THIRD WORLD SANCTIONS MOVES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Paper presented to the Study Group on Sanctions against South Africa on 9 August, 1979, by: Dr Willie Breytenbach, Manager: Research and Publications, of the S.A. Foundation.

A.

Introduction

1. The question of Third World sanctions moves against South Africa must not be seen in isolation.

2. The Third World can hardly impose crippling sanctions on its own. It needs the support of South Africa's major trading partners in the West. It also requires mandatory collective action from international associations like the United Nations, the European Economic Community and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Other relevant but rather peripheral international associations are the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, the OAU, and the so-called Front Line States.

3. Although Third World countries opposed to South Africa's domestic policies find support from the UN, the real crunch would only come if the Western members of the Security Council succumbed to Third World pressures. The West is in a dilemma because it has great commercial and economic interests in South Africa. A key country in this issue is Great Britain. In May this year, Lord Carrington, new Foreign Secretary said that punitive sanctions against the RSA as a result of the problems of SWA/Namibia would not be instituted. He said that the Namibian deliberations had not reached a dead end and sanctions were therefore out of the question.

B.

The United Nations

1. The UN sanctions moves against South Africa, which enjoy the blessing and support of most Third World countries, are concerned mainly with three issues: oil embargo; the South African support for the 'illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia'; and South Africa's 'refusal to comply with the Security Council's resolutions providing for free and fair elections under UN supervision and control and leading to genuine independence for Namibia'.

2. A study prepared at the request of the special Committee against Apartheid and published by the UN Centre Against Apartheid in...
in June 1978 called for a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa.

3. The Special Committee then called upon the Security Council on 21 September 1978 to impose an embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa.

4. The call for an embargo was contained in a special report to the General Assembly and Security Council (A/33/22/Add.1-S/12858/Add.1) which the Committee adopted in closed session. In the report the Committee also recommended that all States be urged to enact legislation to prohibit:

a. The sale or supply of petroleum or petroleum products to any person or body in South Africa or to any other person or body for the purpose of eventual supply to South Africa;

b. Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or supply of petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa;

c. The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, of any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa;

d. The supply of any services (technical advice, spare parts, capital, etc.) to the oil companies in South Africa.

The report recalled that since its inception in 1963, the Committee had constantly emphasized the importance and effectiveness of an oil embargo against South Africa among measures which might be taken by the international community for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa.

5. On 29 November 1978, the General Assembly responded to the call of the Special Committee and adopted resolution 33/23 with the overwhelming support of Communist and Third World countries in which it strongly condemned Western and other states and transnational corporations for their assistance to 'racist régimes' in southern Africa, especially in the political, economic, military and nuclear fields, which impeded the enjoyment of human rights of the 'oppressed peoples of that region'.

It reaffirmed that States which assisted such régimes became accomplices in the inhuman practices of racial discrimination, colonialism and apartheid perpetrated by those régimes.

The Assembly requested the Security Council finally to adopt binding decisions to prohibit all collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field and to take effective measures to prevent the apartheid régime from acquiring nuclear weapons; and appealed to all states scrupulously to observe sanctions imposed by the United Nations on the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and the arms embargo imposed by Security Council resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 on SA.

6. The UN General Assembly closed its debate on Namibia on 3 May 1979 with a call to the Security Council to impose international sanctions on South Africa. The resolution called on member states
and international bodies to increase their military and financial aid to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as the sole recognised representative of the Namibian people.

In the closing vote, 118 members voted for the resolution, and none against, with 16 abstentions (including the nine European Common Market (EEC) countries and Greece, Canada, the United States, Japan, Austria, Portugal and Swaziland.)

Communist, Third World and several Scandinavian and Latin American countries, plus Australia and New Zealand, while voting in favour, expressed misgivings lest the resolution intensify the fighting in Namibia by proclaiming SWAPO as sole representative. A number of them also opposed sanctions against South Africa, preferring continued efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the question of Namibian independence.

C. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

1. Most oil producing countries exercise an embargo on oil sales to South Africa. The Economist of 7 July, 1979 commented as follows: 'The embargo by oil producing countries on sales to South Africa is now so intensive (only a couple of Latin American countries appear not to abide by it) that, after the loss of its Iranian supply, South Africa was bound to turn to North Sea oil. There is no discriminatory clause against South Africa in North Sea oil contracts. Yet many countries keep an unofficial boycott against South Africa without such clauses. Once South Africa turned to the North Sea, Britain faced choosing either to go along with the unofficial boycott, or to keep up its traditional free trade links with South Africa.'

Shell, the other British oil company trading in South Africa, did not need to force the British Government's hand as it has had sufficient non-embargoed oil to meet its South African needs. BP has not!

2. Iran decided, after the Shah was ousted, to embargo oil sales to South Africa. This is still the case today. Yet Iran continues to import significant quantities of South African goods, especially industrial plastics.

D. Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

1. The sixth conference of AAPSO took place in Lusaka in April 1979. During that occasion the President of Zambia appealed to 'progressive forces' to give all they had in material support to the so-called liberation movements in Southern Africa.

2. Opening the sixth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization conference in Lusaka, Dr Kaunda warned that hesitation by progressive forces to support the Patriotic Front of Rhodesia and Namibia's SWAPO materially at this delicate moment was dangerous. He reminded the more than 300 delegates at the conference from 26 different countries that people in Rhodesia,
Namibia and South Africa were dying in hundreds every day as they had no say in their own destiny. 'There is a systematic liquidation of innocent civilians on the false excuse that they are terrorists', he said.

3. The delegates later concluded their deliberations with a call to all peace-loving and progressive nations to withdraw their support from minority regimes in Southern Africa.

In its resolutions the conference strongly condemned all major powers which, in violation of United Nations resolutions, still maintained relations with 'the racists'. The conference also condemned 'Western imperialist countries' which continued to maintain close collaboration with the 'Salisbury and Pretoria regimes'.

E. Africa and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

1. The African insistence on an economic and related embargo on South Africa is clearly hypocritical. Most African states have been active at the United Nations in demanding an economic boycott of South Africa. All those involved are members of the Third World group and official members of the OAU. South Africa maintains a favourable trade balance with Africa, exporting goods valued at R534.5 million in 1978 to Africa while importing goods valued at R245.0 from Africa. Safair and the South African railways play an important role in the transportation of export goods of which food is the most significant item. South Africa is reported to be trading with 23 African countries. The volume of trade is increasing again after the slump of 1974/75 when the Portuguese, a major trading partner in Angola and Mocambique, withdrew from the continent. Trade with Zambia had also decreased from R68 million in 1968 to R32 million in 1974/75. This is growing again. African insistence on trade sanctions, particularly from the so-called Front Line States which include three major trading partners, Botswana, Zambia and Mocambique, is therefore clearly hypocritical.

2. The latest Africa move on sanctions was made at the recent (July 1979) OAU foreign ministerial conference in Monrovia (Liberia) when a resolution was passed calling for world sanctions against South Africa if negotiations on a SWA/Namibian settlement failed. Immediately prior to that a top level OAU delegation arrived in Southern Africa to discuss with governments the implications of UN sanctions against South Africa on the economies of landlocked and other Southern African countries. This delegation visited Mocambique, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It is not known what the outcome of these deliberations were. This visit followed from the UN condemnation of South Africa on 29 April 1979 for its 'continued incursions' into Angola. The Security Council was asked to consider 'the most effective sanctions against South Africa'. However, the new British Government said that sanctions were out of the question.
3. Two Southern African states, both members of the so-called Front Line States, Tanzania and Zambia, participated in an anti-apartheid colloquialism in Sweden on 13 March 1979. Government representatives of Algeria, the Netherlands, West Germany, as well as representatives of SWAPO and the South African ANC also participated.

The Tanzanian representative (Mr Salim Salim, Ambassador to the UN), said that time has come to shatter some illusions about the situation in Southern Africa. 'The first one', he said, 'is the naive belief that a violent situation can be solved by any other means than violence.' The second, he continued, is the step by step approach advocated by the main trading partners of South Africa who say that: 'the more trade and business and social contact we have, the easier it would be to persuade South Africa to change its policy.' Although these countries have been practising this policy for the last ten years, the result of this policy of gentle persuasion was practically zero.

His point was developed by Thomas Nkobi of the ANC, who said: 'Those who say that economic embargo against South Africa would hit South African Blacks most should recall the words of late Chief Luthuli who said that if a temporary hardship is a way of removing a permanent suffering, it is the price we are gladly prepared to pay'.

4. At a meeting of the Anti-Apartheid Movement held in London and attended by representatives of the ANC, Botswana and Zambia, it was decided to launch a campaign against military and nuclear links with South Africa. The AAM would work for an effective implementation of the UN arms embargo against South Africa. Earlier, at a meeting of non-aligned countries in Maputo (30 January 1979), representatives of 24 countries discussed the problems of Rhodesia, SWA/Namibia and South Africa. No government representatives called for sanctions. However, the Patriotic Front of Nkomo and Mugabe called for measures prohibiting the sale of arms of war materials to South Africa and Rhodesia. The PF then named the US, France, West Germany, Portugal, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada as supporters of the White ruled countries.

5. Nigeria This is one of the major oil-producing countries in Africa. It is assumed that Lagos enjoys close and cordial relations with the governments of the major Western powers. This relationship hinges to a large extent on the Southern African issue and, from the Nigerian point of view, whether the Western powers 'can take effective measures to eradicate all forms of racial oppression in that area'.

Nigeria's oil production makes it the most important trading partner on the African continent for many Western countries, including the US and the UK as far as British exports are concerned.

Oil power has enhanced Nigeria's position as an African power, also in the international context. It has become a pacesetter on
the Rhodesian sanctions issue. Could it pressurize the US and the UK not to lift sanctions? And to stop the British Government supplying North Sea oil to South Africa?

Nigeria is the world's seventh largest oil producer, with an output as of late May of 2,4 million barrels per day. It is responsible for about 3,5 per cent of world production. About half of Nigeria's oil is sold to the eastern United States, where it is especially valued for its high gasoline proportion and low sulphur content. According to US Government sources, American imports of 1 million barrels per day from Nigeria account for about 17 per cent of US crude imports, currently averaging between 6,2 and 6,3 million barrels a day. Since the United States is also a major producer of petroleum (8,7 million bpd during the first quarter of 1979), Nigeria's petroleum accounts for 6-7 per cent of American petroleum consumption.

A State Department specialist ventured the prediction that Nigeria would not withhold its petroleum from world markets, but did not rule out the possibility that Lagos might take advantage of the current higher spot market prices ($30 to $37 per barrel in late May and early June vs. $20,96 on contract for Bonny crude, the 'average' Nigerian oil) by reducing deliveries under contract.

A Nigerian oil embargo would cause more problems for the United States than for Britain, whose North Sea oil is a high gasoline, low-sulphur crude comparable to Nigeria's best. British oil from the North Sea is exported in part, while British requirements for heavy crude are imported from non-African sources.

When BP was allowed to sell North Sea oil to South Africa, the Nigerian Government announced that it nationalized BP's assets in Nigeria. One-tenth of Britain's oil consumption (200 000 barrels per day) is provided by Nigeria. The decision, if applied, would be irritating but not crippling to the UK economy. The British decision to allow North Sea oil to be sold to South Africa has not been reversed yet. But the US is still more susceptible to pressure.

F. Conclusion

The most effective direct and indirect Third World sanctions moves against South Africa were initiated by the United Nations (arms embargo) and Iran (oil embargo). The most articulate sources of pressure and sanctions are the UN Centre Against Apartheid (nuclear and arms embargoes), the UN General Assembly (nuclear and arms embargoes), the OAU, AAPSO and the ANC (asking for general 'effective sanctions' without specifying commodities), and the AAM and Patriotic Front making specific requests for the cutting of military and nuclear links (the AAM) and arms and war materials (the PF). The two most outspoken African countries on sanctions are Nigeria (oil) and Tanzania (general sanctions). The only African state that abstained from voting in the UN when the sanctions resolution was passed called for international sanctions against South Africa on the
SWA/Namibia issue was Swaziland. South Africa's support of the Muzorewa Government is increasingly being seen by Third World countries as a means to call for further sanctions against South Africa.