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**Markets and market access for  
African exports: Past, present  
and future directions**

**by**

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## **1. African traditional and non-traditional exports**

A 1997 report to the UN Secretary General indicates that economic growth in Africa slowed to 3% from 4.4% in 1996 (UN, 1997). Declines in agricultural production and exports, as well as in oil prices, contributed to the slower growth. Given the significance of agriculture, low output also adversely affected income, consumption and the growth in the processing sectors. In some countries, political instability or civil strife negatively affected economic growth in 1997. Growth in Africa could slow even more if export growth is held back by the currency crisis and economic slowdown in East Asia, which has become the fastest-growing trading partner for some sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.


In recent years, unlike the period of the mid 1980s, SSA countries' exports have begun to show some signs of recovery. This may be attributed partly to the structural adjustment and trade liberalization measures adopted since the early 1980s. For example, Africa's exports grew by 12% in 1995 in value terms, a considerable improvement compared with the 3% of the previous year and the preceding three years of negative growth in value. However, Africa's export growth continued to lag behind world trade in both value and volume terms. Yeats and Ng (1996) in a study of 30 products exported by SSA countries over the period 1962–1964 and 1991–1993 have shown that while world trade in all non-fuel goods increased at a compound rate of 11.8%, the corresponding growth rate for 30 African products was more than six and half percentage points lower. Based on the available statistics, countries with growth in exports exceeding 20% included Angola, Central African Republic, Kenya, Reunion, Tanzania and Togo (WTO, 1996).

As can be observed in Appendix Table A1, merchandise exports for a number of SSA countries experienced fluctuations over the period 1984 to 1995. Except for the period between 1991 and 1995, the trend for the majority of SSA countries has generally been upwards.

Notable exceptions are Democratic Republic of Congo (DRM—ex-Zaire), where earnings declined from US\$2.5 billion in 1988 to \$1.6 billion in 1995; Nigeria, where earnings dropped from US\$1.6 billion in 1990 to \$1.1 billion in 1995; and South Africa, where earnings fell from \$2.4 billion in 1990 to \$1.9 billion in 1995.

The countries that experienced the highest rate of growth in export earnings in the late 1980s and early 1990s are those that suffered the worst decline in earnings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These countries include Ghana, where earnings increased from \$808 million in 1989 to US\$1.4 billion in 1995; Madagascar, where earning increased from \$314 million in 1990 to \$639 million in 1995; and Tanzania, where earnings increased from US\$290 million in 1986 to \$639 million in 1995 (Figure 2.1).


**Figure 2.1: Merchandise exports of selected countries, 1980–1995 (000's US dollars)**



Source: Appendix Table A1.

Agricultural raw material exports experienced much higher degrees of fluctuation in export earnings than did mineral and oil exports. Figure 2.2 shows that the shares of SSA countries in world exports generally declined in all categories of resource-based exports for the period 1970–1995. As a percentage of total world exports, SSA's share dropped from 0.8% in 1970 to about 0.3% in 1995 (Figure 2.3; see also Appendix Table A2).

**Figure 2.3: Shares of sub-Saharan African countries in world exports of primary commodities, 1970–1995 (percentages)**



Source: Appendix Table A2.

Table 2.1 indicates that most SSA countries are essentially primary commodity exporters, where the share of primary commodity exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports has remained high—in most countries, except Mauritius and Zimbabwe, above 70%. However, Kenya and Seychelles experienced significant improvements in export diversification, with the share of primary commodity exports in total merchandise exports declining from 94% in 1980 to 71% in 1993 for Kenya and from 97% to 71% for Seychelles. Countries where the share of primary commodities in total exports remained low in 1993 include Botswana (13%), Lesotho (14%) and Swaziland (43%).

**Table 2.1: Share of primary commodities in all merchandise trade values**

Region (Country or area)	Exports of primary commodities as a percent of total exports							
	(A) Excluding fuels				(B) Including fuels			
	1975	1980	1990	1993	1975	1980	1990	1993
Central Africa								
Cameroon	89.2	63.3	44.6	44.9	89.5	92.6	95.6	86.1
Cent. African Rep	83.5	84.5	68.2	46.3	83.6	84.5	68.2	46.3
Gabon	15.4	18.9	26.4	24.8	94.9	99.2	99	99
Zaire	98	60.5	83.6	66.5	99	72.8	99	99
Eastern Africa								
Ethiopia	83.6	92.3	85.7	95.6	86.6	99.7	91.7	96.5
Kenya	53	58.6	72.9	59.5	69.7	93.8	85.9	70.9
Mozambique	82.2	75.1	84	91.8	93.4	80	85.1	93.4
Uganda	99	98.2	99	99	99	99	99	99
Tanzania	79.4	85.4	73.7	77.4	84.4	90.2	73.9	77.9
Southern Africa								
Angola	31.7	10	0.3	0.5	96	88.7	92.9	76.2
Botswana	64	37.5	14.5	13.1	64	37.5	14.5	13.1
Lesotho	77.7	27.5	22.1	14	77.7	27.5	22.1	14
Malawi	88.2	86	91.6	88.1	88.3	86.2	91.6	88.1
Swaziland	80	79	83.3	43.2	80	79	83.3	43.2
Zimbabwe	71.7	51.9	57.3	63.3	73.1	53.2	58	63.7
Western Africa								
Côte d'Ivoire	82	84.1	64.3	76.9	87.6	86.3	78.2	98.1
Ghana	86	87.6	93.6	73.6	88.5	87.9	97.7	80
Nigeria	6.3	2	2.3	2.5	99	95.5	95.7	89.3
Senegal	82.7	65.7	68.7	37.3	89.7	84.5	81.7	48.3
Island States								
Madagascar	87.3	91.3	78.1	82.3	95.9	97.1	78.6	82.7
Mauritius	87.6	71.4	33.2	31.4	87.6	71.4	34.6	31.4
Seychelles	33.1	23.9	24.6	32	99	96.9	68.2	71.1

Source: UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 1995, United Nations.

Not only do most SSA countries depend on primary commodity exports, but export earnings are also highly concentrated in a few primary products. Table 2.2 shows, for example, that some countries depend on three commodities for as much as 90% of their total merchandise exports and for most of the countries the figure is above 50%. Countries with very high export concentration include Angola, Uganda, Seychelles, Nigeria, Zambia and Gabon. All except Uganda are mineral and oil exporters. African countries' exports are also concentrated in a few markets, mainly the European Union, North America and Japan. As stressed below, this has implications for efforts to increase both product and market diversification.

**Table 2.2: Share of three leading commodities in total exports**

	Export dependence on three leading commodities		Dependence on three non-oil commodities		Three leading commodities in 1990-92
	avg 75-77	avg 90-92	avg 75-77	avg 90-92	
Central Africa					
Cameroon	69.1	81	69.1	25.8	Fuels - Woods - Coffee
C. African Rep.	69.9	55.7	69.9	55.7	Wood non coniferous - Live animals - Cotton
Gabon	91	99	15.3	19.2	Fuels - Manganese ore - Wood
Zaire	83.5	81.5	81.6	59.5	Copper - Fuels - Coffee
Eastern Africa					
Ethiopia	70.5	79	70.5	78	Coffee - Hides & skins - Fuels
Kenya	60.5	56	44.9	45.6	Tea - Coffee - Fuels
Mozambique	48	58.1	46.3	58.1	Fishery commodities - Nuts - Cotton
Uganda	97.9	81.5	97.9	81.5	Coffee - Cotton - Sesame seeds
Tanzania	52.5	43.5	52.5	43.5	Cotton - Coffee - Tea
Southern Africa					
Angola	99	94.5	24.9	0.3	Fuels - Fishery commodities - coffee
Botswana	61.9	10.4	61.9	10.4	Nickel intermediate products - Bovine meat fresh - Copper ore
Lesotho	48.3	11.1	48.3	11.1	Wool - Cereals preparations - Wheat & wheat flour
Malawi	78.2	88.8	78.2	88.8	Tobacco - Tea - Sugar
Swaziland	47.2	33.3	47.2	33.3	Sugar - Fuels - Fishery commodities
Zambia	93.2	99	93.2	99	Copper metal - Sugar - Groundnuts
Zimbabwe	25.2	53	25.2	53	Tobacco - Nickel refined - Cotton
Western Africa					
Côte d'Ivoire	75.7	55	75.7	48.1	Cocoa & products - Fuels - Wood
Ghana	83.1	67.4	83.1	67.4	Cocoa & products - Aluminum - Wood
Nigeria	97.5	99	4.9	1.8	Fuels - Cocoa & products - Natural rubber
Senegal	59.5	49.3	59.5	43.8	Fishery commodities - Fuels - Groundnut oil
Island States					
Madagascar	59.5	43.4	59.5	43.4	Vanilla - Fishery commodities - Coffee
Mauritius	79.6	32.3	79.6	31.2	Sugar - Fuels - Fishery commodities
Seychelles	99	78.6	30.4	30.6	Fuels - Fishery commodities - Copra

Source: UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook, United Nations (1995).



Yeats and Ng (1996) have shown that for a combined total of 30 African export products, covering the period 1962–1964 and 1991–1993 Africa’s market share declined by over 11 percentage points (from 20.8% to 9.7%), which implies annual trade losses for the region of just under \$11 billion—equivalent to the total development assistance of \$10.9 billion in 1991. Which countries or groups of countries were gaining market shares as SSA’s share was declining? Primarily the OECD countries. In addition, market shares for middle income Asia rose by over 4 percentage points, while those for non-OECD Europe and central Asia increased by almost the same amount. Latin America’s trade shares, in contrast, declined but by only about one-third as much as the decline in Africa’s share. The key point to note is that no other country group has experienced a loss of market share—erosion of competitive position—that comes close to matching that of Africa.


Over the decade of the 1980s, for example, there were rapid declines in the share of world exports for both Ghana and Zambia. Ghana’s merchandise export earnings declined from \$1.1 billion in 1980 to \$560 million in 1984, recovered to \$890 million by 1990 and have continued on an upward trend since 1990, primarily because of structural adjustment and trade liberalization measures under way since the early 1980s. Zambia, on the other hand, saw its merchandise export earnings drop from \$1.46 billion in 1980 to \$550 million in 1985 because of a very sharp drop in world copper prices (the main export product). The trend, though fluctuating, has been reversed since 1987. Rates of growth of GDP and per capita GNP have declined sharply in both countries. Is this purely a case of lack of market access, of a terms of trade shock, of domestic supply constraints or a combination of all three factors? We return to this question below.

Sekkat and Varoudakis (1998) and Elbadawi (1998) have shown that the evolution of the share of manufacturing in total exports has remained extremely low in most SSA countries, although some countries have made considerable progress. The most remarkable examples are Côte d’Ivoire and Mali in the Franc Zone, and Ghana, Madagascar and Tanzania (during the 1990s) in the non Franc Zone, each of which achieved a steady increase in the export share of manufacturing (Figure 2.3; see also Appendix Table A3).

Mauritius has been particularly successful in promoting manufactured exports, mainly through a reliance on export processing zones (EPZ). Starting in the 1970s, with a share of manufactures in exports below that of Kenya, and with a share of manufacturing value added in GDP lower than Senegal’s, manufactured exports in the first half of the 1990s reached more than two-thirds of Mauritius’ total exports (Elbadawi, 1998). As for the relative importance of non-traditional exports as an indicator of export diversification, the SSA countries still lag behind the fast growing economies of East Asia, but are comparable to Latin America. For SSA, the share of non-traditional exports in GDP in 1994/95 was 3.8% compared with 9.2% for East Asia and 3.6% for Latin America. The best performers have been South Africa (5.7%), Tanzania (8.8%) and Zimbabwe (7.1%) (Figure 2.1; also Appendix Table A1).

A broad overview of historical trends is very helpful in “setting the scene” and putting the analysis in perspective—in other words, for explaining why the issues being examined are important. The next stage in developing policy relevant analysis is to move to a more detailed and disaggregated examination of the current situation.

**Figure 2.3: Share of manufacturing exports in total exports**



Source: Appendix Table A3.

### Leading current exports from 20 African countries

One of the principal themes of this paper is that the analysis of a country's traditional and non-traditional exports and export markets must be done at a *highly* disaggregated level. This is true because—for most purposes—data on market access barriers are meaningful only at a highly disaggregated level. Granted, for general trade policy discussions it is useful to know, for example, that the European Union average tariff on fish and fish products is far above the average for all EU goods. But no country or firm actually exports “fish and fish products”. They export one or more very narrowly defined categories that vary by type of fish and degree of processing and, similarly, the tariffs and non-tariff barriers they encounter can vary enormously within what appears to the non-specialist to be a more or less homogeneous product category. (One of the main reasons why national tariff nomenclature is so highly disaggregated—often 15,000 to 20,000 separate items—is the desire of governments to give special protection to certain firms producing particular narrowly defined products.)

### ***Basic data***

The most disaggregated internationally comparable trade data are six-digit Harmonized System (HS) data taken from the UN COMTRADE database (HS trade data are better than SITC trade data because trade barrier data are available in HS). At the time of writing, the latest year for which complete data were available was 1995. Our analysis is based on data for the 20 SSA countries listed in Table 2.3 (actually 19 countries plus SACU). This is a reasonable cross section of countries: 9 of the 20 are classified by the UN as least developed countries (LDCs) and 2—Ethiopia and the Seychelles—are not yet members.

**Table 2.3: The 20 exporters in our sample: Merchandise “exports” in 1995 to 23 countries**

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<b>Total (millions \$)</b>	<b>Country<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Leading six-digit categories<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>Six-digit categories in excess of \$1 million</b>
17,976	SACU	33	787
12,129	Nigeria	2	66
3,155	Côte d’Ivoire	9	90
2,611	Gabon	4	20
1,619	Cameroon	9	42
<i>1,490</i>			
<i>1,490</i>	Congo, D.R.	5	40
<i>1,477</i>	Mauritius	25	100
1,459	Zimbabwe	26	125
1,340	Ghana	11	58
1,181	Kenya	20	71
875	<i>Zambia</i>	3	27
563	<i>Madagascar</i>	15	55
563	<i>Tanzania</i>	30	55
525	<i>Uganda</i>	2	15
395	<i>Ethiopia</i>	4	24
381	Senegal	14	35
362	<i>Malawi</i>	4	27
225	<i>Mozambique</i>	8	22
139	Central African Rep.	6	7
44	Seychelles	7	5

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<sup>a</sup>Italics indicate a country the UN classifies as a least developed country.

<sup>b</sup> Six-digit HS categories that account for 3% or more of total merchandise “exports” to the 23 country aggregate, except in cases in which the “3% and above categories” do not account for at least 75% of total merchandise “exports” to the aggregate. In which case the largest categories accounting for less than 3% were added in descending order until the 75% figure was reached.

Sources: UN COMTRADE.

Our “export” data are actually partner import data from an aggregate of 23 major importing countries that in 1995 purchased well over 90% of world exports of goods and services. The reason for choosing this particular group of partner countries is that it is the one used in the 1997 WTO study from which we take much of our data on trade barriers confronting Africa’s exports (the 23 countries, which are listed in Appendix Table A4, include all of the OECD countries except Mexico, plus Poland and 13 of the larger traders among the developing countries; it also includes SACU, one of our 20 African exporters).<sup>1</sup>

### ***Current leading exports***

The first step was to identify the leading six-digit export product groups for each of our 20 countries (see the note to Table 2.3 for the definition of “leading export”). For the 20 countries as a whole, there are a total of 136 leading exports.<sup>2</sup>

If there were a complete overlap of product groups among the 20 countries’ leading exports, there would be a total of 33 six-digit product groups (the number for SACU), whereas if there were zero overlap there would be 237 different leading exports (the sum of the figures in column 3). Our figure of 136 leading exports lies almost exactly half way between those two extremes. *The substantial diversity of export structures among the 20 countries is evident from the fact that two-thirds (91) of the 136 leading exports appear on only one of the 20 lists of leading exports.*

### ***Current export diversification***

“Export diversity” is not only a relative concept, but also a subjective one. One criterion might be based on the presumption that the number of leading six-digit export groups should be positively related to the level of total exports (in other words, that larger traders are expected to have more diversified export structures). If SACU is excluded, the mean and median values of the figures in column three of Table 2.3 are 10.7 and 9, respectively (with SACU they are 11.8 and 8.5, respectively). By this criterion, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Ghana are the “typical” countries *among the 20 in our sample*. Four countries exhibit well above average *relative* export diversity—Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Senegal. (Considering the difference in the size of total exports, it could be said that SACU’s exports are much less diversified than the exports of these four countries.) At the other end of the spectrum, six countries exhibit well below average export diversity—Nigeria, Gabon, DRC, Zambia, Uganda and Ethiopia.

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<sup>1</sup>WTO (1997) was prepared for the WTO’s high-level meeting on integrated initiatives for least-developed countries’ trade development, held in October 1997.

<sup>2</sup>“Own” export data were collected for six of the 20 African countries in Table 2.3 that are presumed to have above average quality trade statistics. Those six-digit HS data were for exports to all destinations (rather than to our 23-country aggregate) and were f.o.b., whereas our partner data are c.i.f. Even allowing for these differences (which tend to offset one another), the discrepancies between the own data and partner data were often very large. For example, the ratio of own data to partner data was in the 0.68–0.99 range for only 26 (30%) of the 86 leading six-digit categories; for 21 categories it had a value below 0.34, while 7 categories had a ratio in excess of 1.34. The 136 products, which are listed in Appendix Table A5, include the category 9999AA, “Commodities not specified according to kind”. With respect to the HS nomenclature, it is important to keep in mind that the six-digit product groups vary enormously in terms of the value of world trade they cover. Coffee (not roasted, not decaf) and bananas each have their own six-digit category; so do cashew nuts, avocados, and brassieres (and parts thereof).

The picture changes, but not dramatically, if the criterion is the number of six-digit product groups for which exports exceed \$1 million (again we might expect a positive correlation with the size of total exports). If SACU is excluded, the mean value of the figures in column four of Table 2.3 is 46.5 (83.6 with SACU) and the median is 55. Nigeria moves much closer to the norm for the 20 countries, Côte d'Ivoire improves, Zimbabwe and Mauritius continue to exhibit well above average export diversity, and SACU achieves an export diversity much more in line with the total value of its merchandise exports. The typical countries among our 20 by this criterion are Cameroon, Madagascar, Tanzania and Ghana.

At the two-digit level, the HS classification covering the entire range of goods is divided into 21 broad "sections" (product groups). Yet another measure of export diversity (not shown in Table 2.3) is how many of those 21 broad product groups are represented in each country's list of leading six-digit exports—in other words, to what extent do a country's leading six-digit export categories range across the expanse of those 21 broad product groups? Once again, Nigeria and SACU define the two extremes (1 and 11, respectively). But there is a narrowing of the variation among the countries. For example, by this measure the merchandise exports of Senegal and Mozambique are as diversified as those of Mauritius and Kenya (7 out of 21 sections represented) and only marginally less so than those of Tanzania (8) and Zimbabwe (9).

### ***Per capita exports and income***

Table 2.4 provides figures on per capita exports of goods *and services*, based on the countries' own statistics for exports to *all destinations*, and purchasing-power-parity-based per capita income estimates for the 20 African countries. The export figures vary enormously, from an estimated \$9 per person in Mozambique to \$3,743 for the Seychelles, with a median value of \$98. While the three countries with the highest per capita exports—the Seychelles, Gabon and Mauritius—have the three smallest populations among the 20 countries, it is also the case that South Africa (SACU) has the fourth highest exports per capita and the fourth largest population among the 20 countries.

**Table 2.4: Per capita trade and GNP (US dollars)**

Country	1995 exports of goods and services <sup>a</sup>	1996 PPP-based GNP	Country	1995 exports of goods and services	1996 PPP-based GNP
Seychelles	3,734	—	Nigeria	96	870
Gabon	2,647	6,300	Ghana	88	1,790
Mauritius	2,101	9,000	Central Afr. Rep	57	1,430
SACU <sup>b</sup>	760	7,450	Malawi	45	690
Côte d'Ivoire	314	1,580	Tanzania	39	—
Zimbabwe	217	2,200	Madagascar	38	900
Cameroon	177	1,760	Congo, D.R.	32 <sup>c</sup>	790
Senegal	138	1,650	Uganda	23 <sup>c</sup>	1,030
Zambia	128	860	Ethiopia	13	500
Kenya	99	1,130	Mozambique	9 <sup>c</sup>	500

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> Based on each country's own export data, except for the DRC, for which the import figure of the 23-country aggregate was used. Services data are for 1995 except that in five instances it was necessary to use 1994 data, in two instances 1993 data and in one instance 1991 data

<sup>b</sup> South Africa only.

<sup>c</sup> Exports of goods (merchandise) only.

PPP = purchasing power parity

Sources: UN COMTRADE, TWO Annual Report 1997 II); UN World Population, 1996; World Bank World Development Indicators, 1998.

Service exports, presumably mainly earnings from tourism in most instances, are exceptionally important for the Seychelles (four times larger than exports of goods), and play an important role in a number of the other countries. Estimates of the share of services in total exports of goods and services range from 32% to 46% for (in ascending order) Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ethiopia and Tanzania.

A comparison of the per capita export and income estimates in Table 2.4—where the countries are ranked in descending order of exports—confirms the generally positive relationship of the two series. Using the 20 countries as the point of comparison, Zambia's per capita exports are larger than would be expected from its per capita income, while Ghana, the Central African Republic and—especially—Uganda have lower levels of exports per capita than would be expected.

### *The most important exports*

As our intention to present reasonably detailed data on trade barriers facing Africa's key exports, 136 products is an unwieldy number. Using a dual "size/frequency" criterion, we have narrowed the list of current leading exports to the "most important exports" for our group of 20 countries.

Appendix Table A6 lists those current leading exports that meet either of two criteria: Part A lists the 25 most important on the basis of export value for the aggregate of the 20 countries, while Part B lists the 25 that appear most frequently on the 20 countries' individual lists of leading exports (products with the same frequency were ranked in descending order of the value of exports).<sup>3</sup>

The 17 six-digit products that appear on *both* the value and frequency lists—our definition of the most important—are shown in Table 2.5. There are no surprises in the table. All of the products are either agricultural (including timber) or mineral based, and range from unprocessed to partially processed. Noticeable differences between the two rankings include cotton (fifteenth in terms of aggregate value, but second in terms of the frequency with which it is a leading export), tuna (sixteenth in value versus fifth in frequency) and tea (twenty-fourth in value versus sixth in frequency).

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<sup>3</sup>The list excludes category 9999AA "commodities not specified according to kind".



**Table 2.5: The most important merchandise exports of our group of 20 African countries**

090111 (2nd, 12)	Coffee, not roasted not decaffeinated	440722 (19th, 4)	Lumber, okoume, obech, sapelli, sipo, acajou, makore, etc.
090240 (24th, 5)	Tea, black (fermented or partly) in Pkgs>3kg	520100 (15th, 7)	Cotton, not carded or combed
160414 (16th, 6)	Tuna, skipjack, bonito, prepared/perserved Not mince	710210 (11th, 3)	Diamonds, unsorted
170111 (10th, 6)	Raw sugar cane	710231 (9th, 6)	Diamond (jewellery) unworked or simply sawn, cleaved
180100 (4th, 4)	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	720239 (9th, 6)	Diamonds (jewellery) worked, but not mounted or set
240120 (13th, 3)	Tobacco, unmg'd stemmed or stripped	720241 (8th, 2)	Ferro-chromium >4% carbon
270900 (1st, 4)	Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals, crude	740311 (12th, 3)	Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought
440334 (17th, 3)	Logs: okoume, obeche, sapelli, sipo, acajou d' Afrique, etc.	810510 (22nd, 3)	Cobalt, unwrought, matte, waste or scrap, powders
440399	Logs, non-coniferous, nes		

Notes: See text for definition of “most important.” The figures in parentheses indicate, respectively, the ranking of each product, among all 136 products, in terms of value; and the number of times each product appears on the list of leading products of each of the 20 countries. For example, the first product—090111—ranks second out of 136 in terms of the total value of exports of the 20 countries, and it appears on the list of leading exports of 12 of our 20 countries.

Source: Compiled by authors.

### Potentially important non-traditional exports

Postwar experience suggests that (for most countries) a heavy reliance on exports of primary commodities significantly reduces the contribution trade can make to economic development. Thus when analysts are working with countries whose current exports are very heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of primary products, and whose export

performance over the past decade or so has been conspicuously disappointing, it is not surprising that there is a great deal of interest in exploring the potential for developing “non-traditional exports”. When the exports of a country or group of countries are very heavily concentrated on certain foreign markets—as most of Africa’s exports are on the EU market—it is also worthwhile to explore the options for expanding traditional exports to non-traditional foreign markets.

Exploring the prospects for, and the policies needed to promote, non-traditional exports is an unusually challenging topic. Because of space and time limitations, the treatment in this paper is limited to a few general observations related to domestic conditions that create a favourable “climate” for export diversification. Work on non-traditional exports that goes beyond an in-depth analysis of such conditions—that is, that moves on to an examination of the prospects of specific products—inevitably involves a large element of attempting to “pick winners”. It may be too strong to say that experience has completely discredited such efforts, but there certainly is no empirical basis for claiming that this is a promising route to developing internationally competitive exports.

A WIDER project on Growth, External Sector and the Role of Non-Traditional Exports in SSA (headed by Gerry Helleiner) has already produced material that is very useful in getting started on this topic.<sup>4</sup> Among the insights in Helleiner (1997) are:

- SSA’s endowments of relatively abundant natural resources and relatively scarce human skills appear to offer little hope of developing significant manufacturing for export in the near future, except in some unskilled labour intensive primary processing activities. (p. 4)
- SSA’s best strategic course is almost certainly consciously to build upon its primary production base; in most cases, this means smallholder agriculture. (p. 7)
- Trade theory and policy have unduly dominated development discussion. In actual fact, trade typically *follows* developments in publicly provided infrastructure, other malleable endowments and prior *private investment decisions*. To the degree that private investments are influenced by governments at all, they are usually, in large part, the product of other (non-trade) kinds of policies. (p. 6, emphasis in the original)
- *Generalized* encouragement of exports, particularly via “sound” exchange rate management, meets with widespread approval in Africa today. On the other hand, more *directed* and *selective* policies to meet expansion objectives are more controversial. Further, the building of appropriate *capabilities* and *institutions*, where action is much more difficult to quantify, may be as critical to success as incentive structures (which seem to have proven insufficient in recent African experience). (p. 8, emphasis in the original)<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>See Helleiner (1997) and Frazer and Helleiner (1997). UNCTAD has also done considerable work on the issue of non-traditional exports.

<sup>5</sup>The work for which Douglass North received the Nobel Prize in economics could be very useful on the last point. See in particular North (1990).

- The credibility, basically the predictability, of African governments' own trade (and other) policies is fundamental to their effects. If private decision makers do not think the new incentive structures or institutions are likely to be sustained they will not respond in the expected development-oriented way. Sustainability (stability) of policies is therefore likely to be far more important than technocratic "perfection"—not only in trade matters but in general. (pp. 8–9)
- Africans can usefully draw on others' related experiences, particularly in low income (or recently low income) Asia. The advantage of the African "latecomer" lies not only in the possibility of technological "catch-up" but also in the possibility of learning from others' experiences, positive and negative, with alternative patterns, processes of change and policies. (p. 9)

These various points cover much of the territory transversed by the growing literature on meeting the pressing need to improve the supply-side response throughout SSA.

In the effort to expand and diversify African exports, the transport sector is an important example of a priority area for reform. Data presented in Yeats (1997) demonstrate conclusively that unnecessarily high transport costs put African exports at an important cost disadvantage vis-a-vis exports from competitors.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, he adds, "The structure of African transport costs also seems to have an important adverse impact on the types of goods exported ..." often working "...against local processing of domestically produced commodities" (p. 19). He continues, "Evidence suggests that the anticompetitive cargo reservation policies adopted by most African governments have had a major adverse influence on freight costs. So, the answer is clearly deregulation." (p. 19, footnote omitted)

### ***Don't neglect traditional exports***

There is absolutely no doubt that for trade to be a strong stimulus to development and growth in Africa, the composition of exports needs to shift towards more processed goods, including manufactures. At the same time, the discussion of transport costs calls attention to the more general point that Africa's poor export performance cannot be blamed entirely on the product composition of current exports. It would be unfortunate if an excessive concern with promoting non-traditional exports were to lead to a neglect of the potential to expand traditional exports—especially in those cases where governments pursue activist interventions in the market, *since there is no way for government policies to favour one industry without disadvantaging other industries.*

The option of promoting traditional exports in non-traditional markets—which for most African countries means everywhere outside the EU—has already been mentioned. Two other considerations argue against neglecting traditional exports. First, in the case of traditional markets, the necessary export/marketing chains are already well established. Second, because SSA is a very small supplier in the world market for most of its exports, the

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<sup>6</sup>Recall that in Table 2 the figures suggest that per capita exports from Uganda are noticeably smaller than would be expected from the level of per capita income. It is interesting to note that Yeats found that while net freight and insurance payments by African countries as a group were about 15% of the value of merchandise exports (1991/92), the corresponding figure for Uganda was 71%.

*excess* elasticity of demand for *its exports* (as distinct from the elasticity of demand for each of those exports from all sources) can be quite high.<sup>7</sup>

A 1996 World Bank study argues along similar lines, calling into question the conventional wisdom that “commodity dependence” is always bad for economic growth.<sup>8</sup> The authors conclude (Yabuki and Akiyama, 1996: 40):

Problems often associated with commodity-dependence do not arise because of commodity-dependence per-se and...can be alleviated through appropriate policies .... In other words, ... countries can be both commodity dependent and have high export and income growth.

An examination of the components of successful commodity sectors in various countries strongly suggests that it is the initiatives and innovative actions of the private sector that make these commodity sectors dynamic and vibrant. Such successful cases are found in the coffee sector in Uganda, the gold mines in Ghana, and the cut-flower industry in Colombia. Transfers of foreign capital and technology that have played important roles in developing new commodity and processing industries in a number of countries are best achieved when the private sector takes the initiative.

... important roles for governments to play ... include eliminating price controls and state monopolies, promoting research and development, developing infrastructure in transportation and communication, enticing foreign capital and technology transfers, and establishing a legal system for the use of innovative financial instruments.

### ***Do WTO rules restrict efforts to improve the supply-side response?***

A reasonably complete answer to this question would involve first preparing an inventory of policies that have been advocated as solutions to supply-side rigidities, and then systematically going through the WTO rules and disciplines at a detailed level to see which of those policies are covered by the rules and disciplines, and—for those that are covered—what the rules and disciplines permit or do not permit. Even then, however, there would remain a number of uncertainties. This is because there are “grey” areas surrounding nearly

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<sup>7</sup>Intuitively this point may be illustrated by noting that an individual wheat farmer in the United States, who supplies only a tiny fraction of the US wheat market, faces an infinitely elastic output demand, even though all US wheat farmers collectively face the overall elasticity of demand for wheat (for example, -0.6). This does not mean that African exporters collectively face an infinitely elastic demand for their exports, but rather that the demand they face is more elastic—in many instances, much more elastic—than the overall elasticity of world market demand for the product in question. See Blackhurst (1973).

<sup>8</sup>Comparing Asia, Latin America and Africa, it has been observed that in both Asia and Latin America, non-traditional crops expanded while the composition of exports from SSA remained fairly stagnant, (Akiyama and Larson, 1994). In Latin America, export expansion included fruits, vegetables and oilseed production. In Asia, on the other hand, production increases affected all sectors of agriculture with the largest gains coming from fruits and vegetables.

all the rules and disciplines that can only be definitively clarified by decisions of WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body.<sup>9</sup>

Such an answer would also distinguish between the eight WTO members among our 20 countries that are least developed countries and the ten that are not, since the LDCs are allowed more latitude in certain circumstances. (The two non-members, Ethiopia and the Seychelles, are of course not bound by WTO rules, but the fact that the Seychelles is in the process of acceding to the WTO is no doubt nudging the trade regime in the direction of WTO conformity.) Because they are developing countries, the ten that are not LDCs also get some additional latitude vis-a-vis the obligations of the developed countries, but much less than that available to the LDCs.

In the latter part of 1998 the WTO Secretariat published a *Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements* (the official report, *The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations: The Legal Texts*, is an exceptionally reader unfriendly publication, partly because of the rhetoric but mostly because of its organization). In addition to explaining the results of the Uruguay Round in a straightforward and easy to understand way, the new *Guide* contains a 24-page synopsis of provisions concerning developing countries and LDCs that greatly facilitates the identification of special provisions for these two groups of countries.

On a general level, the special treatment for LDCs is most evident in the Marrakesh Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries. As the *Guide* notes (pp. 226–27), the substance of the Decision includes the following:

- While complying with the general rules set out in the Uruguay Round agreements and related accords, LDCs will only be required to apply individual commitments, obligations and concessions that are consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their institutional capabilities. [Para. 1]
- The rules and transitional provisions resulting from the Round should be applied in a flexible and supportive manner to LDC members. This includes any determinations and authorizations that might be made by WTO councils and committees in different situations involving LDCs (such as extensions of transition periods, time-limited exemptions, etc.). [Para 2(iii)]

These general points are in addition to instances in which LDCs are explicitly subject to fewer obligations or easier rules. To take just one example, and again quoting from the *Guide* (p. 230), under the Agreement on Agriculture, “LDCs are not required to undertake reduction commitments in agricultural market access, domestic support or export subsidies [Article 15.2].” Under that same agreement, developing countries other than LDCs “do not have the commitment to reduce certain domestic support measures which are an integral part of their development programs (in vestment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture and agricultural input subsidies generally available to low -income or resource-poor producers [Article 6.2].” Part Five of the new *Guide* details numerous other special provisions, including those in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.

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<sup>9</sup>Only another WTO member can bring a formal complaint about non-compliance with WTO obligations. Thus as long as trading partners are willing to ignore non-compliance with WTO rules and disciplines, a country can—if it wants—get away with non-compliance.

For those who believe the textbook infant industry argument finds meaningful support in the real world experience of developing countries during the past two or three decades, and that such protection has a role in overcoming domestic supply constraints, it will be comforting to know that the WTO rules allow a country (that is already a WTO member) to have any level of protection it desires, subject to three easy-to-meet conditions: it must be tariff protection (no quantitative restrictions, except in well-defined special circumstances), it must be applied on an MFN basis (regional integration agreements being a permitted exception), and it must not involve raising a bound tariff above the bound level. Moreover, should the first or third conditions prove too burdensome, the country would have recourse to the seldom-used GATT Article XVIII:C.

Analysts with an interventionist bent, and who are confident (1) that governments in SSA have the necessary design and implementation capabilities to intervene effectively in the economy at a fairly disaggregated level *and* (2) that interventionist programmes will not be captured and distorted by special interest groups, view this combination of fewer WTO obligations and eased rules for developing countries—especially for LDCs—as providing an important degree of “flexibility” in the search for policies to improve the domestic supply response. Other analysts, skeptical that either of these conditions holds anywhere—least of all today in SSA—and concerned about the stability (predictability) of African trade regimes, and the associated problem of creating policy credibility vis-a-vis foreign and domestic investors, view this added “room for maneuver” in the use of trade-related policies as a serious disservice to the WTO’s developing country members.

## **2. Market access barriers facing African exports**

Market access for its exports does *not* rank high on the list of problems currently confronting SSA countries. In the last decade or two, for example, exports from many developing countries in Asia and Latin America, with less favourable access to the EU market (they do not receive Lomé preferences), have out-performed Africa’s exports to the EU by a wide margin. Inadequate domestic supply response, not the level of market access abroad, is the explanation of Africa’s poor export performance.

It is also the case, however, that a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO is expected to be launched in late 1999. Agriculture and services will be on the agenda for certain, but there are a number of other candidates for the agenda as well—including further tariff cuts and bindings on industrial products, state trading, government procurement, competition policies, investment policies, and reform of the rules governing free trade areas and customs unions. The upcoming round of negotiations may well determine the level and pattern of protection in WTO countries for the next 15 to 20 years—that is, the pattern and level of protection in the period when Africa’s efforts to improve its domestic supply response, *if successful*, will begin to pay off in enhanced export competitiveness.

Thus, while the focus of efforts must be on improving the domestic supply response, African governments cannot afford to neglect the preparations, already under way, for the new round. They need to be active in Geneva and in the capitals of important trading partners—potential as well as current—lobbying to get topics of interest to them on the agenda.

Preparing for the new round involves two distinct categories of policy analysis and planning for African governments: one is concerned with foreign obstacles to Africa's exports and the prospects for negotiating reductions in or elimination of those barriers; the other involves each African government deciding which of its own import barriers it would be willing to reduce and by how much. This section of our paper is intended to be an input into the first category of analysis and planning for the new round. The final section of the paper includes some material that is relevant to the second category of Africa's preparations for the new round.

### **Selecting import markets and barriers to be examined**

As was noted above, our analysis of Africa's exports focuses on the 23 major importing countries (counting the EU member states as one) used by the WTO Secretariat in preparing data on trade barriers for the October 1997 meeting on LDC trade issues. For two of the products (diamond jewellery worked but not mounted, and ferro-chromium >4% carbon) information was available for only a small number of importing countries.

Those tables—a sample of which is provided in Appendix Table A4—provide information, generally for each of the importing countries, on (1) five types of tariffs (the post-Uruguay Round bound MFN tariff, the applied MFN tariff, the GSP/GSTP tariff, the tariff applicable to imports from LDCs and “other” non-MFN tariffs); (2) quantitative restrictions,<sup>10</sup> and (3) other duties and charges. Even a cursory look at the tables makes it clear why work on market access barriers at a highly disaggregated level (the only level that really matters for most purposes) is so challenging. Not only is it difficult and time consuming to compile the information, but much of it risks being out of date within a short time (the bound MFN rate is the only import barrier for which it is possible to be reasonably confident that it will not change until the next multilateral negotiation). It is also evident from the tables that the six-digit HS level is not sufficiently disaggregated for a number of products (for example, when the figure in the “MFN tariff” column shows a range—say 0–10—it means that different rates are applied within the six-digit category).

It is not easy to summarize the information in the 17 tables covering our products. In terms of buying power and/or population, the major actual or potential markets among the 23 importing countries are the EU, the United States, Japan, China and India. An impressionistic summary of the information in the tables for the 17 products suggests the following overview:

- **European Union:** With the exception of South Africa, each of our 20 African countries receives Lomé preferences (and South Africa is negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU). For 12 of the 15 products for which we have EU data, these preferences are non-operative because the post-Uruguay Round bound rate is zero (the three exceptions are prepared or preserved tuna/skipjack/bonito, raw cane sugar, and tobacco). The Sugar Protocol provides important benefits to certain of our 20 African exporters.

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<sup>10</sup>Quantitative restrictions include import licensing (automatic and non-automatic), minimum import prices, quotas, tariff quotas, import monitoring/surveillance, prior authorization, state monopoly, canalized imports and bank authorization. With respect to the information on “quantitative restrictions” and “other duties and charges,” the WTO Secretariat’s notes to the tables observe that the information “should not necessarily be considered an exhaustive list”.

- **United States:** Nine of the 15 products for which we have data have post-UR bound MFN tariffs of zero. Among the other six products, one has a 1% tariff, two have GSP rates of zero and four have a zero duty for imports from LDCs. The only barriers of any consequence appear to be those applied on imports of raw sugar and prepared or preserved tuna/skipjack/bonito from the non-LDC countries among our 20 African exporters.
- **Japan:** Nine of the 16 products for which we have information have post-UR bound rates of zero. Of the seven with non-zero rates, five have a zero duty on imports from LDCs, three have a GSP rate of zero, and two have a GSP rate below the MFN rate. Judging from the tables, the most important barrier facing the 16 products appears to be the 6.4% GSP rate on prepared or preserved tuna/skipjack/bonito (versus an MFN rate of 9.6% and a rate of zero for imports from LDCs).
- **China:** Because China is not (yet) a WTO member, the tariff data refer to 1997 applied rates only, which means that the rates today or one year from now may be quite different from those in the tables (tariff concessions are an important part of the negotiations on China's accession to the WTO). Tariffs are high on six products—ranging from 20% for cocoa beans to 70% for black tea (in between are coffee, tuna/etc., sugar and tobacco); tariffs on the remaining nine products range from 1½% to 9%, with a (simple) average of about 4%. The tables contain no Chinese non-tariff barriers on these 15 products (licensing, where it exists, is automatic).
- **India :** The trade regime for the 15 products for which we have data is very restrictive. Tariffs on four products are unbound (tuna/etc., petroleum, unsorted diamonds and copper cathodes); six have bound tariffs of 100% or 150%, and four have bound tariffs of 25% or 40%. Applied 1997 tariffs on cotton and the two non-tropical woods are zero, on coffee and black tea they are 10%, and on the remaining ten products they range from 25% to 40%. There is a “special tax” of 5% on all 15 products, and 7 of the products are subject to import licensing.

For the 15 or 16 important exports for which we have data, two broad generalizations can be drawn from this brief survey:

- With the exception of tuna/skipjack/bonito, and in some instances sugar, access to the markets of the main industrial countries is virtually unrestricted.
- Access to the Chinese and Indian markets (and to a number of other developing country markets, no doubt including those of our 20 African exporting countries themselves), in contrast, remains highly restricted for many of Africa's important exports.

### **Other markets and other products**

This brief synopsis covers the important exports to five foreign markets. What about other markets and other products—not only non-traditional exports, but also the other 119 products on our 20 countries' lists of leading exports?

There is no way to broaden the discussion without moving to very general descriptions based on broad averages and generalizations—that is, to a level of discussion of trade barriers



whose value we have questioned more than once already in this paper. However, there is at least one useful role that moderately disaggregated data on trade barriers can fulfil. Coupled with knowledge of the country's current and expected future export interests, such data can guide analysts to those parts of trading partners' trade regimes that warrant closer examination in the course of preparing a list of the country's goals in a new round of trade negotiations. As we noted above, there is an urgent need for African governments to begin this kind of work in preparation for the round of WTO negotiations that will be launched in late 1999.

The study (WTO, 1997) from which Appendix Table A4 was taken focused on exports from the LDCs—more specifically, on the leading 112 six-digit HS LDC exports (9 of our 20 African exporters are LDCs). The data revealed that about 70% of LDC merchandise exports enter industrial country markets duty free, either under tariff lines that have bound MFN zero tariffs (about 30%) or as a result of GSP or special LDC preference schemes. It adds, however, "...the picture varies from one developed country market to another. Certain [markets] offer preferences on an extensive range of products .... [While some] others offer practically no tariff line that is entirely free of tariffs or specific duties" (p. 4). On the issue of tariff escalation, the study concluded, "Tariff escalation will decline significantly following full implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, but it will still persist to some extent for many product chains" (p. 5).<sup>11</sup>

A recent joint UNCTAD/WTO study (UNCTAD, 1997) focused on post-Uruguay Round tariff peaks, defined as rates above 12%, in the EU, the United States, Japan, Canada, Brazil, China, Korea and Malaysia. It includes ad valorem estimates of specific and combined rates, which is particularly important because so much of the tariffication in agriculture in the Uruguay Round involved the use of (inherently opaque) specific duties. Among the points in the study are:

- About 10% of the tariff universe of the Quad countries will continue to exceed the level of 12% ad valorem after full implementation of the Round. This rate refers to effectively applied tariffs for imports from developing countries. All presently applied tariff suspensions, as well as general GSP concessions as applied in favour of developing countries in 1996/97, were subtracted. Developing countries apply rates above 12% ad valorem more frequently than the Quad countries but have fewer extremely high rates. (pp. 3–4)

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<sup>11</sup>The study also includes a few remarks on the issue of preference erosion. Referencing an OECD study ("Market Access for the Least Developed Countries: Where are the Obstacles?" TD/TC(97)19, Paris, 1997), it notes "A recent OECD Secretariat calculation suggests, as an order of magnitude, that the overall effect of the erosion of the European Community's preferences on imports from the ACP countries under the Lomé Convention could amount to between 1% and 5% of these countries' annual export earnings" (footnote on p. 5). For these countries there will also be limited losses from the erosion of the less generous GSP, as well as of other preferences, in the markets of other OECD countries.

Perhaps equally or even more important than the very limited effect (in nearly all instances) of preference erosion associated with the Uruguay Round, is the fact that not only is preference erosion a "backward looking" topic, but the reality is that very little can or will be done about it. Moreover, any new preference margins would in turn be eroded in the next multilateral negotiation on tariffs. Countries affected by preference erosion almost certainly will find that their scarce negotiating skills and political leverage are better spent working on forward looking issues they can do something about, such as preparing for the new WTO round and lobbying vigorously to get items of interest to them on the agenda.

- The problem of peak tariffs occurs in six sectors: (1) major agricultural staple food products; (2) fruit, vegetables, fish, etc. (3) the food industry; (4) textiles and clothing; (5) footwear, leather and travel goods; and (6) the automotive sector and a few other transport and high technology goods such as consumer electronics and watches (p. 4) (These are the sectors in which the tariff reductions by the industrial countries in the Uruguay Round were below the average reduction for all products.<sup>12</sup>)
- ... in the agricultural sector ... quite a number of peak tariffs remain applicable to LDCs in all major markets ..... [In the United States] peak tariffs on exports above the [preferential] tariff quotas remain applicable to LDCs ..... [In Japan] ... LDCs continue to face peak MFN rates for beef and other meat products, sugar and sugar products, various fruits and fruit juices, etc. The EU applies extensive preferences to agricultural imports from ... [ACP] countries. But high tariffs, including MFN peak rates, remain in effect for a number of major food products, in particular for imports beyond limited preferential tariff quotas or past trade levels .... Many other agricultural and processed agricultural products obtain only a partial reduction of MFN duties .... Consequently, even many preferential ACP rates remain at peak levels. (p. 8)

### **Summary of market access barriers facing African exports**

Certain broad guidelines, which can be used to give direction to the detailed analyses and preparations of African governments for the upcoming WTO round, emerge from this brief review of evidence on barriers to Africa's exports:

- Among the 17 currently important merchandise exports, tariffs (and other barriers) remain a problem for tuna/skipjack/bonito and sugar in the markets of the major industrial countries.
- All or nearly all of the 17 products face high tariffs and other barriers in the markets of developing countries.
- Options for expanding traditional and new *primary commodity exports*, to traditional and new markets (including other developing countries), should not be neglected.
- Recalling the earlier discussion of *non-traditional exports*, it seems very likely that for at least the next two or three decades the comparative advantage of countries in SSA will lie mostly in the products of smallholder agriculture and manufactures whose production is intensive in unskilled labour.
- Tariff peaks affecting products of current or potential export interest to African countries—including major food products, vegetables, fruit, fish, textiles, clothing, footwear, leather and travel goods—are common in virtually all countries.

An obvious and important conclusion is that tariffs—the traditional trade policy tool that risks being neglected these days as new and more “glamorous” topics come onto the WTO's agenda—matter very much for Africa's exports. It is critically important to African countries

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Table II.3 in WTO (1998).

that further reductions and bindings of industrial tariffs are added to the agenda of the upcoming WTO round (agricultural tariffs are already on the agenda).

### **3. African participation in the WTO**

The issue of the participation of SSA countries in the WTO can be divided into (1) participation in the routine day-to-day activities, defined to include not only activities in Geneva, but also implementation of new Uruguay Round commitments at home; and (2) participation in the preparations for the new round of multilateral negotiations scheduled to be launched on the eve of the new century. Although there is not, as will be seen, a clean and neat separation between the two, it is a useful distinction for an initial discussion.<sup>13</sup>

First, however, a point of central importance to both categories of participation. The GATT and now the WTO are what is often called “member driven” organizations. Relative to the IMF and the World Bank, the member countries play a *much* more active role in the full range of WTO activities. The counterpoint to this is that relative to the secretariats of the IMF and World Bank, the WTO Secretariat has *very* limited authority and influence over what takes place in the WTO (budgetary considerations do *not* explain the fact that the WTO Secretariat has only one-fifth the staff of the IMF and one-thirteenth the staff of the World Bank).

Because the participation of member countries is so central to virtually everything that takes place in the WTO, a lack of active participation in WTO work by resident delegates and their backup staff in capital can be much more costly to a country than would be the case with a similar level of neglect vis-a-vis other international economic organizations. *There is no one to represent the trading interests of SSA countries in the WTO except those countries themselves.*

It is a very welcome development, therefore, that the four decades of mutual benign neglect between the SSA countries and the GATT/WTO has come to an end. But a great deal more needs to be done by these countries before it can be said that they are adequately representing their vital trading interests in the international organization that sets the rules governing trade in goods and services, settles trade disputes, and periodically organizes multilateral negotiations to reduce barriers to trade.

#### **Participation in day-to-day activities**

Active participation in the WTO's day-to-day work requires an adequate size staff resident in Geneva. Here, two sobering sets of statistics may be noted. A survey based on data for June 1997 revealed that one-half of the WTO members from SSA—18 out of 36—had no resident representative in Geneva to cover *any* of the Geneva-based international organizations (altogether, 34 members or one-quarter of the WTO membership had no resident delegate in Geneva). To the extent these 18 African countries are represented in WTO activities, it is by staff that must come from embassies elsewhere in Europe or from national capitals. Among the one-half that does have one or more permanent representatives in Geneva, the vast majority have very small staffs that are required to cover not only WTO activities, but also those of other international organizations (UNCTAD, ILO, ITU and so forth). In contrast, for

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<sup>13</sup>This section, in particular the first part, draws heavily on Blackhurst (1998).

all WTO members with resident representatives in Geneva, the average number of professionals who work *more or less full-time on WTO matters* is just under five.

The other statistics concern the number of meetings each week in the WTO building. All WTO councils, committees and working groups are open to all members. There are 4 councils, 18 committees, the Trade Policy Review Body, working groups on investment, competition and government procurement, 28 accession working parties, “heads of delegations” meetings, and meetings of various ad hoc and negotiating groups. Allowing for vacation periods, and *not* counting the informal meetings that took place outside the WTO building, there was an average of 46 meetings a week of all kinds in 1996, of which nearly 16 per week—more than three per day—were important enough to have interpreters present. With this level of activity, adequate coverage of work going on at the WTO is a challenge for even the large delegations.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that it is not just the staff resident in Geneva that matters, but also the size of the support staff in capital. This is especially true now that WTO activities cover issues that (1) are *much* more technical than the traditional fare of tariffs and quotas (they include financial services, telecommunications, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, protection of intellectual property, environmental policies and trade, investment policies, competition policies, and so forth), and (2) involve several ministries besides the trade ministry, and thus require effective inter-ministry coordination in capitals.

All but the very largest delegations cope with this situation by focusing on those WTO activities that they judge to be the most relevant to their current trading interests, and “free riding” on the work of other delegations for the rest. This clearly is the most that any of the countries in SSA can hope for. Modest as it is, only South Africa appears to be anywhere near even this “second best” solution.

An option the WTO Secretariat has tried to promote, without success, is to have groups of developing countries—for example, from the same region or regional integration agreement—cooperate by dividing up responsibility for covering the different WTO meetings each week (the Nordic countries are probably the only group that ever managed to do this for any length of time). Granting that such cooperation is perhaps unlikely in a major trade negotiation because of a diversity of negotiating strategies and goals, it is *not* easy to understand why it is so difficult when it comes to the WTO’s mostly routine day-to-day work, where intuition suggests there would be a broad range of common interests among many countries in SSA. (The nature of the obstacles to such cooperation among these countries, options for overcoming the obstacles, and the pay-off from doing so, would be a very interesting and timely research project.)

To take just one current example, consider the Committee on Rules of Origin. This is an important topic for the countries in SSA, yet (with the partial exception of Nigeria) their input into the Committee’s work has been minimal and not at all coordinated among the group. This despite the fact that the technical complexity of the topic makes it a perfect candidate for cooperation among a group of countries with limited technical and negotiating resources, not to speak of limited political leverage when each is working alone.

Through its technical assistance activities, the WTO Secretariat helps the lower-income WTO members to cope not only with the level and complexity of the WTO’s day-to-day work, but

also with the challenges of implementing their Uruguay Round commitments. The problem is that the amount of resources available for capacity building and other forms of technical assistance—money plus WTO Secretariat staff who are both experienced in the complexities of issues on the WTO's agenda *and* available to work on technical assistance activities—is grossly inadequate.

One relatively objective way of backing up this assertion is to compare the increase in the number of countries needing technical assistance with the increase in resources for supplying the technical assistance.<sup>14</sup> Between the launching of the Uruguay Round in September 1986 and April 1997, the membership of the GATT/WTO increased from 85 to 131, an increase of 46 members or 54%. All of the new members—except the EU, Liechtenstein, and four East European countries—are developing countries, including eight LDCs. In addition to the 40 new developing country members, there are 28 countries in various stages of acceding to the WTO, virtually all of which need technical assistance during their accession and will continue to need technical assistance after they become members.

Of the 85 members in 1986, approximately 55 were developing countries. Now there are about 95 developing countries in the WTO—an increase of 72%. If we include the 28 countries in the accession process, since 1986 the number of countries that, in principle, would benefit from WTO technical assistance activities has increased from 55 to 123, or by 124%.

What happened to the technical assistance budget between 1986 and 1997 (excluding special off-budget, one-off grants by individual member countries)? There was an 84% increase in the nominal budget (unadjusted for inflation), and a 47% increase in the number of staff in the Technical Cooperation and Training Division.<sup>15</sup>

This is not the whole story, however. Over that 11-year period there was a very major increase in the scope of the WTO's activities and responsibilities, and thus an increase in the overall budget and staff of the WTO Secretariat. *That increase in the scope and complexity of activities, by itself, increases the need for technical assistance, independent of any increase in the number of countries needing technical assistance.* Perhaps a more telling comparison, therefore, is between the shares of the GATT/WTO budget and staff accounted for by the Technical Cooperation and Training Division in 1986 and in 1997. In 1986, the Division spent 4.7% of the GATT budget and had 5.1% of the staff; in 1997, the respective figures were 4% and 5.5%.

One interpretation of these figures is that although the budget and staff of the Division, by remaining more or less constant as proportions of the overall Secretariat budget and staff, have kept pace with the expanding scope and complexity of the WTO's activities, there has been no increase at all in resources in response to the big increase—72%, or 124% if we count acceding countries—in the number of countries needing technical assistance.

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<sup>14</sup> Many of the statistics in this paragraph and in the next four paragraphs are based on data in Buffle (1998).

<sup>15</sup> There are currently 12 professionals plus the Division Director in the Technical Cooperation and Training Division. Professionals from other parts of the Secretariat participate in technical assistance missions, but the amount of such help is severely limited by the pressure of work in the other divisions.

The off-budget support from individual WTO members is an attempt to fill the resulting gap. But it is insufficient, not only in terms of the amounts of money involved, but even more importantly because it does not result in any increase in the number of professional staff permanently employed by the WTO Secretariat. This is a critical consideration because the nature of WTO activities is such that, in most instances, meaningful technical assistance can only be provided by people with a reasonable amount of experience working at the WTO Secretariat.

A substantial increase in regular budget funds for technical assistance, including additional professional staff, would allow the WTO not only to expand its existing technical assistance activities, but also to introduce new ones. A leading example of a very useful new activity is the proposal that the WTO open regional offices devoted primarily to technical assistance activities—for example, four in English-speaking Africa, two in French-speaking Africa, four in the former Soviet Union, and three or four each in Asia and Latin America (currently the WTO has no staff outside Geneva). An even more ambitious proposal—not strictly speaking technical assistance, but nonetheless designed to enhance developing country participation in the WTO’s work—is to provide funds to every WTO member, from the regular WTO Secretariat budget, for three delegates resident in Geneva and working full-time on WTO matters.<sup>16</sup> *If either of these proposals—especially the latter—sounds far-fetched, consider the fact that if the WTO Secretariat budget were **doubled**, there would still be **11** international economic organizations with larger budgets* (Blackhurst, 1998).

The 36 WTO members from SSA represent more than one-quarter of the WTO membership, and the total number of members with an equally strong interest in expanded technical cooperation activities (out of a total developing country membership of about 95) must be at least double that number. Coupled with the fact that WTO members attach great importance to making decisions on the basis of consensus—including decisions on the agenda of the upcoming round—these numbers suggest that a cooperative effort, led by the SSA countries, might just be successful in obtaining a major increase in the WTO’s technical assistance budget. True, most of the additional money would come from the major developed countries (budget shares are based on shares of world trade). But it would be entirely appropriate for the African group to point out—as part of the argument in favour of such an increase in resources for technical assistance—that it is precisely the large traders who are so fond of describing the WTO as “member driven”, and that this is a unique opportunity to demonstrate that their commitment is to a truly “member driven organization” rather than to a “large trader driven organization”.

### **Participation in preparations for the upcoming round**

Another area of WTO activity where the participation of SSA countries is severely restrained by shortages of money and experienced professionals is the planning and preparation for the new round of multilateral negotiations that will be launched in late 1999. As with participation in the WTO’s routine activities, and implementation of Uruguay Round

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<sup>16</sup> See Blackhurst (1997). Another very interesting and timely research project would be to consider the relative merits, from the viewpoint of the sub-Saharan African countries, of different types of technical assistance from the WTO Secretariat (training courses in Geneva, technical assistance missions to the countries, regional offices, assistance designed to increase participation in WTO activities in Geneva versus assistance with implementing Uruguay Round commitments, and so forth).

commitments, technical assistance from the WTO Secretariat can be helpful to countries having difficulties identifying what should be their goals in the new round and in participating in preparations for the round. Unfortunately, however, the same severe limitations on Secretariat resources and staff also apply. Countries that want to pursue their trading interests in the new round must do it themselves.

At Marrakesh it was agreed that agriculture (including agricultural tariffs) and services would be on the agenda. Discussions are already under way to determine what other topics, if any, will be added to the agenda. The governments of SSA countries should be playing an active role in these discussions, and it should be a collective effort since individually they are too small to have much of an impact. But this presupposes having not only the resources to lobby aggressively, but also the resources to decide (in advance) exactly what to lobby for.

### ***Reconsider tariffs***

It was argued above that because tariffs remain a serious obstacle to many of Africa's current and potential exports, it is important that African governments lobby actively to get industrial tariffs on the agenda. A closely related consideration, not mentioned above, is the proliferation of free trade areas and customs unions around the world. It is very much in Africa's interest to minimize the extent to which those regional groupings discriminate against Africa's exports, and the best way to do that is through extensive MFN reductions in tariffs (the principal motivation behind the Kennedy Round in the mid 1970s was the desire of third countries to minimize the discrimination against their exports in the markets of the original six members of the European Economic Community).

The opportunity to negotiate reductions in foreign tariffs on Africa's exports is not the only reason why it is important to have industrial tariffs on the agenda of the new round. Equally or even more important is the opportunity it will provide for further liberalization of African trade regimes, in a reciprocity setting in which they can "get something in exchange from their trading partners" for liberalizing actions that would be worth doing unilaterally if there were no new round.

South Africa's tariff regime is characterized by moderately high tariffs and a high proportion of bindings (98% of lines). The tariff regimes of virtually all other SSA countries are characterized by high applied tariffs and *very* small percentages of lines bound (and where tariffs are bound, they are often bound at very high rates). It was very unfortunate that these countries failed to use the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations to substantially reduce levels of protection and increase levels of bindings. (This is the principal reason why all estimates of gains from the Uruguay Round show very small gains—in some instances even losses—for sub-Saharan Africa. It is also an important reason why intra-African trade flows remain so small.) Provided that industrial tariffs are on the agenda, the new round will be an early opportunity to correct that mistake.

It is important to keep the argument for lower tariffs in SSA in perspective. It does not have to be an argument for free trade, nor an argument against the use of infant industry protection or against import substitution. A tariff regime in which 100% of the lines are bound at rates no higher than 30% ad valorem, and with applied rates averaging one-half the bound rates—in other words, a tariff regime not unlike many in Latin America—would offer plenty of scope for infant industry protection and import substitution. *Such a tariff regime would also be a*

*major improvement over nearly all current trade regimes in SSA.*<sup>17</sup> Once such a tariff regime had been in place for a while, the debate over further liberalization could move on to the pros and cons of free trade, infant industry protection and import substitution.

The 100% level of tariff bindings—even when this includes ceiling bindings<sup>18</sup>—is important for the increased predictability it brings to the trade regime. This is no small consideration in SSA, where policy credibility at home and abroad is one of the greatest challenges faced by governments that are serious about economic reform and anxious to attract domestic and foreign investment.

Imagine two SSA countries that have just announced economic liberalization programmes and whose political regimes, economies and policies are identical in all respects, except one: country A has applied tariffs of 15%, 100% of which are bound at 30%, while country B has applied tariffs of 15%, none of which are bound in its WTO schedule. If your pension fund was committed to investing in one of the two countries, which one would you recommend?

### ***What else besides tariffs?***

As noted earlier, other candidates for the agenda of the upcoming WTO round include state trading, government procurement, rules for foreign investment, competition policy, and reform of the rules governing free trade areas and customs unions. Again the shortage of experienced analysts and negotiators means the governments in SSA cannot cover all or even most of these issues. One issue they may want to involve themselves in, if rules on foreign investment make it onto the agenda, is the use of financial incentives (such as tax holidays and subsidized infrastructure) to attract foreign direct investment. More specifically, since there is no way the countries in SSA can match the funds spent by the OECD countries and the higher income developing countries to attract FDI, it is very much in their interest that new WTO rules on FDI include very strict limitations—if not a prohibition—on the use of such financial incentives.

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<sup>17</sup>In the case of these countries, it is very likely that the argument that cutting tariffs would be bad for government revenue is a red herring. Tariff revenue is zero in two cases: when tariffs are prohibitively high and when they are zero. Somewhere in between these two extremes is the average tariff rate that maximizes tariff revenue. Intuition suggests very strongly that tariff revenue in most sub-Saharan African countries would *increase* if tariffs were reduced substantially. A study designed to test this hypothesis is yet another idea for a timely and important research project.

<sup>18</sup>A ceiling binding occurs when a country binds a tariff at a level above the currently applied rate. With a ceiling binding, a country is free to raise (or lower) the applied tariff, as long as it does not exceed the bound level.



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**Appendix Table 2.A1: Merchandise exports to the world (millions of US dollars 1980–1995)**

Country/Region	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Central Africa																
Cameroon	1,418	1,610	1,637	1,317	1,289	1,409	1,603	1,729	1,670	1,837	1,906	2,159	1,937	1,651	1,432	1,662
CAR	147				85	92	66	129	134	148	151	126	116	132	151	173
Gabon	2,531				2,012	1,952	1,271	1,286	1,196	1,629	2,490	2,230	2,257	2,326	2,365	2,643
Zaire	2,269	1,079	986	956	1,023	1,071	1,399	1,813	2,460	2,417	2,326	1,649	1,246	1,144	1,256	1,632
Eastern Africa																
Ethiopia	459	701	727	798	417	334	464	391	381	444	366	276	154	222	281	454
Kenya	1,363							907	1,014	922	993	1,052	1,008	1,099	1,482	1,875
Mozambique	281				96	77	79	97	103	105	126	162	139	132	164	174
Tanzania	508					359	290	337	338	423	415	342	416	450	519	639
Uganda	319	300	292	275	385	387	436	384	298	282	210	176	172	157	254	595
Southern Africa																
Angola					2,053	2,224	1,319	2,322	2,520	3,014	3,884	3,449	3,833	2,900	3,002	3,519
Botswana	545				674	744	714	1,592	1,478	1,820	1,753	1,903	1,725	1,725	1,880	1,848
Lesotho	58				29	23	26	30	64	66	60	58	105	95	136	168
Malawi	281				309	249	245	279	294	269	412	476	397	321	373	410
Swaziland	368				237	176	267	424	466	494	554	580	608	626	827	781
Zambia	1,457	789	748	498	661	547	704	873	1,155	1,410	1,264	1,085	1,111	949	1,067	1,190
Zimbabwe	281				1,148	1,109	1,301	1,455	1,668	1,692	1,726	1,785	1,530	1,610	1,947	2,216
Western Africa																
Côte d'Ivoire	3,013	2,266	1,623	1,404	1,309	1,413	1,621	3,091	2,664	2,697	3,003	2,705	2,945	2,519	2,869	3,870
Ghana	1,104	1,189	803	683	558	658	763	825	881	808	897	998	986	1,064	1,236	1,431
Nigeria	25,956	16,758	12,215	7,707	12,020	13,113	5,899	7,383	6,875	9,812	13,670	12,264	12,307	11,297	9,534	10,916
Senegal	422	928	959	924	534	554	620	671	679	758	894	803	828	707	794	969
Island States																
Madagascar	437				333	274	304	329	280	318	318	334	324	332	447	502
Mauritius	434				373	435	675	892	1,001	995	1,201	1,213	1,303	1,299	1,344	1,539
Seychelles	6							8	17	15	28	19	20	22	27	22
Developed Africa																
RSA	25,698				17,163	16,293	18,385	21,219	21,871	22,191	23,549	23,306	23,413	24,261	18,296	18,976

Sources: UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook 1995, United Nations  
African Development Indicators 1997, World Bank

**Appendix Table 2.A2: Sub-Saharan African exports by category as a ratio to total world exports**

	Non-fuel/ Total world (%)	Fuel / Total world (%)	Minerals/ Total world (%)	Agricultural / Total world (%)	Total SSA / Total world (%)
1970-1979	0.485	0.073	0.181	0.076	0.814
1980-1985	0.217	0.141	0.096	0.039	0.493
Growth (%)	(123.4)	48.1	(87.3)	(94.0)	(65.1)
1986-1989	0.195	0.088	0.090	0.030	0.403
Growth (%)	(11.4)	(60.2)	(7.7)	(28.1)	(22.5)
1990-1995	0.154	0.088	0.067	0.025	0.333
Growth (%)	(26.9)	0.0	(34.5)	(23.4)	(21.1)

Source: UNCTAD (1995).

**Appendix Table 2.A3: Average share of manufactured exports in total exports**

	Country	1970-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94
<i>CFA</i>	Burkina Faso	5.81	5.73	5.22	6.22
	Cameroon	3.45	2.75	2.76	2.64
	Congo	12.94	5.97	8.58	20.89
	Côte d'Ivoire	4.35	6.11	7.63	10.43
	Mali	7.14	10.45	12.39	22.84
	Senegal	9.69	12.63	14.19	12.52
	Togo	4.85	10.53	4.67	7.86
<i>Non CFA</i>	Ghana	3.87	5.65	8.77	18.24
	Kenya	16.15	17.17	14.49	18.57
	Madagascar	6.54	7.14	9.62	18.04
	Malawi	4.02	7.98	4.86	7.01
	Mauritius	13.83	32.36	59.46	67.61
	Nigeria	0.92	0.42	1.27	2.00
	Tanzania	10.18	11.39	10.41	13.74
	Zambia	2.16	3.23	3.99	4.47
	Zimbabwe	33.08	30.42	28.19	31.29

Source: Sekkat and Varoudakis (1998).

**Appendix Table 2.A4: H.S. 090111 coffee (not roasted or decaffeinated)**

Market	Tariffs* MFN bound**	Applied	GSP/GSTP	LDC	Other	Other duties and charges	Quantitative restrictions
Australia	1	0	0	0	@1		
Brazil	35	10	0	0		Charges***	
Canada	0	0	0	0			
Chile	25	11	0	0		Air cargo and dispatching tax, 5.3-7%	
China	N/A	40	0	0			Automatic license
Chinese Taipei	N/A/	5	0	0			Permitted with license
Egypt	10	5	0	0	@2		
E.C.	0	2.5	0	0	@3		Tariff quotas
Hong Kong, China	0	0	0	0			
India	100	10	0	0	@4	special tax 5%	Non-automatic license, import licensing
Indonesia	40-50	0-30	0	0			
Japan	0	0	0	0			
Korea	54	3	0	0			
Malaysia	sp	0	0	0			Import authorization
Morocco	34	25	MOP 50%	0	@5	Charges****	
Norway	0	0	0	0			
Poland	15	10	0	0			
Singapore	10	0	0	0			Authorization
South African C.U.	119	0	0	0	@6		
Switzerland	sp	sp	sp	sp			Automatic license
Thailand	90,sp	40	0	0	@7		
Turkey	50	13	0	0			
USA	0	0	0	0			

@1 = Forum Island (LDCs) receiving duty-free preference: Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa

@2 = Niger receives preferences under a bilateral trade agreement.

@3 = E.C. Lomé rates to all LDCs, except Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Yemen; GSP suspended for Myanmar.

@4 = SAPTA members that are LDCs receiving margin of preference: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal.

@5 = Guinea, Mauritania and Sudan receive preferences under bilateral trade agreements.

@6 = Malawi and Mozambique receive duty free preference. Lesotho receives duty free as a parts of SACU.

@7 = Laos receives 20% preference rate under a bilateral trade agreement.

Source: Compiled by authors.

Appendix Table 2.A5: The 136 leading exports

Commodity code	Product description	Number of times it appears in our 20 tables	Total value, aggregate of our 20 countries (US\$000)
10600	Animals, live, except farm animals	1	12,948
20130	Bovine cuts boneless, fresh or chilled	1	43,288
20230	Bovine cuts boneless, frozen	2	28,623
30269	Fish, fresh or chilled, whole	1	26,763
30342	Tunas (yellowfin) frozen, whole	1	4,708
30343	Skipjack, stripe-bellied bonito, frozen, whole	1	9,557
30379	Fish, frozen, whole	1	6,155
30410	Fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe	3	20,009
30420	Fish fillets, frozen	4	176,139
30559	Dried fish, other than cod, not smoked	1	777
30613	Shrimps and prawns, frozen	5	195,164
30749	Cuttle fish, squid, frozen, fried, salted or in brine	1	17,644
30759	Octopus, frozen, dried, salted or in brine	1	7,978
60310	Cut flowers and flower buds for bouquets, etc, fresh	3	158,529
70810	Peas, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled	2	17,780
70820	Beans, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled	2	49,187
70990	Vegetables, fresh or chilled	1	16,456
71310	Peas dried, shelled	1	4,552
71333	Kidney beans and white pea beans, dried shelled	1	4,164
80130	Cashew nuts, fresh or dried	2	105,204
80290	Nuts edible, fresh or dried,	1	7,089
80300	Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried	2	269,577
80430	Pineapples, fresh or dried	1	105,833
80440	Avocados, fresh or dried	1	15,656
80510	Oranges, fresh or dried	1	166,448
80610	Grapes, fresh	1	156,193
80810	Apples, fresh	1	164,128
81090	Fruits, fresh	1	48,494
90111	Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated	12	1,816,993
90240	Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages >3kg	5	289,396
90420	Capsicum or pimiento, dried, crushed or ground	1	10,522
90500	Vanilla beans	1	70,966
90610	Cinnamon and cinnamon-tree flowers whole	1	816
90700	Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems)	2	18,776
00590	Maize except seed corn	1	18,559
120300	Copra	1	6,866
120740	Sesame seeds	2	38,054
130214	Pyrethrum, roots containing rotenone, extracts	1	24,823
150810	Groundnut oil, crude	1	62,033
160250	Bovine meat, offal, not livers, prepared/preserved	2	25,761
160414	Tuna, skipjack, bonito, prepared/preserved, not mince	6	377,010
170111	Raw sugar, cane	6	710,716
170310	Cane molasses	1	11,245
180100	Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted	4	1,662,251

<b>Commodity code</b>	<b>Product description</b>	<b>Number of times it appears in our 20 tables</b>	<b>Total value, aggregate of our 20 countries (US\$000)</b>
180400	Cocoa butter, fat, oil	2	167,090
200559	Beans, prepared or preserved, not frozen/vinegar	1	16,633
200820	Pineapples, otherwise prepared or preserved	1	45,881
200940	Pineapple juice, not fermented or spirited	1	13,168
220720	Ethyl alcohol and other spirits, denatured	1	108,782
230500	Groundnut oil cake and other solid residues	1	16,368
230610	Cotton seed oil-cake and other solid residues	1	8,045
240110	Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped	3	81,527
240120	Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped	3	514,763
240130	Tobacco refuse	1	22,716
250410	Natural graphite in powder or flakes	1	9,931
251020	Natural calcium phosphates, ground	1	12,519
252400	Asbestos	1	57,862
260111	Iron ore, concentrate, not iron pyrites, unagglomerate	1	452,529
260200	Manganese ores, concentrates, iron ores>20% manganese	2	310,285
261000	Chromium ores and concentrates	2	131,413
261690	Precious metal ores and concentrates except silver	1	124,121
262090	Ash or residues containing metals, metal compounds	1	211,662
270111	Anthracite, not agglomerated	1	93,914
270112	Bituminous coal, not agglomerated	1	1,387,901
270119	Coal except anthracite or bituminous, not agglomerate	1	315,413
270400	Coke, semi-coke of coal, lignite, peat & retort carbo	2	20,778
270900	Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals, crude	4	81,470,941
271019	Light petroleum distillates	1	1,125,428
283620	Disodium carbonate	1	16,163
310520	Nitrogen-phosphorous-potassium fertilizers, pack>10kg	1	13,556
410110	Bovine skins, whole, raw	1	3,471
410121	Bovine hides, whole, fresh or wet-salted	1	3,115
410221	Sheep or lamb skins, pickled, without wool	1	21,030
440122	Wood in chips, non-coniferous	1	151,171
440334	Logs, okoume/obeche/sapelli/sipo/acajou a' Afrique/etc.	3	374,011
440399	Logs, non-coniferous	3	273,410
440710	Lumber, coniferous (softwood) thickness <6mm	1	15,224
440722	Lumber/ okoume/obeche/sapelli/sipo/acajou/makore/etc.	4	338,286
440799	Lumber, non-coniferous	1	37,741
470200	Chemical wood pulp, dissolving grades	1	234,797
470329	Chem wood pulp, soda/sulphate, non-conifer, bleached	1	92,431
470411	Chem wood pulp, sulphite, coniferous unbleached	1	3,987
520100	Cotton, not carded or combed	7	382,554
520300	Cotton, carded or combed	1	3,492
520512	Cotton yarn >85% single uncombed 714-232 dtex, not ret	1	4,273
520942	Denim cotton >85% >200g/m2	1	11,843
530410	Sisal and agave, raw	2	19,079



<b>Commodity code</b>	<b>Product description</b>	<b>Number of times it appears in our 20 tables</b>	<b>Total value, aggregate of our 20 countries (US\$000)</b>
560721	Binder or baler twine, of sisal or agave	1	89,900
610463	Womens, girls trousers, shorts, synthetic fibres, knit	1	10,285
610510	Mens, boys shirts, of cotton, knit	1	41,177
610610	Womens, girls blouses & shirts, of cotton, knit	1	10,008
610910	T-shirts, singlets and other vests of cotton knit	3	140,239
640399	Footwear, sole rubber, uppers of leather,	1	7,645
710210	Diamonds, unsorted	3	705,163
710231	Diamonds (jewellery), unworked or simply sawn, cleaved	6	738,891
710239	Diamonds (jewellery), worked but not mounted or set	3	307,881
710310	Precious, semi-precious stones unworked, partly worked	1	6,684
710399	Precious & semi-precious stones, nes, worked, not set	1	5,317
710812	Gold in unwrought forms non-monetary	1	1,813,619
710813	Gold, semi-manufactured forms, non-monetary	1	13,816
711011	Platinum unwrought or in powder form	1	1,394,142
711021	Palladium unwrought or in powder form	1	224,484
711031	Rhodium unwrought or in powder form	1	129,554
711210	Waste or scrap containing gold as sole precious metal	1	5,021
711319	Jewellery and parts of precious metal except silver	2	26,558
711620	Articles of precious, semi-precious, artificial stone	1	2,829
720211	Ferro-manganese, >2% carbon	1	155,795
720230	Ferro-silico-manganese	1	94,759
720241	Ferro-chromium, >4% carbon	2	739,309
720249	Ferro-chromium, <4% carbon	1	43,572
720250	Ferro-silico-chromium	1	14,143
740200	Unrefined copper, copper anodes, electrolytic refinin	2	141,780
740311	Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought	3	696,365
740319	Refined copper products, unwrought, nes	1	65,368
750110	Nickel mattes	1	102,094
750210	Nickel unwrought, not alloyed	2	194,898
760110	Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed	2	338,493
760120	Aluminium unwrought, alloyed	1	23,778
810510	Cobalt, unwrought, matte, waste or scrap, powders	3	308,517
841191	Parts of turbo-jet or turbo-propeller engines	1	19,435
842139	Filtering or purifying machinery for gases, nes	1	106,835
910811	Assembled battery watch movement, mechanical display	1	8,339
911390	Watch straps etc and parts, of leather/plastic/etc	1	15,364
940190	Parts of seats	1	219,325
950341	Stuffed toys - animals or non-human creatures	1	8,166
9999AA	Commodities not specified according to kind	4	383,648

Source: Compiled by authors.

**Appendix Table 2.A6: The 25 leading six-digit categories of “exports” of our 20 African countries to the 23 importing countries in 1995**

Commodity code	Product description <sup>a</sup>	Export value (million \$)	Number of times it is a leading export
<b>A. Ranked by total value of “exports”</b>			
270900	<i>Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals, crude</i>	81471	4
90111	<i>Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated</i>	1817	12
710812	Gold in unwrought forms non-monetary	1814	1
180100	<i>Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted</i>	1662	4
711011	Platinum unwrought or in powder form	1394	1
270112	Bituminous coal, not agglomerated	1388	1
271019	Light petroleum distillates	1125	1
720241	<i>Ferro-chromium, &gt;4%carbon</i>	739	2
710231	<i>Diamonds (jewellery) unworked or simply sawn, cleaved</i>	739	6
170111	<i>Raw sugar, cane</i>	711	6
710210	<i>Diamonds, unsorted</i>	705	3
740311	<i>Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought</i>	696	3
240120	<i>Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped</i>	515	3
260111	Iron ore, concentrate, not iron pyrites, unagglomerate	453	1
520100	<i>Cotton, not carded or combed</i>	383	7
160414	<i>Tuna, skipjack, bonito, prepared/preserved, not mince</i>	377	6
440334	<i>Logs, okoume/obeche/sapelli/sipo/acajou d' Afrique/etc</i>	374	3
760110	Aluminium unwrought, not alloyed	338	
440722	<i>Lumber, okoume, obeche, sapelli/sipo/acajou/makore/et</i>	338	4
270119	Coal except anthracite or bituminous, not agglomerate	315	1
260200	Manganese ores, concentrates, iron ores >20% manganese	310	2
810510	<i>Cobalt, unwrought, matte., waste or scrap, powders</i>	309	3
710239	<i>Diamonds (jewellery) worked but not mounted or set</i>	308	3
90240	<i>Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages &gt;3 kg</i>	289	5
440399	<i>Logs, non-coniferousnes</i>	273	3

**B. Ranked by the number of times it appears in the “leading exports” tables of our 20 African countries<sup>b</sup>**

90111	<i>Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated</i>	1817	12
520100	<i>Cotton, not carded or combed</i>	383	7
710231	<i>Diamonds (jewellery) unworked or simply sawn, cleaved</i>	739	6
170111	<i>Raw sugar cane</i>	711	6
160414	<i>Tuna, skipjack, bonito, prepared/preserved, not mince</i>	377	6

90240	<i>Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages &gt;3 kg</i>	289	5
30613	<i>Shrimps and prawns, frozen</i>		
270900	<i>Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals, crude</i>	81471	4
180100	<i>Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted</i>	1662	4
440722	<i>Lumber, okoume, obeche, sapelli/sipo/acajou/makore/et</i>	338	4

30420	<i>Fish fillets, frozen</i>	176	4
620342	<i>Mens, boys trousers &amp; shorts, or cotton, not knit</i>	123	4
710210	<i>Diamonds, unsorted</i>	705	3
740311	<i>Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought</i>	696	3
240120	<i>Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped</i>	515	3

440334	<i>Logs, okoume/obeche/sapelli/sipo/acajou d'Afrique/etc</i>	374	3
810510	<i>Cobalt, unwrought, matte., waste or scrap, powders</i>	309	3
710239	<i>Diamonds (jewellery) worked but not mounted or set</i>	308	3
440399	<i>Logs, non-coniferous nes</i>	273	3
60310	<i>Cut flowers and flower buds for bouquets, etc, fresh</i>	159	3

620520	<i>Mens, boys shirts, of cotton, not knit</i>	148	3
610910	<i>T-shirts, singlets and other vests, of cotton, knit</i>	140	3
240110	<i>Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped</i>	82	3
30410	<i>Fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe</i>	20	3
720241	<i>Ferro-chromium, &gt;4%carbon</i>	739	2

a) Product descriptions in italics indicate a product that appears in Parts A and B of the table.

b) See Appendix Tables A4 and A5.

Source: Compiled by authors.