Seminar Report

Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding

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Lanzerac Hotel, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 20 and 21 September 2010
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Seminar Report

Introduction

In the course of the past two decades, since the end of the Cold War, the international community, acting through international organisations or ad hoc coalitions, has been increasingly engaged in often vast programmes of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding has formed a core issue in international intervention in post-war societies ever since United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept as key to successful preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

In these complex situations the international community faces the critical gap between ‘blueprint’ top-down strategies, focusing at the state level, and the actual interests and politics of the national, local and regional actors involved. Especially local-level initiatives are often overlooked. Given the widespread recognition that context and local ownership are of critical importance, the focus should then be on the means and potential available to the international community to effectively assist post-conflict reconstruction processes and dynamics.

The primary objective of this seminar was to bring together researchers, practitioners and policymakers to reflect critically upon the nature of current post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts, assess the challenges of fostering peace and security in post-conflict societies, and provide a practical framework for such undertakings.

The seminar sought to generate policy proposals and track progress in the following key areas:

- Examining the nature of current peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts – terms often used interchangeably – and the validity of the normative basis on which these undertakings are built, the objective being the clarification of vocabulary and processes
- Assessing the practical implementation of these strategies by the international implementing agencies
- With a focus on the security dimension, articulating the challenges faced in implementing some specific elements of peacebuilding by drawing from in-country experiences and addressing key practical concerns such as local ownership and accountability
Koen Vlassenroot opened the seminar by contextualising the seminar and institutions involved, noting that the L’Observatoire de L’Afrique is a network of think-tanks designed to stimulate debate on African peace and security issues between African and European experts, practitioners and policymakers. He explained that the seminar aimed to discuss post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building, reminding us that the concepts, though widely used, lack any clear and agreed definition. Not only is there a gap between theoretical discussions and the practice of peacemaking, but there is also a tendency to concentrate on technical solutions. Although technical solutions might be seen as generally applicable, they ignore the particular and complex dynamics of each local situation, and indeed the particularities of locations and dynamics within countries. There is also a tendency to operate in a top-down manner and to try to vitiate the moral problems this causes by talking about the imperative for local ownership.
Initially peacebuilding was considered a necessary step once peacemaking had established the framework for a negotiated settlement and peacekeeping had ensured that warring factions would not re-engage in armed conflict. In the 1990s, the concept was broadened to include not only rebuilding in post-conflict settings, but also conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Some definitions of peacebuilding are so general that they incorporate virtually all forms of international assistance to societies that have suffered – or are at risk of – armed conflict (for example government decentralisation, rural development, social investment, fiscal reform, human rights, security and justice sector reform, and nation-building); others, though more specific, focus attention on clarifying international mandates rather than on conditions for peace in the host country. More recent approaches to peacebuilding focus on the comparative value of international peacebuilding efforts in relation to each other, and in contrast to regional and domestic efforts.

The prefix ‘re’ in ‘reconstruction’ implies that an entity that has collapsed or is no longer in existence is to be reconstructed to its original state. Thus, ‘peacebuilding as reconstruction’ would refer to strategies adopted to rebuild states emerging from civil war – post-conflict peacebuilding essentially being a mammoth experiment in social engineering aimed at creating conditions for sustainable peace within countries emerging from civil wars.

If peacebuilding is understood as a ‘liberalising’ process of transforming states into functioning liberal democracies (‘conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic governance’, ‘democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights, and the rule of law’), then reconstruction efforts are limited by the simultaneous responsibility to respect and uphold international norms.

If, on the other hand, peacebuilding is understood as a bottom-up process, then the peacebuilding process must be linked to the social context; it must derive from the societies themselves if it is to become legitimate, involving context-specific visions of political order, justice, or ethics. This communitarian vision posits that any society has the right to make its own choices ‘regardless of the degree to which those choices correspond with emerging international norms’.

The first session therefore focused on the postulated visions, goals and ultimate objectives of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in war-torn societies in an effort to clarify the conceptual confusion of terminology and process.

**PRESENTATION 1**

**Professor David Chandler.**

Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster

Professor David Chandler introduced the concept of ‘the liberal peace’ and examined how this informs our understanding of peacebuilding in Africa. He started by questioning the value of beginning the seminar with a discussion about the liberal peace, also raising the issue of the increasing criticisms of the concept by those who might be counted as from the political Left or Right.

He explained that the concept of ‘the liberal peace’ makes a number of different assumptions which often go unremarked. However, these pertain to a framework of meaning that has changed over time – particularly after the end of the Cold War, and then again after 9/11.
Chandler identified the Left’s critique of the liberal peace as a cover for maintaining existing global power relations, arguing that the liberal peace has become little more than a technical issue. Leftist criticism warns that assumptions guided by Western power interests serve to reproduce inequalities and relationships of subordination.

Chandler noted that conservative critics ask whether the liberal frameworks we so glibly universalise are in fact exportable at all. These critics argue that we may need to consider building institutions before trying to make them democratic. They emphasise the danger of introducing democratic competition in areas where institutions are new or fragile, stating that this may actually recreate conditions for renewed conflict, for example by legitimising elected warlords.

Chandler described the dominant discourse as constructing a discursive conundrum of having a liberal worldview but encountering people elsewhere who do not share the same liberal philosophical framework. Persistent liberal intervention continues to be problematic on the basis of this discourse of cultural differentiation. There appears, therefore, to be a consensus that in order to create more effective policies, anthropologists should be used more extensively to gain a more profound understanding of the contexts within which intervention takes place. An auto-critique of liberalism is being played out in the understanding of and lessons learned from liberal peace. There is a need to deconstruct our former modernist universalist aspirations and to accept that they do not fit into the ‘real’ world.

This is a self-driven and self-comforting critique, one which Western authorities feel at home with – where failure on the ground is nevertheless confirming the differences and difficulties of the world. New institutionalism suggests that change will take a long time and that this change may only become apparent over time. Authors on the new institutionalism identify the absence of institutions which could avert decisions that lead to violent conflict as a core problem. This perspective diverges from the traditional liberal understanding of peacebuilding and acknowledges that people affected by problems need to conceive and take ownership of these problems on their own terms.

PRESENTATION 2

PROFESSOR MAXI SCHEMAN,
Department of Political Studies, University of Pretoria

After introducing the concept of ‘liberal peace’, Professor Maxi Schoeman explored its empirical aspects, with particular emphasis on its practical dimensions in Africa.

She noted that although the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is relatively new, many of the ideas on which it is founded are borrowed and have not been adequately critiqued. This presents an epistemological difficulty in that the same terms may be used but with very different and new meanings. This has profound implications for how engagement occurs between people with different value systems and understandings.

Schoeman explained that the attempt to build a liberal peace in Africa is taking place within a new world security agenda in which ‘failed states’ loom large. It endeavours to expand the existing world order. The evolving AU peace and security architecture carries many of the hallmarks of broader international ideas on peace and security, specifically the so-called new international security agenda of the post-September 2001 era. The obsession with terrorism explains the militarisation of peacebuilding and the securitisation of development. In some respects we may see the liberal peace as modernisation theory revisited.

The liberal peace focuses on the construction of state capacity, which means that we have to ask ourselves, whose security counts? We also have to realise that achieving the liberal peace will be a slow and protracted process, and will be extremely expensive. Is the international community able to countenance these unpleasant realities? Are the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) talking the same language but with different meanings? Statebuilding is not the same thing as peacebuilding. And we have to realise that the policy discourse, however grave it may sound, may be serving as a substitute for action.

The challenge for Africa, according to Schoeman, is to ensure that what is promoted on the continent is peace and security relevant to the people of the continent and not a securitisation approach that focuses on the needs of ‘outsiders’ first and foremost.

If the doctrine of collective security is to have any real meaning in the 21st century, the international community should adopt not only the responsibility to protect, but also the responsibility to build and to change.

The broad issue of peace support – the whole plethora of measures (and ideas) aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the long term, in other words, the restoration or creation of comprehensive peace and security – would require from the AU serious reflection on the kind of peace and security being built. Second, at a practical level it requires the international community to move beyond the rhetoric of ‘burden-sharing’ to actual and timely support to peace operations in all phases. Partnership should begin to mean just that.
DISCUSSION SESSION

Arguments raised centred on the ideas of transferability of the liberal peace and affordability of the liberal peace raised by the two presenters.

The implementation of liberal peace was discussed and it was noted that the problem begins at policy-making level. Often policy does not reflect reality on the ground, while ignoring the urgency of the situation, the available resources, and the roles of the various actors.

The battle of values, with particular reference to the increasing role of China in Africa, was another point of interest. It was noted that China should not always be separated from other international actors. China’s role was not necessarily a bad thing but depended on how intervention and investment were managed.

The complexity of African solutions was debated and it was questioned whether the problems themselves were African. Subsequently it was asked what would happen if some countries would democratically decide not to become democratic and if the source of terrorism would be defined as the inability to accept anything other than liberalism.
Although there appears to be agreement that peace cannot be imposed by external forces but must be promoted through strategies that take into account the local context, empirical evidence shows that, in practical terms, peacebuilding is essentially an externally driven exercise in statebuilding and social engineering.

During this session it was considered how the lead agencies engage in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The issue of security was dealt with from a broader perspective and the diversity of donor approaches was discussed.

**PRESENTATION 3**

**CARL SKAU,**
Councillor Political and Commercial Affairs,
Embassy of Sweden, Harare

Carl Skau spoke about his experience in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in observing the policymaking process first-hand, illustrating the various motives at play that may have little bearing on the situations apparently being addressed. Skau considered the vast number of new bureaucracies being established to deal with peacebuilding, the protracted arguments about their respective tasks and staffing, and their relationship to other parts of the international superstructure. He noted that so much effort is expended on such matters that the initial drive to make a difference gradually dissipates.

The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission offered an alternative to the huge expense involved in peacekeeping missions. However, most its discussions still focus on the failings of the recipients of international assistance rather than on those of the donors.

Skau identified coordination of action, unity of strategy, recurrent problems of capacity, the need for swift and flexible funding, and clarity regarding the division of labour as problems hampering the execution of peacebuilding strategies.

He emphasised the importance of the local context, noting that this cannot be satisfactorily addressed from New York. There has been a growing realisation that the nature of conflict is changing and that if the conflict is local, then the solution should also be local. Skau noted, however, that the system continues to be top-down and that mandates remain relatively inflexible. On a related topic he noted that the international community needs to be realistic about what can be accomplished. Skau advised that there should be an amalgamation between theory and context in order to develop more effective strategies.

**PRESENTATION 4**

**JOHN KARLSRUD,**
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo

John Karlsrud shared his experiences from working with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) as a special assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and as planning officer. His role included planning and liaison with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian community, as well as taking part in the development of an intercommunity dialogue strategy.

In his position Karlsrud was able to witness the changing attitudes of General Idriss Déby’s government towards the MINURCAT mission during the Chad crisis. Particularly interesting was the way in which the government of Chad used aspects of the mission to assert its local control and displace traditional leaders whom the
international community wanted to play a greater role in peacebuilding.

Karlsrud questioned whether the type of security implemented was the correct response for the context and whether it acknowledged local needs and opinions. He noted that the UN needs to change its approach to accommodate flexibility in adapting to low-level threats.

Karlsrud emphasised the importance of questioning the local national security initiatives the international community supports. There is a risk of undermining or even dismantling existing governance structures and replacing them with unsustainable and imposed solutions. This emphasises the importance of a bottom-up approach and contextualised activities.

The point was made that long-term partnerships with local actors can create tensions during shorter-duration peace operations. Local reconciliation efforts in Chad in 2009 attempted to combine local and modern actors. Karlsrud cautioned that it is possible for intervention to have the opposite effect to that intended and thus continuous information flows to inform analysis are very important.

DISCUSSION SESSION

The discussion began with comments regarding the balance between local, or traditional, and modern mechanisms of conflict resolution. Although modern mechanisms are not always appropriate, it is important to eschew the romantic or esoteric interpretations of traditionality.

In view of the substantial amount of criticism levelled against the Chadian mission, a question was raised regarding reaction at UN level. It was noted that changes at UN level are slow and that there is a need to have skilled staff on the ground. There are a number of HR challenges and more focused efforts are needed to build expertise.

Concern was expressed about the impact of the mission on the ground in Chad. As the European Union was the main supporter of the mission, the discussion turned to the crucial issue of how the lessons learned in Chad failed to transform into policies and practices. Although these lessons are not new, there is little evidence of change in sight. The presenters highlighted the problems posed by developing expertise on the ground and noted that it is often young and inexperienced staff who are sent on this kind of mission.

On another note, the ambitions of peacebuilding missions were criticised. It was argued that their expectations and aims are often unrealistic. The root of this may be traced back to the issue of accountability. Donors should take a more humble approach, but they are using public funds and as it is essential that donor states are able to persuade their citizens that they are in fact resolving the problems at hand, there may be overambitious declarations of intent.
Institute for Security Studies

This session addressed the challenges faced in integrating non-state armed groups into a new post-war reconstruction framework. The focus was on successful strategies employed to turn such groups into political movements.

Experts involved in the implementation of such strategies related their own experiences in these areas of international engagement, highlighting the challenges faced in implementing these strategies and questioning the need for and ability to foster local ownership of such processes.

PRESENTATION 5

Dr Karel Arnaut, Ghent University, Belgium

Dr Karel Arnaut’s presentation provided some new insights into the dynamics of the Ivorian crisis and its evolution. Arnaut explained that there is a greater association between the two different economies in the north and south than commonly assumed, noting that interlinked ‘warlord economies’ and patronage networks have developed, thereby linking the regions. Arnaut structured his argument around three points: the political dimension, the incorporation of armed groups, and state reconstruction.

With regard to the political dimension, Arnaut noted that several peace accords have resulted from dialogue between the government and the rebels since 2003. The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement was widely promoted to the public and framed in the rhetoric of reconciliation and brotherhood. The attempt at reconciliation did not go smoothly, however, as voter identification and determining the eligibility of candidates during the election process proved to be both difficult and expensive.

Arnaut noted that the incorporation of armed groups in government affects a whole range of spheres of social and political life. For instance, following the peace agreement, there was a proliferation of small armed groups in the north, while in the south more recruits enlisted in the army.

Incorporation of armed groups inevitably leads to the transformation of all these spheres. The process in Côte d’Ivoire was accompanied by a militarisation of politics and increasing populism in political rhetoric. During the peace process two separate elites established themselves in the north and south respectively. Although they have been cooperating increasingly in certain areas, many issues remain unresolved.

The outcome in Côte d’Ivoire may be quite different from that anticipated by external advocates of the liberal peace. Arnaut identified several policy considerations:

- Interveners should be wary of a policy of peace at all costs and the potential for creating new hegemonic structures, as in Côte d’Ivoire
- Monitoring peace, as the economics of violence have come to permeate several sectors of society
- Global political agreements need to be finetuned at local level

PRESENTATION 6

Jean-Marie Gasana, Independent Researcher, Burundi

Jean-Marie Gasana’s presentation on the Great Lakes region demonstrated that the issue of non-state armed actors remains at the forefront of our concerns. Announcements of a regional peace are at best premature. The eagerness of the international community to extract
itself from the region has had unfortunate consequences in the recognition of political settlements that merely harbour the seeds of future conflict.

Gasana’s presentation focused primarily on Burundi and the environment during the 2010 elections. The incumbent party was the only party to participate in the second round of elections in 2010, the opposition choosing to boycott the contest. As far as outsiders were concerned, however, the limited competitiveness of the elections seemed less important than maintaining the existing order. The elections were declared largely free and fair and well organised by the international community, but Gasana questioned whether this was really the case.

Gasana noted that when the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD-FDD) came to power in 2005, they regarded their regional/international supporters in different ways. Gasana used the analogy of a family to illustrate Burundi’s relationships with external partners. Tanzania was viewed as an uncle, Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a cousin, South Africa as a godfather, and Gabon as a grandfather. The CNDD-FDD used external actors to stabilise and extend its power, despite the powersharing agreement signed by all former rebel movements and parties.

Gasana described the political will to address problems in the Great Lakes as being limited. The situation was aggravated by the international community’s support of the incumbent regime and their rhetoric about a democratising and developing society.

In Gasana’s view some of the major problems in the region are a lack of ownership of problems and solutions, as well as the early phase of transition that many states are in.

**DISCUSSION SESSION**

During the discussion the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Côte d’Ivoire was further examined, focusing on how the process has progressed and whether there is an end in sight. The observation was made that the process is slow and that there tends to be more focus on the national than on the local level, but that the process has matured. The identification process was cited as a positive example, but it was re-emphasised that there is not yet an end in sight and that problems with the system remain. It was noted that the current dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire are clearly about the renegotiation of power structures.

Concern was raised regarding why an exemplary peace process such as that seen in Burundi seems to be falling apart. It was concluded that intervention focuses too much on the political aspects of the process and neglected economic issues. In order to successfully integrate former militias it is necessary to create jobs and relevant opportunities.

It was noted that observers, opposition parties and other actors had failed to take into consideration the effect of five years of campaigning by Pierre Nkurunziza in their expectations for the outcome of the 2010 elections. Free maternity care and primary education have a huge effect on the population in terms of the popularity of the provider. Police intimidation also had a greater impact than expected.
This session dealt specifically with the challenges of DDR, drawing upon case studies to see if it was possible to identify best practices and also consider the challenges faced in the final, reintegration, stage of DDR.

**PRESENTATION 7**

**DR MARTIN RUPIYA.**

African Public Policy Research Institute, Pretoria, South Africa

Dr Martin Rupiya examined the conceptual genesis of peacekeeping and the search of middle powers for a role in the international security framework, which was especially welcome to the major powers after their experience in Somalia with the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Rupiya also considered the joint problems of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).

The intervention in Somalia, which became infamous after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident, led to the general withdrawal of the US military from external civil wars and marked the end of an era. Subsequent pressures for intervention or non-intervention should be seen in that light.

Rupiya identified the commonality of negotiated treaties as the point of entry for intervention, the formation of transitional authorities and the holding of supervised elections with the objective of post-conflict reconstruction. Their particular frameworks are informed by local dynamics (Angola, Burundi, Chad, the DRC, Mozambique, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire). Somalia is often discussed as a deviation from these common dynamics, because of the influence of Islamic fundamentalism.

He observed a changing political environment in Africa that needs to be considered. In Somalia, for example, there is a strong possibility of an Islamic state emerging in the future. There is also an increasing maritime insecurity issue along the African coastline. Some states, such as Kenya, have quickly accommodated changes such as introducing elements of sharia law into their constitution.

Rupiya noted that DDR and SSR in countries such as Sudan, Darfur and Somalia are problematic and will have to be examined closely. The broader problem in Africa is the creation of opportunities and alternative employment for (ex-)combatants that would enable them to disarm and demobilise. Some organisations have developed a mentality of putting off reintegration until later. In first doing things that seem more urgent or important, they are failing to recognise the importance of this step.

**PRESENTATION 8**

**PROSPER NZEKANI ZENA.**

SSR/DDR/SALW Expert, Democratic Republic of Congo

Prosper Nzekani Zena analysed the role of natural resources in sustaining conflict and violent entrepreneurs, as well as attracting sponsors of violence from neighbouring states. His presentation illustrated the need for a long-term view of the conflict that has been raging intermittently in the DRC since independence.

The problems of DDR and its failure are illustrated by what is happening at present in Ituri. The vast mineral wealth situated along the eastern border of the DRC has aggravated the country’s problems. Nzekani Zena noted that DDR has generally been carried out without a concomitant focus on SSR. DDR is not a once-off event but needs constant reiteration and reinforcement. It also has to be seen in a holistic manner and as part of a far wider process.
Nzekani Zena explained the numerous challenges facing the DDR processes in the Ituri region which began in 2004. Although more than 6,000 weapons were initially collected, the process has been undermined by a continuous re-recruitment of combatants. It was noted that it is not possible to conduct DDR and SSR processes in an insecure environment. Though a common vision and political will are essential to success, there has been very little ownership of the process. DDR is linked to the local context and should be linked to alternative policies of sustainable development. Nzekani Zena argued for more thorough examination of the root causes and motivations of armament, in particular the high rank accorded to armed groups, their privileged access to illegal resources and the political situation in their country of origin.

Nzekani Zena also advised a long-term and global approach to the general security situation, including DDR, instead of taking a ‘firefighting approach’ whose primary concern is to address the immediate crisis. It was noted that new aspects of the rolling crisis are constantly emerging, demanding fresh thought and analysis.

Reintegration must connect the DDR action to the recovery of the entire country through activities that last and must also involve local communities to avoid presenting the benefits of DDR as rewards to ex-combatants only.

**PRESENTATION 9**

**ANITA SCHROVEN,**
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany

Anita Schroven used the examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia to illustrate the impact of DDR processes in the local context. This approach emphasised the regional variations within countries, and the different dynamics at play. It also showed how bonds formed in war survive to influence the post-conflict situation and subsequently change the political landscape, especially in the towns.

Relevant timing was mentioned as a prerequisite for avoiding the unintended and negative impacts of DDR. In Sierra Leone the slow payment of pledged funds made DDR impossible, and as a consequence armed groups remained active long after their nominal demobilisation. Often only the capital represents a place where reintegration can take place. Combatants often do not want to return to their places of origin to take up farming, as they have developed other skills or needs.

Schroven indicated that in neither Sierra Leone nor Liberia were the armed groups fully dissolved. The situation was aggravated by poor development and a failure to deliver on education and training packages. Allegiances and loyalties to the group remained – especially to the former officers – making groups influential political actors locally as well as nationally. Frustrations and previous loyalties made mobilisation relatively easy during election periods. Schroven noted that local populations also experienced a great deal of frustration stemming from the perception that armed groups were being rewarded while little was being done for locals.

Schroven attributed many of the failures of the DDR processes to the old and inflexible UN blueprints and best practices. An observation was made, however, that groups with enough leverage on occasion were able to adjust these blueprints, which resulted in more local ownership and opportunities.

**DISCUSSION SESSION**

The distinction between DDR and SSR, which in practice is often unclear, was a starting point for discussions. It often seems that officially the one process starts before the former is fully accomplished. The likelihood of not fully demobilised and reintegrated ex-combatants regrouping and remobilising was mentioned as a serious issue.

Leaders involved in negotiating the peace agreements and DDR were identified as part of the problem. Such leaders are often unable to motivate combatants to join the process, as they have alienated themselves from their groups while seeking to further their own individual prospects.

The expectations of ex-combatants were raised as a problem to keep in mind during negotiations. Not any place or occupation will meet the expectations of combatants. Many will not accept going back to poverty or hard work in a rural setting. The negotiation process is about the future of the former combatants.

The institutionalised monitoring process within the UN could be more effective, but it was noted that all the information goes back to UN headquarters and is seldom utilised on the ground, which delays the learning process.
Too often, post-conflict peacebuilding is regarded as a purely operational process, using blueprints that stipulate what institutions must be established and what systems must be introduced, with technical aspects tending to take priority. The question frequently arises as to whether local political mechanisms, capacities and conflicts have been taken into account and whether mechanisms have been put in place to safeguard their continued existence.

Recognising the need for such a context-sensitive approach to rebuilding, external actors – for they provide the primary impetus for post-conflict peacebuilding – have begun to redefine and modify their strategies. This practice-oriented session addressed the elusive issues of local ownership, accountability and capacity in post-conflict reconstruction processes in an attempt to go beyond mere rhetoric in considering the real or perceived divergence between international expectations and local priorities as a key reason why peacebuilding efforts may ultimately fail.

**PRESENTATION 10**

**Bertine Kamphuis,**

*University of Amsterdam, Netherlands*

Bertine Kamphuis examined the broader policy context in which state-building and state formation is taking shape in Afghanistan and looked at the interaction of the sometimes contradictory imperatives of legitimacy and state-building.

Development, international security, democratisation, Afghan security, state-building and peacebuilding objectives could not be pursued simultaneously because of the tensions between winning hearts and minds and sustainable development; the cooptation of warlords and legitimate democratic processes; and working with warlords to hunt down Osama bin Laden and protecting Afghan citizens against warlords. Kamphuis noted that in cases where politicians have a history of perpetrating violence, it is difficult to term the political project as democratic and in the interests of the people.

Kamphuis identified the contradiction between donor-managed aid and the democratic budget process as having implications in terms of accountability. Donor country control of how budgets are spent denies the local/national authorities any kind of ownership and there is little of the self-determination so often found in donor rhetoric. Following the realisation that these goals are conflicting, some authors have suggested that prioritising aid ownership and building state capacity is the solution.

Kamphuis presented two main arguments why this solution won’t work. It suggests that we can reverse the Western state formation path: first we create a tax bureaucracy, and then we build a need and basis for taxation. This kind of ‘reverse engineering’ of the Western European state formation process can never be possible. Moreover, the problem lies in the idea that it is possible to repeat the historical process outside the original local, national and regional context. Additionally such efforts are selective in that certain elements that we commonly associate with the state are chosen to be created and others not.

The second point made was that the Afghan aid rentier state that preceded state-building exercises was ignored in post-2001 efforts and strategies. This resulted in aid funds being used to consolidate the weak rentier state and not in developing the model state that was intended. More viable state formation processes have, however, been taking place outside urban areas and away from donor projects. In terms of peacebuilding this might imply reduced room for bargaining between the weak aid rentier state and these
alternative state formation processes, as the latter have grown stronger over time.

**PRESENTATION 11**

**DR JUDY SMITH-HÖHN.**
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

Dr Judy Smith-Höhn’s presentation explored some general observations from Sierra Leone and Liberia regarding the links between peacebuilding and local ownership. Conclusions made were based on a comparison of the security sector in both states. Data obtained from surveys and focus groups yielded several interesting results.

Smith-Höhn indicated that many approaches to peacebuilding start with the false assumption of a commonality of purpose within the local community. A heterogeneous society cannot simply be accepted as a given. The security vacuum in Sierra Leone following the withdrawal of the international peacekeeping force resulted in non-state security actors filling the gap. Despite this outcome, Smith-Höhn found that local people in urban settings still gave a positive rating to state actors as the primary protectors.

The issue of donors working to deadlines was identified as being problematic in the peacebuilding process. This approach tends to be result driven, for example the number of returning refugees. Goals such as sustainability and local ownership are more difficult to measure. Smith-Höhn noted that donors need to be honest about what can be achieved and package these goals effectively.

**DISCUSSION SESSION**

The discussion started with a debate on the essence of ‘the local’. It was argued that this is not a uniform category and that we often have the wrong impression of what ‘the local’ is supposed to be. It was argued that sometimes it seems an easy way out to blame the absence of locals in a peace process for its failure.
In any given post-conflict environment, a multitude of mostly international actors tend to engage in reconstruction efforts aimed at rebuilding security institutions. In the past, this has resulted in the duplication of effort and the recognition by several agencies that there was a need to develop coordination mechanisms. This session considered the extent to which such mechanisms have been effective, and whether and how they have enhanced the impact of reconstruction activities, and also reflected on the capacity and will of different stakeholders and agencies to harmonise their planning and implementation activities.

PRESENTATION 12
EMMANUEL KLINIS,
Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Brussels

Emmanuel Klimis began his presentation by questioning the title of this session. He stated that coordination should be seen as a challenge rather than a dilemma. Klimis noted that development initiatives in post-conflict states are an interesting entry point to assess coordination mechanisms.

Klimis argues that the ‘technicisation’ of development politics has led to a lack of accountability, political decision-makers being replaced by technical experts as a source of influence or impact on the system. The literature about coordination is limited and dominated by a normative approach, mainly using the OECD framework as reference. Klimis believes that more assessment of donor impact in post-conflict countries is necessary. The DRC in the post-election period in 2003 was used as an example of the difficulty of donor coordination, particularly in sectors such as security, when the host state is reluctant to allow such coordination.

Klimis elaborated on the case of Burundi where more effective donor coordination was allowed. For Belgium, which is the main bilateral donor in the country, the responsibility for coordination was shared between the ambassador and the head of the development cooperation office. The relationship was beneficial to all parties involved as they shared information, which led to the development of mutual trust and understanding between the parties. The favourable relationship led directly to more effective and productive development assistance, in line with Belgian foreign policy.

Klimis identified some lessons learned and made several recommendations. There is a general acknowledgement of the need for a more uniform relationship between donors, starting with a common understanding of the problems. However, Klimis noted that, contrary to the internationally agreed discourse, a common understanding of issues will not necessarily lead to a common strategy (on account of cultural and other biases), although it is an essential starting point in the alignment of international and local partners. There is also a need for a more uniform relationship between the various components of a single donor. Klimis emphasised the danger of separating the political and technical aspects of intervention, arguing for political engagement of a donor to match its other forms of engagement (for example development or economic cooperation). He noted that locally driven initiatives are essential to avoid a field gap in HQ-based decisions. If a single donor’s activities are not harmonised in close dialogue with those in the field, there is a risk of policy evaporation between policy development and implementation. In order to establish lasting communication structures, the use of ‘human messengers’ frequently travelling between HQ and the field seems an effective way to build confidence, strengthen coherence, and reduce the
Kari Marie Kjellstad, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo

Kari Marie Kjellstad shared some of her experiences from working with the UNMIL Donor Aid Coordinating Team in Liberia. The objectives of the project were to assist in capacity-building in the Liberian National Police.

Kjellstad observed that the problem with donors is not overlap or duplication, but rather fragmentation of donors. Each of the donor countries has its own preferences when it comes to donor contributions, which results in little donor flexibility.

Kjellstad noted that donors are more concerned with their own idea of what is needed than with meeting the requirements of the beneficiaries. She explained that the Norwegians are supporting ten women and children protection sections in various police stations in Liberia, but noted that it is impossible to support a single specialised unit if the rest of the police force is dysfunctional.

Another donor supported recruitment of female police officers. This was identified as being a challenge in a context where there are very few qualified female candidates because of their lack of education. The answer to this was to give female candidates a ‘light three-month’ high school education.

With regard to equipment and furniture in police stations, there was also a clear lack of understanding of the local context. Furniture that was imported instead of being produced by local carpenters was difficult to repair because of a lack of spare parts and because it was technologically too advanced. Similarly, computers were purchased for use in police stations where no electricity was available.

Kjellstad suggested that in the future the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should play a greater role in undertaking assessments and informing the donor community about the actual and practical requirements on the ground. In similar vein, it was suggested that donors should be more receptive to local solutions. She recommended that assessment missions be undertaken in order to achieve a better picture of what is happening on the ground before attempting to become involved in any country.

DISCUSSION SESSION

It was emphasised that more research may not necessarily lead to a common understanding of problems and strategies. There is also a time issue involved in that it takes time to understand, align, and coordinate donor activity. There is also a danger of ‘donor fatigue’. It was noted, however, that ultimately greater feedback from the field results in the implementation of more effective and efficient programmes.
Annexure A  

List of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnaut</td>
<td>Lead Researcher, Ghent University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boshoff</td>
<td>Head, Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathelin</td>
<td>Programme Manager, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandler</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwell</td>
<td>Independent Researcher, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ellermann</td>
<td>Intern, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gasana</td>
<td>Independent Researcher, Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handy</td>
<td>Director Research, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemmer</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoebeke</td>
<td>Senior Researcher, Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamphuis</td>
<td>Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlsrud</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kjellstad</td>
<td>Police Adviser, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klimis</td>
<td>Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nzekani Zena</td>
<td>SSR/DDR/SALW Expert, Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td>Intern, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rupiya</td>
<td>Executive Director, African Public Policy and Research Institute (APPRI), Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoeman</td>
<td>Head, Department of Political Studies, University of Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schroven</td>
<td>Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skau</td>
<td>Counsellor Political and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of Sweden, Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Höhn</td>
<td>Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlassenroot</td>
<td>Professor, University of Ghent / Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels</td>
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# Day 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:00–08:15</td>
<td>Arrival and administrative arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>08:15–08:30</td>
<td>Opening and welcoming address</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr Paul-Simon Handy, Director Research, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, and Professor Koen Vlassenroot, Ghent University, Belgium / EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>08:30–09:00</td>
<td>Session I – Questioning the liberal peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:00–09:30</td>
<td>Professor Maxi Schoeman, Department of Political Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:30–10:30</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–10:30</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30–11:00</td>
<td>Session II – Operationalising and implementing peacebuilding: the role of lead agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00–11:30</td>
<td>John Karlrud, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30–12:30</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30–13:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30–14:00</td>
<td>Session II – Post-conflict reconstruction and the incorporation of non-state armed groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:30–15:00</td>
<td>Jean-Marie Gasana, Independent Researcher, Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00–15:30</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:30–16:30</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>18:30</td>
<td>Cocktail function</td>
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## Day 2

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<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:00–08:30</td>
<td>Session IV – DDR: Disarmament and demobilisation now, reintegration later?</td>
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<tr>
<td>08:30–09:00</td>
<td>Prosper Nzekani Zena, SSR/DDR/SALW Expert, Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:00–09:30</td>
<td>Anita Schroven, Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany</td>
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<td>09:30–10:30</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>10:30–11:00</td>
<td>Tea/Coffee</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00–11:30</td>
<td>Session V – Local ownership, accountability and capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30–12:30</td>
<td>Dr Judy Smith-Höhn, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30–12:45</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:45–13:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30–14:00</td>
<td>Emmanuel Klimis, Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Brussels, Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00–14:30</td>
<td>Kari Marie Kjellstad, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:30–16:30</td>
<td>Richard Cornwell, Independent Researcher, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Function</td>
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Seminar Report

Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding

This publication was made possible through funding provided by the Embassy of France. In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.