DIALOGUE IN AFRICA

by

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NOTE: This is the text of a talk given at a private meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 18th May, 1971. The discussion which followed the talk has been reproduced, with the minimum of editing, from a tape-recording.

At a meeting of this Branch of the Institute about two years ago I discussed the outward movement in South Africa's foreign relations, and I surveyed the development of this movement from the time of its emergence as a recognisable factor in South African foreign policy in 1965/66. Since then another dimension has entered into this movement, namely the possibility of some form of dialogue with other African states. My conclusion in 1969, before the talk of dialogue, was that even though the results of the outward movement were very limited, it was a significant factor when seen against the extent of South Africa's international isolation. It is probably still true to say that the concrete results are limited, and, especially to governments and peoples of other countries, it must appear that the advances made in our relations with the rest of Africa are slight and do not yet justify the description of a "breakthrough" - a word so widely used in our press nowadays.

However, it is necessary to judge the developments of the past few years against the growing isolation of South Africa in the early sixties, as well as the threats of isolation which still continue in various areas of our foreign relations. It may be useful therefore to look back briefly at the situation as it was a decade ago.

During the 1950's, criticism of South Africa in the United Nations and elsewhere was increasing, but the country's international position was not acute. There were, for instance, no serious threats of sanctions; the United Nations Security Council had not been brought into the picture; and even in Africa, South Africa was not under strong pressure. Mainly because its contacts in Africa were through the colonial powers, South Africa was able to play a fairly important role in various international technical bodies, such as the CCTA, the CSA and the regional groupings of the United Nations specialised agencies. The independence movement in Africa was well under way and, as you will recall, the South African Government was at first very critical of the increasing speed with which the Western colonial powers were appearing to withdraw from Africa. In the early fifties for instance, Dr. Malan spoke of an African Charter which would unite mainly the White powers of Africa in a common policy aimed, inter alia, at guiding Africa on the road to "European" civilization and at protecting the African peoples from communist and Asian influence. But by the mid-fifties attitudes in South Africa appeared to be changing. The Prime Minister, Mr. Strijdom, said in 1955 that South Africa should behave towards the new non-White states in such a way that they and South Africa would not face each other as enemies, "but as peoples and governments which recognise and honour each other's right to exist". By 1957 when Ghana, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Lybia had gained their independence

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Mr. Strijdom recognised that "the whole position has changed in Africa". He recognised, too, that there would have to be contact with new African states in economic and other spheres, and he added: "in the course of time there will have to be ordinary relations and even diplomatic relations". The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Eric Louw, also spoke at this time of his policy to maintain contact with other states in Africa whether they were European or African controlled.

These indications of changing attitudes, of a recognition of the new international situation, especially in Africa, were perhaps the beginnings of an "outward" policy by the Government and an attempt to prevent South Africa's isolation. But the beginning of the new decade saw a dramatic turn for the worse in South Africa's international position. The critical occurrence was of course Sharpeville and the other racial disturbances which occurred in various parts of South Africa in 1960. The United Nations Security Council was, as a result, asked for the first time to consider South African racial policies as a possible threat to world peace, and throughout the world criticism of the South African Government reached new heights. The South African economy suffered, and within a little more than a year South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth.

The new and extreme external pressure on South Africa was due not only to events within the country, but also to the fact that 1960 was the peak year of the anti-colonialism campaign. In that year alone sixteen African states achieved independence and were admitted to the United Nations. The colonial powers, with the exception of Portugal, had now in effect given up all attempts to resist the pressures on them to withdraw from Africa, and, as fast as they were able to, they were handing over authority to African Governments. In this process they had no inclination to defend South Africa. The threat of isolation which had been building up during the 1950's now became very real for South Africa, both in Africa and in the international community generally.

During the early sixties, South Africa's membership of several international organisations was ended, and in others effective participation was no longer possible, including all those concerned with Africa.

At the same time the reaction within South Africa was to go on to the defensive, which further increased the political isolation. The mood among the electorate was not one which encouraged talk of contact with Black African states. White South Africans to a great extent built a psychological wall of reaction against the potential threat of Black Africa and a generally hostile world. This reaction was strengthened by a widespread view in the Western world that South Africa was in fact under imminent threat of violent eruption from within and irresistible pressure from Black Africa. In a lecture in 1960, the historian, Dr. C.W. de Kiewiet, pictured South Africa in a state of siege and tension as the African states emerged to political independence. He said: "World opinion limits South Africa's opportunities to take whatever strong steps may be necessary to strengthen her position and widen the margin of safety...South Africa is isolated and in danger. Destiny is marching to its borders. It will cross them in ways unseen and unpreventable. When it crosses them it will ask for a reckoning that I cannot foretell."

This may sound unreal now, but it was the mood in the early sixties, and it is against this background that we must judge the developments of the second half of the sixties and of the past year in particular. The outward movement
has reflected a growing urge within South Africa, not only by the Government, but by businessmen, industrialists, scientists and so on, to break out of the threatening isolation. They have realised that no individual and no country can thrive in isolation, and this realization has led to active steps to find and to develop new contacts.

The outward movement has not been concerned only with Africa. It has involved efforts to expand trade and diplomatic contacts in Asia and Australasia and moves to establish new links in various fields with Latin American countries. There has also been a more pragmatic attitude in recent years towards the United Nations, and in general a less defensive attitude towards criticism. But it is mainly in respect of South Africa's relations with Africa that the outward policy has become known, and it is here that the results of the policy have been most significant when judged against South Africa's complete isolation in Africa early in the sixties.

I do not intend now to give another survey of the outward movement, but rather to look in more detail at the recent developments. However, in order to set the scene, it can be recalled that the highlights of this movement in Africa were the full acceptance of the independence of our three small neighbouring states and the development of co-operative relations with them; the establishment of friendly relations with Malawi, including the exchange of diplomats and the substantial assistance, both financial and technical, given to Malawi by South Africa; the increasing contacts both official and unofficial with Madagascar and also Mauritius; and the development of some links, mostly economic with other African states, in spite of their official position towards South Africa, which was one of supporting the OAU policies of boycott.

Much of this development was, of course, due to changing circumstances in Africa and not only to a new trend in the policy of the South African Government. A more pragmatic attitude towards South Africa was manifested in particular in the policies of President Banda of Malawi, and there were other signs that some African leaders were beginning to question the old policies of force and isolation - if only because they were not achieving anything through such policies. Then the new trend broke into the open with President Houphouët-Boigny's dialogue proposals last year.

Before attempting to survey the dialogue situation and what it may mean, it is necessary to make two qualifications. Firstly, we are obviously still in the early stages of this process, and the framework for possible dialogue is still taking shape. While there have been many statements from various sources about dialogue, the aims and motives are not yet clear, and there is still some confusion about the whole matter. It is, therefore, perhaps too early to be talking about this in any definitive way.

Secondly, what one says at this stage is based almost entirely upon press reports, of which there have been almost too many, and one has to be aware that there is much we do not know about what has been going on, for example in the way of private contacts - official, semi-official and unofficial. Nor is it possible to say much about the patient work which has been going on for years in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and which has no doubt formed the basis for whatever success there has been so far in the outward movement and dialogue. In the nature of things much that has happened and is happening in our relations with African states is being kept secret. We may only be seeing the tip of the proverbial iceberg, and there may therefore be factors unknown to us now which have a direct bearing on what I am going to say.
The event which brought the dialogue question into the open occurred at the beginning of November, 1970, when President Félix Houphouët Boigny of the Ivory Coast announced that he was planning to call a meeting of African leaders to urge direct talks with South Africa, because he considered that force would not solve the problem of apartheid. (He had referred to the possibility of dialogue earlier in 1970. But now he stated it openly as a proposal.) In an interview a few days after the announcement, he indicated that he wanted to win OAU support for his initiative, and that he did not intend acting unilaterally. On this occasion he commented also that to obtain peace, there was only one weapon - negotiation.

"We are pre-occupied by one problem - apartheid. I know there are different approaches to this. The Ivory Coast, on this question, as well as others, supports negotiation and dialogue. But we are not alone and we shall not limit ourselves merely to stating our position. I will take my pilgrim's staff and I will see all the Presidents for a heart-to-heart talk.

"We hope to succeed by dialogue. For seven years we have had nothing but grand and violent speeches, with tragic and sometimes ridiculous results. We cannot make threats without the means to apply them."

The President went on to argue that the threats encouraged South Africa to accumulate more arms, encouraging a defensive reaction which would be vented against the black states to the north.

"My opinion is that we shall obtain nothing by the use of force. How can we reach a solution if we refuse all contact with South Africa?"

President Houphouët Boigny scorned what had been achieved so far in Black Africa's campaign against Pretoria. "Do you really think the Olympic ban has embarrassed South Africa? Look at the truth squarely. One day in Lagos I was served out-of-season white grapes from South Africa. A boycott will never stop South Africa from consuming Ghanaian or Ivorian cocoa. Let's stop deluding ourselves!"

The Ivorian leader added that he approved the Malawian position on South Africa. "You want Malawi to destroy herself in the name of African unity. African unity should not be the unity of the cemetery. If we must invade South Africa, let's do it with our diplomats."

President Houphouët Boigny received immediate support from President Tsiranana of Madagascar, who welcomed the move "to solve this important African problem with patience and intelligence". Early support came also from President Bongo of Gabon and President Mogo of Dahomey. The former said in a broadcast statement: "In the military and economic spheres South Africa envies States like ours nothing. So it is necessary to make these people hear reason, and to make them hear reason it is necessary to have dialogue with them".

Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho and President Banda of Malawi were, of course, also in support, although they have both made it clear that they were advocating the same thing long before Houphouët Boigny. Chief Jonathan
did in fact use the very word at an OAU Conference in Addis Ababa in September, 1970, when he said that Lesotho's policy on African matters was "contact and dialogue". Some time ago he offered Lesotho as a centre for dialogue with South Africa, and he has recently expressed disappointment that his offer has not been taken up either by South Africa or other African states.

Support came also from Ghana, although this should perhaps be regarded as an independent initiative, because the Prime Minister, Dr. Busia, had actually raised the possibility of dialogue in 1969. But he encountered considerable opposition in Ghana at that time, and in mid-1970 the Ghanaian Assembly unanimously adopted an opposition motion to the effect that, until South Africa changed its policies, sanctions by Ghana (originally imposed by Dr. Nkrumah) should be maintained. Then in October, 1970, Dr. Busia himself commented that Britain should be pushed out of the Commonwealth, if it resumed arms sales to South Africa. Such resumption, he said, would be "immoral", and he referred to his views as being identical to those of other Commonwealth leaders, such as Dr. Kaunda.

However, while visiting Canada in November, i.e. after Houphouët Boigny's statement, Dr. Busia told a press conference that neither trade embargoes nor guerilla warfare was likely to break the rule of the white minority government in South Africa. Instead, he suggested, African and Commonwealth states should negotiate with the South African Government while encouraging "constitutional and moral change" from within the white-ruled country. A few days later in Germany he repeated his belief that dialogue would be a better way to try to end apartheid than force.

In December Dr. Busia spelt out his philosophy in more detail in a statement to Parliament in Accra. It is perhaps worth quoting his remarks at some length:

"We would like to see in South Africa a multi-racial society in which every citizen, whatever his origin, race colour or creed, enjoys the same human dignity, rights, privileges and opportunities, as every other citizen, a society in which every citizen has an equal and unfettered opportunity both for individual development and for service to his country in justice and freedom, according to his ability and capacity.

"Before I became Prime Minister I followed the united efforts of independent African countries to train and equip freedom fighters to fight for their freedom in South Africa. Since becoming Prime Minister a number of truths have become evident to me.

"What has so far been done to train and equip freedom fighters is woefully and hopelessly inadequate for them to wage a successful struggle against the well-trained and well-armed troops of the South African Government ... only six out of 41 (OAU) members have so far paid their contributions in full (to the Liberation Fund).

"However, if freedom fighting is to be persisted with, a re-appraisal of our attitude is called for. If war is our aim
and chosen method, it should be clearly stated and demonstrated --- we must be prepared to sacrifice commensurate proportions of our national income to build up armed forces sufficiently powerful and strong for the destruction of South Africa.

"What we appear to be doing so far is to send our African brothers to slaughter.

"..... I understand why we of the independent African countries have not been able to give adequate assistance to the freedom fighters on a scale that will enable them to wage a successful armed struggle with South Africa. The greatest need in all independent African countries today is development.

"With the knowledge at our disposal, conscious too of the frustrations and persistent inadequacies of our policies of force and isolation, are we right in maintaining that the policies of violence and isolation are the only ones on which we must rely for ending the inhuman oppression of South Africa?"

To return to President Houphouët Boigny – he was attempting, as a start, to obtain the support of the OCAM group of French African States. But in this endeavour he suffered a significant setback only a week after his first statement, when two important leaders, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Amadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, rejected his proposal. A spokesman for the Senegal Government said there was "no question" of starting a dialogue with South Africa which had "built racism into a dogma and made apartheid a religion". South Africa's policy, he added, threatened peace and was destructive. Mr. Ahidjo was no less dogmatic in rejecting dialogue.

In spite of this opposition, it was announced in mid-November by the Foreign Minister of Madagascar that the "new approach" to South Africa would be discussed at the OCAM summit meeting scheduled for January, 1971. This announcement was made after a meeting of Presidents Houphouët Boigny and Tsiranana with the Presidents of Niger and the Central African Republic. It could be assumed therefore that the latter two were generally in favour of the dialogue proposal. Another member of OCAM – Mauritius – had by this time also indicated support. This made a total of seven OCAM States which appeared at least favourably disposed (Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Gabon, Dahomey, Niger, Central African Republic, Mauritius). Those definitely opposed were three: Senegal, Cameroon and the Peoples Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). The remaining five had taken no clear position: Togo, Chad, Upper Volta, Rwanda and the Dem. Republic of Congo (Kinshasa).

The position, therefore, looked hopeful for President Houphouët Boigny's initiative. Once majority support had been obtained from OCAM, he presumably planned to go to the OAU and there gather further support from a group of English-speaking States. But unfortunately this "strategy for dialogue" did not work. When the OCAM Summit Meeting was held in Fort Lamy, Chad, at the end of January there was not even a debate on the dialogue proposal, although up to the last minute the Ivory Coast and Madagascar delegations were saying that the dialogue issue would be dealt with. They must have become convinced in behind the scenes talks that they could no longer expect majority support. The communique at the end of the meeting dealt with a number of other questions, but on this one it simply said:
"The Conference listened to the communications of the Heads of delegations from Ivory Coast and Madagascar on South African problems. It took note of them."

Something apparently had gone wrong on the road to Fort Lamy. I do not know what it was, but I can suggest some possible influences:

1) The opposition of Senegal and its influential leader, President Senghor.

2) The opposition which emerged from President Mobotu of Congo (Kinshasa). This was surprising, as it was expected that he might adopt a more pragmatic line towards South Africa. In February, after the OCAM meeting, it was reported that President Mobotu was actively lobbying other OCAM states to drop the dialogue issue for fear that it would split the group.

3) Lobbying against dialogue from outside the OCAM group - by President Kaunda and possibly also Nigeria.

4) The reaction amongst Black African States to the alleged invasion of Guinea towards the end of November. The mood of militancy was not conducive to talk of dialogue with the White South. In December a special OAU meeting was held in Lagos primarily to consider Guinean allegations, and it seems that the discussions there affected the strategy of President Houphouët-Boigny.

In March a new boost was given to the dialogue move by Mr. Vorster's statement that he was willing to meet other African leaders on an equal footing. Ghana's Foreign Minister responded immediately that he would be prepared to go to South Africa for discussions with the Government. Subsequently, President Bokassa of the Central African Republic went even further and said that he would be prepared to establish diplomatic relations. A two-day debate in the Ghanaian Parliament ended with support being given to Dr. Busia's approach - in spite of strong objections from the opposition. The government motion, however, approved of a dialogue which would be "based on the philosophy underlying the Lusaka Manifesto" and which would be "one of the weapons which could be used in the struggle to eliminate apartheid". (In view of the extent to which the Lusaka Manifesto has figured in statements of African leaders - both supporting and opposing dialogue - it will be necessary to come back to this question a little later.)

On 30th March at his press conference, Mr. Vorster referred again to his willingness to meet African leaders. In answering a question as to whether formal invitations would be issued to countries like Ghana which had responded favourably, Mr. Vorster said that formal invitations would in certain cases be sent, depending on the reaction of states to his expression of a desire for contact. At this press conference he also announced that President Banda of Malawi would pay a state visit to South Africa later this year.

Early in April a new voice was added to those supporting a more pragmatic approach to South Africa - if not actual dialogue as proposed by President
Boigny. President Amin of Uganda stated that he would be prepared to visit South Africa to study the conditions in which Africans lived, if the idea met with the approval of the OAU. He declared: "I believe in action. If the Heads of state in Africa want to know South Africa and Rhodesia, they should do so practically, rather than just sitting in their offices." It should be noted that General Amin emphasised that he would only undertake such a visit, if it were approved at the OAU Summit Conference in June.

The next major event was the press conference given by President Houphouët Boigny in Abidjan on 28th April. Apart from the journalists from many countries, the President's audience included resident diplomats, Ivory Coast diplomats recalled especially for the meeting, and (according to a report in the London Times) almost the entire political and military leadership of the country. The press conference is reported to have lasted for five hours and many subjects must have been covered. But there is no doubt that the President's references to South Africa attracted the main attention. According to the correspondent of Le Monde, he made a "series of spectacular statements on the need for Black African states to work out some form of peaceful understanding with South Africa. The henceforward historically significant date marks the beginning of a new movement towards some rapprochement between Black and White Africa."

It has not yet been possible to see the full text of President Houphouët Boigny statements. In the meantime one must make do with several lengthy press reports, and from these I wish to quote some of his remarks, which help to convey an idea of what is in the mind of this African leader:

"To ensure their development and independence, African states absolutely need peace, and only a real neutrality, which to be achieved requires peace among all African states including South Africa, will enable them to avoid the rivalries of the big powers."

The Ivory Coast leader said that like other African heads of state he found South Africa's apartheid policy revolting and he condemned it. But, he added, the attitude of that country's white minority could not be changed by force. "We must at all costs banish the spectre of a war with that country, which would be a catastrophe for the entire continent.... After mature reflection, I believe that a dialogue with the whites of South Africa is possible."

"Let us seize this opportunity. Mr. Vorster has promised to receive us on a footing of equality. For all who are motivated by the spirit of peace and the welfare of Africa it will, I truly believe, be an act of faith and courage to respond favourably to the invitations of the South African Premier."

"Without doubt, the system of apartheid practised in South Africa outrages us all, and we identify ourselves completely with the universal decree of condemnation." But apartheid, he said, was a matter "within the jurisdiction of South Africa and it is not by force that it will be eradicated."
"What must be decided is whether bellicose verbalism, the disastrous consequences of which are known to all, or a carefully thought-out approach conducted with serenity, realism and modesty, would serve more faithfully the dignity, the pride and the best interests of our continent."

"The White population of South Africa, whose claim to be Africans is as good as ours, have a most important part to play in the development of our continent in peace and harmony."

But the South Africans, he said, would have to give a little. "They must recognize the necessity to transcend the question of apartheid, thus removing the only grounds for disunion between them and their other Black brothers in Africa."

President Houphouët Boigny said his aim was to get an agreement in Africa to help the South African Whites to "enter into a dialogue with their own Blacks". He had no illusions about this: "We cannot change the situation in South Africa by making a speech. We have to communicate; we have to get in touch."

The President made frequent mention of the danger to Africa from communism. He said that two giants, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, were fighting for leadership of the communist world, but he suggested that both powers were in agreement about wanting to ensure the triumph of communism in the world.

In a three point plan for peace in Africa, President Houphouët Boigny proposed (1) that African leaders should clean up their own households and allow justice, tolerance and permanent dialogue; (2) that South Africa should be accepted as an African state and that all South Africans be accepted as Africans in terms of the Lusaka Manifesto; and (3) that African states take a neutral stand in world politics. On this latter point he made it clear that he was not thinking of non-alignment as preached at the Lusaka Conference last year, or so-called "positive neutrality". He referred to Switzerland as a model of "true neutrality".

A meeting is still to take place between President Houphouët Boigny and Dr. Busia of Ghana, and early in April it was reported that the meeting would be held within the next three months. This probably means that it will take place before the OAU meeting scheduled for late June, and no doubt the question of dialogue will figure prominently in the discussions between the two leaders. In the meantime the Ivory Coast President has been actively seeking support in the capitals of other African countries, particularly the French-speaking states. It appears that the OAU meeting will be crucial, because many of the African leaders have indicated that they wish to have at least a green light from the OAU - if not the actual blessing of a majority in the OAU - although President Houphouët Boigny and a few other leaders have probably committed themselves too deeply now to be able to back down, even if an OAU majority opposes their initiative.

President Houphouët Boigny and his firm supporters would, of course, have been in a stronger position at the OAU meeting if they had been able to achieve at least majority support from OCAM countries at the Fort Lamy meeting in January.
There is a danger that the OAU may decide as a compromise to send an official delegation to South Africa representing the organisation. In other words it would take upon itself the responsibility of discussions with South Africa, rather than allow individual members to approach South Africa directly. This is probably the line that President Kaunda will take, and the potential support for such a move is considerable. However, it is also possible that Mr. Vorster's revelations about the secret contacts which President Kaunda himself has had with the South African government, may affect the strength of his position. In fact this may be part of the explanation of Mr. Vorster's decision to reveal the correspondence and other contacts.

If the OAU does decide to approach South Africa, it is very doubtful whether the Government would agree to meet with representatives of the organisation. The terms for the discussions would then be very different from those which would apply in the case of bilateral talks, and the government would probably regard a proposal from the OAU as amounting to interference in South Africa's domestic affairs, which it would not be able to accept. Moreover the African side in the dialogue - if it could still be called that - would be under the control of the more extreme states - the so-called "progressives".

I have already mentioned the opposition to dialogue of Presidents Senghor of Senegal and Ahidjo of Cameroun. In West Africa President Sekou Toure of Guinea is also strongly in opposition, as is General Gowon of Nigeria. Another important centre of opposition in Black Africa is in East Africa - Tanzania - and also Zambia. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda are actively seeking increased support for the OAU's liberation committee, which has its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, and the philosophy behind dialogue is completely contrary to the philosophy behind the liberation movement, which is one of confrontation. Early in February the Tanzanian Government claimed that a dialogue between African States and South Africa would undermine the cause of the African Liberation Movement and would be "a grave betrayal". It said further that this was "exactly what was intended" by the dialogue proposals.

The position of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda is relevant to the question of the Lusaka Manifesto which has been mentioned as a possible basis for talks with South Africa. This Manifesto has been supported by governments outside Africa, too, including the United States Government. It originated with Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda and was adopted by the East and Central African States at a meeting in Lusaka in April, 1969. It was then approved by the OAU and eventually, at the end of 1969, by the United Nations itself.

I do not know how many of the people who talk about the Lusaka Manifesto have read it in full. Members of our Institute have at least had the opportunity to do so, as the full text was circulated as an annexure to a paper issued by the Institute last year. It certainly deserves close reading; it is an important, carefully drafted document; and it presents clearly, in generally moderate language, the case of many Africans and their governments against the White-ruled states. But in my view it is not a document which can form the basis of a dialogue with the South African Government - unless parts of it are ignored. While it expresses preference for negotiation rather than the use of force, it supports the liberation movements, and, while it recognises all the peoples who have made their homes in South Africa as Africans, it argues strongly for the isolating and ostracising of South Africa. There is no suggestion anywhere in the Manifesto that any sort of dialogue is possible with the present South African Government. On the contrary it says,
in calling for South Africa's isolation: "The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations."

Admittedly it does not demand a complete transformation of society immediately, but it does demand a radical change of direction and a commitment to a society based on individual equality, before there can be any acceptance by other African states. This requirement that there should be change within South Africa before any dialogue or co-operation takes place, is reflected in the statements of those now opposing the Houphouët Boigny initiative.

It was also, by the way, stated explicitly by President Kaunda in his letter to Mr. Vorster in April, 1968.

This point is perhaps overlooked by those South Africans who argue for an acceptance of the Lusaka Manifesto as a basis for negotiation. This may be a worthy ideal, but the present discussion is about dialogue with the existing South African Government - and the Manifesto in my view rules that out. As there is no other government in sight, one must confine oneself to the feasibility of dialogue within the realities of the present situation in South Africa.

The Lusaka Manifesto therefore, in my view, reflects the policy of confrontation adopted in particular by President Nyerere, and seems to me to constitute a stumbling-block in the way of contact and discussions, rather than a help towards dialogue with the South African authorities.

There is, of course, the possibility that the Government may be able to convince some of those in Africa who stand by the Lusaka Manifesto, that the ideals of the Manifesto may be achieved through its present policies. But there is no sign at all yet of this happening - although Dr. Muller does claim that there is a growing understanding in other countries.

Before turning to consider some other basic questions about the dialogue proposals from the South African side, it may be useful to attempt a rough assessment of how all the 41 African States - members of the OAU - are lined up, or are likely to line up if this issue comes to a head at the OAU meeting next month.

Judging by statements made in recent months, or by their known political positions, I would place 14 states in the column favouring the proposals of the Ivory Coast and Madagascar or of Ghana, which, while there are differences of approach, all point in the direction of contacts with the South African Government. These are : the Ivory Coast and the four other states associated with it in the so-called "little entente", namely Dahomey, Togo, Upper Volta and Niger; four additional OCAM states, namely Madagascar, Mauritius, Gabon and the Central African Republic; Ghana; Uganda; Malawi; Swaziland; and Lesotho.

Those opposing dialogue at this stage are twenty : Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroun, Congo (Brazza), Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi, Zambia, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia. However, I would place question marks next to four of these countries, namely Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Tunisia and even possibly Morocco. Although they have indicated disapproval, there
are reasons for thinking they may shift, if the dialogue proposals appear to be gaining substantial support. But for the moment they are opposed and may well remain so.

This leaves seven states in the uncertain column. The first three - Botswana, Kenya and Gambia - I feel will almost certainly support some form of dialogue. This is perhaps true of the fourth and fifth, too - Liberia and Chad. The remaining two are Rwanda and Equitorial Guinea.

It would seem therefore, that the dialogue proposals can be expected to receive the support of at least 14 and at the most 25, of the total of 41 African countries. (I must explain at this point that I do not in fact expect a clear-cut vote on this issue in the OAU, with countries lined up publicly for and against dialogue. But this break-down perhaps helps to judge how the wind is blowing.)

The potential support for dialogue is perhaps surprising, and, of course, it could melt away overnight if something unexpected happens to disturb the present trend. But it certainly justifies the open campaign and the private lobbying which President Houphouët Boigny is conducting prior to the OAU summit. In fact, the support of a majority of the OAU membership is just within his grasp - unlikely as this may sound to us in the embattled south.

This review of the changes taking place in Africa indicates at least that South Africa has entered a new phase in its foreign relations. At the same time there is no reason for complacency, as this new phase is bound to be a very difficult one. If mistakes are made on our part, or if things happen in South Africa to disturb the trend, we shall have much more to lose than in the past, and we could land up in a worse situation than before. This is probably the reason for Dr. Muller's cautionary statement last week that the matter of possible dialogue should not be disturbed by untimely speculations, and that not everything being done should be examined under a microscope. His statement also indicates the sensibility of this issue. 'In contrast to the reports and comments in our press and radio, the Government has on the whole been very reserved and cautious in its reaction to the events of African leaders. The main problem which makes the issue so sensitive relates, of course, to the question of South African domestic policies. Apart from statements already quoted, an illustration of this fact was given only last week in the statement of the Foreign Minister of Mauritius, Mr. Duval, during his brief visit to South Africa. He said, according to reports, that many African states would join President Houphouët Boigny's dialogue move, if the South African Government would "discard inessentials in its race policy and make spectacular concessions". He said that if the Government could indicate that it was willing to take account of world opinion and to examine criticism by its friends, it would be very helpful to those moderate leaders in Africa working for dialogue. If South Africa took the opportunity being offered, it would find "great and rewarding results". I understand that on his return to Mauritius Mr. Duval commented that in his view a dialogue would bring changes in South Africa.

If one takes simply the dictionary meaning, then a dialogue is a conversation between two or more people. In the classical sense - and here one could go back to Plato - a dialogue is a means of arriving at the truth about some
matter, a form of intellectual exploration, with no pre-conditions set by the parties involved, except that the form of dialogue must be acceptable to them. In the present context, however, there are other implications, namely that there are differences between the parties and a desire to reconcile these differences by persuasion not force. If there were no differences, a dialogue would be superfluous, although without some areas of agreement and some common basic assumptions, a dialogue would not be possible, or at least would not be likely to lead to constructive results. There are examples in history that show that when countries in a state of enmity attempt discussions or dialogue in an attempt to avoid worsening relations of even the outbreak of hostilities, they will not succeed unless they have interests in common which give substance to their desire for peaceful relations. In other words the national interests of the respective parties in the dialogue must be severed by an improvement of relations. The African leaders supporting dialogue appear to feel that the interests of their countries would be best served by peace, or a lessening of tension, in Africa, and by paying more serious attention to the problems of development. This is true from the South African side, too. There is also agreement about the potentially disturbing influences of outside powers, and a common interest in preventing the spread of such influences. There is furthermore the role which South Africa is equipped to play in African development. These areas of agreement and common interests are reflected in statements by some of the black African leaders, as well as in the South African Government's comments. They will provide much to talk about in any discussions which may well lead to some constructive common endeavours.

But the differences which relate mainly to our internal problems, still remain, and dialogue implies that in discussion of these differences there cannot be dogmatic positions on either side: there must be a degree of flexibility, a willingness to see the other point of view and even to be influenced. If the expectation of results is determined beforehand by either side, there may well be disappointments. It may well be, of course, that all that should be expected at this stage is that the talking should begin and should continue. It is possible that talking, rather than fighting, is an end in itself, even if the points of difference remain. But this is a short-term end, and at some stage we shall have to come to grips with the issues dividing us from Black Africa.

It appears from the statements of all the African leaders who have supported the idea of dialogue with South Africa, including our older friends, President Banda and Chief Jonathan, that they see dialogue as a means of influencing the course of events within South Africa itself. It must of course be taken into account that the extreme statements in this regard in which dialogue is, for instance, referred to as a "weapon" in the struggle against apartheid, are made partly in order to ward off criticism from other African leaders who do not support dialogue. In other words, there are some things which have to be said, because these leaders cannot allow an impression to be given that they are supporting the South African Government's racial policies. Because of the feeling in Africa about these policies, such an impression would destroy any influence they may have. While expressing strong objections to apartheid, some of these leaders no doubt see the possibility of material advantages for their countries in the way of trade with South Africa, as well as financial and technical assistance.
At the same time, taking all this into account, it has to be appreciated from the South African side that the differences in regard to our internal policies are very real ones, and it is here that the Lusaka Manifesto perhaps expresses very well the feelings of most of the African Leaders about the situation in the Republic. It is from this point of view that one sees a cloud over the future of dialogue. The fact that South Africa's domestic policies are an issue in its international relations, constitutes a real dilemma for us and creates special difficulties for the Government, not least on the domestic front, in its discussions with the other African governments.

The Government clearly recognises that the dialogue will concern its internal policies, and at his press conference in March Mr. Vorster said:

"... as far as the policy of separate development is concerned, it can be discussed, and I take it as a matter of course that it will be discussed."

One can also recall that on an earlier occasion, in July, 1969, in a speech on his outward policy, Mr. Vorster spoke of his desire to establish friendly relations with other countries on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs. They "must accept us as we are," he said. At the same time he recognised that in contacts with other countries, which he was seeking, there would be attempts to influence South Africa. "People can and will of course, try to influence you. There is no law against it. All countries, in fact, try to influence each other, because that is what diplomacy is for. But one must not try to reform another country."

This apparent acceptance of the fact that South Africa's domestic policies will be an issue in the proposed dialogue amounts to a significant concession to the views of other African governments, because it is contrary to normal international law and practice that any sovereign state's domestic affairs should be subject to interference by other governments, and because the South African Government has always adopted a very rigid stand against attempts at interference in its domestic affairs. This has in fact been a cornerstone of its foreign policy. However, it remains to be seen how the dialogue will proceed, if the "separate development" policy becomes a major issue, on a resolution of which further progress in the dialogue depends. Possibly there will be visible and constructive progress in domestic policies while the dialogue proceeds, which will help to satisfy other African leaders, at least to some extent, on this score. But it cannot be expected that the Government will make concessions in its internal policies simply to please other countries, even though it must be realised that relations with the rest of Africa will never become normal, until discriminatory practices which are not defensible, have disappeared from South African society.

Here Mr. Duval's point is perhaps relevant, when he speaks of "concessions" in respect of "inessentials", which would nevertheless be "spectacular". The supporters of dialogue do not demand a radical change of direction; they do not demand a change of government. But they will need evidence of change away from discriminatory practices, as well as from policies based on racial discrimination. And how the Government and the South African electorate will in due course react, will have to be dealt with in a further instalment of this story.
I wish to conclude with a quotation from an editorial in a Ghanaian paper, the Pioneer, which indicates, in perhaps rather dramatic terms, the opportunity and the challenge being offered to us in South Africa. Looking at the question from the Black African side, the Pioneer said:

"..... there can be no doubt that the advocates of the humane strategy of dialogue have already begun to win the moral round for Africa.

"A new wind of change has started to blow over the South African issue, and however sceptical any observers might be, they cannot close their eyes to the existing fact that a bridge of communication has taken shape for the commencement of civilised and very active dialogue.

"The challenge is: how do African leaders cross the bridge? The answer is in the lap of the OAU.

"The statesmanship of the Organisation has got to face this greatest test so far of its life. It might even be the greatest and most significant test of all time to be faced and conquered by Black Africa!"
DISCUSSION

(Some of the questions and comments have been shortened.)

Question: In his first statement in November, 1970, President Houphouët Boigny was reported to have said he also wanted to seek talks with Portugal. I wondered if you had any light to throw on this aspect of the dialogue between the northern and southern parts of Africa?

Answer: It is quite true that he did refer to Portugal. But as far as I can gather this aspect has not played a major part in subsequent statements or discussions. I think it is rather assumed though, that the proposed dialogue in fact applies to the so-called White South, but that it is a question of starting with South Africa. Rhodesia provides a particular problem, of course. It is perhaps relevant to mention here that the Lusaka Manifesto was somewhat easier, as far as the Portuguese territories were concerned, in the sense that it made it quite clear that racialism was not involved, and that it was purely a question of colonialism, from the African point of view - whereas the dialogue proposals seem to be concerned with the question of racialism.

Q: Could I try to clarify one point that has worried me. Our speaker seemed to indicate all the way through, or at least for the latter portion, that our Prime Minister had accepted the idea that the discussions could be on all subjects. Well, while I am not an expert on this matter - I read about it occasionally and follow the English Press - I thought until very recently the edict was that all sorts of subjects were simply taboo in the dialogue. This is what really distressed me; if you start off with a dialogue in which a whole lot of things must not be discussed, well this just gets you nowhere. I thought it was almost at the point of a revolver that our Prime Minister agreed that apartheid could be discussed. Is this so?

A: I think you have to look at this in a fairly wide context, and a fairly long-term context. As I mentioned, it has always been a very important principle of government policy, as it is with most governments in fact, that there should be no interference in domestic affairs. This principle has been defended by South Africa more strongly than most other countries. Now we have a situation where obviously if we do not discuss internal affairs, we will not have any dialogue. The Government has accepted this, of that I am convinced. Mr. Vorster has now said quite clearly, twice in March, in important statements, that he was willing to meet other African leaders and discuss any subject with them without preconditions. Now at first, it is true, he said in effect: I will explain our policies to them. In other words: I will do the talking. This may still be in his mind; we cannot exclude that. He may think that what will happen is that they will come to this country and ask questions. Then he will explain the policies to them, and hopefully they will go away convinced. This may well be his idea. But in fact he has said quite clearly that he is willing to have discussions without preconditions. And, as I indicated, he acknowledged on an earlier occasion that, when you have discussions of this kind, the other side will try and influence you.

I think there are signs that in the discussions Mr. Duval (Foreign Minister of Mauritius) had with Dr. Muller last week there may already have been a little bit of dialogue. Mr. Duval indicated that he had given Dr. Muller his views on South African internal policy. Then you will recall that Dr.
Muller made a statement in the House of Assembly very shortly afterwards, in the debate on his Vote, to the effect that it was extremely important that things were not done and said in South Africa which adversely affected the racial situation, and which did in fact harm our external relations. He also made another statement earlier to the effect that some of the things done in the implementation of the government's policy were not approved by the government itself. These may be small signs of an awareness of the problem.

As I have already mentioned, this is a problem which would be difficult for the government of any country, namely, to say openly that it is willing to discuss internal policies with a view to possibly changing them. This would be a breach in a rule of international law which most countries adhere to very strictly, and I think that one has to see the dilemma in which we are placed here and the very delicate nature of this whole issue. But to answer your question very briefly, I think the government is now clearly prepared to talk about the subject.

Q: You mentioned Botswana as a special case in relation to the dialogue matter. Could you perhaps explain?

A: It was wrong in a way to leave Botswana out of this; but to discuss Botswana we would almost need a separate paper, as it is in a special position. However, there are a few comments that could be made briefly here. Botswana, as you know, has close relations with South Africa in many spheres, and is very dependent on South Africa, but it has increasingly adopted an independent political position. President Seretse Khama appears to be very close, in the political sense at least, to President Kaunda. He has also been increasingly critical in public statements of South Africa, but at the same time he has been very clear in all his statements that he does not believe in solving the problems of Southern Africa by force. He has shown this not just by words; the Botswana authorities have been very strict in not allowing any subversive elements to come into Botswana from Rhodesia or Zambia, with the aim of coming through to South Africa. This is most important, because Botswana is strategically in a very significant position for us.

On the question of dialogue, the President of Botswana has said that he hoped that South Africa and Portugal would be persuaded to take up the offer contained in the Lusaka Manifesto for dialogue based on a commitment to the principles of human equality and self-determination. He stressed that the Lusaka Manifesto was the basis and that the offer remained open. He has aligned himself, therefore, very much in that camp, but at the same time he has stressed that to achieve change in Southern Africa peaceful means must be used. In view of these and other factors, I said the position of Botswana was uncertain, because I do not see Botswana actively going out and supporting the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Ghana, position. But at the same time I do not see Botswana putting anything in the way of some form of contact and dialogue.

Q: It seems that all the African states with Black governments want change in South Africa, but that some of these Black governments want change by force, while others want to come here to talk about it. But does the difference in approach extend further into what they actually want to achieve down here? Would the more militant governments want greater change within this country, than the pro-dialogue governments?
A: Yes, by and large, I think that is probably true, although it is difficult to generalise, because there are differences even between those who support dialogue. There are probably important differences between Dr. Busia and President Houphouët Boigny. That is why a meeting between them would be fairly important. But, by and large, I think that, as I have indicated, those who are in the "progressive" camp, as it is called, would want to see revolutionary change in South Africa before there is any rapprochement. Those who support dialogue also want change, but I think they would look at it in an evolutionary way. They would be prepared to talk, as long as they could see the situation evolving. Our government may feel that, if it talks to people like that, who think in terms of evolution, it is possible that it could convince them that this evolution in South Africa could take place along the general lines which the government is in fact proposing. Many changes are needed, perhaps, at a greater speed, but there is a possibility that there could be talks on that basis. I might mention here that Sir Seretse Khama has even said that, if the South African Government want to convince others about separate development, then it must provide some evidence. Where is the independent Transkei? What do the Black people have?

Q: As a British citizen, not a South African, who has lived for fifteen years in different parts of Africa, and speaks some of the languages, I should like to make some comments. An important point has already been made, that, although South Africa is the main protagonist, any real dialogue would have to include the Portuguese and the Rhodesians. But is there any point in all this? These people wish to talk to South Africa, in order to change its internal policies. South Africa, on the other hand, does not want to talk to them to change their internal policies. South Africa's public relations, however, are so bad, that this point does not get put over. Another point is that some of these countries will merely want to take a large slice of aid and come to some temporary arrangement. Then there will be a change of government and probably a change of policy. I could tell you stories about the money supplied by the British Government. Suffice it to say, millions have gone down the drain.

No, let us be constructive about this. It is a very important time in the history of this country, and I am very pro-South Africa. I think that without South Africa, the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia, the continent might well be lost. The infiltration of the Chinese into Dar-es-Salaam, Zambia, right up into the Copper Belt, is a very serious matter. When they get control, President Nyerere and President Kaunda will be out, and in their places will be people taking over from Peking. I am all in favour of dialogue, but I do feel that our public relations on this matter may not be very effective. What are we trying to do?

A: I think there are several points here. One is that we cannot remain isolated forever on the African continent. There is a fairly strong and growing feeling, perhaps difficult to define, that we must become more truly part of Africa. Mr. Vorster has referred to it as a mission in Africa, a commitment to Africa. This is a very real factor, and it should not be discounted. It sounds perhaps idealistic, if you like, perhaps unreal in the present day world, but I think it is significant as one of the factors. Now there are others, of course; trade is one, but perhaps not as important as has been made out by some. Our links in this respect are much more important with Europe and the
United States, and even Asia. Then there are strategic factors. There is the growing power of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, and the encroachment of both big communist powers in Africa. It is extremely important from this point of view that South Africa should have friendly relations with as much of Africa as possible. Furthermore, in regard to the importance of our relations with the United States, Britain and other Western Powers, if we can show that we can work with Black Africa, this will have an immense influence on our relations with the Western Powers. The division between Black Africa and White Africa has in fact caused acute problems for countries like Britain, the United States and France. They have tried, particularly Britain and France, to straddle this division in Africa; they have not wanted to be forced into a situation where they would have to choose between Black Africa and White Africa. And obviously, in these circumstances, it is a delicate balancing trick. They have real interests involved. British trade with the rest of Africa is the same roughly as with South Africa. They do not want to lose either. So obviously if the two can come closer together, it is going to make it easier for them, and then our relations with them will ease.

These are some of the considerations, I think, and perhaps I should have dealt with them more fully. They are real and important considerations, and I think they make it well worth our while to accept this challenge.

Q: Is there not perhaps one other point that has not been mentioned, namely that we want to ensure peace in Africa? Peace can only be achieved through this dialogue. If we do not come to terms, if we do not talk, then possibly we will come to a shooting war in Africa. I think that this is possibly one of the major factors in this desire, on the part of both South Africa and Houphouët Boigny and others, for dialogue, namely peace in Africa.

A: I agree with that, and I think President Houphouët Boigny has made that point very well.

Q: I wonder if I may expand the discussion a little bit along the economic lines? A contribution from the floor touched on this subject, and you Mr. Barratt tended perhaps to feel that the economic consideration was not as strong as it might be. As I understand it, South Africa's trade with Britain at the moment amounts to about R500 million a year. This amounts to about one third of our total exports, while it amounts to only about 5% of Britain's exports. And I think that with the prospects of Britain entering the Common Market now greatly enhanced, we have got to face the question of the complete phasing out of that massive export trade, unless we develop some other place for it to go. Concurrently we have the situation that our production of gold, is, according to the authorities, likely to fall substantially over the next decade or so. From every standpoint, therefore, we have a situation which is rather different to that which everyone thinks, i.e. the general image is of the President of the Ivory Coast and others seeking dialogue with South Africa with a view to getting South Africa to change its internal policies. I wonder if it is not a little bit the other way; I wonder whether we in this country do not have our backs against an economic wall in no uncertain sense. There is an urgent necessity to develop trade with the rest of Africa. Africa has a population verging on 300 million people, and we have only slightly over 20 million. What is more logical than that we should develop the rest of Africa as our market place? Therefore perhaps we are much more desirous in seeking
avenues for dialogue with Africa, than general public opinion would have one suspect. It seems to me, particularly in the last year or so, that we in this country are absolutely committed to achieving dialogue for reasons of necessity.

A: I would be reluctant to enter into a detailed discussion of this, as I am not really qualified to do so, but it is not my impression that, in the immediate future, trade with Africa in general will be a very important factor. This is not of course the case with Southern Africa, where it is very important. Now I quite agree that in the long term it may be important, as you have put it. But when one considers Britain going into the Common Market, I think that in fact what our people are trying to do now, is to make sure that our markets in Europe are secure. I see great difficulties in the way of a significant increase in our trade links with the rest of Africa at the moment, but I think there are others here who may wish to comment on this. I would not like to give the impression that I am against an expansion of trade - obviously this would be to our benefit and the rest of Africa, too - but I cannot see it as a major motive at this stage on the part of our people.

Q: I am inclined to agree on this point, for the basic reason that most of our exports go to Europe, go to America, go everywhere, in fact, except the other African areas. Most of our exports are primary products, the very kinds for which there is no market in Africa, and not likely to be for the foreseeable future. For example, we export considerable quantities of mineral ores, wool, maize, sugar; all these kinds of items are still terribly important. Of course, it is true, we are going to export more and more manufactured goods, but these are still quite a small percentage of our total exports, and unfortunately it is going to remain that way for quite a long while. It is true perhaps in the much longer term, that there will be a natural market for these kinds of products in Africa. I would now like to ask whether you do not think that this whole obsession with apartheid, when discussing the dialogue issue, is to some extent a smoke screen, in this sense that, although our Prime Minister may say he will talk about it, he and the other African leaders must be perfectly well aware that the chance of external influences of this kind really affecting the racial situation here is absolutely marginal. But because of the whole background of controversy, for fairly obvious political reasons, both sides must take the positions they have, when in fact they are much more interested in the very realistic things, like possibly an exchange of know-how, political contact, political backing, maybe even in the longer term trade, links in intelligence - all kinds of much more practical things.

A: Yes, I would to some extent agree with that; I think that their influence on internal policies may be marginal. What will effect change in South Africa, and it should be so, will be influences of our own people on developments here. I agree, too, that interest probably centres on many of the things which you have mentioned, and here one could perhaps take up the point which we were discussing immediately before. One could perhaps say that to these African countries trade with South Africa may be very important, much more important to them than to us. I think this is perhaps illustrated in the case of Malawi; we import from Malawi very much more than we export to them.
However, I still feel that the issue of racialism, or however they describe it, cannot be overlooked. It is important to them. To President Houphouët Boigny himself it may not be a burning issue, but he will find it an issue among many people of his country. In Dr. Busia's case this is quite clear. Students have come out very strongly against dialogue, and the Opposition, which is fairly strong in Ghana, has also reacted sharply. So, whether he likes it or not, he will be forced into a position of having to show some development, if he enters into contacts with South Africa. I think this is going to be true not only in relation to some groups within their own countries, but to other leaders with whom they are closely associated in other matters. President Houphouët Boigny and Leopold Senghor, for instance, have many friendly contacts and many interests in common, apart from this issue of dialogue on which they are divided. One can foresee that President Houphouët Boigny, when he talks with President Senghor, is going to want to be able to tell him: "Look my talking with South Africa has done some good." I feel this is a factor that one cannot overlook, even if one takes fully into account the pragmatism of some of these leaders.

Q: Is there not the danger that, if the wrong thing is done, it could easily upset the whole business of dialogue. I have not been able to understand why President Kaunda was exposed at this time. I wonder if you would say something about that, and also about whether President Kaunda is the force which we sometimes get the impression he is, if we read the Press.

A: To take the last point first, President Kaunda was I think a greater force than he is now. This is partly because he has immense problems in his own country - tribal rivalries and economic problems. He is going to have to give more attention to Zambia's own internal affairs in the future, if he remains in power, than he has in the past. But, while his importance may be somewhat downgraded now, he apparently still has considerable moral influence in Africa. You may have seen only today that President Bongo of Gabon (who has been one of the staunchest supporters of contacts, since Dr. Barnard and Dr. Jack Penn visited there some time ago now, and who, I am sure, has been working behind the scenes in support of dialogue) is now reported to be concerned about the rift which is developing between President Houphouët Boigny (also one of the important figures in Africa) and President Kaunda. President Bongo is hoping, he says, that some way can be found for a compromise settlement which will bring these two together. It seems to me, therefore, that President Kaunda still has influence in Africa.

As far as the other point is concerned, of why the correspondence was opened up by Mr. Vorster, I do not know. I think there must be reasons about which we have not yet been informed. It remains a mystery to me, because on the surface I cannot see a good reason. It was in its way a little dialogue going on, even if President Kaunda was saying strong things publicly; he was apparently willing to discuss, and it looked as though there was a build-up towards a meeting. Significantly, however, President Kaunda said that he would not be prepared to discuss the date of the meeting until after June, which of course is the month of the next OAU meeting. Therefore I think that the clue possibly lies in President Kaunda's plans for that meeting. Apart from possible domestic political considerations, Mr. Vorster's action may have been an attempt to discredit President Kaunda before he would do irreparable damage to the dialogue trend in Africa - perhaps by some compromise.
proposal at the OAU, which would not be acceptable to South Africa. For in-
stance, he could attempt to prevent individual countries from seeking contacts
with South Africa, and propose instead an official OAU approach on the basis
of the Lusaka Manifesto. This may now be more difficult for him, as he has
been shown to have had private contacts himself. This is, of course, specu-
lation on my part, but in any case it was a risk which Mr. Vorster took and
not typical of South Africa's usual practice in the conduct of its foreign
policy. But perhaps this is indicative of a new and risky phase we are
moving into in our foreign relations.

Q: I would like to ask how the Nationalist government reconciles the fact
that they are prepared to have dialogue with leaders of African states, yet
in South Africa they are not prepared to have dialogue with non-Europeans here?

A: Well, this is, of course, a point which has been brought up very strongly
by some African leaders, including President Gowon of Nigeria, Haile Selassie,
and even President Houphouët Boigny himself who has said that he hopes to be
able to teach white South Africans to have a dialogue with their own black
people. President Gowon has said that he will not talk to the South African
Government until it talks to its own people. The Government has given an
answer to this, and argues that it is in fact talking with the leaders of the
homelands on a fairly regular basis. This is true, but it is also true that
some sections of the black people of South Africa have not accepted the home-
lands policy, and do not yet feel part of that. In other words there are
still many who do not regard these people, with whom the government is talk-
ing, as their leaders. Well, this is obviously one of the things which is
going to provide a problem in this issue of dialogue. But you know as well
as I do the policy of the government on this point. It only regards as lea-
ders of the black people those who are either elected or appointed leaders
within the different groups in their homelands, and on that basis it argues
that it is having a dialogue, or at least discussions.

Q: Some of the main motives for the dialogue move on the part of African
states have been mentioned, such as the desire to avoid conflict in Africa,
the danger of communist influence, the economic aid South Africa could give,
the possible influence on South African internal policies, and so on. These
do not seem sufficient reasons by themselves. For instance, the direct eco-
nomic aid would be limited, and the African statesmen must also realise that
their capacity to influence internal policies is limited. In looking for
further motivations, it is of interest that the states supporting dialogue
appear to be those which have opted for a free-enterprise economy and have
a more conservative approach, compared to the more radical, socialist-inclined
states. These states which are in favour of capitalism may be looking for
more foreign investment, which could result from greater stability in Africa.
And dialogue with South Africa could be one way of bringing about that stability.

A: Yes, it is true that various factors have been mentioned as possible
motives. I think, however, that one is always in difficulty when trying to
isolate motivating factors. This is not really how these decisions are made; not
really how these developments take place. Much of this motivation and
reasoning only emerges as policies develop. On the question of economic aid,
I did not indicate this as being a major consideration. I think these coun-
tries must realise, or perhaps they have even been told, that South Africa does
not have unlimited aid to give them. Moreover, South Africa has a strong policy of not giving aid in the way that it has been given by some of the bigger powers in the past. The emphasis, except perhaps in the case of Malawi with two big loans, has been more in the area of technical assistance, and the stated policy is one of trying to help them to help themselves. So I would not put that as a major consideration, although it may be one of them. The question of peace in Africa is a real consideration, not just in a vague sense, but for two reasons. There is already conflict in the Southern part of Africa, this is drawing outside powers into Africa, and this is something that President Houphouët-Boigny, for instance, wants to avoid. The second reason is that he is concerned, as are many African leaders, whatever the basic philosophy underlying their social systems, about the development of their own countries. This is now becoming a pressing issue; they have talked about it for ten years, but now some of them are beginning to realise that they have got to do something. Dr. Busia, in that statement which I read, did not say: I am in principle against fighting South Africa. He said rather: We are not able to do that, as there are more pressing concerns for us; we have got to develop our countries. Therefore, if we are still concerned about apartheid, let us try another way. It seems to me that this line of reasoning is very important in leading to the proposal for dialogue rather than confrontation with South Africa, and here your very interesting comment fits in very well - that these countries want stability so as to be able to attract more easily the investment they need for development, from Europe, America and elsewhere, perhaps including South Africa.