Rhodesia — The British Commonwealth Conference

by

Professor B. Cockram

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Members are reminded that this address was given in a private meeting of the Cape Town Branch of the Institute, and that any statements or declarations made by the Speaker may be repeated but must not be linked with the Speaker's name nor with the name of the Institute.

Jan Smuts House
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg

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WAR N I N G

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RHODESIA - THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

I propose to talk this afternoon about the relevance of the Commonwealth Conference, which took place in London between the 6th and 16th September, to the conflict between Britain and Rhodesia. It was a very different Conference to those with which I was concerned between 1926 and 1962: not eight but twenty-two Commonwealth countries were represented and the invitations extended to Barbados, Botswana and Lesotho will increase this number to twenty-five, or if Tanzania is represented, to twenty-six before the next Conference meets. It took place in London, but it was organised, not by the British Cabinet Secretariat and the C.R.O., but by the new Commonwealth Secretariat, headed by a Canadian, Arnold Smith. It met in Marlborough House, a palace donated by the Queen as the Commonwealth Conference centre in London.

The African members made it clear in advance that they intended to discuss Rhodesia from the first moment, and refused to accept Mr. Wilson's alternative suggestion of the usual survey of the international scene into which particular international problems of interest to Commonwealth countries could then be fitted. Mr. Wilson made the gesture of offering to relinquish the Chairmanship, by tradition the prerogative of the host country, although with it would have gone his best chance of controlling the debate on Rhodesia: he must have heaved a sigh of relief when his offer was, somewhat grudgingly, not accepted, but the African Commonwealth Ministers who would have preferred another Chairman got their own back by compelling him to listen quietly while his country, his Government, and finally himself were criticised in unbridled terms by Sir Albert Margai, of Sierra Leone, a flamboyant extrovert who tours the villages in his own country with his pockets filled with £5 notes, much in the tradition of the music hall ditty -

"Oh, have you seen the Shah?
He's out with my mamma.
He's lined his coats with £5 notes.
Oh, have you seen the Shah?"

Mr. Wilson was provoked into expostulating at being blamed for Britain's exploitation of her African colonies in the nineteen-thirties, by pointing out that he was seven years old at the time and living with his father in Australia, but Sir Albert marched on relentlessly for two hours to his racialist finale.
An intelligent piece of British official timing saw the appearance in the press the next morning, side by side with the account of Sir Albert's speech, of a caustic report to the House of Commons by, I think, the Controller and Auditor-General, of the disappearance of a considerable portion of the last British loan to Sierra Leone.

Mr. Wilson had not only to sit and take it, he had to make his own alternative proposals for spelling out his final approach to Mr. Ian Smith in order to prevent almost all of the Afro-Asian members from demanding, in the name of the Commonwealth, the immediate use of force, and threatening otherwise to leave it. Dr. Banda of Malawi commented sarcastically that "all that Britain would then lose would be their overdrafts"; but their departure would have been an immense blow to Mr. Wilson's prestige and he spared no effort to prevent it. Yet Mr. Arnold Smith's last-minute effort to draft an acceptable communiqué (albeit one merely recording the course of the discussion), reinforced through the night as it had been by the diplomatic skill of his own Prime Minister, Mr. Lester Pearson (of Canada), seemed to be fruitless, and Mr. Wilson admitted to the press, when the Conference was over, that at 10 a.m. on the final morning: "I don't think many people felt it (the Commonwealth) was going to survive." Nearly the whole nine days had been spent on Rhodesia, as if, said Mr. Holt, the Prime Minister of Australia, "it were more important than Vietnam." It may not have been but it certainly came closer to wrecking the Commonwealth.

With these words of introduction I must ask you to bear with me while I try to deal in some detail with the provisions of the communiqué relating to Rhodesia.
The Commonwealth Conference

1. The Commonwealth communique is likely to be the dominant factor in Rhodesian affairs during the next three months. The Prime Ministers began by recognising that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but added that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world. They reaffirmed their statement at the Conference in Lagos, in January, that any political system based on racial discrimination was intolerable, and therefore that:

1. the rebellion must be brought to an end;
2. all those detained for political reasons must be released;
3. repressive and discriminatory laws must be repealed; and
4. the principle of one-man-one-vote, regarded as the basis of democracy, must be applied to Rhodesia.

2. The communique went on to add that most (Prime Ministers) had expressed their firm opinion that force was the only sure means of bringing down the illegal régime. Of the others, some had shared the British Government's objection to the use of force while "agreeing that it was not ruled out where necessary to restore law and order." Most had also urged Britain to declare that independence would not be granted before majority rule, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and to refuse to resume negotiations with Mr. Ian Smith.

3. The communique then noted that the British Prime Minister had stated that "the British Government would not recommend to Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles", attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, and regarded it as implicit in this principle that the test of acceptability must be that the people of Rhodesia as a whole had been given the chance to show whether they were prepared to accept settlement which would make independence precede majority rule.

4. So far there was nothing new in the communique which was binding on Britain, but the Conference proceeded to take note of the following pledges which the British Government had made (in an effort to persuade the member countries of the Commonwealth to leave control of the Rhodesia dispute in its hands):

(a) that, after the illegal régime had been ended, a legal government would be appointed by the Governor and would be broadly-based. During this interim period the armed forces and police would be responsible to the Governor. (The effect of this would be to prevent any coup in Rhodesia by, for example, dissatisfied members of the Rhodesia Front party if Mr. Smith had previously agreed to a settlement);
(b) that the British Government would negotiate with the interim administration a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles;

(c) that this constitutional settlement would be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia "as a whole by appropriate democratic means";

(d) that the British Government and Parliament must be satisfied that this test of opinion was fair and free, and "would be acceptable to the general world community." (The reference to the general world community could be interpreted as requiring the approval of a majority of the members of the U.N.);

(e) and that the British Government would not consent to independence before majority rule, unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to wish this.

5. The communique continued that most of the Heads of Government considered that the wishes of the people of Rhodesia, as a whole, should be indicated by a one-man, one-vote referendum, and noted that if the illegal regime were not prepared to take the initial steps to bring the rebellion to an end, (a) the British Government would withdraw all previous proposals, and (b) given the full support of the Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, be prepared to join in sponsoring, in the Security Council and before the end of the year, a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. There are two saving clauses: "given the full support of the Commonwealth representatives at the U.N.". (which could be read as giving the United Kingdom an option not to do so if, say, Australia and New Zealand objected), and the reference to mandatory sanctions being "effective and selective" (which would permit of British objections to mandatory sanctions which the United Kingdom might hold to be unlikely to be effective, or to be too general in their operation), but it is improbable that these conditions would give the U.K. much ground on which to object to sanctions desired by an overwhelming number of members of the U.N.

6. Any such ground was further cut away by the success of the African members of the Commonwealth in forcing the U.K. to agree to a statement in the communique that sanctions at their present level were unlikely to achieve the desired political objective within an acceptable period of time, and therefore, that stronger and mandatory economic sanctions must be applied, and applied under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, the chapter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Most of the Heads of Government went on to express the view that such sanctions should be authorised not only under Article 41 (which provides for measures not involving the use of armed force), but also under Article 42 (which provides for such action by air, sea or land forces, as may be necessary, including demonstrations, blockades and other operations). This section of the communique expressly states that the majority wished action
under Articles 41 and 42 to cover both exports and imports, but
that others believed that action should be selective. The
wording would, in practice, appear to leave it to the Security
Council to decide the extent to which sanctions should be
mandatory and might be enforced by a blockade, and equally,
therefore, to leave it to the U.K. to decide at what point, if
any, to veto any resolution submitted to the Security Council
which might seem to it to be too drastic. Whether, at that
ultimate point, the Labour Government would feel able to veto
action acceptable to most of the other countries of the U.N. is
doubtful, but a veto might just be possible if it appeared that
otherwise a blockade might seriously threaten British trade with
South Africa.

7. Finally, it was agreed unanimously that assistance
should be devised to enable Zambia to complete her cut-off of
trade with Rhodesia and to withstand any serious effect on her
economy resulting from this.

All agreed to meet again if the illegal régime
were not brought to a speedy end.

8. It will be seen that the freedom of action of the
British Government has been very considerably restricted, both
by the principles which the Conference agreed should be observed,
and by the procedures which the British Government itself offered
to follow to that end. These procedures were outlined with the
object of preventing the Conference from laying down even more
restrictive ones. It would appear that there can only be agree-
ment now on the basis of what would be close to surrender by
the Rhodesian Government:

(i) Since the new Government would be formed by the Governor,
Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Mr. Smith would have to throw over
the officer administering the Government, Mr. Dupont,
and since the new ministry would have to be represent-
ative of all shades of Rhodesian opinion, including
African, there would not be room for more than, say,
three or four Rhodesian Front ministers. Those omitted
would be those unwilling to serve in such a ministry,
presumably those most closely identified with the
present Government, particularly in its legal and
constitutional actions, and therefore including the
Minister of Justice, Mr. Lardner Burke, and the
Minister of the Interior, Mr. Harper. Their omission
might well split the Rhodesia Front party, a course
unlikely to commend itself to Mr. Smith as a way of
strengthening his own position.

(ii) By such a surrender Rhodesia, as a whole, would have
lost control of her military and police forces, which
would come directly under the control of Sir Humphrey
Gibbs, and would therefore be unable to react if the
British Government should thereafter impose harsher
conditions.
(iii) The new Ministry would have then to negotiate with the British Government from a position of weakness, and would have bound themselves, in advance, to accept a decision as to the future constitution, probably on the basis of one-man, one-vote - the very basis which they have all along refused to contemplate. The parallel between the position which Mr. Smith would then be in and the position in which Sir Roy Welensky found himself three years ago, is so obvious that it could never be overlooked in Rhodesia.

Mr. Bowden's Visit

9. In such circumstances Mr. Wilson can have had very little reason to believe that there was much hope of an agreed settlement still being reached. If he had had any such hope it would have been natural that the Prime Ministers' Conference should have been followed by a most careful examination by British Ministers and officials (1) of the way in which Mr. Smith could best be approached, (2) of the assurances which might be offered to him in return for the concessions which he was required by the communiqué to make, and (3) of an area of immediate discussion which might offer some possibility of agreement, and so facilitate other and later discussions. If, as stated by Mr. Wilson, Dr. Verwoerd had helped to initiate the earlier discussions between the British and Rhodesian Governments (whether, as stated by him, but denied by Mr. Smith, by urging Mr. Smith to start discussions, or, as subsequently stated by Mr. Smith, by advising Mr. Wilson to initiate discussions for which Mr. Smith had always said himself to be ready), it would have been the normal course to give Mr. Vorster a week or two to get into the saddle, and then to seek his support for the initiation of the new discussions at the ministerial level. With the conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference, and with the provision by the U.S. of an additional credit, staving off the prospect of an immediate financial crisis for sterling, Mr. Wilson was under no international compulsion to act with frantic speed. Yet Mr. Bowden, the Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Elwyn Jones, the Attorney-General, were sent to Salisbury almost overnight, and, apparently, without even the courtesy of asking Mr. Smith whether the time of their arrival would be convenient to him. (They had, indeed, to delay in Malawi as a result). And it obviously was not a convenient time for Mr. Smith, because the Rhodesia Front party was due to hold its annual congress the same week at Bulawayo.

10. The chronology, in fact, was all wrong, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Mr. Wilson was activated by other motives. He may have decided that it was advisable to give an impression of urgency, in order to prevent the African members bolting the Commonwealth ticket in New York. With such juicy morsels on the U.N. plate as South West Africa and apartheid, it was, however, unlikely that they would do so, and in fact, they made no such attempt. Mr. Wilson may also have had in mind that it would be easier to reject Mr. Heath's request that Parliament should be recalled to debate the change in the Government's policy towards Rhodesia, if he could point out that two senior ministers were already on the way there and that it would be
preferable to await their return. Or he may have had very much in mind the meeting of the Labour Party Conference at Brighton on the 3rd October, when, faced with major discontent with his policy in Vietnam and over the wage-freeze, it would be common-
sense to try to take the sting out of the criticism of lack of progress over Rhodesia by being able to point to immediate
action to carry out the decisions of the Commonwealth Confer-
ence. Whichever of the three reasons was the most influential,
or if all combined to influence Mr. Wilson's decision, by
acting as he did he subordinated what he has himself called the
last chance of reaching agreement, to minor political advantages.

11. This interpretation of Mr. Wilson's actions seems
also to be supported by what happened during Mr. Bowden's stay
in Salisbury. After the first two meetings with Mr. Smith, Sir
Morrice James, Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth Affairs
Office in London, was sent back to London to report urgently to
Mr. Wilson, but although he arrived on Friday, the 23rd September,
he did not see Mr. Wilson until Sunday, the 25th. Mr. Smith
had meanwhile had to go off to Bulawayo, leaving Mr. Bowden to
see privately over 100 Rhodesians who were allowed to call
freely at Government House but whose names or car numbers were
taken by the Security authorities. Between the weekend and
Mr. Bowden's departure from Salisbury on the 28th September,
after Sir Morrice had seen Mr. Wilson, and after there had been
time for Mr. Bowden to receive Mr. Wilson's views, Mr. Bowden
did have three further talks with Mr. Smith, but, at a press
conference before he left, he said that while the points of
difference had been made clearer, the parties were still as far
from agreement as ever. He was always happy but he was not
optimistic about an agreement being reached. He added
ominously that there was still time for discussions but that
there was less than two months to go. The impression was left
that Mr. Bowden and Sir Elwyn were going through the motions
of the negotiations mentioned in the Commonwealth Conference
communique, without much conviction that anything would, or
possibly could, come out of them.

12. It has been more than usually difficult to find
out what the five talks with Mr. Smith covered. Mr. Smith was
reported to have said at Bulawayo that he could begin to see
the end of the road and this led to a flurry of optimism in
the Stock Market. It appears from a fuller London report that
what he actually said was: "we know we have saved our country.
I have a strong feeling that the end is in sight. I believe
we have won the battle for the railways and we have more petrol
today than at the commencement of the exercise." The British
Government should fall into line with the Rhodesian High Court
in accepting that his was the de facto government of Rhodesia.
Then the "stupid game" of trying to pretend that the Rhodesian
Government did not exist could end. He described the Common-
wealth Prime Ministers' Conference as a "ten-day farce. It had
had the impertinence to discuss Rhodesian problems in our
absence." Even allowing for his audience being the Rhodesia
Front party congress, this was not the language of someone who
was taking the discussions with Mr. Bowden completely seriously.
The "Times" reported on the 27th September that the basis on
which Mr. Bowden had been prepared to reach an agreement had been
(a) the establishment of a second-chamber senate to guarantee unimpeded progress towards majority rule;

(b) a Cobbold-style commission which would seek to determine the attitude of the people as a whole towards the proposed settlement (the Cobbold Commission satisfied itself, in a somewhat indefinite fashion, that the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo favour inclusion in Malaysia);

(c) Mr. Smith to head a broadly-based interim Government, appointed by Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, to shepherd in the new independence constitution, and

(d) a new constitution to increase the scope for African participation in the constitutional machinery.

A report in the London "Observer" added that the interim government would be led by Mr. Smith and would include several members of his cabinet, but would also include such moderates as the Chief Justice, Sir Hugh Beadle, Mr. Evan Campbell, former Rhodesian High Commissioner in London, Sir Albert Robinson, former High Commissioner for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mr. Josiah Gondo, African leader of the Opposition, and possibly one other African acceptable to the whites.

13. An account in the "Times" of 30th September of Mr. Bowden's report to the British Cabinet after his return also added a little. Mr. Bowden had informed the Cabinet that there was no alternative to Mr. Smith as the head of a new Government in Rhodesia, that Mr. Smith was prepared to discuss a new constitution, to test Rhodesian opinion once more, and to hold a general election, but that only after these phases could there be any return to "legality", and that the change to legality would have to be completed within twenty-four hours. Mr. Smith might be prepared, that is, to save Mr. Wilson's face by going through the motions of resigning and being asked by Sir Humphrey Gibbs to form a new Government but only if the process were so speeded up as to make it clear that it was simply a formality. The "Times" continued that the British Cabinet remained equally firm that Mr. Smith must agree with them the terms of a return to legality and that this return must take place before the discussion of the terms of the new constitution. Mr. Smith had, Mr. Bowden thought, been ready at one point to consider this but he had firmly rejected the idea of an interim government, and far from being prepared to guarantee unimpeded progress to African rule he was still thinking of the possibility of delaying this by balancing new African B roll seats in Parliament with new European A roll seats. Mr. Bowden, for his part, had, according to Colin Legum, been prepared to agree to arrangements which would delay an African majority for two or three elections, or from ten to fifteen years, but this was the limit. Mr. Smith had not rejected the idea of a Royal Commission, possibly headed
by Lord Cobbold, as a means of testing Rhodesian opinion. Mr. Bowden had added sadly to the Cabinet that Mr. Smith was a good deal easier to deal with when not accompanied by his colleagues, but, since they were present at the earlier talks, an equally plausible interpretation may be that Mr. Smith began by listening, reported to the Rhodesia Front congress, and then communicated his and their decisions to Mr. Bowden after he had returned to Salisbury. Mr. Bowden is said, by several sources, to have convinced Mr. Smith of his honesty and to have got on well with him, and it may prove to be one of the ironies of Rhodesia's progress to independence that Britain has had to wait until too late for the right minister to be appointed to the C.A.O.

The report concluded that during the period of the Labour Party Conference the issues would be given detailed expert examination by the C.A.O., and that the views of the Cabinet would subsequently be communicated to Mr. Smith, possibly by Mr. Bowden. No doors were closed, but it is fair to comment that the course now to be followed is the one which should have been adopted immediately after the Commonwealth Conference.

It is to be hoped that the last word has not been said by one of the Rhodesians who participated in the discussions with Mr. Bowden: "either I am loony or the British are, because at the end of it all I am faced with trying to sort out irreconcilable contradictions."

Mr. Wilson and the Tar-Baby

14. I have not the time this evening to examine both the positions in which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith now find themselves, and a more appropriate time for considering Mr. Smith's will, in any event, be on the anniversary of U.D.I. next month. I propose, therefore, to concentrate on Mr. Wilson's.

15. The British Prime Minister has been trying to walk not one but half a dozen tight ropes during the past year. The trade gap and the imbalance of payments, the threat to the £ sterling, inflation and the wage, capital and credit squeezes, British support for America's policy in Vietnam, the continued existence of the Commonwealth, and his own (private) war with Rhodesia. He has failed to close the trade gap; Britain's indebtedness, far from being reduced, has steadily increased; he has admitted that in July he did not know, for a day or two, whether devaluation could be avoided; and inflation continued relatively unchecked by the measures taken by the Labour Government, until they took that month the desperate decision to freeze wages, and deliberately increase unemployment. By deciding not to devalue Mr. Wilson put himself into the hands of the foreign bankers and committed himself to the necessity, if the voluntary freeze did not work, of making it compulsory; two decisions by British Courts last week are reported to have obliged the Cabinet to decide to do so on the very eve of the Labour Party Conference. In Vietnam Mr. Wilson must accept President Johnson's policy or risk the latter cutting off further dollar credits and ceasing to support the U.K. at the U.N. over Rhodesia. Yesterday's uproar at the Party Conference's
church service in Brighton has shown how strong is left-wing feeling over Vietnam. And in order to keep the Commonwealth together Mr. Wilson had to make concessions to African demands for a stricter time-table and harsher conditions for the negotiations with Mr. Smith. He had, nearly a year ago, unwisely sought to placate both left-wing Labourites and Commonwealth Africans by seeking U.N. support for import and export sanctions against Rhodesia, and risked the experiment of mandatory sanctions against the transit of oil through Beira. He can have little hope that, committed now to seeking general mandatory sanctions on oil at one remove, he could avoid a clash with South Africa, which would be disastrous for Britain's £250 million exports to South Africa, and to the tottering £ sterling. Yet each step to such a crisis has now been spelt out and even for so astute an opportunist as Mr. Wilson, there is little room for manoeuvre left. The analogy of the gambler whose losses are already such that the stakes must be doubled with each game if he is to have a hope of recovering them, is but too apt.

16. If I conclude by reminding you of a story which will be familiar to many, it is because it seems to me to express Mr. Wilson's predicament. You may remember "the Wonderful Tar-Baby Story" told by "Uncle Remus": Brer Fox made a Tar-Baby with some tar and some "turkentine", put a hat on it, and set it in the road.

Along came Brer Rabbit: "Mawnin'," sez Brer Rabbit, "nice wedder dis mawnin'," sezee.

Tar-Baby ain't sayin' nuthin', en Brer Fox he lay low.

"How duz yo' sym'tums seem ter segashuate"(sagaciate = fare) sez Brer Rabbit, sezee.

Brer Fox, he wink his eye slow, en lay low, en de Tar-Baby, she ain't sayin' nuthin'.

"How you come on, den? Is you deaf?" sez Brer Rabbit, sezee. "Kaze if you is, I kin holler louder" sezee.

Tar-Baby stay still, en Brer Fox, he lay low.

"Yous stuck up, dat's w'at you is," sez Brer Rabbit, sezee, "en I'm gwineter kyore you, dat's w'at I'm a gwineter do," sezee.

Brer Fox, he sorter chuckle in his stummick, he did, but Tar-Baby ain't sayin' nuthin'.

"I'm gwineter larn you howter talk ter 'spectubble fokes ef hit's de las' ack," sez Brer Rabbit, sezee. "Ef you don't take off dat hat en tell me howdy, I'm gwineter bus' you wide open," sezee.

Tar-Baby stay still, en Brer Fox, he lay low.
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Brer Rabbit keep on axin' 'im, en de Tar-Baby she kept on sayin' nuthin', twel present'y Brer Rabbit draw back wid his fis', he did, en blip he tuck 'er side er de head. Right dar's whar he broke his merlasses jug. His fis' stuck, en he can't pull loose. De tar hilt him.

ButTar-Baby, she stay still, en Brer Fox, he lay low.

"Ef you don't lemme loose, I'll knock you agin," sez Brer Rabbit, sezee, en wid dat he fotch 'er a wipe wid de udder han', en dat stuck.

Tar-Baby, she ain't sayin' nuthin', en Brer Fox, he lay low.

"Tu'n me loose, fo' I kick de natal stuffin' outen you," sez Brer Rabbit, sezee, but de Tar-Baby, she ain't sayin' nuthin'. She des hilt on, en den Brer Rabbit lose de use er his feet in de same way.

Brer Fox, he lay low.

Den Brer Rabbit squall out dat ef de Tar-Baby don't tu'n 'im loose he butt 'er cranksided. En den he butted, en his head got stuck.

Den Brer Fox, he sa'ntered fort', lookin' des ez innercent es wunner yo' mammy's mockin'-birds. "Howdy, Brer Rabbit," sez Brer Fox, sezee. "You look sorter stuck up dis mawnin'," se'ee, en den he rolled on de groun', en laf't en laf't twel he couldn't laf' no mo'."

17. I can only regret that it is not Brer Rabbit and the Tar-Baby who are stuck today, but Mr. Wilson, Britain, the Commonwealth and the U.N., and I doubt if Mr. Brer Fox Smith feels any inclination to laugh. I have spent my adult life in the service of the Commonwealth, and this week I had to read in an editorial in the conservative "Daily Telegraph": "Britain's position in the Commonwealth has become one of responsibility not only without power but, except in a most tenuous and doubtful form, without influence. On the contrary the Commonwealth is now, with a few obvious exceptions, a group which Britain makes expensive efforts to sustain and organise, but which sees its main function in exercising concerted pressure on Britain," and on the first page of the "Spectator", a conservative weekly, the bitter conclusion that "the only good thing that is likely to come out of the Rhodesian fiasco is the break-up of the Commonwealth", under the heading "R.I.P.".
RHODESIA - MAY, 1968

by

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6th MAY 1968
RHODESIA - MAY 1968

It is nine months since I attempted to make any assessment of the situation in Rhodesia. In the previous eighteen I had spoken at least six times on UDI and the problems which it had created for Rhodesia, Zambia, Britain and South Africa. No final solutions have been reached to any of these problems; but our newspapers and newscasts have been filled with the infiltration of terrorists, counter-terrorist action, support respectively for terrorists from Zambia and for counter-terrorists from South Africa, the succession of British ministers and ex-ministers visiting Salisbury, visits by Mr Smith to South Africa, and possible visits by Mr Smith to Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.N., calls for economic, political and military action, and what have you. Now both within and without Rhodesia major decisions are going to be taken.

A. Mr Wilson and Mr Smith

At the end of my August talk I listed my own conclusions. The first was "that time is running out faster for Mr Wilson than for Mr Smith". The contrast between Mr Wilson's position today and what it was in mid-1967 is devastating: Britain has run into two successive balance of payments crises; sterling has been devalued, and appears to have no future as a reserve currency; efforts to enter the European community have again been vetoed by de Gaulle; Britain's military capacity to play the role of a world power no longer exists, a budget of unprecedented stringency has put paid for the time being to any hope of the improvements in the standard of living promised by the Labour Party in two successive general elections; by-election after by-election has seen Labour candidates defeated by crushing majorities, and Gallup polls show the Conservatives leading by 24½%, the biggest percentage ever; under 100 Labour MP's would be likely to be returned if elections were held this year, and Mr Wilson's own support has sunk from 69% to 33½%, the lowest ever recorded for a British Prime Minister. Even the Labour weekly, the 'New Statesman', has been speculating that he may prove to be a liability rather than an asset if he remains as Prime Minister.

Mr Smith, on the other hand, has coasted along without losing or gaining much support. Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Mr Thomson and Sir Alec Douglas Home have all tried their hands at finding a basis for negotiation, but nothing has come of their efforts; each time hopes were raised only to be dashed, and demands were put forward by members of the Rhodesia Front party for stronger action by the Government. In September they were for the replacement of Colonel Knox, the Australian Chairman of the party; in January a new party was suggested which would be committed to reaching a settlement with Britain and the member of the Front for Salisbury City resigned; this month it was the turn of a member for Bulawayo. But a new party to the left never became more than a suggestion and Mr Smith dismissed the right wing resignations, which were not followed by others, as removing a small element of opposition which was better forced into the open outside the party, than left to white-ant inside it. Sanctions (with which I will deal later) still bite; terrorists still strike; and Rhodesians have had to face the disappointment which always comes with recognition of the necessity of a long-haul; but outside pressures, which do not discriminate between Government and Opposition, have had their usual effect of consolidating support for
the Government. Mr Smith may not have been responsible for the delay in publication of the report of the Constitutional Commission but the delay avoided a new element being interjected whilst discussions were still taking place. Its recent publication has injected an element of debate, if not of action, when criticism might otherwise have developed at Government inaction; he can follow the Report by feeding speculation as to what amendments the Government may propose; and his promise of first a referendum on the amended draft, and then a general election, should enable him to spin out the debate until well into 1969. Indeed, Mr Smith's problem has been to gain time in Rhodesia for changes to occur elsewhere, while taking as few irrevocable decisions as possible. 1971, the date by which a general election must take place in Britain, must have seemed to him to be a desperately long way ahead, but he has refused to be hurried, has recently announced that he is confident that an agreement could be reached with a conservative government, and emphasised (in a broadcast in January) that there have always been two roads to Rhodesia's objective of independence: a highway by agreement with Britain, and a detour via the Constitutional Commission. He may now hope that they will converge at a date earlier than 1971. *

B. Sanctions

I went on in August to suggest that sanctions had already been beaten. This has since become a common-place, to the extent that even Mr Thomson, the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, has admitted their failure to Parliament. To take the more important -

Exports

Tobacco - By the closing date for the surrender of quotas, by farmers prepared to accept the 6d lb. offered by the Government for growing other crops instead, 924 farmers surrendered their full quotas and 36 a portion of them. These surrendered quotas represented (as far as I can work out the figures) about 55 million lbs. of the 68 million lbs. which the Government had hoped would be surrendered. The remaining 1,744 growers, therefore, had to have their quotas reduced by 11% to fit them within the total limit of 132 million lbs, which the Government was prepared to buy. This meant that they would receive 11% less than they had hoped. The crop, owing to the drought, has however actually fallen

* Of course Mr Smith could alternatively follow the course recommended to him by Nicholas Monsarrat, what the latter called the simple 5-stage plan:

"1. He should abdicate gracefully and hand over Rhodesia to majority African rule.
2. Rhodesia would then be recognised as a sovereign independent nation.
3. After a short interval Mr Smith, with armed forces still loyal to him, would stage a coup d'état.
4. He would seize total power, murder all the opposition leaders, imprison all lesser malcontents, suspend Parliament, take over the press, and elect himself President for life.
5. His would then be the legal regime, as good as any in Africa, and would be recognised as such within 48 hours. For form's sake, he should adopt army rank and Africanise his name. I suggest Colonel Nibmar."
below the target and the tobacco farmers have therefore been claiming that they should receive the slightly higher price which could be paid within the ceiling envisaged. This was one of the grounds of criticism of the Government by the Rhodesian Front member for Salisbury City. The Government has, however, not only had to disappoint the tobacco farmers in this, but also to cut the guaranteed average price for Virginia tobacco, from the 1966-9 crop, from 28d to 22d a lb., a cut of 21%. The estimated saving is £3,500,000 in the year. Among the objectives would seem to be the need to reduce the crop further to avoid increasing, more than may be inevitable, the existing stockpile of tobacco. No figures are given of the extent of the present stockpile, but it has been reported to be believed in Salisbury that 60% of last year's crop has been disposed of. Figures are not given for the price at which sales have been made but it is certain that the Rhodesian sales organisation has had to cut prices well below world market prices in order to persuade buyers to engage in under-the-counter deals. These sales, and sales of other Rhodesian exports covered by existing UN sanctions, are said to be conducted at various free ports, in the Canaries, at Macao, Rotterdam and so on. On the other hand it has been pointed out that sales of South African tobacco to Canada have increased from 1 million lb. in 1966 to 4 million lb. in 1967, and similarly sales to other countries, and that it may be paying South Africa to buy Rhodesian tobacco for her own use at cheap prices and to sell her own tobacco overseas at a somewhat lower price than she would otherwise be able to do, so increasing her own export markets, and her ability incidentally to help Rhodesia.

Minerals - Exports of most of Rhodesia's minerals are also prohibited by sanctions.

Chrome is one of the more important. South Africa produces 900,000 tons of chrome, twice as much as Rhodesia, and uses about 200-250,000 tons; one-half to two-thirds of Rhodesia's production can therefore easily disappear over the border to be reflected eventually in increased South African exports. The American corporation, Union Carbide, is said to maintain a stockpile of 130,000 tons of chrome in Lourenço Marques, which is constantly replenished. It belongs to Rhodesian, South African or Portuguese companies, and a constant stream of freighters is loaded by night under armed guard. A 33,100 ton Italian ore-freighter, the Mare Tranquill, is said to have sailed from Lourenço Marques one day in March with a cargo of 18,000 tons of Rhodesian chrome bound for the Russian port of Odessa!

Asbestos - The chrysotile production is continuing in the two chief centres of Shabani and Mashaba. Two small mines have been closed but their closure was not due to sanctions. Asbestos is exported in large quantities from the Havelock Mine in Swaziland, but I do not know enough about the types of asbestos to hazard any guess whether its product is sufficiently akin to Rhodesian for the two to be mixed up somewhere along the pipeline.

Copper - The Messina (Transvaal) Development Company and M.T.D. (Mangula) have both been maintaining full production and similar export possibilities exist.
Gold - Rhodesia is the sixth largest producer of gold in the free world (500-600,000 ozs. in 1965), and "if things become more difficult a gold stockpile would be a tremendous advantage." Significantly Rhodesia found it unnecessary to devalue its £ when the £ sterling was devalued last year and Mr Smith was able to take credit for not adding to the difficulties of the U.K.

Nickel - "The brightest prospect on the Rhodesian mineral scene is Anglo-American's development project at the Trojan Mine near Gatooma." £10 million is to be spent by Anglo-American, and 7,500 tons of nickel will be produced a year when the mines are in production, worth £6 million in foreign exchange. The grades are not comparable with those being developed in western Australia, but compare favourably with those of the Canadian mines near Sudbury in Ontario.

Coal - Wankie Colliery has maintained production at an annual 3 1/2 million tons, in spite of the threatened loss of the Zambian market. The copper mines in Zambia have found the local coal to be of too poor quality to be used without dilution with Rhodesian coal and the special truck-lift has had to continue to be employed to freight to Livingston coal from Wankie additional to that which Rhodesia Railways could transport.

If the deposits of copper ore now being investigated from Matabeleland, through Botswana to South West Africa, prove to be payable then the mining future of Rhodesia will indeed be bright.

Imports

Rhodesia has also reduced considerably her dependence on external sources for the supply of a number of essentials which have hitherto had to be imported.

Wheat - The 1966-7 Report of the Sabie-Limpopo Authority indicates that the rapid growth of wheat under irrigation in the Lowveld, combined with increased production in the Highveld, makes the total elimination of wheat purchases, costing £2.8 million, a realistic objective.

Fertiliser - Sabie Chemical Industries are raising £16.8 million for their nitrogenous fertiliser project, of which £8.7 million is to be provided from outside sources, £2 million from within Rhodesia, and £6.1 million will come in the later stages from profits during the earlier ones.

Petrol - While all petrol has to be imported, Mr Smith was last week able to reveal that supplies reaching Rhodesia by road and rail were so adequate that he had offered to assist Zambia in its desperate shortage by opening up the Peruka refinery so that crude could be imported via the Lonrho-owned pipeline from Beira, in disuse since UDI, refined and sent on to Zambia. He must have enjoyed making this offer to Zambia as much as helping Britain over the £!

Textiles - The index of Rhodesia's industrial production increased from 110.5 to 113.4 in 1967, and the Rhodesian clothing industry has been able, in part, to offset loss of its former market in Zambia by exports to South Africa (now 3 1/2% of the
market) but pressure is now on the exporters to accept a limit, in order to reduce the likelihood of counter-measures having to be taken in South Africa to protect the local industry.

Beef - On the farms drought has reduced the maize crop, and will undoubtedly affect the output of beef, but Professor Sadie, in his report on future development, has pointed out that 59% of the country is suitable for livestock and another 17% for a combination of livestock and cash crop farming. His conclusion was that Rhodesia could support a cattle industry whose beef production would be bettered only by that of the Argentine and Australia.

Immigration
One of the more serious aspects of sanctions was the initial emigration of several thousand Rhodesians to South Africa and elsewhere, for it is in white manpower that Rhodesia is so desperately short. Fortunately the emigration was soon checked, partly by the discovery that incomes in Rhodesia were about 25% higher than in South Africa, partly by the recovery in confidence. Professor Sadie has nevertheless emphasised the need to step up immigration, pointing out that unless this was done Rhodesia, in twenty years, would have more than 8 million Africans and only 290,000 Whites, a ratio of 29 to 1, compared with the present ratio of 19 to 1. Since he estimated that 1 White was needed to provide employment for 7.4 Africans in the modern section of the economy, and since the number of Africans seeking work in this section is about 40,000 a year, he estimated that the immigration target should be about 12,000 Whites a year. Rhodesia gained 4,142 by immigration in 1967 and has been taking full-page advertisements in British newspapers in an attempt to persuade much larger numbers to emigrate to Rhodesia. The response is said to be so satisfactory that some Labour backbenchers have been pressing for the campaign to be stopped and 'discouragement' of emigration to Rhodesia has had to be included in the British draft resolution for the extension of sanctions. The immigration campaign is itself an indication that Rhodesia is sufficiently sure of its ability to defeat sanctions to be prepared to spend, from the reserves of foreign currency which it has had to hoard so carefully, not inconsiderable sums to safeguard, as far as possible, its long-term future.

Communications and Power
It may be convenient at this point to mention what has been happening to the remaining common services of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, since they are vital to communications and power. This month the phased evacuation from Zambia of Rhodesia Railways staff is due to be completed. So far as assets are concerned, the deficit on the joint account in June 1967, when the unitary system was divided, was £3,258,162, compared with £383,061 in the previous year. It was reduced by utilising the balance of the Rates and Wages Stabilisation Account (£3,603,442), and the remaining deficit was then divided, each government accepting responsibility for £2,327,360. Rhodesia Railways then sought to recoup at least part of this loss by increasing its freight rate per ton on Zambian copper carried to Beira from £16 to £20, which President Kaunda denounced (three days in advance) as yielding £1 million or so to the rebels. Rhodesia Railways still remained the cheapest route for copper and the interruptions on the other routes guaranteed that it would continue to be used by the copper companies. Passenger fares have also been increased, but
whether sufficiently to avoid another deficit this year remains to be seen.

Central African Airways was due to be broken up on 31st August 1967, but a transitional agreement was made to provide, from 1st September 1967 to 31st December 1967, services between Zambia on the one hand and Rhodesia and Malawi on the other. The Zambian DC3 services would meanwhile be operated by Zambian Airways. After the 31st December Central African Airways would cease to operate altogether, and, if agreement had not been reached on the allocation of its assets, aircraft and other assets would be made available to the three national airlines in order to enable them to provide services after that date. Over three-quarters of the personnel were taken on by Air Rhodesia from 1st September 1967. Before the end of the year the Zambian Government announced the interruption of air services between Zambia and Rhodesia, and as a result Zambian Airways was expected to lose its most lucrative run, between Lusaka and Salisbury, and £700,000 a year in revenue. The cheapest alternative to this 1-hour direct flight is a 300-mile flight to Livingstone, a bus trip over the Victoria Falls Bridge and a 350-mile flight from there to Salisbury, costing at least £23 as against the previous £10, and trebling the time taken on the journey. If British proposals to boycott all communications with Rhodesia are approved by the United Nations, it is unlikely that direct flights will be resumed.

The Central African Power Corporation has continued to run the Kariba hydro-electrical scheme, and will continue to do so at least until the development of the Kafue scheme, entirely within Zambia, removes Zambia's complete dependence on Kariba for the power necessary to operate the copper mines. A Yugoslav corporation has been given the contract for the Kafue dam but it will be years before the new hydro-electric power station comes into operation.

C. A Republic?

I also suggested in August that it might be only a question of time before Rhodesia became a republic. In the intervening months a republic has come much nearer. The authority of Her Majesty the Queen was brought directly in question by the advice given to her by the British Government to reprieve the condemned terrorists and scarcely had the furore caused by their execution begun to die down when the Constitutional Commission offered, in its Report, alternative proposals for a Head of State. If agreement were reached with Britain then, obviously, Her Majesty would remain Head of State. But, if agreement were not reached the Commission rejected as impracticable any idea of a separate monarchy, i.e. of Her Majesty remaining Head of State as Queen of Rhodesia. In that event the Commission saw no alternative to a republic.

To begin with the condemnation, appeals, and execution of a number of the captured terrorists. This has led the Judiciary in Rhodesia to move steadily towards recognition of Mr Ian Smith's government as the de jure as well as the de facto government of the country. On the 29th January in the Rhodesian Appeal Court, Sir Hugh Beadle and a majority of the judges found that the Rhodesian Government was a de facto government in effective control of the
On the 1st of March, the Appeal Court dismissed an application of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England by three Africans who had been sentenced to death for acts of murder and terrorism. Sir Hugh Beadle, after noting a statement made the previous day by the Minister of Justice, Mr Lardner Burke, that the Rhodesian Government would not recognise a decision of the Privy Council, added that: "If I considered an appeal to the Privy Council would be of any benefit I would not hesitate in giving them the declaration, but I was satisfied that the Government meant what it said in its affidavit (in the main constitutional case, on Thursday, the previous day) that it would refuse to recognise any decision of the Privy Council." The Appellate Division therefore refused the application, since "no judgment would be of any value inside this territory." This was on Friday, 1st March. Over the weekend the British Government advised Her Majesty the Queen to exercise her prerogative of mercy to commute the death sentences to life imprisonment. It appeared in the course of the next day or two that no appeal had been made by the legal advisers in Salisbury of the convicted men, but that the firm of solicitors in London which had previously been acting on instructions from them, had made the request, and that they justified it on the ground that there was insufficient time to consult Salisbury. Mr Sheridan said: "I was faced on Saturday with an enormously difficult problem when the hangings seemed imminent, and I had no time to liaise with Salisbury." I have seen no suggestion that Sir Humphrey Gibbs had either intervened or been consulted. The reaction could have been predicted. The Appeal Court ruled in favour of the execution of the three Africans on the ground that the British Government had had no legal right to advise Her Majesty. Two of the three men submitted petitions for clemency to Mr Dupont, but the petitions were rejected and it was officially stated on T.V. in Rhodesia that, for the British Government to have taken this unconstitutional action, on

* Sir Hugh Beadle considered that it was a fully de facto government, in effective control of the territory, and that this control was likely to continue, but was not so fully established as to justify de jure status; administrative and legislative acts must therefore conform to the 1961 Constitution. Sir Vincent Quenet considered it to be a de facto government which had also acquired internal de jure status, and therefore that both its constitution and laws had binding force. In Mr Justice Macdonald's view it was a de facto government, and, so far as a municipal (i.e. Rhodesian) Court was concerned, a de jure government in the sense that it was the only law-making and law-enforcing government functioning for the time being within the state. Similarly, the 1965 Constitution was in a sense the de jure as well as the de facto constitution, and, since Her Majesty the Queen had declined to accept any position under this constitution, Rhodesia was a de facto republic. Mr Justice Jarvis said that the government was in effective control and likely to remain so, but that legal effect could be given only to such acts as would have been lawful under the 1961 constitution. Mr Justice Fieldsend thought that it was neither a fully de facto nor a de jure government; the Court therefore remained one constituted by and deriving its authority from the 1961 constitution; acts to be accepted as valid must be those reasonably required for the orderly running of the country; but the just rights of citizens under the 1961 constitution must not be defeated.
incomplete evidence and information, was irresponsible and contrary to their own stated policy in such matters. Mr Duncan Sandys criticised Mr Wilson for involving the Queen in the dispute with the Rhodesian Government. Sir Hugh Beadle left Government House, Salisbury, where he had lived with Sir Humphrey Gibbs since UDI, and the British Government withdrew his dormant commission to act as Governor in the absence or incapacity of the latter. The British Government did not contest that the convicted men were guilty of murder, committed before UDI, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the consequences of the action taken may have received insufficient consideration in advance. The loyalty of Rhodesia to Her Majesty was badly shaken by the whole episode and the likelihood of the establishment of a republic greatly increased. Judges have been pushed into closer support of Mr Smith's government, and Mr Julius Greenfield, when he replaced Mr Justice Fieldsend, who resigned, received his commission from Mr Dupont and swore an oath under the 1965 instead of the 1961 constitution. Sir Humphrey has been deprived of his legal adviser and main prop.

The Rhodesian Constitutional Commission published their Report in Salisbury on 10th April. It is a lengthy document of 180 pages, and, correctly, does not attempt to draft a constitution, but examines the possible constitutional solutions to the problems of Rhodesia, and sets out clearly the Commission's own conclusions. Although none of the Commissioners were constitutional experts they have shown a capacity for factual analysis and have not recanted from the logical deductions. In a brief historical survey the Commission point out that "only minimal use was ever made by the U.K. of the so-called 'reserved powers' (under the 1923 Constitution) and that any influence they had on the internal government of the country was negligible," and that upon the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, at the end of 1963, "all the legislative powers surrendered by Southern Rhodesia (to the Federation in 1953) were restored, and indeed, because of advances in the 1961 Constitution (for example, the power to legislate with extra-territorial effect), its overall powers were greater than before Federation." The Commission therefore point out the illogicality of the British Government in granting independence to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, which had never enjoyed self-government while refusing to grant it to Rhodesia. This was particularly so because the principle of the paramountcy of African interests, had never at any time applied in Rhodesia. Mr Thomson had himself made the revealing remark earlier in the month that "the truth in Rhodesia - and it is an old truth - although it was largely concealed from us for 40 years, is that Britain has responsibility without power."

The Commission then set out the basis of their approach; that the preservation of a country's system of government must depend on the acquiescence, if not the consent of the governed, and therefore that the main races of Rhodesia should have a voice in the councils of the nation. This involves the removal of suspicion and misgivings among Rhodesians of any one of the main races or ethnic groups that they might be permanently dominated by one or more of the others. The Europeans must therefore surrender any belief in permanent European domination and the Africans in ultimate African domination. Africans must concede that Europeans,
because of their greater competence and experience should exercise the more authoritative voice at national government level for a period which cannot be measured by clock or calendar. Similarly Europeans must concede to Africans a voice in government at the national level which, with the passage of time, must be allowed to gain increasing but not limitless power. The only acceptable solution therefore must be one based substantially on ultimate racial parity of political representation, which the Commission point out was favoured by the majority of members of the Monckton Commission in 1960.

The Commission's next conclusion is that there is no practical alternative to the continuance of Rhodesia as a single state. They reject complete partition because the Ndebele and Shona tribes are rivals for political and economic power, and any partition would founder on the single issue that the division of land had been unfair since no conceivable division would satisfy either. Neither of these tribal units, nor an European state, would be viable without the others. Federation they believe would be "an unhappy compromise between an unitary form of government and total partition" and "would involve a degree of fragmentation" to which they are totally opposed.

They go on to decide that "for Rhodesia there is much merit in retaining a modified Westminster system." They recommend "the establishment of a Senate, operating in an atmosphere of minimal party political influence and possessing effective power": 12 senators should be Africans, 12 Europeans, while 7 should be from either race. Of the 12 Africans 6 should be Chiefs, elected by the Chiefs, and 6 commoners, chosen by electoral colleges consisting of elected members of African Councils in the rural areas and African Advisory Boards in the urban areas. 3 chiefs and 3 commoners should represent Mashonaland and the other 6 Matabeleland. The 12 Europeans should be nominated and elected by an electoral college. The remaining 7 senators should be appointed either to represent interests not sufficiently represented; or because of previous distinguished service and should be appointed by the Head of State. The members of the Senate would elect their own President and the life of the Senate would be 6 years, but it should not be dissolved coincidentally with the Legislative Assembly. Its task would be to review all bills and it would be able to amend or reject any bill except a money bill, for which there are special provisions. The Senate could not, however, reject a bill which had been repassed by the Legislative Assembly after a period of six months. The delay would be 12 months in the case of a bill which might be inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. A Senate legal committee should be established and charged with the duty of comparing all legislation submitted to the Senate with that Declaration. If, however, a bill was certified by the Prime Minister to be of such a nature that it should be enacted without delay, such a bill could be submitted to the Head of State, if approved by a majority vote of a joint sitting of both houses.

So far as the lower house, the Legislative Assembly, is concerned, the Commissioners consider that to withdraw the substantial African representation in the present Parliament would be unrealistic, if it could not be replaced by some other form of representation at least as effective. They feel it is necessary for
a considerable period that Europeans should hold the reins of power, and therefore that, at the outset, they must command a majority in the Legislative Assembly, but they also feel it right to provide at the start for a modest increase in the number of members representing Africans. They therefore recommend that the Assembly should number 80, and that of the seats 40 should be reserved for representatives of European voters, 20 for representatives elected under a combined common roll, and 20 reserved for representatives to be elected on a system of special African representation. When the Africans secure control of all the common roll seats there would be a balance of 40 Europeans and 40 Africans. They therefore recommend that a Speaker from outside the ranks of the members should be elected by them jointly. The 40 constituencies for Europeans would cover the whole country. Of the African representatives 12 would be elected by the Tribal Trust Lands, 2 by the African Purchase Areas and 6 by the African Urban Areas. If there should be a stalemate in the Legislative Assembly the Prime Minister could request a joint sitting of both Houses for not more than 12 months. The representatives of the Tribal Trust Lands would be elected by a series of electoral colleges consisting of chiefs, headmen and elected members of the African Councils, and in the African Purchase Areas, the occupation of African Purchase holdings would be the qualification for electors. In the African Urban Areas the qualification would be the occupation of married accommodation in certain designated African townships. Any existing B roll voters who might lose their voting rights under this scheme would be placed on the common roll, for which voters would have to possess adequate knowledge of English, be able to complete and sign the form for enrolment, and either have been in receipt of an income of not less than £900 for a period of two years, or be owners of land, the net value of which was not less than £5,000, or have been in receipt of an income of £600 and completed four years secondary school education, or be chiefs or headmen. The numbers of African voters the Commissioners expect to be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for Tribal Trust Lands</td>
<td>1,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for African Purchase Areas</td>
<td>up to 15,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>and for African Urban Areas</td>
<td>potentially 100,000</td>
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The Commission recommend the retention of the present system of a Parliamentary Executive. The Head of State should appoint the Prime Minister who would, in turn, select his ministers, and the ministers would have the right of audience in both Houses, but to vote in one only. The Head of State, if Rhodesia was a monarchy, would be appointed by Her Majesty acting on the advice of her Rhodesian ministers, or in the case of Rhodesia being a republic, by election by both Houses of the Legislature jointly, and his term of office in that event would be 7 years. The Commission concluded that if no final agreement with Britain were reached, and no recognition by the Crown were forthcoming, the retention of a monarchy would be impossible, and a republican form of government would be inevitable. They recommend that the oath of allegiance should be taken to the State of Rhodesia. The establishment of the Judicature should be entrenched in the Constitution, and the Commissioners, by a majority of 4 to 1 recommend that the provisions of the 1961 Constitution relating to the appointment of all judges should be followed in preference to that of the 1965 Constitution. The Commission recommend that a Declaration of Rights should be retained, but dryly commented that the Rights and Freedoms should be those set out in the 1965 Consti-
tution, but the 33 pages which they occupied in that Constitution should be "abbreviated as far as compatible with the need for precision." The Declaration of Rights should allow for preventive detention but there should be a tribunal to which detained persons should have an ultimate right of appeal, and the decision of the tribunal should be binding.

For amendment of the Constitution a bill should require to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly, and a two-thirds majority of members of the Senate, which could exercise only its normal power to delay passage. The entrenched provisions would require in addition approval by a three-quarters majority at a joint sitting. These would be, inter alia, those setting out the arrangements for amending the Constitution, dealing with the composition of the Legislature, defining the franchise, preserving the land rights of any person or group, the appointing judges or the Head of State, and preserving English as the official language, and all clauses of the Declaration of Rights.

The Constitution should continue to protect by appropriate entrenchment the allocation and use of the Tribal Land, and the African Purchase Areas, and the European areas. The African Purchase Areas should be extended by the 4 million acres by which they were reduced in 1961, and nearly 6 million acres should be retained in the unreserved land category, to provide additional farms for Africans. Special residential areas should be retained as at present within urban areas, but multi-racial business areas should also be retained.

Finally the Commission recommend that provision be inserted in the Constitution to recognise the institution of chieftainship and to entrench the position of chiefs in African society.

So far the Report has been denounced as drivel by Mr Idensohn, who left the Rhodesia Front earlier this year to set up the Rhodesian National Party to the right; what was wanted, he said, was "a Republic with racial segregation." Robin James, another right-wing critic did not believe that anyone would accept the Senate proposals for one minute. 'Die Rhodesier', which expresses the views of the Afrikaners, who constitute 10% of the European population, wrote that "the only alternative to majority rule is separate development. The sharing of institutions must generate greater racial friction and separate development offers the only protection against progressive integration." ZAPU headquarters at Lusaka, at the other extreme, dismissed the Report as "a true reflection of the agony of racism," and it has been criticised in more moderate terms by members of the African opposition party in the Legislative Assembly. Mr Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister, agreed with the Commission that there was no alternative to an unitary state but added that "in 20 years time 8 million Africans will live in Rhodesia. If we wish to be here also we should forget race, and be prepared to share in a non-racial citizenship." The welcome from moderates has been general, if, for the most part, unenthusiastic (but a constitutional report of 180 pages seldom arouses enthusiasm). The Rhodesian Constitution Association, the rump of Sir Edgar Whitehead's old National Party "has warmly
welcomed the Report on the grounds that it rejects apartheid, espouses racial cooperation, and retains an unitary system of government." Sir Roy Welensky "hoped the British Government would confine its remarks to constructive observations", but, with the wisdom of his long and bitter experience, "doubted if there were many thinking people who believe a constitution prepared and produced in the present day will be in existence in fifty years." It is at least safe to assume that no one will expect Rhodesia to rival Venice whose constitution lasted unchanged for 486 years! Mr Neville Bertram, the Chairman of the 'Forum' was "impressed by the forward-looking approach of the Commission." Mr Winston Field was strongly in favour: "if the British Government is not prepared to accept a constitution as reasonable as this they must be impossible to deal with." But the octogenarian Lord Malvern had the last word: "we should have done much better to stick to the Winston Churchill constitution of 1923 which was working itself out nicely." No member of the Government has so far commented but it has been conjectured that both the party caucus and the Cabinet are divided. One or two statements made by ministers recently in other connections, may give indications of what their views may be towards particular recommendations. Mr Hardner Burke said in March that "if there is one word I do not want to hear in connection with Rhodesia, that is the word republic. We are independent and will continue to be independent. But I think that when we are completely on our own we are going to be the Free State of Rhodesia." (The Constitutional recommendations would only need the word 'free' to be inserted before the words 'State of Rhodesia'). Mr Smith has said that any doubts which he had had about a republic had been "wiped out by the antics of Harold Wilson and his Socialist Government." In any event the mere task of drafting a constitution, after the members of the Rhodesian Government have made up their minds, will involve interpretation of the recommendations and take a good deal of time, so keeping open for months, if not longer, the possibility of further discussions with the British Government. The Government is then pledged to submit the Constitution to a referendum. Mr Smith has shown himself a master of the difficult act of letting time provide solutions to as many problems as possible, and he will probably play the Constitution for quite a while before it is finally gaffed and brought to land.

D. Negotiations with Britain

What in fact are the prospects of further negotiations with the United Kingdom? In August last I forecast that it was unlikely that a political agreement would materialise from the enquiry which Sir Humphrey Gibbs had been authorised by Mr Wilson to make as to the amendments in the Tiger proposals which Mr Smith would wish to propose. In retrospect that looks like the understatement of the year, for whenever it has appeared subsequently that discussions might be resumed with a prospect - even a remote prospect - of success, they have been put out of court by some quite extraneous development. In August it was the incursion of terrorists from Zambia. The Rhodesian Government asked the British Government to make representations to Zambia, but any representations were open to the counter that had Britain done as Zambia had begged her to do, i.e. used force against Rhodesia, such incursions would not have been necessary. On the 25th August Mr Wrathall commented that "the
silence is such as to make it plain that the British Government is in favour of these activities, hoping that they will further its own economic offensive against Rhodesia." At the end of August the Rhodesian note was rejected by the British Government, and Sir Dingle Foot, who had just resigned the Solicitor-Generalship, said publicly that the time was coming when Britain should give aid to the African guerrillas in Rhodesia. The Zambian Government denied that it was assisting their incursions; it was merely giving shelter to political refugees, and had actually confiscated illegal arms several times (presumably from the non-existent freedom fighters). Mr. Wrathall followed up his comment by warning that retaliation might be necessary if Zambia continued to harbour terrorists. 

The movement of some of the terrorists towards South West Africa, and the inclusion of African National Congress members among them, led to the despatch of South African police to aid the Rhodesians in rounding them up, and this did provoke the British Government to state that it would be dangerous and deplorable if Zambia allowed its territory to be used as a base from which armed parties could attack Rhodesia. The statement added that the British Government had already protested to South Africa against the unauthorised entry of South African forces into "the British territory of Rhodesia." The Zambian Government rejected the British note as "ludicrous, nonsensical and unhelpful."

By this time Sir Humphrey's efforts were concentrated simply on persuading the Commonwealth Secretary to visit Rhodesia and see for himself, and he did succeed in arranging for Mr. Thomson to include Rhodesia in his series of visits to Central Africa. Before coming to Rhodesia Mr. Thomson saw President Kaunda and visited South Africa, presumably to check the views of the South African Government and in the hope that it might be persuaded to influence Mr. Smith towards a settlement. Mr. Vorster had, just previously, warned that "if Zambia wanted to try violence South Africa would hit Zambia so hard she would never forget it." Mr Smith had himself visited Mr Vorster earlier in October and according to the press had conferred with him for four hours about Mr Thomson's forthcoming visit and on collaboration against the terrorists. Mr. Vorster was said to have stressed his conviction that a settlement on Rhodesia was imperative for the stability and prosperity of Southern Africa and Mr Smith commented "how refreshing it is to have discussions with a Prime Minister who says the same things to you in private as he says next day in public." It is not clear to which of Mr Vorster's statements he was referring, presumably the one about hitting Zambia, for when Mr Thomson saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Hilgard Muller, on his way to Salisbury, he was less enthusiastic, commenting negatively that "he did not say he was not optimistic". Mr Thomson had several discussions with Mr Smith, and was even less optimistic about these; they had disclosed one or two new differences over the Tiger plan "which had not been created from our side." He "had not given up hope" but he had made it "absolutely plain" that gradual but unimpeded progress to majority rule was "an absolute essential" for any settlement that the British Government could commend to the Commons and to the Commonwealth. The British Government had not contemplated a sell-out and he had not come to arrange one. He had been anxious to find out if there had been a substantial change of circumstances, which would have enabled the British Government to go back to the rest of the Commonwealth about the pledge on
NIBMAR (no independence before majority rule) but "I must confess that I have not found that kind of change of circumstances at this stage." Mr Smith, for his part, said that he had got on well with Mr Thomson - "he seems to be a decent fellow" - but he did not think it would help to meet Mr Wilson. Before Mr Thomson reached London, however, Mr Smith had, in a broadcast on Independence Day (11th November) complained that Rhodesians had been attacked by the British Government "with incredible viciousness ... They hope to destroy the loyalty of our people to their Government and country, and wait in vain to see the breakdown of law and order. This makes me believe that their public stand is deceitful and inconsistent; that their real motive is blatant political expediency aimed at appeasing the forces of world communism." The broadcast had been recorded before Mr Thomson's visit but Mr Smith clearly did not feel that the results of the visit were such as to cause him to alter it. It was no wonder that Mr Thomson then told the House of Commons that his report had to be sombre. All the impetus to discussion might however not have been lost had not Britain's financial crisis then intervened and pre-occupied ministers well into the new year.

It was the obvious fact that some outside intervention had become necessary which led Sir Alec Douglas Home, the former Conservative Prime Minister, to decide to come to South Africa to see for himself what might be possible. Like Mr Thomson he first visited South Africa where he saw Mr Vorster, and then saw Mr Smith in Salisbury. Mr Smith had said in August that if he had been negotiating with a Conservative instead of a Labour Government, Rhodesia would already have reached agreement with Britain. Sir Alec believed that his discussions with Mr Smith had indicated that negotiations might usefully be resumed, but Mr Wilson gave no indication that he agreed and seemed indeed, to have been glad to be relieved of any pressure to resume negotiations by the flare-up over the execution of the two terrorists reprieved, on his advice, by the Queen. Mr Smith and his ministers he denounced as "evil" men. Mr Wilson indicated his intention of seeking an extension of the existing sanctions. "The events of the past three weeks have shown that ultimate power in Rhodesia lies in men to whom we could not entrust any constitution which required acceptance of the rule of law. ... We could not trust men like Lardner Burke and Dupont to carry it out." Mr Heath said that this speech "had shown the Prime Minister at his worst. The exercise of the Queen's prerogative of mercy had been shown to be completely ineffective. This had dramatically illuminated the real situation existing between Britain and Rhodesia. The writ of the Queen as advised by the Commonwealth Secretary does not run in Rhodesia. Neither does any decision of the British Government in the Parliament at Westminster ... Sanctions have stiffened the spirit of Rhodesia and strengthened their resistance, including most of the Africans. To strengthen the policy of mandatory sanctions, as the Prime Minister had indicated, would harden Rhodesian spirit further and would have no effect in other countries." It is difficult to come to any other conclusion but that the Labour Government is no longer interested in reaching agreement except on terms which predicate complete surrender by Rhodesia. The Conservatives have not only repudiated sanctions but called for immediate negotiations for a settlement. 15 backbenchers in mid-April followed up this demand by drawing attention to the recommendations of the Constitution Commission reasserting the value of multi-racial institutions, envisaging the possibility of a continuing relation with the Crown and recommending...
increasing African participation in the functions of government, which led them to consider the moment to be "manifestly favourable for renewed talks, and immediate negotiations, with a view to full Rhodesian independence." I fear that Sir Alec cannot have been as optimistic. About the whole of the discussions there has been an air of unreality, particularly as they took place at a time when all Rhodesians have been preoccupied with the brutal realities of terrorism.

**B. Terrorists**

The Rhodesian note of 31st August 1967, which was rejected by the British Government, drew attention to the crossing of the Zambesi by terrorists from Zambia and to the storage of arms and ammunition there for their use; since mid-1966 all vestige of control over them seemed to have vanished and the Zambian Government had progressed from a policy of ignoring or condoning terrorist activity to one of offering direct encouragement. Terrorists sent into Rhodesia had been trained in Russia, China, Cuba, Algeria, and at three camps in Tanzania; they were indoctrinated in communist ideology while being trained; and were armed at various centres in Zambia with weapons supplied by the African Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity in Dar-es-Salaam. A careful review of the cases of detainees in Rhodesia had shown conclusively that both ZANU and ZAPU had planned the violent overthrow of the Government by any means at their disposal. It was announced that in 18 months more than 120 terrorists had been captured by Rhodesian Security Forces and more than 17 killed; two weeks later 9 were caught by a Botswana police patrol near the Rhodesian border and 5 more killed in Rhodesia. One of the targets, and possibly the main one, of this raid had been the Caprivi Strip of South West Africa and General Keeyv said that South African Defence Force units had been in close liaison with both the Rhodesian and Botswana authorities but had not taken part in joint action with their forces. It was stated, at the end of the year, that the confirmed casualties suffered by the terrorists in this operation were 31 killed and 26 captured, and that 7 Rhodesian soldiers or police had been killed.

In January a second group of terrorists, estimated initially at 300, were said to be ready to cross the Zambesi. A civil defence network covering the whole of Rhodesia had been organised to deal with them. The advance party of the group had disappeared into the Rhodesian bush. Twenty were said later to have been picked up without resistance "weak-willed, undisciplined, tactically naive and burdened with a technology they do not understand;" they had been much inferior in quality to the first wave in August; some had been press-ganged into service. President Nyerere of Tanzania at this point came out into the open: "of course there are freedom fighters on Tanzanian soil. They train here and we offer them facilities. It would be absurd to deny it." The main camp was said to be at Kongwa, inland from Dar-es-Salaam, and the infiltration route via Mbeya and Lusaka to the two areas of attack, west and east and Lake Kariba, towards Victoria Falls and Wankie, and towards Chirundu and Salisbury respectively.

The execution of the five condemned terrorists in March led to a renewed attack later in the month, by a group estimated to
be between 150 and 200. By the 4th April, 36 had been killed. This attack led Mr Botha, the South African Defence Minister, to warn countries which harboured guerrilla fighters that they faced reprisals, and this was followed by a request to the British Government to use their influence with the Zambian Government to secure the withdrawal of facilities before such action became necessary. Rhodesia announced that 40 terrorists had been killed in 3 weeks and that it had been necessary to send territorials in to reinforce the Rhodesian regulars and police in the continued fighting. The captured terrorists had been carrying up to 100 lbs. of weapons and ammunition apiece and this was slowing them down; "they were well trained in conventional guerrilla warfare but lack of food often made them surrender rather than fight. First-class assistance had been given to the security forces by both the local kraal dwellers and the farm workers." A further 15 terrorists were killed in the next two weeks. Five more members of the security forces had been killed in action and one accidentally.

Possibly 1,000 terrorists have already been in action. The Minister of Justice said on the 19th April, that, in all, about 100 had been killed within Rhodesia, but added that "it would be wishful thinking to suggest that we have already won the battle against terrorists. The so-called liberation movement of the Organisation of African Unity is likely to coordinate on an increasing scale its attacks on Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories. Large numbers of terrorists are poised for the attack and many more are undergoing training." The Rhodesian Government last week pinpointed two training camps in Zambia, one 'Nkomo' in the Chunga river valley, 16 miles north-west of Lusaka, the other 'Lithule' 20 miles from Lusaka. Both camps are used by ZAPU and by the African National Congress. Mr Smith commented that while Rhodesia was "trying to avoid an escalation" the Zambian Government, in spite of President Kaunda's recent assurances, was still helping them. As for Rhodesia itself "we have come to the conclusion that we may have to live with this sort of thing for quite a while." The South African Deputy Minister of Police told Parliament on 26th April that 77,000 rounds of ammunition, 54 automatic weapons, including machine guns, sub-machine guns and other weapons of Chinese, Czechoslavakian and Russian manufacture, 6 bazookas of Russian and Chinese manufacture, 169 hand grenades, 44 lbs. of explosives and 10 land mines were discovered during a single day in March in the Zambesi Valley. In Belgium the mercenaries returned from Burundi have said that their next employer will be Rhodesia; 80 to 100 mercenaries had already been recruited: "they prefer us. We are cheaper than a regular army. The Africans are psychologically afraid of us, and if things go wrong our existence can easily be denied."

So the position rests. Two major infiltrations of terrorists (of between 150 and 300 men) have each taken the Rhodesian forces nearly two months to clear up. Rhodesian losses have been small, but the burden of keeping so large a number of men in action against the insurgents (probably at least the 10 to 1 ratio found necessary by the British in Malaya) has imposed an added strain on the economy and on Rhodesian manpower. What the Financial Mail has called "the vast construction of new road services in and to the Zambesi valley is a heavy burden." Indignation is mounting in Rhodesia against Zambja's unwillingness or inability to close down
the training camps, and there has clearly been talk about the
possibility of using a mercenary force for a raid on the camps.
Whether responsibility were then to be repudiated or not Rhodesia
could not expect the benefit of the doubt which Zambia has for so
long enjoyed and the escalation feared by Mr Smith would certainly
occur. Yet, in spite of the risks, if, as Mr Smith expects, other
major infiltrations from Zambia take place, then some retaliatory
action, by Rhodesian forces, by South African forces, by a
combined force (or by mercenaries), is a distinct possibility. It
would initially be likely to be limited to Zambia, but action in
which the Portuguese might participate, might subsequently be taken
against the bases in Tanzania. Southern Africa is too well aware of
the speed with which infiltration of terrorists can expand into
guerrilla action, Vietcong fashion, not to be tempted to destroy
the latter in its infancy by preemptive strikes.

It is because the guerrilla situation is so explosive
that the request by the British Government to the United Nations to
make economic sanctions against Rhodesia comprehensive and drastic
is so dangerous, although it is in all conscience serious enough
in itself. On 23rd April Lord Caradon (formerly Sir Hugh Foot and
brother of Sir Dingle) submitted to the Security Council a draft
resolution proposing that, acting under Articles 39 and 41 of the
UN Charter, the Council should decide -

I. that members of the UN should prevent
   (a) the import into their territories of all commodities
       and products originating in Southern Rhodesia;
   (b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories
       to the contrary;
   (c) shipment in their ships and aircraft or transit through
       their territories of any such commodities;
   (d) the sale to Rhodesia of any commodities other than
       medical supplies or educational films, etc.;
   (e) the shipment of such commodities to Rhodesia;

II. that no funds, investments or other financial resources
    should be made available to Rhodesia or Rhodesians, other
    than for humanitarian or educational purposes, or pensions;

III. that no one travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport
    should be admitted into their territory;

IV. that their airline companies or aircraft should not operate
    to and from Southern Rhodesia; and

V. that they should take all practicable measures to discourage
    their nationals from emigrating to Southern Rhodesia.

Mr Vorster immediately made it clear, and in no uncertain terms,
where South Africa stood: "I see it as my duty to tell the Prime
Minister of Britain in all earnestness that South Africa will not
allow itself to be prescribed to regarding who she will be friends
with and who not, and with whom she will do business and who not.
A country cannot do this. It is wrong in principle - particularly
for a big country and then has to call in all the other bullies to
help. More than ever I am convinced that it was a fatal mistake to
drop this matter into the lap of the UN where it does not belong."
He told Mr Wilson that "it would be well to remember that South Africa was not any longer a colony taking orders from Britain." On the following day Mr Vorster added "the British Prime Minister has on various occasions said that he was not seeking a confrontation with South Africa. My reply to this is this: if you are not seeking a confrontation then you must not come forward with proposals which, to put it mildly, could potentially lead to a confrontation. If sanctions and boycotts were to be effective internationally as instruments to be involved when states had differences, then eventually no state would be free of the danger of such action. Then we are back in the jungle. Then we are back in a world where anarchy prevails."

The most serious risk of immediate confrontation with South Africa lay in Section IV of the resolution submitted to the Security Council. Could Britain, as sponsor of it, allow S.A.A. flights via Salisbury to continue to land at London Airport? If action were taken against South African Airways South Africa might retaliate by curtailing BOAC's very profitable London-Johannesburg flights. Mr Stewart, once again Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, answered the question indirectly when he was asked in the House of Commons if retaliatory boycotts would be organised at the UN if Portuguese or South African airlines violated the sanctions, and said "I must give a negative reply," i.e. in this matter there will not be confrontation between Britain and South Africa.

Mr Stewart went on to justify the request to the UN for total economic sanctions on the ground of the "long haul" - that sanctions cannot be abandoned merely because they achieve results slowly. It was the London 'Times', in an editorial, which really gave the game away: "obviously," wrote the editor, "the ability of South Africa and Portugal to sustain Rhodesia and frustrate sanctions leaves a huge hole in the wall. To extend sanctions to them would however risk the very conflagration which the British Government fears from applying force. It is now for the members of the UN to show whether they can make sanctions effective, notwithstanding this loophole, by firm controls in their own areas and over their own nationals. If, given time, they cannot or will not do so, they can hardly expect Britain indefinitely to continue to bear a costly burden that others will not share ... The British Government's responsibility to the Africans in Rhodesia is fully acknowledged, but no Government can long forget its prime responsibility to the people at home." So here is the way out: if the new sanctions are not effective, without confrontation with South Africa, Britain will, so far as she is concerned, give up sanctions.

It is a clever ploy: Mr Wilson might even carry a House of Commons which he could expect to be wearier than ever of the Rhodesian issue. If meanwhile his Government has been defeated and the Conservatives are in he will be able to condemn them with being ready to make. For his part Sir Alec Douglas Home, after indicating his belief that a settlement would have been possible with Rhodesia had his initiative been pursued, has already contracted out of the new sanctions. "If there are any victims of these - they will be the African labourers who are the only people we are trying to help." And he added "to set the record straight may I remind the Foreign Secretary that the Opposition did vote against the extension of mandatory sanctions. We
proposed that sanctions and UDI should run concurrently in the context of negotiations genuinely pursued and this is where the Government has fallen down."

To sum up:

(1) Economic and financial sanctions have failed, but in spite of the steady growth of Rhodesia's G.N.P. they have hurt the tobacco farmers, and will hurt them more; they are hurting the Africans by reducing the number of jobs for them both on the farms and in industry. By compelling the diversification of agriculture, the development of mining, and the extension of local manufacture, they will however enable Rhodesia to make rapid strides when they are ended.

(2) Rhodesia is hacking out its own solution to its constitutional problems. No constitution providing for future majority African rule is likely to be accepted and the Commission have therefore sought to secure agreement on future parity between Europeans and Africans. This the moderates on both sides may be ready to accept. The position of the Crown has become incidental, and, as the Commission has pointed out, will be dependent on whether or not an agreement has been reached with Britain before other considerations lead to a republic.

(3) The initial guerrilla attacks have failed and have brought military and police help to Rhodesia from South Africa. The danger is that the failure of economic sanctions, and the stresses within Zambia may lead to further incursions motivated by frustration which will produce drastic counteraction, whether by Rhodesia, South Africa or just possibly a mercenary force. The danger of a Vietcong developing in Central Africa has consolidated South African support for Rhodesia, and indirectly for Portugal, and the southern African states would probably face the risks of action rather than the dangers of inaction.

(4) There is no prospect of any negotiations between the Rhodesian Government and the British Labour Government being successful. The possibility of a negotiated settlement will depend therefore on Mr Wilson's Government being defeated before Rhodesia becomes a republic. Thereafter, as I suggested last August, negotiations would be primarily concerned with a commercial treaty.