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In September 2005 leaders from across the globe met in New York to evaluate the progress made since the Millennium Declaration was adopted in 2000 by member states and to further elaborate on United Nations (UN) reforms. 2005 was to provide the historic opportunity for world leaders to implement the policy decisions and reforms in advancing the causes of security, development and human rights. Collective action has been strongly emphasised taking into account the inter-connected nature of peace, security and development. In a world characterised by conflicts, the efforts and commitment of the UN and its relationship with the member states in maintaining peace and security are significant. It is commendable that the call for collective action is taking place regardless of the difficulty in reaching consensus or the challenges that the organisation continues to face in attaining the desired reform.

Thus, the current issue of Conflict Trends is being published in a very exciting and deliberate period of discussions on the reform of the UN but more so within the changing architecture of Africa’s peace and security. Conflicts on the globe remain a major obstacle to development, increasing the urgency for peace and security. Meshed with this challenge, the changing nature of peacekeeping operations, that reflects a more complex and multi-dimensional environment, has seen the capacity of the UN stretched to its limit as reflected in the five-fold increase in field personnel since 2000. Peacekeeping has been at the forefront of the UN mandate, and the increased demand indicates that countries emerging from conflict still need assistance from the organisation to prevent conflict relapse. In advancing the need for peace, security, development and human rights, the proposed establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council reinforces the commitment of the organisation to a comprehensive and integrated approach to peacekeeping and peace building.

Similarly, the African Union (AU) must be recognised for its progress in establishing a peace and security management system despite its institutional challenges. Its cooperation with the UN has been useful in meeting the requirements of peacekeeping operations on the continent, namely Sudan and Burundi. The AU has even made strides to operationalise the civilian and civilian police dimension of the African Stand-by Force, recognising that the full potential for peace is not merely the absence of violence, but the attainment of human rights, good governance, and access to quality of life.

Therefore, this issue not only highlights peacekeeping developments from their policy and operational manifestation, but also surveys the peacekeeping landscape in Africa, highlighting the institutional developments and challenges. In working toward an integrated approach to both peacekeeping and peacebuilding, we look into civil-military cooperation as an important operational rejoinder to mould multiple activities in the various stages of conflict.

This issue portrays peacekeeping as an important step in the conflict resolution and transformation process, but it leaves the door open for wider discussion and engagement on the root causes of protracted conflict. Therefore, it is our hope that the opinions expressed in this issue will go the distance in stimulating discourse as a step through which the threats and opportunities of security can be effectively addressed.  

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Classical Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has been one of the most visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and security. The history of UN peacekeeping is a mirror to the record of the organisation’s own evolution: the initial high hopes, the many frustrations on the ground and the sometimes bitter disappointments in the end. Peacekeeping evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement as conceived in chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. It grew side by side with preventive diplomacy as practised and articulated by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The technique of preventive diplomacy was to be used to forestall the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs into conflict situations that were either the result or potential cause of a power vacuum in the Cold War. It was given concrete expression by inserting the thin blue wedge of blue beret UN soldiers between enemy combatants.

The goal of traditional peacekeeping missions was to promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great power rivalry. Operations varied in function and size, ranging from a few dozen observers on the India–Pakistan border to a 20 000-man force in the Congo. Classical peacekeeping was not meant to keep world peace, lacking both mandated authority and operational capability to do so. But it did succeed in stabilising several potentially dangerous situations. Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations promoted a kind of preemptive disengagement.

The first steps towards a pragmatic contribution to peacekeeping had already been foreshadowed by the League of Nations. The earliest UN peacekeeping missions, of the supervisory-observer variety, were undertaken in the 1940s in the Balkans, Greece, Kashmir, Korea, Indonesia and Palestine. Their experience shows that observer groups are needed and work: not as a panacea, but as long-lived expedients. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) first fully described the new institution of part-time soldiering for the UN and threw up difficult custodial problems in the wake of the divorce between security requirements and political issues. It established that the cardinal distinction between collective security and peacekeeping lay in their reliance upon force and consent respectively. The immediate goal of the force was to provide a fig-leaf of respectability for the withdrawal of the aggressors. Thereafter, its mission was transformed into the larger role of separating the erstwhile Egyptian-Israeli combatants. It did so not by means of the Charter formula of collective security involving the might of the major powers, but by means
of a peaceful interposatory force made up of contingents from the minor powers. UNEF was neither expected nor equipped to engage in hostilities; its deterrent effect was to be produced by its very presence as a symbol of the international community.

The UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo (ONUC) highlighted custodial problems in the Congo arising from the sudden departure of an irresponsible colonial power, with the UN dealing with the resulting authority vacuum only through floundering efforts. The force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is a good example of time being a more likely solvent of a historical conflict than the UN – but the latter is the most likely means of gaining time. The 1970s saw a return of UN forces to the Middle East in the form of UNEF-II, UNDOF and UNIFIL. The Middle East was also the setting in the 1980s for a steady displacement of UN peacekeeping by great power multilateral peacekeeping in the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the Beirut Multinational Force (MNF).

**Peace operations**

The number of UN operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the UN was placed centre-stage in efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts. However, the multiplication of missions was not always accompanied by coherent policy or integrated military and political responses. When the missions encountered problems, the ‘crisis of expectations’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s in turn gave way to a crisis of confidence-cum-credibility in UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s, and member states began to limit their military, political and financial exposure.

Terms like ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace support operations’, and ‘peace operations’ are used generically to refer to missions and operations that fall short of military combat between clearly recognisable enemies. Traditional peacekeeping was under UN auspices, command and control. There was a reaction against UN peacekeeping because of widespread, if often inaccurate, perceptions that UN operations led to diplomatic ennui and could not be freed of the Cold War rivalry and other highly politicised antagonisms that had infected large parts of the UN system. The second generation of peacekeeping operations were mounted either unilaterally or multilaterally, but in any case outside the UN system, in Zimbabwe, the Sinai, Beirut, and Sri Lanka. The precursor to this sort of extra-UN peacekeeping operations might well be said to have been the international control commissions in Indochina set up by the Geneva Agreements of 1954.2 On the one hand, the non-UN operations adopted most of the principles of third-party military interposition and buffer from traditional UN peacekeeping. On the other hand, they expanded the range of tasks and functions to beyond just military interposition.

Traditional peacekeeping aimed to contain and stabilise volatile regions and interstate conflicts until such time as negotiations produced lasting peace agreements. By contrast, the third generation of peacekeeping saw UN missions being mounted as part of package deals of peace agreements, for example in Namibia and Cambodia. The peacekeeping mission was an integral component of the peace agreement and meant to underwrite it by providing third party international military reinforcement. Reflecting the changing nature of modern armed conflict, UN operations expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of their missions. The newer ‘complex emergencies’ produced multiple crises all at once:3 collapsed state structures; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease or genocide; large-scale fighting and slaughter between rival ethnic or bandit groups; horrific human rights atrocities; and the intermingling of criminal elements and child soldiers with irregular forces. Reflecting this, third generation operations had to undertake additional types of tasks like military disengagement, demobilisation and cantonment; policing; human rights monitoring and enforcement; observation, organisation and conduct of elections; rehabilitation and repatriation; and temporary administration.

In Somalia and elsewhere the United Nations attempted the fourth generation of ‘peace-enforcement’ operations, with results that were anything but encouraging – hence General Sir Michael Rose’s metaphor of ‘the Mogadishu Line’ that peacekeeping forces dare cross only at their peril.4 A peacekeeping operation in a theatre where there was no peace to keep, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia offered neither safety to the local people, solace to the displaced and dispossessed, nor even the consolation to the international community of having done the job to the best of their ability. Its failure to prevent the horrors of Srebrenica in 1995 remains a stain on the world conscience for passivity in the face of the calculated return of ‘evil’ to Europe and a tragedy that, in the words of the official UN report, “will haunt our history forever”.5

Partly in consequence of the disastrous venture into
peace-enforcement, in Bosnia and Haiti UN peacekeeping underwent a further metamorphosis into the *fifth generation* of enforcement operations being *authorised* by the UN Security Council (UNSC), but *undertaken* by a single power or ad hoc multilateral coalitions. There was not a single such operation during the Cold War (1945–89); there were 15 such operations set up between November 1990 and September 2003. The UN itself took back responsibility for a traditional-type consensual peacekeeping, once the situation had stabilised, for a temporary period, but with the tasks of third generation expanded peacekeeping.

East Timor represents the evolution into the most recent, sixth generation of peacekeeping. A UN-authorised multinational force is prepared for combat action if necessary and is given the mandate, troops, equipment and robust rules of engagement that are required for such a mission. However, the military operation is the prelude to a de facto UN administration which engages in state-making for a transitional period. That is, a ‘nation’ is granted independence as a result of UN-organised elections. But the nation concerned has no structures of ‘state’ to speak of. It is not even, like Somalia, a case of a failed state; in East Timor a state has had to be created from scratch. In the latter the UN finally confronted and addressed the dilemma that haunted it in the Congo in the 1960s and Somalia in the 1990s, namely that peace restoration is not possible without the establishment of law and order. But in a country where the writ of government has either collapsed or is non-existent, the law that is made and enforced so as to provide order can only be that of the UN or of another foreign power (or coalition). Sergio Vieira de Mello was the de facto UN Viceroy in East Timor.

**Review and reform of UN peace operations**

A significant cost of the cascade of generations of peacekeeping within a highly compressed timeframe is that most of the major operations today have little real precedent to go by; each has to make and learn from its own mistakes. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a high-level international panel, chaired by former Algerian foreign minister (and subsequent special UN envoy to
Afghanistan and then Iraq) Lakhdar Brahimi, to make recommendations for changes in UN peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report was unusual in the candour of its analysis and recommendations. It came to the overall sound conclusion that “when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them”. For in the final analysis, “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed”. Mandates, and the resources to match them, have to be guided by pragmatic, realistic analysis and thinking. The UN Secretariat “must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour”. The UN needs to develop the professional civil service culture of providing advice that is sound, based on a thorough assessment of options, independent of what might be politically popular or fit the preconceptions of the decision-makers and free of fear of consequences for politically neutral officials. The Secretariat was urged to tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear. Where clearly unimplementable missions have been approved because of confused, unclear or severely under-resourced mandates, the UN has to learn to say ‘No’. Nor should the need for impartial peacekeeping translate automatically into moral equivalence among the conflict parties on the ground: in some cases local parties consist not of moral equals but obvious aggressors and victims. The panel concluded that political neutrality has too often degenerated into military timidity, the abdication of the duty to protect civilians and an operational failure to confront openly those who challenge peacekeeping missions in the field. Impartiality should not translate into complicity with evil. The Charter sets out the principles that the UN must defend and the values that it must uphold. The reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor implies a degree of moral equivalence between the two and damages the institution of UN peacekeeping. The response of some developing-country commentators to this was that impartiality should be seen in terms of the fair application of UN mandates, not as an excuse for moral equivocation between victims and perpetrators.

In order to arrest and reverse the sense of drift, UN approaches to peacekeeping need to reflect the multifaceted nature of UN action in countries afflicted by mostly civil wars. This means promoting the rule of law and economic recovery by integrating the military, policing, institution building, reconstruction and civil administration functions of peacekeeping operations to a much greater degree than in the past. Following the Brahimi Report, the staff complement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York was increased to provide better support to field missions. The officers of the military and police advisers were bolstered. The old and not so well-regarded lessons learned unit was restructured into a best practices unit. DPKO’s logistics base in Brindisi (Italy) received funding to acquire strategic deployment stocks. The reorganised UN Stand-by Arrangements System provides for forces to be made available within 30-90 days of a new operation.

But these all amount to technical tinkering. The chief determinant of failure and success will be the quality of decisions made by member states in the Security Council, led by the permanent five states (P5). ‘Twas ever so, and ever will be.

**Conclusion**

Traditional peacekeeping operations do not enforce the peace, but they do buy time. Moreover, they can help to contain sporadic incidents that are not meant to initiate a large-scale war. The deficiencies in the machinery of peacekeeping merely highlight the fact that such forces cannot be self-sustaining. It is perhaps more accurate, therefore, to speak of war-dampening rather than peacekeeping forces.

The tenets of classical UN peacekeeping came under sustained challenge under the impact of changed circumstances and demands with the end of the Cold War. The UN became involved increasingly in post-conflict reconstruction, ‘building’ peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. It has had to address the resulting problem of being overloaded with tasks while remaining seriously under-resourced and spread far too thin. The zeal to intervene everywhere had to be tempered with caution about entering into entangling commitments. The UN’s dilemma is that it must avoid deploying forces into situations where the risk of failure is high; not be so timid as to transform every difficulty into an alibi for inaction; and be flexible and agile enough to be able to adapt missions to fast-changing political requirements.
and operational environments.

The need for UN peacekeeping remains and will continue. How can we reconcile “the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operation activities as core functions of the United Nations”; that is, the imperative of ad hoc missions with the persisting reality of permanent engagement? Modern peacekeeping demands a very broad range of skills and competence, including “innovation, flexibility, initiative and moral courage”. Peacekeepers have to determine the application of relevant domestic, international humanitarian and human rights law to their conduct and operation. Civilian, police and military elements have to cooperate willingly and coordinate effectively with one another and with NGOs in the pursuit of common objectives. They have to be adaptable as the focus changes from security in one mission to humanitarian assistance in another and peacebuilding in yet a third. The last has led to growing recognition of the importance of instilling and institutionalising the rule of law and justice systems that avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach on the one hand, and encompass the entire criminal justice process on the other – from police, prosecutors and defence lawyers to judges, court officials and prison officers – in a whole-of-legal-chain approach.

The older certitudes of traditional peacekeeping no longer apply when peacekeepers find themselves operating with the executive authority of transitional administrators inside societies characterised by criminality, corruption, political instability and armed power struggles. They have to ensure their own security in an environment in which far from being an emblem of safety, the blue helmet can be a target. They must learn to use modern information and communications tools to their advantage while being conscious of hostile elements also exploiting the newer opportunities to maximise mayhem. All this and more must be done in harmony with professional colleagues in a truly multinational, multicultural and multilingual effort operating in highly localised and particularised theatres.

Countries with large financial and military resources are reluctant to deploy to address African conflicts. This will also have to change if UN credibility on peacekeeping is to be restored. In order to reoccupy its niche
as a major actor in international security, the UN requires consistency of purpose, the resources to give it substance and a convincing attention span. One of the remarkable trends of recent years has been the falling incidence of organised armed conflict alongside a rising number of peace agreements that are actually holding. But for UN peacekeeping, this has produced a paradox: “The military resources needed to help keep the peace are being strained by so much peace to keep”.

The challenge of peacekeeping shows no sign of abating. In March 2005, over 65,000 UN peacekeepers (soldiers and police officers) from 103 countries – over half the total UN membership – were deployed in 17 missions around the world. The total number of fatalities in peacekeeping operations from 1948 to March 2005 was 1,941. The annual cost of UN peacekeeping operations stood at US$ 3.9 billion in early 2005, and the cumulative cost from 1948 to 30 June 2004 was a surprisingly low US$ 31.5 billion.

Is this value for money? How do we judge? One benchmark could be that governments spend one trillion dollars on arms every year. The UN’s peacekeeping budget is less than New York city’s budget on its fire and police departments. More positively, some of the recent UN successes include the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most extensive police reform and restructuring project in the UN’s history; East Timor, where the UN guided a traumatised people to independence through a ring of fire and helped to lay the foundations of democratic governance; Sierra Leone, where a UN force facilitated the transition to democratic governance by a much improved security environment; and Liberia, where a UN force was dispatched in record time to help in the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. In a recent article, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping noted that in Burundi over the past year, with UN help, a new constitution has been approved, an election held and a new president sworn in a peaceful transfer of power. In East Timor and Sierra Leone, peacekeepers are packing up and going home, their jobs done. And UN workers helped Afghanistan to prepare for its first parliamentary elections since the overthrow of the Taliban regime.

Peacekeeping is a circuit breaker in a spiralling cycle of violence. The problem with traditional peacekeeping was that it could at best localise the impact of conflicts and then freeze them. The UN can do the job, sometimes, but only if given all or most of the right tools: uniformed soldiers and police officers from industrial and developing countries, specialised military support services from countries with modern military forces, financial resources, strategic force reserves, political support in the Security Council and sustained commitment. The last requires time and patience, for building sustainable peace has no instant solution. The community of states must be willing to work with local partners and institutions to create enduring structures of liberal democratic governance, the rule of law, market economy and civil society.

Kofi Annan has appealed to member states to ensure that the UN has effective peacekeeping capacity commensurate with the demands placed on it. He urged the creation of strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly and welcomed the development of regional capacities by the African and European Unions. He added that “the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships”.
The outcome document adopted at the 2005 UN world summit acknowledges the special contribution of regional organisations to peace and security, the importance of partnerships between the UN and regional organisations, and the special needs of Africa. In this context, it supports efforts by the EU and others to develop rapid deployment, stand-by and bridging capacities, and the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for African Union capacity building. More generally, the declaration endorses a stronger relationship between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; encourages more consultation and cooperation between them through formalised agreements and the involvement of regional organisations in the work of the UN Security Council; encourages regional organisations with peacekeeping capacity to place these at the disposal of the United Nations through the stand-by arrangements; and encourages economic, social and cultural cooperation as well.\(^1\)

Considering that 70 percent of UN peace operations are now deployed in Africa, these comments are of particular relevance to the continent. Africa would have been in a much stronger position to encourage and oversee all this if the AU had joined forces with Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G4) in a joint resolution on enlarging the composition of the Security Council. Instead the AU insisted on the principle of equal veto rights for all permanent members, new and existing, for which there is absolutely no support in the rest of the world. The principled stand stalled the head of momentum that had built up over several months of G4 campaigning, and the moment that came closest to structural reform of the Council in 40 years was lost.\(^1\)

Reflecting the changing nature of modern armed conflict, UN operations expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of their missions.

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### Endnotes


3. The Congo crisis of the 1960s, and the UN operation there from 1960 to 1964, could be said to have been precursors to the complex emergencies and third generation missions.


10. Ibid., para. 51.

11. Ironically, in 2004, as the UN special envoy for Iraq, when Brahimi himself made the rather obvious point that the Palestinian conflict cast a complicating shadow over efforts at stabilising the Iraqi security situation, he was criticised for exceeding his brief.


19. Up-to-date figures can always be found by navigating through the UN home page on the Internet (www.un.org).


In the 21st century, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions. Since 1989 most UN peace operations have, in effect, been peacebuilding operations in that their focus was on supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace processes, which included classic peacebuilding tasks such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), justice sector reform, organising elections, training and restructuring new police forces, and facilitating the transition from interim to transitional, and eventually to democratically elected governments.

The development from peacekeeping to peacebuilding has emerged as new, mostly civilian dimensions were added to traditional military peacekeeping mandates. These new dimensions were aimed at assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace process by: supporting transitional arrangements; establishing new or reforming existing national institutions such as the defence force, police service, and the judiciary; assisting with the organising of elections; supporting constitution drafting processes; and facilitating restorative justice initiatives. The civilian dimension of peace operations is thus closely linked to the peacebuilding nature of modern complex peace operations.

In the process of operationalising the African Stand-by Force system it is thus crucial to identify which civilian dimensions should be developed alongside the military and police aspects of the stand-by force system. It may be useful to first analyse the phases and dimension of peacebuilding operations, and to then identify the various civilian actors that are utilised to fulfil these functions in peacebuilding operations.

**Peacebuilding operations**

Peacebuilding is a complex system that consists of multiple short-, medium- and long-term programmes that simultaneously address both the causes and consequences of a conflict. In the short term, peacebuilding programmes assist in stabilising the peace process and preventing a relapse into violent conflict. In the long term, peacebuilding programmes, collectively and cumulatively, address the root causes of a conflict and lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Peacebuilding systems require a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector, international institutions and agencies.
and international non-governmental organisations. These actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society. Peacebuilding starts when hostilities end, usually marked by a ceasefire or peace agreement, and typically progress through three stages, namely a stabilisation phase, a transitional phase, and a consolidation phase. Peacebuilding ends when a society can sustain its transition without external support and it is replaced by a sustainable development period.

**Peacebuilding phases**

Successful peacebuilding operations evolve through three broad phases, namely the stabilisation phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase. These phases should not be understood as clear, fixed, time-bound or having absolute boundaries. One should anticipate considerable overlap in the transition between phases, and regression is possible, in which case a specific system may switch back and forth between phases.

**The stabilisation phase**

The stabilisation phase is the period that follows immediately after the end of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and secure environment and management of the immediate consequences of the conflict through emergency humanitarian assistance programmes. The stabilisation phase will typically overlap with what the humanitarian community will refer to as the humanitarian emergency phase. During the mid to latter parts of the stabilisation phase preparations will be underway for medium-term rehabilitation and longer-term reconstruction and development actions and it is likely that various needs assessment processes will be undertaken during the stabilisation phase, often culminating in an international donor conference. Depending on the situation the stabilisation phase typically ranges from 90 days to a year.

**The transition phase**

The transition phase typically starts with the appointment of an interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to select a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transition phase typically ends with an election, implemented according to the provisions of the new constitution, after which a new fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.

The transitional phase is focused on establishing a new legitimate and sustainable socio-political order, underpinned by a functioning bureaucracy, rule of law and a sustainable socio-economic system. The humanitarian focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The transitional phase typically ranges from one to three years.

**The consolidation phase**

The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation and nation-building, boosting socio-economic reconstruction, consolidating rule of law and security sector reform and supporting development programmes across the political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding.

The peace operation, and especially the military component, is likely to draw down and eventually withdraw during the early or mid stages of the consolidation phase. There will be a transition of responsibilities from the peace operation to a peacebuilding office and the UN Country Team and internal actors. The consolidation phase typically ranges from four to ten years, but the country is likely to continue to address conflict-related consequences in its development programming for decades thereafter.

**The dimensions of peacebuilding**

Although the specific configuration of each peacebuilding system will be unique, it is possible to identify a broad peacebuilding framework that consists of the following five dimensions:

1. Security;
2. Political transition, governance and democratisation;
3. Socio-economic development;
4. Human rights, justice and reconciliation; and
5. Coordination, management and resource mobilisation.

**The security dimension**

The security dimension refers to those activities aimed at ensuring a safe and secure enabling environment for the internal and external actors. In the stabilisation phase this will include actions aimed at minimising the
opportunities for spoilers, criminals and other opportunists who thrive in these near chaotic environments. The military force will, in most cases, take control over the territories formerly controlled by the parties to the conflict and ensure freedom of movement throughout the mission area for the civilian components of the mission and humanitarian agencies. Where necessary, this may include providing security to the civilian actors in the form of armed escorts or related activities. In the transitional and consolidation phases the emphasis gradually shifts to security reform aimed at the development of appropriate, credible and professional internal security, police and defence services.

The political transition, governance and democratisation dimension

The political transition, governance and democratisation dimension involves the development of legitimate and effective political institutions, encouraging democratic participatory processes, supporting the political transition, and reforming the bureaucracy at all tiers of government. The political process includes building the capacity of political parties and civil society, facilitating a comprehensive peace agreement, facilitating the formation of an interim and/or transitional government, supporting a constitutional process and eventually supporting the electoral process. The governance process includes reforming the civil service, strengthening public sector management; reviving local governance; facilitating enabling legislation and policy frameworks and broadening the participation of civil society in the decision-making process.

The socio-economic development dimension

The socio-economic development dimension covers the relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, and reintegration of populations displaced during the conflict including refugees and internally displaced persons. This dimension needs to focus on an approach that ensures effective dynamic linkages between activities related to the provision of emergency humanitarian needs and longer-term measures for economic recovery, sustained growth and poverty reduction. Programmes to be implemented in this dimension include emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social services such as education, health, and social welfare; and enhancing economic growth and development through employment generation, trade and investment, and legal and regulatory reform.

The human rights, justice and reconciliation dimension

The human rights, justice, and reconciliation dimension is concerned with ensuring accountable judicial systems, promoting reconciliation and nation building, and enshrining human rights. Programmes include justice sector reform and establishing the rule of law; promoting national dialogue and reconciliation processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and monitoring human rights. Peacebuilding programmes within this dimension should also help to create an environment conducive to peace, justice and reconciliation; increase the involvement of women at all levels; reparations, and provide participatory processes which include vulnerable groups.

The coordination, management and resource mobilisation dimension

Coordination, management and resource mobilisation are cross-cutting functions that are critical for the successful implementation of all the dimensions and the coherence of the peacebuilding system as a whole. All these dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. No single dimension can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding system – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. The success of each individual programme in the system is a factor of the contribution that this programme makes to the achievement of the overall peacebuilding objective. It is only when the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources. Coordination is concerned with synchronising the mandates, roles and activities of the various stakeholders and actors in the peacebuilding system and achieves this through joint efforts aimed at prioritisation, sequencing and
harmonisation of programmes to meet common objectives. In this context coordination is the process that ensures that an individual programme is connected to the larger system of which it is a part and without which it cannot succeed15.

The civilian dimension of peace operations

Multi-dimensional peace operations include civilian, police and military components. While the military has a very important role to play in peacebuilding operations, security represents only one facet of the comprehensive response matrix needed to build peace. The military component’s role is to establish a safe and secure environment within which the civilian dimension can carry out the political transition, governance and democratisation; humanitarian and socio-economic development, and human rights, justice and reconciliation tasks. Not all these civilian dimensions are integrated into the peace operation. Many are carried out by UN agencies and international and local NGOs alongside the peace operation as part of the overall country strategy. It is important for our purposes to identify which civilian components should be developed as part of the African Stand-by Force system. And which civilian tasks are likely to remain outside an African peace operation, but with which such an operation would need to be able to establish synergetic linkages.

Depending on the mandate of the peace operation, the civilian component typically includes units that specialise in political affairs, legal advice, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender, child protection, electoral, DDR, public information, and mission support (finance, personnel, administration and logistics). Police officers, together with prison experts and legal advisors, deal with the rule of law aspects of the peace process, including justice sector reform.

The civilian dimension covers a broad range of areas that have been identified as critical entry points by the UN for effecting positive change in societies in the post-conflict recovery phase. The total cumulative and collective effect of the programmes undertaken by these various...
components is meant to have a system-wide impact across the conflict spectrum.

In August 2004 the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), for example, had a senior management structure consisting of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), a Deputy SRSG for Operations and Rule of Law, a Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction, a Force Commander, and the Director of Administration. The Gender Advisor Unit, the Legal Affairs Section, the Communications and Public Information Office, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) Section, the Resident Auditor, the HIV/AIDS Unit and the Political Planning and Policy Unit reported directly to the SRSG.

The Civil Affairs Section, the Corrections and Prison Advisory Service, the Human Rights and Protection Section, the Legal and Judicial System Support Division, the Civilian Police Commissioner and the Electoral Advisory Unit reported to the DSRSG for Operations and Rule of Law. The Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction had a Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation Section that was sub-divided into two units and four sector offices, namely a Resource Mobilisation and Trust Fund Programme, a Quick Impact Projects Unit and an Integrated Humanitarian Coordination and NGO Liaison Unit.

A peace operation’s humanitarian affairs function is typically focused on coordination and liaison between the peace operation and the operational humanitarian and development actors that operate alongside the peace operation. The members of the UN System are commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a resident representative (RR) who is typically the head of the UN Development Programme.
(UNDP). The RR is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN system in the country and often also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). Where there is a UN peace operation deployed, as in the example of UNMIL, it is now standard practice that one of the deputy special representatives of the secretary-general (SRSG) will be from the humanitarian or development community and have the RC/HC function. The members of the UNCT typically include the UNDP, the World Bank, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). All these organisations have their own mandates, budgets and programmes, and the RC/HC’s function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonise their policies and programmes.

Alongside the UNCT one will find a large number of international and local NGOs that actually carry out most of the programmes in the governance and democratisation; humanitarian and socio-economic development, and human rights, justice and reconciliation dimensions. Many NGOs act as implementing partners for UN agencies and they are thus part of the overall service delivery chain that stretches from the donors, through the UN agencies to the actual programmes on the ground. Other NGOs have a direct link with funding agencies or receive funds directly from the public to operate more independently. Together with others, such as the donor community, international and regional organisations and of course most importantly the local authorities and civil society, they all form part of what we can envisage as a complex peacebuilding system.

The civilian dimension of the African Stand-by Force

The AU, and before it the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), has traditionally deployed small military observer missions. The AU’s first armed peace operation, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), consisted of a brigade-sized military force, an unarmed military observer group and a civilian component that included a mission support element, political and military advisors, and a civilian head. AMIB operated alongside a civilian UN political office and various UN agencies, NGOs and donors.

The AU’s second peace operation, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS I & II), which is still ongoing, consists of military observers, a protection force, civilian police officers, a political affairs and a humanitarian affairs section, mission support and a civilian-led management structure. AMIS operates alongside a large humanitarian effort in Darfur and a UN mission focused on the peace process in southern Sudan (UNMIS).

If we want to build on these AU experiences, the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) should develop the capacity to expand the civilian dimension of its peace operations so that they are in a better position to influence a broader spectrum of elements in the peace-building systems within which they operate.
AU and REC peace operations should probably as a minimum, and depending on the mandate of each specific mission, provide for civilian components that can render the following services: political liaison and monitoring; legal advice; planning, coordination and monitoring; public information; human rights; humanitarian liaison and mission support. Depending on future mandates electoral advice and monitoring, DDR, rule of law and justice sector reform could be considered as well.

Many of these civilian components can be supported by existing expertise within the AU or RECs, whilst others will need to be specifically identified, trained and recruited. The AU and RECs should consider establishing a civilian stand-by roster populated by trained and pre-screened professionals that can be called upon to deploy to AU or REC peace operations at relatively short notice.

Such missions should also develop a dedicated capacity to coordinate their efforts with those of the other actors working in parallel to them, such as the UN agencies, donors, local and international NGOs, civil society, private sector contractors and the host government. A planning, coordination and monitoring capacity is thus a critical requirement for each peace operation.

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Endnotes

2 This definition of peacebuilding was first formulated by the author and Senzo Ngubane for an ACCORD study on Peacebuilding in Southern Africa commissioned by JICA in 2004. It was subsequently further refined by the author for NEPAD’s African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework.
3 There are various different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essential progression from violent conflict to normalisation, e.g. the Association of the U.S. Army & Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC published a Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework in 2002, in which they identify three stages, namely: the initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability.
6 The drawing down of the UN peace operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and East Timor (UNMISET), and the establishment of UN peackeeping officers in their place, are two contemporary examples.
7 Ibid, NEPAD. 2005.
12 CSIS. 2005, Making Peacebuilding Work: Reforming UN Peacekeeping Operations, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC.
17 The Norwegian-funded Training for Peace (TfP) programme (www.trainingforpeace.org) has as its principle objective the development of Africa’s civilian peace operations capacity. The TfP Programme at ACCORD is focused on civilian peacekeeping training through, amongst others, a Civilian Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CPPC) Course. See www.accord.org.za
18 One such civil-society based civilian stand-by roster is already operational: the Southern African Civilian Stand-by Roster for International Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Missions (SAFDEM). See www.safdem.org.za.
“Please if you kill my husband then there will be no one to take care of me,” she told them. “The three men, they grabbed me and raped me. I lost the child. I was in pain! I was bleeding badly, there was plenty of blood.”

Violence against women in conflict situations is commonplace but not unique as violence against women occurs in peacetime as well. However, it is the situation that women in conflict zones find themselves in that leaves them vulnerable to such atrocities. The impact of conflict on women is most severe as they are forced to experience conflict not only as future peacemakers but as victims, opponents and survivors. The changing nature of conflict no longer resembles traditional wars seeking to restore justice, and this has clearly impacted on the nature of security. Security is expected to resemble its collective nature of political, social, economic, environmental and cultural security. The distinction between military and civilian populations is unclear, thus leaving civilian populations embroiled in the conflict with women exposed to greater danger as they try to survive and seek security for their families and communities. As a result, the collective properties of security have become even more difficult to implement. In attempting to advance the collective action of security, development and human rights, sexual abuse and exploitation of women in conflict zones has therefore become accepted as an inevitable consequence of war. It is not characterised by the mass graves that can be unearthed in a few years to reveal the evidence, houses ablaze marking the destruction of whole communities or loss of a limb to reflect disability. It is a silent, often anonymous shame, where the collapse of a nation’s basic institutions sees the collision of political, economic, legal and moral legitimacy. It is difficult for security to be enjoyed without development or for development to be enjoyed without security, but where no respect for human rights exists, neither security nor development will be enjoyed.

It is within the context of such collapse and violence that the role of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeper becomes most prominent. Working together with the UN agencies, their task is to re-establish the rule of law, curb direct political violence, and promote good governance and reconciliation to help the host country recover from the trauma of conflict and violations of human rights. This the UN peacekeeper accepts consciously with constraints on both public and private life, but always treating the inhabitants of the host country with respect, consideration and courtesy. For women who have been used as a weapon of war and to the general civilian
population, the blue-helmeted peacekeepers are their symbol of trust, integrity and impartiality. However, the reality on the ground in recent years, in spite of clear codes of conduct for peacekeepers and a policy of zero tolerance of immoral acts of sexual abuse and exploitation, reflects a different picture tainting the image and reputation of the UN. The media and human rights groups have given prominence to the issue. With the UN involved in 17 peacekeeping missions across the world, eight of which are in Africa, it faces a huge challenge in preventing the incidents of abuse and exploitation in some, even all, peacekeeping missions.

This article aims to highlight the impact of conflict on the sexual abuse and exploitation of women, and UN peacekeepers as perpetrators of such violations. The article will also look at the UN’s zero tolerance policy and prevention strategies for sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers.

**Women, conflict and peacekeepers**

The reality of patriarchy pervades most conflict-ridden societies and this form of institutionalised male dominance shows high correlations between hierarchy, gender and culture as well as direct, structural and cultural violence. “Direct violence, such as rape, intimidates and represses; structural violence (poverty, inequality) institutionalizes and cultural violence (accepted norms and values) internalizes the relation.”³ As detailed in an International Committee of the Red Cross report, “in certain villages bordering conflict zones, young girls have admitted that armed men come in at night – these girls are used as sex workers – they are not allowed to protest – they are not allowed to lock their doors and the whole community tolerates this because these armed men protect the community – so it is a trade-off.”⁴

The very structures and institutions that would ordinarily be in place to protect and promote the human rights and security of these men, women and children are weakened and even destroyed in the wake of conflict. Sexual exploitation and abuse becomes a systematic tool of war, increasingly used as a strategy by warring factions to portray women as less than human, to disrupt and destabilise already vulnerable communities, and humiliate the men in these communities.⁵ Within the wider disintegration of the social and cultural fabric, women are forced to take on new roles in a society that still largely views the status of a woman in relation to her husband and marriage. In overcoming prejudices, women in conflict situations are further confronted by poverty and
economic instability and the ability to simply enjoy rights as women and as human beings is seriously diminished.

The increasing lack of economic opportunities, their status as second-class citizens, the loss of their family networks, particularly the men, through conscription, displacement, detention and even death, leaves women exposed to greater challenges of unemployment, poverty, insecurity and violence notwithstanding bereavement and the psychological scars they must still endure. For their survival, women are forced to seek new methods of coping to not only help sustain themselves but their surviving families as well. The vast majority of internally displaced persons and refugees across conflict-ridden Africa are women. Without access to employment and the reality of unequal gender relations, they do not have adequate food, shelter, money or goods, and are forced into or become easily exposed to prostitution and rape, using their bodies to acquire these items for their survival.

**Peacekeepers as perpetrators**

The recent revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers shocked and angered all as the UN has been quite clear about its zero tolerance policy and codes of conduct since allegations of sexual abuse were levelled against UN personnel in West Africa in 2002. It has been reported that some UN peacekeepers abused not only their positions of power but the integrity and professionalism of the institution by sexually exploiting and abusing women and girls, who were already victimised by war. Peacekeepers’ involvement in such acts was reported in the early 1990s in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo by media and human rights groups and again later more allegations emerged in Mozambique, Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia. But it was not until the allegations emerged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in mid-2004 that high-level officials responded to the issue to convince the inhabitants of the host country that the institution was serious in its efforts to eliminate and continue in its prevention of such conduct. Soldiers in the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) were accused of sexual abuse of minors under the age of eighteen, trading food for sex, child rape and organising a child prostitution ring in Bunia, north of the DRC, with the Office of Internal Oversight stating that payment for sexual favours ranged from two eggs to US$ 5 with abandoned and illiterate orphans. The latter clearly depicts the desperation of the victims where the power imbalance and the lack of proper employment further perpetuates the effects of poverty, serving only to increase the acts of exploitation and abuse suffered by the local women and girls.

It is true that prostitution is legal in some troop-contributing countries (TCC), and it is with great ease and acceptance that some peacekeepers, with a higher disposable income than many locals, engage in these activities. However, despite the rule of law of their country of origin, each peacekeeper undertakes to comply with the rules set out for peacekeepers and they are obliged to respect the standards set under the UN Staff Rules and Guidelines. The Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are the United Nations Peacekeepers is explicit in its policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse. Ethics and discipline are ingrained in peacekeepers and must remain with them throughout their careers, as peacekeepers are not only ambassadors for their unit, but ambassadors for their countries and the UN and represent the commitment towards ensuring security and human rights for all.

It is the primary task of UN peacekeepers, despite certain privileges and immunities, to help a country recover from the trauma of conflict knowing that the expectations of the local population will be high. However, these tasks must be conducted with awareness and respect for local customs, culture, religion, traditions and gender issues. The reality is that the traditional nature of peacekeeping operations has shifted, increasing the interaction between peacekeepers and the civilian population during peacekeeping missions. The dynamic nature and active process of human interaction seeks to reinforce the validity of the actions, whether legal or illegal, between peacekeepers and the civilian population. It has been suggested that peacekeepers have failed to understand the dangers and risks in peacekeeping operations as they have come to accept their day-to-day activities as normal. However, the stressful environments that peacekeepers are confronted with are far from normal, and an inability to understand the extent of the trauma of the local population they are tasked to protect has been the cause of problems like exploitation and abuse. The behaviour by these UN peacekeepers is a breach of the code of conduct and their moral responsibility to protect and treat the local population with respect, consideration and courtesy. The actions of a few have certainly been disappointing for the UN as there are many more peacekeepers who have sacrificed...
their lives and undertaken great feats to achieve peace and security and their reputation must not be tarnished. Instead, the UN, together with member states, is faced with a greater challenge in preventing and eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions. The goal of security, development and human rights for all must be strongly advanced and those held responsible for violating the codes of conduct must certainly be held accountable.

The United Nations and zero tolerance

Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, compared peacekeepers who committed these acts to a physician who violated the patient entrusted to his care or the lifeguard who drowned the very people in need of rescue. The misconduct of some has certainly brought into question the credibility of 80,000-odd troops in the 17 missions worldwide and the entire institution of the United Nations in its attainment of international peace and security.

In his capacity as Adviser, Prince Zeid undertook a visit to the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC from 24 October to 3 November 2004 to determine the nature and extent of the problem. In addition he consulted with Secretariat officials and representatives of troop and police-contributing countries that provided the most military personnel to complete the first comprehensive analysis of the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. During his visit to the DRC, women’s organisations highlighted to Prince Zeid that several factors contributed to sexual abuse and exploitation of women and girls, and that these were not internal to the mission but included the erosion of the social fabric of society due to conflict, extremely high levels of poverty, lack of income-generation activities and a high incidence of sexual violence against women and children during the civil conflict leading to a degree of local acceptance of violent and/or exploitative behaviour against them. However, within MONUC there was also the shared perception that the problem was being dealt with ineffectively with whistle-blowers not being protected. In drawing on his experiences and extensive consultations, Prince Zeid’s report therefore raised four main areas of recommendations to the Secretariat in a report entitled “A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (A/59/710). These four areas include the current rules on standards of conduct; the investigation process; the organisational, managerial and command responsibility; and individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability. The details of the recommendations outlined in Prince Zeid’s report are outlined below.

Rules on standards and conduct

The rules and disciplinary procedures that govern the various categories of personnel within the peacekeeping operation are not standardized. Troop-contributing countries are responsible for the conduct and discipline of their troops. Therefore the report recommends that the General Assembly should apply the rules set out in the Secretary-General’s bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) to all categories of UN peacekeeping personnel. In addition, the General Assembly should decide that those standards, as well as those set out in the publications entitled “Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets” and “We are UN Peacekeepers”, be included in each memorandum of understanding signed by the organisation with each TCC and that the TCC be obligated to ensure that they are binding on the military members of their national contingents.

The investigation process

The report recommends the establishment of a permanent professional investigative mechanism to investigate complex cases of serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse as it is clear that specialised expertise is required. Furthermore, an expert in military law, preferably a prosecutor, from the troop-contributing country concerned should participate as a member of any investigation of members of its contingent ensuring that the investigation gathers evidence in a manner that satisfies the requirements of national law so that further action can be taken if it is concluded that misconduct has occurred. It is also recommended that the memorandum of understanding require the troop-contributing country to share information that it has obtained through its contingent’s investigations into the incident. The troop-contributing countries should hold on-site courts martial, since that would facilitate access to witnesses and evidence in the peacekeeping area. Troop-contributing countries whose legislation does not permit on-site courts martial should consider reforming their legislation.

The organisational, managerial and command responsibility

Accountability of the Organisation – Extensive training,
Ivory Coast Mission officials confer following the UN's concern about alleged rights violations committed by security forces in a neighbourhood in Abidjan

an effective programme of outreach to the local community, a data collection system to track the investigation and resolution of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the establishment of a few full-time positions at Headquarters and in the field to coordinate action by missions on those issues are some measures to assist in the elimination of the sexual exploitation and abuse. Recommendations are also made for mission-specific measures to deal with the problem and measures to help make life in missions less difficult. In addition, the UN should make basic assistance available to alleged victims.

Accountability of managers and commanders – It is recommended that the measures to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse be made part of the performance goals of managers and commanders. Furthermore, managerial performance should be rated in accordance with the actual implementation of those goals. Similar recommendations are made with respect to the assessment by the Force Commander of the performance of contingent commanders and senior officers.

Individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability

Individual disciplinary accountability – It is recommended that there be strict disciplinary accountability for peacekeeping personnel who violate the organisation’s rules against sexual exploitation and abuse. The General Assembly should define acts of sexual exploitation and abuse as serious misconduct within the meaning of the Staff Regulations to emphasise that member states will not tolerate such abuse. In addition, the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to introduce expedited procedures to deal with such cases, including suspension without pay when appropriate. It is recommended that the model memorandum of understanding between the UN and troop-contributing countries provide that, if a Department of Peacekeeping Operations investigation in which they participate concludes that a member of their contingent committed an act of sexual exploitation and abuse, the country must agree to forward the case to its competent national or military authorities to be considered for prosecution in accordance with its laws and to report the results to the Secretary-General.

Individual financial accountability – It is recommended that UN peacekeeping personnel be held financially accountable for harm caused to victims as a result of their acts of sexual exploitation and abuse. In particular, the General Assembly should authorise the Secretary-General
to require DNA and other tests to establish paternity in appropriate cases so as to ensure that peacekeeping personnel can be obligated to provide child support to so-called peacekeeper babies that they father and abandon.

_Criminal accountability of military members of national contingents_ – The model memorandum of understanding should specifically provide that troop-contributing countries must ensure that their contingents are obligated to respect local law. It is noted that the model status-of-forces agreement assumes that the Secretary-General will obtain formal assurances from a troop-contributing country that it will exercise criminal jurisdiction over its troops in return for the immunity conferred upon them by the host state under the terms of the status-of-forces agreement. However, such formal assurances are no longer obtained, and these clauses should once again be inserted into the model memorandum of understanding to ensure that troop-contributing countries have a legal obligation to consider for prosecution acts of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by military members of peacekeeping missions that constitute crimes under the laws of the troop-contributing country or the host state. The model memorandum of understanding should require the troop-contributing country to report on any action taken by it on cases referred to it as a result of UN investigations in which it participated. The General Assembly is requested to decide that acceptance of such procedures constitutes a necessary condition for acceptance of an offer by a troop-contributing country to supply troops to the organisation.

_Criminal accountability of United Nations staff and experts on mission_ – The founders of the UN did not intend that the privileges and immunities of officials (staff have the status of officials) and experts on mission (civilian police and military observers have the status of experts on mission) should constitute a shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes committed in a state hosting a UN operation. However the absence of a functioning judicial system in some peacekeeping locations means that it is not feasible to waive immunity in those jurisdictions. As a result, the prosecution of staff or experts on mission for crimes committed in such a state depends on whether the state of nationality of the suspect has conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction on its courts to take such action and whether it can, in the circumstances of the case, effectively take such action. But this would tend to be the exception rather than the rule. It is recommended that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to advise him as to whether it would be feasible to draft an international instrument or use other means to ensure that UN personnel are subject to criminal prosecution for defined crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The recommendations set out in Prince Zeid’s report and the progress in implementing the special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse reflect the seriousness of the matter for the organisation. The recommendations are inter-connected and in order for them to be most effective in eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations, tremendous support and agreement will have to be garnered from senior leadership within the UN, from the peacekeeping missions as well as the troop-contributing countries. Lack of support will only feed into the already existing perception that peacekeepers will go unpunished for crimes they commit. Peacekeepers are indeed aware of the limited jurisdiction that the UN can exercise over them and are aware that the countries within which they serve have dysfunctional legal systems; therefore troop-contributing countries must take greater responsibility in enforcing legal requirements on peacekeepers.

Whilst the investigative process appears clearly defined in terms of its technical capacity, more trust needs to be built into the system by both the complainants and the victims, who are afraid to come forward. With several cases involving food, shelter and money, there is very little incentive to become involved in the investigative process as the priority is survival and sustainability and not sexual exploitation or abuse – an act that has become so commonplace for victims that its severity is diminished. Prince Zeid’s report recommends the provision of some basic assistance for victims from the UN and financial accountability on the part of the perpetrator. This message must be conveyed to victims, especially highlighting or describing the form of UN assistance that will be provided, that may include basic first-aid treatment, feedback to victims, and counselling.¹⁰ Leadership and coordination between the civilian and military components within a mission setting will be instrumental in fulfilling the objectives of the recommendations described above, but the ultimate message will be if the troop-contributing country and the UN showing that those who violate the UN standards will be punished.
Taking action towards zero tolerance

In his presentation to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno stated that since December 2004 investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been completed. Of the 152 personnel involved (32 civilians, three civilian police and 117 military), five UN staff have been dismissed, four have been cleared of allegations and nine are undergoing disciplinary processes. Seventy-seven military personnel have been repatriated or rotated home including six military commanders.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has established a task force working on guidance and tools to address sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations that include a database, worked on jointly with the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), to track and monitor allegations, investigations and follow-up actions. The missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Sudan Liberia, DRC, Burundi and Haiti have established Personnel Conduct units that provide basic induction training but also make recommendations on how to prevent, identify and respond to misconduct by all UN personnel. Premises and areas frequented by prostitutes in the field missions of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Congo are now out of bounds to all personnel.11 The step by the government of Morocco to arrest six of its soldiers accused of sexual assault on civilians in the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is certainly positive and welcome, and an example for more troop-contributing countries to follow.

These are merely some of the attempts to ensure that preventing and eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse takes some precedence in the field, and it is with continued awareness, education and training that the scope of the problem will be reduced.

Conclusion

Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that UN peacekeeping is a noble calling playing an integral part in the world’s efforts to maintain peace and security. The recommendations set out in Prince Zeid’s report are commendable but the evidence of its implementation must be consistently brought to the attention of all to highlight that the UN is making strides in its efforts to eliminate the problem. The current vigour with which missions are reacting to sexual exploitation and abuse should not dissipate once the severity of the problem decreases, instead the momentum should be upheld to ensure that sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is a thing of the past.

The increase in the number of peacekeeping personnel in areas torn apart by conflict will see the UN facing challenges each time, especially with a local population that has little left to sustain itself on. The local population, mainly women, will continue to be desperate for an income, food and shelter and will seek various ways to adapt to the environment they find themselves in. In spite of their desperation, it is the task of the UN peacekeeper to uphold the rule of law in promoting the collective nature of security and human rights for all.

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Endnotes

7 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘We are the United Nations Peacekeepers’.
The media repeatedly makes us keenly aware of the ongoing and lurking conflicts on the African continent. Reality, unfortunately, also tells us that they are not about to go away any time soon. Most of these African conflicts are very complex and internal in nature. In fact, some are actually so protracted that official state structures have totally collapsed. These realities indeed create daunting challenges for potential interveners. To obscure matters even further, most African conflicts encompass deliberate targeting of local civilians and, where present, international peacekeepers and aid personnel – a tactic which unfortunately has become a significant, and often preferred, weapon in the toolkit of many combatants. Darfur is a sad, but true, current case in point.

Yet, there is now a stronger general willingness from the international community, and from within Africa itself, to solve these conflicts in more timely, effective, and efficient ways than ever before. The number of, and allocated resources and commitment to, United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and regional economic community (REC) peace operations in Africa is increasing. Moreover, so-called “hybrid operations”, in which several intergovernmental organisations intervene in the same conflict, are also growing. NATO, the EU, and the AU, for example, are – directly and indirectly – often involved prior to, or alongside, UN missions in Africa.¹

There is also broad agreement that most of these complex African conflicts require robust and multidimensional conflict and post-conflict management approaches, covering everything from halting and containing fighting through the use of force to rebuilding entire states through extensive peacebuilding efforts. Ideally, these tasks demand integrated and complementary involvement from the military, civilian police, and other civilian mission leaders and specialists. Furthermore, these peace missions need to cooperate with external non-mission components, especially the development and humanitarian actors operating in the same peace mission areas. Hindsight from numerous less than successful peace operations conducted by the UN, the AU, RECs, or a combination thereof, as well as lessons from various reports and studies, highlights this general need for better coordination and integration among all actors engaged in complex multidimensional peace operation settings.
Yet, African governmental and intergovernmental institutions continue to lag behind in developing and deploying comprehensive peace operation capacities. The few AU- or REC-led operations conducted to date have indeed been significantly limited in terms of meeting the necessary comprehensive demands. As a natural consequence, the current multidimensional operations set up in Africa – such as UNMIL in Liberia and UNMIS in Sudan – are significantly dependent upon UN or other non-African resources.

Considering these broad realities, this article will discuss African peace operation capacities, particularly as regards comprehensive capabilities beyond the traditional military peacekeeping tools. More specifically, it will do so by looking more closely at what integrated multidimensional approaches to peace operations entail and require; the current status of African peace operation policies and capacities; some inherent traits which impede necessary institutional African capacity development; and, accordingly, what could, and should, be done in order for AU- and REC-led missions to become more comprehensive and self-sufficient.

**UN and African policies and priorities**

Assuming that multidimensional integrated peace operation approaches and capacities are required in general, and that possessing such comprehensive capacities is what Africa is striving to attain, there is a need to establish parameters for what such ‘comprehensiveness’ broadly entails. The first part of this assumption is supported by recent experiences and strategic policy studies and recommendations advocating all-encompassing UN peace operation capabilities, such as the Integrated Missions report. The second part of the assumption, related to African aims to obtain a comprehensive regional capability, is supported by officially documented African intergovernmental priorities and initiatives, including the Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union and the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee.

As the recently published Integrated Missions report states, “There is no adequate definition of an integrated mission. Nor is there an example of an integrated mission that serves as a model of what an integrated mission should be.” Yet, the report provides a broad definition of the concept; one that strongly advocates the need for comprehensive approaches, and related all-encompassing capacities, to satisfactorily perform peace operations:

> The term “integrated mission” is defined as an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.

> In defining the purpose of engagement, the UN should set out the steps for agreeing on common objectives and strategy based on the comparative advantages of the UN system.

> It should provide an organisational structure and draw from pooled resources to achieve these objectives and ensure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness for the beneficiaries.

Thus, an integrated mission should entail:

- A clearly defined purpose for UN engagement, based on a robust analysis of the situation. The nature of the situation and the development of the UN objective for engagement should determine the composition, role, scope of authority and, as applicable, the latitude for freedom of action of the UN capabilities working with, and through, the representative of the Secretary-General within clear chains of command;

- A structure to ensure effective external and internal communications, the ability to deploy needed assets and resources, and capacities to monitor, review and revise in collaboration with headquarters’ strategic and operational objectives;

- A process whereby the wider United Nations system is mobilised and collaborates, in pursuit of the goals defined by the integrated mission planning process.

Where the UN works with regional organisations, other multilateral organisations or multinational forces, a UN integrated mission should also provide the background of overall international community coordination to achieve commonly defined objectives.

Although the “integrated missions” concept predominantly focuses on the UN, it is logical that if a similar – non-UN – capacity is to be developed within a regional African context, similar criteria have to be met.
The African Union, under its *Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union*, entitled “Peaceful Africa in a Peaceful World”, prioritises and supports this logic through the following objectives and activities:

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<th>Objectives</th>
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| • Build the capacity to respond rapidly in crisis situations (conflict management and humanitarian affairs)...
| • Contribute to international peace and security
| • Ensure the intervention of the African Union in potential conflicts of limited intensity...

Furthermore, chapter 2.1 of the *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee*, which was adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (May 2003), provides for the establishment of the following generic components of a valid African multidimensional peace operation capability:

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| **Finalization and implementation of the continental architecture for the promotion of peace and security**
| • Ratification of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol;
| • Operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force, including the establishment and the operationalisation of regional stand-by brigades and contingents;

**Post-Conflict Management, Refugees and Displaced Persons**

| • Improvement of the continental institutional mechanism for humanitarian affairs management;
| • Formulation of a coordinated approach to post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping.

**Conflict Prevention**

| • Establishment of a data bank of African experts and personalities to be mobilized for conflict prevention and electoral operations. |

More specifically, paragraph 3.14 of the same policy document provides for the establishment of a civilian component of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) as follows:

3.14 Civilian Components.

The Meeting recommends that by 30 June 2005 the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component structure shown at Annex D. Qualifications should be similar to that required by the UN, while the AU roster should be linked to UN rosters.

These policy statements – clearly inspired by the UN’s recent “multidimensional integrated” approach is sound, rational, and strongly indicates a goal to build a comprehensive self-sufficient peace operation capacity in Africa. Not surprisingly, lofty policy provisions on paper are often far from reality on the ground.

**A civilian ‘capability gap’**

Several African nation-states have contributed significant numbers of blue-helmet troops to UN peace operations. In addition, RECs – mainly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through its ECOMOG Mission Observer Group (ECOMOG) operations in Western Africa – have led and conducted a few peace operations. Moreover, an AU-led African mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was recently established. The nature of these African contributions has been predominantly military, and their track records are mixed, at best. Yet, recent peace and security initiatives undertaken by the AU and RECs are indeed a welcome development. As a matter of fact, the African Stand-by Force concept described above is attracting considerable financial support from the G8 and other donors, though almost exclusively for military components.

Apart from traditional military peacekeeping tasks, like monitoring ceasefire agreements and patrolling buffer zones, peace operation mandates have increasingly broadened over the past decade. This mandate expansion, including disarming and demobilising combatants, organising elections, and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction, has warranted and necessitated the development and integration of numerous new civilian
assets and capabilities. More specifically – as repeatedly experienced through lessons from the Balkans, Africa, and reiterated in Afghanistan and Iraq – competent civilian assets are undoubtedly needed to monitor and implement crucial tasks such as political, civil, human rights, rule of law, reintegration, and election affairs.

While the actual African contribution on the ground has mainly encompassed security-related peace-enforcement assets and measures, the UN has had to take charge of most civilian peacebuilding-related functions. Indeed, if anything, the UN is currently the only international organisation capable of undertaking all-encompassing missions under one umbrella. Moreover, the UN system and international NGOs are basically the only providers and end-users of these civilian capacities. If it is true that self-sufficient integrated multidimensional peace operation capacities are needed and desired on the African continent, a closer look at its current status, beyond the policy provisions alluded to above, is essential.

Although Africa now recognises the need for civilian resources at the policy level, the AU and RECs still predominantly focus on establishing and deploying military components. The development of civilian mechanisms, such as the establishment of a database for civilian peace operation personnel, has been scheduled for the second phase of the operationalisation of the ASF. One could thus argue that by developing the military capacity first, the AU and RECs regard the establishment of a civilian capacity as complementary to the military capacity, and not as an integrated part of a multidimensional stand-by system. If this trend continues, the gap between military and civilian capacities will only increase, and thus seriously hamper African efforts to develop a truly integrated multidimensional peace operation capacity.

In most cases, the AU and RECs have employed seconded or retired military officers to man their peace operation units. This trend reinforces the institutional bias to the military aspects of peace operations. For example, military aspects in ASF documents are extensively covered, while references to civilian aspects are limited to a few general sentences. The AU and RECs would benefit from a more balanced approach to the various dimensions of complex peace operations and one way in which this can be achieved is by hiring more experienced
There are also a number of African civil society and non-governmental organisations that specialise in peace and security issues and some of them have developed capacities that could support the AU and RECs in the area of civilian peace operation knowledge, needs, and training capabilities. The AU and RECs should be encouraged to utilise these existing African resources more efficiently in their own capacity building initiatives.

One positive example is the fact that ECOWAS recently asked the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and its NGO partners to conduct several evaluations and needs assessments of West African intervention efforts. Even more significantly, it has requested extensive assistance in creating the plan and structure for its military and civilian components of the ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF). Considering that ECOWAS, by far, is the most experienced, resourced, and knowledgeable sub-regional organisation as regards peace operations, one can only imagine the need for external support in other sub-regions. Another indication that African non-governmental institutions can be useful partners, and hence could make an even more meaningful contribution to African governmental organisations in the future, is the fact that some African NGOs have been utilised quite extensively for generic, in-mission, and pre-deployment training of civilian peacekeepers by UN organisations and African missions on the continent.

The way ahead

As alluded to above, numerous studies, needs assessments and consultations with governmental officials have found that African institutional and operational civilian capacities are limited. This is true at both headquarters and mission levels. Yet, there are a few potential initiatives which could improve this capacity significantly.

The first that needs to be developed is a real awareness about civilian peace operation capability needs within intergovernmental institutions. If they continue to
and deployed. This would surely make a considerable
impact on a stand-by roster from where they can be recruited
and trained. Thus, they can be recruited
with functional knowledge; and placing them
in isolation, regardless of strength and security-related
operations in a military capacity.

A second requirement that African intergovernmental
institutions need to support is the development of a
comprehensive value chain — one that combines identifying persons with the appropriate education and background;
training them in the relevant skills and providing
them with functional knowledge; and placing them
on a stand-by roster from where they can be recruited
and deployed. This would surely make a considerable
contribution to improving the availability of suitably pre-trained and selected personnel for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Africa.

**Conclusion**

Reality has shown that applying military capability in isolation, regardless of strength and security-related
effectiveness, can only serve as a temporary “band aid”,
especially when engaged in complex African conflict
settings. What is clearly underdeveloped in Africa today are
competent civilian peacebuilding capacities to lead and complement military efforts of the
missions. Currently, the AU and RECs simply do not have the
necessary resources, experience, or knowledge to build needed
civilian peace operation capacities. Until they do, civil society
organisations can offer such a service to the AU and RECs.
In so doing, Africa’s capacity to rapidly respond to emerging crises with a more balanced,
civilian, civilian police and military response will be enhanced.

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## Endnotes

1. Examples include UN-led operations in the DRC, where NATO sent troops; and Sudan, where there is an AU operation in Darfur and NATO and the EU are contributing with military and police assets and training.

2. Practical examples include the ongoing integrated UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UN’s current efforts to ensure that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is as comprehensive and integrated as possible.

3. *The Brahimi Report*, *In Larger Freedom, the Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, the report of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, NEPAD’s draft African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework and a number of other related reports more or less advocate comprehensive and integrated peace operations approaches. Practical examples include the ongoing integrated UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN’s current efforts to ensure that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is as comprehensive and integrated as possible.


5. Ibid., pp 15-16.

6. Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union Volume 3: 2004-2007 Plan of Action, pp 18-22. (It is noted that the relevant timeline for the establishment of the ASF have since been revised to 2006.)


8. Ibid.

9. In addition, two other potential AU operations are at the planning stage for the DRC and Somalia.

10. See KAIPTC reports available at [www.kaiptc.org](http://www.kaiptc.org)

11. One example is the numerous civilian expert and civilian police in-mission and pre-deployment training courses conducted by the Institute for Security Studies and ACCORD through their Training for Peace Programme. See [www.trainingforpeace.com](http://www.trainingforpeace.com) for more details.
Can Africa claim the twenty-first century? Finding African solutions to African problems is what has marked Africa’s claim to the 21st century. One of the greatest achievements in Africa at the dawn of the new millennium was the adoption of the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union (AU). Of great significance is that the Constitutive Act underlines the links between peace, security and development. It stresses in its preamble that the scourge of conflicts in Africa forms a major impediment to the socio-economic progress of the continent and hence the need to promote peace, security and stability.

The adoption of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, in Durban, South Africa in July 2002 was a remarkable leap forward. The PSC not only provides the anchor for a continental peace and security architecture but also enables a more politically engaged African Union. It is within this framework that an innovative African approach to peacekeeping, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction should be harnessed. To do this, two fundamental questions must be answered. First, is it realistic and feasible to make post-conflict considerations an integral component of a peace agreement? Second, would a developmental peacekeeping approach be an effective response to breaking the conflict trap?

**A new approach: developmental peacekeeping**

The key aspect of a developmental peacekeeping approach would be ensuring that peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) concerns are weaved together in such a way as to ensure a continuum. Such an approach demands a very different perspective and modus operandi by both national and international actors. The Africa Human Security Initiative (AHSI) comments that,

> It also has far reaching implications for: the mandate of UN Missions; the coordination of humanitarian, development and peacekeeping assets; the phasing and priority accorded to the provision of security and post-conflict reconstruction efforts; and local ownership.

Indeed, it would require policy innovation, improvisation and flexibility coupled with political commitment to such a process. The recent peacekeeping missions in
the Great Lakes Region – Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda – provide insights into the reality of having to deal with the simultaneous needs of peace making, maintaining of security, provision and coordination of humanitarian aid, resettlements of large populations, and reconstruction of basic infrastructure and tackling of war economies.

The deployment of the AU’s first peacekeeping mission in Burundi (AMIB), for example, represented a critical moment for the development of a continent-wide security architecture in Africa. The AU took the responsibility of deploying AMIB because the UN could not authorise a peacekeeping mission in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. AMIB’s central objective was to create conditions sufficiently stable for the UN Security Council to authorise a UN intervention. AMIB essentially provided the security dimension of the UN’s political mission in Burundi, thus linking it to the UN system.

In addition to maintaining liaison between the parties and monitoring and verifying ceasefire implementation, AMIB’s other tasks were facilitating the movement of combatants towards assembly areas, providing technical assistance to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Though the mission was not mandated to protect civilians, the challenges of ground operations forced its leaders to draft rules of engagement (ROEs) to allow their troops to protect civilians in the face of imminent danger. AMIB’s intervention was hailed across the continent as a possible model for an ‘African solution to African problems’ and its lessons has been incorporated in the PCR programme in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

In Rwanda, one of the parties to the conflict decisively won the war against the regime that instigated genocide, and, therefore, the country’s PCR programme has followed the path as dictated by the winning party. Thus, Rwanda’s PCR model has put more emphasis on justice and punishment. This emphasis is mitigated by the nature of the genocide. The government’s case is that in order to stop impunity and future crimes against humanity, it is imperative that genocide perpetrators are prosecuted according to Rwandan law and international covenants.

Available instruments for the government include the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the common law courts, and the Gacaca traditional courts. The latter is, however, much more than a common law court for it includes truth-telling and forgiveness seeking.

As a PCR mechanism, this may contribute to reconciling the social fabric of society.

The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is more complicated. Various peace interventions mediated by South Africa, Zambia and Libya have been violated by all sides. The Lusaka accords of 1999, for instance, provided for the disarming of militias, deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and an Inter-Congolese dialogue, but little progress was made in implementation and all parties violated the agreement. However, the inclusion of the Inter-Congolese dialogue and power-sharing transitional government followed by all-inclusive universal suffrage elections guaranteed by an international peacekeeping force (MONUC) can be referred to as an attempt to incorporate a PCR programme in the peace process.

Though quite different in trajectory and achievement, what these three cases have in common is the lesson that a conflict-affected country must confront the challenges of a trade-off between immediate emergency needs, short-term measures necessary for rehabilitation, reconstruction of destroyed social and physical infrastructure and the medium to long-term needs for socio-economic recovery and sustainable development.

**Peace agreements at a glance**

Some have argued that the possibility of incorporating post-conflict considerations within peace agreements should be explored. The thinking behind this argument is that peace keeping intervention strategies, as manifested in the Great Lakes Region initiative, represent entrance at a conflict mitigation level. This in essence means conflict management through supporting ‘keeping peace’ and getting parties to sign agreements.

Yet, practical experience in most cases including Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Sudan shows that this is not enough. The experience from across Africa shows that there is a need to broaden the intervention strategy from peacekeeping and securing peace agreements to PCR activities that address the root causes of conflict, confidence-building measures between divided parties and people, and changing the pervasive culture of violence and conflict.

The Rwandan PCR provides a unique example on two fronts. First it provides for the establishment of the Specialised Commissions including the Commission for National Unity and National Reconciliation. Second, key socio-economic development issues of rehabilitation, repatriation and reintegration are provided for in detail
within the PCR programme. Of particular significance is the provision made in Chapter 1 Article 4 of the Protocol of Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons. Under article 4 it is stated that, in order to promote social harmony and national reconciliation, refugees who left the country more than 10 years ago should not reclaim properties, which might have been occupied by other people. The Government shall compensate them by putting land at their disposal and shall help them resettle.6

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of Sudan provides an even more interesting PCR programme. The CPA comprises various accords that were successfully reached in the course of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) negotiating process. These are two agreements, on wealth sharing and security arrangements, and four protocols – power sharing, resolution of conflicts in the three disputed areas and self-determination for the south. The CPA also includes two annexes which detail the implementation modalities of each separate agreement.7

The PCR challenge in Sudan lay in facilitating the emergence of a New Sudan paradigm that is inclusive, cross-cultural, inter-religious and pluralist. Towards this end, the CPA provides a formula for power and wealth sharing. It also recognises that the relationship between state and religion is one of the most divisive issues in the Sudan polity. Thus, it stipulates that the country's constitution will have to be rewritten during the interim period so that Islamic law does not apply to non-Muslims. Section 3.2.1 declares that, There shall be a National Government, which shall exercise such functions and pass such laws as must necessarily be exercised by a sovereign state at national level. The National Government in all its laws shall take into account the religious and cultural diversity of the Sudanese people.8

The CPA, further, provides for the creation of Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), the National DDR coordinating council (NDDRC), to be appointed by the Presidency, and two separate DDR committees, one for the north and the other for the south.9 There is no doubt that the establishment of a national unity government, the move towards a decentralised system and the latter commissions and committees are mechanisms for enhancing a PCR programme in Sudan.

Not as complex as the Sudanese CPA, but equally important in its recognition of a PCR programme, is the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (APRAB) that was signed on 28 August 2000. Comprising five protocols, the agreement’s approach revolves around the important issues of national reconciliation, and the distorted histories of the various
communities in the Burundi society.

Protocol 1 of the agreement addresses the problems of exclusion and genocide, and stipulates a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a mechanism for addressing issues of distorted histories, justice and impunity. Protocol 4, on the other hand, addresses issues of reconstruction and development and mandates the establishment of a commission on the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees, IDPs and returnees.

Reconciliation as catalytic for peace building and PCR

Viewed broadly then, a central theme that runs through the Rwanda, Burundi and the north-south Sudan peace agreements is national reconciliation and unity, not as ends in themselves but as pillars of national development. Indeed, without national unity and reconciliation it is hard to imagine how the transition from conflict to recovery can be made. For national unity and reconciliation provides the foundation for lasting peace and development.

Yet, group solidarity is an important characteristic of the African continent’s social dynamics and represents an important pillar on which national unity and reconciliation and future developments can be built. As the three cases highlight, it is in fragile societies that some of the rippest opportunities present themselves for innovative local solutions and for leaping forward into the global environment through rebuilding the nation into a much stronger, self reliant and more modern state.

This means, in effect, that the process of national unity and reconciliation must take centre stage in moving from war to peace and from nation building to recovery and sustainable development. Crucial in this movement is the international community, which will need to change the way it approaches peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. Meaningful and sustainable peace building and recovery require comprehensive longer term support, which only the international community can provide.

This support includes political and financial commitment from all parties including international development organisations. Indeed, the recent call by the UN Secretary-General for the creation of an international peace building commission (PBC) is a step in the right direction. An enhanced PBC is an important building block towards the realisation of this goal.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our argument is that the decline in inter-state conflicts and the dramatic increase in intra-state conflicts have raised the need for a broader framework of conflict intervention that transcends traditional peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping has its origins in the UN response to inter-state conflict and is predicated on the security of the state. The transformation of conflicts from inter-state to intra-state has, therefore, demanded a change from a narrow framework, designed to mitigate the impact of war, to one which acknowledges that the nature of modern conflicts is such that something more than ‘keeping the peace’ has to be done to help conflict resolution and peace-building.

The thinking is that intra-state conflicts in Africa destroy the productive human capacity and infrastructure necessary for development, which in turn disrupts production and weakens social, economic and administrative structures, and ultimately causes the collapse of the state and the peace-time economy. In turn, this reduces the ability of post-conflict societies to normalise economic relations and structures that can dismantle war economies and predatory practices.

There is, therefore, a need to develop a framework with a PCR programme that focuses not just on the disarmament of combatants and their re-integration into society, but that also focuses on dismantling war economies, which are at the root of the problem.

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Endnotes

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the respective organisations.

1 See Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace & Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU).
2 Ibid.
4 UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UN-DPKO), available at www.un.org/depts/dpko
5 Powell, 2005.
9 Ibid.
The African Union and Peace Support Operations

Our world body for peace and security, the United Nations (UN), talks of reform and a new life, 60 years after it was formed. Indeed it is our institution, for it should ideally serve our interests, including those of the African continent and its institutions such as the African Union (AU). For the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), reform is surely about improvement and enhancement to meet the strategic objectives of the world as spelt out in the UN Charter. But for the AU’s burgeoning Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) talk is more about a beginning, with little to learn from institutions, unlike its veteran equivalent in New York. This coincidence of history calls for rational discussion free of emotion as the opposite generally characterises our debate when we scrutinise the techniques and causes of violent conflict on the continent. More importantly the coincidence of UN maturity versus AU evolution directs attention to Africa as the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations on African terrain will rely on Africans’ dedication to match political aspirations with the full commitment of well prepared and professional military resources. This challenge leaves very little room to find flimsy reasons not to deploy troops whenever African brethren tears themselves apart in violent conflict. And our memory is still fresh of what happened when an international response was required in Burundi. Despite expressed commitment to form an African coalition at a time when Burundi looked to the continent’s powerful nations to assist with enforcing a shaky peace agreement, only three countries stayed the full course.

The vision of creating an African Stand-by Force (ASF) poses a significant challenge to the continent. Equal distribution of labour on peacekeeping among the nations within the framework of regional stand-by brigades will ensure that it matters less whether a certain country is a regional powerhouse. While the brigades will look after their backyards, they will be deployed outside their regional base and be augmented by units from other regions. This is the core motivation for the currently evolving process to standardise policies on doctrine, standard operational procedures (SOPs), command and control, information, training and evaluation, and logistics. Undoubtedly these are vital to the future performance of the ASF. The ASF should not ghettoise peacekeeping, as it must be a resource for all corners of the continent and be at the disposal of our world body. As a foundation of military formations, doctrine will ensure the complementarity of the continent’s armies and compel procurement policies for defence equipment to accommodate interoperability. Short of converting Africa’s war
machines into pacifists, national armed forces will retain their national defence posture hence the envisaged inter-operability will apply in some elements. Pledging of units for a regional ASF brigade does not mean reserving the entire defence force for peacekeeping duties.

Levels of operational readiness of the brigades will be key to the ASF's effectiveness. Needless to say, neither the world body nor our young AU can rely on forces whose operational state is questionable. Sixty years after its establishment, the UN will have no option but to play an instrumental stewardship role in the ASF in terms of training to guarantee acceptable levels of operational readiness for rapid deployment. The experience of the UN in its relationship with the Stand-by Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) is instructive to its relationship with the AU. The UN/AU relationship must provide answers as to whether the AU must continue to bite the bullet by deploying to make the peace thereby strengthening weak ceasefire agreements and later hand over to the world body to re-hat AU forces with blue helmets – literally preparing a soft landing for a well-resourced UN mission. Once again the Burundi experience under the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) is a lesson not to be forgotten easily. It raises the question that while the the AU and the regional initiative planted the seeds for the fruits to be soon harvested by all and sundry, does the AU have a right to its institutional pride and be accorded the recognition it deserves for its role in Burundi? And what form of recognition should this take, if at all? This line of probing may seem aggressively discomforting or even easy to dismiss as simplistic considering the complex and clearly dynamic world system. But it is central to the future relationship of the AU and UN on peacekeeping matters. Still, would Africa's radical pan-African lobby consider it alarmist to wonder whether the current African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) may follow in AMIB's footsteps? Paradoxically does AMIB present a bad or good lesson learned for the AU? The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) must consider this admittedly controversial issue as we ponder the role for an assertive AU and a reformed UN.

For fundamental understanding it is important to note that the basic reality is that the UN deploys forces to keep peace without ownership of a standing world armed force. It developed the stand-by arrangement system simply to be assured of resources at its disposal (of course depending on the likes and dislikes of the member states) when the tranquillity of human life is upset by violent conflict. The African continent became bolder and decided to establish the ASF and herein lies the dichotomy between the AU and UN. Beyond moral obligation and obvious genetic compulsion, African leaders answered the clarion call for African solutions. Indeed practitioners and theorists of peacekeeping will attest to the dividends of establishing the ASF, notwithstanding the cynicism that the idea is overly ambitious. The basic advantage is that the continent will have reliable knowledge of the general state of the armed forces in every region.

This is a significant and yet cautious break from a past of military secrecy, especially with the expectation that the AU will be able to effectively monitor and verify operational readiness. As such it will be easy to develop realistic operational plans when executing decisions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The depth of each country's commitment to AU programmes can be measured by the level of readiness of the pledged military regional ASF units. Furthermore Africa's hitherto unrecognised operational planning expertise will be elevated to its rightful place as ASF operational planning will start at the regional level, empowering African armies to determine the manner and approach of the continent's efficacy in peacekeeping. Africa will no longer simply be the source of troops but will be at the centre of determining the degree of success operationally, nurturing a culture of common approach to military professionalism in the long term. Lastly as an institution the AU will exercise a measure of ownership over the military resources pledged, if the various legal instruments enabling the existence of the ASF are anything to go by. These observations may be deemed cynically as ramblings bordering on naivety.

When violent conflict erupts, it holds no sympathy for an institution still learning to walk the rough terrain of resolving conflicts relying on armed forces as a cardinal instrument of displaying resolve to warlords. The challenges are many. Consider how the AU should respond when a country in conflict chooses which country shall deploy into their territory for peacekeeping. Further ponder the situation of a country with a superficial health system that demands that the AU not deploy soldiers who may be infected with HIV. What about countries who deem it appropriate to deploy troops under the AU but do little to prepare them operationally, paying little regard to basics such as immunisations and language proficiency? When and how should the AU confront emotive, problematic and uninformed attitudes that perpetuate the stigmatisation of soldiers infected with HIV even when they are physically able to perform in the mission area? In the age of the AIDS pandemic, will the
AU consider stocking anti-retrovirals (ARVs), since there can never be a perfectly healthy soldier in the African environment where the quality of life is far different from other parts of the world? Soldiers reflect the society from which they come. All these issues may seem peripheral, but it would be foolhardy to ignore them as these will shape AU peacekeeping policy in response to an ever-changing and unpredictable environment. The more we ponder these issues, we are bound to recognise the inescapable reality that the AU has to develop flexible techniques with less rigidity and commensurate pragmatism. The latter should not mean abdication of principle, but principle underpinned by best practice and realism. By so doing the AU’s peacekeeping operations will stretch, and not overstretch, the contours of conventional peacekeeping including concepts of operations.

Current parameters are that there must be a ceasefire, consent for peacekeeping forces to deploy, and clear willingness to implement the ceasefire – as when the truce breaks down peacekeepers run for safety à la Rwanda 1994. Admittedly peacekeeping could be a great adventure if such perfection of circumstance or condition is a reality. The AU has the responsibility to interrogate current dominant textbook approaches to concepts of operation. Military deployment for VIP protection tasks (as was the case of South Africa in Burundi) to ensure the physical safety of the main protagonists in a peace process is a case in point.

All being said, will the ASF compete with the UN standby arrangement system? The response is absolutely no. But if indeed the UN/AU relationship does not verge on competition, how much longer will the AU’s poor peacekeepers be the firefighters as they enter treacherous terrain to police shaky ceasefire agreements only to hand over to the well-endowed UN to complete the task? How well can the AU salvage institutional pride when clearly it cannot stay the course in complex operations owing to fragile structures and unpredictable funding and other resources? Yet idealism calls for a relationship of equals and complimentarity.

It is no accident that we began with direct reference to the UN’s moment of history, yet the central protagonist is the AU’s PSO Division. As it evolves, the challenges ahead are not insurmountable, as shown by Africa’s resolve to enter Sudan in their thousands to help bring peace to the country. Resources may not be a catch-all solution, but demonstrable political commitment is Africa’s trophy today. Sixty years later, will the UN’s DPKO have learned any lessons from the AU’s PSOD?

Bereng Mtimkulu is the Head of the Peace Support Operations Division at the African Union.

Endnotes

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the African Union.
Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established on 30 November 1999. MONUC is headquartered in Kinshasa, with liaison offices in Ethiopia, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia and Namibia.

Given the complexity of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the mission mandate and strength has gone through a number of revisions and updates through the years. MONUC is the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world.

Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, his son Joseph Kabila was named head of state. Various peace deals were signed thereafter making progress towards the establishment of a government of national unity in 2003, with Joseph Kabila as President.

Despite initial signs of hope and a fragile peace – including elections planned for 2006, the conflict in DRC remains violent and protracted. MONUC has maintained over 16,000 peacekeepers in the country since 1999, yet unchecked tribal, rebel, and militia fighting continues unabated in the northeastern region, drawing in neighboring states. Since the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in 2003, conflict and violence in the Ituri region has increased.

The issue of abuse and sexual exploitation of women and children by UN peacekeepers came to the fore, amidst much publicity in 2004 when such revelations centered on the widespread acts committed by MONUC personnel. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services launched investigations and the necessary action was taken against perpetrators. In addition large-scale campaigns were undertaken to reiterate the UN's zero-tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse.

MONUC: UN ORGANISATION MISSION IN THE DRC

MONUC's mandate also extends to supporting the Government of National Unity and Transition by:

- Securing and protecting transition institutions and officials until the integrated police unit is ready to take on responsibility.
- Improving security conditions for humanitarian aid and assisting in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
- Supporting operations to disarm foreign combatants and facilitating the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of disarmed foreign combatants.
- Contributing to the disarmament portion of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).
- Contributing to the successful completion of the electoral process by ensuring a secure environment for peaceful elections to take place.
- Assisting in the promotion and protection of human rights.
- Assisting with security sector reform, including integrating the national and internal defence forces.

The MONUC mandate includes:

- Monitoring the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and developing an action plan for implementation.
- Obtaining the release of prisoners of war and military captives.
- Facilitating humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring.
- Deploying mine action experts.
- Protecting civilians, UN and humanitarian personnel.
- Maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential volatility.
- Establishing necessary operational links with the UN operation in Burundi (ONUB) and with the DRC and Burundian governments.
- Seizing, collecting and disposing of arms and related weapons.
- Observing and reporting on armed groups and foreign military forces.

African Civilian Police Contributions to MONUC

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African Troop Contributions to MONUC

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MONUC STRENGTH

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</table>

MONUC BUDGET: 1 July – 31 October 2005

US$ 403.41 million (gross)

References:
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DOPO), available at: www.un.org/depts/dpko
Statistics as at 31 August 2005.
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999 established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) specifically to build the capacity of security service organisations in a country that was torn apart by political instability. As the Mission made progress, the Security Council in its resolution 1537 of 30 March 2004, announced that the UNAMSIL would retain a residual presence in Sierra Leone for an initial period of six months from 1 January 2005. The Mission’s approved budget for July 2005 to June 2006 is US$ 113.22 million to support contributions from 33 countries of which 11 are from Africa. This would ensure a seamless transition from the UNAMSIL strength of over 9,000 forces to the current 2,515 while at the same time helping the Sierra Leonian government to assume total responsibility for providing security services to its citizens. The improved internal security situation; normalisation of Guinea-Sierra Leone relations over the Yenga border dispute; and the return to democratic processes in the hostile neighbour, Liberia, influenced the decision.

UNAMSIL’s scale-down programme had three objectives, namely, transferring security responsibilities to authorities; transferring the mission’s physical assets to the Sierra Leonian government; and transferring ownership of charity projects to communities.

UNAMSIL handed over all security responsibilities to the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). As a result, authorities were given overall security primacy of the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western provinces in 2004. This illustrated growing confidence in the ability and capacity of Sierra Leonian authorities to handle any security situation in the country. In addition, UNAMSIL provided a year-long training programme intended to improve the professional conduct of members of both the SLP and RSLAF. The training covered exercises in rioting and insurgency control, basic computer skills, fingerprinting techniques, file management, human rights, community policy and training of trainers. This enabled the country’s security service organs to enhance their preparedness to deal with crisis of overwhelming proportions. This further developed the state security organs into coherent organisations capable of maintaining peace in the country with the support of UNAMSIL until its eventual pull-out.

UNAMSIL constructed police barracks throughout the country, as well as police training centres and a regional police training centre; and undertook expansion work at the Police Training School in Hastings; and then handed over to the authorities. The Mission also handed over several of its camp sites, premises, schools, hospitals, community centres and religious buildings to Sierra Leonian authorities.

Regionally, the Mission worked with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) regarding Sierra Leonian ex-combatants who would be demobilised in those countries as well as re-integration programmes of the returnees into their respective societies. Indeed, efforts have been made to establish mechanisms for cross-border and inter-mission cooperation leading to the regional meeting aimed at harmonising disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes of the three Missions, as well as formulating basic principles and guidelines for such collaborative efforts.
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003. On 1 October 2003, UNMIL deployed 15 000 military personnel to assist in its operations throughout the country, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation worldwide. As of 30 September 2005, the authorised strength stood at 15 974 uniformed personnel contributed by 59 countries of which 16 are from Africa. However, the Security Council through Resolution 1 626 of 19 September 2005 set the ceiling of authorised personnel to 15 250 military officers for the period 15 November 2005 to 31 March 2006.

UNMIL’s mandate, which guides its operations, includes implementing the ceasefire agreement by continuous liaising with the field headquarters of the warring parties; implementing disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programmes targeting all belligerent parties in collaboration with strategic partners; protecting key government installations (particularly ports and airports), civilians and United Nations staff, facilities, installations and equipment; supporting humanitarian activities; promoting human rights, particularly of returning refugees and internally displaced people in close cooperation with other strategic partners; and assisting the transitional government efforts in its democratic institutionalisation process.

The improvement in the security situation following the peace agreement resulted in the spontaneous return of over 340 000 refugees, with the support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who had fled to other West African countries. Internally displaced people numbering over 300 000 were also facilitated to return to their communities despite being compromised by continuing security concerns and a lack of basic infrastructure.

The UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section developed comprehensive plans to protect and promote human rights, including those of sexually exploited women through prostitution and economically exploited children who had worked as domestic workers. In this regard, a number of initiatives were implemented including monitoring, reporting and training of the UNMIL and Liberian personnel officers. To this end, trained human rights officers were by December 2004 deployed to 11 of Liberia’s 15 counties. Moreover, this section assisted in drafting legislation for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights.

UNMIL Gender Unit ensured that the protection of women and girls was incorporated into all aspects of UNMIL’s operations including rehabilitation and reintegration opportunities for women associated with the conflict. In addition, the Unit assisted government in developing its strategy across all Ministries with a view to specifically protecting the rights of women and girls.

While all other forms of economic sanctions were lifted, the UN Security Council maintained bans on the export of rough diamonds and timber as well as the sales or supplies of arms and related material to any recipient in Liberia other than UNMIL. UNMIL through the Security Council stressed the links between illegal exploitation of diamonds and timber, the illicit trade in these resources, and proliferation and trafficking of arms, which fuelled and exacerbated conflicts in West Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Civilian Police Contributions to UNMIL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<th>UNMIL BUDGET: July 2005 – June 2006 fiscal year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$ 760.57 million</td>
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</table>

1 This includes 250 military observers, 160 staff officers and 1 115 civilian police officers.
2 This comprises 1 694 troops, 215 military observers and 1 065 civilian police, who are assisted by 323 international civilian personnel, 733 local staff and 438 UN volunteers.

The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was established by Security Council Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004 for an initial period of 24 months as from April 2004. This followed deteriorating political instability, which posed a serious threat to international peace and security in the region. Thus, the birth of UNOCI facilitated the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the January 2003 peace agreement.

UNOCI was authorised by the Security Council to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. This Mission’s mandate was originally stipulated by resolution 1528 before subsequently being further developed by the Security Council’s resolution 1609 of June 2005. The same resolution empowered UNOCI in coordination with the French forces stationed in Cote d’Ivoire to implement its mandate including monitoring the cessation of hostilities, especially the movements of belligerent armed groups, weapons and the arms embargo within the country and/or across shared borders; implementing a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme for former combatants; protecting United Nations personnel and local civilians, installations and equipment as well as disarmament, cantonment and demobilisation sites; securing, neutralising or destroying any weapons, ammunition or any other military material surrendered by ex-combatants and militias; and facilitating the free flow of humanitarian assistance.

There are 50 countries supporting UNOCI operations, of which 20 are from Africa. The total member states’ contributions by June 2005 was 6,240 military personnel, which rose to 7,013 by 30 September 2005, of which 2,658 are contributed by Africa. By January 2006, the mission strength is projected to rise to 7,090 military personnel and up to 725 civilian police officers.

UNOCI has been urged to prioritise the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into society. It is thus imperative for the belligerent forces and the international community to declare their long-term commitment to sustainable demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants including women, children and girls conscripted in any aspect of this conflict.

UNOCI and strategic partners should consider specific rehabilitation and reintegration needs including the provision of education, job opportunities, medical support programmes, especially psychological counselling of ex-fighters and their families, and any other sustainable alternative livelihoods.

UNOCI is carrying out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilisation programmes.

UNOCI through the Security Council appealed to the Ivorian political leaders to both exercise restraint in their statements and respond positively to regional and international initiatives aimed at ensuring a peaceful and lasting resolution to the three-year conflict that has lasted for too long.

UNOCI appreciates the efforts of its strategic partners including the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and has pledged to monitor the implementation of the Pretoria Declaration regarding the disarmament of ex-combatants, dismantling of militias and preparation of elections. The mission is working together with the strategic partners to institutionalise democratic processes ranging from voter registration to the actual conduct of transparent electoral process.

**UNOCI BUDGET: July 2005 – July 2006**

US$ 386.89 million gross

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</table>
The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, Resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004, to support and implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians in restoring lasting peace and bringing about national reconciliation, as provided for under the Arusha Agreement of 2000. Initially ONUB was authorised for a six-month period and was composed of the existing African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) forces. ONUB is headquartered in Bujumbura.

The ONUB mandate includes:

- Monitoring implementation of ceasefire agreement and investigating violations.
- Carrying out disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.
- Monitoring the illegal flow of arms across national borders.
- Dismantling militias.
- Monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons.
- Creating necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- Facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
- Ensuring a secure environment for the successful completion of the electoral process.
- Protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as UN staff and facilities, and ONUB personnel.
- Providing advice and assistance to the transitional government by:
  - Monitoring borders with special attention to refugee and combatant movements.
  - Training and monitoring the police.
  - Implementing reform of the judiciary and correction system.

Following successful democratic elections in July 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) was inaugurated as president of the country. The prognosis for the future of democratic Burundi is hopeful and positive. ONUB continues to fulfil its mandate in this post-conflict and reconciliation phase in Burundi through continued efforts in:

- DDR of former combatants and the increasing numbers of returning refugees from neighbouring countries.
- Support, training and technical advice to the Burundian national police.
- Assisting in the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure coherence among various international partners providing support for the national police.
- Monitoring, documenting and reporting ongoing violence, killings and other human rights violations committed by all parties and groups.
- Requesting investigations of documented cases of extrajudicial executions.
- Expansion of the campaign against sexual violence to target a wider cross-section of Burundian society including communal authorities and traditional elders, and assistance to victims of sexual violence.

ONUB: UN MISSION IN BURUNDI


$307.69 million gross

ONUB STRENGTH

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African Civilian Police Contributions to ONUB

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African Troop Contributions to ONUB

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US$ 307.69 million gross

ONUB: UN MISSION IN BURUNDI

- Efforts, with other UN bodies, to prevent forced repatriations (Rwandan asylum-seekers).
- Monitoring ceasefire agreements by all parties.
- Regular patrols at the camps housing Congolese Banyamulenge refugees.
- Completion of the deployment of the ONUB maritime unit on Lake Tanganyika.
- Continued cooperation with MONUC (DRC mission) to fulfill mandates.

While ONUB has made significant progress in clamping down on perpetrators of violence, there have also been ongoing challenges from the Forces Nationales pour la Liberation (FNL) elements who have continued with violent attacks against the newly integrated National Defence Force of Burundi and against civilians in some parts of the country, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment of captured FNL supporters by National Defence Force personnel.

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, is expected to provide recommendations on the continued size and mandate of ONUB in post-transitional Burundi by 15 November. The recommendations will be based on an overall assessment of the situation in Burundi following the present transition period, and will include key benchmarks to guide the implementation of an eventual exit strategy for ONUB.

UNMIS: UN MISSION IN SUDAN (SOUTHERN)

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. The Mission’s mandate includes:

(a) To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) through:

- Monitoring and verifying implementation of the CPA and investigating violations;
- Liaising with bilateral donors on the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIU);
- Observing and monitoring armed groups’ movement and redeployment of forces in accordance with the CPA;
- Assisting in the establishment of the DDR programme with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction;
- Assisting the parties to the CPA in promoting understanding of the peace process through effective public information campaign, in coordination with African Union;
- Assisting the parties to the CPA in addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace-building;
- Assisting the parties to the CPA, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and assisting in the training of civilian police;
- Assisting the parties to the CPA in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability, and assisting the parties to develop and consolidate the national legal framework;
- Ensuring an adequate human rights presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;
- Providing guidance and technical assistance to the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other international actors, and supporting the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the CPA.

(b) To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions.

(c) To assist the parties to the CPA, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination.

(d) To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including IDPs, returning refugees, and women and children, in close cooperation with other UN agencies, related organisations, and non-governmental organisations.

Under this mandate, UNMIS is authorised to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces, within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the GoS, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

The mandate authorises UNMIS to have up to 10 000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel. Since its establishment, however, the mission has faced several challenges that have hampered its effectiveness.

The first challenge is the huge disparity between the authorised numbers of personnel and the actual number on the ground. The second challenge is the deep mistrust and suspicion that exists in the Sudanese society, courtesy of the long-running war. Indeed, the mission watched helplessly as violence engulfed the Sudan in August following the tragic death of SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang de Mabior. A total of 130 citizens died, hundreds were injured and property worth millions of dollars destroyed in several cities of Sudan including the national capital Khartoum, and provincial capital Juba.

The third challenge is the increasing violence, the killing of three African Union Mission (AMIS) personnel and two civilian drivers and the abduction of dozens of others in the Darfur region. And lastly, the emergence of new rebels in the eastern region has created a new war front in the country that challenges the north-south peace process.

**AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Current Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AFRICAN CIVILIAN POLICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Current Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNMIS STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Personnel</th>
<th>Total Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Current Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>1 926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observers</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>1 018</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>2 623</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNMIS BUDGET:**

1 July – 31 October 2005

US$ 315.99 million gross

**AFRICAN MILITARY OBSERVER CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Current Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) under resolution 1312 of June 2000.

The Mission’s mandate as granted by resolution 1320 of 20 September 2000 includes:

- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities;
- Assisting in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed by the parties;
- Monitoring and verifying the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998;
- Monitoring the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;
- Simultaneously, monitoring the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometres from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy;
- Monitoring the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;
- Chairing the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the United Nations and AU in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities;
- Coordinating and providing technical assistance for humanitarian mine-action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it; and
- Coordinating the Mission’s activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of the UN and other organisations in those areas.

UNMEE was established to support the 18 June 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities that was signed in Algiers, Algeria. President Bouteflika, chaired the peace talks. The UN Security Council emphasised that the agreement linked the termination of the UN peackeeping mission with the completion of the process of delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.

The parties called upon the UN, in cooperation with OAU, to establish a peacekeeping operation to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. In December 2000, the parties followed the June Agreement with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This latter agreement required the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border, a neutral Claims Commission (CC) which would decide on claims from both sides, and an independent investigation into the origins of the conflict.

Under resolution 1430 of 14 August 2002, the Security Council (SC) authorised UNMEE to continue until March 2006, and revised its mandate in order to assist the Boundary Commission in the implementation of its Delimitation Decision to include:

- Demining in key areas to support demarcation;
- Administrative and logistical support for the Field Offices of the Boundary Commission.

Initially, UNMEE comprised 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorisation. The SC later expanded UNMEE to a total of 4 200 military personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions and the necessary support units.

By 31 July 2005, UNMEE comprised 3 293 military personnel, including 3 079 troops from 38 countries and 214 military observers. There are also 241 international civilians, 245 local civilians and 66 UN volunteers.

The head of the mission, who is a Special Representative to the UN Secretary General, has overall authority and maintains close contact with government leadership in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as the Africa Union. The Mission’s offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara are supported by regional offices in Mendefera, western Eritrea, and Mekelle, northern Ethiopia, and its key activities include military activities, humanitarian work, human rights, political affairs and mine action, HIV/AIDS and administering UN volunteers.

Lately, the mission has been facing difficulties following restrictions by the Eritrean government on helicopter flights and the ban on vehicle movement in some areas inside the TSZ at night and restrictions to the main roads during the day. These impositions follow deteriorating relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, the general situation in the Mission area in which UNMEE is deployed remains militarily stable.

The restrictions have forced UNMEE to vacate smaller posts and to regroup them into bigger posts of company. Out of 40 contingent posts and 19 team sites, 18 posts and one team site have been regrouped and routine patrolling and monitoring of the TSZ is now being carried out from those regrouped posts.

The UNMEE budget for the year 2005-2006 was US$ 185.99 million gross.

**UNMEE STRONGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Current Strength</th>
<th>Total Authorised Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel incl.</td>
<td>4 200</td>
<td>3 293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>3 970</td>
<td>3 083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observers</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Personnel</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNMEE BUDGET: 1 July 2005 – 30 June 2006**

US$ 185.99 million gross

Referenced from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO), available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko
The Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – initially the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) – was established by the African Union (AU) as a monitoring mission in April 2004 following the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004 by the government of Sudan (GoS), and two rebel movements from the Darfur region, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

As an observer mission, AMIS comprised 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. At the 17th Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting in July 2004, the mission was enlarged to make provision for a staff of 3,320.

On 20 October 2004, the AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC) further enhanced AMIS to include assistance for confidence building, protection of civilian and humanitarian operations and observance of all agreements signed since the N’Djamena Agreement of 8 April. The AU has, thereafter, gradually deployed 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police.

AMIS’s first phase of deployment ended on June 2005 and on 20 May 2005 its personnel had reached a total of 2,635, comprising 452 military observers, 1,732 troops, 44 CFC members/international support staff, 413 civilian police personnel and 12 members of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF). The second phase was supposed to have ended in August 2005 with deployment of 6,171 military personnel with an appropriate civilian component including up to 1,560 civilian police. The third phase, which was supposed to be decided in September 2005, is a follow-up mission and is projected to have 12,300 personnel.

The mission is primarily charged with protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Janjaweed attacks in camps spread across Darfur, and there has been a significant improvement in the security situation where the troopers are deployed. To effectively carry out its mandate, however, the mission needs to be bolstered. The mission’s weaknesses include command and control, logistical support and operational practice.

Moreover, the mission faces several critical challenges. The first challenge is the huge disparity between the authorised numbers of personnel and the actual number on the ground. Second is the increasing violence by the Janjaweed against IDP camps and villages as happened on 28 September 2005 at the Aro Sharow IDP camp, and by the rebels against GoS and AMIS troops as happened on 8 October when SLA rebels killed three AU soldiers and two civilian drivers, and a JEM splinter faction detained 58 others.

Third is the unravelling of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which is at greater risk following the death of the Southern SPLM leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior. Indeed, the aftermath of his death saw large-scale violence that killed 130 people and injured hundreds across several cities of Sudan including the capital, Khartoum. And lastly, the deteriorating situation in Eastern Sudan has opened up another crisis with possibilities of large-scale atrocities.

The AMIS mandate includes:

- Conducting area reconnaissance to determine sector sites and priorities of operation.
- Establishing sector headquarters (HQs) and sites according to the scheme of deployment.
- Liaising with the local authorities of all parties at sector and tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) levels.
- Monitoring and verifying the activities of all parties and the security situation in and around declared safe areas.
- Monitoring and verifying the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps, through the GoS.
- Monitoring and verifying the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties.
- Monitoring and verifying hostile militia activities against the population.
- Monitoring and verifying the overall security situation within the area of responsibility (AOR).
- Monitoring and verifying attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias.
- Investigating and reporting allegations of violations of the 8 April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.
- Protecting AU personnel, equipment and installations.
- Protecting observer patrols on vehicle and helicopter deployment as required.
- Protecting civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities.
- Protecting both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities.
- Providing a visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.
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**US$ 466 million gross** [authorised strength]
Shake Hands with the Devil:
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

Author: Lt.Gen. Roméo Dallaire
Publisher: Arrow Books
ISBN 0099478935
Year: 2004
562 pages

General Roméo Dallaire has done the peacekeeping community an enormous service by painstakingly reconstructing the events that led to the Rwanda genocide and the international community’s response, or lack thereof, in the days and months that followed. The book is written from his personal experiences and painful memories as commander of the United Nations (UN) forces in Rwanda. He sheds light on the various historic and political events that built up to the genocide, including the broken political process and the apathy of the world as events unfolded in Rwanda. What sets this book apart is the insight General Dallaire provides into the workings of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and its relationship with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN headquarters in New York.

The book tries to identify the many things that went wrong in Rwanda, at all levels, and the enormous cost that failure had for the victims of the genocide, as well as for others involved. It is not a comfortable or easy read, but an important one if we want to learn from the mistakes of the past and improve some of the shortcomings of the international system General Dallaire has so painfully and personally experienced.

The core question raised is who should be held responsible for allowing the Rwanda genocide to have occurred? In the first place criminal liability lies with those that have carried out the genocide. Many responsible for planning and executing the genocide have been brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda based in Arusha, Tanzania. Some perpetrators have been sentenced, while some cases are still ongoing. Many thousands of ordinary people who participated in the genocide have also faced trial in Rwanda. The establishment of the International Criminal Court in The Hague has now institutionalised the tribunals held in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. This should make it easier in future to hold responsible those who commit such atrocious acts.

One can also make a case for the international community to be held morally accountable on the grounds of negligent omission, as evident in the failure of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to do everything in its power to prevent or stop the genocide. It is clear, with hindsight, that there was enough information at the time, and that the real problem was the lack of political will by the permanent member countries of the UNSC to act decisively to prevent or stop the genocide. What is really shocking is that those who planned and executed the genocide anticipated the meek and weak reaction from the UNSC. In the wake of the international community’s failure in Somalia it was apparent that if they killed some of the Belgian peacekeepers the most likely result would be the withdrawal of the Belgium Battalion, and the further weakening of the resolve of the UNSC to take assertive action.

It is therefore easy, with hindsight, to blame those in
positions of power, but as General Dallaire highlights, and as the UN’s own independently commissioned enquiry into Rwanda has confirmed, the Rwanda genocide was allowed to carry on for 100 days without any meaningful response by the international community because of a series of systemic failures, at all levels, in the UN.

Humanitarian intervention was a hot topic throughout the 1990s. When is it legitimate to intervene? How can we make it less arbitrary? How can we ensure that it would be obligatory in certain cases, such as, genocide, crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations, for the UNSC to intervene? The debate culminated in the Canadian Government forming an Internal Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty and the production of a formula known as ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ or R2P. In short, the Commission promoted a shift in emphasis away from the state’s right to sovereignty to a new emphasis on the responsibility of the state to protect its people. Their report argued that if a state looses the will or capacity to protect her people then the obligation shifts to the international community. Their report argued that if a state looses the will or capacity to protect her people then the obligation shifts to the international community. For a while there was hope that this new formulation could form the basis for a new consensus but the events following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S, and the intense debate around the war on terrorism and the legitimacy of the American-led intervention in Iraq has eroded any consensus that may have existed at the time.

Today, the threshold for international intervention has shifted slightly from the more risk-conscious consensus that held sway in 1994. We would like to think that the international community would, more than ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, be more willing to intervene in such crises than was the case before. Unfortunately, recent events in Monrovia, Bunia and Darfur suggest that we have not necessarily made much progress. The present conflict in Darfur is a stark reminder that we have not yet reached a point where there is a clear understanding of when the UNSC will order an intervention. It is still left in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council, whose decisions are based on their own national interests.

In 1994 Rwanda did not hold any national interest for any of the permanent members of the UNSC. In fact, the UNSC was pre-occupied with its peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Bosnia. When the genocide started in Kigali the killing and public maiming of the eighteen U.S. Rangers in the streets of Mogadishu was still fresh in the minds of those making decisions in Washington, D.C. American national interest thus demanded the opposite to what occurred in Somalia, namely that the Administration should prevent exposing their troops to physical danger in situations that did not have clear American interests at stake. Thus when the issue of Rwanda came onto the agenda, Washington D.C. was so risk-averse that its instruction to Madelaine Albright at the UN was to ‘cut and run.’ She protested and argued
instead for a small peacekeeping mission to remain. So, whilst General Dallaire was waiting for the cavalry to come riding over the hill, the debate in New York was whether to close down the mission completely, or whether to leave a small token force in place. The only member of the UNSC to pose a convincing argument to the contrary was the Nigerian Permanent Representative who spoke on behalf of the African block.

When the cost of changing the fundamental structure of a system, such as the composition of the Security Council, is too high we tend to shift our focus to technical solutions. It is thus not surprising that most attention has since gone into various proposals and reports aimed at improving the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations. Of these the most prominent was the Brahimi Report that recommended, amongst others, that the UN should not send peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep, and that when peacekeepers are deployed they should be equipped with a mandate and resources that will enable them to deal with all contingencies. As a result, most new peacekeeping operations are deployed with elements of a chapter VII mandate that gives them more authority to use force than was the case before.

However, the fundamental dynamics of peacekeeping has not changed from the essential truths and paradoxes that General Dallaire had to deal with in Rwanda. He highlights that the moment a peacekeeping mission begins using force it loses its impartiality in the eyes of those against whom force is being applied. Once a peacekeeping mission loses its impartiality it also loses its very reason for existence. The complexity of peacekeeping is evident in the paradox that a more robust mandate and peacekeeping force is a very effective deterrent as long as it does not actually have to use the force at its disposal. General Dallaire found himself caught between the reality of a fast changing situation and the limitations of his mandate and resources.

A 1997 Carnegie Commission study on conflict prevention cites the example of Rwanda to make the case for prevention. General Dallaire estimated that a deployment of 5000 UN troops by April 1994 would have been sufficient to halt the genocide. The Carnegie Commission calculated that a 5000 strong peacekeeping mission would have cost the international community approximately US$ 500 million per year and the total cost would thus have been in the range of US$ 1.3 million. In the end, the overall assistance to Rwanda in the wake of the genocide had a price tag of approximately US$ 4.5 billion. The need to improve abilities to present cost estimates of this nature to politicians and other decision-makers to convince them of the cost of inaction, is very apparent.

Through his personal story, General Dallaire has contributed enormously to improving our understanding of the limitations of the international system. At the same time he shows how every individual can make a difference, regardless of the larger dynamics that exist. The story of Captain Mbye is especially inspiring. Captain Mbye was an unarmed Military Observer from Senegal who, in defiance of the limitations placed on him by the mandate of the mission, personally saved more than a thousand Rwandans before succumbing in the turmoil himself. There is no statue or memorial for Captain Mbye in Senegal, Rwanda or at the UN Headquarters in New York. Yet, so much more about respect, responsibilities, courage and honour lives on through his story and others, as told by General Dallaire.

Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow at ACCORD and an advisor to the Training for Peace (TfP) programme.