general political instability which characterised Portugal during the period 1982-85, did little to help formulate a coherent strategy for post-colonial relations with Lusophone Africa. However, the main problem behind a renewed deterioration in Luso-Mozambican relations was the fact that under the Soares 'centre bloc' government, the legacy of decolonisation in the form of sectoral interests, was to be the dominant force behind African foreign policy.

In March 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed the controversial Nkomati Accord, with the ostensible objective of establishing peace between the two neighbours. While South Africa failed to adhere to this Accord, another factor appeared which increased the difficulties in the path of peace in war-torn Mozambique. As the Mozambican Economic Affairs Minister declared, the Portuguese component of RENAMO was trying to sabotage the Nkomati Accord. President Machel himself publicly acknowledged this when he condemned the 'planning of a conspiracy against Mozambique' by 'circles nostalgic for colonialism'.

On 21 October, the Mozambican newspaper Domingo published an article that publicly accused Portuguese Deputy Prime Minister, Mota Pinto, Minister of State Almeida Santos and industrialist Manuel Bullosa of organising a coup against FRELIMO. According to Gillian Gunn the article was held up in the Ministry of Information while FRELIMO pondered the implications of going public. Yet this conspiracy also reflected the depth of feeling which
decolonisation had left among certain sectors of Portugal’s political and economic elite; especially, since many in this social class, like Bullosa and Santos, lost considerable property in Africa upon the independence of the PALOPs.

Furthermore, the subsequent withdrawal of the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) - then more widely known as MNR - from peace talks with FRELIMO under the mediation of South Africa in mid-October 1984, followed an alleged phone call from Mota Pinto to RENAMO’s delegation head, Evo Fernandes. Some writers have viewed the phone call as a ploy by South African military intelligence, but as Vines points out, Mota Pinto himself never denied the phone call.⁶

South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha was also forced to cancel a trip to Lisbon, just before boarding his plane, as a message from the Portuguese government declared his visit ‘inopportune’. The purpose of Pik Botha’s trip had been to arrange a meeting with Mario Soares in order to find out why there had been Portuguese interference.⁷ It seems that Lisbon had cancelled the visit in an attempt not to associate Mario Soares too closely with pro-RENAMO activities.⁸

In November 1984 as sectoral interests in Portugal increasingly took hold of foreign policy, the then Mozambican Foreign Minister, Chissano, threatened to transfer the Mozambican embassy from Lisbon to Madrid as a protest against ‘the acts of banditry’ prepared by ‘Portuguese citizens and personalities’ against Mozambique.

As Gillian Gunn highlights, the fact that there was a marked shift in RENAMO’s post-Nkomati demands adds ‘credibility’ to claims of greater Portuguese involvement following the 1984 agreement.⁹ Before Nkomati, the guerrillas’ demands, reflecting the priorities of their South African patrons, consisted of calling for free elections, free enterprise, and non-discrimination against neighbours with different political systems.¹⁰ After Nkomati, RENAMO began to emphasise demands which were traditionally associated with the objectives of former Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, such as ‘de-nationalisation, the return of the regulo system of administration (chiefs appointed by the colonial administration) and the return to Mozambique of former Portuguese settlers’.¹¹ Echoing the words of many RENAMO supporters in Portugal, Bullosa, the former owner of the Maputo oil refinery, stated that his support for the guerrillas was a question of undertaking ‘certain political compromises in order to keep open a variety of options’.¹²

In essence the Portuguese component of RENAMO aimed to use the organisation as a bargaining counter with FRELIMO. It hoped at best to secure
a return of properties that were nationalised by FRELIMO in 1975 or, at worst, obtain a degree of monetary compensation.

With Nkomati and what appeared to be a South African disengagement from the war in Mozambique, it seems the Portuguese RENAMO-wing sought greater control over the guerrilla organisation to further its own aims. It naturally had little interest in witnessing a cease-fire in Mozambique since it would remove the only means available to them of pressuring FRELIMO. It should be said, however, the South African take-over of RENAMO soon after 1979 seems to have caused a series of conflicts between rival groups in Washington, Lisbon, and Pretoria, over control of the guerrilla organisation. As we will see, RENAMO’s Portuguese component continued to wield a powerful influence over the guerrilla organisation in the post-Nkomati years.

**RENAMEO Support**

The widespread nature of RENAMO support in Portugal, which extended beyond the influential political and economic circles that were typified by the 1984 conspiracy, has been one of the main reasons behind the constant difficulties in Luso-Mozambican relations. As a result of the problematic nature of Portuguese decolonisation, RENAMO support, as in the case of UNITA, permeated a number of social institutions.

RENAEOMO’s main source of support in Portugal came from radical elements within the former Portuguese settler community in Mozambique – the retornados. However, according to RENAMO defector Oliveira, support from this social group in Portugal decreased throughout the 1980s as the retornados integrated into Portuguese society.

The fact that the Roman Catholic Church was under persecution in Mozambique provided RENAMO with a situation that could be carefully exploited to increase its support within Portuguese society. The Catholic Church is a powerful social institution in Portugal with close links to the conservative circles from which both UNITA and RENAMO support has come. As a result, RENAMO actively courted the church in the mid-1980s, promising Roman Catholicism a religious monopoly in occupied zones under its command. Moreover, the Portuguese Catholic Church was also viewed as a crucial stepping stone for closer links with the Vatican hierarchy. The Vatican’s position on the matter remains unknown, but it seems that while it condemned RENAMO’s methods, it has not been unsympathetic to its aims. The visits of President Machel to the Vatican in 1985, and that of President Chissano in 1987, were an attempt to undermine the support the guerrillas received from certain Roman Catholic circles by establishing friendlier relations with the Vatican hierarchy.
Following the sympathy which certain leaders of the Portuguese Catholic Church had shown for RENAMO in the past, such as that offered by Cardinal Eurico de Melo, the visit to Mozambique of the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon in September 1990 was viewed by some observers as a deliberate goodwill gesture by the Portuguese Roman Catholic hierarchy towards FRELIMO. The visit was also clearly integrated within the Portuguese Government’s effort to develop closer ties with Mozambique.

In Portugal another enclave of both RENAMO and UNITA support had been within Portuguese military intelligence (SIM). This support was a result of the personal friendships which existed between certain elements of SIM, members of the two guerrilla organisations, and elements of South African military intelligence. In 1986 tangible proof of this support appeared as SIM sent RENAMO a consignment of books and medicines to their Phalaborwa base in South Africa. Lisbon’s interests in Mozambique, such as the Cabora Bassa dam have been a further reason to use SIM as a channel of communication with the guerrilla organisation. However, the close ties between the two institutions seem also to have been used as a useful channel of communication during the recent protracted peace process.

Perhaps the greatest source of Portuguese involvement in the Mozambican conflict came not from Portugal, but from South Africa. The six hundred thousand strong Portuguese community in that country, most of them former settlers in Angola and Mozambique, organised their own support networks for the guerrilla movement. Although as we shall see later, Portuguese diplomacy attempted to discourage the pro-RENAMO activities of this community, final responsibility for their actions rested with Pretoria. As Gillian Gunn states, ‘somebody somewhere had to be deliberately looking the other way when elements of South Africa’s Portuguese community arranged their own cross border supply operations to RENAMO.’ Although it should be stressed that control of RENAMO rested with the South African Defence Force, this clandestine support network had the effect of giving the Portuguese component of RENAMO a substantial degree of influence within the organisation. This influence was to be particularly important in laying the ground work for greater Portuguese involvement in the post-Nkomati period.

The pro-RENAMO activities of this community involved a close alliance with Portuguese industrialists in Lisbon such as Bullosa, Champalimaud and, until his death in 1982, Jorge Jardim. Gillian Gunn states that the activities of these pro-RENAMO supporters hampered the role that many, even including Mario Soares, had envisaged for Portugal, as an intermediary channel for western assistance and investment to Africa. It is ironic that while Soares envisaged this role for Portugal, it has been under his various mandates as Prime Minister that relations with the PALOPs deteriorated severely.
Cavaco Silva and Mozambique

With the arrival of Cavaco Silva in power during 1985 a new phase of Luso-PALOP relations was initiated, with Lusophone Africa acquiring a 'strategic priority' in Portuguese foreign policy. As the Prime Minister stated 'good relations with the five (PALOPs) are not a priority for the US or England, but they are for Portugal.'

Cavaco Silva's 'strategic priority' had a two-fold aim. On the one hand, it was an attempt to establish a more positive and mutually beneficial post-colonial relationship with the PALOPs. This objective, as we saw in the last chapter, had already been a dominant pre-occupation behind the earlier post-revolutionary foreign policies of Eanes, Sa Carneiro and Pinto Balsemao. The desire to define a new relationship with Africa meant that Cavaco Silva, unlike Soares, made strenuous efforts to divorce the activities of pro-RENAMO lobbies from official foreign policy. As the Prime Minister stated, 'my government does not have one policy over the table and one underneath it'.

However, as we shall see, the conflicting aims of Portuguese pro-RENAMO sympathisers and those of Cavaco Silva were to introduce a contradictory dualism in Portugal's relations with Mozambique. This conflict between the Prime Minister and influential sectors of Portuguese society, was also symptomatic of the feelings and social rifts which decolonisation continues to evoke within contemporary Portuguese society.

Secondly, Cavaco Silva's 'strategic priority', as was pointed out earlier, was also an effort to introduce a new dynamism to Lisbon's linkage between a close political and economic relationship with Africa and a strengthening of Portugal's international relevance in Brussels. This is a linkage which can be traced back to the 'Summit of Bissau' in 1978, and Sa Carneiro's own African 'Realpolitik' in 1979. Under Cavaco Silva this linkage, as Portugal's active diplomacy in Southern Africa was able to bear witness, was characterised by a strong diplomatic effort to promote Portugal as a leading Euro-African link. Moreover, what appears to be Lisbon's need for an international role involving Africa, also suggests that Portugal has not found in Europe alone a solution to the identity crisis which occurred in the country as a consequence of decolonisation. Rather, Portugal continues to view an active relationship with Africa as a fundamental characteristic of national identity.

Between 1985 and 1987, Cavaco Silva's rapprochement with Mozambique produced few tangible results, the main cause of which appeared to rest more with the incompetence of the then Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State than with the Prime Minister himself. In 1987, the activities of RENAMO, as well as UNITA in Portugal, were still the main problem preventing closer
relations between Portugal and the PALOPs. In June of that year the Foreign Ministers of the five arrived in Portugal asking the government to curb the activities of those groups as a condition for friendlier relations.

Interestingly, it was only after a meeting with President Soares that Mozambican Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi declared that 'all obstacles which jeopardise good relations between Portugal and the five' could be removed. However, in 1987 with the Soviets in active retreat from Africa, the PALOPs, led by Angola, had their own vested interest in urgently seeking closer relations with Portugal as a means of strengthening their relationship with the European Community.

The visit of Mario Machungo, the Mozambican Prime Minister, to Lisbon in February 1988 appeared to signal the new will that existed on both sides to establish a more positive post-colonial relationship. The rescheduling of the Mozambican debt, and the resolution of a series of economic disputes added further credence to the appearance of a new rapprochement between Lisbon and Maputo. In March 1988 when the Secretary of State, Durrao Barroso, formulated plans for a Portuguese intervention in the resolution of the conflicts that persisted in Southern Africa, the renewed degree of friendliness between the two states was an important factor in identifying Mozambique as the conflict in which Portugal was most likely to play a key role. The formulation of these plans also revealed the efforts the Portuguese undertook in order to develop an active African foreign policy, which by promoting Portugal as a Euro-African link, was thought to strengthen the country's presence in the 'European Concert'.

Portugal had already played an important role in attempting to curb Pretoria's destabilisation in Southern Africa through a series of agreements beginning in 1984 on the Cabora Bassa Hydro-Electric scheme. In the tripartite negotiations (Lisbon, Maputo, and Pretoria) on the dam, for which Portugal is financially responsible, the Portuguese along with the Mozambicans attempted to commit South Africa to the viability of the project. It was hoped that by committing Pretoria to the dam, the South Africans would be forced into taking stronger action against RENAMO. However, this was a failure as guerrilla actions after 1985 continued to leave the dam at a standstill.

In December 1988, a new series of agreements designed to intensify economic and, above all, military co-operation between Mozambique and Portugal were signed. Lisbon also clearly acknowledged that if a strong linkage was to be developed between African and European Foreign policy, then Portugal had to secure a strong rapprochement with all the PALOPs. The visit of Cavaco Silva to Mozambique in September 1989, the first by a Portuguese Prime Minister since 1982, further reflected Cavaco Silva's desire to establish a new post-
colonial relationship with that former colony. In the spring of that year a trip by Portuguese Secretary of State Durrao Barroso to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa seemed to indicate that Lisbon would indeed play a key role in the Mozambican peace process. The fact that both Lisbon and Maputo downplayed a mutual expulsion of diplomats in March 1989, over the murder of RENAMO's Evo Fernandes by Mozambican secret police, demonstrated the new importance that was attached in both countries to the development of mutually beneficial relations.

As part of Portugal's efforts to forge a new post-colonial relationship with Mozambique, Durrao Barroso's trip to South Africa also had the clear objective of attempting to persuade the Portuguese community in South Africa to terminate its support for RENAMO. A subsequent trip in 1991, by the President of the regional government of Madeira, Alberto Joao Jardim, and the Mozambican Economy Minister in 1989, also sought to persuade the Portuguese community in South Africa to return to Mozambique through investment and not violence. Jardim's visit to Mozambique and South Africa was particularly important as a goodwill gesture to Maputo. Not only is nearly half the Portuguese population in South Africa of Madeiran origin, but Madeira was thought to be part of RENAMO's international support network. In February 1990 the Portuguese made a renewed attempt to take a more active role in the Mozambican peace process. Both Durrao Barroso and SIM had personal meetings with RENAMO leader Dhlakama, the main aim of which appeared to be the planning of a meeting between Dhlakama and Chissano in Lisbon during the latter's trip to Portugal in April 1990.

However, if Lisbon intended to mediate the Mozambican conflict, the existence and activities of Portuguese pro-RENAMO lobbies soon dashed any such hopes. Cavaco Silva's failure to control the activities of these lobbies cost him the strengthening of his desired link between privileged relations with Africa, and a reinforcement of Portugal's relevance in Brussels. An urgently needed redefinition of Portugal's relationship with Europe and Africa was to fall victim to the continuing legacy of decolonisation.

In Mozambique, many in FRELIMO, led by the party's number two Armando Guebuza, objected to any role by Portugal in the resolution of the Mozambican peace process. The main reason for this appeared to be a strong desire to punish the Portuguese Government for what was perceived as its lack of action against the activities of Portuguese RENAMO lobbies, and the use of Lisbon as the movement's main international propaganda headquarters. Some FRELIMO sectors also viewed any increased Portuguese involvement in the peace process as an arrangement tainted by neo-colonialism. These influential tendencies within FRELIMO led Chissano to refuse RENAMO's proposal of Lisbon as a possible venue for peace talks in July 1989. After a series of failed African
The Mozambican peace talks were eventually transferred to Rome in June 1990, under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Santo Egídeo community. A European forum also provided a diplomatic means with which to terminate the unsuccessful mediatory role played until then by Presidents Arap Moi of Kenya and Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The main problem had been that while FRELIMO accused Arap Moi of partiality towards RENAMO, similar accusations were levelled by RENAMO against the role of President Mugabe. However, the real problem lay in the fact that RENAMO had little interest in negotiating any peace formula which did not involve a power-sharing deal. Aware of their military advantage, and their lack of political structures, the guerrillas, as they were to do for a long time in Rome, displayed no intention of negotiating an end to the war.

The Roman venue of the talks was also a triumph for the efforts which the Mozambican Catholic Church had undertaken in calling for peace in Mozambique since 1987. However the venue was not solely the product of the religious link. Unlike the Portuguese, the Italian government had maintained close relations with the Maputo regime since independence, viewing Mozambique as Rome’s gateway to the markets of Southern Africa. While FRELIMO knew it could count on a large number of influential friends in Rome such as Andreotti, RENAMO viewed a European forum as a means of increased publicity and credibility. The legacy of Portuguese decolonisation soon manifested itself in the Rome peace talks, with the Portuguese lobbies making their presence strongly felt. In September 1991, Portuguese military intelligence organised a trip to Lisbon by the head of RENAMO’s delegation in Rome, Raul Domingos. This trip caused great annoyance both in Rome and Maputo and many claimed that SIM, in alliance with Portuguese business and political circles, were actively interfering in the Rome negotiations.

Interestingly, the visit of Raul Domingos to Lisbon served to emphasise further the split within the Maputo regime on the question of Portugal’s role in the peace process. While Chissano and the Defence Minister, Mariano Matsinhe, viewed the actions of SIM as ‘useful and necessary’, others such as the Minister of Information condemned the active interference of Portuguese military intelligence. The actual purpose of the visit continues shrouded in mystery.

In May 1991, Matteo Zuppi, a mediator in the talks, blamed ‘some’ Portuguese sectors for the almost ‘surreal’ moves which RENAMO carried out to block any agreement during that round of negotiations. Aware of RENAMO’s military advantage, the Portuguese lobbies, intent on regaining their properties, sought to use the military situation as a means of pressuring FRELIMO into a more sympathetic stance towards their interests. In a constitutional draft circulated by RENAMO in May 1991, paragraph four clearly demonstrated the Portuguese influence. This called for a court to oversee the return of all properties, or
compensation in the form of money to those who had been robbed by the 'Marxist thieves of FRELIMO'. The constitutional draft itself is attributed to an American journalist, Bruce Fein, closely associated with the right wing Heritage Foundation. In August 1991, Armando Guebuza, the head of FRELIMO's Rome delegation, publicly stated that Portuguese sectors were also pressuring RENAMO into transferring the negotiations to Lisbon.  

A few months earlier in March 1991, Cavaco Silva and the Lisbon RENAMO lobby clashed publicly. The Prime Minister had been infuriated by the attempts of Antonio Rebelo De Sousa, a socialist deputy, and leader of the Lisbon RENAMO lobby, to obtain a visa for a planned trip by RENAMO's leader Dhlakama to Portugal. De Sousa had contacted both the presidency and SIM, in an attempt to by-pass what was known to be the opposition of the Prime Minister to such a visit. Cavaco Silva made it clear to De Sousa and his lobby that he would not tolerate any 'double play' that would further jeopardise good state to state relations between Mozambique and Portugal. The Prime Minister added that no such visa would be issued if the request came from de Sousa or his lobby. In July, Cavaco Silva took full and personal responsibility for the Mozambican 'dossier', in a move designed to prevent any members of the Lisbon lobby obtaining any information that might allow them to interfere in the Mozambican peace process. This move might have prevented further sectoral involvement by Portuguese lobbies in the Rome talks, but it came too late for Portugal to play the key role it had initially planned in the resolution of the Mozambican conflict. Lisbon's role in the peace process appeared to be one of sideline diplomacy, facilitating contact between RENAMO and Rome. Portugal remained, however, an observer in the Rome peace talks along with the US, France and Britain, as well as a member of the verification committee established to oversee the partial cease-fire signed in December 1990.

While Cavaco Silva remained adamant on the necessity for good state to state relations with the Maputo government, Portuguese circles together with retired generals in Pretoria continued to provide an important source of RENAMO support. Other significant RENAMO support came from a series of right wing organisations in Europe and the US.

Unlike the success story of Portugal's relations with Angola, outlined above, the activities of sectoral interests cost Portugal a privileged political and economic relationship with Mozambique. Moreover, post-colonial Luso-Mozambican relations demonstrated the fact that if Portuguese diplomacy wants to develop its role as a leading link between Europe and Africa, many of the ghosts of decolonisation need still to be exorcised.
Endnotes


13. In this chapter we will not concentrate on the struggle between the rival RENAMO factions, only on the relationship between Portuguese RENAMO support and Luso-Mozambique relations.


17. Portuguese diplomatic source.

18. Nilsson A, *op.cit.*, p.43. This work gives a detailed account of the Portuguese military involvement with RENAMO.


26. Interview with Cavaco Silva, *op.cit.*. Lisbon, 1991

27. The five referred to are the five Lusophone African nations.

28. Portuguese diplomatic source.

29. Full quote available in *Chapter One*.

30. Private South African business source.


32. Mugabe and Arap Moi began their mediation in August 1989.


34. *Ibid.*.


In clear contrast to the ongoing problems of Luso-Mozambican relations, Portugal’s post-colonial relations with Angola demonstrate a more successful aspect of Cavaco Silva’s desired *rapprochement*. It is also in Portugal’s role as mediator in the Angolan conflict that Lisbon’s efforts at developing the linkage between African and European foreign policy proved most successful. Yet Cavaco Silva’s desire to establish close relations with Angola, as in the case of his attempted *rapprochement* with Mozambique, has involved a long process in overcoming the problems which the legacy of decolonisation also left in Luso-Angolan relations.

Although, as we saw earlier, President Eanes tried to develop close relations with Angola his policy was quickly frustrated by the activities of anti-MPLA circles in Lisbon. In 1982 about a dozen Portuguese personalities were involved in an attempt to overthrow the Angolan government known as ‘Operation Kubango’. Moreover, with the return to power of Mario Soares as Prime Minister in 1983, relations with Luanda deteriorated rapidly to what one diplomat described as nothing short of ‘disastrous’.

There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, during its mandate the Soares government, lasting from 1983-1985, was too pre-occupied with Portugal’s membership of the European Community to formulate an active African foreign policy towards Lusophone Africa as a whole. This omission in foreign policy, coming as it did after the non-existence of an African foreign policy during the political instability of the 1982-1983 period, only further weakened Portugal’s post-colonial presence in Africa. Portugal’s then Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama, did attempt to forge a closer relationship with his Angolan counterpart, Paulo Jorge, but these attempts came to nothing as they coincided with Jorge’s political demise within the MPLA. Moveover, Lisbon’s inability to formulate an African foreign policy was all the more serious as it coincided with the MPLA’s desire to strengthen its ties with other European countries such as France and Spain. The MPLA viewed a diversification of its links with the west, and particularly the European Community, as a means of diluting any possible neo-colonial influence that Portugal might attempt to develop in its post-colonial relationship with Angola.

Luanda’s desire to lessen its ties with Portugal was not only a corollary of the MPLA’s Marxist orientation, but it also reflected the Angolan leadership’s desire to consolidate the nation’s newly acquired independence.
Angola’s post-colonial ties with the communist bloc also had a negative repercussion on the country’s relations with Portugal that went beyond the problems faced by two nations on opposite sides of the then east-west divide. The Soviets and Cubans quickly established their control over all the key sectors of the Angolan economy; and, intent on reaping the benefits of their presence in the country, used their influence to discourage any rapprochement with Portugal. They feared that closer relations with Portugal would lead to a return of the Portuguese business community which could seriously undermine their own economic objectives. Both Cubans and Soviets realised that not only did the Portuguese know the country far better, but that their operations would also be more suited to the pre-independence economic infrastructure installed in Angola.

However, the main reason for the poor state of relations between Portugal and Angola during the mid-1980s was the activities of pro-UNITA lobbies in Lisbon and their relationship with the Soares government, a situation which closely mirrored the problems which this government had in relation to Mozambique.

The very re-emergence of Soares as Prime Minister due to his active anti-MPLA diplomacy in Washington and his earlier position on the contencioso, made Luanda extremely reluctant to develop close ties with Lisbon. A further tension was introduced to Luso-Angolan relations because of the Prime Minister’s son, Joao Soares, who was strongly involved with pro-UNITA lobbies in Lisbon. Many, particularly within the MPLA, viewed Joao Soares’ UNITA involvement as a visible sign of the Prime Minister’s own sympathies for the guerrilla organisation.

**UNITA Support**

As in the case of RENAMO, UNITA support in Portugal was motivated by an array of reasons, ranging from ‘those with a nostalgic sentiment for Empire ... to firsthand anti-communists’ who resented the MPLA’s dictatorship. These sympathies allowed UNITA privileged contacts with Portuguese political, ‘military, religious and business circles’.

However, UNITA support in Portugal was far more extensive than that of RENAMO, especially within political circles, a situation which only served to further strain post-colonial relations between Portugal and Angola. The fact that UNITA, unlike Rhodesia-created RENAMO, existed before Angolan independence and is viewed as having taken an active part in the Angolan liberation struggle, increased the movement’s political credibility not just in Portugal but also internationally. UNITA’s political acceptance also stemmed from the fact that it presented a far more coherent political programme than its
Mozambican counterpart. These factors permitted a plausible perception of UNITA as a movement fighting for western democratic ideals.

However, having said that, a clear distinction between the two movements is something of a myth. Although UNITA did indeed exist as a liberation movement before Angolan independence, it had for a long time been part of the counter-operations activities of the Portuguese colonial forces fighting in Angola, not unlike the role played by RENAMO with both the Rhodesian and South African military. In fact, the movement was only recognised by the Organisation of African Unity shortly before the ‘Alvor’ independence agreement in January 1975. At least until 1988, UNITA and RENAMO also shared the same paymasters - the South African military. Although the principal difference between UNITA and RENAMO is normally seen as one of differing methods - as one Portuguese diplomat explained - the barbarity of one or the other differed very little.

In essence, as the similarities between the two organisations suggest, Portuguese support for UNITA is possibly more closely motivated by the social traumas which decolonisation left on Portuguese society than any particular political affiliation. However, the more open political support which UNITA received in Portugal from all sides of the political spectrum clearly illustrated the greater following which the Angolan guerrillas enjoy in comparison to their Mozambican counterparts.

In the political sphere, UNITA support was mostly concentrated in the right-wing CDS Party and in a small group of Socialist Party leaders. The CDS openly supported UNITA from 1975, when it allowed the guerrillas to open their first Lisbon office at their party headquarters. In the Socialist Party, Joao Soares, along with deputies Joffre Justino and Jose Brandao, formed the main UNITA nucleus. Yet many in the Socialist Party such as one of the party’s main leaders, Vitor Constancio, repeatedly made it clear that the Socialist Party as a whole was not sympathetic to the Angolan rebels. Cavaco Silva’s strong anti-UNITA stance, which lead him to describe the organisation as a ‘terrorist movement’ prevented the emergence of any strong UNITA support in the PSD. Nevertheless, support even for UNITA came from certain sectors of the trade union movement and a number of feminist organisations.

UNITA’s main support in Portugal naturally came from ‘extremist’ elements in Portugal’s retomado community. As a pro-UNITA bulletin declared in Lisbon as late as 1986, aside from the political pressure exerted by this social group on the political parties and the government, ‘many of them, well established businessmen ... sponsor scholarships, book publishing, the purchase of medicines and fund raising, to which they themselves contribute generously’. UNITA also enjoyed strong support within the Portuguese military hierarchy.
and particularly within military intelligence. Due to collaboration with the Portuguese military in the colonial war, UNITA developed a closer relationship with the military establishment than RENAMO. Former Portuguese colonial army men also worked closely with the South African Defence Force to recruit mercenaries and train UNITA guerrillas. As in the case of RENAMO, logistic support for UNITA also came from the large Portuguese community in South Africa.

UNITA's wide-ranging support network among influential Portuguese circles and the activities of the Soares family generated increased friction between Portugal and Angola in 1985. In that year the MPLA's Political Bureau advised the Angolan government to undertake a series of retaliatory measures against the Portuguese government for what they saw as the 'freedom of action' UNITA enjoyed in Lisbon. The Political Bureau did add that this was the only source of 'friction' between the two countries. These retaliatory measures, which the Angolan government did indeed carry out, involved the suspension of 'business contracts in the process of negotiation or about to be initiated'. Existing contracts with Portuguese firms were also to be 'revised' and/or 'terminated', and the Angolan government would begin to search for alternative markets to Portugal. The retaliations cost Portugal around US$200 million. In 1985 Lopo Do Nascimento, a member of the Political Bureau, clearly stated that Portuguese companies would face 'the kinds of difficulties' not associated with the operations of firms from other European countries (such as France or Germany), which had expelled the 'puppets'.

Cavaco Silva and Angola

With the first government of Cavaco Silva in June 1985 and his desire to develop a new post-colonial relationship with Africa, relations between Portugal and Angola also began their first tentative steps towards a new rapprochement. With the visit of then Portuguese Foreign Minister, Pires Miranda, to Luanda at the end of 1985, the MPLA declared 'it felt a new dialogue was about to begin at all levels'. Moreover, the diplomatic and domestic efforts which Cavaco Silva had undertaken to ensure a mutually beneficial relationship with Luanda, and a prominent Portuguese role in the Angolan peace process, revealed the importance Lisbon attached to its African dimension as a means of strengthening the country's international presence, especially within the European Community. Portugal's central role in the Angolan peace process became the clearest action by Lisbon designed to promote Portugal as a leading Euro-African link. It must be stressed that, while Cavaco Silva provided the political leadership necessary for a redefinition of Portugal's relationship with Africa - bearing in mind UNITA's powerful support in the country - it was his Secretary of State, Durrao Barroso, who was the primary architect of Portugal's African diplomacy.
In a parallel situation to that of Mozambique, Cavaco Silva's rapprochement with Angola led to another struggle with the influential Portuguese circles who supported the Angolan rebels. However, determined to develop closer relations with Angola, the Portuguese Prime Minister took his first direct action against the UNITA lobby in 1986 by prohibiting any official UNITA representation in Lisbon. All UNITA representatives in Portugal who did not carry Portuguese passports were also declared 'persona non grata'. UNITA, however, continued to maintain a small office in Lisbon manned by Portuguese citizens (with the exception of one who held an Ivorian passport) on a part-time basis. To the great annoyance of UNITA and its Portuguese friends, the rebel movement was also prohibited from giving any press conferences or making any appearances on Portuguese state-controlled television (RTP).

Cavaco Silva's actions towards the MPLA provoked considerable criticism and resentment from UNITA's influential friends. They viewed the Prime Minister's foreign policy as devoid of any moral or political considerations, resting solely on economic interests. The legacy of decolonisation was only all too clear, as Durrao Barroso pointed out: 'The problem with these sectors is that they view the Angolan conflict as if it were a Portuguese conflict ...' which has 'limited and conditioned the best decisions in terms of the national interest'. Yet, Cavaco Silva's determination to improve relations with the Angolan Government secured not only Portuguese economic interests in that former colony, but it also allowed Portugal the international prestige associated with the mediation of the Angolan conflict. In the Spring of 1987, the signing of a series of agreements on economic co-operation between the two countries, along with the visit to Portugal of Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos later in the year, heralded the beginning of a new post-colonial relationship between the two states.

Cavaco Silva's rapprochement with Angola was also greatly facilitated by the Soviet disengagement from Africa. The Soviet retreat, along with Angola's economic crisis and the country's transition to a market economy, led the MPLA to target Lisbon as the 'pivotal centre' of its European policy. The subsequent appointment of Pedro van Dunem 'loy' as Angola's new foreign minister in 1989, and the appointment of a new ambassador to Lisbon, both of whom were known to have many friends in Portugal, revealed the importance Luanda was now attaching to closer ties with the former colonial power. In Portugal, Angola knew it would have no difficulty in capturing the interest of the Portuguese business community. Furthermore, unlike business circles in other countries, this community not only spoke the same language but in most cases had also a large degree of previous experience in Angolan operations.

The MPLA's new image in Portugal also held the clear political objective of undermining UNITA support in the country where it had most friends (outside
Angola). Moreover, with Washington’s growing ability to pressure Luanda politically, militarily and economically, Lisbon became a vehicle through which to seek an urgently needed rapprochement with the west - primarily Washington. The MPLA was aware that by drawing closer to Portugal it would also be strengthening its political ties with the EC at a crucial time when it needed all the international support it could muster.

In March 1988 - as with the Mozambican case - the changing international situation along with the new degree of friendliness between Portugal and Angola, enabled the Secretary of State, Durrao Barroso, to formulate plans for a possible Portuguese intervention in the resolution of the Angolan conflict. Such plans would never have been possible without Cavaco Silva’s determination to forge closer relations with the MPLA.

In retaliation against Cavaco Silva’s leanings towards Angola, the Portuguese UNITA supporters institutionalised their support for the movement through the creation of a lobby in April 1988 called the ‘Forum Portuguese para a Paz e Democracia em Angola’ (FPPDA). The aim of this lobby was to publicise and increase UNITA’s support amongst Portuguese public opinion with a view to pressuring the government into a more sympathetic stance towards the guerrilla organisation. They hoped that public pressure would terminate the government’s growing international support for the MPLA. The creation of the forum also revealed that UNITA supporters, along with the Portuguese Government, viewed the changes in the international system as implying an impending resolution of the Angolan war.

The FPPDA was an umbrella organisation that encompassed people from the various sectors of Portuguese society where UNITA support was to be found. Although the forum gave its name to a couple of initiatives it still rested mostly on the influence and indirect power that the organisation’s members carried in their various positions. However, the lobby proved wholly unsuccessful in changing Cavaco Silva’s foreign policy. A head-on clash between the lobby and Cavaco Silva came in July 1988, when the Portuguese Prime Minister refused UNITA leader Savimbi an entry visa. If the move to bring Savimbi to Portugal had been designed to embarrass the government, because of its close ties with a communist regime bitterly resented in Portugal, then it failed. It was Cavaco Silva, not the lobby, which garnered the support of public opinion.

The Portuguese Prime Minister’s battle with the pro-UNITA lobby, ironically, proved instrumental in increasing the closeness between Luanda and Lisbon. The MPLA clearly appreciated Cavaco Silva’s stand, claiming it was a ‘gesture of courage and political clear-sightedness. In a context characterised by the ... hostility of some political circles towards the Angolan ... Government’. The stand of the Portuguese Government, at a crucial phase in the MPLA’s
existence, was instrumental in securing Luanda’s trust for the future role Portugal would play in the Angolan peace process. As both Cavaco Silva and Durrao Barroso stated several times, had it not been for the Portuguese Government’s ability to nurture the trust of the MPLA, it would not have been possible to mediate in the Angolan peace talks. Relations with UNITA were only to be a consideration at a later stage.

On the advice of Durrao Barroso the Portuguese Prime Minister carried out a diplomatic offensive that further increased the MPLA’s trust in and ties with Lisbon. In Washington and Brussels the Portuguese Government attempted to secure increased international support for the Angolan regime. The Portuguese persistently tried to persuade the American administration to lend its support to Dos Santos’ peace initiatives and terminate its support for UNITA. The MPLA appears to have been willing to negotiate any peace agreement on Southern Africa that precluded the necessity for direct negotiations with the UNITA rebels. That situation was soon to change.

Although Lisbon and Luanda finally secured a peace formula that permitted the MPLA to remain in power, the Bush administration actually increased its support to UNITA. Following the December 1988 accords on the Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence, the US replaced South Africa as the main source of UNITA military aid. As the accords were signed in New York, the Americans initiated a massive UNITA supply operation via Zaire. In January 1989 President Bush wrote to Savimbi assuring the latter of unwavering American support. After Cavaco Silva’s visit to the White House in late 1989, the Portuguese Prime Minister declared that he could not understand why there was a ‘dialogue’ between Washington and Moscow and not one between Washington and Luanda. 30 As Portuguese Foreign Minister Deus Pinheiro stated, US support for UNITA, at a time when the MPLA had no alternative but to negotiate a peace agreement, turned the Americans into the ‘instigators of conflicts, rather than the promoters of peace’. 31

The Foreign Minister’s statement revealed that Lisbon’s assessment of the effect international changes would have in Southern Africa was essentially wrong. When Durrao Barroso formulated his plans for a Portuguese intervention in the Angolan peace process he had assumed that the Cuban withdrawal, together with the independence of Namibia, would lead both Pretoria and Washington into a new accommodation with the MPLA. In essence, Durrao Barroso assumed that the 1988 New York agreement heralded the termination of American and South African support for UNITA. As a consequence of this, Lisbon thought that UNITA would then be an internal problem that would be no match for the powerful MPLA army. Yet although this analysis proved erroneous, it achieved Lisbon’s main priority - that of securing the MPLA’s trust for a Portuguese intervention in the Angolan peace process. Moreover, in
Europe, no Community member state detracted, at least officially, from Portugal's diplomatic position in relation to the MPLA. In fact, it is presumed that France worked closely with Portugal in the quest for peace in Angola.

With the June 1989 Gbadolite summit, Lisbon began to reassess its foreign policy towards UNITA. Although Portugal would continue to seek international support for the MPLA, the presence of eighteen African leaders at the meeting between Savimbi and Dos Santos indicated that the MPLA was being forced to negotiate an accommodation with UNITA. Importantly, the presence of Heads of State from the Front-line States, such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, demonstrated that even close allies were pressuring the MPLA into an agreement with the rebels. However, the Gbadolite summit between Savimbi and Dos Santos under the mediation of Zaire’s dictator Mobutu failed. This failure was due to the incompetent diplomacy of Mobutu which actually left both parties confused as to the nature of the agreement they had concluded.32

The failure of Gbadolite provided the Portuguese with the opportunity again to use an active foreign policy as a means of promoting Portugal as the leading Euro-African link. The result was a diplomatic offensive by Lisbon to secure a central role in the resolution of the Angolan conflict as had initially been planned. It is unclear whether or not the Portuguese had initially foreseen the possibility of an African solution to the Angolan conflict, but one week after Gbadolite, a Portuguese delegation, headed by Durrao Barroso, visited Brazzaville, Kampala and Kinshasa. The delegation’s dual aim was to seek a closer evaluation of the situation, and to secure African support for an increased Portuguese role in the Angolan peace process.

Following Gbadolite, Lisbon established informal but official contacts with the Angolan guerrillas through a communication system linking UNITA headquarters in Jamba with the Portuguese foreign office and the Prime Minister’s residence. The direct link to Cavaco Silva reflected the Prime Minister’s determination personally to oversee Portugal’s involvement in the Angolan peace process. The Prime Minister continued to forge closer links with UNITA by sending two deputies of his PSD party and two elements of military intelligence to Jamba. The fact that Portuguese television was also allowed to interview Savimbi in Jamba clearly emphasised Lisbon’s new accommodation with UNITA. Having obtained the trust of the MPLA, Portugal now intended to develop a new relationship with UNITA that would permit it to become the mediator between the two belligerents.

With the new communication channels opened to UNITA and Washington’s clear determination to support the guerrillas, the Portuguese Government became instrumental in stressing to the MPLA that a military solution to the conflict was no longer viable. Lisbon’s new contacts with UNITA also turned Portugal into a vital link for communication between the two warring parties.
which enabled the establishment of official peace talks in 1990. Although it was
only after Gbadolite that Portugal opened official channels of communication
with UNITA, the Portuguese Prime Minister had always maintained unofficial
contacts with the Angolan guerrillas through two deputies, Carlos Robalo and
Luis Geraldes.33

The final step in Lisbon's reconciliation with UNITA came in January 1990
when Jonas Savimbi was finally allowed to visit Portugal. However, the fact
that Cavaco Silva met Savimbi at PSD headquarters, as the leader of a political
party and not as Prime Minister, signalled to Savimbi that his organisation did
not yet have equal diplomatic recognition to that of the MPLA from the
Portuguese Government. As Durrao Barroso had stated, Lisbon's main pre-
occupation in Angolan foreign policy was always to secure the trust of the
MPLA, since UNITA - due to its nature as a rebel movement - was more likely
to accept negotiations whenever they were offered.

While Cavaco Silva attempted to secure the trust of the MPLA and to allow
Portugal an increased international role in the Angolan peace process, the
legacy of decolonisation was to make one last attempt to hamper the Prime
Minister's foreign policy. The Portuguese President, Mario Soares, in close
alignment with UNITA circles in Lisbon, carried out a parallel diplomacy
aimed at increasing UNITA's international support. Soares lobbied the US
administration and countries such as Morocco not to terminate their support of
the Angolan rebels.34 On Savimbi's behalf, Soares also attempted to persuade
Bonn and Paris to assume a more friendly international position towards
UNITA.35 Neither government acquiesced to the diplomatic importuning of
Soares and Savimbi. The Portuguese President had always kept in close contact
with UNITA through the presence of various members of his staff such as
Naval Commander Homen De Gouveia.36

Soares' parallel diplomacy was not only prejudicial to the coherence of the
Portuguese state on such an important international issue, it was also in clear
breach of the constitutional powers bestowed on the presidency. Although Eanes
had considerable powers especially in the field of foreign policy during the late
1970s, the subsequent revisions of the constitution in 1982 and 1989
significantly reduced the powers of the presidency. In the area of foreign
policy, as in most other areas of government, primary responsibility for the
nation's affairs now rest with the executive. The institutional dichotomy which
Soares' diplomacy created between the presidency and the executive on African
foreign policy was remarkably similar to that which Soares had introduced
between the two institutions when he was Prime Minister in the mid- to late-
1970s. The competing differences between the two institutions clearly
highlighted the hold that the legacy of decolonisation continued to have on
Portuguese society.
As a result of his actions Soares was not present at the signing of the Angolan peace accords in May 1991. The government gave the President a choice of either being present at the signing of the accords and not making a speech or being allowed to make a speech only at an official function hosted by the presidency. Soares opted for the latter alternative.

Other countries such as the Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Morocco all attempted to obtain a more prominent role in the mediation of the Angolan conflict. Even Washington sought to place any negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA in Geneva, a forum that was clearly designed to increase UNITA’s international credibility and prestige. However, it was under Portuguese mediation in Lisbon that the guns were, for a time, silenced in Angola on 31 May 1991. Cavaco Silva and Durrao Barroso seemed to have succeeded where others had failed and used their African foreign policy to allow Portugal a greater international profile.

Endnotes

1. Beyond the fact that ‘Operation Kubanjo’ was linked to the South African military, no other detailed or hard information has been found on this attempted coup d’état.


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Research carried out in 1985 by Dr. Shirley Washington of the Department of Political Science, University of Ohio, US.


11. Ibid., p.148.


15. Ibid., p.70.

16. On trade union involvement, see Conchillia A, op.cit., p.70; and on the feminist organisations see Portugal e as Conversacoes entre o MPLA e a UNITA, p.148.


18. Ibid., p.72.

19. Ibid., p.72.


27. Portugal e as Conversacoes entre o MPLA e a UNITA, p.148.

28. Ibid.


33. Portuguese diplomatic source.


35. Informafrica, Os Bons Oficios de Soares. Lisbon, date unknown, p.7.

36. Portuguese diplomatic source.
PART TWO: BICESSE AND POST-BICESSE
The Bicesse Agreement

As the Cold War ebbed, many sought to mediate in Southern Africa. The present authors do not propose to repeat here what they have itemised in detail elsewhere.1 Suffice it to say that Zambia, Zimbabwe and Italy among others, all sought mediatory roles. Often under US observation, if not loose leadership, coalitions of mediating powers drove the search for peace onwards. Of these, Italy played a major role in the Rome talks that lead to agreement to end hostilities and hold elections in Mozambique. It was Portugal, however, that played a major role over Angola.

However, this role did not materialise in a vacuum. Changes in the world and within Angola led to the need for sympathetic mediation. In 1990 the MPLA’s December Congress approved the abandonment of the one-party state adopting it its place a multi-party system. The Congress also abandoned Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology and undertook a purge of the Central Committee aimed at replacing diehard hardliners with new younger reformist-minded cadres. The groundwork had been laid for a western-style democratic system of government in Angola.

This process of political change was inevitable given the fall of communism and the geo-strategic changes caused by the winds of change in the Kremlin. By 1990 the fall of the Berlin Wall had driven African states to move away from authoritarian rule towards representative democracy and by the year’s end, forty operated democratic systems. The political changes in Angola were therefore part of a wider post-Cold War international trend. It was a political move that found widespread support in Angola.

However, this move also aimed at opening another front in the struggle against UNITA. After all, it undermined UNITA’s primary justification for war - the need for democratic rule in Angola. Naturally, the MPLA hoped that this masterstroke would weaken the guerrillas’ internal and international standing and support. The move, however, had come too late for that; but it was sufficient to suggest a brokered peace and elections in which both the MPLA and UNITA could participate.

After a year of tough negotiations under Portuguese mediation, and with constant pressure from the US and whatever pressure the Soviet Union could muster, the MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Peace Agreement. They had done so under great duress. In April 1991, the MPLA also adopted democratic
socialism as the official party ideology and removed the term ‘Workers Party’ from the official party name. As peace became a reality so the MPLA completed its transition from a Leninist vanguard party to a democratic one capable of competing in a multi-party scenario.

The Agreement

Here, both because it seems not to have been done elsewhere and also because Portugal continued to hold Bicesse as its model for repairing Angola after the aborted elections and return to war, we analyse the agreement in detail.

The 31 May 1991 peace agreement established a new framework for Angola’s transition from armed conflict and single-party rule to peace, stability and a multi-party democracy. The transition rested on the demobilisation and disarmament of the MPLA/UNITA armies and the creation of a new unified Angolan Armed Forces, the formation of a representative police force and the holding of elections under international supervision, including a role for the United Nations. The agreement also involved a triple-zero clause that prevented both sides from acquiring weapons.

Aside from the political steps outlined in the agreement, Bicesse also enshrined a number of dispute-resolution and organisational structures designed to oversee and facilitate the implementation of the peace accord. The most important of these was the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC). The JPMC was made up of representatives of the MPLA and UNITA, together with members of the troika of foreign observers - Portugal, the Soviet Union (later Russian Federation) and the United States. It was the role of the JPMC to investigate cease-fire allegations and to ensure compliance by both the MPLA and UNITA with the responsibilities they had assumed at Bicesse. The JPMC was in essence the high authority responsible for the entire political transition until the holding of elections. It began functioning as the cease-fire came into force.

The Commission was basically a confidence-building mechanism in that both belligerents - irrespective of one being the party in government - had equal control over the transition. As a result, decisions could only be taken on the basis of a consensus between the MPLA and UNITA. In essence, the country’s entire transition rested on the goodwill and faith of the main belligerents, with no third party recognised as having the authority to control and enforce the accords in an impartial manner. According to the agreement the troika countries ‘would’ be heard in this JPMC decision-making process, but they could not change the effective veto both the MPLA and UNITA now held.

Although Bicesse stressed that the JPMC was not a substitute for the government, the Commission was also designed to allow UNITA a degree of
power during and over the transition. UNITA may not have been willing to form an interim government as unpopular and pressing decisions may have risked alienating voters, but it was certainly not prepared to relinquish a formal and institutional degree of political power during the transition. In recognition of the opportunity which the JPMC offered UNITA, its delegation to the Commission tended, at least initially, to be larger and made up of higher ranking officials than the MPLA’s.²

The accords also gave birth to the Verification and Monitoring Commission (VMC) which, as its name implies, was responsible for monitoring the cease-fire and the redeployment of forces from both sides. This body was made up of representatives from the MPLA and UNITA, along with members of the three observer countries, and an invited representative of the United Nations. This body was created before the cease-fire but also took up its functions as the cease-fire came into effect.

Another commission established by the accords was the Joint Commission for the Creation of the Single Army, whose role was to monitor and assist the creation of the proposed new single army (FAA). This Commission was made up of the members of the two armies, the FAPLA (MPLA) and FALA (UNITA), along with representatives from the three countries involved in assisting the creation of the new force - Portugal, France and the UK.

Bicesse was hailed by many as a model for similar transitions elsewhere. Despite some significant clashes between opposing forces in the summer of 1992 in Malange and Bié, and a series of largely unnoticed minor skirmishes, the cease-fire held extremely well. The elections of the 29 and 30 September 1992 took place in what observers considered an acceptable if not, given the circumstances, an exemplary fashion. Initial results put out by the mass media pointed to an overwhelming MPLA victory in both the legislative and presidential elections.

However, the hope of established peace proved an illusion. On 3 October 1992, UNITA leader Savimbi claimed - as it looked increasingly as if the MPLA had indeed won both the legislative and presidential elections - that there had been widespread and systematic fraud in the elections. On 5 October 1992 a serious breach of the peace agreement occurred, when eleven UNITA officers withdrew from the new single army in support of Savimbi’s position. Following a series of investigations, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative announced on 17 October 1992 that the elections had generally been free and fair. The MPLA won the legislative elections with 53.74% of the votes and UNITA received 34.1%. President dos Santos received 49.57% and Savimbi, 40.07%; since neither achieved a clear 50% or more, a second round was still required by the electoral law.
On 30 October 1992 a serious shoot out between government and UNITA forces took place at Luanda airport. The government claimed the rebels had attempted to take the airport. The following day the tension rose even more as serious fighting between the two broke out in the capital. Many top UNITA leaders and hundreds of UNITA supporters were killed. Heavy fighting also broke out in Malange, Lobito, Cafunfo and Benguela. UNITA forces throughout the country began to flex their muscle and by mid-December UNITA occupied two-thirds of all Angolan municipalities. Civil war had returned.

What went wrong? This requires a multi-faceted answer as there was not just one reason but a complex interplay of several factors linked to the very nature of the fundamentals outlined in the peace agreement. While outwardly there were very few signs of real trouble, the flaws in Bicesse allowed the two main actors - the MPLA and UNITA - jointly to undermine the entire transition framework.

The most basic flaw - but possibly what made the agreement possible in the first place - was the fact that it conferred on the belligerents equal custodianship for the implementation of the peace accord. The animosity and distrust which each party harboured against the other, following sixteen years of civil war, was only natural and would make collaboration between the two a difficult exercise in itself. But with both parties distrustful of each other and in the absence of a third party capable of enforcing the provisions of Bicesse and of offering security guarantees to one in case of non-compliance by the other, the agreement only fuelled the need to be on guard against any moves by the adversary which might lead to an unfair political and/or military advantage. The risk was always felt of military decapitation or political oblivion. In essence, both sides wanted to hedge their bets; they would co-operate with the peace process in as much as they had signed it, but not without reserving a guarantee in case it all went wrong. Its failure was almost a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The MPLA's suspicions surrounding UNITA's depth of commitment to the peace process were evident from the onset of the peace process. The arrival of UNITA's JPMC members headed by UNITA General Salupeto Pena, and not the organisation's Vice-President Chitunda, sent waves of distrust through the MPLA. At the same time, UNITA became increasingly distrustful of what it saw as a pro-MPLA UN. This was mostly based on the fact that the UNAVEMII was based in Luanda.

The spirit of animosity and rivalry between the MPLA and UNITA was further exacerbated by the prospect of winner-take-all elections. The race for electoral victory fanned the spirit of rivalry and hostility between the two. Both sides knew that the elections were not just about establishing a representative
government in Angola, but that they would also declare the winner of 16 years of civil war and reward it with legitimate political power - something alien to both parties. The race for political power brought with it a serious problem - propaganda.

Propaganda

The May 1991 peace accord called for an end to hostile propaganda; yet, it simultaneously encouraged the phenomenon by the phased link contained in the agreement between peace, elections and political power.

The electoral campaign started almost immediately after the signing of the peace agreement. Neither the MPLA or UNITA had any intention of waiting for the beginning of the official electoral campaign on 10 August (the campaign was due to end on 26 September 1992) to bolster their electoral support through the use of propaganda. Peace was in and the race for power was on.

Although both sides complained almost on a daily basis of the other's aggressive propaganda in the JPMC, neither party took advantage of the commission created to deal specifically with the issue. In fact, no official complaint was ever formulated by either the MPLA or UNITA in the propaganda commission. Both sides realised the powerful potential of propaganda in harnessing political support and were evidently not prepared to relinquish it easily. The state-owned media, namely the Jornal de Angola, the TV station, the radio service and the official news agency, Angop, displayed flagrant disrespect for impartiality and free reporting. These were not only partial to the MPLA regime but they, at times, seemed to foment and encourage hostile anti-UNITA propaganda. In similar fashion to the incumbent regime, UNITA used its own means of communication to hurl abuse at the adversary. The guerrilla movement continued to keep its famous Vorgan radio broadcasting and to publish its newspaper, Terra Angolana. UNITA was certainly not willing to stop its radio transmissions in a country where the illiteracy level and the lack of television sets makes it a powerful means of political mobilisation. This is particularly true in rural areas, where most of UNITA's supporters were located.

Under such conditions the bitter resentments accumulated throughout sixteen years of bitter war were only too easily used and abused to the further detriment of any spirit of national harmony. 'Their pre-election campaigns ... shunned the peace process ideal of national reconciliation in favour of blatant intimidation'. In the words of UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in early 1992, the inflammatory nature of the hostile propaganda practised by both sides gave rise to 'great concern' on the part of observers.
While mistrust and the desire to win increased political support bred virulent and aggressive propaganda, so this in turn fanned further mistrust and led to increased propaganda and animosity. The interplay between this growing spiral of distrust, suspicion and hostility and three other important processes outlined in Bicesse proved lethal to the peace process.

The Single Army

The first of these three processes was the purported extinction of the two rival MPLA/UNITA armies and the creation of a new unified Angolan Armed Forces. One day before the elections on 28 September a new 8,000-strong Angolan Armed Forces was officially announced. At the ceremony, Antonio dos Santos França (FAPLA/MPLA) and General Arlindo Pena (FALA/UNITA) were sworn in as Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff and both FALA and FAPLA were officially declared extinct. This new military force was to prove little more than an official declaration. The fiasco behind the single army’s creation was clearly revealed when eleven former UNITA military officers walked out on 5 October 1992.

Bicesse stated that the process of disarming, demobilisation and creation of the unified army was to begin with the entry into force of the cease-fire and to be concluded by the elections. The May peace accord stipulated that both the MPLA and UNITA were to have their forces assembled at their respective locations sixty days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. There was a total of 151,900 troops to demobilise; 114,000 from the government and 37,000 from UNITA. The new army was to achieve a strength of 40,000 with each side contributing 20,000 men from their respective armies. The 6,000-strong airforce and the 4,000-strong navy were to come solely from the MPLA’s ranks, as UNITA did not possess these types of military forces; although a form of participation for UNITA in both these structures was to be found by the JPMC.

The timetable turned out to be overly ambitious due to a number of reasons. There were the technical difficulties. The entire process of demobilisation, disarmament and the eventual establishment of the single army (DDS) was significantly delayed by a lack of adequate quantities of ‘civilian clothes, funds, vehicles and aircraft’ necessary to the exercise. The devastation which the war caused in Angola meant that the lack of social infrastructure such as roads, bridges and telecommunications only further hampered the fulfilment of the timetable for DDS.

Severe lack of medical supplies, food, clothes and the general poor state of living conditions in the assembly areas caused further problems for the process.
of DDS. On a number of occasions delays in demobilisation, coupled with the poor conditions in the camps, sparked off bouts of violence and unrest as patience was exhausted and tempers frayed.

In government assembly areas the situation was worsened by lack of both pay and leadership. This led not only to violence but to the spontaneous exit of large numbers of undemobilised soldiers. Soldiers even stormed airports demanding to be put on planes to Luanda, while others stormed government regional offices demanding their demobilisation papers.

The anxiety felt by many of these men, who knew little more than fighting as a profession, over their uncertain futures aggravated the frustration felt by many soldiers. The existence of unhappy and hungry armed soldiers and the possession of arms by large sectors of the population contributed to a general increase in the level of crime and insecurity in the country.

If the technical difficulties did not facilitate the timely conclusion of the process of DDS then the reluctance of the two belligerents to disarm totally undermined it. In March 1992 the MPLA began to transfer an elite contingent of its demobilised military into a new special riot police squad. This paramilitary force quickly became known as the 'ninjas' because of their swift and powerful tactics and were operational by the time of the Pope's visit to Angola in mid-1992. While UNITA claimed this was a serious violation of the peace accord, the MPLA stressed this was normal standard practice. According to the MPLA, the new anti-riot police numbered little over one thousand and were scheduled to reach a strength of 1,516 by the end of December 1992. Interestingly the MPLA also claimed that a total number of 4,080 former armed services personnel had been integrated into the regular police force.

The MPLA's attempt at hedging its bets in case the peace process was derailed paled in comparison to UNITA's. The rebel movement concealed large numbers of undeclared troops and weapons throughout the vast Angolan territory. UNITA declared the existence of 37,330 guerrillas under its command, although earlier, as Keith Somerville highlights, Savimbi had claimed the existence of troops in the region of 50,000 to 70,000. On one occasion alone, and after repeated government accusations, a JPMC investigation found several hundred undeclared UNITA troops in Cuando Cubango.

Demobilisation did indeed accelerate as the elections drew closer, and by 7 October a total of 96,620 government troops had been demobilised, representing 80% of the projected figure. However, a much lower figure of (at best) around 10,000 to 15,000 of UNITA troops had been demobilised. This meant that while the government had significantly scaled down its military capacities UNITA was left with around two-thirds of its initially declared guerrilla force.
The speed with which UNITA reconstituted its forces following the decision to question the electoral results offered further proof of how UNITA had kept most of its military machinery intact and ready for action.

Even without these severe hurdles, the creation of a credible single army within the space of one year was questionable from the beginning. The creation of a real *esprit de corps* between soldiers accustomed to fighting each other for sixteen brutal years, wherein one side was bound to have killed a family member on the other side, was a deep psychological barrier to overcome. Even aside from the psychology of creating a single army under these conditions there was also the real problem of integrating two groups of soldiers used to differing tactics and operational doctrines. The traditional military tactics of the FAPLA were clearly different from those used by UNITA's guerrilla forces.

A single army is clearly not created simply through the holding of an official swearing in ceremony. Rather, successfully integrating soldiers from previously opposed forces requires the establishment of a real climate of national reconciliation where the political leadership of previously opposed forces are truly united and committed to the task of national reconstruction.

**A Representative Police Force**

Policing proved another bone of contention between the MPLA and UNITA. As far as policing was concerned, the peace agreement provided for the creation of a joint MPLA/UNITA mechanism to monitor the neutrality of the Angolan police and for the establishment of a representative police force.

Tension between the two over police matters was initially fuelled by UNITA's refusal to recognise the authority of the police when any of its followers were involved in criminal acts or complaints. However, the real source of friction between the two parties lay in the creation of the representative police force. UNITA initially demanded that 7,500 to 8,500 of its members be incorporated into the force. The government conceded a UNITA intake of only 1,200. In late summer 1992 the row over the representative police force reached new heights; only 39 members of a 183-strong UNITA contingent undertaking training to be incorporated into the new civil police force were accepted.¹⁷ UNITA claimed that the MPLA was creating artificial obstacles to its participation in the new civil police force by setting impossible criteria such as length of schooling. This situation only contributed to what was already by that time a growing gulf between the two. Severe communications, logistic and accessibility problems in many areas of the country also prevented the joint policing mechanism from fulfilling its task.¹⁸
Extension of Government Authority

Under the terms of the Bicesse Accord central administration was to be extended throughout the whole of Angola. As with the two processes described above, this problematic exercise both reflected and contributed to the growing spiral of mistrust and hostility between the MPLA and UNITA.

The process of extending government authority to all parts of the country got seriously underway in November 1991. UNITA searchingly questioned the viability of this process. While UNITA's attitude revealed its mistrust of the MPLA, its reluctance to allow the enemy into its privileged domain increasingly vexed the MPLA. UNITA-controlled areas were only very slowly opened to government administration. In June 1992 the government had penetrated into all but one of Angola's 165 municipalities and all but 90 of approximately 600 communes; by 2 September 1992 the extension of central administration had improved significantly but there were still 52 communes under UNITA control without any form of central administration. Destroyed bridges and mined roads further hampered the pace and extension of central administration.

The difficulties involved in extending government authority were especially problematic since voter registration was to be carried out by the government. Any citizen eligible to participate in the elections, but who failed to be registered, forewent the exercise of his right to vote. Again a lack of resources such as food, accommodation and land and air transport delayed moving personnel and materials to the registration centres dispersed throughout the country. Poor communications also inflicted delays on the ability to transmit data obtained in the field.

A mixture of technical and political difficulties experienced by the government in extending central administration raised serious doubts as to the viability of the registration process in the provinces of Moxico, Cuando Cubango and Uige. Further doubts on the efficacy of registration were raised in the Cabinda enclave. Because of intimidation by both government forces and the local separatist movements (FLEC and FLEC-Renovado) only about one-third of the eligible population registered to vote. The National Electoral Commission also decided not to register some nearly half a million Angolans living abroad due to a lack of registration materials.

Yet, at the end of the day, the registration process which lasted from 20 May to 10 August was considered a success. 4.86 million voters were registered, which represented some 92% of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million.
A Transition within a Transition

Another factor that hampered the Angolan transition was the transition within a transition. It did not just involve the emergence of a new political system or new power relationships, it also involved two belligerents undertaking transitions from authoritarian structures to democratic political parties.

The MPLA proved remarkably successful at adapting to its new environment. It shook off its *dirigisme* and learnt the art of political persuasion and multi-party competition. As its electoral campaign demonstrated, it learnt to substitute a leading role in society with political consumerism and electoral appeal, although its control of the state media still displayed a liking for old habits.

However, UNITA's transition from guerrilla movement to democratic political party proved far more difficult. Initially it seemed UNITA had all the right credentials needed to facilitate its own political transition. The organisation had a political programme, a charismatic leader, qualified personnel, popular following and an international support network that included the planet's most powerful nation. Yet, in the end, the transition proved somewhat more difficult than expected.

The process of metamorphosis from guerrilla warfare to democratic multi-party civilian political life involves a complete change in the guerrilla psyche. No longer can the guerrilla rely on force to quell opposition or achieve ends; rather he must immerse himself in the art of political canvassing, diplomacy, negotiations, compromise and political persuasion. Above all, the guerrilla must learn the complete antithesis to all he was taught - to accept political defeat. The incapability of a sophisticated guerrilla movement like UNITA to adapt to electoral scrutiny and democratic party politics only reveals the level of difficulty concerned in this type of transition.

To Have or Not to Have Elections?

Worried by events and the growing animosity between the MPLA and UNITA on the eve of the multi-party elections, the Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD) held a press conference in early July 1992. The PRD denounced the significant delays registered in the three key areas discussed above, and argued that these delays constituted a solid reason to postpone the crucial centre of Angola's transition - the elections. The pre-occupations aired by the PRD did not belong to the party alone, but were shared by a great many number of Angolans and foreign observers alike. Yet, the three country-troika - and especially the US - had other ideas.
The International Dimension of the Settlement: The Troika

The international dimension to Bicesse was another factor which contributed decisively to the failure of the peace process in Angola. Bicesse conferred on the three-country troika made up of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States, the formal role of observer and advisor in the transition. It was, however, obvious to all that the real influence that could be exerted by the troika stemmed not from the official role assigned it by Bicesse - minor as that was - but through individual bilateral channels. In this, the US was by far the most powerful of the three.

The lack of formal responsibility given the troika in the Angola Peace Accord - as both UNITA and the MPLA found to their taste - made it easier for the three countries to distance themselves from any central responsibility should the process go horribly wrong - as it did. It allowed the diplomatic prestige of involvement in the process without risking the price of failure or embarrassment. While this suited the three states well it did little to provide real and/or automatic international guarantees when the process went wrong. The troika could perhaps have been a high judge, instead it played the role of consort.

In the face of non-compliance with the peace accord by the MPLA and UNITA and the growing signs of political tension which risked derailing the whole process, the troika adopted a passive stance of public silence. It is, however, unfair to say that the troika's attitude was solely driven by a desire to secure the diplomatic prestige from involvement in the Angolan peace process without burning its fingers. As one British diplomat pointed out, the troika was caught in the 'tinkerbell syndrome'. In other words, the troika states were firmly convinced that if they believed hard enough in the process and avoided criticising either of the two parties - which might have led to increased dissatisfaction and tension - the country's political transition would be successful.

The troika's faith in the goodwill of the belligerents was strengthened by the relatively successful cease-fire over 18 months. They believed that this signified the will of both parties, despite their mutual distrust and reluctance, to comply fully with the terms of Bicesse. While it was acknowledged that there were 'great reservoirs of mistrust, rivalries and even hatreds' in Angola, the troika believed - or at least wanted to believe - that there was a 'deep feeling in Angola that any recurrence of hostilities would be self-destructive and fatal' to the country. In essence, the troika expected the process to muddle along to a successful conclusion.
Furthermore, in the period 1991-1992 there was still a general mood of euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold War and the inevitability of peace and democracy. It seems the troika got caught up in the 'end of history' thesis, which suggested that the changed international conditions of the post-Cold War militated in Angola, as in other trouble spots, against a resumption of the civil war. After all, neither side could now exploit the support which came from international superpower rivalry. This naive belief in the 'moment of history' led the troika significantly to underestimate the important internal power struggle which had for so long formed the foundation dynamics behind the Angolan conflict.

However, not to denounce the irregularities which began to characterise the peace process and to hope for the end of the conflict was one thing; allowing the elections to go ahead as scheduled in September under clearly adverse conditions was quite another. The United States insisted with absolute determination that the elections should go ahead, no matter what. Washington was tired of Angola and it had other more pressing issues to resolve. Moreover, UNITA, the US's long-standing ally in Angola, was expected - in Washington - to win the election.

Under a UNITA-win-scenario the military equation was also important to Washington. A UNITA electoral victory was expected not only to prove the weakness of the MPLA's electoral stance but it also would have the effect of placing in power the belligerent with what Washington considered the strongest military capacity. The MPLA was therefore not expected to risk a military challenge against UNITA. In Washington's reasoning this meant the war was definitely over.

In this light it is not surprising that the US did not readily condemn UNITA's non-compliance with demobilisation or the fact that it did not declare the exact number of troops under its command. Whatever happened to the MPLA and/or its supporters in the post-electoral period was to be an internal matter.

Although the US must accept primary responsibility for the debacle that followed, the passivity with which the two other troika states accepted Washington's position implies they too must share a degree of responsibility for subsequent events; and this means responsibility falls also upon the Portuguese.

But a number of questions arise. What could the troika have done? Would public denunciations have changed the end result? Would the troika have been able to exert sufficient influence to postpone the elections bearing in mind the attitude of both belligerents determined to hold elections?
Elections

Bicesse had two main and inextricably intertwined objectives: the termination of armed conflict and the consolidation of a western-style multi-party democracy in Angola. The elections were supposed to be the centre-piece, not only of Bicesse, but also of a process of political liberalisation first set in motion by the MPLA in 1990. The peace accord presumed the cessation of hostilities would create an environment propitious to the holding of elections wherein the Angolan people could, for the first time in their history, choose an electorally accountable government.

While both belligerents complained about the other's non-compliance with the terms of Bicesse, they had no intention of allowing the increasingly tense and volatile political climate preventing the holding of elections. Set on gaining the ultimate political prize available - legitimate political power - both shut their eyes to alleged cease-fire breaches and other serious infringements of the peace agreement.

The importance and significance of the elections had turned them into a contentious issue between the MPLA and UNITA, even during the negotiations. The MPLA had proposed a three-year time gap from the cease-fire to the holding of elections during which a power-sharing national unity government would rule the country. UNITA argued in favour of a one-year time frame and no transitional government. The MPLA stated its preference for separate presidential and legislative elections while UNITA demanded holding them jointly. No agreement was forged in relation to the existence of a transitional government, but a compromise time frame of 15 to 18 months for the holding of elections was finally agreed upon.

UNITA's shorter time-frame stemmed from the conviction of its inevitable electoral victory. The movement wanted to capitalise on the euphoria generated by peace and what it believed to be an MPLA capitulation. The MPLA in turn wanted a longer time span to increase its popularity ratings and to wear down the rebels as a credible political force.

UNITA also argued for the simultaneous holding of presidential and legislative elections so that it could use Savimbi's charisma to bolster its electoral standing. The MPLA put forward the reverse exactly because it wanted to separate presidential candidate dos Santos from the MPLA's party candidature. The MPLA saw President dos Santos as more likely to triumph than the party and thus hoped to avoid a complete marginalisation from political power.

UNITA was initially far more confident about victory in the country's first ever unfettered elections. The movement had for long thought that sixteen years of
war against one of Africa’s most Stalinist regimes had assured it of popular support and political power. The ethnic support UNITA could muster among the country’s most numerous ethnic group - the Ovimbundu - was also viewed as both crucial and decisive.

The incumbent MPLA regime began to see its electoral chances increase only as time went on, although some were from the onset far more optimistic about the MPLA’s chances. As one MPLA minister allegedly stated, the MPLA controlled the media, the Bank of Angola and the finance ministry, so how could it loose the elections.28 According to one eyewitness, several thousand containers of food imported via Luanda further aided the MPLA’s electoral campaign.29

Canvassing

In the early part of 1992 events took a turn for the worse. In March, two leading longtime UNITA figures defected - Miguel N’Zau Puna and Tony da Costa Fernandes. Their defections brought revelations of Savimbi’s cruel and lethal witch hunts and the death of various prominent UNITA cadres who disagreed with the movement’s leader. Their defections and subsequent revelations could not have come at a worse time. The defectors were listened to and believed in Washington. As a result, UNITA began to close in on itself and to demonstrate a hardened and more aggressive posture towards the outside world.30

UNITA actions throughout 1992 went on increasingly to undermine its electoral standing and bred a great deal of resentment among city populations, especially in Luanda. Savimbi’s rhetoric became increasingly ethnically bellicose. At rallies Savimbi appealed to the Ovimbundu’s historically-felt injustices and grievances. He seemed almost to incite his brethren towards an Ovimbundu take-over, with phrases such as ‘now it is our turn’. In Luanda and other cities UNITA increasingly adopted heavy-handed tactics such as arbitrary roadblocks. In the capital alone UNITA placed some 3,000-5,000 heavily armed soldiers. UNITA’s authoritarian streak, which caused so much anger in Luanda, was highlighted when one of the movement’s roadblocks even forced the Portuguese Foreign Minister to take an alternative route to the Portuguese embassy.31

By the summer of 1992, revelations of UNITA’s political and militaristic attitudes, together with revelations surrounding its ‘dirty tricks and human rights abuses’ began to alienate the better educated voters who might have felt tempted to vote for change.32 In addition, uncommitted voters were unanimous in stating that they would be more likely to face reprisals from a victorious UNITA than a triumphant MPLA.32 One Angolan commentator typified the election contest
as between a thief (MPLA) and a murderer (UNITA) and asked, who would you vote for?

The MPLA, on the other hand, conducted a smooth and professional campaign with the help of a Brazilian group of consultants. UNITA's general behaviour also aided the eventual MPLA success. In the face of UNITA's increasingly authoritarian and worrying behaviour the MPLA began to be viewed as the only force capable of preventing UNITA and its menacing leader from attaining power. While Savimbi's posture helped undermine UNITA's electoral standing, President dos Santos had the opposite effect on the MPLA's. Dos Santos was successfully projected as a peace-maker and a man of moderation capable of handling the challenges of building a modern Angola. In contrast, Savimbi never entirely overcame his image of an aggressive tribal warrior.

Notwithstanding the deeply hostile state of relations between the MPLA and UNITA, reports of voter intimidation, and with the main provisions of Bicesse in tatters, the election still managed to take place in a sea of calm. The fact that both belligerents were by then convinced of electoral victory greatly contributed to this situation.

However, sensing the perilous situation which had been reached by August 1992, and the increasing view that UNITA was not going to win the elections, the troika began running around between dos Santos and Savimbi seeking assurances that they would accept the election outcome. It seems that the troika also attempted to convince both parties of the need for power-sharing arrangements in the guise of a government of national reconciliation. The Portuguese Secretary of State echoed this arrangement in a speech at Luanda airport when he stressed that the government formed after the election would 'reflect the dominant political forces according to their electoral representation to guarantee a sufficient base of support for national reconciliation'. Both sides apparently accepted such a view.

The real stars of the election turned out to be the Angolan people, whose behaviour allowed the elections to proceed in an exemplary fashion. Many voters walked miles in the baking sun to deposit their votes. With a turnout of over 90%, the people demonstrated that they clearly understood the concept of democratic rule and desired it - even if their leaders did not.

**The Non-Emergent Third Force**

A total of 16 political parties emerged in the run-up to the elections to compete with the MPLA and UNITA for political power. These 'third forces' were guaranteed financing from the state along with 10 minutes daily airtime on
state-owned television and a twenty minute daily slot on the state-run radio service. However, the parties never got off the ground. Money was a major consideration, as none of the new parties was able to find the millions necessary to compete with the electoral campaigns undertaken by the MPLA and UNITA. The new parties were also absolutely dwarfed by the privileged access enjoyed by both the MPLA and UNITA in relation to media resources. The third forces could hardly project their existence or manifest a presence while the MPLA and UNITA constantly used the means of communication each possessed for their own constant propaganda.

In fact, one of the most stringent criticisms levelled by some quarters, mostly those associated with the smaller political forces in one way or another, is that Bicesse hampered the process of peace and democratisation by failing to provide the small forces with an institutionalised place in the country’s transition. As a result, some of the small parties tried to make up for this by calling for a national conference such as those seen in a number of Francophone African states.

The main argument put forward was that the conference would check the powers and actions of an unaccountable government during the transition. In January 1990, President dos Santos did indeed call a multi-party conference. But the conference was abruptly called off when the smaller political forces demanded an institutionalised conference with greater powers over the state. This conference would have allowed the small parties a guaranteed slice of power. The President considered this proposal to constitute an outright coup d'état.

While the MPLA, unwilling to have any upstarts curb its power over the state-apparatus, snubbed such a position, the same was also true of UNITA. UNITA disliked the idea of a national conference wherein what it deemed insignificant political forces, which had not even been involved in the civil war, sought a large-scale participation.

Under the Angolan scenario would the existence of a national conference have prevented a resumption of the war? It seems doubtful. A conference may have checked the powers of the MPLA; it may have limited the funds available to its campaign; it may have limited its access to air waves and even tamed its propaganda. But for all the misdemeanours carried out by the MPLA in the transition period, the problem in the end lay with UNITA. Had UNITA still lost the elections with a conference in place would the movement have accepted the results? Would the conference have forced UNITA to demobilise? The answers to both appear negative.
Aside from the difficulties and the inevitable bi-polarisation after sixteen years of civil war between the MPLA and UNITA, the third forces also failed to make an impact because of their shortcomings. Some of the new parties were perceived as little more than MPLA and/or UNITA creations from the beginning. Initially other new political parties tried to maintain an equidistant position in relation to UNITA and the MPLA. But as the conflict between the MPLA and UNITA gathered momentum in the 15 months to the elections, the parties increasingly took sides. In essence, bi-polarisation was encouraged by Bicesse as much as by the behaviour of the non-armed and newly-created parties. They clearly had no intention of forming a united front against the two main actors.

As Angolan intellectual Joaquim Pinto de Andrade also points out, many of the new parties were based on little more than ‘personal ambitions’ and lots of opportunism. Even their manifestos were similar and differed very little from the MPLA’s own electoral programme.

**Is the War an Ethnic Conflict?**

Some observers have insisted the Angolan Conflict is another African tribal war. UNITA and Savimbi have been at pains to portray this version of events. The attack on the Bakongos which occurred in January 1993 in Luanda and other cities, together with the hunt for the Ovimbundu on the now famous night of 31 October-1 November 1992, has been seized upon by some as living proof of this. However, while ethnicity is important, both to contemporary politics and the on-going conflict, there is no ethnic conflict as such in Angola. As a Zambian parliamentarian and former cabinet minister, Baldwin Nkumbula, recently stated, ‘Savimbi is going back to ethnicity because he has problems’.

**The Ovimbundu**

Many have seen UNITA’s Ovimbundu support base as the justification for labelling the Angolan war an ethnic conflict but the situation is not that simple. During colonial times, the Ovimbundu regarded Luanda as a distant power centre in which ‘creoles’ and ‘mestiços’ had a privileged position in the colonial administration. After independence these grievances were aggravated by what was seen as a creole take-over of power that brought few tangible economic benefits to the south of the country. This has allowed UNITA to fan traditional Ovimbundu grievances and suspicions of the Luanda elite and to secure itself a guaranteed constituency.
However, although UNITA commands, or at least commanded, a large degree of Ovimbundu support before the renewed war, there has never been a widespread conflict between the Ovimbundu and any other ethnic group in Angola. Following independence, large numbers of Ovimbundu moved from the south to other parts of the country and mainly to Luanda. The Ovimbundu have never been subject to persecution or forced from their new homes whether in Luanda or anywhere else by ethnic feuds. In the capital the Ovimbundu have become an important part of the city’s economy. The fresh agricultural produce available in Luanda is produced primarily by Ovimbundu living on the outskirts of the city. Since independence the Ovimbundu have also taken up jobs in the state apparatus, although their representation within the MPLA has always been weak. Moreover, many of the single army’s soldiers, which have been busy fighting UNITA since the abrogation of the 1992 elections, are members of the Ovimbundu ethnic group. At the time of writing (1994), the country’s Prime Minister, Marcolino Moco, is an Ovimbundu, in a clear effort by the elected government to attenuate the dissatisfaction felt by this ethnic group in relation to political power.

The Ovimbundu massacres which took place in the fall of 1992 in Luanda and other cities were not linked to an ethnic feud, but to the Ovimbundu’s identification with UNITA. Swiftly armed by the government to prevent a perceived UNITA take-over sometime shortly before the night of 31 October, the citizen militia sought revenge on all those associated with UNITA. The Ovimbundu were an easy target because of their known links to Savimbi’s movement. Yet, the excesses of violence witnessed left many non-Ovimbundu bodies littering the street. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the armed militia were composed by any one ethnic group in particular with a tribal grudge against the Ovimbundu.

Purposefully or not, the government seems to have reacted rather slowly in curbing the carnage. Weakened by military impotence, it had little choice but to rely on the armed population of Luanda to prevent what it presumed was a UNITA take-over. One source also claimed that the ferocity of anti-UNITA feelings was so intense that even President dos Santos had difficulty in making his authority felt.

Thus, although traditional Ovimbundu grievances of alienation from power motivated support for UNITA and provided the conflict with an ethnic dimension, there is not an established, historically-determined and violent ethnic feud between the Ovimbundu and any other ethnic groups in Angola. The Ovimbundu have not and do not live segregated from the rest of Angolan society.
The Bakongos

In January 1993, hundreds - possibly thousands - of Bakongo and Bakongo regressado were killed in a massacre similar to the one experienced by the Ovimbundu. Some observers and UNITA quickly seized upon this to reaffirm the ethnic nature of the conflict in the country. However, the massacre against the Bakongo and especially the regressado seems to have been motivated by a linkage between a number of political and economic factors and the state of war and economic poverty.

Large numbers of the Bakongo fled to Zaire with the onset of the colonial war in Angola in the early sixties. Following independence many returned to Angola and mainly to Luanda. The regressado, as they came to be known, quickly caused a great deal of resentment among other sectors of the population. Firstly, they returned with an open preference for the French language and other Francophone habits acquired while in Zaire. They began to be seen more as foreigners than nationals. In addition, the Bakongo and especially the regressado ties with Zaire associated them, in the minds of many, with Mobutu’s support for UNITA. In an MPLA stronghold such as Luanda this raised unease and suspicion.

Secondly, and possibly what has caused most friction in cities such as Luanda, is the Bakongo flair for private enterprise. The Bakongo and especially the regressado dominate the black market and what there has been of a private sector; they are street vendors, shop owners, taxi drivers, etc. The regressado are seen as having obtained the best apartments in the central district through bribery and because one of their own had responsibility for allocating property left by the Portuguese.

The natural flair for commerce and business associates the regressado and, to a large extent, the Bakongo in general, with money and wealth. As the economy deteriorated following independence, so this social group increasingly became the target of envy and resentment from various quarters and ethnic groups.40

In January 1993 the two motivating streams of anti-regressado/Bakongo resentment came together. UNITA had stepped up its military action and occupied most of the country; the economy was disastrous and Zaire was strongly supporting UNITA. In Luanda anti-UNITA hatred was high. However, the pogrom was not spontaneous. Somebody somewhere had orchestrated the anti-regressado attack which quickly gathered momentum leaving hundreds - possibly thousands - dead.

Explanations have been put forward, ranging from official government complicity, to officials who resented the Bakongo/regressado wealth, to an
alliance between a radical pro-independence Bakongo movement and UNITA aiming to fan anti-MPLA hatred among the Bakongo and increasing their own support amongst that ethnic group. But whatever the real explanation for the brutal events of January 1993, they are clearly more linked to the relationship between the regressado/Bakongo and the situation of war and economic hardship which affects Angola than to any long-term festering ethnic conflict. One thing is certain, the Bakongo - the regressado - have not stopped trading or left Luanda!

Democratisation as a Whole

Despite the renewed state of war the process of democratisation has not ground to a halt as some analysts have suggested. Democratisation in Angola has made progress. Despite significant frailties, democratic institutions now hold the reigns of power for the first time since independence. The crux of the matter is no longer how to bring representative government to Angola, but how to strengthen and guarantee it.

In November 1992 a new parliament based on the election results took office; out of a total of 220 seats, 129 belonged to the MPLA, 70 to UNITA and 21 to other smaller political parties. Only twelve UNITA deputies unhappy with Savimbi's return to war took up their parliamentary duties. In December 1992, a government of national unity was sworn in made up of 27 posts. UNITA was offered four: Minister of Culture, Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Public Works and Social Assistance. Although at best UNITA posts were minor, the organisation accepted these and nominated incumbents. Six other positions were offered to parties with representation in parliament. The parliament began functioning in full in February 1993.

UNITA's war has naturally hampered the development and the subsequent strengthening of these institutions. UNITA deputies are constrained by the fact that they represent a party at war with the system. Their position bears little resemblance to that of the main opposition groups in more advanced parliamentary democracies. None of the UNITA officials nominated to the government of national unity have as yet assumed their functions. The end of the war will make a significant contribution to strengthening democracy. Yet, strengthening the new and still weak system of representative government will not happen automatically and will be a complex process. Civil society will have to learn to organise itself and to take the opportunities presented by representative government to increase its influence in the political decision-making process. The appearance of a strong civil society with the mushrooming of new professional and social associations will depend to a great extent on overcoming the low levels of education in Angola and the country's general
state of underdevelopment - something which requires peace, stability and of course time.

Media freedom, which has come to play a fundamental role in modern democracies, is still significantly curbed by the state. Only recently President dos Santos criticised the independent projects of a number of journalists by stating the need to avoid the sensationalism which characterises the press in other countries. The comment was not in itself incomprehensible, but his notion that the state should judge what is and what is not sensational demonstrates the fledgling nature of press freedom and democracy in Angola. The judiciary, another important cornerstone of representative government, is still, as João de Melo highlights, cumbersome and largely inoperative.\(^42\)

**Elections and Ethnicity**

It has been argued above that the conflict underway in Angola is not an ethnic one, but that it includes an ethnic dimension. As demonstrated by the country’s first ever free elections, a similar situation appears to hold true for the relationship between ethnicity and political behaviour. Naturally, it is a relationship which will influence the future development of the political system in this country.

The elections provided a curious picture of the role of ethnicity in moulding political and electoral behaviour. In the case of the Ovimbundu, the elections demonstrated the existence of a clear and strong link between ethnicity and political behaviour and mobilisation. Around 60% of the Ovimbundu votes cast were in support of Savimbi’s UNITA. The remaining 30% voted for other parties, mostly the MPLA, and 10% registered blank and/or invalid votes.\(^43\)

In contrast, the electoral behaviour of the Bakongo demonstrates a completely different picture to that provided by the Ovimbundu. The Bakongo vote was actually split almost 50/50 between the MPLA and UNITA. Interestingly, the ethnic group displayed little interest in voting for Bakongo-based parties in the election, of which there were eleven. Of these, the FNLA got the best electoral score with 2.40% of the total vote. It clearly failed to win a proportion of votes commensurate with its historical significance. Even its veteran leader, Holden Roberto, got only a mere 2.21% of the votes cast in the presidential elections. As far as the Bakongo are concerned the ethnic card is clearly not of primary political value.

The electoral gains of the Partido de Renovação Social (PRS) turned out to be a real surprise. The party carried out an electoral strategy aimed at seeking the support of the Chokwe people who are concentrated mainly in the Lundas of
north east Angola while supporting the MPLA’s candidate dos Santos in the presidential elections. The strategy worked and the party elected six deputies to the new parliament.

The Angolan Ovambo who live mainly in the southern province of Cunene demonstrated another variant of ethnicity translating into politics. The Ovambo in Angola are part of the Ovambo ethnic group which resides primarily in northern Namibia and who have always supported SWAPO. UNITA’s South African links caused widespread resentment against the movement among this ethnic group and influenced their outright support for the MPLA in the elections. Out of a total of 102,958 valid votes in Cunene, the MPLA obtained 90,253 and UNITA 4,714. Ethnicity clearly was present in the Ovambos’ electoral behaviour, but the Ovambos’ electoral preference rested on their experience of the MPLA/UNITA conflict and not on a desire to seek increased ethnic representation in the political system.

All this presents an interesting picture of the relationship between ethnicity and political behaviour in Angola. It seems that although ethnicity can decisively influence political behaviour, it does not necessarily lead to demands for greater ethnic representation in the political system. The strength of the link between ethnicity and political behaviour also appears to be dependent on the particular ethnic group in question. While the Chokwe and the Ovimbundu supported greater political representation for their ethnic group, the Bakongo were not attracted to the idea. While the Ovambos’ ethnicity influenced their vote it did not signify a bid for increased ethnic representation in the new political structures.

The potential power of ethnicity in influencing political behaviour has not gone unnoticed in Luanda. Many intellectuals and politicians alike now admit the need for a decentralisation of the political structure and a new emphasis on strengthening local power. Furthermore, the gulf which has developed in the perception of many Angolans between the peaceful haven of the economically and politically privileged in Luanda and the rest of the poverty-stricken war-torn country is another important factor urging an end to the centre’s monopoly on power.

The political and intellectual elite have begun to understand that the task of modern nation-building in Angola and the legitimacy of the state itself is closely linked to a shift in political power away from the centre towards local government. No future system of representative government in Angola can expect legitimacy or success unless it ensures greater and more equitable participation by all of the country’s ethnic and social groups. In clear contrast to past practice, the political emphasis is now on bringing the people into government as opposed to imposing government on the people.
UNITA’s demand for increased participation in local government structures in areas under its control and the fact that the grievances outlined above are most acutely felt by the Ovimbundu, the country’s largest single ethnic group, will make decentralisation an important part of any future peace agreement. Both peace and representative government in Angola are thus strongly tied to the striking of a new balance in political power relationships between central and local government, city and countryside, voter and politician; and this takes the future beyond the limits envisaged by Bicesse.

Endnotes

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
16. Peacekeeping Information Notes, 1993: Update 1; United Nations; UNITA figures based on authors’ calculations.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
24. The words were taken from the United Nations, Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, June 1992 and reflected the opinion prevalent among the diplomatic community in Luanda most related to the process, especially the troika states.

25. Portuguese diplomatic source.

26. Ibid..

27. Ibid..


29. Foreign businessman in Angola at the time: author interview. Luanda, October 1993.

30. Portuguese diplomatic source; and see also Somerville K, op.cit..


33. Ibid..


35. Interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade in Grande Reportagem, 23 February 1993.


40. Ibid..

41. These scenarios were based on author interviews with Portuguese diplomatic sources, interviews with high-ranking MPLA politicians and informal conversations with several journalists. Luanda, October 1993.

42. Melo J, op.cit..

43. Ibid..

44. Based on a series of author interviews. Luanda, October 1993.
After Bicesse

After the failure of the 1992 elections in Angola the western world, including the sponsoring troika of Bicesse, reacted in dismay at the renewed hostilities and at their ferocity - not only because of suffering in Angola itself, but of the signal it might send to those about to attempt an electoral process in Mozambique. Most importantly, however, the western powers were concerned that South Africa should emerge into a peaceful region so that western interests there could be safeguarded as they rippled out from South Africa into a region of great potential. So much faith had been placed in Bicesse, however, that no alternative format for a way forward seemed possible. Durrao Barroso, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, in July 1993, reiterated his faith in the Bicesse formula, indicating that others also did. 'I am in agreement with both the UN and the international community when they uphold the idea that Bicesse is still the basis for any long-term solution in Angola. There were three basic ideas behind Bicesse: a ceasefire, elections and the creation of a single army'.

As we have seen above, all three basic ideas were compromised in both concept and application. The Minister added that both the MPLA and UNITA also, publicly at least, subscribed to a return to the Bicesse principles. In part, and in line with our discussion above, this is because Bicesse effectively marginalised all other internal parties, leaving Angola and a conflict over Angola to the MPLA and/or UNITA.

By early 1994, however, Portuguese foreign policy was in disarray. Barroso complained publicly of President Soares' 'Lone Ranger' role in disrupting government policy. Soares had granted the UNITA General Ben Ben a Presidential audience in which Ben Ben had the opportunity to accuse bitterly the Portuguese Government and the Prime Minister in particular of bias against UNITA. Barroso complained that, at the very moment when UNITA required pressure placed upon it, Soares had gifted the rebel organisation with an indulgence. 'It is true that there have been occasions and behaviour by the President which have left us in embarrassing situations ... At times dialogue has to be mixed with pressure. At that point in time (when Soares met Ben Ben) the UN Security Council aimed to send UNITA a message of firmness. The President decided to signal something else.'

Interestingly, almost as a sign of Portuguese policy fatigue, Barroso said that 'events in Angola will not converge towards peace until the situation in South Africa has been solved'. By this it is assumed he meant that a majority-ruled South Africa would no longer supply UNITA, or tolerate military elements who
clandestinely did so. He might also have meant that Portugal, from a distance, would be less effective than a regional hegemon turned from bad to good.

Although by mid-1994 the Portuguese position was still that Portugal was not only a valued member of the troika but that Portugal ‘has more than any other state, including the troika countries, undertaken international diplomatic efforts in Washington, New York (or the UN), Paris and London, plus other capitals to avoid a complete marginalisation of the Angolan conflict from international politics. Interest has after all been significantly reduced in comparison to Somalia, Bosnia and more recently Rwanda.

Indeed, slaughter in these countries detracted from international interest in Angola. As far as Portugal’s role in Angola was concerned, however, it is true to say that, even before the elections, its role in the troika was far from an animating one. After the election, as the mediatory role of the UN increased, Portugal became not a marginalised actor but a member of a coalition of actors that was to feature in particular the US and the UN. It was a valued member to be sure, but could not be described as the animateur of the peace process that took place first via the shuttle diplomacy of the UN’s Margaret Anstee, and then at the protracted negotiations in Lusaka. Below, we give a chronology of the diplomatic negotiations and itemise the actors involved. Settlement of sorts in Lusaka towards the close of 1994 reinforced the implications of Bicesse - that Angola was a political space occupied by the MPLA and UNITA. Far from democracy, Angola was seen as a settlement between two warring factions who had fought for power and who would now - by a negotiated formula, not by any electoral mandate - share power. Throughout Southern Africa, the idea of sharing power under a democratic regime took the regional and international imagination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29-30 September 1992</td>
<td>Angolan elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 October 1992</td>
<td>F.W. de Klerk praises Angola for peaceful election.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 October 1992</td>
<td>Savimbi claims polls were rigged and threatens war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 October 1992</td>
<td>Savimbi withdraws his military forces from the week-old Armed Forces of Angola (FAA).</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 October 1992</td>
<td>Angola’s National Electoral Council suspends announcement of results to head off the threat of violence. More than 80% of ballots counted. Ballots now to be double-checked.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 October 1992</td>
<td>International pressure on Savimbi to accept results, including UN Security Council and Washington. Savimbi refuses to see senior western diplomats who have tried to meet with him.</td>
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</tbody>
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99
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 October 1992</td>
<td>US Assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen, announces that Savimbi will accept election results.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 October 1992</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Margaret Anstee, begins shuttle between dos Santos in Luanda and Savimbi in Huambo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 October 1992</td>
<td>Fighting breaks out between MPLA and UNITA in Luanda. Senior UNITA leaders leave to visit Savimbi in Huambo.</td>
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<td>12 October 1992</td>
<td>Pik Botha flies to Angola as a 'mediator'.</td>
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<td>13 October 1992</td>
<td>Botha meets Savimbi in Huambo and suggests a form of power-sharing. Savimbi expresses interest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 October 1992</td>
<td>Botha meets dos Santos in Luanda. Angolan Government on the same day announces it will not release election results until enquiries into alleged irregularities were completed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 October 1992</td>
<td>Portuguese sources announce Savimbi agrees to a second presidential round of balloting, after UN officials informed him that dos Santos has fallen just short of 50%.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 October 1992</td>
<td>A hoped-for summit between dos Santos and Savimbi, brokered by Botha, fails to materialise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 October 1992</td>
<td>Second attempt for a summit between dos Santos and Savimbi fails. Pik Botha flies back to Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October 1992</td>
<td>US State Department calls election 'free and fair' and calls for early second round of presidential balloting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 October 1992</td>
<td>MPLA and UNITA representatives meet in joint commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 October 1992</td>
<td>Leaks from the joint commission talks suggest UNITA demands for a transitional government and a partial rerun of parliamentary elections, under UN control, in 7 out of 18 Angolan provinces, where it has alleged fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 October 1992</td>
<td>UNITA troops seal off Huambo and begin shelling Caala nearby.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 October 1992</td>
<td>Savimbi reported to have 'slipped into South Africa' to meet South African Government officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 October 1992</td>
<td>Heavy fighting breaks out between MPLA and UNITA forces in Luanda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 November 1992</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali announces Angola-wide ceasefire agreed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 1992</td>
<td>Botha declared 'persona non grata' by MPLA who also accused South Africa of permitting or running 50 flights to UNITA territory over five days. Botha's power-sharing vision, with a federal structure, seen by analysts as a prototype for South Africa itself.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>10 November 1992</td>
<td>UN Under Secretary-General, Marrack Goulding, flies to Huambo to see Savimbi. Goulding kept waiting six hours on the tarmac before Savimbi sees him.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 November 1992</td>
<td>UN Special Representative, Margaret Anstee, receives letter from Savimbi, saying he will accept election results.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 November 1992</td>
<td>Anstee meets Savimbi and announces MPLA/UNITA meeting to take place in the Namibe Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December 1992</td>
<td>UNITA announces four ministers to take up portfolios offered by MPLA Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 January 1993</td>
<td>MPLA takes Huambo. Savimbi flees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>Anstee spends January trying to set up peace talks in Ethiopia. Increasingly, observers see her as naive, too soft on Savimbi and able to be manipulated by him as she seeks to rescue election results. By 20 January, the UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM) has pulled out from 41 of its 67 observer locations. However, 4 days of talks do take place at the end of January in Addis Ababa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1993</td>
<td>Throughout February, fighting rages, particularly around Huambo, with UNITA now in its second month of seeking to retake the city. Anstee tries to set up further Addis meeting for the end of February but UNITA fails to arrive. Angolan, UN, Portuguese, Russian and US senior officials wait in vain for four days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 1993</td>
<td>UNITA retake Huambo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>In May talks fail in Abidjan, after UNITA announces it will not withdraw from captured territory, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. Anstee announces her retirement from both Angola and the UN. UNITA says it will not recognise the Brazilian tipped as her replacement. On 19 May, Clinton announces US recognition of the MPLA government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1993</td>
<td>UNITA hardens its negotiating stance by announcing, in Lisbon, its rejection of the 1992 election results, but leaves the door open for negotiations on power-sharing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>Cuito subjected to intensive fighting and is taken first by one side, then retaken by the other.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>The new UN Special Representative, Blondin Beye, announces, in New York, new negotiations and UNITA withdrawal from territories taken since the 1992 elections. This latter promise is received sceptically. However, talks begin in Lusaka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December 1993</td>
<td>Truce announced at Lusaka.</td>
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July 1994

Continuing talks are deadlocked. UNITA accuses Beye of seeking to isolate it. The MPLA rejects a compromise drafted by Zambia’s President Chiluba.

November 1994

The MPLA retakes Huambo. Talks are threatened by the scale of the attack. Beye launches desperate shuttle diplomacy.

20 November 1994

Angola Peace Accord (The Lusaka Protocol) signed by UNITA’s negotiator, Eugenio Manuvakola, in the absence of Savimbi, and the MPLA’s Venancio de Moura, in the absence of dos Santos. The guns do not fall silent quickly.

Actors and Their Interests

1. The United Nations

The UN had no choice but to ‘do Angola on the cheap’. It was committed to several similar exercises and faced a cash-crisis. Moreover, it never had extensive control over the electoral process and, although international observers found them largely free and fair, the fact that they were not actually run by the UN facilitated suspicions of irregularities. During the violence that followed the elections, the UN’s mediatory role was hampered by its choice of objective. Its mediation was to save the election results and, through this, the success of the original UN role in Angola. Its primary objective was not an end to the violence as such - although this was a powerful correlated objective. Margaret Anstee was probably far too trusting of Savimbi, though she probably had no choice but to take his word as evidence of progress. Savimbi, for his part, used the promise of negotiations as cover to mobilise for war - although, frankly, he would have done this with or without a figleaf. After, however, the UN’s massive effort at Lusaka helped redeem its earlier insufficiencies.

2. The United States

The early days of the Clinton administration were confused. Personnel changes were slow and, on Africa, Bush appointees continued to occupy key positions for some time. Moreover, Clinton faced sufficient battles in Congress to allow one over Angola to slide down his agenda. Sufficient other actors were involved in Angola for the US to play, for a time, a secondary role. The continuing disregard of Savimbi for the results of a democratic procedure finally forced the Clinton administration to act. By May 1993, however, Clinton was clearly more focused in Angola, and a whole array of policy movements date from this period. Recognition of the MPLA provided other mediators with set parameters. The Angolan Government could not be compromised in its negotiating role as a government, rather than as one of two otherwise equal combatting forces.
Other mediators, including Russia, but particularly Portugal had interest drawn from the history of their involvements, and Portugal had a general idea of future benefits for itself in Angola - the major external actors, however, were the UN and the US. The first was involved 'on the cheap'; and the second was simply, at first, mired in its own more general confusion. There was no money for the UN to have done better; and there were no over-riding interests any longer for the US to have thought and acted with greater clarity or urgency.

The Future of Mediation in Angola

Notwithstanding the fact that the MPLA won the elections, it has long been difficult to have an unblemished view of any side to the Angolan conflict. The MPLA offensive, beginning in Luanda, at the end of October, was possible because it felt international support was now with it as the victors of a democratic process. However, while taking UNITA by surprise, it was an offensive that probably killed key pragmatists within UNITA and thus reduced the positive chances for successful negotiations. The very fact that UNITA was surprised probably meant it had considered negotiations were a continuing prospect in the immediate future. Set against this were UNITA's own military actions around Huambo.

As the impact of US recognition of the MPLA Government spread and as majority rule came to South Africa; and as the fact of a less easily renewable inventory of armaments made itself felt within UNITA, so too the prospects for mediation and settlement increased. This had little to do with the efficacy of mediation as such, and everything to do with an elusive 'ripe moment' slowly maturing. It may have occurred earlier if mediators had greater interests involved, more money and determination or guiltier consciences. If Portuguese mediation helped lead to fresh talks, there is some superficial satisfaction or irony in that. History, if not dialectical, may have circular aspects. In this case, the wheel may have turned one bloody revolution and returned to where it started nineteen years and countless human tragedies later.

Endnotes

1. Interview with Durrao Barroso, Expresso, 17 July 1993.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Source: Portuguese Co-operation
Bilateral Economic Co-operation and Portugal's Euro-African Dimension

Although diplomacy has been Lisbon's primary means of both preserving and developing the country's African dimension, an important component of Portugal's post-colonial relationship with Lusophone Africa has been the emergence of bilateral co-operation structures. As in the case of other former colonial powers, Lisbon realised it needed to find a new presence on the African continent that was appropriate to the newly independent status of its former colonies. However, Portugal's economic inability to establish post-colonial bilateral relations with the former colonies, as practised by the wealthier community states such as France and the UK, forced Portuguese co-operation to develop its own particular characteristics. With the arrival of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and the importance he attached to relations with Lusophone Africa, Portuguese co-operation has been an area increasingly developed to strengthen Portugal's Euro-African dimension.

Through all the problematic years of Luso-PALOP post-colonial relations, Portuguese co-operation has represented a more positive aspect of this relationship. Although poorer than the comprehensive bilateral development programmes of other European former colonial powers, the mere existence of Portuguese co-operation reflects the significance which post-colonial relations with the PALOPs were to assume in post-revolutionary Portuguese foreign policy, even if the personal actions of some in Portugal, particularly in the mid-1980s, revealed other ideas on the nature of this post-colonial relationship.

Lisbon's commitment to African co-operation is not simply aimed at creating a new international presence for Portugal, it also stems from a profound desire to preserve and develop ties which have been part of Portuguese history for 500 years. In Portuguese society, Portugal's Vocacao Africana/African vocation and A maneira Portuguesa de estar em Africa/The Portuguese way of being in Africa, are still fundamental characteristics associated with the national identity.

Of course, like other bilateral structures of African aid, Lisbon has used this post-colonial institution as a means of securing stronger economic ties with the PALOPs. Although, as we have seen, political problems - particularly with Angola - undermined the benefits which could otherwise have been derived from the existence of Portuguese co-operation.
The Origins of Portuguese Co-operation

The origins of Portuguese co-operation were constrained by internal political events, especially those which produced shifts in African foreign policy and by the political sensitivity surrounding the African question since 1975. Although the first co-operation structures emerged in 1974, political factors meant that it was only in 1979 that two structures clearly emerged as the central institutions for African co-operation. These were the Instituto para Cooperação Económica (ICE) and the Direcção Geral para a Cooperação (DGC).

The differing functions of the two organisations also reflected the sensitivities which decolonisation had left both in Portugal and Africa. While the DGC was to be responsible for ‘disinterested’ co-operation such as education, health, culture and technical and scientific co-operation, the ICE on the other hand was to have responsibility for promoting and nurturing financial and economic co-operation with the PALOPs. Above all, the ICE was to have responsibility for managing the controversial contencioso, a task which was extinct by 1979. In this first phase of Portuguese co-operation from 1974-1979, little was done in tangible terms aside from signing general co-operation agreements with Cabo Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique during 1975. A co-operation agreement with Angola was only signed at the historic Bissau summit in 1978 after the political difficulties between the two countries were, at least temporarily, resolved. What little co-operation did exist, limited itself to answering requests from the young PALOP nations for technical assistance primarily in their administrative structures. At this stage, Portuguese co-operation was far from operating as part of an active strategy designed to strengthen Portugal’s presence in Africa and the country’s Euro-African dimension.

Portuguese co-operation was given its first major impulse with the pragmatic African realpolitik of Sa Carneiro in 1979. The Prime Minister’s desire to find a new post-colonial modus vivendi with Lusophone Africa, as was discussed earlier, led to the signing of a number of financial agreements between the Bank of Portugal and the PALOPs’ central banks during 1979-1980. Although the agreements were specifically designed to stimulate business activity between Portugal and the former colonies, they also signified the beginning of Lisbon’s active search for a new and mutually beneficial relationship with Lusophone Africa. By 1982 the maturing nature of Portuguese co-operation was reflected in the creation of the office of the Secretary of State for Co-operation, whose responsibility would be to co-ordinate Portugal’s strategy in this area of African relations.

At a time when the Portuguese were attempting to develop a more fruitful post-colonial relationship with the PALOPs, the creation of this state department
took on a renewed urgency due to the particular organisational approach of Portuguese co-operation.\textsuperscript{1} Although ICE has been the main agent of co-operation (for this reason the following analysis concentrates mainly on ICE activities) and, aside from the activities of the DGC, Portuguese co-operation also entails the specialised divisions that most of Portugal’s ministries possess in this area. Additionally, other organisations such as the Instituto para a investigacao Cientifico-Tropical (Institute of Tropical Science Research) and the Instituto de Medicina Tropical (Institute of Tropical Medicine) also play an important part in official African co-operation. The dispersed institutional nature of Portuguese co-operation has attempted to avoid the neo-colonial accusations that one single institution with responsibility for co-operation may have been subject to. This organisational approach to structures also reflects both the recent nature of Portuguese decolonisation and the existence of, until recently, communist regimes in the former colonies with all their heightened sensitivities to post-colonial relations. However, as many have stressed in Lisbon, this decentralised approach to organisation, along with the bureaucratic conflicts it has generated between the various organisations involved in co-operation, has done little to make for a more effective co-operation strategy in Africa.\textsuperscript{2}

Portugal’s economic weaknesses have also meant that ICE has been forced to formulate a co-operation strategy which balances Portugal’s financial limitations with practical assistance in Lusophone Africa. The result has been to develop ICE co-operation along a capacity building action, in a clear effort to provide a more systematic approach to co-operation that goes beyond simply answering particular requests from the PALOPs.\textsuperscript{3} In essence, Portuguese economic co-operation has centred its activities in areas such as technical assistance, training for skilled personnel and on the formulation of studies in areas ranging from management to agriculture. Such activities are designed to augment the institutional developmental capacity of Lusophone African countries.

ICE has also tried to overcome the constraints that Portugal’s fragile economy imposes on co-operation with Africa, by developing a network of tripartite and multilateral agreements with more financially powerful entities. Unable to finance large scale project development in the former colonies, Portuguese co-operation has attempted to increase its relevance in Lusophone Africa by acting as an economic and financial intermediary between a series of wealthier institutions and states in the north and the poorer PALOPs of the south.

Acting as a channel for northern assistance and investment to the PALOPs has involved a number of tripartite ventures with countries such as the US, Sweden and France, as well as multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, with in most cases the PALOPs as third parties.\textsuperscript{4} During 1984, Portugal attempted to widen its intermediary role by establishing African co-operation agreements with Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria.\textsuperscript{5} However, nothing
came of these agreements. Both Austria and Germany had already experienced a number of unsuccessful ventures in Africa and were reluctant to commit themselves to further projects, while Italy’s own interests in Lusophone Africa and particularly Mozambique prevented any significant co-operation with Portugal.

Portuguese Bilateral Co-operation: Europe and Southern Africa

Portuguese co-operation has found another important source of tripartite collaboration in the European Community. As the Community’s Lorenzo Natali stressed, the limitations which Portugal’s economy imposes on the country’s bilateral African aid has made Lisbon less reluctant to collaborate with the Community in this field than other wealthier member states with more well-endowed bilateral aid programmes. The result of this has been to make Portuguese bilateral co-operation an intermediary between Community resources and the development needs of Lusophone Africa. Talks between Portugal and the European Community on possible tripartite co-operation began in 1982. The proposals Portugal put forward in Brussels had been subject to prior consultation with the PALOPs in bilateral discussions. With Portugal acting as a Euro-PALOP intermediary, six tripartite projects have been undertaken or are in the process of execution. This relationship, which as we shall see in the next chapter, is integrated into the wider triangular Portugal/PALOP/Community relationship that emerged during the 1980s, wherein Lisbon actively sought to promote itself as a leading link within the wider context of Euro-African relations. This aim in Portuguese foreign policy underlay Cavaco Silva’s move to locate the council of Europe’s North/South Centre in Lisbon during 1988.

These notions of Portugal as a special north/south and Euro/African link, which have acquired such a dominant role in Cavaco Silva’s foreign policy, reflect a clear development of the philosophy of Third Worldism. It was Third Worldism that first made a strong link between the country’s level of development and a special solidarity with the Third World. Portugal’s role as an intermediary between the advanced North and the PALOPs was therefore not only an attempt to perpetuate Portuguese influence in Africa, it was also part of a developing theme in post-revolutionary Portuguese foreign policy.

Tripartite co-operation also provided Portugal with a means to preserve an important facet of its African dimensions - that of its relationship with the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) [now SADC]. In the post-colonial world, co-operation is synonymous with political influence and this point has not been lost in Lisbon, especially since in Southern Africa other Community countries such as the UK and Italy actively compete for their share of political and economic gains. Unable to compete with these
economically more powerful countries in terms of bilateral agreements, tripartite agreements have permitted Portugal to maintain an active presence in SADC’s development that would otherwise not be possible. In the SADC energy sector, based in Angola, Portugal is involved in more projects on a tripartite basis than any other European Community state. In the transport and communications sector which is based in Mozambique, Portugal occupies fifth place in terms of total number of projects undertaken. Italy, the UK, Denmark and the Federal Republic hold respectively the first four places.

Under Cavaco Silva’s African diplomacy, tripartite co-operation with a number of multilateral organisations took on a new dynamism. Tripartite agreements with multilateral organisations, as opposed to those with a state, allow Portugal to be the only country whose influence is strengthened in the recipient nation. During 1990 Lisbon’s desire to promote Portugal as a ‘bridge between continents’ led the Portuguese Government to place a trust fund of US$1 million (renewable possibly annually) with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to stimulate tripartite co-operation with the PALOPs and this international agency. Portugal and the UNDP have co-operated on a series of projects and a number of further projects are planned. In keeping with its role as an intermediary between the north and the PALOPs, Lisbon provided Angola with technical and diplomatic support when this country applied for World Bank and IMF membership. Furthermore, Portugal’s desire to act as a north/south intermediary also received clear expression in a plan for the rehabilitation of the Angolan economy together with the ADB and the UNDP.

Cavaco Silva’s commitment to a new phase in Luso-PALOP relations, and his desired strengthening of the country’s linkage between European and African foreign policy, had also revealed itself in the total GNP devoted to African development. In 1990 the figure was 0.23% of GNP, whereas by 1991 the figure had risen to 0.27%. In bilateral financial relations alone, by 1991 Portugal had rescheduled a total PALOP debt of 180 million pounds. Other monetary agreements are planned and there are moves towards the creation of an Escudo zone. The government has also created a number of additional funds for co-operation, which includes private sector co-operation, totalling US$326 million.

These figures may not be significant in comparison to the amounts other wealthier countries spend on co-operation with Africa but, in the case of Portugal, they represent a considerable investment in a new relationship with Lusophone Africa.

The Portuguese have undertaken a considerable effort to develop a viable system of co-operation with their former colonies, one that has been closely
intertwined with post-revolutionary foreign policy, particularly under Cavaco Silva. Moreover, economic co-operation and the particular form it has taken to overcome Portugal's economic weaknesses, has proven an important means in preserving and developing Portugal's African dimension. However, with the political and economic changes underway in the PALOPs, and the increased competition these will bring from more powerful states, Lisbon may well have to rethink the relationship between its organisational approach to co-operation and an efficient co-operation strategy and especially one that also more consciously benefits the Portuguese private sector in Africa. The fact that in Lusophone Mozambique, Portugal is only the fifth largest investor in the country does not accord well with Lisbon's desire to be a leading Euro-African link.

Endnotes

1. The period refers to the presence of the centre right-wing governments in power from 1979 to 1981.
4. *ICE Annual Reports* give detailed accounts of these projects.
10. This was the title of the UNDP Lisbon Conference, Lisbon, 21 August 1991.
11. Portuguese Co-operation source.
12. Portuguese Co-operation source. Also included there is the 1991 Fund for Private Sector Co-operation.
The European Community, Portugal and Lusophone Africa

European Integration will confer a new dimension to Portugal's African policy, allowing the country to assume in a pragmatic form and without complexes, the role of 'Interlocuteur Privilegié' in deepening the dialogue and co-operation between Europe and Africa. Being authentically ourselves, refusing to be the instrument of any hegemony, we will continue to a greater understanding between the two continents.

Jaime Cama
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1983-1985)

Along with an active diplomatic presence in Southern Africa, and the efforts which Portugal has undertaken in the field of bilateral co-operation, the other important factor in Lisbon's attempt to establish the country as a leading Euro-African link has been its activity within the European Community. An unofficial alliance between Portugal's diplomacy in the EC co-operation decision-making structures and the participation of the Portuguese private sector in Lomé mechanisms has played a fundamental role in strengthening Portugal's Euro-African dimension. This Euro-African role, beyond acting as a diplomatic 'back-up' to Portugal's European presence, is also integrated into Lisbon's search for a formula which seeks to develop privileged links with the PALOPs, while overcoming Portugal's bilateral economic weaknesses. In essence, Portugal has sought to demonstrate that close relations with Lisbon can be rewarded with increased benefits to the PALOPs' own bilateral relations with the European Community.

The symbiotic relationship that has emerged between Portugal and Lusophone Africa, centred around the European Community, together with Portugal's intermediary role, has produced an almost contractual post-colonial relationship between Lisbon and the former colonies. This mutually beneficial relationship contrasts with the more neo-colonial pattern of relations which wealthier former colonial powers, relying for the most part on bilateral arrangements for influence, have established with their former overseas possessions.

Portugal's attempted bridge role between Lusophone Africa and Brussels is complimentary to the institutionalised links each of the PALOPs maintains with the European Community. This has required the presence of all the African Lusophone nations in the Lomé Convention. Although the three smaller PALOPs joined Lomé I during the mid to late 1970s, Angola and Mozambique
were only to do so much later for two main reasons: first, because both communist regimes refused to recognise the status of West Berlin which was clearly enshrined in the Treaty of Rome; and, secondly, because they claimed the EC did not take a strong enough stance on the Namibian question. Their position on both points clearly reflected their then-international and regional contexts. In 1979 Community funds to both countries were blocked as a means of pressurising them into becoming full members of Lomé.

With growing South African destabilisation in Southern Africa by 1982 and increasing pressure from other SADCC Lomé members, both regimes responded positively to a letter from the then EC Commissioner for Development. As a result both Angola and Mozambique took part in negotiations for Lomé III and became formal members of that convention in 1985.

Portugal, the PALOPs and the Community

In 1985 Christopher Stevens pointed out that the presence of all the PALOPs in the Lomé Convention, together with Portugal’s membership of the Community, could provide a new dynamic to post-colonial relations between Lisbon and the former colonies. As Stevens highlighted, close relations between Paris and her former colonies during Lomé I, in contrast to those between London and the Commonwealth, meant that Francophone ACPs received a greater amount of EC aid than their Anglophone counterparts.

This is where Cavaco Silva’s rapprochement with Lusophone Africa has acquired particular significance, since, by forging closer links with the former colonies, the Prime Minister has permitted both sides to develop a relationship which seeks to exploit the mutual advantages that stem from their individual ties to the European Community. As Portugal’s Commissioner in Brussels, Cardoso Cunha states, there has in fact been a noticeable move by Lusophone Africa to establish closer relations with Lisbon as a means of better ‘administering’ their bilateral relations with the Community. This move was particularly evident from 1987 onwards when Angola and Portugal - hitherto the most problematic of Luso-PALOP post-independence relations - began to exhibit a new phase of friendship.

As a consequence of Portugal’s desire to become a leading Euro-African link and the new relationship that has been forged with the PALOPs, the Portuguese have undertaken a number of diplomatic moves designed to achieve both objectives. In negotiations for Lomé IV, Portugal used its diplomatic presence within the Community to have the PALOPs classified as a regional grouping based on their cultural and linguistic affinities. This now allows the Lusophone
African countries to benefit from Lomé funds designed to encourage regional co-operation among ACP countries. Access to these funds would otherwise have been impossible due to the geographical disparity between the Lusophone African nations. During the negotiations for Lomé IV, Portugal also adopted the position that the poorest ACP nations should be the primary beneficiaries of development aid. This was not simply a semantic stance in the nature of north/south relations, but one which echoed Portugal’s desire to act as an intermediary for both the PALOPs and Africa, since this proposal would benefit chiefly the African continent, and particularly its poorest group of nations which include the four PALOPs of Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Principe, Cabo Verde and Mozambique.

In an action designed to compliment Portugal’s African diplomacy, the Portuguese Government was instrumental in securing the ‘Community Platform’ on Angola. This platform was adopted by the Community on 28 November 1991, after Portugal took a ‘troika’ to Angola in the previous January, composed of itself, the Netherlands and the UK. The Community Platform on Angola pledges a ‘special effort’ in a ‘co-ordinated manner’ for the process of Angolan national reconciliation and democratisation. The express aim of this ‘special effort’ was to concentrate on the economic reintegration of displaced people, refugees and UNITA guerrillas.

However, although the Portuguese Government had intended to use this aid as a stabilising factor in the transition period from the Angolan peace accords in May 1991 to the elections in September 1992, the aid has not materialised. The main reason for this was that many Community members agreed to provide aid to Angola only after a democratic regime emerged in the country following the September 1992 elections.

Cavaco Silva himself pointed to the declaration made at the end of the June 1990 European Council meeting as a further reflection of Portugal’s African presence in Brussels. The Prime Minister was referring to the section of the declaration which called on the European Community to increase its commitment to the development of Southern Africa. As these examples demonstrate the Portuguese have essentially developed a circular foreign policy relationship between Europe and Africa. While Europe has become an important factor in establishing closer post-colonial relations with Lusophone Africa, in turn, these closer ties with the PALOPs have strengthened Portugal’s desired ability to become a leading Euro-African link.

**Portuguese Business, Lomé and Africa**

Portugal’s integration into the European Community has allowed the financially-limited Portuguese business community a new source of finance for its desired
expansion on the African continent. Within the Lomé framework Portuguese business has begun to participate actively in the structures designed to stimulate private sector co-operation between Europe and the ACPs, such as the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Centre for Industrial Development (CID). In taking advantage of the opportunities offered by these two structures, the Portuguese private sector has increased the link between Europe and Africa in two main ways: firstly, by strengthening Portugal's own economic presence on the African continent and, secondly, by increasing the amount of direct Community resources channelled into the development of the African continent.

As Table 1 demonstrates, Portugal - the second smallest contributor to EDF after Luxembourg - has held a constant seventh place in terms of EDF contracts won among Community members. However, as Table 2 also suggests, the Portuguese presence in the EDF is by far not the strongest Euro-African link in this area of Lomé, since among member states EDF continues to be dominated by companies from the former colonial powers of France and the UK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(ECU '000) Contributions</th>
<th>% Per Member States</th>
<th>Estimated Revenue</th>
<th>Actual Revenue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>62.753</td>
<td>59.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.08</td>
<td>32.930</td>
<td>31.372</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>373.680</td>
<td>355.998</td>
</tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>413.030</td>
<td>393.486</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.24</td>
<td>19.660</td>
<td>18.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.55</td>
<td>8.729</td>
<td>8.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.58</td>
<td>199.456</td>
<td>190.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.958</td>
<td>2.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.64</td>
<td>89.470</td>
<td>85.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.88</td>
<td>13.980</td>
<td>13.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>105.624</td>
<td>100.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>262.730</td>
<td>250.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,583.090</td>
<td>1,510.665</td>
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Portugal and Spain began contributing to 6th EDF in April 1989
Table Two

<table>
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<tr>
<th>6th EDF</th>
<th>31/12/1990 (%)</th>
<th>31/12/1989 (%)</th>
<th>31/12/1988 (%)</th>
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<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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On the other hand, the fact that a large percentage of the EDF resources diverted by the Portuguese business community are channelled into Lusophone Africa has made the Portuguese private sector an important Euro-PALOP economic intermediary within the Lomé framework. The value of this role is greatly increased for Lusophone Africa since the recently communist nature of their politico-economic systems has produced few companies which can compete with other stronger ACP counterparts for EDF investment. Portuguese business participation in EDF has, as a consequence, allowed the PALOPs to benefit from Lomé resources they would otherwise have found difficult to obtain. The preferential treatment EDF gives to ACP companies is strongly reflected in the fact that these companies are responsible for 30% of total EDF investment granted.

The creation of joint ventures between Portuguese companies and those in the PALOPs may become of central importance in increasing Lusophone Africa's ability to benefit from EDF finance. Furthermore, the transition to market economies now being undertaken by all the PALOPs, and the fear of increased marginalisation felt by Africa in general since the changes in Eastern Europe,
has given an added importance to Portugal’s economic presence in Lusophone Africa. The fact that the Portuguese business community speaks the same language has been another crucial factor behind the PALOPs desire to establish closer relations with Portugal.

EDF investment has also allowed the Portuguese private sector to expand in countries beyond Lusophone Africa, such as Guinea-Conakry, the Central African Republic and Zaire. The importance attached to EDF investment opportunities by those sectors of the Portuguese business community seeking to expand their African operations were reflected in the fact that, by September 1990, Portugal had the highest return on its contributions to EDF among community members of some 81%. Lomé resources have clearly increased Portugal’s significance in the larger context of Euro-African economic relations, and the same can be said of the Portuguese private sector’s presence in CID.

In the case of CID participation, the Portuguese private sector has become an important economic intermediary between Community resources and the African continent, the main beneficiaries of which are again the Lusophone nations. Portuguese business participation in CID came as a consequence of the accord signed by this Community institution and Portugal’s Instituto do Comercio Externo de Portugal/Portuguese Foreign Trade Institute (ICEP). The ICEP/CID agreement works on the basis of joint co-financing for projects in their pre- and post-investment phases. One year after the accord was signed, Portugal occupied second place to Belgium in CID projects; yet, by 1992 Portugal had more projects in CID-assisted joint ventures than any other Community member. Of the eighty projects in question, spanning twenty different countries, 92.7% were located in Africa, of which 72% went to the PALOPs, 3.8% to the Pacific and the remainder 3.8% to the Caribbean. The mutual interest in Portugal’s Euro-African dimension, between the Portuguese foreign policy elite and the private sector led to the creation in 1988 of ELO (LINK) - the Portuguese Association for Co-operation and Development. The close links between the political sphere and the business community on the issue of Africa were clearly highlighted by the fact that men such as the Portuguese Secretary of State for Co-operation, Durrao Barroso, and the Finance Minister, Braga de Macedo, were important figures in the organisation’s appearance. ELO’s close political contacts also reflects the interest that Cavaco Silva had in the association’s birth. In essence, the creation of a business association devoted to fostering close links with Africa was viewed as an important means of securing increasing political support from the business community for the Prime Minister’s rapprochement with the PALOPs. ELO was also viewed as useful in breaking what was a near monopoly in business relations with Angola in particular, especially in the field of consultancy, by companies with strong communist links.
ELO’s central philosophy is based on what the organisation’s leaders term the ‘discoveries model’. The aim is to increase the co-ordination between official foreign policy and Portuguese economic activity in the area of African relations. In order to stimulate further the Portuguese business presence in Africa, ELO pursues its own activities, such as forging a closer association between the Portuguese business community and international multilateral sources of finance such as the World Bank. ELO is also a member of the influential ‘Group of Seven’ Euro lobby, which seeks to foster closer co-operation between the European private sector and ACP countries. This lobby is composed of seven private sector associations from differing Community states with interests particularly in Africa.

The importance which Portugal’s Euro-African dimension exerts throughout Portuguese society is also reflected in the organisation’s belief that the challenge of Portugal’s European presence is ‘the link between Europe and Africa’. The emergence of an organisation such as ELO, along with its close ties to the Portuguese policy-making elite, signifies that Portugal’s relationship with Africa is entering a more pluralistic phase. One consequence of that is that Portugal’s membership of the European Union (EU) - both politically and economically - will no doubt continue to be an active promoter of close Euro-African relations. While Portugal may have moved closer to Europe through its membership of the EU it has also actually found thereby a means of strengthening its ties with Africa, appropriate to the realities of the post-colonial world.

**Future Obstacles**

The advent of South Africa as an acceptable economic player in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, may cause that country to act as a magnet for both European public and business funds - both for investment and development within South Africa itself and, particularly, for its regional impact, with South Africa becoming an economic engine for its region. In such a case, it could become the favoured intermediary between the developed world - Europe in particular - and its developing neighbours, diminishing Portugal’s attempt to play such a role from a geographical distance.

All the English-speaking states of the Southern African region are members of the Commonwealth. With Mozambique’s precedent-creating application for membership of the Commonwealth the prospect arises of a Commonwealth bloc stretching from coast to coast. Many within the Commonwealth have speculated on a future Angolan membership once the criteria of democratic government have been satisfied. Although this remains something for the future, there is concern in Lisbon that the English-speaking Commonwealth may well prove more attractive, indeed useful, to Angola and Mozambique than the dream of a Portugal-centred Lusophone Commonwealth.
As for the dream of a Portugal-centred Lusophone Commonwealth, there may well be one day a Lusophone Commonwealth - but the Brazilians may well prefer it to be Brazil-centred; and Lusophone Africa may see value in a Third World-led association. As noted above, Brazilians helped mastermind the 1992 MPLA electoral campaign and other links are already in existence or explored on the ground. The Portuguese dismiss Brazilian dominance of any such grouping and, when pressed, insist there are complementary interests between the two. In 1994, however, there was established a formal Community of Lusophone Nations - having the promotion of language as its priority. Separately, a group called Five Plus One was planned (Portugal plus the five African Lusophone states), from which Brazil is to be excluded. There is a struggle here not yet fully joined - but Portugal's foreign policy has rested in no small part on its own Lusophone leadership, or making the Lusophone states internationally meaningful or strategic under its leadership. The number of jokes in Brazil about Portuguese abilities make English jokes about the Irish seem positively politically correct. Beyond the scope of this study, but worth a mental note for the future, something new in Lusophonia may be emerging. And, in Angola itself, it is Brazilian troops who will form the core within UNAVEM III, authorised in February 1995.

Endnotes


4. Interview with Cardosa e Chunha, ELO, 8, 2. Lisbon, January/February 1992, p.47.


9. Although companies from other member states may naturally obtain EDF investment for Lusophone Africa, for obvious reasons the percentage of EDF Portuguese investment channelled to the PALOPs is far higher.
10. Unlike more powerful economic concerns Portuguese companies tend to be more amenable to joint ventures as a means of overseas expansion.


15. Portuguese diplomatic source.

16. This lobby founded in 1973 is composed of Afrika Institut (Netherlands), Afrika Verein (Germany), CCBA (Belgium), Cian (France), ACP Association (UK), Asafrica (Italy) and ELO. These associations represent around 1500 European companies operating in Africa, the lobby has close contacts with the EU's co-operation department and the ACP secretariat in Brussels.


18. Commonwealth Secretariat source.

19. Portuguese diplomatic source.

20. Source: Portuguese Co-operation

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1. Five individual Portuguese diplomatic sources.
2. Portuguese Co-operation sources.
3. Rome source on mediation in Mozambique conflict.
4. Mozambican diplomatic sources.
5. British diplomatic sources.
7. ICE sources.
8. Angolan diplomatic sources.

The names of the above people have not been mentioned due to personal requests to this effect.

Major Secondary Sources


120


48. 1974 Party Manifestos of the PS, PPD and CDS.


## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific grouping</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGC</td>
<td>Direccao Geral para a Cooperacao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPPDA</td>
<td>Forum Portuguese para a Paz e Democracia em Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Instituto para Cooperaçao Economica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICEP</td>
<td>Instituto do Comercio Externa de Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMC</td>
<td>Joint Political and Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Movement of the Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>Portuguese-speaking African Nation</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Portuguese Communist Party</td>
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<td>PRD</td>
<td>Partido Renovador Democratico</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>SIM</td>
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<td>Sao Tome e Principe</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>United Nations Verification Mission</td>
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<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>VMC</td>
<td>Verification and Monetary Commission</td>
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Although much has been written on the foreign policies of the United Kingdom, France and other great metropolitan powers towards Africa, very little has appeared in English on Portuguese foreign policy. It is often assumed that, after the 1974 Portuguese revolution, sudden de-colonisation was accompanied by a sudden loss of interest in Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth, and this book is an attempt to redress the lack of knowledge in English on the subject. Based on first hand author interviews, the book offers a sympathetic, though critical account of an often overlooked 20-year history.