Workshop report
Expert meeting on the future of DDR programming in Africa: Links with SSR and peacebuilding
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Acknowledgements

The ISS would like to thank the governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden for the support they have given to the ISS. Their assistance made the hosting of this important workshop possible.

The ISS would also like to thank the participants for taking the time to attend the workshop and for their informed and enthusiastic engagement with the subject matter. Their experiences and insights on DDR and SSR greatly enriched the quality of the discussions. The organisers also want to extend our appreciation to Rino Kamidi and Mary Chivasa, two interns working with Dr Cheryl Hendricks, for their efforts in making the meeting a success. In addition, we would like to acknowledge the work of Dorcas Onigbinde, from ACCORD, and Dominique Dye, from AMP, for stepping in to assist with note-taking.
**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts</td>
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<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>AMP</td>
<td>Arms Management Programme</td>
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<td>ASAP</td>
<td>Africa Security Analysis Programme</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>BINUB</td>
<td>Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Center on International Cooperation</td>
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<td>CJS</td>
<td>Criminal Justice Sector/System</td>
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<td>CNDDR</td>
<td>Commission Nationale Demobilisation, Disarmament et Reinsertion</td>
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<td>CSANDF</td>
<td>Chief of South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Certified Personnel Register</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Dafur Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>East Sudan Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Democratie de Liberation du Rwanda</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization of Migration</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>JIUS</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Units</td>
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<td>JSCD</td>
<td>Joint Standing Committee for Defence</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Mkhonto we Sizwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NSDDDR</td>
<td>North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>Peace Building Commission</td>
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<td>PCD</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAFD</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SRS</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Security General</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Security Sector Governance</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
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<td>UEPNDDR</td>
<td>Unite d’Exécution du Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reinsertion</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN-DOA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-CHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive summary

INTRODUCTION

Africa has experienced many disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and the majority of the countries in which DDR is currently in progress are African. As a result, there is a great deal of knowledge and experience of DDR on the continent. Reflection on these processes, along with that of similar processes in war-afflicted countries outside of Africa, has enabled stakeholders to take stock of security sector reform (SSR) and identify both the lessons learnt and the reforms seen within DDR programs. Multicountry demobilisation and reintegration programmes (MDRPs) and the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) are approaches that have evolved because of the lessons learnt in the field.

However, the implementation of these more comprehensive approaches to DDR and SSR in Africa still proves challenging. Some of these challenges are:

- The requirement for stronger linkage and more effective coordination of DDR and broader SSR and peacebuilding activities
- Ineffective reintegration programmes
- Human and financial resource constraints
- Insufficient focus on the realities of women ex-combatants
- An insufficiency of female participation in SSR and broader peacebuilding activities

The success of DDR and SSR is a crucial first step towards the development and long-term sustainability of fragile post-conflict states. Those working in the field have to regularly assess the policies and practices that have been put into place, both to ensure that they are being implemented effectively and, if need be, to effect change. It is also important that Africans themselves, who are tasked with implementing DDR and SSR programmes and who bear the consequences of failed programmes, voice their opinions on the viability of the programmes and the measures necessary to bring about more meaningful change in this sector.

Accordingly, the ISS held an expert meeting on “The Future of DDR Programming in Africa: Links to SSR and Peacebuilding”. This meeting was significant in that it was able to bring together a diverse number of key stakeholders for an intense two-day dialogue on DDR and SSR in Africa. The meeting was attended by 45 representatives from the national DDR commissions of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, representatives of the World Bank (WB) and the UN, as well as researchers and NGO representatives engaged with DDR processes.

OBJECTIVES

- To provide a platform for dialogue between DDR and SSR experts and policy-makers
- To provide a platform from which to posit African voices centrally into the dialogue on DDR and SSR
- To provide an opportunity for those involved in DDR and SSR to compare experiences
- To develop an overview of the implementation of DDR in Africa and identify lessons learnt
- To identify stumbling blocks and the tools required to implement the change made necessary by lessons learnt
- To develop key recommendations for future DDR and SSR programming

THEMES

- Overview of DDR policies and practices in Africa
- DDR experiences in South Africa and the Central African Republic
- DDR experiences in DRC and Burundi
- DDR experiences in Sudan
- Strengthening reintegration programmes in post-conflict countries
- Factoring gender, age and disability into DDRRR
- The way forward
- Key recommendations

The presentations given on these themes were rich with information on conceptual challenges, the current status quo of DDR programmes and the challenges they continue to face. In addition, they suggested possible ways of redress.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Conceptualisation of security must be informed by a human security perspective.
- Defining the appropriate value system, vision and mission of the security sector must be the first step of DDR and SSR programmes.
- SSR must incorporate a sustained focus on the criminal justice system, inclusive of traditional justice systems, which need to be reinvigorated.
- The provision of security must be seen as part of the provision of governance.
- DDR and SSR must be seen in a more comprehensive manner, i.e., it is part of a broader package of stabilisation and peacebuilding programmes inclusive of political social and economic programs.
- SSR should be an integrated approach to security and not remain largely the reform of the military.
- States must take ownership of DDR and SSR and develop these programmes through national institutions.
- From the beginning of DDR implementation, provision must be made for the programmes to be phased out.
- We must always clearly establish the eligibility criteria for entry into DDR programs.
- Community security must go hand in hand with DDR.
- Vetting of those in, or joining, the transformed security structures should be an essential component of SSR.
- Future programming needs sufficient political will, financial support, research, monitoring and evaluation, and accountability.
- In particular, adequate support for reintegration programmes is required, and this needs to incorporate, economic, social, political and psychological dimensions.
- Reintegration must accept and prepare adequately for the fact that many ex-combatants want to move to urban areas.

- Sexual violence continues in the post-conflict setting. This highlights an important need for strong and effective criminal justice systems.
- The involvement of women in peace processes is essential, especially to limit the impunity that men give to men for violating women during conflict in peace negotiations.
- A gender perspective must be mainstreamed into DDR.
- Women and their needs should be made more visible in concrete and effective ways so that they can benefit from DDR.
- Regional or provincial DDR programmes should be considered.
- Security studies must be a component of all African educational institutions.
- Countries must identify clearly what they want from partners during DDR and SSR.
- National NGOs and civilian training establishments must be used for implementation. In addition to being more cost-effective, they have local knowledge and expertise.
- An Africa Alliance on DDR should be considered in order to continue regular interaction and sharing in different types of forums.
- More attention must be paid to mentally and physically disabled ex-combatants through the provision of special long-term projects.
- A protocol on disability in Africa should be considered.
- The Regional Economic Communities (REC’s) must have a greater involvement in post-conflict reconstruction.
- All reintegration processes need to have a long-term perspective and regular follow-up and corrective action need to be factored into DDR programmes.

What follows is a reflection of the issues raised, the debates surrounding these issues, and the findings of what proved to be a highly informative two-day exchange.
Openings remarks

Dr Cheryl Hendricks, Senior Research Fellow in the Security Sector Governance Programme (SSG) of the ISS, Professor Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director of the ISS, and Lt Gen (ret) Marc Caron, Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), MONUC, Democratic Republic of Congo, welcomed participants and delivered the opening remarks.

Dr Hendricks gave a warm welcome to representatives of the UN, national DDR representatives, government representatives, NGO representatives, and colleagues. She noted that the workshop was the result of the collaborative effort of three programmes at the ISS: the Africa Security Analysis Programme (ASAP), the Arms Management Programme (AMP) and the Security Sector Governance Programme (SSG). Over several years, and in varied ways, these programmes have been dealing with issues pertaining to DDR and SSR in Africa. The workshop was, however, the first time they had pooled both their financial and human resources.

Hendricks indicated that the idea for the workshop had its genesis in a field trip she undertook to Sudan in July 2008. She met with representatives of the North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDR) to find out how the reintegration process was progressing. Just prior to that she had undertaken a similar field trip to the DRC.

As the Sudanese spoke about their achievements and challenges, she was struck by the fact that while some of the lessons learnt from programmes in other countries had been taken on board in the fashioning of the Sudanese DDR programme, implementation challenges remained quite similar.

The North Sudanese expressed an interest in learning more about the South African experience of DDR and SSR. Hendricks believed it would be more fruitful to have a broader information-sharing and analytical engagement – bringing together a diverse range of African participants that could identify best practices for dealing with persistent challenges faced by DDR and SSR programmes on the continent.

Hendricks noted that there was an overwhelming amount of interest generated by this workshop, which indicated its timeliness. She also observed that the last time the ISS had held a workshop of this nature on this topic was in 2004. Since most DDR programmes are located in Africa and the continent remains largely the testing ground for new DDR practices, Africans have the opportunity to provide intellectual input into designing the best DDR programmes, but Africans also bear the direct brunt of misguided or inappropriate activities. It is therefore critical that Africans share their experiences and that their voices echo loudly in the shaping of DDR programmes. It is important, too, that DDR is not viewed in isolation, but that clear linkage is developed between DDR, SSR and broader peacebuilding activities.
A wide range of expertise was gathered at the workshop in the form of practitioners, researchers and policymakers—people who specialise in different aspects of DDR implementation and representatives from countries where DDR programmes were currently underway. Hendricks indicated that this type of workshop was a rare opportunity and that participants should use the space effectively to address pertinent issues and to make concrete recommendations on the way forward.

Professor Cilliers also welcomed the delegates to Cape Town and to the expert meeting on the future of DDR programming in Africa. His address follows below:

Africa is the most conflict-prone region in the world, and this is reflected in the lowly position that its member countries occupy in the Human Development Index (HDI). Much has been written about DDR, SSR and peacebuilding in Africa—probably enough to fill this entire venue.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has its origins as a project on SSR and I want to spend a few moments sharing a few thoughts drawn from our experiences in South Africa. The predecessor to the ISS was called the Institute for Defence Policy and was established at the end of 1990 with the conviction that ‘something had to be done’ to safeguard the transition process in South Africa. Much of our work in those years was to try and set a new vision for the armed forces of a democratic South Africa. Not uncharacteristically of many other processes, we were faced with the challenge of integrating opposing armed formations that had been at war with one another, of demilitarising a highly armed and violent society, of dismantling what was in some senses a war economy, while at the same time changing the strategic posture of a future military from one at war with the region to a very different orientation.

What differed from much of the many lessons and best practices that we will see today, is that the ISS argued right from the start that the single most important issue with which armed forces had to grapple with was to define an appropriate value system, vision and mission for itself. These developments in South Africa occurred shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and, with the apparent victory of Western democracy and of free market capitalism. South Africans scrambled for appropriate models upon which to build a common future. In many senses the road that was eventually travelled was one from Westminster to the Bundestag (then in Bonn and not in Berlin). We ended up looking at the examples of the establishment of the Bundeswehr in the former West Germany in doing so we tried to define an appropriate value system upon which to build the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). These principles were drawn from the civic education and constitutional provisions that had been taught in the Bundeswehr as part of Innehre Fuhrung and translated into the doctrine of mission-orientated command and control. These concepts were then fed into a comprehensive process of integration, demobilisation and disarmament.

Clearly the challenges facing South Africa were very different from those in much of the rest of Africa. In parallel, the country embarked upon a fundamental process of redefining the role and purpose of its armed forces. Instead of a force for the protection of white minority interests, South Africa embarked upon the process of creating the SANDF, which is recognised today as a force for national and regional crisis prevention and intervention. Peacekeeping and disaster relief are therefore key tenets of the mission of the armed forces of South Africa in the 21st century.

In my view, this requirement, the need for clarity on the role, function and orientation of armed forces, is often missing in many settlement processes. The military is seen as an object, something to be managed down, to be controlled and often ignored. The armed forces are seldom given the attention that they require, and the fact that the politicians cannot agree on a clear way forward, means that they are left to fend for themselves.

While demobilisation and reintegration of the former members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) worked to an extent, DDR in South Africa was largely a failure as regards the former guerrilla armies. This is an experience that has been repeated in many African countries. In fact, the lessons from the rest of the continent are quite depressing. In the absence of a formal economy, at a time when the only support is from donors through the provision of humanitarian relief, reintegration of former combatants into their communities and civilian
life is seldom effective. Although most African countries do not objectively need armed forces, the reality is that this is one of the key tenets of independence in situations where Africans have bought into the competitive security paradigm of developed countries. What Africans need are gendarmerie-type forces and the attention needs to shift from too great a focus on the military to the police and the associated criminal justice system.

So the third issue I want to place on the table is the need to view the security sector as an integrated concept – to understand that post-conflict reconstruction requires a focus on reorienting the military, but also on building the police and those structures within the criminal justice system that provide security for ordinary people. This is an opportunity that was missed in South Africa and we continue to pay a heavy price here for treating defence sector reform separately from reform of the criminal justice system. This is a lesson that is often not learnt elsewhere. While there is much talk of security sector reform, partners often mean reform of the defence sector or the criminal justice sector, seldom do they consider as an integrated concept.

The final point is similarly quite simplistic – the requirement that development requires a secure environment, a degree of stability. I see from the programme that you will be looking at South Africa, Burundi, the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). Clearly, many challenges remain in these countries. We need only look at developments in the Eastern DRC to reflect on the ongoing challenges that inadequate governance presents. At the end of the day the provision of security is part of the provision of governance and if there is no governance, there can be no security.

With these few remarks allow me to express my best wishes for the rest of our deliberations.

Lt Gen (ret) Marc Caron noted that the workshop provided a good networking opportunity. His descriptions of his experiences in the DRC indicate that there is a challenge to consolidating DDR and SSR processes. Justice and the rule of law are areas that prove to be especially challenging to the processes.

According to Caron, the brassage process in the DRC was conducted with limited resources and was either not completed or not effective in forming a new army. The new army, Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), is now the main violator of human rights.

Caron went on to state that DDR is a vital precursor to SSR. However, the DDR process in the DRC has been a flawed one, for ‘three months of brassage does not make an army.’
Overview of DDR policies and practices in Africa

This session was chaired by Mr Guy Lamb, Programme Head of the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. Mr Kees Kingma, Senior Social Development Specialist for the World Bank in Uganda, Dr Jennifer Hazen, Researcher at Small Arms Survey in Geneva and Dr Vanessa Farr, Senior Gender Advisor for the UNDP in Palestine, were the contributors for this session.

Mr Kingma spoke to theme ‘Demobilisation and Reintegration in Africa: Policies and practices over the last decade.’ Kingma indicated that some DDR assessments took place more than a decade ago, in, among others, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Lessons had been learnt from the DDR processes but were often not fully considered in subsequent DDR implementation. He reiterated that DDR is part of the broader SSR and peace processes and that for sustainable results African countries must own their DDR programmes.

Most DDR programmes have relied on international financing and the support of many international agencies, for example, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOCHA, WFP, UN-DPA and WB have all been involved in supporting DDR in Africa. Kingma questioned whether there is such a thing as a generic DDR policy. He suggested that, rather than such a policy, there are guidelines and strategies. This is primarily because DDR is context specific, and the way in which the peace process evolves determines DDR programming. There are a number of DDR standards and lessons learned exercises, for example, by the OECD and UN, the Stockholm Initiative, the Paris Principles and Guidelines, UN Resolution 1325 and the MDRP.
Kingma identified the following key lessons learnt during the implementation of DDR in Africa:

- DDR is not a technical exercise – it should be seen basically as a political/peace process
- DDR planning must be nationally owned and to the extent possible implemented through national institutions
- Because there are so many actors involved in the DDR process, an overarching institution is required, for example, a national commission or a policy board to provide guidance
- Predictability needs to be balanced with flexibility. It needs to be clear who is entitled to what, but changes should be possible in response to new challenges in the specific circumstances
- A clear phasing-out strategy of the DDR is required and one needs to prevent moving targets (extra benefits) when some ex-combatants are not perceived to be reintegrated well
- It is often advisable – towards phasing out – that any additional assistance would be based on needs rather than entitlements for ex-combatants.

Dr Hazen, drawing on her experiences in West Africa, provided the meeting with some key questions and comments for consideration. Hazen noted that one of the key questions out there is whether DDR is DDR successful? She argued that we do not have clear answers for two reasons: first, success largely depends on the goals defined for DDR, and there is no widespread agreement on the goals. The goals are also likely to vary from one context to another. Second, we lack the indicators and the data to be able to measure and identify success.

For example, the DDR process in Sierra Leone has often been called successful. But, she asked, successful at what? It is true the country did not return to war, but it is not clear that DDR is responsible for this. In fact, examples from the DDR programme suggest that it faced a number of difficulties. Concerns that disarmament had not collected a sufficient number of guns led to additional community disarmament programmes. Demobilization, she indicated, never really took place. Many Revolutionary United Front (RUF) combatants remained together at their headquarters in Makeni just a month before the presidential elections, and long after demobilization was supposed to have been finished. Reintegration stumbled along with long delays, shortened trainings, many selling their kits for cash, very little advice on options, little in the way of psychosocial care, little in the way of assistance for women associated with the fighting forces, and no follow up to determine whether ex-combatants had been able to find employment after their reintegration training. Hazen contended that when this DDR process is called a success it is not clear what that means or how that assessment has been made.

Other key points raised by Hazen were:

- How do we determine the requirements for entry into DDR?
- What happens with the weapons after they are submitted for collection?
- What does it mean if we collect 10,000 guns when 30-, 40-, or 50,000 combatants are going through DDR? Are we missing guns, or were there never that many guns to start?
- If we move beyond counting the number of guns collected, what are the best indicators for measuring the success of disarmament? Can we measure success by the number of combatants who return home or by the lack of obvious organized groups?

She noted that with reintegration, which, conceptually, lacks the clarity of disarmament and demobilization, our understanding is still evolving. There is still a debate over reinsertion versus reintegration, as well as individual versus community reintegration. Although reintegration is widely viewed as a long term goal of reintegrating combatants into economic, social, and political structures, it has often been implemented in economic terms as returning combatants to sustainable livelihoods. Regardless of whether reintegration is viewed from a more complex angle or simply an economic point of view, it is clear that reintegration cannot be achieved in the short time span of the typical DDR programme. This raises questions about how we think about reintegration, and how we implement reintegration programmes in practice. In practice, much of what has been called reintegration has actually been reinsertion.

Assessing DDR, Hazen contends, has often been about the numbers: how many weapons were collected, how many combatants were returned ‘home’, and how many combatants went through reintegration training programmes. Yet, it is unclear what these numbers tell us about the success of the programme or the impact of the program on issues such as security and economic opportunities in post-conflict countries. The lack of rigorous monitoring and evaluation means we do not know what works, what does not, or whether DDR has been effective. There is a tremendous need to do more on data collection, research and analysis about DDR programs in order to inform current and future programs.

Dr Farr spoke to the topic ‘Gender Mainstreaming in DDR’. She indicated that ten years ago there was no knowledge of the linkage between DDR and SSR, and no links were made between development and post-conflict
reconstruction. We still have not moved very far in this regard. To quote Farr:

When I first started working in this field, DDR and SSR programmes were gender-blind and militarised in the most classic sense of the terms: at national level, they were negotiated, conceived and implemented by men, for men (usually by and for men actually implicated in the war). The ‘experts’ who designed and funded DDR processes, spoke at international conferences and wrote technical papers on DDR, were also all men. These DDR actors were not just any men: they were, overwhelmingly, military men. Whether they were on the receiving end of a DDR programme or the programme’s designers, they spoke the same language, understood the logic of militarism in similar ways and went about the business of demobilising fighters in pretty much the same way, no matter the context in which they were working. Attention was overwhelmingly paid to the ‘hard’ issues, disarmament being a particularly favoured focus, perhaps because it was easy to count the numbers and types of weapons demobilised, which made for good reports! […] The ‘soft’ side of DDR – all those apparently intangible issues that agglomerate around ‘reintegration’: the impacts of war trauma; impunity and lack of justice; fighters’ ill-preparedness to make a living without a gun in an economy already shattered by war; their reliance on and identification with organised violence as the best, or only means to make their way in the world; their problems with drug addiction, alcoholism, war disability, HIV infection; their aggressive attitudes towards women and less-powerful men – got very little substantial attention. Indeed, all the ‘soft’ stuff of turning soldiers back into functioning, peaceable civilians, with the ability to contribute to sustainable growth and development, was dropped off the end of the DDR process for someone else to deal with as best they could.

Farr pointed out that there has been change in this regards, much of it at an institutional level, beginning with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security and its formal mention of the necessity of including women in all aspects of DDR programming. This resolution facilitated the entry of women into discussions on the ‘hard issues’ and saw the emergence of many women’s civil society organisations dealing with peace and security issues. More concretely, she noted that there has been more focussed attention paid to the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict zones and the passing of UN Resolution 1820 explicitly calls for the development of mechanisms for the protection of women from violence in, *inter alia*, all DDR processes and in justice and security sector reform efforts.

However, at an operational level, Farr argued, not much has changed. Women remain excluded from formal peace processes; they remain marginal to DDR processes and gender-based violence remains alarmingly high. She notes:

...there are countless well-documented, carefully researched, politically astute and people-centred reasons why DDR programmes need to change if they are ever to achieve their much vaunted ambition of underpinning peace in conflict societies. There is an overwhelming body of evidence that shows a carefully thought-through strategy to advance gender equality through DDR might be one of the keys to unlock the full potential of such demilitarisation processes. At the end of the day, however, there is too much vested interest in carrying on with ‘business as usual’.

In conclusion, Farr contended that we have good frameworks in place regarding gender and DDR but that, too often, we allow ‘local customs’ to override these.

**DISCUSSION ARISING FROM THE OVERVIEW OF DDR POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AFRICA:**

- There is a huge gap in the institutional linkages between development, DDR and security.
- Weapons collection was never about the weapons themselves but to take them out of the political discourse.
- National ownership is complicated when dealing with a divided nation, and even more so when other people’s money becomes involved. The management of national ownership is complex.
- Donors will eventually pull out. How will they do this cost-effectively?
- DDR must be seen in a more comprehensive manner and is not the only path to stability. It is part of various programmes in a country. We have to also see it in the context of environmental protection. We must take into account the political programme of the country. Reintegration cannot progress without an understanding of the economic aspects and issues related to it, such as poverty.
- The presentations neglected to cover the AU policy of PCRD. There was also silence surrounding national consensus and government ownership of DDR. National actors are at the mercy of non-state actors and cannot work freely or act without them. It is very difficult to
bring about national consensus among local actors. How can the government own the DDR process?

- The eligibility requirements for the selection of participants in the DDR programme require more discussion.
- The lack of trust and mistrust among tribal groups makes it very difficult to disarm these groups, such as the Janjaweed in Sudan. Disarmament can only take place after trust has been established, security restored and arms trafficking across the different bordering countries stopped. We need to reconstruct some developmental projects and build confidence before disarmament takes place.

**PRESENTER RESPONSES:**

- National ownership is not like owning and driving a car. It is a process that has to be managed. Local ownership, in practical terms, is when the government is involved in dealing with specific groups and actors. Brokering and taking the lead on key DDR decisions should rest with local and national actors. In some cases, this might not hold and external actors will have to be brought in or their input sought.
- Reintegration eligibility should increasingly be only on a needs basis. There is justification for broad reintegration, with some specific entitlement for reinsertion/reintegration support for ex-combatants but with an effort to share the benefits broadly in the community.
- We need to look beyond the mantra of DDR for alternatives. DDR does not have to be a linear process, we need to experiment with this.
- If you position DDR as the only ‘game in town’, are you not setting up DDR as a reward?
DDR experiences in South Africa and the Central African Republic

This panel was chaired by Dr Marit Kitaw of COMESA. Major General Len le Roux, the director of the ISS office in Pretoria and Mr Tsepe Motumi, Acting Secretary for Defence of the SANDF, presented on the South African experience, whilst Mr Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher at the ISS, covered the Central African Republic.

Major General Le Roux noted that when South Africa democratised, DDR was not a familiar concept. Instead, the term ‘defence transformation’ was employed. He also noted the process was driven wholly by South Africans. Le Roux highlighted the apparent absence of defence policy development in Africa and the greater focus on activities such as DDR. DDR therefore occurs in a policy vacuum.

Defence transformation in South Africa entailed positioning the new Defence Force in a new society and transforming civil military relations in accordance with democratic standards as part of the nation-building process. This meant integrating the various forces (MK, APLA, those of the TBVC states) within the national force, improving gender and racial representation, reviewing the norms, culture, functions, posture and force design.

Integration had two legs: incorporating into the SANDF all personnel whose names appeared on the Certified Personnel Registers (CPR) of the statutory and non-statutory forces, and educating and training all members of the SANDF to meet international standards of competence and professionalism.
Oversight bodies were put in place. These included an Integration Committee, where all participating forces were represented, a Ministerial Oversight Committee with representatives from the Secretary for Defence, CSANDF, JSCD and BMATT, and a Parliamentary Oversight Committee being a Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee for Defence.

The process was not all smooth going, and issues of racism and sexism surfaced. This indicated the need for civic education and cross-cultural sensitivity training. Among other issues which came to the fore was debate as to whether true integration of the various actors into a restructured defence force was taking place, or whether the SADF was merely absorbing other players into it. In addition, the armies that were to be reintegrated, namely the guerrilla armies and the conventional SADF, were radically different.

Those who were not integrated were demobilised through the parameters of the Demobilisation Act, approved by Parliament in December 1996. The act stipulated that demobilisation had to occur within one year. Some 7 081 persons were demobilised at an average payment of R22 000 ($6 000). However, the majority of those who were demobilised remain unemployed.

Mr Motumi asked why, 14 years down the line, we are still talking about DDR in a South African context. He noted that the three R’s in the process (DDRRR) were often overlooked and that these presented the major challenges for ex-combatants who have not been adequately catered for.

Motumi identified the following flaws in the South African DDR process:

- Not everybody was captured on the Certified Personnel Register
- There has been no indication that the veterans actually received their cash payouts
- DDR only applied to the liberation forces and not the SADF, so the playing field was not level. An example of the resulting consequences can be seen in the vast discrepancies of pension benefits.

Motumi asked whether there could be a connection between criminality and the lack of reintegration in South Africa. In conclusion, he noted that there must be the political will to address the issue of war veterans for it is one which will come back to haunt us if it is not addressed.

Nelson Alusala, looking at DDR in the Central African Republic (CAR), contended that disarmament should be viewed as a continuous process because people rearm. He asserted that we must also take cognisance of the fact that disarmament means a loss of livelihood. We therefore need to be specific about what people get in return for disarming.

The CAR government set up a project to create an integrated approach to the DDRRR process. The objectives were to disarm ex-combatants, demobilise and reintegrate them, and build the capacity of communities to accept and welcome them. The MDRP and UNDP contributed $9 777 343 and $3 201 250 respectively as funding for the project. 7 655 ex-combatants were demobilised and reintegrated. They were paid $700 for resettlement and $150 as a transitional safety allowance. They were also encouraged to form their own meeting groups to discuss their issues.

The skills and education offered to ex-combatants comprised of:

- Agriculture: 12% of ex-combatants
- Livestock: 19% of ex-combatants
- Fishing: 10% of ex-combatants
- Technology: 10% of ex-combatants
- Retail trade: 48% of ex-combatants
- School and university: 1% of ex-combatants

Only 0.2% of those who chose retail were still in business in 2008. The project cost $13 million, but only collected 487 SALW and 11 626 rounds of ammunition. Of these
SALW, 61% came from civilians who were not involved in the conflict.

The project closed in February 2007 having achieved very little success. Some of the weaknesses identified were:

- Some programmes were planned without proper assessment and understanding of the realities on the ground
- Many soldiers had more than one weapon
- Police officers sometimes bought back the weapons
- The process was not wholly inclusive
- The eligibility criteria were problematic and the verification procedure was skewed
- A major challenge is the monetarisation of the DDR process. Money is equated to arms, which creates a dependency on arms. As a result identification and registration documents are falsified and reinsertion kits are sold
- If SSR is not strengthened, weapons will easily be recirculated

**DISCUSSION ARISING FROM PRESENTATIONS ON DDR EXPERIENCES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CAR**

- The will of the people for unification can be more difficult to attain than the introduction of regulations and structures.
- What criteria were used to decide upon forms of training? What measures were used to correct the mistakes identified in the demobilisation process in South Africa? How did the South African process look after those who went to school? How can ex-combatants who choose training or education deal with a lack of resources?
- How much money should be allocated to reintegrate an ex-combatant? What indicators should be used to analyse the beneficiaries’ successes or failures?
- What did the CAR project aim to achieve? What remains incomplete?
- Was there any attempt to discuss reparations during these DDR projects?
- We should make a clear distinction between absorption and DDR.

**PRESENTER RESPONSES:**

- There was a failure to include ex-combatants into the police and other security related institutions in South Africa. It should also be noted that the South African case was a specific case in a specific economy.
- Potential assessment tests were used on the SA ex-combatants because many did not have any certification.
- Demobilisation benefits were a way to contribute to the war reparations.
- The state must fill the gap and compensate ex-combatants who have not been adequately compensated.
- Weapons are still in the hands of the community in the CAR. Repossessing weapons that have fallen into the wrong hands is a very important and beneficial process.