Conflict in the Horn: Prevention and Resolution.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Conflict destroys the very bases of development: environmental resource, economic infrastructure, and the social and civic ties that permit and sustain development. Understanding the nature, causes and consequences of conflict through scientific inquiry is indispensable to conflict prevention and management endeavours. Among the major causes of conflict, it is possible to mention such factors as a breakdown of governmental structures, increased pressure over natural resources (e.g. grazing land) and ethnic and religious differences, which can be exploited by domestic power elite and international business interests. Conflict leads, among other things, to breakdown of law and order, disruption of economic activities, humanitarian crises (e.g. displacement of people, including vulnerable groups such as women and children) and a state of uncertainty that deter long run investment efforts and stability.

It is, therefore, important to improve our understanding of the nature, causes and consequences of conflict in the Horn with a view to deliberating on possible measures to be undertaken towards conflict prevention, resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction.

The Ethiopian Chapter of OSSREA held its Second Annual Workshop from 8th to 9th June 2001, at Imperial Hotel, Addis Ababa. The workshop focused on this theme: Conflict in the Horn: Prevention and Resolution. Participants (55 in number) represented academic institutions, research institutions, the public sector, the private sector, and NGOs. Eighteen papers were represented at the workshop.

The papers were presented and discussed under three sub-themes:

1. Causes of conflict and state policies;

2. Ethnicity and conflict;

3. Indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict (see workshop programme).

The participants were enthusiastic and active during floor discussions. Presentation of papers was followed by discussion of major issues and policy options. During this time, the participants deliberated on the nature and causes of conflicts and they gave interesting recommendations.

A business session was held at the end of the workshop. A relatively large number of members of the chapter (37 compared to 25 during the first workshop) attended the session.

The Liaison Officer presented reports of activities undertaken since the first general assembly of members, which was held on March 4, 2000. Members deliberated on problems encountered by the liaison office and gave useful suggestions. Among the decisions of the assembly, the following are worth mentioning. First, contact persons were established in twelve institutions. Second, tentative themes were suggested for the third annual workshop. Third, members recommended that a centre be established for the study and documentation of conflict and its resolution in the Horn.
The following summaries are prepared pending the publication of the proceedings of the workshop.

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2. SUMMARY OF PAPERS PRESENTED

2.1 Theories and Conceptual Frameworks of the Nature, Causes and Consequences of Conflict

(Kinfe Abraham)

Humanity is posed with resolving the enigma of conflicts and ending their unprecedented, ignominious outrage. Fixing a broken peace perforce demands the understanding of the nature and causes of conflicts. Hence, this paper is a synopsis of the theories and conceptual framework of the nature, causes and consequences of conflict and approaches to resolve them. The paper commences by providing global perspective on the nature and causes of conflicts. It identifies assumed racial, ethnic and religious superiority, and autocratic rules as the main sources of conflict that breed from hankering for economic and political power.

In addition to the above and other sources that the paper enlists, conflicts may also be triggered by demand for justice and access to social and physical infrastructures. Demand for justice also involves crave for civil, political, cultural and religious rights. It may also include the quest for secession and independence. The manifold social, economic and political repercussions of conflicts consecrate collective security as the best means to end the recurrence of wars. This was the bedrock for the establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations. However, such institutional approaches failed as they derailed to serve the interests of the powerful ones.

2.2 The Fundamental Causes of Armed Conflict in Human History: Reinterpretation of Available Sources

(Mohammed Tadesse)

Through a long process of cultural development, human beings are able to score remarkable achievements in their life. However, people are still unable to avoid conflicts of violent/armed character, which are destructive in their nature. Archaeological findings, anthropological interpretations and historical records indicate that people have been engaged in armed conflicts since the prehistoric period. Naturally, the following questions may ensue: What is the nature of this phenomenon? What are the roots and responsible causes of waging limitless destructive wars without interruption? Why are people not in a position to overcome conflicts of armed nature for
the last time? Although it seems too ambitious, the paper tries to deal with this crucial problem, which indiscriminately affects all.

In all periods of human history, armed conflict has been an important issue of intellectual debate. Great thinkers, politicians, historians, theologians, military theoreticians, and behavioural scientists have exerted maximum efforts to examine and explain the nature of the problem from different perspectives. However, their findings are diversified and influenced by different factors. Some of the conclusions made by these experts have also led their audiences to a muddle. Therefore, it is essential to re-examine the problem for three major reasons:

   i) Curiosity to learn about the nature and causes of the problem;

   ii) Misdiagnosis of the nature, sources and/or causes of armed conflict by experts and non-experts; and

   iii) Unwillingness on the part of the world to learn from its tragic history.

The study tries to analyse the following questions: Is violent / armed conflict an eternal phenomenon that cannot be controlled or a social phenomenon that can be controlled? What are the fundamental causes of armed conflicts in the history of humankind?

Hence, attempt is made to:

   a) Re-examine different approaches and theories of scholars in explaining the nature and course of armed conflict;

   b) Reinterpret the nature of armed conflict in human history, whether it is an innate genetic characteristic of human beings, a social construct or determined and moulded by both; and

   c) Enrich the existing knowledge on the matter and probably provide some valuable conceptual explanations to the problem.

The problem is mainly conceptual in nature, which dictates the method of collecting and analysing the data. Thus, the paper uses a body of concepts from behavioural sciences to apply a thematic approach and scientific methods and techniques, which enable to look for evidences, describe the nature and causes of the problem, and formulate broad statements.

The paper uses secondary sources of multidisciplinary character (findings of biology, psychology, anthropology, archaeology, relevant historical and other social science theoretical books, thesis, articles, religious books, etc.). Based on the available materials, the researcher has reviewed and classified different views of scholars regarding the nature of aggressive behaviour in general and armed conflict in particular. Finally, the data is analysed using a descriptive method of study. The findings are as follows:
1. On the nature of armed conflicts: i) the evolutionary development of human intelligence is the primary responsible factor (under conditions) for the origin of aggressiveness in human behaviour, which gradually planted the culture of war in the history of humankind. ii) The present state of human warrior culture is inevitable and a continuous process of evolutionally development and it remains part of human life for a long period.

2. On the causes of armed conflict: Conflicts of violent/armed character are not products of a single factor. Conflicts result from the denial or ignoring or suppression of human biological as well as socio- psychological (ontological) needs. Just for the sake of simplicity, the paper classifies the responsible motives, needs, or causes of armed conflict into fundamental and specific causes:

i) The fundamental causes, which are common for all violent conflicts, are grouped into primary and secondary sources.

   a) Under primary source of fundamental character come:

      - Human nature
      - Socio-psychological needs
      - Economic factors

   b) Under secondary source of fundamental character come:

      - Politics and
      - Culture (the presence of warrior tradition)

ii) Specific causes. Each war that had taken place in different periods of human history has its own specific causes of functional character. The specific causes of certain wars may not be the responsible causes for the other and /or all spoils of wars. In one way or the other, specific causes also belong to the fundamental causes. Let us see some of the conflicting events of historical character that can be marked as specific causes, which were used to:

   ✪ Adopt strangers (assimilation);
   ✪ Enslave others;
   ✪ Enlarge territory;
   ✪ Colonize;
   ✪ Achieve unification;
Establish sphere of influence;

Settle border conflict;

Separate from the main historical nation-state;

Achieve irredentism, etc.

The following initiatives can be taken as possible options to maintain relative security before the outbreak of armed conflict, and if not, to minimize the destruction:

1. Human beings, by their nature of evolutionary development, do not possess the ability to avoid conflicts forever and to maintain peaceful life for the last time. But the findings of this research confirm the possibility of either delaying the development of the responsible factors for the origin of armed conflict and/or minimizing its all round destruction. This is viable only if the concerned bodies are able to diagnose the sources of armed conflict and take all preventive measures, which also include maintaining reasonable force of defence and balance of power in their respective areas. Hence, there should not be any magnanimity to disarm the nation unilaterally;

2. Although the paper needs further investigation, it can be used for:

   - Enriching the theoretical basis and help others to study related topics of specific character
   - Differentiating the "rational" from the "accidental" causes of violent conflicts

2.3 Socio-Economic Explanation of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

(Astatke Bayou)

This paper focuses on understanding and explaining the past and present violent history of conflicts in the Horn to find ways and means of substantially reducing the prevalence of conflict. In short, the objective is to search for an alternative strategy to prevent conflict. The methodology employed in carrying out the study was based on secondary sources of information: relevant books, academic journals, and newspapers.

Valuable information collected by the writer while he was a student in the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague on Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti has been efficiently utilized. The writer's experience and observation of the peoples of the Horn was also useful in shaping up the organization and execution of the study.
In the three countries of the Horn, i.e., Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, 19 coups have been recorded, of which 15 were in Sudan. These coups resulted in a breakdown of law and order that in turn undermined and halted the process of democratisation, development and peace. Dictatorship has never produced legitimacy, rule of law, good government or democracy. A ruler must govern by listening to the opinion of those who opted to be ruled. The humanitarian crisis that follows the breakdown of law and order needs to be stopped.

Whenever a conflict situation prevails between the Horn countries, the hostility gets out of hand. The conflicting states start looking for an ally, be it among the Horn states, other African countries, Arab countries or the superpowers. This act of trying to outflank one another by becoming a pawn to a regional ally or superpower has already damaged the efforts of nation building and resulted in balkanisation. The Horn countries are being disintegrated and there is a cause for alarm. Conflicts of this nature should be settled through compromise, consultation and mediation. Most anthropologists and some social scientists argue that ethnicity is the major cause of conflict and war. There is lack of conceptual and scholastic clarity regarding the term ethnicity. Some take ethnicity as a core concept and source of societal harmony. In the case of the Horn, this notion fails to pass this test. Somalia is homogeneous, whereas Kenya is heterogeneous; yet, Kenya is harmonious while Somalia is in chaos to the extent of disintegration. In Somalia, conflict is based on clan affiliation whereas one rarely observes ethnic conflict in Kenya. Therefore, the term ethnicity passes for clan in Somalia. Thus, the art of using ethnicity as a framework to analyse conflict in the context of the Horn is inadequate and at times misleading. It is highly confusing whether it is a myth or reality.

Culture and religion have long been the source of conflict and war in the Horn. Conflicts and wars waged based on culture and religion were highly pronounced in Ethiopia and Sudan among the countries of the Horn. The religious wars fought by Gragn and Yohanes in Ethiopia and the religious and cultural wars fought for hundreds of years by the Kingdoms of Dongola and Alwa against the southward moving Arabs had claimed more lives than any other war. The recent religion based sporadic conflicts in the Horn must be taken seriously, because conflicts based on convictions are the most ardent, dangerous and difficult to control. One must give the right to the individual to worship his 'God' or choose his religion.

Regarding trans-boundary rivers of the Horn, the principle of equitable water utilization by both upper and lower riparian states, along with international law, is in order. When one considers both the principle of equity and international law, practical difficulties arise. This is so because a large proportions of the waters of the Nile has been utilized by the lower riparian countries, Egypt and Sudan. The agreements made during the colonial time did not take into consideration the interests of the upper riparian states. The question of utilizing especially the Blue Nile Waters by upper riparian countries without reducing the volume of the flow to the lower riparian countries is becoming critical. Water is scarce resource. Scarce resources have value measured in price. Thus, a compromise solution less than war is the application of opportunity cost calculation to compensate upper riparian states.

In considering conflicts related to the making of a nation, the policy to be followed should be oriented to an anti-balkanisation of the Horn countries. The phenomena are threatening the continuity of nation building. When considering conflicts originating from social anthropology
and ethnology, the best policy to be adopted is to use both traditional and non-traditional mechanisms of settling dispute as in Somaliland. This area needs to be deeply explored and exploited to the advantage of conflict resolution. Regarding conflicts arising from issues related to religion, the policy to be adopted should be to let the individual have the religion of his choice, and the state should remain secular. While accepting the principles of equitable utilization of the Nile Waters both by upper and lower riparian countries, the practical policy to be followed should be compensation to the upper riparian states based on opportunity cost, as a large proportion of the waters of the river has already been utilized by the lower riparian countries, Egypt and Sudan.

The policy direction to be initiated regarding the other trans-boundary rivers that have their sources in Ethiopia, Shebelle, Juba and Omo, should be based on the principle of equitable utilization of water from these rivers without undermining international law.

Regarding external intervention, the policy to be applied is to say, "no, thank you!" to the Arabs and the West while respecting their legitimate interest. This policy will curb the outflanking of the Horn countries against one another and at the same time limit the possibility of balkanisation. The big powers are of course expected to respect their magnanimity.

The peoples of the Horn and their leadership must adopt a policy of looking for the opportunities around them. With the help of the international community, they should reverse their pigeonhole outlook and join their hands and resources together to overcome the tragedy of war, poverty, destitution and hopelessness. The organization of joint cooperation and operation in areas of marine fisheries, shipping lines, water resources, energy, biodiversity, desertification and trade are some of the opportunities that foster development and reduce conflict in the Horn countries.

2.4 Geo-Political Explanations of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

(Alexander Attilio)

The objective of the paper is to exhaust the major explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa to devise ways and means of transforming conflict into cooperation. A politico-geographical approach has been adapted as the methodology for conducting the research.

Conflict is undesirable. In its violent form, it claims the lives of many people, destroys property, and diverts human as well as financial resources away from development. The Horn of Africa has been engaged in conflict. For most of its existence, its politics has been influenced by many factors and many actors. To what extent each of these has affected the stability and development of the region has been discussed in the paper.

No factor has been as influential as the geographical location of the region vis-à-vis the major petroleum producing states, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as an important route for transporting petroleum. The region's proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict area needs also to be pointed out. This strategic location has called for the involvement of various states.
European colonizers were the first to fully engage in the politics of the region during the nineteenth century although external influences from Islam had preceded them. French, British, and Italian colonizers divided the countries in the Horn of Africa among themselves with the exception of Ethiopia. They established boundaries that cut across the same people, dividing them. They also imposed their rule on an unequal basis. The process of nation building in these states of the Horn was also interrupted. These issues became the sources of the problems that developed subsequently.

When the Europeans withdrew from the region, they left deep scars. The political vacuum was soon filled by the superpowers whose primary interest was to maintain their ties with their clients and not to resolve conflict in the region. The United States established diplomatic and military ties with Ethiopia as early as the late 1940s. However, by the early 1960s, the Soviet presence in the Horn was being felt. Somalia, had established ties with the Soviet Union, and so did Sudan, but to a lesser extent. Moscow wanted to divert western attention from Europe, where it felt more vulnerable. However, developments within Ethiopia changed the situation as a revolution unfolded and a new Marxist regime came to power.

The superpowers switched clients and Ethiopia was supported by the Soviet Union while Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt were under the umbrella of the United States. The Ethio-Somali conflict of 1977-78 further increased the patron-client relationship. However, by the late 1980s, internal developments within the Soviet Union coupled with the Strategic Defence Initiative of the United States led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which entailed the end of the Cold War.

This meant, at least in the beginning, the withdrawal of both the United States and the Soviet Union from the region. However, this was not to last as new 'threats' to Western interests in the form of Islamic Fundamentalism emerged and the United States re-engaged itself in the politics of the region. At a regional level, neighbouring Arab states have always played a significant role to maintain their interest in the Horn of Africa. Egypt and Saudi Arabia want to keep their interests in the Nile Basin and Red Sea littorals. They also seek to emerge as regional powers. Iran for its part has exported its Islamic Fundamentalism to Sudan, with which it maintained good ties. The end of the Cold War also saw the secession of Eritrea and the collapse of Somalia. The United States being the sole superpower, democratic principles were further propagated to the Horn of Africa as well as the rest of the Third World. In terms of water resources, the region is endowed with the Nile, the Awash and the Wabe Shebelle Rivers, but the area has remained underdeveloped. The need for using the offices of regional organizations - to minimize external influence and to cooperate especially on the development of the various river basins - was pointed out.

Concerning the internal problems of the region, territorality is one factor that exacerbates conflict. Among the theoretical justifications for backing this proposition, one is the principle that territorial contiguity is a source of inter-state conflict. The more borders a state has, the more likely it is to engage in inter-state conflicts. Similarly, it has been established that few other issues lead to war unless they have a link with territorial issues. This proved to be the case during the Ethio-Somali conflict of 1977-78 and the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998.
The marginalisation of pastoralists is also considered as further fuelling the internal conflict. The pastoralist population is nowhere as concentrated as it is in the Horn of Africa. This community had its political power taken away by the State, over time. The State wanted to reduce its movements and exploit it; cultivators were pressured to take over its land, and the region's meagre natural endowment created a competition for survival in which pastoralists entered into conflict among themselves.

To sum up, there is an important relationship between ethnic conflict and territoriality in the Horn of Africa. For an internal conflict to emerge, usually grievances of the concerned group come from distributional inequities as well as ethnic elements. In addition, the major factors causing ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa are, inter alia, the meagre natural endowments in the region, the emergence of modern states, the uneven development among various regions and groups, cultural oppression in general and marginalisation of pastoralists in particular, class conflict and ideology, and regional or ethnic as well as clan movements.

In general, territoriality has been seen as the core of ethnic conflict. To minimize or resolve ethnic conflict, there is a necessity to `de-territorialize' ethnic issues. By separating an issue - in our case ethnic conflict - from its territorial base, it is believed that the resolution of ethnic conflicts would be minimized if not resolved.

2.5 The Root Causes of Conflict among the Southern Pastoral Communities of Ethiopia: A Case Study of Borana and Degodia

(Dejene Aredo and Abdurahman Ame)

Southern pastoral populations of Ethiopia inhabit the rangelands located in Borana Zone of Oromia and Liban Zone of Somali region characterized by semi arid climate and extremely diverse natural resources, ecology and pastoral inhabitants. The area has extensive borders with neighbouring Somalia and Kenya. The Dollo Ado, Suftu (Mandhera) and Moyale towns are important gateways that allow the trans-clan and trans-national trade network for the movement of goods and people. The area is economically tied to a trade network linking the region to the Gulf States, where camels are exported. The proceeds from live animals are used to purchase manufactured goods and food commodities. Cattle and small ruminants are also taken across the border to Kenya. Ganale and Dawa Rivers traverse the area from north to south and confluence at Dollo Ado and then flow together as Juba River (in Somalia) to the Indian Ocean. The riverbanks of the two rivers form an agricultural belt settled by Garri Maro sedentary farmers. Outside this farming corridor lies the grazing land frequented by Borana, Digodia and Marexaan pastoral groups practising traditional livestock husbandry.

Traditionally the area is endemic to conflicts between rival pastoral groups for pastoral resources. During the 1990s, the frequency and magnitude of conflicts has increased. For instance, in 2000, three major conflicts occurred between major rival pastoral groups (Borana versus Garri, Merehan versus Digodi, Digodi versus Borana). These conflicts resulted in the death of hundreds of people and combined with severe drought, they resulted in dislocations leading to the formation of IDP camps. The objective of this paper is to assess the root causes of conflict and the relationships between food insecurity and vulnerability to conflict among pastoral
groups. There are many types of conflict in the study area: competition over access to water for humans, livestock and small-scale irrigation, and land for farming and pasture are principal sources of social tension. For this study, conflict between Borana and Digodia over pasture and water is the focus. The study relies on secondary data sources and on primary data sources based on personal observations and informal discussions held with traditional leaders, paternalists and district administrators.

The study of conflict is made more difficult because the many dimensions of the subject of the study do not readily submit to ordinary methods of analysis. However, in spite of these and other difficulties, an attempt has been made to highlight the extent of poverty as the predisposing factor for the eruption of conflicts. It is nonetheless believed that even a general appreciation of the many dimensions and consequences highlighted in this study can contribute toward the promotion of more appropriate and effective responses to what has become one of the most difficult problems facing contemporary pastoral society.

The preliminary findings are summarized below.

1. Drought constitutes two consecutive annual rainfall years having <75% of the average (12 years). In the area, the two recent droughts were in 1991-92 and 1999-2000. It means that major drought recurred after eight years. Good rain occurred in 1997 for Filtu district and 1996 for Liban district. For the main season of 1998, the deficit at two stations (Filtu and Negelle) was less than half of the normal. Since 1988, such a large deficit had previously occurred at Filtu in 1992. The phenomena of drought and conflict seem to be related. First, all observed conflicts occurred during drought years. Second, the probability of occurrence of conflict is high during long and short dry seasons.

2. Pastoralists face two main processes during drought that adversely affect their capacity to support themselves, effectively raising the minimum herd numbers required to support the household. Firstly, they face a fall in the levels of productivity from their herds following losses in their livestock capital from higher mortality rates, low or zero rates of calving, reduced production of milk and weight-loss. These factors by themselves would make the pastoral enterprise and household less able to provide for its needs. However, in addition to reduced levels of productivity within the livestock sector, pastoralists also face during drought changes in the terms of trade that adversely affect the purchasing power represented by their herds.

3. The terms of trade between average male cattle, the most commonly sold animal and maize increased from its low level in 1992 (compared to that of 1996 a normal year due to adequate rain and bumper harvest in most parts of the country). After the Elinu effect of 1997-98, the trend has shown a consistent decline. The overall decline during 1997-2000 was more than 60 per cent. For instance, the amount of maize that could be purchased from the sale of an average ox has fallen from 1096 kg in 1996 to 595 kg in 2000. Both the livestock and maize prices declined, but there was a sharp decline in livestock price (50%). By early 2000, an average ox was sold for Br 541 where it would have fetched up to Br 1092 during 1996.
4. Coefficients of variation calculated for different markets and livestock types for two major trek routes were identified in the area: Filtu-Dollo- (Suftu) Mandhera and Negelle-Dubluk and Moyale. In each of the two routes looked at here, the Dollo-Mandhera market price has tended to fluctuate more than that of Dubluk-Moyale. Camel prices have a higher coefficient of variation than other livestock prices since almost exclusively camel is for the export/border markets. Filtu prices appear to be slightly more volatile due to the inaccessibility of the area. The least volatile is the market price of Moyale. The coefficients of variation for border market of Dollo show that sheep and goat prices are more volatile in markets located near the border. Similar computations for all livestock prices in Negelle, Dubluk and Moyale markets showed high price volatility. Thus, unreliable and irregular price information coupled with lack of official recognition of cross border trade exacerbates market risk and discourages spatial arbitrage. The impact of changes in terms of trade against pastoral products may jeopardize the coping mechanism of the pastoralists during the drought years and hence contribute to social tensions. Policies that contribute to economic stagnation and decline, thus intensifying poverty and insecurity, are likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and provide fertile ground for the operation of ethnic entrepreneurs.

5. The official market alternatives to cross border trade are minimal. In the face of recurrent drought risks, the lack of official recognition of cross border trade exacerbates market risks. For impoverished pastoralists confronting a borderline between survival and starvation, lack of official support is the result of political impotency of the pastoral communities, as policies emerge from negotiations among those with the potential to influence policy.

In conclusion, it can be underscored that access to pastoral resources is based on social organizations where each clan is associated with a particular territory, which may or may not coincide with the boundaries of the district administrative units. Clans defend their grazing regions forcefully if necessary particularly at times when range and water resources are scarce. However, as pastoral exigency necessitates, often scarce and variously distributed pastoral resources have to be shared between herders from different clans for the well being of the wider nomadic society. As a result, pastoral groups have undergone continuous changes in their ethnic composition, territorial boundaries and process of interaction. The increased conflict over scarce pastoral resources is due to the deterioration in their livelihood triggered by cyclical drought and escalated by ineffective social and political organization. Finally, it should be noted that food aid supplied by donors to pursue non-development objectives, and aid disproportionately supplied to a certain group might have exacerbated the conflict.

2.6 Understanding the Historical Origin and the Emerging Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia

(Merara Gudina)

The modern multi-ethnic polity of Ethiopia was born out of centuries of wars of expansion and conquest, which had left behind scars of history, which in turn have had profound effects not only on men and events of yester years but also on the way the present is understood as well as
the way the future is perceived. This paper argues that the wars of expansion and conquest that led to the creation of the Ethiopian Empire-State in the last quarter of the 19th century and the historical dynamics that defined its subsequent evolution, had resulted in a national domination of one or two ethnic groups over the multitudes of others. It further argues that as part of that process, the independence of various ethnic groups was forcefully taken away; a massive alienation of land from the indigenous peoples was carried out for a hundred of years. In addition, the cultures and languages of the indigenous peoples were suppressed while those of the dominating ethnic group were imposed on the subjected ethnic groups.

The forceful alienation of land from the indigenous peoples, especially across much of the centre-south had provoked national resistance of one form or another by the subjected peoples in the 1960s, which partly contributed to the revolutionary upheaval of 1974 that ended the country's ancient regime. However, the country's military regime, which assumed state power in the midst of the crisis of the spontaneously broke-out revolution, could not resolve the deep-rooted ethnic conflict by its top-down approach of regional 'authority' formula. Regrettably, despite the land nationalization, which can be termed as a major response of the state to alleviate the grievances of the marginalized ethnic groups, with its bloody military interlude that decimated the cream of one dynamic generation, the regime had further aggravated the ethnic cleavages among the country's population with a resultant effect of a devastating civil war, which led to a change of the regime in 1991.

The demise of the military regime in May 1991, mainly because of the combined onslaught of ethnic-based movements, in turn resulted in a new dynamic of inter-ethnic relations informed by competing ethnic nationalisms. Therefore, this paper seeks to trace the historical origin of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and the current emerging dynamics thereof. It also attempts to suggest a "new social contract" for the permanent resolution of ethnic conflict in the country.

2.7 Law As a Source of Conflict: The Ethiopian Experience

(Seleshi Zeyohannis)

The study is geared towards establishing the linkage between law and conflict. Analyses and interpretations of pieces of legislations of public laws of Ethiopia have been made. Historical and sociological findings have also been used, as secondary sources. The Ethiopian law, being chaotic and eclectic must have been a fertile breeding ground for germination and escalation of conflicts. This is true on both the legal theory and jurisprudential level and constitutional plain. From the point of view of sociology of law, the function of a legal system is to distribute and maintain allocation of values that society feels to be right. Refined at most, the function can be characterized as the pursuit of socially or ethically determined justice.

The conscious desire and effort of people to develop a conception of law should be by recognizing the centrality of diversity and conflict in social life. This is discernible wherever and whenever law is provisionally taken as a process of formally articulating normative expectations. The greater the magnitude of diversity of perception and evaluations is, the greater will be the variability of perception of justice. To state that people seek to acquire and use resources to satisfy their own interest is, of course, to say that they want to have and exercise power. Power is
here understood as having control of resources, the exercise of which means the mobilization of efforts to increase the probability of reaching on acceptable resolution of actual or potential conflicts. The reality suggests then that law is a set of resources for which people contend to promote their own ideas and interests.

Law has also the function of allocating social, political and economic resources. The different relationships established among various combinations of proprietary relationships, for instance, are not only reflections of the differences in the socio-economic system, but they are also institutions or mechanics by which the said system is made to operate. An institution of law may have institutive, consequential and terminative rules.

One other aspect of law, as a resource, may quite appropriately relate to a question of integration. Rules, laws and legal systems are all resources whose control and exercise bestow power on the actor. In this respect, five modalities have been identified so far. These are the control of the means of direct physical violence, i.e., the army, police, security forces, etc.; production, allocation and other forms of use of material resources, i.e., economic power; decision-making processes, i.e., political power; definition of and access to knowledge, beliefs, values (ideological power); and human attention and living-time, i.e., diversionary power.

The particular advantage that may be derived from the conception of law as power is that it facilitates the analysis of the processes by which normative declarations are given inter-group significance. When norms are thus articulated the conditions when and how conflicts many arise by the control or mobilization of legal resources can be formulated into a theory of law of conflict management. In this respect, the writer has postulated two major propositions. On the horizon of the legal system, potential and actual conflicts of various nature and degree must have emanated and could have been properly managed by the use of a legal system informed of both sociology of law and jurisprudence. A legal system, whose pattern of linkage imparts unity of its entire component parts can be formulated based on legitimacy, validation and appropriate institutions with the corresponding structural design, which could, by social engineering, be curved out of the historical, anthropological and sociological findings of the Ethiopian society.

On the constitutional level, in the absence of integrative economic markets, information, education systems and consensus arrangement, i.e., devolution of single-party-led politicised ethnicity based on symmetrical allocation of power in a parliamentary form of government can bequeath conflicts on all levels in the absence of firmly established formal and informal machinery of control, i.e., constitutionalism.

Developing an umbrella of legal system within the framework of deep pluralism, lawyers, sociologist and anthropologists have to work out the ways and means of narrowing the gap between state-enacted-laws and enduring customary laws. In the mean time, two levels of legal regimes have to continue in operation: state-enacted-laws, on one hand, and customary laws at local or state level, on the other. On top of all, positive law backed by the international community, Christianity-Islam and enduring traditional morality (as evidenced by councils of elders and findings of social scientists) must form the backbone of the Ethiopian legal system.
In view of the parliamentary democracy form of government, we are presently having the organic and close relationship between the representative body (The House of Peoples’ Representatives) and the executive. Such formal organs of control as the Judiciary, Ombudsman, Human Right Commission and even the Auditor General should be made accountable to the House of Federation or to an enhanced Office of the President. This helps to provide an effective check and balance system between and among the legislature and the executive as bridged by majority seat, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, on one hand, and the Judiciary, on the other, as shown about, thus strengthened by the newly formed organic relation and a shift in accountability. All these require a through study by the concerned professionals, officials and academics with a view to effect smooth and yet structural change at all levels, i.e., in jurisprudential, constitutional and administrative spheres.

The constitutional experiment referred to above should be allowed to give birth to good governance by and through conscious and gradual adjustment and innovation than to social rapture, the recurrence of which has exasperated most of us.

2.8 Issues of Security and Conflict in the Ethiopian Frontiers: Notes on State Policies and Strategies

(Allehone Mulugeta)

Ethiopian peripheral areas are historical and geographical constructs. Their inclusion in the traditional polity was spearheaded by Menelik II’s "Imperial March to the South" where the geographical outer limits of the fringe areas were negotiated through the various international treaties the emperor signed with the western colonial powers (Great Britain, France and Italy) in the 1890s. This colonial legacy in the Horn of Africa surfaces as an important systemic cause of conflict in the peripheries by dividing ethnic groups, restricting pastoral mobility, introducing new tax regime on local communities and disrupting local traditions. Owing to the structural weakness of the centre, successive Ethiopian governments did not command effective control over the peripheries; instead, they used indirect rule and loose administrative means for control and regulation. Though centre-periphery interaction had varied in time and space, both during Menelik's period and afterwards, visible marginalisation, relative under development, and less integration have been durable features of the border areas within Ethiopia.

The pastoral economy that for long has been dominating the lowland areas and the traditional and well-knit social control mechanisms of the local communities have been impaired due to varied trends involving ecological and demographic upswing, misguided state intervention and encroachment, depletion of resources and others. The crisis within the pastoral way of life, which is externally injected through varied interventions, gradually accelerates the eventual fallout of the economy from self-correcting strategic cycle. The aforementioned negativities are further compounded with the resultant spillover effect of conflicts within neighbouring countries. These conflicts are felt primarily and strongly in the peripheries. Inter-state conflicts in the Sudan and Somalia have not only brought a huge influx of refugees into these peripheries thereby creating an immense pressure on frontier people but they have also drawn Ethiopia as an actor into these conflicts. For example, through support to SPLA in Gambella area where the Derg went to the extent of literally abdicating local administration to the Sudanese rebels, the government was
engaged in peripheral mutual blackmail and intervention with its neighbour to realize foreign policy objectives. SPLA's interaction with local groups left a serious impact on the area by militarising the people and injecting animosity among them.

True to the traditional Ethiopian way of "revolt and resistance", where the wealth and material resources collected through robbery, trade and hunting in the lowlands and their inaccessibility made these areas refuge for bandits, a number of armed apposition groups like OLF, ONLF, and others still use border areas as launching pad for their resistance against the centre. Hence, the conclusion we can draw is that peripheral conflicts cannot be explained exclusively on a certain model of conflict studies alone. In these areas, what we observe is differing typologies of conflicts triggered by a complex mix of elements involving history and culture, resource, environment and development strategies.

Hence, the paper attempts to discuss the various layers of the causes of these conflicts, to observe the policies and strategies the Ethiopian government is taking to minimize and contain them, and to note how border areas could be sources of regional dialogue and cooperation through institutional set ups like IGAD.

2.9 Conflict in the Horn: Prevention and Resolution

(Shemelis Gizaw)

The fact that the Horn of Africa is central to the politics of the USA, Europe and the Arab world has gained worldwide recognition due to the frequent incidents of war in the region. The solution for the conflicts in the area should be sought in the context of the history, political system, religious affiliations and economic relations of the Horn countries to the rest of the world.

Recent changes in the political order of the world may have also changed the influence of the East on the Horn countries. This has been demonstrated in the direction western countries are taking on matters concerning the Horn countries especially after the end of the cold war. This, however, does not mean that the old ties between the Horn countries and the East has been broken. The tie between them has only been loosened and it can be tightened in times of emergency. This factor can intensify conflicts between neighbouring countries of the Horn.

Peacemaking activities of the UN Security Council, the international community, the OAU, and that of the states of the region need to be coordinated to work for the common goal of resolving conflict in the Horn. The example of actions taken by these organizations and some countries (both African and non-African) should be encouraged. It is necessary to remind neighbouring countries of the Horn to take the initiative to resolve conflicts and not to fail to understand the importance of peace in the zone for the economic development of every country in the sub-region. Objectives of the study are:

1. Analysis and explanation of conflicts in the Horn,

2. Identification of possible causes of conflicts in the Horn, and
3. Consequences and recommendations on conflict prevention and resolution.

The assumption in the approach of this study is that physical proximity to other countries or part of the world sometimes facilitates the creation of conflict and that conflict is a kind of interaction. The negative development of interaction between states or regions, however, can develop into violent armed conflict unless it is handled properly.

According to this assumption, the conflicts in the Horn can accrue from the region's proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict zone, to the Arab countries in general and to Israel and Egypt, which are allies of the USA. This fact has attracted foreign intervention into the affairs of countries of the Horn. This has often resulted in either permanent tension of conflict or in actual conflict between countries of the Horn. This approach is called "politico geographical" approach, which has been maintained by Professor Mesfin Woldemariam and it might have been followed by others who made studies on the subject. Some of the causes of conflict in the Horn include:

- Competition for the share of state power
- Regional ethnic conflicts
- Conflicts over resources like cultivable land and land for cattle grazing
- Conflicts based on colonial grounds, i.e., fragmentation of ethnic groups into separate regions in different countries of the Horn and the need to join their kinsmen (in neighbouring countries) by violence especially in times of crisis
- The sub-region's location, i.e., its proximity to the Red Sea Coast, which has strategic importance for the USA, and
- The region's being the source of the River Nile and its basin, over which at least three countries contest.

Together with mechanisms that can help to restore peace permanently in the area, employing some other methods of resolving conflicts is critical for the settlement and well-being of civilians in the war zones. The following are some of the methods:

- Establishing an institution like those which are among neighbouring countries for trade, for the control of eruptions of conflict instead of waiting for the action of the UN Security Council and having it authorized,
- Isolation of the warring parties from civilians and protecting their rights of obtaining humanitarian aid by using the established institutions,
Employing strict arms embargo and economic sanctions to bring the fighting parties to agreement and ensuring the observance of the embargo and sanctions by the institutions, and

Controlling arms trafficking by neighbouring and distant countries.

It should be stressed that the role of institutions to be established for emergency actions together with the effort made by the UN Security Council and the OAU to restore peace in the region permanently is decisive. Once the need for a coordinated action is established, the cooperation of these organizations and the international community in implementing policies is unquestionable.

Moreover, the cooperation among countries of the region where there is a threat of conflict is critical since the UN Security Council and the OAU may lack the capacity to respond to emergency needs immediately. Furthermore, countries of the Horn should have more concern for conflicts in neighbouring countries than what they have had because a problem in one country often affects the peace of several states in the zone. The case of Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan is a good example to demonstrate this: some days after the end of the fight with Ethiopia, a petroleum pipeline was blown in the Sudan by the rebel forces suspected to have been supported by Eritrea according to the notice given then by the Sudanese media.

The biggest role can still be played by the UN Security Council by authorizing the institutions and enabling them to be available to save the lives of civilians in areas of conflict. Lessons should be taken from the destruction that followed the delay of action that was critically needed in the civil wars of Rwanda and Somalia in which millions of lives were lost. It is, therefore, necessary to recommend that:

1. Democratisation of governments to share power with rival groups and to limit their stay in power

2. Supporting and strengthening sub-regional institutions established for prevention of conflict

3. Arranging peace education programs in the Horn so that the population would come out of colonial influences

4. Helping states to balance economic disparities that could be causes of conflict between social groups

5. Employing indigenous methods of resolving conflicts to ensure restoration of peace locally and permanently

6. Increasing the role of women in peace restoring activities; they are liable to dangers of war, out of the responsibility for themselves and for their children, who are also victims of conflict in most cases, they can play decisive roles in settling disputes
7. Controlling the implementation of humanitarian aid programs and monitoring their activities; in some instances, the aid program is diverted to serve the aims of one or the other of the fighting groups (UN Secretary General's report to the Security Council, 16th April, 1998).

2.10 Inter-State Ethnic Conflict Resolution Strategies: Lessons to Overcome Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia

(Befekadu Zeleke and Diribissa Abate)

Most of the wars in the Horn of Africa for the last decades have been described in terms of ethnic conflicts: the civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. Ethnic conflict is simply a cleavage between groups based on differentiations in ethnic identities, while inter-state ethnic conflict is a conflict that arises between different ethnic groups within a state.

Ethiopia is a country inhabited by more than eighty ethnic groups. After the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991, a transitional government was established in the country by a charter. Among the different objectives addressed by the new government was the decentralization of administration to the regions and the local-level units for the new Ethiopia and its different ethnic groups to:

- Reduce the inter-ethnic conflict that has divided the Ethiopian society for centuries;

- Promote equitable material conditions in all areas of the country, and

- Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector performance on the field (Cohen, 1995).

Hence, nine regional governments and two city administrations were established. Ethnicity was the major criterion used in drawing the boundaries between these states. This move perpetuated the Ethiopian tradition of drawing administrative boundaries along ethnic lines, boundaries that continue to provoke disputes today (Brietzke, 1995). Furthermore, little attention was given to the regions' respective geographical size, population densities, agriculture and resource bases, and levels of infrastructure, existing administrative capacity, or ability to generate revenues. As a result, states differ greatly in size and potential. This further increased inter-state differences among the ethnic groups in the country. As these different regional governments based on their ethnic backgrounds started to be established, the issues of ethnic claims over resources that were considered common such as minerals, land and water, became very explosive. Thus, this inequitable economic background led to different ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. Recent clashes between the Ethio-Somali people and the neighbouring Oromos in the east, between the Afar and the Oromos in the northeast, the different conflicts in the south and conflicts between the Amharas and the Oromos in the southwest parts of the country are just few examples. Although the Ethiopian government has been trying to resolve these conflicts using different mechanisms, the problem still exists in different parts of the country. The main purpose of this study is to identify the major strategies used to minimize ethnic conflicts within a state and to recommend those strategies that apply:
To explain the major theories relevant to ethnic conflicts,

· To discuss the major causes for ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic societies,

· To briefly discuss the nature and consequences of inter-state ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, and

· To forward the major strategies that should be used to overcome different ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.

To achieve the above objectives, a descriptive survey method is used since it is more appropriate to reveal the current problems. Different studies carried out in the area of ethnic conflicts are reviewed and discussed in the study. Besides, different indicators of ethnic conflicts are briefly discussed using secondary data from documents.

The findings of the study indicate that political and economic and backwardness is the major source of the different ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. The major political issues are related to the movements of democratisation, decentralization, and self-determination, which usually give rise to the publicity of ethnicity and fundamentalism while the society is not acquainted with them. The economic issues are associated with the disparities of economic resources among regions; while lack of education among the mass, poverty and high population growth aggravate the ethnic conflicts in the country.

The policy implications of the study include reducing political tensions, strengthening the economic base and promoting awareness among citizens to minimize ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.

2.11 Language (Wo-Ga-Go-Da) Caused Conflict in North Omo Zone: A Lesson towards Future Policy Implementations

(Daniel Aberra)

Ethiopia is a multilingual and multiethnic country where ethnic groups have lived together for many centuries. Due to their contact, various types of conflicts arise now and then among them. Some of the conflicts were violent while others were settled through traditional reconciliation, compromise and interventions by the Federal Government.

In this paper, the introduction of Wogagoda as a medium of instruction and administration in North Omo Zone is reported as the cause of the conflict. In the conflict, infrastructures and books worth 40 million Birr were destroyed; seven people died; 139 teachers were transferred, many were imprisoned and three hotels were reduced to debris. In this study, the actual situation of Wogagoda that caused the conflict, the process of its pre-implementation, its causes and consequences are narrated in light of: (1) Policy decision on ethnic languages in education (1992); (2) Education and Training Policy (1994); (3) Constitution of Ethiopia (1994), and (4) The Cultural Policy (1997).
The methodology used is a qualitative one. Case studies and documentary analyses are used to describe causes of the conflict. Data have been gathered from various primary and secondary sources. The "Wogagoda" conflict is studied in light of linguistics specifically socio-linguistics in which the main domains are the interactions of language and society and the impact of one on the other. The study showed that the conflict happened due to ignorance and deliberate neglect of the application of tested and workable linguistic, sociolinguistic and language planning theories. Therefore, the focus here is adding language planning to the interdisciplinary approaches and theories of conflict prevention and resolution mainly to avoid language based ethnic conflict. By doing so, it shows how language can be insulated from being the cause of conflict. Language planning is really the missing link between language policies and peoples' activities.

2.12 Ethnic Conflict As a Global Political Problem: Review of Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives

(Hussein Jemma)

Today, ethnic conflict is one of the internationally recognized major social conflicts. To properly address this problem and contribute to its solution, there must be a clear understanding of the concepts and theories that deal with ethnic conflict and the issues associated with it. Nevertheless, there are misperceptions and controversies among scholars in the field in treating this complex and politically sensitive issue. The main debates revolve, above all, around concepts such as ethnic group, ethnicity and ethnic conflict and theoretical issues including causes and resolutions of inter-ethnic clash, particularly violent conflict. This paper examines current conceptual and theoretical debates related to inter-ethnic clash. It intends to show some strengths and weaknesses of the prevailing disputes in the analysis of ethnic conflict.

Scholars of social sciences view the content and symbol of ethnic group in various ways. Some consider ethnic group as an objective entity that has its own distinct boundary, while others view it as a subjective phenomenon that is condemned to change through inter-ethnic interaction. Viewed from an objective or "primordialist" perspective, an ethnic group is a category of human population that shares a number of attributes such as common origin, history, culture, language, territory, and the like. One crucial element of an ethnic group is that its members are biologically linked to each other than to others. Essentially, it is because of blood ties that the members distinguish themselves from non-members or "outsiders" and that they are similarly considered by others as distinct identities. In short, primordial approach perceives ethnic identity as something that is fixed and with distinct social boundaries. Subjective or situational perspective sees ethnic group as a flexible and changing phenomenon, which is doomed to alteration through the interaction of an ethnic group with other ethnic communities. The prevailing circumstance determines the content and symbol of an ethnic group. In other words, ethnic group is a socially constructed and fluid entity.

The attributes of an ethnic group do generally serve as a common ground for ethnic ties and for the development of ethnicity. Ethnicity concerns the feeling, behaviour, and psychological makeup of an ethnic group. A controversial matter in the discussion of the concept of ethnicity concerns whether or not religion is an element of ethnicity. That is, while some researchers
consider religion as an attribute of ethnicity, others do not. Moreover, this issue is also controversial when viewed in comparison with the existing reality.

Two major problems surround the meaning of ethnic conflict. First, the issue of definition is largely ignored. Second, there is no agreed upon meaning of ethnic conflict. Some attempt to define it in the context of domestic politics, while others tend to also consider the international aspect of inter-ethnic clash.

Ethnic conflict takes different forms. That is, its nature varies substantially ranging from peaceful expression of grievances to outright use of physical force or violence. This means depending on the prevailing circumstance, the parties involved in the conflict and the means preferred to settle the dispute, ethnic conflict varies from peaceful reflection of conflict of interests to a violent struggle and civil wars, etc.

There is no agreement among academics in the field on the sources of ethnic conflict. Most of the scholars consider discriminatory government policies as root causes of ethnic conflict. According to this view, conflict would take place where political power holders favour their ethnic group politically and economically, while excluding other ethnic communities. This is what is known as the politics of exclusion. Besides, cultural domination or fear of assimilation does also lead to inter-ethnic clash. In addition to those that stem from power relationship, i.e., between a dominant ethnic group, the "in-group" and the excluded ethnic identities - the "out groups", ethnic conflict may take place horizontally. This concerns the clash that may emerge between or among neighbouring ethnic communities often because of competition over economic resources. On the other side are those researchers who tend to confuse fundamental causes of ethnic conflict with "triggering" factors, such as weakening of central authority, economic shock or external intervention. However, to others these are just factors that may accelerate the explosion of ethnic conflict; they cannot engender conflict by themselves.

Perhaps one of the apparent limitations of the theories of ethnic conflict is that they tend to sidestep discussing conflict resolution mechanisms. The bulk of the existing literature mostly focuses on problem description rather than on developing possible methods of ethnic conflict resolution. There are, however, two contending theories, namely, Pluralist Society Theory and Consociation List Perspective, both of which deal with issues of ethnic conflict resolution. These perspectives seem to be antithetical to one another in the sense that they hold diametrically opposed positions regarding the possibility of resolving ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic state. The Pluralist Society Theory sees no solution to ethnic conflict. According to this perspective, because of an incompatibility of interests among ethnic groups, a multi-ethnic state is destined to disintegration. Only the intervention of external forces can rescue it. Consociation List Theory, to the contrary, assumes that it is possible to resolve ethnic conflict and promote inter-ethnic solidarity under a democratic environment. It appears that most researchers accept this approach. They hold the opinion that where there exist democratic system and the rule of law, ethnic conflict may be resolved through negotiation, based on a political will to accommodate the interests of others.

An analysis of the current conceptual and theoretical debates over ethnic conflict and the related issues reveal that there exist contending views and wider gaps among the researchers in the field.
The existence of such gulfs hints at the need for rigorous researches. These studies should be based primarily on empirical data. They must also be comprehensive and they must consider experiences of various parts of the world. Profound empirical research findings are vital instruments for narrowing down the existing misconceptions and for further developing concepts and theoretical explanations.

2.13 Ethnocentrism among Four Ethnic Groups of Students Implications and Future Direction: The Case of Dilla College of Teacher Education and Health Sciences

(Demewoz Admasu)

Ethnocentrism understood as having positive attitude and behaviour towards one's own while negative and hostile attitudes towards other ethnic groups has become an issue of the 20th century, especially in multi-ethnic countries such as Ethiopia. Ethiopia consists of more than 80 ethnic groups with their own languages, heritage, and areas of settlement. These ethnic groups have long history of interaction and national representation. Each ethnic group needs to be studied in its own terms and in relation to others.

Since 1991, ethnic politics has been exercised in the country. Political parties are organized along ethnic lines. Rationalization and decentralization of power is in order. Regional states are divided on major ethnic basis. Federal and national elections are answering the needs of those political parties. Regional, zonal, and Woreda civil and official positions are filled with natives of the respective regions. Federal positions are filled on ethnic quota systems.

Whether or not this ethnic politics has brought about ethnocentrism is not (much?) researched especially by psychologists. There are some indications of ethnocentrism. Scholars have recommended researches in this area. Ethnic conflict is also reported to have displaced about half a million people from 1991 to 1995. This researcher, therefore, strongly believes that the issue of ethnocentrism, its implication on present-day and future Ethiopia, and its future direction should be carefully studied. Students of Dilla College of Teacher Education and Health Sciences are cases used for this purpose. The findings of this research would enlighten the society, the individual, the college, the government and others interested in ethnic matters in Ethiopia. Intervention programs may be suggested, if need be. Vigorous research attempts would be initiated, as well. In light of this, this research attempts to answer the following questions.

1. Are students of Dilla College of Teacher-Education and Health Sciences ethnocentric towards their own and other ethnic groups?

2. Is there a (statistically significant) difference in ethnocentrism among the different ethnic groups?

3. Is there a (statistically significant) gender difference in ethnocentrism among students of these ethnic groups?

4. Is there a (statistically significant) religion difference in ethnocentrism among students of these ethnic groups?
5. What is the implication of this ethnocentric attitude on students of the college?

6. What should be done in the future on ethnocentric attitudes and/or relations in the college in particular, and institutions of higher learning, in general?

To carry out the research, four major ethnic groups of students (Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, and Gurage) of Dilla College of Teacher-Education and Health Sciences, Debub University, were selected. These ethnic groups were selected due to their relatively large size in the student population of the college. From the total sample, responses indicated as Amhara (47.9%), Oromo (24.5%), Tigre (9.2%), Gurage (6.7%), and others (11.7%). Data were gathered from 185 students of undergraduate degree program in the 1999/2000 Academic Year. Data collection instrument was adopted from Demewoz (1997) who reported to have made a descriptive survey of ethnic and racial measures, discussions with varying ethnic group colleagues, and so forth. The reliability of the instrument was reported to be .73. The instrument has three parts: Bio-data, bi-polar trait dimensions, and labelling the better dimension of the bi-polar continuum. Percentages, Chi-square, ANOVA, and Scheffe statistical tests were employed for data analysis. Nearly all ethnic groups of students considered in the study were found ethnocentric: they rated their own ethnic group higher than they did others. Some specific results that were statistically significant include: (a) the Amhara ethnic group mean ratings significantly differed between its own and the Oromo, between the Gurage and the Oromo; (b) the Oromo ethnic group mean ratings significantly differed between its own and the Amhara ethnic groups; (c) the Tigre ethnic group mean ratings significantly differed between own and the Oromo, between the Amhara and the Oromo ethnic groups; and (d) the Gurage ethnic group mean ratings significantly differed between its own and the Amhara, between its own and the Oromo ethnic groups.

No significant difference, however, were observed in terms of gender, religion, and interactions; and in labelling the better continuum of the bi-polar trait dimension.

The above results indicate that the subjects were ethnocentric. This could be partly explained by ethnic group membership and/or assumed similarity wherein one's own ethnic group is considered as a point of comparison, culturally and biologically superior, and wherein it is over evaluated while other ethnic groups are under evaluated. On the other hand, long history of interaction, superordinate common goals and high level of education seem less important in neutralizing the issue of ethnocentrism at the college level.

From the above results, it can be learned that national feeling, unity, helping and cooperative behaviours may be endangered, national agenda narrowed and replaced by ethnic agenda. As a result, ethnic tension, violence and conflict may prevail. This problem may make it difficult to create a stable government. This may continue in future, as well. Some intervention strategy seems imperative.

Educational equity, integrated pluralism, ethnic isolation, celebrating diversity, training scholars and designing researched intervention strategies may be opted based on multidisciplinary research for present and future Ethiopia.
The history of conflict is as old as human history. From the dawn of human history, communities have been competing for control of resources and for dominance. These competitions inevitably led individuals as well as social, political, economic, and religious groups to conflicts. It is true that conflict has devastating effects and it is unwanted. It is also true that conflict is unavoidable and it continues to occur.

Since the causes of conflict are different, it would be better to use different mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. By avoiding conflict, we avoid not only one of the hindrances of economic development but also foreign powers' intervention, which may exacerbate the domestic conflicts. Therefore, more than anybody else governments, whose main duty is maintenance of peace and security, are responsible for providing their respective peoples with alternative conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, popular and widely used among these are the indigenous mechanisms.

Indigenous mechanisms are time tested and effective to handle conflicts that arise in the Horn region. Had it not been for these mechanisms, things would have been exacerbated and gone out of the government's control and been developed to full scale of war between the neighbouring states. When compared with the non-indigenous ones, indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are less complex, save time, and give a chance to parties in conflict to actively participate to solve their own problems and to handle their affairs in a relatively more acceptable way to them.

The objective of this paper is to investigate how the Oromo, one of the largest ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa, deal with conflict using indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, and to examine how effective these mechanisms are and how they work.

This is a case study to show that the peoples in the Horn of Africa have time tested and effective indigenous mechanisms to prevent, mitigate, manage, and resolve conflicts, and to draw the attention of the governments of the Horn countries to streamline and use these indigenous mechanisms to make the region more stable and peaceful.

The methodology used in this research is collecting information from primary sources through interviews with different informants and from secondary sources through library research and organizing/reorganizing and analysing the information.

The findings of this research show that:

Oromo people have four developed, widely used and effective indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. These are:

1. *Ilafi Ilamee* mechanism (negotiation or compromising mechanisms);
2. Jarsumma mechanism (reconciliation administered by the community elders);

3. Gada system mechanisms (judicial, administrative and political mechanisms); and

4. Waqefanna system mechanism (religious adjudication).

These indigenous mechanisms have been used for the prevention and resolution of:

1. Conflicts with the central government of Ethiopia;

2. Conflicts with the peoples living in their neighbourhood; and

3. Conflicts within themselves.

These Oromo indigenous mechanisms are popular and they are widely used in almost all Oromo Land, now called Oromia, and they have different advantages including, but not limited to, the following:

1. They quickly respond to crisis.

2. They contribute to reduce regular court caseloads.

3. They contribute to saving of public money.

4. Given the shortage of judges who work in the regular courts and budget constraints, they are complementary to the modern government structures and are not substitutes or competitors as some government officials think and worry about them.

5. They give access to many people who do not find the modern system of conflict resolution comfortable, affordable or suited to their need.

6. Disputants are satisfied with their operations and view their outcomes as fair because these mechanisms give a chance to the parties to actively participate in handling their affairs.

Therefore, these indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict will continue to operate parallel with modern government structures as they have been doing for years. Thus, it would be better if governments in the Horn of Africa officially recognize, revitalize and empower these mechanisms and use them as alternative for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution.

To revitalize and to make the Oromo indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts more effective, it is necessary to consider the following recommendations and/or policy implications:
1. **Capacity Building.** The nature and causes of conflicts are changing from time to time. To analyse the causes of these conflicts and come up with lasting solutions for recurring causes, it is necessary to enhance the capacity of local peacemakers through training and experience sharing tours and workshops. These trainings and workshops should focus on increasing conflict management skills, enhancing capacity to analyse information related to conflicts, and narrowing down social distance among the members of different ethnic and religious groups.

2. **Establishing Conflict Management Fund.** At present, unlike in the past, due to different reasons the people are unable to host the local peacemakers who travel from place to place to make peace. In addition, means of transportations are changing from horse, mule and camel in favour of motor vehicles that require payment. For these purposes and other activities, the local peacemakers need money to respond to conflicts on time. Therefore, establishing conflict management fund that can be used to cover the cost of the activities of local peacemakers is very important.

3. **Empowerment.** The Oromo indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict have been in operation for centuries. Besides, Article 78(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia gives power to the House of the Peoples' Representatives and State Councils to establish or give official recognitions to religious and customary courts to adjudicate disputes relating to personal and family laws. Nevertheless, these Oromo indigenous mechanisms have not been given this official recognition yet, save the Shari' a court. Some state officials even forget that these indigenous mechanisms will assist the regular court system to reduce court caseloads and contribute to saving of public money. Rather they look on these mechanisms as competitor, not as complimentary. This attitude has to be changed, and indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict should be given official recognition and be empowered. Polices that encourage these indigenous mechanisms should be advocated.

### 2.15 Luba Basa and Harma Hodha: Traditional Principles of Conflict Resolutions in Metekkel

*(Tesega Endalew)*

Ethiopian society has been a rich conglomeration of ethnic communities who have been continually interacting among themselves for millennia. The Gumuz, Shinasha, Agew Oromo and Amhara inhabitants of Metekkel continued their interactions for their daily activities. Although they have their own respective traditional principles of conflict resolutions they gradually adopted Oromo traditional customs and various traditions including the *Luba Basa*, *Harma Hodha* and *Michu* mechanisms of conflict resolutions. *Luba basa* (lit. to set free) and *Harma Hodha* (lit. licking a breast) are among the most important traditional principles of conflict preventions and resolutions. Both terms are Oromo names and are used by the Gumuz and Shinasha who also speak Oromo. *Luba basa* is more of a preventive mechanism that gradually establishes ethnic integration through adoption. The *Harma hodha*, however, establishes a kind of parent-child relationships between ethnic groups, individuals as well as
within groups. Although less adoptive it plays an important role in alleviating conflicts. In Metekkel region, particularly in Wanbara and Dibati districts, these mechanisms started to be effectively applied after the Oromo settlement in the eighteenth century. These institutions are intra- as well as inter-ethnic conflict resolution principles and are widely applied in many parts of Ethiopia; they can even meet demands out side Africa. If refurbished, the findings show that they can be of paramount importance to policy makers and practitioners.

The methodology used included systematic interviewing of resourceful informants from all the subject groups to supplement the available literature. Their testimonies were carefully crosschecked and they were systematically analysed using a qualitative method of research.

2.16 Indigenous Institutions of Conflict Resolution among the Ab'ala Afar of Northeastern Ethiopia

(Kelemework Tafere and Mitiku Haile)

A study was carried out on indigenous institutions of conflict resolution among the Afar who share a common boundary with Tigrayan highlanders in northern Ethiopia. The latter constitute a separate ethnic group and they have a slightly different means of subsistence. The study aimed to examine the types of disputes in historical perspectives and to understand local ways of handling conflicts ranging from intra-clan to inter-ethnic levels. The study employed a number of data collection methods including formal and informal interviews, case studies, analysis of secondary data and participant observation.

The findings revealed that the nature of conflict changed with changes in the ecological, socio-economic and political arenas. In the past, the Afar led a predominantly nomadic life in which livestock husbandry was the dominant source of economic subsistence. This form of economic performance dictated a particular social organization within the Afar and it shaped their relations with neighbouring ethnic groups particularly the Tigrayan highlanders. For example, within the Afar community, there seemed to be strong mutual support networks among kin groups usually expressed in the form of resource sharing and strong clan solidarity. Within the Afar, conflicts arose between and among groups and individuals, but these conflicts did not occur over issues of land and water rights and territoriality.

Gradually, changes in the natural and social set-ups have had significant impact on the Afar's mode of living. Ecological disasters causing huge livestock loss have forced the Afar to diversity their means of income to cope up with the situation. There were increased inclinations towards the agricultural mode of production and movement to permanent settlement areas near urban centres. This took the form of wage labour migration and trade relations.

This shift in the means of livelihood had its own effects as far as the traditional institutions and value systems are concerned. With a shift from nomadic based economy to cultivation, the pastoral attitude of communal ownership of land altered and conflicts taking the form of land disputes and water diversion rights became rampant. Urbanization and wage labour migration had also weakened kinship obligations and clan solidarity, which had their own influence on
local dispute settlement. According to Afar customary laws (Madaa), the whole clan is responsible for any offence caused against members of another clan within the Afar territory. This is manifested in the process of conflict resolution in which clan members contribute their own share in collecting the money and livestock to be paid as compensation.

On the highland-lowland dimension, past experiences reveal that raids triggered by resource competition, loss of stock and the quest for social honour had been common. This was particularly seen in the southern part of the ethnic boundary where the Wajirat community in the highlands presented the biggest challenge to the Afar. Such violent and persistent conflicts between the two groups resulted in loss of life and property wreckage as they entered into cyclic moments of confrontation and feud in the form of retaliations and counter-retaliations. With the Tigrayan communities in the northern part, relatively fewer conflict cases have been reported.

Currently, however, sedentarization reduced mobility of the Afar and minimized the extent of inter-ethnic conflict. In fact, this together with existing crosscutting ties, economic and social relations with the highlanders, strengthened peace in the northern parts of the ethnic boundary. In some cases, fights that occur between individuals or small groups especially in the southern territory often quickly turn into inter-ethnic conflict expressed in reprisals. However, dissolution of the traditional political system of the southern highlanders has made it difficult for them to pursue their institutional violence against the Afar. Besides, the current federal system of government has generally enabled the Afar to see themselves as a group giving little importance to clan differences. This along with the Afar people's increased involvement in national affairs created power balance between them and the Tigrayan highlanders leading to a reduction in the prevalence of raids. Furthermore, as the Afar are now settling down in permanent areas, the old nomadic strategy of movement no longer proves to be an effective means of dealing with inter-ethnic conflict. There is now a tendency to seek a more realistic and non-violent means of resolving conflict; and this is resort to traditional institutions of peace making. The Afar and Tigrayans seem to be keen on not prolonging hostilities to the extent of spoiling their age-old healthy relations in the form of kinship and marriage, information exchange and trade to mention just a few.

When conflicts occur at various levels, the Afar generally rely more on their own local dispute settlement forums than the government legal machinery. Within their own group, clan elders as well as kinship and domestic groups maintain peace through sanctions following mablo assemblies. Relations with the highlanders are also regulated via a jointly established institution called Gereb, which enforces order based on written customary laws. In both mablo and Gereb assemblies, a group of prominent elderly personalities involve in a chain of negotiations and arbitration processes to resolve conflicts in an orderly and transparent manner. At present, government institutions also co-operate with the indigenous systems at different stages. Governments administrative and legal organs may occasionally directly involve in the actual conflict resolution process (in an intra-clan context) or may act as facilitators by creating favourable conditions for resolution through the indigenous system (in an inter-clan and inter-ethnic context). This institutional support from modern legal set-ups along with the internal integrity of the indigenous institutions themselves has contributed to the effectiveness and continued strength of the latter.
The findings of this research have policy implications particularly in the areas of resource tenure and legal administration. For example, they have direct repercussions on issues of regionalism, legal decentralization and pluralism in jurisprudence. As far conflict resolution is concerned, the study shows that a cross-fertilization of indigenous and modern institutions is vital for healthy intra- and inter-ethnic relations in the future. In deed, it has been said that national development planning in Africa should consider local realities at the grass roots level. People's perceptions, views and practices should always stand high on the agenda in such endeavours. In connection with this, the old stereotyped view of pastoralists as war-like and as lawless should strongly be challenged in light of the growing body of literature that proves otherwise.

2.16 Intermarriage between Conflicting Groups: The Case of the Arsi Oromo and the Sidama

(Girma Negash)

The basic objectives of this study can be summarized as follows:

1. To bring to light and properly document the age-long intermarriage between the Arsi and the Sidama about whom little seem to be known thus far.

2. To investigate the puzzling paradox how two peoples who perceive one another as enemy, and often at war with each other, happen to intermarry.

3. To identify specific reasons that induced Arsi-Sidama neighbours to look for a partner from a hostile group.

4. To analyse the attitude of members of the two respective communities towards such cross-border marriages.

5. To examine the progress of the intermarriage issue in a time perspective.

6. To investigate the possible impact of this intermarriage on the conflict between the Arsi and the Sidama.

In pursuance of the outlined objectives of the study, a qualitative method of research was employed. Historical sources of three categories were carefully collected and analysed: oral data, archival data and previous literature. Oral data are of great value where relevant written materials are few or hard to find. The oral data used in this study were collected through several trips to different localities along the Arsi-Sidama border. Despite the current dismal condition of our provincial archives, attempts have been made to get access to pertinent materials. The archives of Zeway Warada provided some valuable data to corroborate and countercheck the oral information. Relevant secondary written materials (published and unpublished), though very few, were also consulted. The following were the findings.
1. Despite incessant and still active conflict between the Arsi and the Sidama, a large number of people belonging to the two hostile groups are knitted together by cross-cultural marriages.

2. The most important factor for the ever-increasing rate of Arsi-Sidama intermarriage is the extremely high rate of the Arsi *gabbara* (bride-wealth or bride-price). In consequence, those Arsi who either are unable or unwilling to pay the rather high Arsi *gabbara* have made it a strategy, since the distant past, to look for their partner in life among their southern neighbours (the Sidama) for a tolerable bride-price.

3. Owing to the *gabbara* factor and other established traditions, intermarriage between the two has always been of the pattern that the Sidama almost exclusively provide the bride and the Arsi the bridegroom, and not vice versa.

4. Intermarriage between an Arsi and a Sidama has never been an object of social disapproval. Arsi young men have been taking the hands of Sidama girls for marriage just as they would take those of fellow Arsi girls.

5. There has been a considerable rise in the number of Arsi-Sidama marriages in the wake of the Second World War. The state of affairs during the *Derg* regime (1974-1991) seems to have created an environment conducive to the further growth of the rate of Arsi-Sidama intermarriage.

6. At a given locality, the extent of intermarriage and the intensity of the conflict are mutually interdependent. As one goes to the east, the relationship between the Arsi and the Sidama appears to be relatively more cordial than conflictive. Similarly, it is in this part of the common border that intermarriage between members of the two groups is rife. On the contrary, the western borderlands, where tense relationship and a high frequency of conflicts are inherent features, show a very low record of cross-border marriages. In sum, wherever there is a high rate of intermarriage the relationship is friendlier, and a low rate of intermarriage presupposes strained relationships.

From the history of the conflict during the past fifty years alone, the western borderlands to the west of the Addis-Awasa road have been haunted by frequent Arsi-Sidama conflicts. The realities in the east have been quite the opposite. The eastern borderlands have experienced major conflicts between the two groups in about fifteen years' intervals. Marriage ties and settled way of life seem to have been the most important contributing factors for the relative peace that the Arsi-Sidama neighbours of the east enjoy, as opposed to their western counterparts. This evidently is a substantial revelation, pertaining to the overall Arsi-Sidama relations, which can serve as a principal stepping-stone for policy makers, experts and civil servants ready to partake in any endeavour aimed at enduring peace and development in the region. For instance, the government can devise integrative projects that would narrow the distance between the two peoples and promote a sense of amity and togetherness. One such project could be poly-ethnic settlements at some volatile sites along the common border. The experience of Shamana, a locality exactly on the Arsi-Sidama border about 35 km to the west of Lake Awasa, is a useful lesson in this regard. Shamana, which used to be a traditional battle ground for the two peoples,
dramatically changed to become a peaceful area following as resettlement scheme carried out by the Imperial Government in pursuance of the "Third Five Year Plan (1968-1973)". Establishment of commonly shared social services, such as schools and medical institution, at some border localities can gradually erode feelings of animosity and bring members of the two communities closer. Furthermore, as far as resource, particularly land, has increasingly become the most conspicuous cause of disagreement, the government should facilitate grounds for equitable utilization of resources.

2.17 Indigenous Conflict Resolution in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia: The Case Study of the Well Council and Arara of Borana

*(Dejene Aredo and Abdurahman Ame)*

Ethiopians have a rich tradition of organizing to address community problems. This traditional social capital can play a crucial role in resource mobilization, resource management, service provision, information exchange, enhancing popular participation and conflict resolution. This study tries to investigate how the conflict prevention and resolutions work at local levels with special emphasis on the well council and *Arara* of the Borana. The study relied on secondary data with particular emphasis on the *Madda*, a traditional pastoral unit of resource allocation and *Arara* conflict resolution. The dry season water supply is probably the critical limiting factor determining livestock carrying capacity. Consequently, the Borana management system mainly regulates ownership of and access to permanent water points, especially, rather than to pastures. At the centre of Borana traditional resource organization the well (*Madda*) council is crucial.

The council's regulations and laws and its potential role in facilitating intra- and inter-ethnic social networks and reciprocal arrangements for mutual support in times of crisis can serve as a mechanism for preventing conflicts.

At least at the community level, the Borana are an egalitarian and democratic society. Decision-making and action among the Borana can occur at different levels including the individual, household, and community levels. Community level decisions are made through group discussion and consensus by assembly. Decisions can be made along both kinship affiliation and territorial divisions.

The wells are the most important sources of water, constituting a crucially important element of Borana pastoralism. These wells, known as *ellas* are also important focal points of Borana social life. They are the most important resource. Economic and religious life centres on the wells and they are a constantly recurrent theme in Borana politics. Upkeep, control, utilization and maintenance of the wells are constant concern of all Boranas. Access to the wells and the work connected with them are very basic considerations of any stock management unit.

The daily routines at the well are supervised by an officer known as *abba hirega*, the father of the watering order; the watering rota at a well spans 3 days. On the first of these 3 days, the holder of the *confi* usually functions as *abba hirega* himself. The 2 other days are under the supervision of an *abba hirga* appointed by the well council (*cora ela*) which is composed of the users of the well.
The overall authority over the wells is vested in the well council. Watering rights in any particular well must be gained and maintained through participation in this well council, including the jarsi gosa.

The major sanction underlying the Borana system of water control is, of course, exclusion from water. Failure to supply labour to the well and failure to participate in the politics of the well council will lead to rapid exclusion. On matters of accountability, the following are observed.

a. The continuous and coordinated supply of labour is essential for the operation of a Borana well, in both the short and long run. This labour force is supplied by the users of the well, and constant participation in the practical tasks of running the well is a necessary condition for the maintenance of watering rights. Another necessary condition is participation in the well council.

b. The most important task of the well council is to decide on the watering rate, which implies the allocation of watering rights. There are few explicit and formalized rules governing the allocation of such rights, but with water being a scarce resource and considering the very orderly fashion in which work at the wells is carried out, there must be mechanisms governing the allocation of rights and some powerful sanctions underlying the decisions of the well council.

Despite the desire for harmony, peace, and the carrying out of obligation, people will often fall short of the ideal, will default on their obligations and will conflict with their neighbours, kin and compatriots. It then is necessary to heal the breach, find reconciliation and restore peace. The following describes the manner in which Liban District pastoralists in Borana Zone attempt to do this. When a dispute arises, mediators are called at the local level. The litigants meet before 3 to 8 or more of their neighbours and plead their cases. Sometimes a group may be gathered in a moment of a crisis, calling upon those present or within hailing distance at the time to serve as mediators on the spot. More often, a date will be set and a mediation council formed. Together, the mediators and witnesses will be asked to come to help solve the dispute.

There are certain men who will frequently be asked to preside over the council and their judgement is particularly respected. They are not necessarily old or rich but they may be either. What is most important in the eyes of the community is that they be noted for their altruism, their willingness to give their time, their knowledge of custom and precedent, and their good sense, to help solve their neighbours' problems and restore the peace. The litigants, their witnesses, and mediators sit outside, under a tree, listen to the various parties and discuss the case at length. Frequently they send the litigants some distance away. The tone of the discussion is supposed to be one of reasonableness and the litigants are supposed to show respect for the mediators.

After the discussion, which can continue for a long time, the mediators will try to agree on a course of reconciliation, a reasonable solution which will, they hope, be seen by the disputants as a good deal. If they fail to reach a settlement at a given session, they may well call another one, perhaps, involving still more respected mediators, and try again. However, if they fail, there are no more sanctions available at this level of adjudication other than the sanction of negative public opinion. People could turn to two higher levels. One of these is the government court,
which is run by Oromos. The other is *kallu* court, where respected elders attempt to resolve disputes using the same principles of *Arara* (peace) as the courts at lower levels helping people solve their problems and keeping order according to democratic Oromo principles.

The social system is still functional in solving the conflicts, in resource management, and in maintaining the social relationship. The system is not as intact as before. It is being eroded from time to time. The factors that contributed for the erosion of the system could be the introduction of the parallel administration structure, new culture and religion, the effect of the drought, population growth and delineation of administration areas without considering the traditional resource management.
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