THE DARFUR CRISIS:
A TEST CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

by Lansana Gberie

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

INTRODUCTION

For the past seventeen months or so, the world has been gripped by reports and pictures of a horrific humanitarian disaster in Sudan’s western region of Darfur. The region is, in the words of John Ryle, “150,000 square-miles of desert and savannah...linked to Sudanese capital, Khartoum, by 700 miles of dirt road and a single-track railway.” Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed and more than a million displaced in a well-coordinated campaign that some humanitarian organizations, as well as political leaders, have called ‘genocide’. Groups that have called the Darfur crisis genocide include Physicians for Human Rights, the UK-based group Justice Africa, and the Committee on Conscience of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, along with dozens of editorial writers in major Western newspapers.

Human Rights Watch has not used the word ‘genocide’ to describe the crisis, and has limited itself to describing the campaigns of a government-backed militia group which is spearheading the disaster as constituting “war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’.” A similar position has been taken by the comparably influential Amnesty International, which has called for an international inquiry into charges of war crimes and ‘allegations of genocide’ in Darfur. In a briefing paper released in August, the reliably vocal but incisive International Crisis Group described as “gross human rights violations” and a “massive humanitarian disaster.”

The US Congress in July passed a non-binding resolution specifically labeling the Darfur crisis ‘genocide.’ Among the prominent political leaders who have called the crisis in Darfur genocide has been Bill Frist, the Republican leader of the US Senate who, after a visit to the country, wrote a spirited op-ed piece in the Washington Post calling for military intervention to stop the killings if Sudan’s government did not act immediately to “disarm and [disband] the militias and bring those responsible for their crimes to justice.”

The White House and the State Department, however, dithered on the point for several months, refusing to use the word, ‘genocide’ to describe the Darfur catastrophe, probably because of the obligation, under international law, to intervene in order to stop acts of genocide. This is hardly an action that the US government, tied down in Iraq, would be keen on. After UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the region in June 2004, they both pointedly refused to use the word genocide, but in the strongest possible terms each called on Sudan’s government to stop the ‘mass killings’ and dislocations. A month later, Powell intensified the rhetoric, condemning “violence and atrocities on a wide-scale” in Sudan, and calling on the Sudanese government to “stop the violence, facilitate unrestricted humanitarian access by international relief workers, co-operate with African Union monitoring, and enter into political discussions with the Darfur rebel groups.”

Finally, in September 2004, Powell, while testifying before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the consistent and widespread patterns of killings, dislocations and rapes in Darfur “genocide.” Powell noted that: “The evidence leads us to the conclusion that genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur,” and blamed the situation on the “government of Sudan and the Janjawid.”

It was a dramatic turn-around, at least rhetorically. Since the statement was made, however, little has changed on the ground in Darfur. In fact, the terrors and displacement seem to have increased in recent weeks. It has been estimated that 100,000 civilians have fled their homes over the past month as the result of militia terror. However, Powell’s statement prompted a UN decision to collect evidence in Darfur that might support a finding of genocide, something which, the Washington Post notes optimistically, may drive “Sudan to the point where it may accept the presence of foreign troops.”

The African Union (AU), meanwhile, had been steadily but quietly putting pressure on the Sudanese government to halt the militias, convened talks between the warring parties in Abuja, Nigeria, and started negotiations with Sudan’s government to accept a 2000-strong African peacekeeping force to oversee security in Darfur, protect civilians, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. On 15 August 2004, 150 well-armed Rwandan troops arrived in Darfur as the vanguard of this force, and Nigeria’s Parliament voted a week later to send in 1,500 troops. It is likely that given Sudan’s recent objections to these high-profile deployments, and also given the complicated nature of the situation, the UN will take over the AU mission, as it did in the case of the ECOWAS missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi.

But what exactly is happening in Darfur? What are the dynamics of the conflict? Is it merely a humanitarian crisis, or is the humanitarian disaster simply a symptom of a
much more profound, if inchoate, political and social struggle that should be addressed at its roots? The aim of this paper is to provide a brief, but broader perspective on the nature of the conflict in Darfur --- a conflict which is much-discussed, but often over-simplified --- and to outline the dilemmas emerging from a situation where there is a clear international responsibility to protect civilians. Despite the complexities involved, it concludes with a call for urgent and robust action to meet this responsibility.

THE PROBLEM

Darfur is a sprawling and largely arid region in western Sudan, with a population of about 6 million. Until recently, it was known, if at all, for its occasional droughts and, almost always following that, severe food scarcity and conflict between the region’s mainly pastoral ‘Arab’ and largely arable farming ‘African’ communities over its limited fertile land. Even this dynamic, however, is a fairly recent one. It flowed from a familiar but nonetheless sedulous contrivance: the militant politicization of the region’s ethnicity.14

Darfur was absorbed into Sudan by the British in 1922. At the time, Sudan was ruled by Britain and its then client state, Egypt. There are about thirty ethnic groups in the region, all of whom have lived there for centuries, and all of them Muslims. As the British scholar Alex de Waal has noted, “Despite talk of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’, it is rarely possible to tell on the basis of skin colour which group an individual Darfurian belongs.” He notes further that “there is such a long history of internal migration, mixing and intermarriage that ethnic boundaries are mostly a matter of convenience.” Moreover, “Individuals, even whole groups, can shed one label and acquire another.”

These observations are important, because in spite of the gross atrocities, displacement and comprehensive destruction of groups, it is one reason why there is still bickering over the point whether what is happening in Darfur can justifiably be called genocide. Surely, though, such linguistic parsing, however tantalizing in legal terms, is beside the point, because the gross effects of the activities of the Janjawiid15 militia, which is spearheading the current humanitarian disaster, will be genocidal if not stopped in good time. Already, the UN estimates that 600 people are dying daily in Darfur as a result of the depredations of the Jajawiid.16

Hundreds of thousands of Darfurians have been displaced by the violence, and there are more than 120,000 of the displaced in camps in Chad alone, in conditions of near-dereliction.17 Humanitarian organizations estimate that 50,000 Darfurians have died already, and they fear that 300,000 more will die of famine before the end of the year.18 And the violence is systematic and well-coordinated. Janjawiid terror has been aimed at all speakers of Fur, Massalit, Tungur and Zaghawa, linguistic groups among which a violent uprising against the Sudanese state emerged last year. Writing in the Boston Globe, Anthony Lake and John Prendergast called the campaigns “genocide in slow motion.”19 A robust humanitarian intervention has become imperative.

ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

Limited, low-intensity conflict between the pastoral and arable farming groups in Darfur after its occasional droughts has been a feature of the region’s recent history. One such drought occurred in the mid-1980s, to be followed by famine that lasted for a year. The famine precipitated violent conflict between the two groups over land that lasted for years, barely noticed. A ‘reconciliation’
conference was held in 1989 to settle the matter, but it was largely unsuccessful. The conflict, however, ended soon afterwards, partly as a result of a series of ruthless measures taken by Sudan’s military strongman, Omar al-Bashir, who staged a successful coup in 1989; and partly out of sheer exhaustion.

Unfortunately, by this time two toxic factors had entered the already deformed socio-political landscape: Libyan military adventurism and, stemming from this, a militant Arabism. The Libyan leader Muammar al Gaddafi had enmeshed his country in a disastrous war with Chad over the Aouzou Strip, a place rich in gas and other resources, and which rightly belonged to Chad. French troops joined the Chadians in beating back the Libyan forces, and pursuing them into Libya. Gaddafi forged an ‘expansive’ formula for fighting back, collecting discontented Sahelian Arabs and Tuaregs in the region (Darfur shares long borders with both Libya and Chad) arming them, and forming them into an ‘Islamic Legion.’ Some of the ‘Arabs’ were from Darfur and followers of the Mahdist sect, a cranky mock-millenarian outfit. By the late 1980s, after suffering crushing defeat, Gaddafi dismantled the Legion, but its members, well-trained and armed, as well as possessed of a new ‘virulent Arab supremacism’, did not completely demobilize. Leaders of the marauding Janjawid now causing havoc in Darfur were among those recruited and trained by Libya.20

For over 20 years the Arab-dominated Sudanese government had been locked in a brutal civil war with secessionists in the south, which is peopled by non-Arab, largely non-Muslim groups. Intense US negotiation, backed by the UK (the largest bilateral aid provider to Sudan) and other governments led to the Naivasha Agreement, signed in Kenya, which officially ended the conflict in May 2004.21 For much of the period, Darfur was a neglected backwater; its people mired in poverty. After the 1989 coup, the more radical and inclusive Islamist elements in the new government, the most prominent being Hassan al-Turabi, tried a more evenhanded approach that would reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ groups in Darfur, even though few economic benefits accompanied this. In 1999, however, Bashir dismissed Turabi from his powerful post as Speaker of the National Assembly, and had him arrested.

The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), the group spearheading the secessionist movement in the south, attempted to widen its support base and international appeal by depicting its war as a wider struggle of the majority ‘African’ population against an oppressive ‘Arab’ minority government. This was helped by the increasing militancy of some Arab supremacists in the al-Bashir government, as well as those who had participated in the failed Libyan expansionist war. The Fur, Massalit, Tungur and Zaghawa, now more or less racially accreted ‘Africans’, became restive. Some of their leaders, who had been brought into the al-Bashir government by al-Turabi, quit the government. Mostly likely some of them were part of the anonymous group---calling itself ‘The Seekers of Truth and Justice’---which, in May 2000, issued The Black Book, a well-detailed tract which ventilated long-held grievances of the region.

In spite of its grim title, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan is not chiliastic or even irredentist. Rather, it is a carefully-documented catalogue of woes which Darfur had endured at the hands of the national government since Sudan gained
independence in 1956 as Africa’s largest state. The *Black Book* reveals systemic discrimination by the ‘Arab-run’ state against the ‘black African majority’. It contains some truly stunning statistics. It meticulously chronicles the skewed power and economic imbalance between Sudan’s Arab population, which is largely based in the north of the country and its African peoples. It shows that three Arab-speaking ethnic groups---the Shaigia, Jaaliyeen, and Dangagla---have dominated Sudan’s political and economic life since independence.

To be sure, this lopsided policy was inherited from the British colonial authorities, who favoured the ethnic Arabs over the Africans, partly as a result of the fact that they were ruling Sudan in alliance with Egypt, and partly because the Colonial Office in London was dominated by Orientalist romanticisers. The post-colonial rulers, true to form, invested all efforts in perpetuating the status quo. Crucial to this dominance was their control of the state’s security apparatuses: no one outside these charmed circles have ever headed Sudan’s military or police. This is important, since Sudan is one of the chronically coup-prone countries in Africa. No successful coup has been organized by anyone outside these three favoured ethnic groups. These groups, representing about 5 per cent of Sudan’s population, according to the official census, have occupied 47 to 70 per cent of cabinet positions since 1956, and the presidency for all that period. They have further tried to impose a uniform Islamic culture on the country, one of the most heterogeneous societies in the world.22

The *Black Book* is scathing about the lopsided economic opportunities in the country, noting that the country’s Ministry of Finance had become, in effect, a front for northern acquisitiveness. “Only 5 per cent of its staff,” the authors note, “come from outside of the northern region. Hiring of staff in the ministry is primarily reserved for northerners. People from other regions have to contend with the demeaning jobs of tea-making and cleaning offices and toilets. Even the drivers are recruited from among northern school dropouts whose family members are working in the ministry.”

“People from other regions” obviously include ‘Arab’ groups other than the three favoured groups---all the Arab groups combined constitute thirty per cent of Sudan’s population, whereas the favoured Arab groups constitute only five per cent of the country’s population---but the writers of the *Black Book* were not too concerned about such nuance. Although both Arab and African in Darfur had been the object of neglect and discrimination by the Sudanese state, ‘The Seekers of Truth and Justice’ were concerned with only highlighting the plight of the ‘black Africans’. In other words, as their critics have pointed out, they were clearly “motivated by political ambition and were prepared to stir up ethnic hatred to meet their ends.”23

This criticism is not entirely fair, however. Darfur’s recent history had shown to ‘The Seekers of Truth and Justice’, and to anyone else interested in developments in the region, how difficult it had become to forge any unifying front among the regions competing groups: radical Arabism and external influences have served to undercut that possibility.

An interesting and profoundly important twist in the *Black Book*’s analysis is the evidence it presents---of ministerial and other representations---showing that southern Sudan, which had the SPLA to advance its cause by force of arms, has had its share of state patrimony increased
considerably over the years. By 1999, for example, its share of ministerial-level appointments was 16.4%, compared to the west’s 0%, the east’s 1.4% and the central region’s 2%. This was still paltry compared to the north’s 79.5%, but it was a considerable improvement over the previous decade, when there was hardly any such representation. This is of great importance to understanding the current crisis, because it goes to show that the authors understand that armed violence pays, and especially if it is calibrated on a carefully-choreographed ethnic or racial appeal.

In quick order after the release of The Black Book, a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (later renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement [SLM]), aggressively secular and ‘black nationalist,’ emerged in 2003 to champion the cause espoused in the document, claiming that it would fight the Sudanese government until the imbalances were redressed to ensure that Darfurians got their fair share of the national patrimony. Another group, the moderately Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), emerged soon after, also in Darfur, and forged a loose alliance with SLM to fight the Sudanese government. Darfur was in a state of armed rebellion. Hardly anyone, however, including the Sudanese government, took the two groups seriously. The Sudanese government first tried to ignore them, and then later initiated half-hearted peace overtures to the rebels. In April 2003, however, the two groups mounted a spectacular offensive against Sudanese government forces, attacking the el Fasher airport and destroying half a dozen military aircraft. They also kidnapped a Sudanese air-force general. As de Waal has noted, this singular success was highly significant, for the SPLA ‘had managed nothing of the kind in twenty years,’ and it went to show that the Darfur groups had what it takes to make a successful guerrilla army: mobility, good intelligence, and popular support.24

Sudan immediately realized that it had a serious crisis on its hands: this was a problem beyond its comprehension. It’s brutal and effete rulers had always taken Darfur’s quiescence, where relationship with the central state was concerned, for granted. That delusion was now shattered. The Sudanese government, still locked in an unwinnable war with the SPLA, feared the worst: they feared that the new rebel groups would form an alliance, based on ‘racial’ affinity, with the southern Sudanese rebels. Such a development looked plausible—and potentially fatal. There was, in the making, an existential crisis for the Sudanese state.

The stakes had become higher with the discovery, in parts of Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan, of oil. The government’s reaction to the crisis was ingenious. It became more amenable to Western pressure to reach a peace agreement with the SPLA, and on the Darfur front, it resorted to an age-old tactic: the recruitment of surrogates to fight the Darfur rebels on its behalf, and to fight with scorched-earth tactics. It was, as de Waal has noted, ‘counter-insurgency on the cheap.’ Fortunately for the government, it still had that close coterie of vicious and manipulative security officers who had been running Sudan’s wars since the early 1980s. This group had built many networks—of local militia groups, Jihadists and vigilantes—who they could call upon any time to do the dirty work for them. There were the Ben Halba fiursan, a group of northern ‘Arab’ camel nomads, and the even more mercenary former Libyan Islamic Legionnaires to call upon.

The two groups merged to form what has now come to be known as Janjawid. Provided with supplies, arms and virtually
unlimited freedom to do what they liked by the Sudanese government, the Janjawiid militias were unleashed on local peasants and the general civilian population. Relatively little fighting has occurred between them and the Darfur rebel groups, but unarmed civilians have been uprooted from their homes, which are often comprehensively destroyed by the Janjawiid, massacred, or driven across the border into Chad. Their campaigns have led to what the UN has described as the ‘world’s worst humanitarian disaster’, a situation that clearly calls for an urgent and appropriate emergency response.

THE DILEMMAS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Humanitarian interventions in Africa have often been two-track, focusing on the delivery of relief on the one hand and the brokering of peace agreements on the other. Generally, the first consideration trumps the second, for it is assumed that such crises have less political than purely humanitarian salience: things are supposed to fall in place once everyone gets fed and resettled. In the case of Darfur, however, with its echoes of Rwanda---of ethnic pogroms, of extermination of whole groups, of genocide---the immensity and urgency of the situation was grasped very early on, first by humanitarian workers and reporters, then by editorial page and op-ed writers (Nicholas Kristoff of the New York Times was among the earliest and most influential) and world leaders and organizations. The situation called, in the opinion of most observers, for immediate military intervention to stop the atrocities.

Unfortunately, however, debates about the urgency of robust humanitarian intervention in Darfur have been somewhat marred by the memories of the dubious claims by the US and Britain, following the failed search for weapons of mass destruction, of an overriding humanitarian imperative in their disastrous invasion and occupation of Iraq. When Britain’s Tony Blair (who has a commendable record of compassionate foreign policy) suggested at a press conference that he would send troops to Darfur to stop the depredations of the Janjawiid, he was scoffed at by editorial writers and other commentators as a deluded warmonger. A more measured response came from the Vice Rector of the UN University, Ramesh Thakur, who noted that: “A Western intervention, far from offering a solution, may add to the problems. Especially after Iraq, we have to work through regional governments and the United Nations.”

The United Nations, however, had passed a resolution on 30 July 2004, with a one-month deadline for compliance (30 August), calling on the Sudanese government to “identify and declare those militias over which it has influence, and instruct them to cease their activities forthwith.” Khartoum thus had 30 days to end the massive violations of human rights and rein in the Janjawiid. The deadline has since passed, with no sign of compliance by the Sudanese government. Meanwhile, civilians continue to be massacred, and thousands are dying each day of starvation and other war-related woes. On 3 September, Human Rights Watch complained of continuing depredations against civilians in Darfur, including the existence of at least 16 armed Janjawiid camps terrorizing civilians. HRW also bemoaned the fact that the UN Secretariat is failing to acknowledge what several UN agencies and scores of independent reports have documented ---that the government of Sudan is responsible
for attacks against civilians, directly and through support to the Janjawiid militias.  

The crisis in Darfur has clearly reached the very high threshold set by the ICISS for humanitarian intervention, which it noted should only be considered in the face of “large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation…” Instead of action by the major powers, which would make all the difference, however, there has been dithering and great evasiveness. Even Bill Frist, otherwise so direct and morally lucid on the matter, could only venture the fatuous suggestion of using SPLA soldiers, now inactive after the Naivasha Agreement, to protect civilians in Darfur against the Janjawiid—a step that would almost certainly escalate the violence into full-scale ‘race’ war that would possibly engulf the whole of Sudan. The usually sober The Economist managed a tad better, suggesting a “possible tack” of persuading Chad, “across whose borders tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees are streaming, to initiate an intervention in Darfur under its right to self-defence.”

There are precedents for such an intervention. In the 1970s, India intervened in East Pakistan, Vietnam invaded and dislodged Pol Pot’s murderous regime, and Tanzania’s forces helped overthrow the sanguinary Idi Amin’s regime. These were all unilateral actions taken in self-defence, but their effects were of undoubted humanitarian salience: hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of lives were saved as a result. In the case of the Darfur crisis, however, a Chadian military intervention would almost certainly widen the conflict into a regional war, which would be of no help to the people of Darfur.

This paralysing situation makes especially salient comments by Thomas G. Weiss, who has written with great insight on the imperatives of humanitarian intervention, on the dilemmas of such interventions in this very cynical, post-Iraq world. “Critics and sceptics of humanitarian intervention,” Weiss has written, “should be less preoccupied that military action will be taken too often for insufficient humanitarian reasons, but rather more concerned that it will be taken too rarely for the right ones.”

CONCLUSION

The deadline for Sudanese government compliance with the UN resolution calling on it to disarm the Janjawiid expired at the end of August, with no sign of the violence abating. The deadline was probably a bad idea to begin with, given the complicated nature of the crisis. A more effective approach surely would have been to bring the rebel groups and the government together at a high-profile peace conference, and have them agree to a political solution. This is what the African Union has been trying to do, but the AU lacks the leverage of the Security Council and its permanent members. The peace talks it convened between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government failed to reach an agreement in Abuja.

The situation now calls for much more than a combination of peacemaking initiatives, condemnation, and impassioned calls on Sudan to “fulfill its commitment to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates.” It calls for action to stop all parties, and especially the Janjaweed, from their destructive campaigns. Because the UN is not in the business of coercive, non-consensual intervention, it should robustly
back the AU in both its peace-making efforts, and its efforts to provide protection to civilians who remain in imminent danger in Darfur.

By the end of August 2004, the AU had 305 soldiers on the ground in Darfur as part of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, and the UN was working with the AU on a plan that would raise this force level to 3,000 AU troops and 1,200 police officers. However, the Sudanese government has rejected AU offers to increase the size of the force and extend its mandate to include the protection of civilians, insisting on an AU role that is limited to observation and monitoring.

However, the issue of consent should be irrelevant. There was no consent in 1999, to the aerial bombardment and insertion of some 50,000 NATO troops into Kosovo in response to the deaths of some 2,000 people. In this case, the intervention was authorised ex post facto by the UN Security Council. However, the Council now has the opportunity to act pro-actively and in accordance with the ICSS norm:

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.  

It is time for the Security Council to request the African Union, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to deploy a capable force to Darfur with an express mandate to protect civilians. Because the AU lacks resources, in terms of rapidly-deployable and combat capable forces and the finances for sustaining operations in the field, a Security Council member, like Britain (which has, after-all, showed a willingness to intervene) should consider deploying troops alongside the AU and raising the necessary donor support to sustain the entire operation.

The Darfur crisis is a clear-cut (though admittedly, not so simple) test case for the emergent norm of an international responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflict. If the international community fails this test, it will again stand accused of embracing double standards and facilitating the entrenchment of a culture of impunity on the African continent. There are times, and this is one of them, when risky or even failed action is far more defensible than continued inaction.

NOTES

1 Lansana Gberie is Senior Research Fellow with the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
2 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Research Centre, 2001), xi.
4 Ibid.
The international legal definition of the crime of genocide is found in Articles II and III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Article II describes two elements of the crime of genocide, including the mental element; meaning the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such". The 1948 Convention makes its signatories treaty-bound to intervene to stop genocide wherever it is happening. This legal implication was what prevented the Clinton administration from calling the Rwandan genocide by its right name as it unfolded before the eyes of the world. See Samantha Power, *America in the Age of Genocide* (New York: Random House, 2003).


11 One displaced persons camp, Greta, which held 10,000 people on 26 August, was accommodating 40,000 people 7 September 2004. “Hope in Darfur,” *Washington Post*, 22 September 2004.

12 Ibid.


15 According to de Waal, Janjawid ‘derives from ‘G3’ (a rifle) and jawad (‘horse’), but it is also western Sudanese dialect for ‘rabble’ or ‘outlaws’. See Ibid.


20 Alex de Waal, “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap”.


23 Noted in William Wallis, “The Black Book history or Darfur’s darkest chapter.”

24 Alex de Waal, “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap”. Ibid.

25 See, for example, John Laughland, ‘The mask of altruism disguising a colonial war’ *Guardian*, 2 August 2004. Among others, Blair is quoted as saying that: "I believe we have a moral responsibility to deal with this and to deal with it by any means that we can."


29 Ibid.

30 ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, xii.


34 ICISS, *Responsibility to Protect*, xi.