INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of the United Nations (UN) is to ensure peace among (and latterly within) the nations of the world. Peace does not imply the absence of conflict, for conflict is generic to politics and is as ubiquitous as politics itself. It means, rather, the absence of violent means in the reconciling of such conflicts. The UN Security Council's role in this endeavour is to reinforce or create a commitment to the non-violent resolution of conflict by disputing or belligerent parties.

From a moral point of view, the dilemma facing the international community seems to be the way in which a supra-national organisation, such as the UN, can influence recalcitrant member states (or parties) to honour an agreement to resolve conflict by non-violent means, when such influence may entail the UN having to resort to the use of armed force. For both moral and practical reasons, physical peace enforcement must always be regarded as the last resort. Moreover, the actual employment of physical force usually signifies that a policy based on the threat of force has failed. Dahl concedes that the actual use of force may help to lend credibility to the threat, but also warns that if the threat must inevitably be carried out, coercion becomes self-defeating: "A thief may turn a live victim into a dead one, but a corpse cannot open the safe."

The much-lauded Operation Desert Storm has indicated that the post-Cold War international community seems to have no major moral problem with the use of armed force to halt aggression. The problem arises where there is more than one aggressor and/or aggressors are perceived as victims, and when physical force, the means of last resort, becomes mixed with other ongoing forms of influence. In Liberia, Somalia, and Bosnia, for example, acts of violent aggression have been committed by multiple belligerent factions, of which the supporters have also been the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and the object of ongoing attempts at rational persuasion (diplomacy) to end the conflict. Various belligerent factions have also forcefully interfered with UN humanitarian missions. Under such circumstances, the use of some type of military force by peace keepers has become a means to achieving the 'humanitarian' end. The use of force, within the ambit of UN peacekeeping has posed such a moral and conceptual dilemma over the past few years that it dominates the conceptual debate which is centred around the conduct of so-called 'middle ground' peacekeeping operations.

It is amidst this conceptual uncertainty that attempts have been initiated to enhance the capacity of African states in general, and Southern African states in particular, to participate effectively in multilateral peacekeeping missions through the development of common doctrine and training standards. The purpose of this article is to survey the essence of the contemporary conceptual debate on peacekeeping, and to reflect on its implications for efforts to enhance the regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa.
THE 'MUDDLE' GROUND
The middle ground in contemporary UN peacekeeping is so confusing that it may be more aptly described as the ‘muddle’ ground, not least because UN forces deployed in such operations are perceived to be muddling through in the execution of a variety of incoherent mandates, without the reassurance of a clear-cut doctrinal foundation for operations. In fact, beyond a wide consensus on the nature of classical or first generation UN peacekeeping, there is some disagreement among analysts and scholars as to which operations could logically be classified as 'middle ground' operations. However, the following typology provides a coherent point of departure for this survey:

- 'first generation' operations, typical of the first forty years of UN peacekeeping (five are still in operation), and characterised by unarmed or lightly-armed troops deployed to stabilise cease-fires between the regular armies of states, while a political solution to the conflict was being sought; these operations were predicated on the consent of the warring parties, and dependent for success on the neutrality and impartiality of a UN force which would only use arms to defend their lives or their mandate;
- 'second generation' operations, conceived since the termination of the Cold War presented the opportunity to end proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements, and in which the UN or other multinational organisations guided the adversaries to political settlements based on compromise (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola); the UN became involved in ending internal conflicts through a multi dimensional process that included activities such as:
  - the separation of combatants;
  - the disarmament of irregular forces;
  - the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army;
  - the establishment of new policing systems; and
- 'third generation' or 'middle ground' operations, precipitated by the resurgence of more primordial animosities which had been suppressed, rather than addressed, during the Cold War freeze, and which have led to conflicts marked by the most despicable abuses of human rights in the midst of anarchic conditions; 'peacekeeping' operations are launched where there is no peace to keep, but where there is a strong international desire to support humanitarian assistance efforts while attempts are made to find a political solution to the conflict. The efforts of the peacekeeping mission are thus focused on the more limited objective of providing humanitarian relief, rather than the brokering of a comprehensive settlement. Moreover, consent may be absent because authority has collapsed, or be meaningless because of a proliferation of groups claiming authority; agreements are non-existent or worthless, and international law and conventions are openly flouted. The two most salient (and often cited) examples of this type of operation are those conducted in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, while the Rwandan mission is recognised as the most obvious failure.

There seem to be no major conceptual problems with the future conduct of the first two peacekeeping categories, although financing and the willingness of member states to contribute personnel is increasingly a major problem. First generation operations are conducted according to an unambiguous set of principles which have evolved through four decades of UN experience. A pool of appropriate and viable doctrine has also developed over the past five years for the successful conduct of second generation, or 'wider' peacekeeping operations. It is the third category that creates headaches at the conceptual and operational level. The fundamental problem is the absence of, or ambivalent consent, the conceptual cornerstone of the first two categories of peacekeeping operations. Where the consent of one or more conflicting parties is lacking, agreements are broken, and force is used against peacekeepers, which necessitates at least a limited application of the type of enforcement actions authorised by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Once force is used against a belligerent group, that party's consent or potential consent for the UN operation may easily disappear along with any last remaining perceptions of the impartiality of the peacekeeping force. Munro has described the process as follows: "Where suffering is the consequence of conflict, a military presence dedicated to keeping the peace and to the protection of relief operations can find
itself all too often drawn into confrontation with one or more of the warring factions. At this point its impartiality is called into question and its capacity for deterrence through its presence alone starts to lose credibility. Peacekeeping starts to become transformed into peace enforcement, a role requiring the enhancement of military capability to a force level which the international community is today showing itself loath to contemplate.  

It is thus clear that 'middle ground' operations are not situated between first and second generation peacekeeping operations, but rather between peacekeeping per se and peace enforcement. They are constituted as peacekeeping operations, but rapidly degenerate into a hybrid that cannot be labeled either peacekeeping or peace enforcement. Middle ground operations start out with a clear Chapter VI mandate, which is never rescinded, but through 'mission creep' end up taking a number of Chapter VII measures.

In both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the use of limited Chapter VII measures were either ineffective, or complicated the peace keepers' execution of their mandate, due to the inherent incompatibility of peacekeeping principles and enforcement measures. It is also doubtful whether forces trained and deployed for peacekeeping missions are capable of applying meaningful enforcement measures to recalcitrant parties. It is noteworthy that the UN received military support for enforcement from outside entities in both operations: in Somalia, a UN quick reaction force operated outside the UN framework; and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has provided air strike capacity on request of the Commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and is in the process of executing the Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in Bosnia.

The seemingly ineffective nature of middle ground peacekeeping has led to a growing number of calls for a reinvention of the concept of UN peacekeeping. Roberts, for example, has identified a need to establish ways "of transforming an operation from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement mode; to develop a concept for UN operations which are distinct from both peacekeeping and enforcement against aggression; and generally to produce policies with some intellectual, strategic and moral coherence." Tharoor has similarly expressed a more modest hope that "the continuing process of reflection and analysis on this question will result in a consensus among [UN] member states on what peacekeeping is and is not."  

**ATTEMPTS TO FILL THE CONCEPTUAL VOID - RECONNOITERING THE MIDDLE GROUND**

Rather than attempt to classify peacekeeping operations, Mackinlay has divided the types of force used in peace operations authorised by the UN into three broad categories, according to the force levels that have been deployed. High level forces are used for enforcement operations, for example 390 000 in Korea and 500 000 in the Persian Gulf. Examples of mid-level forces are those used in the Congo (19 000), former Yugoslavia (24 000), Cambodia (22 000) and Somalia (20 000). Low level forces have typically been used for interposition and observation (1 400 in the Golan Heights and in Cyprus), or for transition and verification missions (1 000 in Central America and 5 000 in Namibia). According to Mackinlay, each broad category of force level has different military capabilities and limitations, having an impact on both force composition and the variables of consent and impartiality. High level forces have a less multinational composition than the other two force levels and may have a national command structure. They do not act impartially or with the aggressor's consent, and operate in an active war zone from which the population may have been evacuated (peace enforcement).

Low level forces are deployed to create a supervisory presence and, armed only for self-protection, maintain both the principles of consent and impartiality. There is no expectation that the force will have to restore agreements that have broken down and situations that have deteriorated, or that their activities will be seriously challenged (first generation peacekeeping). The mid-level or 'multifunctional' force is multinational in composition and under international command. It may be deployed in various civil assistance roles to help the political process of peacebuilding and to protect or evacuate threatened populations. Because consent is dubious, it must anticipate violent challenges to its authority and be prepared to react, if necessary, with the impartial application of force in order to uphold the mandate, rather than in a punitive spirit. Mackinlay's multifunctional force would therefore be deployed
in those operations previously described as both 'second generation' and 'middle ground'.

Mackinlay points to "the failure in academic research" and the need for a new doctrine to deal with middle ground contingencies, but rejects the notion that practical solutions will be found in the creation of a "more powerful and effective UN 'flying squad'", due to the fears of developing countries and the political and material exhaustion of the minority of UN member states which provide military hardware for mid-level operations. He has asserted that "research must go on and strengthen what seems to be a fatally weak response structure." According to Mackinlay, UN forces would be able to traverse the middle ground more successfully through improved planning, co-ordination and direction of the multiple tasks which are undertaken by various civil agencies and UN military contingents during such operations. While these measures would undoubtedly improve the effectiveness of mid-level or multifunctional forces, Mackinlay has failed to provide a new concept that addresses the fundamental problem of fusing the use of military force for purposes other than self-defence with the principles of consent and impartiality.

STRADDLING THE MIDDLE GROUND

A fairly strong school of thought has emerged that seeks to resolve the dilemma of middle ground operations through denying their raisons d'être. While exhibiting a clear awareness and understanding of the conditions which lead to the undertaking of middle ground operations, adherents of this school reject the idea of "transforming an operation from peacekeeping to peace enforcement." They prefer to straddle the middle ground by forcing a clear-cut, pre-deployment choice on whether a particular situation calls for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, in the belief that the 'constructive' use of force in the resolution of conflict requires clarity and consistency in policy and application.

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, has issued the following warning on middle ground operations: "The clear lesson of Somalia and Bosnia is that to confuse the strategic goals of war fighting and peacekeeping, will risk the success of the mission and also the very lives of the peacekeepers and aid workers themselves. A peacekeeping force ... simply cannot be used to alter the military balance of force in a civil war ... or even attempt to enforce the passage of a convoy - for these are pure acts of war." 8

According to Riza, the primary value of Chapter VII enforcement powers should be their ability to deter. For deterrence to be effective, the international community must clearly signal that enforcement action may only be utilised as a last resort, even if this involves taking sides in cases of internal conflict. The clarity of such a signal may be enhanced through the establishment of appropriate and transparent criteria for decisions on enforcement action by the UN Security Council. 9 However, a credible deterrent also depends on an adequate enforcement capacity in the event of non compliance. This requires the reliable availability of suitably equipped and trained armed forces with an efficient command structure. Unity of command may be enhanced by a greater willingness of the UN to authorise operations led by one country or by a group of states, rather than the more familiar practice of maintaining UN control over most operations, as states are in a better position to react to rapidly changing circumstances than large multilateral organisations. 10

Betts has advanced even stronger arguments against attempting limited, impartial intervention by a peacekeeping force, in what amounts to a total rejection of the concept of viable 'middle ground' operations. 11 Recognising that force may sometimes have to be applied, he advocates that those who dispense force "walk tall and carry a big stick." In essence Betts has put forward the idea that a mid-level intervention force must necessarily pick a desired winner (future ruler) and swing the balance of force decisively in favour of the chosen party in defeating the other contenders for power. Alternatively, if the intervening force is on a high enough level, all belligerent parties may be intimidated into compromising on an internationally preferred peace settlement. For Betts there is no room for half-measures: "... leaders or outside powers should avoid what the natural instincts of successful politicians and bureaucrats tell them is sensible: a middle course. ... If deadly force is to make a direct contribution to peace, it must engage the purposes most directly related to war - the determination of borders and the distribution of political power." 12
It would seem as if many of these sentiments have been incorporated into the evolving Russian peacemaking doctrine which has crystallised out of its missions in Moldova, Tadjikistan, North Ossetia, and Georgia. Russian peacemaking doctrine is not premised upon consent, and operations have involved a relatively high level of force, as they are unrestrained by questions of legitimacy, rules of engagement or public opinion. Peacekeeping is regarded as mainly a military, and not primarily a political problem. Neutrality is regarded as useful, but not necessary, and peace makers are permitted or encouraged to join forces with one of the combatants in order to reduce the costs to Russia. It has also been acceptable to use military force in order to persuade or coerce belligerent parties to come to the negotiating table. While this type of peacemaking doctrine enables rapid and decisive intervention, it more or less represents the antithesis of traditional UN peacekeeping concepts. Nevertheless, there was a strong call by several Western powers to transform the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina into something which would conceptually approximate a Russian peacemaking operation.

Initially, a policy of withdrawing from the flawed UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation and instead supplying arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 'lift and strike' option) was considered non-viable, partly because of the risk of competitive national interventions, and partly because it would probably entail closing down the humanitarian relief effort for some of the besieged areas. Moreover, it would involve the violation of a Security Council resolution which could not be rescinded. However, events on the ground soon undermined practical arguments against the use of force by NATO. From April 1995 onwards, the Bosnian Serb forces responded to the weak reaction of outside powers by virtually halting the flow of humanitarian aid to besieged areas, and by taking UN personnel hostage as a shield against the use of further NATO force. The latter led to a withdrawal of UN forces from positions where they were vulnerable. The stage was thus set for a gradual transition from peacekeeping to a form of enforcement. In September 1995 the UN Secretary General expressed support for Operation Deliberate Force, involving both an air campaign and ground action supported by the French, Dutch and British rapid reaction force which had been established as part of UNPROFOR.

In effect, the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been transformed by default from a peacekeeping mission to a peacemaking operation, after being bogged down in the middle ground for nearly four years. This begs the question of whether it would not have been more effective and humane to straddle the middle ground from the outset, rather than attempt to traverse it without an appropriate map.

TRAVERSING THE MIDDLE GROUND

There have been a few recent attempts to chart a safe course through the middle ground. For example, Gow and Dandeker have questioned the contention that peacekeeping principles and enforcement measures are incompatible, and that the "middle area of contingencies" cannot exist. They have rejected the concept of consent as the foundation of peacekeeping operations, and replaced it with the broader concept of legitimisation which, in their view, provides a viable doctrinal basis for peace support operations where neither the conditions for peace enforcement nor for peacekeeping have been met, a situation which calls for 'strategic peacekeeping'.

Strategic peacekeeping allows for the use of enforcement measures to ensure compliance with terms initially derived from a broadly consensual environment. However, since force will be used against one of the originally consenting parties, it cannot be legitimised through the principle of consent, but rather by maintaining a complex civil-military equilibrium, in which the various civilian and military groupings with a stake in the resolution of the conflict accept enforcement measures as necessary and appropriate. Such acceptance derives from Gow and Dandeker's process of legitimisation which comprises three necessary, but not individually sufficient elements that interact with one another:

- the values and principles upon which the original broad consensus were built;
- the performance, or degree of success with which those in authority carry out their part of the contract; and
- environmental support, or the degree to which various other groups and institutions, in relation to both values and principles and performance, accept the relationship.
The failure of those in authority to enforce compliance will lead to a decline in support due to poor performance in upholding the values and principles of the initial social contract.

Gow and Dandeker have identified a clear need for the use of enforcement measures as an integral part of second generation peacekeeping, and have advanced some convincing arguments on the reasons why the absence of such a capacity is likely to detract from the legitimacy of future peacekeeping missions. However, their process of legitimation is highly complex, because of the large number of civil-military relationships involved. It is far more complex than the 'wider peacekeeping' process of establishing and maintaining consent in a dynamic tactical and operational environment. In fact, the whole concept of legitimation belongs at the political, rather than the operational level. As Tharoor has observed, "the dangers of conceptual confusion for soldiers in the field (and for the credibility of the United Nations) clearly outweigh the short-term advantages that doctrinal elasticity might provide to governments."

The concept of strategic peacekeeping, involving the legitimate use of force across a range of contingencies, is bound to find favour with a US military which remains uncomfortable with being subordinated to a mission which cannot rely on the use of overwhelming force to achieve its ultimate success. Never averse to complexity, the US Army is adopting a doctrinal approach with sufficient elasticity to allow for enforcing compliance in middle ground situations within the ambit of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, in December 1994 the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, whereby "the Army continues the broadening of its post-Cold War doctrine, doctrine that is focused on warfighting, yet accommodates employment across the full range of operations."

One of the latest additions to the growing library of American doctrine on peace operations is the US Seventh Army Training Command's Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations, published as a White Paper on 30 June 1995. In the foreword, the officer commanding, Brigadier General Charles H. Baumann has stated that the UN forces can no longer rely on their symbolic international presence and the moral pressures exerted by the international community to sustain peace, but that "UN forces must now be skilled at all tasks across the spectrum of conflict from Stability Operations to war as they execute these missions ... this MTP will help units prepare for this contingency." The Mission Training Plan (MTP), which is over 600 pages long and cross-references more than twenty other field manuals, documents selected basic collective and individual tasks from platoon to battalion level for units preparing to execute or support stability operations. General Baumann claims that the MTP was developed by "using references from FM 100-23, the Nordic Peacekeeping Manual, the British Wider Peacekeeping Manual, and other selected U.S. and allied publications." This suggests that the MTP may have a wider application value than merely the US Seventh Army. However, it is doubtful whether this complex and sophisticated training plan could be used in an attempt to standardise training even among the forces of traditional UN troop contributing countries.

Some four years ago, Liu made an innovative attempt to traverse the middle ground, while maintaining a modicum of conceptual 'purity' and simplicity. He suggested the creation of a two-tiered 'peacekeeping' force for UN intervention aimed at resolving the type of complex conflict which has come to be associated with contemporary wars of national debilitation. The first tier would be a traditional, lightly-armed peacekeeping force, which would be deployed in the area of operation, and would act as a tripwire. The second tier would be a special multinational task force composed of troops from member states with strong military establishments. It would have a rapid deployment capability and would be armed with sophisticated weaponry with highly visible deterrent power. The second tier task force would be held in reserve near the force headquarters until such time as one of the parties to the conflict threatened the peace keepers or prevented them from fulfilling their duties by forceful means. The task force would then be called in to resolve the situation by a show of force, while the UN Security Council would be alerted to support their deployment with Chapter VII powers.

This concept provides for the strengthening of UN peacekeeping operations without modifying
their basic (traditional) principles, at least as far as the first tier force's operations are concerned. Indeed, it implicitly ignores the parameters of second generation peacekeeping. The moment the second tier force is deployed, however, the operation would take on the characteristics of peace enforcement. Should a show of force fail to deter the further use of force by the recalcitrant party, the task force would obviously have no option but to make war. The question remains, however, where the first tier peacekeeping force is left, other than firmly in the middle ground without a map.

**AVOIDING THE QUAGMIRE - FACING UP TO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

Given the fact that there does not yet seem to be a patently viable conceptual approach to engaging in middle ground operations, how should African countries relate to the ongoing doctrinal debate? For the foreseeable future, the best course of action would probably be to avoid the quagmire.

Through the Secretary General, the UN and a number of foreign governments have recently become strong advocates of the idea of African countries accepting a greater degree of responsibility for peacekeeping in Africa. The French government, for example, proposed the establishment of an African intervention force at a summit of francophone states in November 1994. The British government convened seminars on African peacekeeping in Accra (October 1994), Cairo (January 1995), Harare (January 1996) and Gaborone (August 1995), with the purpose of investigating doctrinal issues, training requirements, and the establishment of a regional early warning system.

During the Gaborone conference support was expressed for the development of a Southern African peacekeeping capability to be used under the guidance of the UN. It was confirmed here that the basis for peacekeeping training was sound general military training and that this would remain a national responsibility. The importance of this observation cannot be overemphasised, as the doctrinal debate on peacekeeping becomes increasingly complex and begins to suggest that the era of the 'super soldier' has arrived. Africa's militaries are confronted by a range of challenges which mitigate against even a "sound general military training", that would obviously include not only combat skills, but also some kind of professional military ethic which precludes pathologies such as Liberian-style armed banditry and Rwandan-style ethnic cleansing. It is on the establishment of minimal and appropriate standards of military professionalism in the armed forces of African states, that the local conceptual debate really needs to concentrate, for without concerted development efforts, potential peace keepers will more likely remain potential aggressors.

Some of the larger potential troop-contributing countries in Southern Africa are wrestling with the problem of controlling the military under conditions of fundamental and rapid domestic political change, conditions often associated with the revolution in the post Cold War strategic environment. In a number of cases, political reform has entailed a complete break with the old political order, necessitating the creation of entirely new civil-military relations. This transformation will not be accomplished simply by superimposing Western concepts of 'enlightened' military professionalism on African cultural traditions, for the continent has proved highly resistant to the idea of a universal military culture that is more pervasive than ancient folklore, tribal law and custom. Moreover, Western concepts of military professionalism imply a perennial search for institutional autonomy which contradicts the notion of tight political control, in many instances essential for regime survival. This is bound to create a high level of tension in the emergent pattern of civil-military relations, not least because attempts to integrate the military into the new political system profoundly affect the nature of military service and the career aspirations of the soldiery.

The emergence of a new political order, especially in a changed strategic environment with few real external military threats, tends to raise the fundamental question of whether armed forces are in fact either necessary or useful (as in Mozambique and South Africa). In no country, however, has the utility and formation of armed forces been seriously questioned. Armies inherited from an era of armed struggle over political dispensations are rather being reconstituted through the fusion of a number of different military groups. Integration, or the process of organisational and normative fusion, is encountering resistance and tensions
which are rooted in recent historical events, and exacerbated by the personnel imperatives of reconstructing a new military. Any process which creates personnel turbulence in an armed force has the potential of initiating reactionary violence by the affected soldiers, and of reinforcing existing divisions among different factions within the military.

The process of force transformation is at an advanced stage in Zimbabwe and Namibia, although intra-military ethnic tensions are still evident in the former country. Mozambique and South Africa have barely completed the first phase of force integration, and, for both, the real challenges of creating effective and cohesive armies still lie ahead. Angola has to run the full course of post-conflict transition under extremely averse circumstances. Thus four of the largest armies in the sub-region are at various stages of coping with some or all of the following challenges in the wake of rapid and fundamental political change towards popular rule:

- amalgamating diverse and previously adversarial armed forces into a single national military;
- fostering loyalty to a new political order and incumbent regime;
- losing professional skills and experience to the private sector, other state departments and non-government organisations;
- countering apathy towards military service in the absence of a credible cause;
- facing commissions of inquiry into previous human rights abuses, and concomitant fears of retribution;
- accommodating civil and political rights in the military without undermining discipline and effectiveness;
- ensuring the general welfare of servicemen and officers in the face of a plethora of competing developmental demands by civil society;
- training sufficient numbers of soldiers in skilled musterings without over-reliance on foreign training institutions;
- adapting to new concepts and mechanisms of civilian control; and
- maintaining force morale in the face of diminishing defence budgets, retrenchments and demobilisation.

It is not only the countries with large armies that are faced with fundamental challenges. Civil-military relations in Lesotho remain volatile, and it remains to be seen how the Swazi defence force will react to the mounting pressures for democratisation in their kingdom.

The bottom line is that a significant number of potential troop-contributing countries in the region are currently engaged in a process of post-conflict peacebuilding (although the level and scope of the preceding conflict may vary from more or less non-violent electoral competition to bloody civil war), which involves, among others, a fundamental transformation of their armed forces. Any conceptual debate on the future of African peacekeeping which ignores this parameter is doomed to the realm of futility. This does not imply that no attempt should be made to educate, train and equip African armies for participation in peacekeeping operations until the problems of force transformation have been resolved. Indeed, such efforts may make a significant contribution to the various efforts at force transformation and regional stability as a whole.

**TRAINING FOR PEACE**

Munro has suggested that earmarked UN peacekeeping contingents should be trained to educate the forces of countries where conflict threatens in military discipline and respect for basic human rights and values. This is envisaged on the lines of the contribution made to the integration of former antagonists by British personnel in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa. This is an essential starting point for the development of a peacekeeping capacity, but the lessons still need to be internalised and taught by the national forces themselves.

British endeavours in the sub-region have recently been complemented by Scandinavian efforts aimed at establishing an indigenous peacekeeping capacity and doctrinal commonality on a national, sub-regional and regional basis. Here it would be prudent to advocate standardisation of a simple, clear and unambiguous doctrine which would prepare contingents for participation in first and second generation peacekeeping operations. In as far as such training is based on unambiguous basic doctrine, especially with regard to the use of force, it may complement and make a significant contribution to the establishment of an
appropriate military ethos.

At the political level, however, national governments should take cognizance of future needs for an enforcement capacity as an adjunct to first and second generation peacekeeping capacity. Such a force may be called upon to deal with regional crises involving a clear act of aggression by an identifiable party, or for meaningful preventive deployment in concert with diplomatic efforts to resolve impending crises. Once established, such a capacity may become suited for insertion into peacekeeping operations where there is gross non-compliance by an initially consenting party. At this stage, however, doctrinal elasticity and attempts to train soldiers "across the spectrum of conflict from Stability Operations to war" should be avoided, for they imply a complex and confusing mix of the use of armed force on the one hand, with concepts such as neutrality, impartiality and the minimum use of necessary force on the other. The adoption of highly sophisticated and untried doctrine and training for "middle area contingencies" would in all probability, through a process of self-simplification at tactical and operational levels, evolve into an approximation of Russian peacemaking practices. The following observation by Chick and Mazrui remains pertinent and haunting to this day: "Ordinary soldiers in Africa, under relatively mild provocation, have been known to respond with staggering brutality."20

In summary, Southern Africa simply lacks the foundational capacity to create forces which are ubiquitous and capable of discharging tasks across the spectrum of 'peace operation' roles. Nor, at the conceptual level, would it be desirable for African countries to attempt to do so. A more realistic vision would be the creation of a readily available, multilateral pool of competent peace keepers at the regional or sub-regional level to prevent the reigniting of conflict, and the creation of a separate, effective and rapidly deployable multilateral enforcement formation able to nip conflict in the bud. The latter is preferable to the option of single-nation intervention which has occurred even within peacekeeping missions. It may be remembered that during the start of UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operations in Namibia in April 1989, members of the liberation army of the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) infiltrated the country in violation of the cease-fire terms. UN representatives authorised, or at least condoned, South African enforcement action to halt the infiltration. A repeat of this kind of scenario would not do much to allay the existing fears of South African hegemony in the region.

As far as 'training for peace' is concerned, its success is predicated upon national governments reaching agreements within the framework of sub-regional organisations and the OAU on what is to be done. This would provide much needed guidance, authority and a framework for action for those governments, organisations and institutions which are promoting the objective of establishing or enhancing a peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa.

CONCLUSION

Africa has not been afforded the luxury of the centuries of development which in Europe led to the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant faith in the abilities of the ordinary person which sparked the rise of liberal democratic ideals, the division of labour, the ascendancy of the nation-state and the development of military professionalism. This fact was clearly demonstrated in the rapid demise of newly established popular governments in the wake of Uhuru. With the lessons of a few miserable decades of 'independence' behind them, African countries are now being engulfed by the third wave of democratisation, precipitated by the termination of the Cold War, the information revolution and the realities of the (inter)dependence of contemporary states. If they are to ride this wave, they will have to learn how to balance and steer the ship of state, before embarking on exotic voyages of discovery.

This is not to say that short, safer passages in well-charted waters should not be embarked on in order to help fellow sailors in distress. Indeed, the spirit of Ubuntu dictates that such rescue missions are part of African humanism. The task at hand is one of caulking the seams in anticipation of such rescue missions, of mastering the basics of professional soldiering, basics which must increasingly include the fostering of respect for civil supremacy, human rights and the rule of law. The latter should logically form an integral part of all efforts to train for peace.
On a more pragmatic note, it is apparent that while some very useful lessons may be gleaned from experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, this does not mean that all, or even the majority of future peacekeeping operations will have characteristics similar to these two operations. In fact, there is ample evidence that unless there are some very powerful national interests at stake, there will be no more UNPROFORs. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that there will be a continued demand for 'second generation' peacekeeping which will remain predicated upon the principles of consent, impartiality and the use of minimum force only in self-defence.

ENDNOTES
1. This paper is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a joint venture between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), and the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP).
3. This is an adaptation of the description provided by S.I. Riza, Parameters of UN Peacekeeping, RUSI Journal, 140(3), 1995, pp. 17-18.
12. Ibid., p. 31.
19. Munro, op. cit.