The Road to Copenhagen: Climate Change, Energy and South Africa’s Foreign Policy

Lesley Masters

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ABSTRACT

The Copenhagen climate change conference set for December 2009 is one of the most significant negotiations since the agreement in Kyoto. Ahead of the conference, South Africa has pursued an active role, indicating its willingness to undertake further responsibility. Drawing on Robert Putnam's metaphor of the two-level game, the analysis considers the challenges facing South Africa in balancing domestic priorities with growing international pressure to reduce carbon emissions. Through the analysis, this paper argues that in its current position, South Africa's credibility in calling for greater international commitment to carbon emission reductions at Copenhagen may be undermined by the government's slow progress in defining and mainstreaming climate change considerations into the country's social and economic development priorities. The climate change–energy nexus has proved to be particularly problematic for South Africa, with a number of key decisions taken indicating the continued prominence of fossil fuels, particularly following the 2007/08 energy crisis. As we approach Copenhagen, South Africa has expressed a number of ambitions and released a number of detailed policy frameworks on climate change, yet questions remain as to whether it will be able to deliver on these. Without effectively addressing the complex interplay between both levels of the two-level game, South Africa may lose out on a significant opportunity to shape the future of the global climate change regime.

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>carbon capture and storage</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CO₂</td>
<td>carbon dioxide</td>
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<td>CTL</td>
<td>coal-to-liquids</td>
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<td>DEAT</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
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<td>DME</td>
<td>Department of Minerals and Energy</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>greenhouse gas</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>LTMS</td>
<td>Long Term Mitigation Scenarios</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NUM</td>
<td>National Union of Mineworkers</td>
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<td>PBMR</td>
<td>pebble-bed modular reactor</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In urging South Africa’s active participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Ian Rowlands noted that climate change negotiations not only offered post-apartheid South Africa a means to demonstrate the ‘shape and direction’ of its foreign policy, but also provided an opportunity for the country to assume a leadership role in influencing the ‘shape and form’ of these international agreements.1 South Africa, however, has been slow to articulate a clear position on climate change and grasp the opportunity to play a decisive role in determining the current global climate change regime. As a result, Pretoria’s initial approach to the issue of climate change has been primarily passive, following wider international positions rather than assuming a proactive role in initiating policy responses. As the Kyoto Protocol nears the end of its first commitment period (2012), talks have begun in earnest to replace it with a new climate change agreement. Discussions will culminate at the UN Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December 2009, where negotiators will hammer out details for a second commitment period of the Protocol. The implications of an agreement, with the prospect of binding commitments for both developed and developing countries, or of the failure to reach an agreement and the detrimental impact of environmental changes globally, provide stakeholders with a particular interest in the outcome of the process. For South Africa, Copenhagen presents a renewed opportunity to play a decisive role in fashioning the shape and form of the future global climate change regime. Nevertheless, while the rhetoric indicates the country’s pursuit of an active role in climate change negotiations, government faces tough decisions in balancing competing interests at both the domestic and international levels.

Drawing on Robert Putnam’s metaphor of a two-level game, this paper highlights the challenges facing South Africa’s decision-makers in reconciling domestic and international imperatives with climate change considerations. The paper moves beyond merely identifying competing interests at both the domestic and international levels to consider how these elements may influence South Africa’s position at the 2009 National Climate Change Summit.

The first section of the paper delineates the two-level game and the impact that national and international priorities have in defining a state’s negotiating position, while the second section unpacks the challenges presented by government’s focus on economic and development priorities. At the national level, or Level II of the two-level game, the country faces pressure from powerful business and industry interests in the fossil fuel energy industry. This places pressure on Level I — the international level of the two-level game — where negotiators will be mandated with the protection of the state’s national interest. So, despite indications that South Africa is ready to take up its responsibility in reducing carbon emissions, negotiators may be unable to pursue a position that will see greater commitments to emission reductions.

The third section addresses the potential of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region in meeting both South Africa’s development concerns and in providing the means with which to significantly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The final section considers the national policy response in supporting South Africa’s drive towards assuming a prominent position in shaping the direction of the future global climate change regime. If Pretoria is to exploit the opportunity to play a progressive role in
guiding the direction of the future climate change regime towards the necessary emission reduction targets, hard and even unpopular decisions will need to be made within South Africa's own policy framework.

**THE TWO-LEVEL GAME**

In foreign policy analysis, Robert Putnam's metaphor of a two-level game highlights the distinct, yet interlinked, game boards on which negotiators and decision-makers must play:  

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments.

For an agreement to be reached on the future of the global climate change regime, the negotiated outcomes at Copenhagen will need to be accepted by both Level I — those negotiating at the international summit — and Level II — the domestic constituencies of the negotiating parties. This linkage is at the core of the two-level game. While an agreement may be accepted at Level I, without 'ratification', or the endorsement of an agreement from Level II, negotiations will stall or cease altogether at Level I. For example, in considering whether to accede to the Kyoto Protocol, tension between the domestic and international levels ultimately saw former US President George W Bush repudiating the agreement. Although his predecessor, Bill Clinton, had signed the Kyoto Protocol (1998), Bush opposed ratification and abandoned his earlier campaign commitment to reducing carbon emissions. This followed an internal cabinet review of the global climate change strategy, which criticised the exemption of the developing countries from undertaking binding commitments on emissions, questioned the impact of the protocol on US economic competitiveness, and raised the issue of US dependency on other states in the trade of carbon credits. The 1996 California energy crisis and the active pursuit of a national energy policy based on the use of fossil fuels only added to the decision by the Bush administration to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol. As Michael Lisowski lucidly argues, 'Bush could not credibly pursue, on the one hand, a domestic policy of expanding fossil fuel supply, and on the other hand, a foreign policy of negotiating an agreement that essentially requires fossil fuel conservation'.

Analogously, South Africa's credibility in pursuing a central role in defining the future of the global climate change regime faces the challenge of reconciling development priorities and a dependence on fossil fuel with the current rhetoric committing South Africa to further mitigating action. As a country with a semi-arid to arid climate, South Africa faces a significant threat from climate change. With increased risks of droughts, flooding and rising temperatures, adopting a prominent role in mitigating GHG emissions is an imperative. At the same time, South Africa's commitment to development priorities has seen a continued dependence on the country's cheap, but dirty, energy sources. Pretoria's pursuit of a significant role in negotiating the future of climate change is important
in addressing the vulnerability of the country to climate change; however, adopting a more stringent position on climate change internationally has provoked opposition and resistance from powerful interests at Level II that may hamper the ratification of any future agreement that includes rigorous emission reduction targets.

The complexity of the two-level game means that these negotiations may, however, provide the opportunity for policymakers to pursue an active climate change response strategy on the back of growing international pressure. So, while South Africa’s position may be conditioned by domestic aversion to greater restrictions on the use of fossil fuels, an international agreement that sees all states obliged to reduce GHG emissions (on a differentiated basis) will allow the national government to press ahead with its more ambitious climate change response strategy. In this analysis, the value of using Putnam’s two-level game metaphor is that it accounts for the complex entanglements between domestic and international influences in explaining negotiating positions.

LEVEL I AND LEVEL II IN THE DEVELOPMENT VERSUS CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE

Development and the national climate change–energy nexus

In a statement at the UNFCCC in Bali, South Africa clearly indicated that as ‘a developing country we will take ambitious mitigation action’. However, national development priorities coupled with powerful business and industry interests have meant that in practice, actions and policy decisions do not reflect the country’s international pronouncements on climate change. South Africa’s response to the issue remains unequivocally linked to the idea of sustainable development. Derived from the 1987 Brundtland Report, this concept is defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. Critics, however, point to the inherent contradictions of the concept, i.e. that ‘[s]ustainability and development belong to different, almost incommensurable worlds’. The reality is that the concept of sustainable development has served as a panacea in policy, obscuring the need for further critical consideration of the linkages between climate change concerns and local development imperatives. This has been particularly apparent in developing countries, where environmental concerns are more often than not considered distinct from, and peripheral to, economic development.

South African policy may be couched in terms of sustainable development; however, policy decisions and government actions reflect a bias towards economic imperatives without critical reflection on their impact on climate change. The national energy shortage, which saw rolling blackouts or ‘load shedding’ across South Africa at the start of 2008, was discussed primarily through the lens of short-term economic implications rather than the challenges of fossil fuel dependency and climate change. For instance, in an effort to curb the energy crisis and meet growing demands, the national power utility, Eskom, set out its plan to reinstate decommissioned coal-fired power stations, as well as start the building of new coal-fired power stations in the Waterberg and at Witbank, with a third located within the already heavily polluted Vaal Triangle. South Africa’s energy sector is
particulary carbon intensive, depending on coal-fired power stations for over 90% of its electricity. As Winkler points out:

About 70% of total primary energy supply in South Africa derives from coal. Coal-fired power-stations provide 93% of electricity production. Given its coal-based energy economy South Africa is one of the highest emitters of greenhouse gases when compared to other developing countries, whether this is measured in emissions per person or per unit of GDP [gross domestic product].

Dependence on fossil fuels for energy production and growing energy demand leaves South Africa in a position where the country's carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are higher than those of European countries, four times the average for developing countries based on per capita figures, and twenty times the CO2 emissions of the US measured per unit of per-person economic output. Indeed, if GHG emissions are measured on a per capita basis (used as a measure in determining the movement towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals), South Africa's emissions are 7.4 metric tonnes of CO2 per annum, compared to a world average of 4 metric tonnes, and compared to other key developing countries such as Mexico with 3.7 and Argentina with 3.5 metric tonnes, respectively.

At the same time as Pretoria was committing South Africa to doing its fair share in mitigating CO2 emissions as part of its common responsibility, the government was also proving to be an avid proponent of coal-to-liquids (CTL) technology. This is a particularly carbon-intensive process producing two streams of emissions; firstly in the making of the fuel, and secondly through the burning of the fuel in energy production. Powerful interests within the oil industry have seen South Africa actively engaged in wooing international support for the CTL process. Efforts aimed at signalling South Africa's role as an important player in the international oil industry have seen the country play host to the 2005 World Petroleum Congress, co-sponsored by Africa's largest oil producing countries, Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria. In addition, September 2008 saw the announcement that a deal had been struck between South Africa's oil parastatal, PetroSA, and its Venezuelan counterpart, Petróleos de Venezuela SA. The deal will not only see PetroSA involved in exploration and oil production in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt, but also the development of a proposed oil refinery in Port Elizabeth. The problem is not only that the oil from the Orinoco oil belt is heavy crude oil requiring greater refinement, but the transportation of the oil between the two states to make use of South Africa's crude oil storage facilities in Saldanha will only add to GHG emissions and perpetuate a dependence on fossil fuels. Agreements such as this pursue energy security without critically engaging with environmental considerations and the prospect of greater climate change commitments.

Industry interests continue to emphasise development priorities to the detriment of climate change initiatives. South Africa's relatively cheap (but highly polluting) energy has been used as a ‘pull factor’ in drawing international investment and providing a competitive advantage for local industry. Paradoxically, the 2004 National Climate Change Response Strategy advocates the ‘relocation of energy intensive industries from annex 1 to non-annex 1 countries’, despite also indicating the potential negative impact that this may have on South Africa's natural resources. There have also been calls by senior government officials for polluting industries from China to be relocated in South Africa. Now the country faces the challenge that some of the worst national polluters are multinational
corporations, which, as Wakeford points out, may ‘command extensive control over
domestic energy resources and revenues, expatriating large profits’. 17 Certainly, during
the power shortages at the beginning of 2008, it emerged that some of the foreign-owned
(energy-intensive) aluminium smelters, including BHP Billiton’s Bayside, Hillside and
Mozal smelters, continued to draw their full complement of 2 500 megawatts of electricity
while local businesses and services such as schools and hospitals relied on back-up
generators.18 Patrick Bond argues that

[t]hroughout the electricity crisis, big smelting companies are protected with reliable supply
and the world’s cheapest electricity; and throughout the climate crisis, the government is
negotiating hard on behalf of big capital so they receive a lucrative property right to pollute,
which they can then trade for more profit.19

Although South Africa’s industrial sector may have signalled a commitment to following
sustainable development policies, this has not resulted in substantial plans for the
reduction of GHG emissions. There has been little in the way of collaboration between
government and business in linking development with the country’s commitments to
climate change. This is reflected in the report presented by the Carbon Disclosure Project at
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which highlights the ‘disconnection between awareness
of climate change and action on the issue’.20 There has also been direct opposition to
government’s more active position on climate change from within the business sector.
From as early as 1997, at a workshop on trade and environment, the view was expressed
that South Africa should not be making ‘first world choices’ that negatively impact on small
businesses.21 More recently, the Energy Reality Group, comprising scientists, engineers
and economists, posited that South Africa should not move forward in efforts to reduce
emissions until the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries
make real commitments to mitigate their GHG emissions. In a statement presented to
the 2009 South African National Climate Change Summit, the group noted that ‘[m]itigation
costs are high, and the threats that climate change poses are too uncertain to
justify diverting significant resources from development’.22

In the two-level game, a decision or negotiation position may be rational for a
negotiator at one game board, but it ‘may be impolitic for that same player at the other
board’.23 For South Africa, an agreement at Level I that results in the mitigation of GHG
emissions will have wider long-term benefits in addressing climate change. Nevertheless,
at Level II, this same agreement will see limitations on the use of fossil fuels threaten
South Africa’s immediate economic competitiveness and will be particularly detrimental
to the country’s large coal industry. South Africa is one of the world’s leading exporters of
coal, and it benefited from the rapidly rising oil prices of 2008. On average, the country
exports over 72 million tonnes of coal a year, predominantly to Europe, India and China,
and as South Africa’s third-largest mineral export, coal has made a significant contribution
to foreign exchange earnings.24 Moreover, according to the Department of Minerals and
Energy (DME), the mining industry as a whole also accounts for approximately 5.1% of
those employed in the formal sector outside of agriculture.25 As coal continues to occupy a
central position in South Africa’s economy, the prospects for the adoption a more stringent
position on carbon emission reductions at Copenhagen may prove politically difficult
at home. Indeed, in an address to the country’s 2009 National Climate Change Summit,
the South African minister of minerals and energy, Buyelwa Sonjica, highlighted the interconnection between energy and climate change, but went on to note that

as the Department of Minerals and Energy we play our part in the drive to preventing the worst impacts of climate change, while protecting our energy sector and ensuring that it remains a key platform for economic growth and development in the country.26

Industry is dependent on and consumes a significant proportion of South Africa’s fossil energy. According to the South African Environmental Outlook, industry is the largest consumer of electricity at 68%, followed by residential consumption at a distant second of 17% and, finally, commercial use at 10%.27 On the other side of the coin, industry, especially South Africa’s natural resource extraction, smelting and refining industries, contribute a significant percentage to South Africa’s GDP. The strength of these interests thus derives from their economic position within South Africa, which is in turn linked to their bargaining capacity through the control of resources such as finance, knowledge and expertise.28 For instance, while civil society groups such as the South African Climate Action Network warn against the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS), it has been included within the climate change policy framework without significant debate. Despite questions concerning the cost and viability of the process, carbon-intensive industries such as Eskom, PetroSA and Anglo American have undertaken a ZAR (South African Rand) 2 million initiative to produce a ‘carbon dioxide storage atlas’ by 2010.29 Such support for CCS has facilitated Pretoria’s move towards adopting the process as a mandatory requirement for future power stations and coal-to-liquid plants as part of mitigating carbon emissions.30 As the process itself is not yet recognised by the Kyoto Protocol as a means of attaining carbon credits, industry will have a particular interest in its placement on the agenda at Copenhagen. Nevertheless, CCS is meant as a stop-gap rather than as a solution to reducing emissions. Concern that industry perceives CCS as an end in itself has seen a number of groups within civil society, including the Southern African Communities’ Environment Institute, Earthlife Africa Johannesburg, groundwork and the South African branch of Friends of the Earth, maintaining their pressure on government regarding the excessive consumption of fossil fuels.

Being ranked within the top twenty contributors to GHG emissions globally31 raises questions regarding the country’s ability to meet international climate change mitigation expectations, especially in light of growing domestic demand for development and government projects aimed at rectifying the electricity disparities of the past. Expanding energy production through the commissioning of new coal-burning power stations, even under strict new emission guidelines, poses a challenge to meeting international emission reduction commitments. For South Africa to pursue a credible role in the Copenhagen negotiations at the end of 2009, domestic responses to energy security will need to include climate change considerations that move beyond merely tipping a hat towards sustainable development. As Putnam states, a negotiator’s credibility ‘at Level I is enhanced by a negotiator’s (demonstrated) ability to “deliver” at Level II’.32 International concern that South Africa will be unable to meet future negotiated commitments, and the possibility this brings for the state’s involuntary defection from an agreement, presents a significant challenge to the pursuit of a central role in framing a post-Kyoto regime.
International development priorities

Despite the urgent need for international agreement on the future of the global climate change regime, the road to Copenhagen is littered with a myriad of competing interests and positions at Level I of the negotiation ‘board’. For instance, even a relatively small rise in sea levels will have a dramatic impact on the island states. This has seen the Alliance of Small Island States actively lobbying for immediate and substantial commitments in mitigating GHG emissions. On a different track, the developing countries of Brazil, India and South Africa acknowledge the importance of mitigating GHG emissions; however, they also continue to maintain an emphasis on the historic disparity in carbon emission contributions and the importance of their right to further development. Differences in emphasis are also present within the larger grouping of developing country negotiation groups, such as the G77. Africa, along with the less-developed states, places an emphasis on finance for adaptation, while the rapidly industrialising developing countries like India prioritise the transfer of technology. Under the Bush administration, the US remained resolutely outside the Kyoto Protocol, stressing that the exclusion of developing countries from binding restrictions on emissions jeopardises the economic competitiveness of developed states. Similarly, the Umbrella Group of industrialised countries continues to call for developing countries to undertake greater commitments in reducing their GHG emissions.

The preceding section highlights the divisions present at Level II of the two-level game; however, South Africa’s position will not be solely determined by domestic demands. Wider international realities present within the international system will play a part in conditioning the country’s position at the international negotiating board. In explaining national–international linkages, James Rosenau posits that countries ‘exist in, and are conditioned by, and respond to a larger environment’. South Africa’s position as a developing country, rather than an industrialised or developed country, plays a significant part in shaping the country’s position at Level I of the negotiating board. Initially, the Minister for Environmental Affairs and Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk, had indicated a bridging role for Pretoria between developed and developing countries. This position has, however, evolved to one where the country has increasingly assumed a prominent role aimed at championing developing states’ interests.

By December 2007 and the UNFCCC Bali climate change conference, South Africa’s pursuit of a leading position as a developing country had become pronounced. The country was not only responsible for co-ordinating the Ad Hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex 1 parties under the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the G77 plus China, but was tasked with the position of chief negotiator for the group on the Adaptation Fund, and elected to represent Africa on the Adaptation Fund Board. In a distinct move away from the pursuit of a bridging role, South Africa was visibly critical of the US position, publicly deriding US representative Paula Dobriansky following her rejection of the proposals for measurable, reportable and verifiable support in building mitigation capacity. This was followed by Minister van Schalkwyk’s ardent criticism of the outcome of the 2008 G8 Summit in Japan, where he referred to the final G8 statement as an ‘empty slogan’ and one that failed to make progress in addressing emission reductions. While a target for reducing emissions was set at 50% by 2050, there was no indication of a baseline year or agreement on binding commitments from the Hokkaido summit. In clear
alignment with the other leading developing states of Brazil, China, India and Mexico, South Africa has continued to press for targets of closer to 80–95% for developed countries in meeting their fair share of emission reductions.40

At the close of the December 2008 Poznan climate change conference, there was a general feeling that few advances had been made.41 Indeed, as a developing country, South Africa pointed towards a growing ‘trust deficit’ as the developed countries failed to take up the lead in reducing their carbon emissions.42 The meeting in Poland not only failed to reach agreement on the status of CCS projects’ eligibility for carbon credits, but also on key issues such as the transfer of technology and sources of new funding for climate change adaptation, an area of particular significance for developing countries.43 International investments, transfer of technology, trade and economic competitiveness have become significant stumbling blocks in climate change negotiations. For instance, one of the central criticisms of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development was that developed countries worked hard to ensure that environmental agreements did not undermine the existing trade regime.44 Even the Kyoto Protocol negotiations saw the intrusion of ‘trade, aid and energy competitiveness’ onto the environmental agenda.45

In the case of South Africa, international development and economic concerns serve as a parameter in defining the country's negotiating position. This is reflected in the objectives and priorities at the centre of South Africa's approach to climate change negotiations. In the first instance, the importance of leadership from the developed world in acting as a ‘trigger’ for greater GHG reductions has been stressed. This includes a comparable effort from the US in committing to legally binding emission reductions. Secondly, there is the issue of financing for adaptation that builds developing country capacity in meeting the challenges of climate change. Here, government has emphasised the importance of finance that is new (and not from already existing official development assistance), predictable and massively scaled up. Thirdly, South Africa has been at the forefront of calls for the creation of a ‘legally binding instrument for measurable, reportable, and verifiable finance, technology and capacity support from developed to developing countries’.46 The importance of economic imperatives has been clearly evident in the country's approach towards the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM continues to be portrayed as an economic mechanism, rather than as a means by which the country can significantly reduce current GHG emissions. This flows from the growing distinction between South Africa and other developing countries in terms of securing CDM projects. As Harris indicates,47

the CDM is only locating in a handful of countries although about 100 developing nations qualify. Four leading countries, China, India, Mexico and Brazil, host an increasing share of new CDM projects — 83 percent in the second quarter of 2006.

As a result, Pretoria has been actively lobbying for the re-examination of the flexible mechanism in facilitating the transfer of finance and technology to developing countries, especially Africa.48

The 2008/09 global financial crisis has sparked concerns that economic issues will once again dominate the global climate change agenda. As Evenett and Whalley posit,
The impact of the global economic downturn on firm viability is also reducing the momentum behind both the climate change negotiations and the implementation of unilateral measures to reduce carbon content, precisely because of fears about the impact on the costs of firms that face competition from abroad.49

As a future agreement on climate change will not include the same legally binding restrictions for all states, developed countries have already mooted the possibility of ‘green taxes’. This is aimed at addressing international economic competitiveness among states that have an aggressive tax on carbon and those that do not. Within the US, a bill has already been proposed (although it failed to receive adequate support in Congress) for an import tax on goods from those countries that have lower carbon taxes, a position China has rejected as blatantly protectionist.50 Barack Obama’s ‘buy American’ policy in response to the financial crisis has also served to stoke fears that international trade and economic competitiveness will overshadow the global climate change debate, despite the new administration’s positive pronouncements on reducing emissions.

As Copenhagen approaches, calls from developed states for a new legal framework with legally binding commitments for developing countries has exacerbated divisions at Level I. For the climate change regime to be regarded as credible and legitimate, the emphasis needs to be on reducing disparities within the regime framework. Although South Africa’s former president, Thabo Mbeki, called for equality as a ‘starting point for a future climate regime’,51 international environmental negotiations are fraught with questions of inequality. This is especially true in the context of trade and development and the challenges surrounding implementation. South Africa has been an avid proponent of a fair response to climate change, calling on industrialised countries to take the lead in committing to binding emission reductions at both the Bali and Poznan UNFCCC conferences on climate change. As Minister van Schalkwyk argues,

[where we draw a line is when some developed countries argue that the developing world should help them carry a part of their burden. The fact of the matter is that the carbon space is finite and 70% of the ‘safe’ carbon space has already been used up, largely by industrialised countries. Any attempt to place an absolute cap on the access of developing countries to the remaining ‘safe’ carbon space will therefore be counter-productive in current negotiations.52

This is inherently linked to the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities, which aims to provide a basis for equality in discussing the future mitigation of GHG emissions and adaptation to the effects of climate change. Not only does it give recognition to the differences between industrialised and developing states in their historical contribution to the current global environmental problems, it also distinguishes between the different capacities in mitigating the effects of climate change.

While there is growing concern that economic imperatives and trade protectionism may dominate the agenda at Copenhagen, they also have the potential to act as a catalyst in support of wider international commitments to reducing GHG emissions. In the two-level game, Putnam asserts that ‘clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives’.53 Pretoria has already acknowledged that without a greater commitment to
reducing GHG emissions, the country may be increasingly vulnerable to changes in trade agreements and tax adjustments with key trading partners. By linking a climate change strategy with the potential economic benefits at both Levels I and II, including green jobs or product access to international markets, South Africa would be able to balance domestic pressure while pursuing a more central role in shaping the future global climate change regime.

This is particularly true in the case of renewable energy, where, as the director-general of the DME, Sandile Nogxina reaffirmed the neglect of renewable energy in South Africa and highlighted the importance of ‘beefing up projects’, as falling behind would have implications for South Africa's international competitiveness. The implementation of the renewable energy feed-in tariff in the first half of 2009 offers South Africa the opportunity to reduce carbon emissions, adding to its credibility and ability in achieving future international obligations. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the country’s pursuit of development priorities has seen international capital gain significant influence within the country. This has also led to growing demand for the country’s fossil fuel resources, marginalising any move towards investment in and implementation of the 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy. In addressing the future of energy security and in meeting the challenges of a post-Kyoto period, South Africa policymakers have overlooked the potential offered by the Southern African region. As the subsequent section demonstrates, SADC provides the means by which South Africa can reconcile the challenges of climate change and development through the advancement of the region's renewable energy resources. Moreover, as both a consumer and producer of renewable energy, SADC offers the means to build energy capacity and a wider market to meet growing energy demands, as well as adding to the mitigation of carbon emissions.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SADC REGION IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE–ENERGY NEXUS

The pollution of the world’s atmosphere is the pollution of a global commons, and as such requires a global response; however, its effects do not impact on all states equally. Southern Africa has been highlighted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report as being particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. At the international level, South Africa not only negotiates from a national position, but as a part of the bloc of African and other developing countries. In an effort to stimulate an inclusive position in promoting wider continental concerns, the emphasis has been on multilateralism, drawing in members of the Africa group and the G77 plus China. Pretoria remains particularly sensitive to its position vis-à-vis Africa. This has seen government rhetoric emphasising the promotion of African solidarity and the presentation of a co-ordinated African position towards climate change negotiations. Yet despite the weight accorded to the African Agenda in foreign policy, South Africa has not given sufficient cognisance to the role of Southern Africa in supporting its pursuit of a significant role in affecting the direction of a future global climate change regime.

While South Africa has been carving out a role as a leading developing country in the pursuit of greater commitments and leadership from the industrialised countries, within SADC it is itself the leading producer of GHG emissions, consuming the majority
Demand for energy within the region is, however, set to rise as states pursue their development objectives. A regionally integrated renewable energy infrastructure would not only allow for sufficient economies of scale in the development of a renewable energy market, but for development based on clean energy and a move away from a dependency on fossil fuel. Moreover, engagement with the region on climate change will facilitate South Africa’s own move towards the implementation of its ambitious policy positions at both the domestic and international levels. Certainly, with mounting international pressure to reduce fossil fuel consumption and national commitments to move towards the establishment of strict timetables for implementation and investment in renewable energy, the region offers a platform for addressing both development and climate change.

In a paper on South Africa–EU trade negotiations, James Hentz builds on Putnam’s metaphor of a two-level game through the introduction of the region as an element in shaping negotiating positions. Hentz’s three-level game is depicted as one where ‘[p]olitical tradeoffs are made across all three levels (domestic, regional, international), and each affects the other’. At the centre of Hentz’s argument is that the region may act as both a stumbling block and stepping stone in the formation of a new agreement. South Africa’s immediate region offers a number of opportunities for the development of ‘clean’ renewable energy in mitigating carbon emissions. According to the International Monetary Fund’s 2008 Regional Economic Outlook, sub-Saharan Africa ‘is richly endowed with both renewable and exhaustible energy resources’ and has as yet barely utilised these resources in generating power. South Africa’s own electricity utility, Eskom, has confirmed the importance of the region in contributing to the future energy mix. In a statement, CEO Jacob Maroga indicated that the Cahora Bassa hydrodam in Mozambique and the Inga hydropower projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) could cause a reduction in the use of coal in energy production of as much as 70–88% by 2025. The importance assigned to the region as a source of renewable energy is a position reaffirmed in the African National Congress’s (ANC) Polokwane resolution on climate change, where the governing party resolved to escalate our national effort towards the realisation of a greater contribution of renewable energy sources, including solar and wind power, as part of an ambitious renewable energy target. The hydroelectric potential of the SADC region should be included in our plans.

As a stepping stone or building block, regionalism can support efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change for SADC, as well as foster relations among states within the region and the continent more broadly. For instance, responsibility for the Grand Inga hydropower project lies with the Western Power Corridor (Westcor), comprising utilities from Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa, with the central aim of feeding electricity into these states’ national power grids. There have also been efforts to review the progress of the SADC energy recovery strategy, or the SADC Energy Roadmap; however, progress has been slow as a result of financial constraints arising from low tariffs, inappropriate national policies and lack of political will on the part of some Member States.

The significance of the SADC region for Pretoria is that it provides the means of reconciling energy demand with development and climate change objectives; however,
there has been little effort to draw on the region in framing solutions to climate change. Instead, the weaknesses of the continent are emphasised including, ‘poverty; limited institutional capacity, limited access to capital, markets, infrastructure and technology; ecosystem degradation; low levels of resilience to disasters and resource-based conflicts’.67

There has been an acknowledgement that much more needs to be done in establishing a programme to build African capacity and defining a ‘much more coherent African response and also joint programmes in particular with our neighbouring countries’;68 however, South Africa has remained primarily inward looking. At South Africa’s first energy summit (September 2007), Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka noted that ‘[e]nergy security is again high on the political agenda and increasing our own generation capacity is on top of our agenda’.69 As oil prices accelerated over the $130 a barrel mark in the first half of 2008, energy security became a political priority, especially for energy-importing states. The uneven distribution of energy sources, including oil, gas and coal, have highlight vulnerabilities within Southern Africa, as well as the region’s dependence on fossil fuels. South Africa’s own response to the energy crisis of 2007/08 not only reinforced a dependence on fossil fuel for the country, but also raised systemic questions regarding energy dependencies within the region.

In his article in Foreign Affairs (1993), Nelson Mandela highlighted regional energy vulnerabilities and the impact of the effects of climate change in the context of the country’s future foreign policy:70

In several cases, notably that of potential water and hydropower projects in several Southern African Development Community [SADC] member states, projects will not be economically viable unless they can count on exports to South Africa. At the same time, South Africa would benefit in environmental terms by importing hydropower and could well become absolutely dependent on water imports from other countries in the years ahead.

The SADC countries remain dependent on South Africa as both a consumer and exporter of energy. Currently, the country exports more energy than it imports, despite former Minister for Public Enterprises Alec Erwin’s claims to the contrary.71 However, as Pretoria endorses greater commitments to climate change, the country will need to look towards the region as both a market for, and provider of, renewable ‘clean’ energy. However, with a number of African states already sceptical of South Africa’s economic continental ambitions and the country’s energy dominance, renewable energy interests may well be viewed as yet another form of South African hegemony. As such, Pretoria will have to work hard with partner countries to ensure that capacity development is perceived as equitable.

Despite the as yet untapped potential of the Zambezi River basin,72 the development of the Inga III and Grand Inga hydropower projects on the River Congo has been singled out by Pretoria as a central element in the move towards utilising the regions renewable clean energy. As Daniel and Lutchman argue,

Grand Inga is the vital element in South Africa’s long-term objective of ensuring its self-sufficiency in electricity. It is little wonder then that the South African government has committed so much in the way of time and effort, as well as military peacekeepers, to the task of bringing political stability to the DRC and to ending the endemic conflict in particularly the eastern region (Ituri) of the country.73
The project’s significance lies in its potential to supply clean renewable electricity to the whole of Africa, as well as provide the possibility of excess energy that could be sold on to Europe. Nevertheless, problems surrounding this large-scale project, including political instability, limited investment and questions of energy security, have meant that it remains at the feasibility study stage with the outcomes only expected in 2014. The irony is that without greater commitments to mitigating GHG emissions and their effect, changes in the region’s climate may reduce hydro-electric prospects.

Within the region, Mozambique has the capacity to provide South Africa with hydro-electric power from the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River. The problem is that while Pretoria may buy hydro-electric power from Mozambique, it sells its own cheaper coal-produced ‘dirty’ electricity to Maputo. Undermining the potential of Cahora Bassa and instilling a dependence on cheap South African energy has been linked to an archaic agreement negotiated between the Portuguese colonial authorities and the apartheid regime in the 1970s, which saw an agreement on fixed low-cost energy price for a sixty-year period. Following South Africa’s energy crisis, renewed attention has been given to the potential of hydro-electricity, although Eskom highlighted that the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric plant was only producing half its capacity because of poor maintenance. What the power utility failed to indicate was that as a result of the export of cheap coal-produced energy, the Cahora Bassa hydropower project has found itself in debt and unable to pay for the costly maintenance necessary. Mozambique has since begun to focus on developing its hydrocarbon industry in an effort to shore up its own energy security and future energy trade (with the aid of donor countries), without wider consideration of the impact on the environment. The US firm Ayr Logistics, Mozambique is now set to build a new oil refinery in Maputo by 2013, while the Indonesian firm Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetes has agreed a $30 million deal on gas exploration in Sofala Province.

Rather than draw on the region as a means of addressing the challenges of the climate change–energy nexus, tension has emerged between South Africa and its neighbours to the north. This has been driven by evidence that these neighbouring countries continued to enjoy cheap electricity, despite energy shortages and countrywide blackouts. Indeed, the South African newspaper *The Times* pointed out that these countries got ‘preferential treatment even though they pay half the rate domestic customers are charged’. The region is, however, on the receiving end of pollution caused by South Africa’s power stations. The decision to allow the building of tall stacks has seen the wider dispersal of pollutants in the atmosphere, leading to an increase in transboundary pollution and acid rain. Although SADC initiated the 1990 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, it has occupied a peripheral position on the regional agenda. As the region is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, it will face additional pressure as the number of environmental refugees escalates, creating a further challenge to the promotion of peace, security and stability. This is not an element considered in any detail by governments within SADC, yet as the Red Cross statistics indicate, since 2001 the number of environmental refugees worldwide has outnumbered those fleeing war and conflict.
Despite being party to a number of multilateral climate change agreements, including the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (accessed to in 1990) and the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (1992), Pretoria has been slow in articulating a clear position on climate change. Indeed, South Africa was one of the last states to ratify the UNFCCC, following complaints from civil society about the lack of consultation. It has not been until more recently that a climate-sensitive approach has emerged in domestic rhetoric and policy frameworks. Following South Africa’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol (2002), the government professed renewed attention to issues of climate change. This saw the adoption of the White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) and National Climate Change Response Strategy (2004), and the hosting of a National Climate Change Conference (2005). By the end of 2007, the ANC, South Africa’s ruling party, had itself adopted a more pronounced position on climate change. Moving beyond the broad-based approach towards the environment present in the party’s RDP White Paper Discussion Document (1994) and the Principles of Environmental Policy, the ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane introduced a resolution specific to climate change. Noting South Africa’s contribution to GHG emissions globally and the country’s continued reliance on coal as a primary source of energy, the resolution indicates that this ‘places an obligation on South Africa, in terms of fulfilling our international responsibilities, to demonstrate our seriousness and commitment to greenhouse gas reduction’. In order to achieve this, the ANC resolved to ‘[s]et a target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as part of our responsibility to protect the environment and promote sustainable development, and to participate in sharing the burden with the global community under a common framework of action’.

The introduction of the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) in July 2008 and the National Climate Change Summit of March 2009 demonstrates the growing importance government attaches to the development of domestic and international positions ahead of the international climate change negotiations. Putnam argues that in the two-level game, credibility internationally is enhanced by the ability to ‘deliver’ on promises at a national level. In an attempt to ‘deliver’ its share of a reduction in global emissions, the LTMS document highlights the move towards implementing both state led action (regulatory) and economic instruments (tax and incentives) in reducing South Africa’s GHG emissions. With the prospect of a carbon tax, as well as more stringent energy efficiency measures, former Minister for the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), Marthinus van Schalkwyk, boasted that the LTMS document is ‘more ambitious and detailed than what many countries in the current negotiation process have put on the table’. Nevertheless, the setting up of policy guidelines and reductions targets still needs to be addressed.

As a framework for a future policy on climate change, the aim of LTMS document is to enhance national co-ordination in reducing South Africa’s GHG emissions. Discussing the LTMS, Harald Winkler states that the ‘key to success [in reducing emissions] will be strong, committed and engaged South African leadership in government, business and civil society, coupled with international alignment and active support’. The adoption of a top-down policy prescription approach has not, however, contributed to the space
for policy debate. For instance, aspects such as CCS and nuclear power are uncritically included in mitigation measures. The political nature of climate change negotiations, both domestically and internationally, presents challenges not accounted for in an approach based on scientific modelling. For instance, although the LTMS may be considered an achievement in a ‘political economy dominated by centralised, energy intensive and dirty industries’,91 the scenario document continues to accentuate the role of nuclear power over the importance of investment in renewable sources of energy, with government committing 51% of the capital required over the next three years for the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR).92

Regional inequality in terms of access to gas and hydropower, as well as questions of fossil fuel dependency, have seen South Africa turning towards nuclear technology as a means of generating ‘clean’ energy. Government has already set out plans to build a second conventional nuclear power station and has invested heavily in the PBMR.93 This form of power generation is claimed to produce no carbon dioxide emissions, and where nuclear capacity has been adopted, countries have seen a dramatic fall in their carbon emissions.94 Certainly, on his visit to South Africa, environmental activist and founder of Greenpeace Patrick Moore proved an avid proponent of a move towards nuclear power as a response to South Africa’s climate change and energy challenges. In his address to numerous audiences across the country, he argued that a shift towards nuclear is ‘far better than taking coal-powered turbines out of mothballs which pump huge quantities of uranium into the air, causing untold illnesses and deaths’.95

A number of key government and business interests are vested in the success of the PBMR, including Eskom, the Industrial Development Corporation and US nuclear giant Westinghouse. In addition, former Minister of Minerals and Energy Buyelwa Sonjica has pointed to the economic and energy importance of Africa’s uranium deposits for the continent.96 The problem is that government and industry continue to gloss over the exorbitant cost of nuclear energy, with an estimated ZAR 100 billion price tag on a new reactor, and the negative environmental impacts of nuclear energy in reaching climate change objectives. The building of additional nuclear power stations will not produce an immediate impact in reducing South Africa carbon emissions. Although energy from the PBMR may not produce carbon emissions, the process itself is not currently carbon neutral. As Earthlife Africa argues,

nuclear fuel cycle releases CO₂ during mining, fuel production, transport, plant construction and decommissioning, as well as for waste management far into the future. Uranium enrichment is one of the most energy intensive industrial operations and as demand for uranium grows and lower grade ores are used, so CO₂ emissions are expected to rise.97

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) trade union movement has also been particularly critical of South Africa’s nuclear programme. In an address presented on behalf of the NUM, Fred Gona pointed out that while there is a champion for nuclear energy within the DME, there is no such champion for renewable energy. He also went on to point out that for the amount of money invested in nuclear power, the electricity it contributes is small in comparison to that of the coal-fired power stations.98

Government’s decision to withdraw financial support from PBMR has been more of a response to the fall-out from the global financial crisis than as a result of pressure from
civil society. Faced with financial difficulties, Eskom has been forced to halt the planned development of a second nuclear power plant and is looking towards the US and Canadian markets for support. However, by March 2009, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Beijing and Pretoria that will see closer co-operation between South Africa’s PBMR and China’s Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology. This South–South co-operation remains couched in the context of economic development, aiming to ‘create opportunities regarding the commercialisation of the technology in the future, and to reinforce the supply chains in both countries’. 

Although government has acknowledged the need to diversify the energy mix, the focus remains on hydrocarbons. This has seen companies looking to develop the Ibhubezi gas field off South Africa’s west coast with an estimated cost of $3–4 billion over a period of 20 years. As a result, questions remain about Pretoria’s ability to achieve nationally what its well-intentioned negotiators are championing internationally — will South Africa be able to deliver on its international commitments or is too much being promised that cannot politically be achieved? Business and industry have continued to express concern for government’s negotiating position on climate change, with the prospect of a future carbon tax only adding to rising concerns from within the sector. While there are those, including analysts from the Energy Research Centre (who also project managed the LTMS), that support South Africa’s move towards undertaking tougher mitigation measures, business and industry have voiced reservations on government plans for a future carbon tax. Responding to the release of the LTMS, Business Unity South Africa noted the need for further studies relating to the socio-economic impact of mitigation measures, drawing attention to South Africa’s commitments to reducing poverty and unemployment. At a conference on biofuels, the director general of the DME, Sandile Nogxina, noted that

[the introduction of cleaner fuels in South Africa was not a single event, but a process marked by key milestones. Regrettably, this had to be driven by government regulation rather than industry leadership or market forces and that statement alone gives you an indication of the kinds of challenges that have been encountered along the way.]

As a basis for a future climate change policy, the LTMS approach not only faces the prospect of being undermined by business and industry interests, but the interaction between government and civil society has been indifferent.

As David Hallowes indicates, although the LTMS document was presented to stakeholders in 2007,

[there was, however, little coherence between this and the stakeholder feed-back process which was constantly revised, apparently to fit with a changing Cabinet time-table. In the event, separate meetings were called with business, labour and NGOs [non-governmental organisations]. Apart from the business meeting, they were poorly organised by DEAT. The labour and NGO meetings were hastily called in July 2008 ahead of the Cabinet Lekgotla. No-one arrived at the labour meeting while the NGO meeting was poorly attended.]

The national budget of 2009 confirmed the move towards the implementation of ‘green taxes’. Linking energy efficiency and the reduction in GHG emissions, the former minister of finance, Trevor Manuel, set out that there would be ‘incentives for investments by
companies in energy-efficient equipment’, as well as a proposed tax on air travel and the
duties on motor vehicles reflecting their carbon emissions.\textsuperscript{105} However, inconsistencies
between policy and government energy initiatives, such as the decision to build
additional coal-burning power stations and the continued development of coal-to-liquids
technologies, are in stark contrast with positions set out in the LTMS. According to the
Required by Science Scenario, no new coal-burning power plants should be built, with
energy from coal declining rapidly by 2025. In addition, the coal-to-liquids process is to
be phased out by the early 2030s, although the LTMS provide for the building of five new
oil refineries.\textsuperscript{106} The LTMS document is not, however, official government policy, although
it signals the urgency with which it needs to set the framework for a long-term climate
change policy and negotiating positions.

Regrettably, while considerable effort has been given to international political
posturing, it has only been more recently that government has looked towards creating
a coherent and credible national climate change policy. The policy is, however, only set
to be discussed as a green paper by April 2010, with the final National Climate Change
Response Policy published by the end of 2010. In addition, while the national summit
recognised the seriousness of climate change, the importance of development remains
central in the construction of any future approach. In creating a climate-friendly path, it
was indicated that ‘[o]ver the long term we will redefine our competitive advantage and
structurally transform the economy by shifting from an energy-intensive to a climate-
friendly path as part of a pro-growth, pro-development and pro-jobs strategy’.\textsuperscript{107}

As South Africa welcomes its new government under the leadership of President Jacob
Zuma, the changes to the composition of the DME and DEAT will shape negotiating
positions. While the full impact of these changes will only be revealed as South Africa
heads into the UNFCCC climate change negotiations in Copenhagen, the creation of a
separate Department of Mines and Department of Energy, as well as the decision to
split DEAT into a Department of Water and Environmental Affairs and a Department of
Tourism, has been met with mixed reaction.\textsuperscript{108} The division of the DME had been on the
government’s agenda since the beginning of the year, with Buyelwa Sonjica indicating that
the division ‘would allow more time and energy to be devoted to each’, thus improving
performance.\textsuperscript{109} However, the division of DEAT and the move of Marthinus van Schalkwyk
to the newly formed Department of Tourism caught analysts by surprise.\textsuperscript{110} As Van
Schalkwyk had played a prominent role in positioning South Africa in the climate change
negotiations, it had been hoped that he would lead the country to Copenhagen. With the
negotiations less than two months away, the new incumbent, Sonjica, will need to push
forward in ensuring that the new department is adequately prepared for the climate change
conference. Concern has been raised that she may prove to be more pro-development
after she announced that as minister she ‘would try to walk a tightrope between
development and the environment’.\textsuperscript{111} This follows decisions granting mining permits
in environmentally sensitive areas. In the end, political will is needed to address climate
change and to take some ‘hard decisions’ at both the national and international levels.
Ensuring sufficient support for climate change policy at the national level will be critical
in ensuring the necessary win-set for the final ratification of an international agreement.
Without this support, any agreement reached at Copenhagen may face repudiation at the
national level.
CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE

Neither level of the two-level game should be ignored by South Africa’s negotiating team ahead of the most important climate change negotiations since Kyoto. Although Putman claims that there may be some tolerance of differences between national and international positions, any agreement will not be able to sustain significant opposition from either level, as the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrated. The 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations present South Africa with a renewed opportunity to play a prominent role in affecting the shape of the future global climate change regime. However, in order to credibly pursue a leadership position, South Africa’s negotiators will need to negotiate with stakeholders at both the national and international levels. At Level II, government faces the challenge of overcoming wider domestic apathy and perceptions of climate change as the preserve of the elite, ensuring interdepartmental co-operation and co-ordination, and encouraging businesses to mitigate emissions while providing resources to support further emission reductions. Although the LTMS document is an indication that climate change is assuming an increasingly prominent position on the government’s agenda, the top-down approach excludes any consideration of the impact of competing domestic interests and priorities in the formulation of a cohesive long-term climate change strategy.

While the Required by Science Scenario in the LTMS notes that South Africa should join ‘the world community in taking action to stabilise GHG concentrations, and negotiate a target as its fair contribution to this shared vision’, defining what is fair is set to become a political battlefield. It is not only South Africa that will be playing the two-level game at the Copenhagen conference. The other states present face similar challenges to their negotiating position. On the one hand, they will face pressure from the national level in protecting the interests of the domestic constituency. On the other, at the international level, states will be under pressure to move towards the adoption of reportable, verifiable and measurable efforts. Climate change negotiations will ultimately result in unpopular decisions for some. On the one hand, if South Africa remains defensive on protecting the future right to development, states such as the US will react negatively, and this will not achieve the emissions reductions needed for reducing carbon emissions. On the other hand, the ratification of policy that will require reductions in carbon emissions will negatively impact on many of South Africa’s key industries and undermine the country’s energy security. Failure to address concerns at the national level (especially the powerful minority interests) may see players at this level upset the game board at the international level, with the result that no agreement may be reached at all.

Despite the current rhetoric at the international level, South Africa’s dependence on fossil fuels, and its economic and development ambitions, pressure from industry and big business will condition the ratifications of any future agreement reached in Copenhagen. This may see Pretoria in a position where negotiators may not be able to commit to further obligations under a new climate change agreement. At the international level, however, if South Africa is not able to commit to further mitigation measures as a significant contributor to carbon emissions, states like the US and the Umbrella Group will be reluctant to take greater action themselves. If an agreement, no matter how watered down, could be reach by all states at the international level, this ‘external pressure’ could be used in undertaking a stronger position on national climate change policies than might
otherwise have been possible. Finding a balance in this two-level game is an imperative, not only for South Africa’s position in the future climate change regime, but in driving the negotiations at Copenhagen forward. With the country and the region already experiencing the effects of climate change and the scientific evidence indicating that change is occurring more swiftly than was initially predicted, the prospect of no agreement at Copenhagen should spur deeper commitments rather than more well-intentioned statements and sweeping promises.

ENDNOTES

27. DEAT, 2007a, op. cit., p. 209.
33. Wills A, ‘Status of the international climate change negotiations’, paper presented by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism at the National Climate Change Summit, Midrand, 5 March 2009.
34. The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of non-EU developed nations that evolved from the JUSCANNZ group (Japan, US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand). The Umbrella Group does not have a formal membership list of states, but usually comprises the following: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and the US. See the UNFCCC party groupings, <http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php>, accessed 12 August 2008.
46 Van Schalkwyk M, ‘Speech delivered at the National Climate Change Summit’, Midrand, 3 March 2009.
48 Part of the Kyoto Protocol’s three flexible mechanisms, which also includes joint implementation and emissions trading. The CDM is the only mechanism that links the developed and developing world (Van Schalkwyk M, ‘Speech by Marthinus van Schalkwyk after assuming the presidency of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment’, Sandton, 10 June 2008, <http://www.search.gov.za/info/previewDocument.jsp?dk=%2Fdata%2Fstatic%2Finfo%2Fspee
ches%2F2008%2F08061109151001.htm%40Gov&rq=((van+schalkwyk)%3CIN%3ETitle)+%3CAND%3E(+Category%3Cmatches%3E+)&t=M+van+Schalkwyk%3A+African+Ministeri
al+Conference+on+the+Environment+(AMCEN)>).
50 Ibid., p. 2.
58 As individual states, the SADC renewable market remains fairly small and does not present sufficient economies of scale for the development of a viable SADC renewable energy market.


60 Hentz JJ, ‘South Africa and the “three level game”: Globalisation, regionalism and domestic politics’, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 46, 4, p. 495.


74 Phasiwe K, *op. cit.*


77 Laing R, Stewart T & M Mkhabela, *op. cit.*


79 Laing R, Stewart T & M Mkhabela, *op. cit.*; emphasis added.

80 Van der Lught C, *op. cit.*, p. 103.


Ibid.


Hallowes D, *op. cit.*, p. 5.


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In addition SAIIA has 49 corporate members which are mainly drawn from the South African private sector and international businesses with an interest in Africa and a further 53 diplomatic and 11 institutional members.