Strengthening parliamentary democracy in SADC countries

Mozambique country report

Joao Pereira

Series editor: Tim Hughes
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Preface

The roots of parliamentary democracy in Southern Africa are spreading and deepening despite operating in sometimes infertile soil. All countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region now operate some form of parliamentary democracy. While a majority of countries exhibit textbook constitutional, electoral and parliamentary architecture, the operation of these institutions is highly disparate. Some labour under the threat of civil war, constitutional flux, and monarchical fiat; others have operated consistently and constitutionally for decades. While there is little fundamental region-wide disagreement on the mechanisms for achieving a democratic polity, there is far less agreement on the appropriate powers, role and composition of legislatures; and still less discussion, let alone agreement, on the appropriate relationship between parliaments and ‘the people’. Indeed the longevity of some parliaments in Southern Africa is no indicator of their constitutional strength, nor the strength of public engagement with them. Established parliaments can operate in an exclusive and exclusory manner. Established parliaments can also become susceptible to (un)democratic reversals, particularly with respect to a strong executive and single party dominance. Conversely, newly elected parliaments can forge innovative and healthy public participation programmes, thereby strengthening and deepening democracy.

This series of reports forms part of the South African Institute of International Affairs’ (SAIIA) three-year research, conference and publications programme examining parliamentary democracy in SADC countries. Its normative objective is to contribute to strengthening parliamentary democracy throughout the region. Specialists in all 13 SADC countries were contracted to conduct primary and secondary research into the state of parliamentary democracy and to make recommendations on how parliamentary democracy might be improved, strengthened and sustained.

Specialists were tasked with researching a number of key themes. The first was to provide a country-specific overview of recent and current constitutional, electoral and parliamentary practice. This included ‘nuts and bolts’ issues such as the electoral system, constitutional provisions for the executive, legislative and judiciary and party political configurations. The organisational structure of parliament, including assembly rules, the roles and powers of committees, the status of the speaker, whips, members, as well as the functioning of parliament as
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an oversight actor, were examined. These questions go, *inter alia*, to the status and credibility of parliament with the electorate.

The second theme was to conduct primary research into provisions for public engagement with parliament. There are two dimensions to this relationship. The first is the mechanisms and modalities parliaments use to convey and publicise their activities to the electorate and civil society in general. These may range from the publication of Hansard to the parliamentary web site. The former serves as a recordal of fact (after the fact), but the latter may also serve to publicise future parliamentary activity and is thus a potentially powerful tool. The more textured research centred on the degree to which parliaments encourage and facilitate the participation of the public in their activities. This may range from the public affairs offices, to the holding of public committee hearings in distant and rural areas.

The other side of the public engagement equation is the channels and practices used by civil society to interact with and lobby parliaments ranging from advocacy, petitions and protests, to oral and written submissions.

Public parliamentary access is often characterised by an ‘insider-group’ and ‘outsider-group’ dichotomy. The insider group is typically well-organised and funded, usually with a clearly identified constituency base and infrastructure. Insider groups may be issue specific, or cohere around markers such as class, race, religion and ethnicity. Such groups often develop effective methods and modalities of political mobilisation, support, lobbying, access and influence. Outsider groups, however, are often the mirror images of their more powerful counterparts. They may share common interests, or suffer from a common affliction or practice, but lack the resources and capacity to either mobilise effectively, or lobby for their interests. Outsider groups may be extensive in number and may even represent a numeric majority or plurality of the population, yet still operate on the margins of political and parliamentary engagement.

An important, or potentially important, linkage in this relationship is the media, and thus researchers were tasked with examining and evaluating their role. There may be an operational and political distinction between the parliamentary coverage of state-owned media, a national broadcaster and a commercial operator. Researchers were asked to evaluate briefly the effectiveness of these channels of communication and dissemination.

Finally, after workshopping their findings, researchers were asked to write a set of tightly formulated recommendations for strengthening parliamentary democracy in their respective countries.

We at SAIIA thank João Pereira and Carlos Shenga for their research and for the application and industry with which they have tackled their work in
sometimes difficult circumstances. This country report will appear in abridged form in a compendium of all 13 SADC country case studies. Its findings and recommendations will be incorporated into a SADC-wide best practice handbook.

Lastly, we should like to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Torben Brylle of the Royal Danish Embassy in Pretoria for his constant support and that of the Danish government in generously funding this project.

Tim Hughes
SAIIA Parliamentary Research Fellow
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Executive summary

Mozambique’s first democratic multiparty election in 1994 was a watershed, bringing an end to 17 years of political conflict, instability and civil war, and closing the chapter on more than a century of authoritarian rule that commenced with Portuguese colonisation. The country’s journey from autocracy began in 1990 when the Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government implemented a new constitution which ended the one-party state and allowed freedom of speech and association. Frelimo’s long-time civil war opponent, Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) signed a General Peace Agreement in 1992 and began to build a political party and campaign for the elections. While Frelimo won the first election, Renamo became a potent opposition force, winning 38% of the vote in the 1994 parliamentary elections. Democratisation took a further step forward with local government elections in 1998 and 2003 and general elections in 1999 and 2004.

The objective of this study is to find answers to a number of questions regarding parliament in Mozambique, namely:

- What are the roles, functions and importance of parliament?
- How important is parliament to Mozambique’s democracy?
- What is the capacity available to and utilised by parliament?
- What type of committee system does the Mozambican parliament operate and what role does it play?
- What is the nature of the relationship between parliament and the public?
- What structures and channels are used by parliament to disseminate information about its activities to the public? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these?
- How does civil society engage with parliament?
- Which civil society organisations (CSOs) are actively involved with parliament?
- What are the weaknesses or strengths of parliament’s existing engagement with civil society?
- What are the roles and functions of opposition parties, their strengths and weaknesses?

The findings of this analysis have implications for the design of efforts to strengthen parliament in Mozambique. First, we demonstrate that Mozambique’s
parliament is a weak, unskilled institution with an executive branch that continues to dominate the legislative and judicial branches. The dominance of the executive means that it continues to draft and propose most bills that the legislature considers. This is clearly indicated by unopposed bills being passed by the majority Frelimo members of parliament (MPs) who do not actually interrogate the bills presented by their party. However, it seems that Frelimo uses informal channels outside of parliament to interrogate the executive. The Renamo-led opposition is too poorly organised to demand accountability, which means that parliament rarely exercises its executive oversight function with the necessary professionalism, accuracy and institutional responsibility. Parliament’s weakness is also due to MPs’ lack of information and research support, limited law-making expertise and the way in which candidates are chosen. Candidates for parliament are selected through a party list system, by province. This tends to result in MPs having stronger allegiance to their political parties than to the constituents they nominally represent.

Second, civil society is weak, poorly organised and unskilled, comprising mainly urban-based organisations that lack strong links to rural civic movements. CSOs also lack financial sustainability, which means they cannot be valuable and credible interlocutors between parliamentarians and citizens. In spite of several material and organisational deficiencies some CSOs have, however, positively influenced the design of government bills.

Third, although parliament opened channels for citizen participation, these channels are still far from effective. The absence of any programme to orientate the work of committees is a major weakness vis-à-vis parliament’s engagement with civil society.

Finally, opposition parties are also weak, poorly organised and financed, fragmented and lack trained staff, and thus do not present a viable alternative to the incumbent party. They have largely failed to perform their critical role in the democratic process: that is, to provide checks and balances on the operations of the incumbent party, prevent abuse of power and ensure, inter alia, that the ruling party does not neglect public interest.

Three focus areas to assist Mozambique’s parliament over the next five years are recommended:

- **Lack of organisation and skills.** General problems that constrain parliament, CSOs and the opposition are organisation and skill. For instance, Renamo – the main opposition party – has been unable to demonstrate that it has enough skilled, experienced or educated people to monitor government’s performance and therefore be seen as a credible, alternative government-in-
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waiting. Capacity-building programmes should be designed and developed that would help strengthen parliament, civil society and opposition parties’ roles and functions. Such projects should address the demands of these organisations, primarily by training and providing them with technical information regarding law making, budget formulation and state lobbying.

- **Lack of financial support.** Financial sustainability is a key problem facing parliament, CSOs and particularly opposition parties in Mozambique. While the ruling Frelimo benefits from the (mis)use of state resources and earns income from private enterprises, rents from hired building and shares in the ownership of some hotels, the opposition parties are generally poorly financed. The opposition has never had a tradition of fee-paying membership and are unable to produce any meaningful income that could help improve their performance in terms of checks and balances on executive power. Lack of financial resources makes it impossible for opposition parties to recruit and develop human resources, build institutional capacity and develop strong links with their constituencies. Donor funding, state funding and improving the party mechanism to raise income is a critical strategy to strengthen parliament’s role, functions and importance in Mozambique.

- **Lack of information and political culture.** The link between citizens and parliament, government and donors, could be strengthened through the development, in different languages, of radio and television programmes as well as programmes aimed at schools on the role and functions of parliament. Apart from the media and schools programmes, government and donors could use traditional leaders, religious institutions and popular local actors to disseminate information about parliament.
1. Introduction

After independence in June 1975 Frelimo established a one-party system of government, displaying intolerance for competing political ideologies and preventing the emergence of any legal opposition. In 1977, the Third Party Congress established Frelimo as a Marxist-Leninist party, distinct from a nationalist front. This ideological option radically reduced the scope for civil society and accelerated reorganisation of the economy on command principles, further aggravating shortages and contributing to the breakdown of rural commercial networks. This reinforced the authoritarian, paternalistic nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens that characterised the colonial regime.

Multiparty politics was, however, legalised in 1994 as a result of domestic and international pressure, compounded by the changing regional and global geopolitical landscape. Indeed, civil war, drought, an increasing balance of payments deficit, growing dependence on foreign aid and insignificant economic growth forced the Mozambican government to introduce multiparty democracy. But this required new types of political institutions to represent the people, to elaborate on the law and to control the executive. Consequently, in addition to the growth of an independent civil society, new political institutions emerged including political parties and parliament. Parliament in particular became key for the consolidation of democracy in Mozambique.

Parliament is the legitimate institutional representative of the people: its most important functions are therefore to represent the interests of the people, followed by legislation and control of the executive. Depending on the system of government, parliament may also be responsible for electing and removing the executive. Parliamentary oversight and control of the executive is a central pillar in any government system using separation of powers.

The general objective of this study was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of parliament in Mozambique with regard to:

- the organisational structures and channels of parliament;
- the effectiveness and capability of parliament;
- the research capacity available to and used by parliament;
- the exercise of accountability to parliament by the executive;
- parliament’s response to the needs and concerns of citizens;
- the functioning of parliament as an oversight actor;
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- interaction with local political actors and civil society; and
- the role of opposition parties.

Two sources of information were used for this study, namely, semi-structured in-depth interviews and literature review; but most information contained herein was gleaned from the authors’ interviews with 25 people, which included MPs (Frelimo, Renamo-Electoral Union and independents), parliamentary staff members, CSO officials and academics. These interviews enabled the authors to understand the nature, role and functions of parliament in Mozambique.
2. The political and economic context

Economic liberation and its impact on multiparty democracy

In the early years of independence the Frelimo government had to make difficult decisions regarding the country’s economic situation. The government inherited a country with weak socio-economic infrastructure, high levels of poverty and illiteracy; a strong dependency on agriculture and migrant labour; and marked social and regional differentiation. To create a stable economy with reduced levels of inequality and favourable socio-economic indicators, Frelimo in 1980 introduced a centralised ‘socialist’ economic model called the Prospective Indicative Plan (PPI).¹

The main features of the PPI were based on three programmes – collectivisation of the countryside, industrialisation and training. The PPI also aimed to give priority to a rapid growth in productivity, projecting a quintupling of material production over ten years, which would have required an average annual growth rate of 17.5% throughout the 1980.² The PPI also had the following characteristics: it centralised capital accumulation in the state; it centralised investments in the state-owned business sector; and it marginalised the peasantry and small farmers, despite rhetorical priority given to the family and cooperative sectors. With the PPI, the state became the supreme interpreter of economic and social development in Mozambique.

The economy started to show signs of growth, although still far from the production peaks in the final years of colonialism. Nevertheless, economic growth was evident from 1977 to 1981. The agricultural sector grew 3.8% a year; an improvement if compared to the immediate pre- and post-independence periods. The fisheries, transport and energy sectors recorded substantial growth rates and the urban elites started to believe that it was indeed possible to end underdevelopment in ten years. However, their faith was in vain and in a short time there was widespread discontent. Economic growth was achieved at the expense of urban consumption and the living conditions of the peasantry. Urban consumption fell to levels never seen before; rationing was introduced, although this did not apply to the Frelimo leadership. Despite the rhetoric about cooperativism, it received minimal government support compared to that given to the state sector. The terms of trade between urban industrial production and rural agricultural production were clearly unfavourable to the latter.³

By 1983 Mozambique’s economy had totally collapsed and the PPI model...
started to be questioned, not just because it was unable to satisfy the growth needs of the country, but also because – contrary to predictions – the gap between rich and poor had widened: the middle class was eliminated and there was a flight of capital. The various model limitations identified included that: import controls inflated production costs; protectionism benefited only some and was rarely translated into local investments; and industry protection tended to lower the purchase price of goods produced by rural families.

Mozambique's economic crisis was aggravated, first, by an increasing balance of payments deficit caused by the South African apartheid government, which cut the number of Mozambicans working in South Africa's mining industry. This led to a reduction in repatriated foreign exchange to Mozambique as well as in income support to families at home.

Second, economic growth did not happen fast enough and a serious decline in food production occurred during 1982/3 when peasants fled the countryside and severe drought devastated Mozambique's southern region, resulting in growing dependence on foreign aid. Third, major donors cut aid in order to pressure the Mozambican government to accept a structural adjustment programme, and civil war wracked the country – with South African support, Renamo spread its destabilisation campaign.

In response to the economic crisis, the government undertook a series of domestic initiatives to speed up economic liberalisation. Slowly, in a deliberate manner (or even denying it was doing so) the Frelimo government came to the conclusion that it was necessary to integrate the Mozambican economy into the dominant international free market system. The government, with financial support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 1986 introduced a structural adjustment programme. This followed recommendations arising from the Frelimo Fourth Congress in 1983, which voiced the need to reassess domestic economic policies. The changes articulated at that congress gave rise to the so-called 1987–1990 Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE). However, this alternative economic system also failed, not so much because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) countries refused to admit Mozambique into its framework but because PRE as an economic policy was not viable – as was soon proved.

PRE was introduced in Mozambique in a war context, which the IMF and World Bank overlooked. This raises the question: Why was the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy initiated in the midst of a war? The reason was to control large sectors of the population that had been marginalised by Frelimo's policies soon after independence, most importantly those living in rural areas. The Frelimo post-independence economic policies
focused on protecting major enterprises in rural areas (farms, plantations and other large projects) rather than the communal peasants and rural poor communities. These exclusionary policies opened a window for Renamo to build up a platform of social support.\textsuperscript{6} Pitcher, for instance, corroborates this argument:

\textit{If one examines the pattern of Frelimo protection and Renamo infiltration, it is easy to discern the influence of the colonial on the military choice that each side made. Areas with previously high agricultural output and commercial potential proved to be more attractive to the cash-poor Frelimo government with regard to investment and protection. Renamo tended to concentrate its efforts on obvious targets such as the railway or communal villages and to situate itself in less populated, less developed regions.}\textsuperscript{7}

By 1983 it had become clear that Frelimo had progressively lost control of rural production and exchange to the parallel economy, had failed to control the peasantry, and was incapable of stopping Renamo's infiltration into, and destruction of, rural society and the economy. Frelimo therefore desperately needed to regain the initiative. Domestically, this was achieved by allowing the development of the private sector and micro companies, particularly in rural areas. Internationally, the isolation of Renamo – Frelimo's main goal – was done by co-opting with the West and adopting market-oriented policies under the control of the IFM and World Bank.\textsuperscript{8}

PRE basically sought to repair the mistakes of the PPl and to restore 1981 production and export indices. In the PRE's view, the main mistake of the PPl had been poor macroeconomic management and distortion of the relative price structures that prejudiced agriculture and exports and discouraged the operations of the Mozambican and foreign private sectors. Thus, in the first phase, the programme proposed four fundamental objectives as a way to rebuild the country's economy, namely:

- liberalisation – promoting the free movement of capital and opening national markets to international competition;
- privatisation of public services and companies;
- deregulation of labour relations and cutting social safety nets; and
- improving competitiveness.

Based on these objectives, the PRE prescribed conditions for new loans. These conditions were:
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- reduction of the government deficit through cuts in public spending (cost recovery programmes);
- higher interest rates;
- liberalisation of foreign exchanges rules and trade (deregulation);
- rationalisation and privatisation of public and parastatal companies;
- deregulation of the economy, for example, liberalising foreign investment regulations, deregulation of the labour market (e.g. wage ‘flexibility’) and abolishing price controls and food subsidies; and
- shifting from import substitution to export production.

PRE’s top priority was macroeconomic liberalisation, which – notwithstanding the fact that there were other priorities – became the dogma of the entire programme and was seen as the ‘solution’ for the economy’s woes and as a way to attract foreign investment. In terms of macroeconomic trends, the first years of PRE achieved some measure of success: the combination of currency devaluation (by more than 100%), reduced government expenditure and increased privatisation was effective. Cross domestic product (GDP) increased from 3.6% in 1987 to 5.5% in 1988, although it fell again in subsequent years. Despite all setbacks, the massive economic reform programme implemented by the Mozambican government enabled the first issuing of a guarantee by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank group ten years later.

PRE has placed Mozambique under the firm tutelage of the World Bank, the IMF and other donors. The IMF and World Bank basically determine the country’s macroeconomic policies and have taken control of Central Bank policies and public expenditure through the so-called Public Expenditure Review. PRE promotes a gradual withdrawal of the state from basic health and educational services. Under its Public Investment Programme, the IMF and World Bank even decide what type of infrastructure should be built. Today, Mozambique is dominated “not by agents of a colonial power, but by the technical, sophisticated and politically disinterested economists of the IMF and World Bank” – what Hanlon has termed as a new type of centralised planning based on “Washington Consensus”.

In a diplomatically subtle manner, further massive amounts of foreign aid were made dependent upon the continuation of domestic reforms, particularly political and institutional reforms. Mozambique’s transition from a centrally planned to a market economy provided the first steps to establish the conditions necessary for democratisation. However, this switch to a market economy was not accompanied by the conversion to a purely pluralist democracy. According to Wuyts, Frelimo’s agenda for economic reform from 1983 onwards was driven
more by the need to snatch the initiative from Renamo, than the desire to introduce a pluralist democracy.

On the one hand, the pressure exerted by the war forced Frelimo to accept the inevitable. On the other, the government – with little hope of an imminent victory against Renamo – tried through various local initiatives to convince Renamo to integrate into Mozambican society and embed itself in the existing single party. But Renamo resisted this enticement and war intensified. During this period Renamo issued a series of political demands calling for the dissolution of the Mozambican government, the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement between Frelimo and Renamo, and the creation of a free market economy.11

From a one-party system to multiparty democracy

In Mozambique, political competition is heavily influenced by past patterns of conflict: the main political parties both emerged out of armed conflict. Frelimo was formed as a liberation movement in 1962; a fusion of three different movements (Unami, Unamo and Manu) and various groups of individuals which, under the influence of decolonisation in Africa, were created by immigrants to neighbouring countries (Rhodesia, Malawi and Tanzania) in the early 1960s. From the start, however, Frelimo was more than a simple alliance of the three movements that formally came together to set up the front. Indeed, this new formation relied from the beginning on two groups of youths who came directly from inside Mozambique, and who formed the two fundamental pillars of the struggle for independence. It was from these groups that the leadership of the movement came, and its army was formed. One group comprised mainly young students from the south of the country with secondary or higher education (some were studying in Europe). It was from this group, and around the figure of Eduardo Mondlane, that the Frelimo leadership was drawn. The second group comprised mainly young peasants who had fled to Tanzania to escape Portuguese repression on the Mueda plateau. From this group would come part of the Frelimo leadership, and most of the fighters who would launch the armed struggle in 1964.

Although converging on a common goal – independence – the motivations of these two groups, so different in origin and social standing, were not the same. While the young intellectuals from the south were motivated by national awareness, the youths from the northern rural communities expressed anti-colonial sentiments.

Insisting on the anti-colonial motivations of the peasant population, admitting that this existed independently of nationalist feelings, and characterising their
struggle as essentially anti-state – because it was the Portuguese administration that was at the centre of the domination and repression that affected the rural population through taxes, forced labour, forced cultivation, expropriation of land, etc. – allowed for a better understanding of the independence struggle. This approach also eliminated one of the blockages that prevented an analysis of the war between Renamo and the Frelimo state from any perspective other than that of external conspiracy. Indeed, the key to understanding the participation of broad sectors of peasant societies in the anti-colonial war – and in the war that followed independence and continued until the early 1990s – is located precisely in the relationship between the communities and the state and its representatives, whoever they may be.

The history of Frelimo during the independence struggle (1962–1974) was marked from the start by a series of internal wrangles. Although, as mentioned earlier, Frelimo was formally the result of the fusion of three nationalist movements set up previously in neighbouring countries and based on the existing nuclei of Mozambican migrants, the formation of this movement was in fact the product of a new alliance of groups coming from the interior. Right away splits and expulsions began and continued until the late 1960s, affecting mainly representatives of the small elite from the centre and north of the country. The last important Frelimo leader belonging to this group, Deputy President Urias Simango, was removed in 1969 as part of the succession crisis caused by the death of Frelimo’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane.

When Frelimo assumed power in June 1975, the main task of the government was to create a new society based on Marxist-Leninist principles and proletarian internationalism. The revolution was to owe nothing to the past, but to make a clean break with it. Internally, the new models emphasised state farms, state control of trading networks and collective production. For rural areas, the development strategy established was based on a countrywide ‘villagisation’ programme run by the state and based on two main pillars: population resettlement and the transformation of production relations. Meanwhile Frelimo secured control of political administrative structures through grupos dinamizadores. Thus ‘tribal areas’ under the control of chiefs were placed under the authority of these groups and party secretaries. This policy had different impacts: unlike in the central and northern areas of Mozambique, relatively few communal villages created in Gaza were the product of direct, forcible resettlement by the government.

A further factor that made collectivisation less conflictual in the south than in other areas of Mozambique was the region’s historic dependence on migrant wage labour. Though resettlement into communal villages was undoubtedly
economically and culturally onerous for most rural dwellers in the south, it was not the direct threat to subsistence security that it was for the central and northern peasantry. Given the importance of wage earnings to the domestic economy in rural southern Mozambique, the disruptive effects of resettlement on household agricultural production were relatively less important to overall household income than was the case in areas where agricultural revenue made up a much larger part of domestic incomes.\textsuperscript{16}

The new political framework introduced by Frelimo allowed little room for the development and organisation of independent CSOs,\textsuperscript{17} especially in the central area of the country since this had been a base for the Mozambican forces that fought against it. Frelimo developed an attitude of great mistrust and repression towards this zone, with some Mozambican soldiers in the Special Forces even seeking refuge in Rhodesia at the time of independence: they were to serve as the initial basis for recruiting what some years later would become Renamo.

Externally, Frelimo fought rigorously for United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Rhodesian regime which deprived Mozambique of some of its foreign exchange earnings and provoked an employment crisis in the Beira rail and port complex. The Maputo rail and port complex was also affected by this decision because some Rhodesian imports and exports used this route too. But Maputo was worse hit when the South Africa authorities decided to reduce drastically use of the port, deviating imports and exports to and from the Transvaal, which normally went through Maputo, to alternative railways and ports in South Africa. The situation deteriorated further when South Africa reduced by almost 80\% the recruitment of Mozambican labour for South Africa.\textsuperscript{18} The impact of this was felt not only on the balance of payments, but directly on the living conditions of a significant proportion of the rural populations of the Gaza and Inhambane provinces – throughout the colonial period South African mines had employed some 20\% of the active male population of southern Mozambique (the Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces).\textsuperscript{19}

Despite this negative impact on the economy, Frelimo continued its confrontational policy against Rhodesia and the apartheid regime, supporting the liberation movements – Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) and the African National Congress (ANC) respectively – in these two countries. During the liberation war and its first years of independence (1975–1980), Mozambique became one of the most important supporters of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. In response to Frelimo’s assistance to the Zimbabwe ‘rebels’, the Rhodesian regime set up a clandestine movement – Renamo – to be the ‘eyes and ears’ against infiltration by Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas.\textsuperscript{20}

Although Renamo was created and supported by external forces it would be
entirely wrong to argue that the formation of Renamo was simply imposed or supported by the outside; a perspective for analysis very much in vogue to explain the origins of this movement.

The war in Mozambique had also a domestic social base. Frelimo’s hostile attitude toward peasant communities, its rural policy based on state farms and on the villagisation of the population, and its inability to organise a satisfactory agricultural marketing system resulted in a fundamental cleavage in Mozambique society after independence. On the one side was Frelimo with its state, the urban population and some groups of the rural population who were relatively close to and benefited from state action; and on the other was the large rural population, removed from power and treated as the simple object of the modernising — and sometimes violent — actions of the party-state.

This process of marginalisation and exclusion of part of the Mozambican population and its traditional leaders, combined with others factors, fed the internal base of Renamo support. The social base of Renamo lay in discontent aroused by the policies of governance after independence, which the population regarded as inappropriate to their socio-cultural universe. However, its base also lay in socio-political and ethnic animosities, existing historically, or brought into being under colonisation, and sharpened during the national liberation struggle and in the structuring of the independent Mozambican state.

Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980 and South Africa, responding to the breach of the ‘white laager’ in Southern Africa, initiated its policy of regional destabilisation, using the South African Defence Force (SADF) to attack neighbouring countries. In the same year, Afonso Dhlakama succeeded Andre Matsangaissa as leader of Renamo and the movement began to receive SADF support. Throughout the late 1980s, neighbouring countries under pressure from Mozambique’s government forced Renamo to abandon its bases outside of Mozambique, with the result that Renamo increasingly established armed camps within the country. By 1988 Renamo had gained control of most of the countryside in the centre and north, confining Frelimo to coastal cities and a few garrisoned interior towns. In 1984, sustained effort reduced Mozambique’s political isolation, and South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord, with each country pledging not to support insurrection in the other.

In September 1986 Samora Machel was killed when his plane crashed in South Africa under mysterious circumstances; Joaquim Chissano became president of Mozambique. Chissano was Mozambique’s long-serving foreign minister and had for some time believed the civil war to be untenable. Chissano did not, however, seek negotiation immediately and instead consulted the army as to whether a military defeat of Renamo was possible. The army top brass
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reckoned that Renamo could be defeated and the government subsequently increased the defence budget.

The Mozambican government also signed contracts with the Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzanian governments, with these countries deploying a limited number of troops along the railway lines in the Nacala and Beira corridors in late 1986 as a way to protect their economic interests; however, this could not defeat Renamo. In 1987 Renamo spread its military operation to all rural areas and some cities. This had a major impact on the country’s social and cultural fabric, leading to disorder and economic and social chaos. Violence became endemic, which in turn provoked panic in the community, providing conditions for a vaster, more desperate violence. In such circumstances the Frelimo government was compelled to follow the route of negotiations in order to end Mozambique’s civil war.

Major political changes began to sweep Southern Africa in the late 1980s: FW de Klerk came to power in South Africa and unbanned the ANC; Namibia gained independence; and Cuban troops left Angola. These changes increased the impetus for negotiations in Mozambique. After initial contact in 1988 and several fruitless attempts to organise talks through the mediation of Kenya and Zimbabwe, negotiations eventually began, with the Catholic Santo Egidio community acting as mediator. Joaquim Chissano travelled across Mozambique to prepare people for the prospect of negotiations. In the process, he stopped using the propaganda phrase ‘armed bandits’ and began referring to Renamo by name. At the Fifth Frelimo Congress in July 1989, Chissano shifted the focus on to Frelimo hardliners, persuading them that Mozambique’s best interest lay in engaging with Renamo politically. It was also at this congress that Frelimo ratified the abandonment of Marxism as the party’s main ideology.

Under social and economic pressure and following years of civil war, the Frelimo government reviewed its ideological rigour in the light of new national and international realities. It was at this congress that Frelimo also resolved to liberalise the political system, setting the stage for future multiparty elections. This move gave the party the support of international donors and ensured it control over the political reform process. In 1990 Frelimo introduced a new constitution which allowed for multiparty elections and new press freedoms. The constitution outlined the pillars of democracy, giving express mention to social justice, equality among citizens, the rule of law, and political pluralism.

Interestingly, pluralism was introduced during the war before direct negotiations had begun and at a time when Frelimo was still hesitating about the usefulness of political pluralism. The new constitution was used to destroy its opponent by offering certain Renamo leaders the opportunity to give up the
military struggle and to form a political party, thereby also winning support from international financial institutions. Above all, Frelimo recognised that the country had reached a point where the single-party system could no longer function as before. Renamo leaders also understood that their survival could only be political. Informal contact between Frelimo and Renamo increased in 1989 and 1990 with meetings in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Official negotiations, however, began in Rome in July 1990; these talks were difficult and advanced slowly, concluding only in October 1992 with the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Frelimo and Renamo, effectively concluding the war.

The end of the war and the decision to embark on a transition to multiparty politics was not so much the result of pressure from below but a process of elite bargaining involving the government, the armed opposition and international mediators, including the country's most important donors. The General Peace Agreement (GPA) was an agreement between the top leadership of Frelimo and Renamo which, from the start, marginalised every other voice, notably that of the unarmed political opposition. The new political settlement was therefore the result of an elitist deal.

Institutional reforms: From popular democracy to multiparty democracy

When Mozambique gained independence on 25 June 1975, Frelimo found itself in a difficult position. The state treasury was empty, but expectations were high. Frelimo inherited a markedly fragile state with the government and economy in the hands of unskilled cadres who had little formal training and were mostly illiterate. Despite political and administrative disarray, Frelimo asserted its own vision of national unity based on the socialist-inspired ideology and programmes that had grown through the liberation struggle, swiftly consolidating one-party rule and implementing a range of other measures to limit opposition and establish control over the populace. In line with socialism, Frelimo committed itself to a centrally planned economy, which also covered political actors, the decision-making process and society as a whole. Centralisation was the method of governance enshrined in the 1975 constitution, and confirmed by Frelimo in 1977.

During the one-party era Mozambique arranged regular elections, particularly parliamentary elections, which were carried out peacefully. Since independence the provinces have been the key territorial units in the selection process for a National Assembly or parliament. The capital – Maputo – is treated as a province.
There are ten others: Maputo Province, Gaza and Inhambane in the south; Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia in the centre and centre-north of the country; and in the far north, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

Mozambique’s single party constitution provided for a People’s Assembly, but its composition and the criteria for election of its members were left open. As ideas took shape the constitution was amended accordingly, starting with provision for provincial assemblies in 1976. A People’s Assembly was finally formed in 1977, forming the apex of a pyramid of indirectly elected assemblies. Direct popular voting took place only at the lowest (local and city) level. District and provincial assemblies were in turn indirectly elected from below. Provincial assemblies then elected the national People’s Assembly.

The first post-independence election can be characterised as a top-down model, strongly influenced by leaders and former freedom fighters and with tight control of the candidate selection process. The fundamental causes of this lay in the very nature of the new power, namely:

- the military origins of the political training of most Frelimo cadres;
- the authority granted to the new power by the national liberation struggle and strongly charismatic character of its leader;
- the type of society that Frelimo inherited, which was characterised by high levels of political and economic sabotage;
- the impact of the internal ideological struggle among different groups, which provoked serious splits. The protagonists of this crisis reappeared on the country’s political stage, and those in power feared they might seek ethnic or regional support, and could represent important foreign interests; and
- the urgent need for the new power to consolidate itself in a geographically hostile context.30

The 1977 election of deputies was from a single list of candidates chosen by Frelimo’s Central Committee, which was unanimously adopted by the provincial assemblies at their first session. Elections held from September–November 1986 saw an extension of democratic practice. Candidates then had to be approved by Frelimo, but did not have to be members of the party. On that occasion the provincial assemblies themselves were responsible for choosing deputies to the national legislature – the People’s Assembly. A further innovation was use of the
secret ballot not only in the National Assembly poll, but also at provincial, urban and district levels.

The adoption of a multiparty system meant that new types of political institutions were needed. During the peace negotiations both sides agreed that effective political participation required that people be allowed the freedom to assemble and speak, to constitute associations, to formulate and press for their demands, and for there to be freedom of the press necessary to obtain and disseminate information. It also required institutions through which these demands could be heard and considered. To create the conditions for effective political participation and multipartism, a legal framework for competitive elections, such as the electoral law and the creation of an electoral body, was to be established.

The Mozambican constitution was the main source of electoral law and provided the basic principles of political rights and freedoms. Among these freedoms, freedom of expression, the press, assembly, association and the freedom to form political parties stand out. The constitution was also the source for producing other important legislation inextricably linked to the elections, such as (and to cite only the most outstanding ones) the laws on political parties, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and demonstration, and press freedom.

The GPA provided some others parameters for the 1994 multiparty elections: it defined general principles for political parties, the registration process, criteria for the establishment of the Comissão Nacional de Eleições – National Electoral Commission (CNE), the role of international observers, etc. The GPA was later submitted de jure to the constitution. The GPA was passed as law by the Mozambican parliament; formally, its legal value was therefore inferior to that of the constitution.

Based on the constitution and GPA, an electoral principle as law was drafted. The electoral law was adopted for a specific time-frame and specific elections and was designed on the grounds of freedom and democracy. Yet, the electoral law enshrined a dual discrimination against Mozambican citizens not normally resident in the country. These citizens were stripped of their right to vote in both the presidential and parliamentary elections.

The electoral law determined that suffrage should be exercised through an individual free vote with equal weight; that is, that each elector could cast a secret vote for each category. This reinforced the idea that “all votes had the same weight: no vote was more valuable than any other”.

On 30 November 1990 a new constitution – the drafting of which had not involved Renamo – came into force, providing the framework for a multiparty
Part III, Organ of the State, stipulates that representative institutions are to be chosen by elections in which political parties compete through “direct, secret, personal and periodic vote”. Previously, the president of Frelimo was automatically the president of the republic. With this new constitution, the republican president was henceforth to be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term.

Although under the old system the Mozambican indirectly elected pyramid of people’s assemblies had had an element of built-in proportionality, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system was now envisaged for both presidential and parliamentary elections.

But during the Rome talks that led to the signing of the GPA, Renamo managed to enforce its position regarding the type of electoral system, rejecting a majority FPTP system43 and insisting on proportional representation (PR), which was subsequently enshrined in the GPA.44 Renamo chose this system, which it believed could better accommodate the conflicting regional and ethnic interests of the main contending parties. The province remained the key territorial unit in the selection process for a National Assembly and a threshold of at least 5% of the vote at national level was introduced for any party to qualify for a parliamentary seat.

The 250 seats in the future parliament were allocated to the 11 provinces (ten plus Maputo City) on the basis of the number of registered voters. In 1994, Nampula Province provided the largest number of seats (it retained this position in the December 1999 election, despite losing four seats following a new voter census). Seats were distributed as follows: Nampula 54; Zambezia 49; Cabo Delgado 22; Sofala 21; Inhambane 18; Maputo City 18; Gaza 16; Tete 15; Manica 13; Maputo Province 13; and Niassa 11. Each province thus became a large, multi-member constituency. A system of party list PR was adopted, with votes converted into seats using the d’Hondt method.45

After deciding the main principles concerning the rules of the electoral game, it was necessary to create institutions that could manage and control the process. In compliance with the GPA, and following approval of the Electoral Law,46 the CNE was set up to organise and manage the electoral process. The CNE that managed the 1994 elections comprised 21 members: ten members were appointed by government, seven by Renamo and three by unarmed opposition parties. The president of the CNE was appointed by the president of Mozambique on the basis of “consensus and unanimity” among all members.47 Two deputy chairmen assisted the CNE president: one from government and the other from Renamo.48

The CNE Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) was established to oversee technical and operational matters. This was led by a
director general appointed by the republican president and two deputy directors, one nominated by Renamo and the other by the unarmed opposition parties: all three had the right to participate in CNE meetings, where they could discuss any matter relating to the meetings or elections, but could not vote. The central STAE consisted of 50 specialists: 25 appointed by government, nine by Renamo, four by the unarmed opposition and 12 by the UN.

An Electoral Tribunal was also set up as the judicial body with the power to judge cases involving election-related litigation, such as appeals against decisions by the CNE concerning any electoral matter. Owing to the high level of mistrust among the main players and to cope with doubts regarding the impartiality of Mozambican judges, the UN was invited in 1994 to nominate non-Mozambican judges with “recognised technical and professional competence” to deal with any possible queries that could arise from the electoral process. The Mozambicans appointed to this tribunal were Jose Trindade, a Supreme Court judge, and Luis Madeira, a Maputo City Court judge. UN secretary general at the time, Boutros-Ghali, nominated the judges Michel Cot (from France), Mariano Finally Oyanguren (Nicaragua), João Moreira (Portugal), and two supplementary judges, Walter Ramos da Costa Porto (Brazil) and Juan Ignacio Gracia Rodriguez (Chile). Contrary to 1994 when the Electoral Tribunal was made up of lawyers from different countries and was under the tutelage of the Mozambican government and the UN, the 1999 Electoral Tribunal was constituted by Mozambican lawyers who worked under strong Frelimo government influence.

In 1995 the main political parties in parliament established various commissions to discuss possible constitutional amendments as a way to create a new political framework for the 1999 elections. The next four years were spent drafting detailed reform amendments to the constitution to transform the roles and powers of both the president and prime minister. Frelimo and Renamo both agreed to the devolution of presidential powers in favour of greater autonomy for the prime minister. However, during the final debate (and at the very last minute) Renamo challenged the consensus that had been reached for a semi-presidential regime and proposed retention of a presidential one, arguing that after consultation with the population it had emerged that the presidential system was most accepted by voters.

Renamo argued that the proposed semi-presidential regime would transform the structure of government from a unitary state to a quasi-federal system of governance. The Frelimo government appeared uncertain and divided as to which regime to adopt; semi-presidential or presidential. Some reporters such as Carlos Cardoso, Machado da Graca and Salomao Moyana have argued that a presidential system benefits the Frelimo wing that is linked to government. This
wing obviously did not want to adopt a semi-presidential regime, while the other wing did. What was clear was that Frelimo supported the idea of a unitary, rather than a federal, state. Under these conditions the proposed changes to the constitution and political system did not go forward. The 1999 elections were held based on a presidential system and the only main constitutional amendment introduced related to the composition of the two key institutions responsible for electoral activities in Mozambique, the CNE and STAE, and the way these structures would be organised and operate at different levels.

While in 1994 members of the electoral body were appointed by the government, Renamo and unarmed opposition parties, electoral body members for the 1999 elections were appointed by the political parties represented in parliament (Frelimo, Renamo and União Democrática [UDI]) and in accordance with the principle of representivity; showing a shift towards a clear distinction between party (in this case, Frelimo) and government. The same evolution took place regarding the nomination of deputy directors for the STAE, which was later to become a permanent civil department. Another important change was visible in the decision-making process: while consensus was legally compulsory in the 1994 CNE, it was now recommended but not imposed. These shifts demonstrate a movement towards common democratic practices, but do not necessarily reflect normalisation in terms of political trust.

For the 1999 elections, the CNE decentralised its decision and supervisory bodies, leaving them with the task of verifying the legality and propriety of all electoral acts. The CNE now comprised 17 people, 15 of whom were appointed proportionally by the parties represented in parliament and two by government. At provincial level the CNE was to have seven members: one nominated by government and six by the political parties represented in parliament. At district and municipal level the government was to nominate one member and the parties in parliament, four. The law also outlines that the CNE chairperson be chosen by consensus reached among the other CNE members, and formally appointed by the republican president; but this consensus was not reached. Of the four names submitted to the president, Reverend Jamisse Uilsson Taimo was chosen as CNE chairperson – a situation that did not guarantee the CNE full objectivity and impartiality.

Two other institutions were also created for the implementation of electoral activities and monitoring: a different STAE and the Constitutional Council. In terms of the STAE, the prime minister appointed the director general and two deputies were nominated by the two major parties represented in parliament. These STAE executives had the right to participate in plenary meetings of the CNE without the right to vote. The STAE was only subordinate to the CNE during the
preparation and implementation stages, such as registration and voting. Once such periods ended, the STAE was an integral part of the Ministry of Public Administration. The STAE was also the financial manager of the electoral process, including the operational and support costs of the CNE. Thus the CNE, as a supervisory body of the state, was financially dependent on the STAE. No tribunal court was set up for the 1999 elections: the Constitutional Council functioned as a court of appeal for all unresolved protests related to the electoral process. Furthermore, the Constitutional Council had to approve the presidential candidates and validate the electoral results. Although the Constitutional Council existed legally, it had not yet been physically constituted: its mandate was carried out by the Supreme Court. The absence of an Electoral Court reduced the possibility for any appeals.

Overall, the legal framework for political competition in Mozambique based on the 1990 constitution, the GPA and political institutions such as the STAE, CNE and Constitutional Court, provided sound guarantees of political rights and political competition.

Mozambique’s first multiparty elections were held in 1994, bringing an end to the long period of civil conflict. In contrast to Central America where elections were a ‘façade’ based on limited citizen participation, Mozambique’s 1994 and 1999 elections marked the involvement of citizens in consolidating democracy, with the main political parties (Frelimo and Renamo) confirming their capacity for adaptation by surviving the transition. Frelimo’s party leadership and cadres had gained much experience during their 20 years of governance to adapt the party to a multiparty system; and although lacking in human resources and experience, Renamo also successfully managed to transform from a guerrilla movement into a political organisation capable of challenging the ruling Frelimo.

**Election campaigns**

**The 1994 campaign**

Mozambique had no history of election campaigning throughout the pre-colonial, colonial, and one-party post-independence eras. The introduction of multiparty politics in 1994 created, for the first time, the opportunity for different political leaders and parties to campaign and to present their programmes and views. To no one’s surprise, Frelimo and Renamo dominated the 1994 campaign, using different strategies and messages to present their programmes and sway voters.

However, without clearly defined ideologies, the election campaigns were based more on debating the past in terms of the civil war, the origins of
opposition parties and the weakness of Frelimo post-independence policy (villagisation and marginalisation) rather than focusing on what should be done to reduce poverty and crime, fight corruption and rebuild the country’s infrastructure. The parties advocated similar economic policies, both promising to stabilise the macroeconomic situation and replace the central planning of the past with a free market economy.

The main message that Frelimo tried to put across for the 1994 elections was that it alone had liberated the country and that only Frelimo could maintain political stability and rebuild Mozambique. Frelimo concentrated on reminding Mozambicans of their suffering under colonisation and as a result of Renamo’s civil war.56

Chissano and his colleagues tried to portray the opposition parties as external political forces created by those who had never accepted Mozambique’s independence. Rather than discussing policy, Frelimo leadership presented the 1994 elections as a continuation of Mozambique’s liberation struggle. The message that one should vote for Frelimo because it liberated Mozambique is still relevant to some people today, particularly those in Cabo Delgado and in the southern part of the country.

Many Frelimo leaders at local level spread rumours that Dhlakama was a thief and an assassin and that Renamo had killed people and had destroyed schools, hospitals, businesses, roads and bridges.57

Frelimo based its campaign on issues of economic liberalisation and promised to create a free market economy and to (re)build basic infrastructure. The Frelimo campaign was also based on Chissano’s personal leadership style and ability: he was widely used in print advertisements, road shows and at rallies as the man who brought about peace and reconciliation, who could deliver on promises and who had a strong international reputation and firm support among the different Frelimo factions.

The opposition parties, particularly Renamo, used a different approach. Renamo attacked the Frelimo government for the social, economic, cultural and political crimes it had committed against Mozambicans during the one-party era. Renamo deliberately focused on the unpopular aspects of Frelimo’s authoritarian developmentalist approaches. Renamo personalities such as Dhlakama, Vincente Ululu, Raul Domingos, David Aloni and their colleagues held public rallies throughout the country, reminding people of the evils of the one-party Frelimo government. This included detention without trial, mysterious deaths, forcing people to abandon their religious beliefs, the abolition of traditional leaders, villagisation programmes and the nationalisation of private property. Frelimo was portrayed as an authoritarian, Marxist-Leninist movement that would never
change, while Renamo president, Dhlakama, was depicted as the father of democracy.

Renamo aggressively sought to use the ethnic factor to its advantage. It argued that it was more inclusive than Frelimo, portraying Frelimo as a southern movement made up of mainly Changana people. When Dhlakama spoke to people in the central and northern parts of Mozambique, he usually addressed them using ethnic identity, such as “my Makwa brothers” or my “Sena sons and daughters” – a practice that had been barred from the nationalist discourse for years.\(^{58}\) (Frelimo had a pro-modernisation approach when it came to power in 1975, addressing all people simply as Mozambicans and discouraging the use of ethnic classifications. Frelimo believed it was necessary to eliminate all vestiges of ethnicity identity such as names, symbols and organisations that supported those values.)

By contrast, Renamo’s civil war was based on the manipulation of traditional values such as religious belief, traditional leaders and ethnic identities.\(^{59}\) During campaigning, Renamo strategists decided to use greater numbers of electoral activists from those groups that were not well represented in the Frelimo government, particularly among the core of old northern Creole (Zambezia valley, Mozambique island and Ibo island), Ndaws-Senas elite, Makwa-Lomwe elite, traditional and religious leaders. During the campaign Renamo activists were forced to speak mainly in local languages and to wear colours that represented the values of northern and central Mozambicans. Dhlakama wanted to remind people, particularly those in the central and north, that they had suffered under the one-party system and to portray Renamo as the party that supported those who were marginalised.

Renamo promised to abolish communal villages (villagisation programme), to re-introduce the authority of traditional leaders, to re-introduce private property rights, to return all property that was nationalised and to establish a good relationship with whites (meaning colonial capitalists) who had been forced to abandon Mozambique in the early period of independence.

The 1994 election campaign focused on the past. In general, all political parties failed to address seriously the country’s pressing economic and social problems.

The 1999 campaign

By contrast, the 1999 election campaigns were more vigorous in terms of government performance and the opposition’s performance in parliament. In 1999 Frelimo emphasised issues and its competence to govern. Chissano argued
that his party had given serious thought to finding solutions to Mozambique's problems and had shown willingness to put this into practice. Chissano accused Renamo of being expert in nothing but destruction. He rhetorically asked crowds how many schools, hospitals and roads had been built in their villages in the past ten years and which government had brought water and electricity to their communities — to which the crowds answered "Frelimo!". Chissano then reminded his audience of the devastating effects of Renamo's sabotage during the civil war.

Chissano also stressed that Mozambique's economic reforms had been heralded as some of the most successful in Africa and that during his ten-year tenure the country had achieved an average economic growth of 10%, the fastest rate on the continent. However, Frelimo leadership acknowledged that the positive impacts of this economic growth had not yet trickled down to the ordinary citizens and that much still need to be done to improve the lot of Mozambicans. Chissano highlighted his party's commitment to poverty alleviation and reducing unemployment. In order to combat poverty, Frelimo promised to promote "rapid sustainable economic growth" aimed particularly at labour-intensive sectors of the economy to create more jobs. In a departure from previous policy, Frelimo declared that "the development of a strong national business class is one of the pillars for the consolidation of national sovereignty".

Chissano also pointed out the danger that Mozambique faced if Renamo were to win the elections, indicating that Renamo lacked skills and human resources to manage the country effectively, that it had unclear policies and was not as well trusted internationally, particularly among the World Bank and IMF.

Chissano aimed to portray Renamo-União Eleitoral (Renamo-EU) as incapable and that under its leadership the country would only slide backwards. Songs that disparaged the opposition were sung at Frelimo rallies, such as the following:

* Dhlakama is a witch; Chissano is a father; Renamo is a witch; Frelimo is a father
  * I will vote for Chissano; I will vote for Frelimo
  * No vote for Dhlakama because he is a witch who can destroy the country;
  * No vote for Renamo.

Frelimo campaigned on the premise that it needed another term to complete its mission that had begun with the liberation of Mozambique and highlighted its superior competence and experience in economic management.

For its part, Renamo capitalised on the general dissatisfaction with the pace of economic growth and regional asymmetry, using the slogan: "Let's change
Mozambique. It focused on the negative aspects of Frelimo's performance, particularly those related to the socio-economic divisions between the south—which had received the bulk of recent foreign direct investment—and the rest of the country where poverty and underdevelopment remained high.

Renamo also focused on corruption, high tax rates, the low-quality hospital and education systems and the low standard of living in rural areas. Chissano's administration was strongly criticised for financial mismanagement and corruption. Regarding corruption, Renamo supporters used songs to discredit the ruling party, such as the following:

- Chissano is a thief; Do not vote for him
- Frelimo is Marxist; It is full of thieves
- Thieves must be in the prisons not rule the country
- Dhlakama is the man of change; Vote for him
- If you vote for him you are going to see where your taxes go and where the money from donors goes; Vote for change and transparency
- Renamo and Dhlakama are the source of change and integrity.

Renamo stated that as government it would “defend a market economy based on private initiative, where freedom and respect for social and human rights [were] indispensable conditions for the well being of all Mozambicans”.

In sum then, the 1999 electoral campaign, despite its discourse, was still based on the past (civil war) and focused on the one hand on Frelimo’s performance, and on the other on Renamo’s lack of capacity to manage the country. As with the 1994 electoral campaign the political parties general failed to address seriously the country’s many pressing economic and social problems. Thus for Mozambique’s first two multiparty elections, competition seemed based on personalities and patronage politics rather than on deeply held principles or well-formulated programmes and policies.

The 2004 campaign

The 2004 electoral campaign again focused on Frelimo and Renamo-EU; however, some minor parties, particularly the Party for Democratic Development (PDD) — a new party created by a former top Renamo leader Raul Domingos eight months before elections — and the Mozambique Independent Party (Pimo) lead
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by Yacub Sibindy, tried to ensure that the campaign was not centred solely on Frelimo and Renamo-EU. Tremendous effort was made by these two small parties to present themselves as “the lesser devils” between the two “bigger devils” – to borrow the PDD leader’s phrase used at a rally in Sofala Province. The PDD campaigned under the slogan “democratic alternative” and Pimo with the slogan “the power of morality”.

These two political parties held numerous rallies to introduce their candidates to the electorate as well as to explain their manifestos and issues. The main national issues for the PDD were changes in economic and social conditions, development and improving democracy. Within and between constituencies the issues varied but tended to centre on improved road networks, better agricultural infrastructure, effective rural health systems, sound education systems and increased employment in rural areas.

The PDD identified education as its top priority, and declared that the Mozambican education system “cannot go on being a centre for low quality pedagogic experimentation”. It went on to note: “Quality education is the basis for the future of our nation ... A people without quality education cannot defeat poverty.” The “far reaching” reforms proposed by the PDD included school lunches and uniforms to be given free of charge to all primary school pupils. Teachers’ wages would be raised and they would be paid on time. (A recurrent complaint by teachers is that they are paid sometimes months late.) Schools, institutes and universities would be “rigorously assessed” in terms of their productivity and outcomes. One remarkable proposal was for the creation of “mobile schools and temporary courses that should function in communities where it is not possible to set up permanent schools”. Their tasks would be to give literacy courses “to adults, isolated communities and poor children”. In both education and health, the PDD stated that it would end corruption. Health care would be “humanised”, there would be “better emergency services”, better mother and childcare facilities, and more hospitals would be built, with more beds added to the existing wards.

Despite the existence of PDD, Pimo and other political parties, the electoral battle continued to be waged between the two “elephants”: Frelimo and Renamo.

Tremendous effort was made by Frelimo presidential candidate Armando Guebuza and Renamo-EU candidate Afonso Dhlakama to explain the issues to their support bases in various languages and dialects on radio, television and at campaign rallies. An important hallmark of the 2004 campaign was Frelimo’s sophisticated media advertisement campaign and its comprehensive manifestos.

For 2004, Frelimo changed its campaign slogan from “a better future”, used
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for the 1994 and 1999 elections, to "the power of change". This change was based on three factors. First, the "better future" that many Mozambicans were promised in 1994 and 1999 had never materialised. During this period the number of unemployed rose, crime increased in big cities and the Chissano government seemed unable to deal with these problems. Second, Chissano's administration was rocked by a number of corruption scandals and the opposition naturally capitalised on the failings of Chissano's government and his party. Third, Frelimo had a new presidential candidate who was portrayed as a strong man, disciplined and a committed leader who cared about the national interest. During the election campaign Frelimo tried to show that Guebuza was the man to fight corruption and bring new blood into the Frelimo party.

Guebuza promised to: continue to pursue a market-oriented economic policy, but with a different approach; reduce poverty; fight crime; and take drastic measures to fight corruption.

Guebuza told a crowd in Nampula that civil disobedience and disorder had to end. The struggle against poverty, Guebuza argued, must involve "a partnership with the business class, since this helps us in our dialogue with international partners and with attracting foreign investment". Guebuza stressed his commitment to develop Mozambican businesses in order to "guarantee an increase in employment and in national wealth", adding:

*We need continued economic growth in order to overcome poverty ... So I pledge to continue encouraging private investment, national and foreign, and to continue improving our relationship with international financial institutions.*

Guebuza promised to pay more attention to rural areas where the majority of the Mozambican population lives.

*I see in the development and modernisation of agriculture the key to defeating absolute poverty. I shall therefore promote the use of improved seeds and of appropriate and sustainable technologies, in order to increase significantly agricultural production and productivity, in quantity and quality.*

He pledged to improve the agricultural marketing system through better roads to productive areas and greater access to credit. Guebuza also promised to improve services at public hospitals and to step up the fight against such diseases as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and cholera. Regarding schools, Guebuza said:
I shall fight for an improvement in the quality of education at all levels. I shall pay special attention to technical and professional education, as one of the factors that can speed up development.\textsuperscript{64}

Guebuza pledged, if elected, to defend all the constitutional rights and freedoms enjoyed by Mozambican citizens. In his personal manifesto to the electorate, Guebuza made the “solemn pledge” to “respect diversity of opinion, freedom of expression and promote freedom of the press”. During rallies Guebuza said: “I shall continue to open greater space for the participation of more citizens and of civil society in decision making”. Guebuza stressed that if elected he would continue the work of his predecessors – Eduardo Mondlane (the founder and first president of Frelimo), Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano. He hoped to “give greater dynamism to the process of building our project for society that we began more than four decades ago”.

During election campaigning Guebuza and Frelimo adopted a discourse to fit the particular demands of people in various areas; be it problems related to elephants that were killing people and destroying crops or the provision of water and electricity, Guebuza promised that he and his party would help.

As in the 1994 and 1999 election campaigns, Frelimo stirred up fears of possible instability and chaos that would ensue should the party lose the elections to the opposition. Frelimo therefore reminded the electorate that the Chissano legacy of peace, stability, development and the provision of socio-economic infrastructure should guide them when voting. The party urged voters to compare the record of Frelimo from the liberation war to the present vis-à-vis that of the other parties which were created by external forces. Frelimo blamed global factors (the World Bank and IMF) and the civil war for the low levels of per capita income and human development levels. During a rally in Sofala Province, then Frelimo Provincial Secretary Felipe Paunde told the crowds that:

Global forces such as the pressure that we are receiving from the World Bank and IMF do not allow our government to do what we want, but we are negotiating with them and they are able to work with our government to fight poverty. In the next five years you are going to see the real change with Guebuza and Frelimo in the parliament.

The main opposition, Renamo-EU, campaigned under slogan “peaceful change” and labelled Frelimo as a corrupt government with a legacy of unemployment, poor education, health and socio-economic policies and mismanagement of state funds. Renamo-EU made voters aware that in spite of global problems, the
difficulties that faced the Mozambican economy were mainly a consequence of government mismanagement.

If elected as government, Renamo-EU pledged to turn the economy around and to improve people’s wealth. Dhlakama promised to build genuine rule of law in Mozambique and to separate the state from the ruling party. In the district of Gurue, Dhlakama declared:

The state is Frelimo. All functionaries of the state are obliged to be members of Frelimo ... Today, there is no rule of law ... Anyone who doesn’t agree with Frelimo is considered an enemy.65

Dhlakama added that a Renamo government would not allow the “systematic delays” in paying teachers’ wages that characterised the current education system. He also stated that many criminal cases had been shelved because they involved important figures within Frelimo. Dhlakama declared that under his leadership there would be no more unemployment, organised crime, armed robberies or unexplained murders.66

1994 Presidential and parliamentary elections

The 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections were characterised by an exceptionally high turnout of some 87% of registered voters. Joaquim Chissano won the presidential election, receiving 53.66% of the valid votes against 33.73% in favour of Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama. There were many other candidates but all fared poorly: Democratic Party of Mozambique (Pademo) leader Wehia Ripua came in third with a mere 2.87% of the valid votes cast.

Frelimo failed, however, to score an absolute popular majority in the legislative elections, winning only 44.33% of the valid votes; but it was able to secure an absolute majority in parliament (with 129 seats out of a total of 250), since a clause in the constitution restricted representation to those parties receiving 5% or more of the popular vote.

Renamo effectively became the leading opposition party, its candidates securing 37.87% of the vote. Of the minor parties, only the UD qualified for representation in the legislature, receiving 5.15% of the vote.67

Though not as clear-cut as the results of the May 1994 parliamentary elections in neighbouring Malawi, regional voting patterns were easily discernible in Mozambique. Grouping the provinces by north, centre and south, Table 1 shows the allocation of seats in parliament after the final count and distribution of seats.68
As can be seen from Table 1, Frelimo won in the four southern constituencies as well as in the two furthest north (Cabo Delgado and Niassa), while Renamo took all the provinces of the centre-north and centre.

Mozambican political scientist, Luis de Brito, has made a detailed analysis of the provincial and district level results. He found that the two main parties each had ‘sanctuaries’ where in 1994 they won more than 75% of the vote. Frelimo’s sanctuary coincided with the areas in the south from where many of the party’s past leaders came, and in areas in the far north where the struggle for independence was waged the longest and where Frelimo had established ‘liberated zones’. Renamo’s sanctuaries coincided with the central regions where its military activities began and from where many of its cadres were first drawn. De Brito also suggests that a sense of marginalisation from the Frelimo state afflicting those areas had translated into voter support for Renamo, as well as identification with the Renamo leadership. However, large parts of the centre/north and northern provinces were sanctuaries for both parties and the vote was more balanced there. These included some of the more densely...
populated areas of the country where de Brito was unable to establish any obvious correspondence between voting behaviour and ethnic affiliation.  

1999 Presidential and parliamentary elections

Mozambique’s second multiparty legislative elections were held in 1999: Frelimo received 48.5% of valid votes cast, Renamo-EU 38.8%, and others 12.7%. Frelimo leader Joaquim Chissano was re-elected as president with 52.29% of the popular vote; Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama gained 47.7%. Voter turnout was about 70% – well down on 1994 – with 8.4% blank votes and 3.2% invalid votes. These election results apparently show an even more bipartisan pattern than that which obtained in 1994; neither the UD nor any other minor party or grouping attained the 5% threshold to qualify for a seat in parliament (see Table 2).

While holding ground in their sanctuary areas identified by de Brito from the 1994 election results, the two main parties made inroads into their opponents’ areas as well. It has been pointed out that in six provinces the party that was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Results of the 1999 Mozambique parliamentary elections by party and province</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
runner-up in 1994 gained seats in 1999. Only in Zambezia did the gap between the parties grow significantly. However, the much more populous Zambezia was second only to Sofala Province as a ‘sanctuary’ of Renamo support. In addition, four non-Renamo political leaders stood on the joint Renamo-EU ticket, and the provincial gains may also reflect this fact.

While Renamo’s strength still lay squarely in the central zone of the country (Manica, Sofala and Zambezia) and Frelimo’s strength remained based in the south and in Cabo Delgado in the far north, three provinces in the centre and north were now closely balanced, with Renamo slightly ahead. Those three were Niassa, Tete and (large and important) Nampula. In fact, the two weightiest provinces in electoral terms demonstrated opposite trends in the 1999 election compared with 1994: Renamo gained further support in Zambezia but lost ground to Frelimo in Nampula (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2004 Presidential and parliamentary elections**

It was believed that the third multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004 would be highly competitive and that Renamo-EU would provide a serious challenge to the ruling party, Frelimo. In the end, however, Renamo-EU and other minor parties did not perform well, with Renamo-EU recording the biggest loss.  

Frelimo again won the parliamentary elections, taking 62% of the vote (160 seats) compared to Renamo-EU’s 30% (90 seats). Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza
was elected as president with 63.74% of the popular vote, while Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama won 31.74% of the vote.\textsuperscript{72}

Interestingly, the 2004 election results do not reveal clear regional voting patterns, as found in the 1994 and 1999 elections. Table 4 shows the distribution of seats in parliament by political party for the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections.

Although minor parties have contested all three democratic elections in Mozambique, the country exhibits a classic two-party system centred on the competition between Frelimo and Renamo.

The country's major political cleavage is in fact that which separates the two political forces that faced each other militarily and later obtained the best results in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections.

The smaller parties that emerged after 1990 did not affect the main contenders for power in Mozambique, and those that did manage to enter parliament in the 1999 and 2004 elections came through the 'backdoor', so to speak, via coalitions with Renamo.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Mozambique country report}

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& Frelimo & Renamo & UD & Frelimo & Renamo-EU & Frelimo & Renamo-EU \\
\hline
Cabo Delgado & 15 & 6 & 1 & 16 & 6 & 18 & 4 \\
Nampula & 20 & 32 & 2 & 24 & 26 & 27 & 23 \\
Niassa & 7 & 4 & 0 & 6 & 7 & 9 & 3 \\
Manica & 4 & 9 & 0 & 5 & 10 & 7 & 7 \\
Sofala & 3 & 18 & 0 & 3 & 18 & 6 & 18 \\
Tete & 5 & 9 & 1 & 8 & 10 & 14 & 4 \\
Zambezia & 18 & 29 & 2 & 15 & 34 & 19 & 29 \\
Gaza & 15 & 0 & 1 & 16 & 0 & 17 & 0 \\
Inhambane & 13 & 3 & 2 & 13 & 4 & 15 & 1 \\
Maputo City & 17 & 1 & 0 & 14 & 2 & 14 & 2 \\
Maputo Province & 12 & 1 & 0 & 12 & 1 & 12 & 1 \\
Emigrants* & & & & & & & \\
Africa & - & - & - & - & - & 1 & 0 \\
Europe & - & - & - & - & - & 0 & 0 \\
Overall Total & 129 & 112 & 9 & 132 & 118 & 160 & 90 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

* Mozambicans living abroad were allowed to vote in the 2004 election.
3. Parliamentary structures and channels for disseminating information

Powers of parliament
The National Assembly is the sovereign representative of the state. It shall, according to the constitution, draft, debate, approve legislation, ensure executive accountability and exercise oversight duties over organs of state. More specifically, parliament has powers to:

- delimit national borders;
- deliberate on the administrative division of the nation;
- approve the electoral bill and referendums;
- propose the carrying out of a referendum on issues of national concern;
- sanction the suspension of constitutional guarantees and declare a state of emergency;
- ratify nomination of the president and deputy president of the Supreme Court, and presidents of the Constitutional Council and Administrative Court;
- deliberate on the Council of Ministers’ reports;
- deliberate on the national plan and budget and respective implementation reports;
- define defence and national security policy, upon consultation with the National Security and Defence Council;
- define the basis of tax policies;
- ratify or condemn international treaties;
- give amnesty and pardon convicted citizens;
- authorise presidential visits to other countries;
- elect the president and members of the Permanent Council of parliament;
- approve parliamentary standing orders and laws governing parliamentarians; and
- create parliamentary commissions and regulate their activities.

The powers of parliament can in principle only be over-ridden by the president. This can happen when upon deliberation parliament, for instance, rejects the government programme for a given mandate. In such a case, the republican president may dissolve parliament and call new elections. The president is given extensive powers and is an important body in Mozambican politics; however, the power given to the president to dissolve parliament can only be exercised once.
Although the functions and mechanisms of parliament are clearly stated in the constitution, parliament does not have the capacity or skills to monitor the executive. Candidates for parliament are chosen through a party list system, by province. This tends to result in deputies having stronger allegiance to their political parties than to the constituents they nominally represent. Additionally, these representatives have not developed sustainable capacity to analyse the national budget and do not have the political skill to make capital out of a minister’s shortcomings.

Parliamentary committees

According to Parliamentary Law No. 6/2001 of 30 April, parliament has three organs: the plenary, the Permanent Committee and working committees. The plenary comprises 250 MPs and has superior decision-making power.

The Permanent Committee

The Permanent Committee is the main structure of parliament and comprises 15 members: the speaker, who is in charge; the deputy presidents; and MPs elected by the plenary who are proposed by respective parliamentary groups, according to proportional parliamentary representation. This organ:

- coordinates activities carried out by the parliamentary committees;
- manages relations between parliament and other similar institutions outside of the country;
- supports the speaker of parliament in his/her duties;
- elaborates and submits to the plenary an annual programme proposal and budget for parliament;
- follows the implementation of parliament’s budget and answers to the plenary;
- prepares the daily agenda;
- creates working groups that include parliamentarians from interested committees whenever a matter is related to more than one committee;
- sets working groups, defines their duties and duration and nominates the chairpersons and secretaries; and
- defines the number and composition of parliamentary delegations to visit foreign countries, taking into account the proportionality in parliament.

The Permanent Committee, together with the Council of Ministers, sets the
plenary agenda where government policies shall be debated, and sets the date and time for voting on projects and proposed laws. It holds parliamentarians accountable for their actions and defines access models to parliament for the general public.

**Working committees**

In order to develop its activities, parliament has working committees that can request a working budget from the Permanent Committee for the formation of working groups. The committees have a minimum of five and a maximum of 15 members elected by the plenary for the duration of the term of the legislature. Each committee chooses its candidates in numbers proportional to parliamentary representation and has a chairperson and a secretary, who must come from different benches. The chairs in charge of these committees are distributed in accordance with the proportion of parliamentary representation, with the majority group choosing who it wants first, followed by other groups in order of size. The working committees:

- submit proposals, laws, resolutions and motions for approval;
- comment on proposed laws, resolutions and motions that relate to their issues;
- design and produce inquests, studies and proposals that are field related;
- evaluate and control state institutions' actions related to their area of specialisation, ensuring that the law is respected and that public opinion is catered for; and
- approve data and reports to be forwarded to the plenary and Permanent Committee.

Within the scope of their competencies, committees can call on government members, state representatives, individuals or collective persons to fulfil their mission; visit state, civil, military, company, public and private services; and have access to classified documentation and recourse to specialists to carry out their duties. The number of working committees to be set up in a given legislature depends on parliament’s needs, but ad-hoc and inquest committees are created only to address specific issues. According to Parliamentary Law No. 6/2001 of 30 April, there are eight working committees:

- **Planning and Budgeting Committee (CPO).** The duties and responsibilities of this committee include planning and budgeting; financial, monetary, fiscal
and consumer policies; banking, credit and insurance activities; and making recommendations for the general state account based on reports and comments issued by the administrative court.

- **Agriculture, Rural Development, Public Administration and Local Power Committee (CADRAPPL).** The duties and responsibilities of this committee include: enforcing the land law; supporting cooperative movements, household production, and small- and medium-sized producers; agrarian development; reforestation and irrigation; promotion of fisheries, defence and valorisation of fishing resources; supporting fishermen and small- and medium-sized businesses; efficiency upgrading, quality control and efficient rendering of public services and its transparency; decentralisation and capacity building of local power with implementation by municipalities; regional development, correction of existing imbalances and gaps; valuation of local resources; and the implementation and development of business, transport and local communication networks.

- **Social Issues, Gender and Environment Committee (CASGA).** The duties and responsibilities of this committee are to: promote education, culture, youth and sport; gender, household and child protection; promote the emancipation of women; protect and promote the environment and cultural heritage; promote employment; defend workers' rights; enhance the labour environment; protect the retired and the old; social reintegration of the displaced population, demobilised military personnel, the physically handicapped and other vulnerable layers of society; maternal and childhood protection and health; and to defend consumer rights and religious activities.

- **Economic Issues and Services Committee (CAES).** The duties and responsibilities of this committee include to: promote and defend formal business, the normalisation of informal business, the development of internal and external economic relations, and the complementarity of industrial production with the country's natural resources; to promote and defend national industry, increase its competitiveness internally and externally, substituting importation with national production; the use of water and energy resources; provide electric power to the nation; rational usage of and internal valuation of mineral resources; promote internal and external tourism; enforce gambling laws; railways and road transport, sport valuation, promotion of the national navy and maritime activities, increment and defence of national airways and airport valorisation; development of national
telecommunications network and mail services; and to follow the SADC programmes as well as other regional and international economic cooperation entities to which Mozambique is a member.

• Juridical Issues, Human Rights and Legal Committee (CAjDHL). The duties and responsibilities of this committee include to: oversee the constitutional and legal aspects of draft bills and of definitive versions as well as agreements and treaties submitted for their approval; ensure individual citizens' rights and freedoms as enshrined in the constitution are exercised; uphold the values inherent to human rights and implementation of international conventions that Mozambique has signed; ensure a culture of respect and that of abiding by the law, citizen equality before the law, access to justice, rights to defence and judiciary support and other constitutional guarantees; ensure procedural legislation that is simple, guaranteeing citizens speedy access to justice; and develop the judicial system and monitor prison activities and services.

• International Relations Committee (CRI). The duties of this committee include: international relations; international agreements and treaties; social and economic cooperation; and international entities.

• Defence and Public Order Committee (CDOP). The duties and responsibilities of this committee include: national defence and security policies; policy formation and development for the armed forces; policies to fight crime; developing police force efficiency and promoting ethics; intelligence and state security policies; and policies inherent to military service and complementary.

• Petitions Committee. The duties and responsibilities of this committee include: petitions, complaints and claims directed to parliament. When a petition refers to issues that might have been judged and sentence passed, the committee will forward such cases to the attorney general, requesting information about its decision; and when the petition refers to complaints or claims that require input from other committees, this shall be sought.

Ad-hoc committees

These are the committees set up to investigate and report on a specific issue. They exist only during the investigation and debate of issues for which they were established and cease to exist after they have presented their reports to parliament. These four ad-hoc committees were created by the 1999–2004 legislature:
• Ad-hoc Committee for Revision of Electoral Law.\textsuperscript{74} This committee was created by Resolution No. 15/2000 of 26 July to review electoral legislation, aiming to improve future electoral processes. In terms of the debate around the revision of electoral legislation, this ad-hoc committee placed more emphasis on those parties represented in parliament than on broader civil society and those political parties not represented in parliament. With minority parties and civil society largely excluded from the debate, little progress has been reported to date.

• Ad-hoc Committee for Revision of Parliament Regulations, Statute of Deputies and Structure of Parliament General Secretariat.\textsuperscript{75} This committee was created to review parliamentary rules, the laws regarding MPs as well as to analyse and restructure the administrative and legislative technical support given to parliament with the objective of fitting these to new experiences acquired during the previous legislature.

• Ad-hoc Committee for Constitutional Revision.\textsuperscript{76} This committee was created during the first multiparty legislature (1994–1999) but did not reach consensus in terms of the proposed constitutional revisions. Resolution 7/99 of 14 May extended the mandate of the committee to the second multiparty legislature (1999–2004) and a new constitution was finally approved in November 2004.

• Ad-hoc Committee for Revision of the National Anthem.\textsuperscript{77} The work of this committee resulted in the new national anthem currently used. It is now dissolved.

\textit{Inquest committees}

Inquest committees are created by the plenary to investigate the legality and functioning of public institutions within the framework of national interest. The committees have the autonomous judicial authority to investigate cases, but the facts involved in a pending court case cannot be the object of an inquest until these have been tried and a sentence passed.

The 1999–2004 legislature set up the Inquest Committee to Investigate the Facts of 9 November 2000. This committee was created to investigate and find accountable those involved in demonstrations\textsuperscript{78} by Renamo party members and militants concerning the non-acceptance of the 1999 multiparty election results. In October and November 2000, there were political protests by Renamo supporters in various Mozambicans cities against the results of the 1999 general
Strengthening parliamentary democracy in SADC countries

elections. Renamo remained convinced that the Frelimo government had won by fraud, and sought to pressure the government to address its claims. In the municipality of Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, the protests turned violent. Protestors ransacked a police station and killed a number of policemen. This in turn provoked a violent response from government security forces. Scores of Renamo supporters, involved or not in demonstrations, were arrested and jailed. Crammed into a single tiny cell, more than 90 prisoners died of suffocation. The incident shocked the country. There were calls for official inquiries from the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as from human rights groups and other civil society actors.

This inquest committee comprised 15 MPs and received a budget to carry out its duties. However, to date, no-one from the committee has formally presented any findings. Two draft papers from interviews with the various stakeholders involved in the case have been written, but because an inquest committee’s proceedings have to be secret, the committee reported its results to the plenary for debate and deliberation in a closed-door session.

Administrative and legislative technical support to parliament

Although the parliamentary and administrative technical support groups are not formally classified as part of parliament’s structures, these two organs play important roles:

- The parliamentary groups have the competence to: present candidates for the presidency; propose candidates for the vice presidency, members of the Permanent Committee and other committees and the chairperson and secretaries of these committees; formulate questions put to government for each parliamentary session; request the interruption of a session and the establishment of inquest committees; be heard before the deliberation of a motion proposing sanctioning of an MP; propose the presentation by the government of information in each session; use of speech for final statements; and be informed by the government about issues of national interest in terms agreed upon by the Permanent Committee and the government.

- The Parliament General Secretariat (SCAR) is the technical and administrative structure of the Mozambican parliament, according to Ministerial Diploma No. 59/98. It entails organs and services of the Mozambican parliament that constitute the administrative management, financial and legislative technical support. Without this legislative support it would be difficult for the plenary,
Permanent Committee and other committees to carry out their constitutional and legal duties. Also, without parliamentary groups parliament would be a show without actors. However, the parliamentary groups and administrative and legislative technical support groups of parliament are characterised by weak and unskilled structures, which means they are ineffective in terms of providing appropriate technical support to parliament and its members. For instance, the SCAR has a technical research department to carry out research and provide technical support on legislative and budgeting areas to other parliamentary organs, but the department does not have the capacity to provide and respond to the demands of parliament. The department therefore relies on expert consultants to fulfil its duties in terms of elaborating on draft bills and writing both specialised and simple reports. For example, from 1999 to 2001, parliament requested technical assistance from extra-parliamentary experts 38 times (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Requested to technical cabinet</th>
<th>Channelled and answered by extra-parliamentary experts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
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</table>


Although the analysis carried out by Shenga is based on data from 1994 to 2001, until now parliament has not been able to develop research capacities and continues to depend on extra-parliamentary experts.

The legislative process

One of the main features of parliament is the law-making process. Proposed laws are sent to the speaker of parliament, who does the first reading together with two vice-speakers. After deliberations the speaker presents the proposal to the Permanent Committee which sets it on the agenda for discussion in the next parliamentary session. The proposal is then forwarded to the appropriate working committee, after which it is distributed to all MPs in the committee. The speaker then sets a date for deliberation of the submitted proposal and feedback is
provided to the proponent. The proposal or project should be presented as follows:

- The proposal/project with relevant analysis and foundations that justify it.
- Its legal framework and insertion within the government programme.
- Its predictable implications, specifically budget wise.
- The project/proposal should be signed by the proponent or organ of parliament.
- The proposal/project should be signed by the president of the republic.
- A proposal/project of law by the Ministers' Council should be signed by the prime minister, with an indication of the possible date of the session for approval by government.

No project/proposal should be sent for debate in a plenary session without first having been analysed and commented on by a relevant working committee. If there is lack of consensus or if amendments are required, the proposal should be corrected by the members of the proposing committee prior to the plenary. Once corrections have been made, the proposal should be distributed to all members of the proposing committee three days before the set date for the committee debate.

The presentation of a project/proposal in a session should not exceed 20 minutes and is presented by the committee chairperson, who should focus on the proposal's content, fundamental principles and the structure of the entire project. Once the general deliberation is completed, the proposal is forwarded for more specific debate, which covers all points and written lines and is followed by a vote. An MP who is not a member of the proposing committee has the right to submit in written form such proposal for debate. Furthermore, if there are any misunderstandings a proposal can be resubmitted (if it is supported by at least 25 MPs or any of the benches) for a new vote covering specific parts of the document. In order to proceed with the deliberations, the Permanent Committee will outline the appropriate amount of time for each intervention.

The speaker then submits the project to parliament for a final vote; this requires the presence of a legal quorum – i.e. more than half of the MPs should be present in such a deliberating session. When the vote is even the bill is resubmitted for a new one-day debate within 48 hours: the proposal is rejected if there is a second even result.

The committees are responsible for ensuring that the final version of a proposed law does not go against the spirit of the constitution. This final version is distributed to MPs who should, within ten days of receipt or any other period
of time that the plenary may decide, study the proposal and deliberate on any amendments that may be deemed necessary. The final revised version is then forwarded to the speaker of parliament who signs it, and sends it to the republican president. The president can then in 30 days either: confirm the bill as it is; make suggestions for changes; or object to the bill in principle. After presidential approval the bill is authorised for publication in the Government Gazette. However, if not approved the bill is sent back to parliament for a second discussion. Parliament does not have to agree with all the suggestions made by the president, but it must vote on the bill again after it has heard the suggestions. A two-thirds majority vote in parliament is then needed for the bill to go forward, after which the president is obliged to approve the bill for publication.

Channels for disseminating information

Parliament ordinarily meets twice a year, opening in February and October for a total of 90 working days a year. Extraordinary meetings may be convened by the president, the speaker, the Permanent Committee, or by at least one-third of the MPs. Parliament can only take decisions when more than half its members are present, and more than half of those present must vote in favour. In the case of constitutional amendments, however, a two-thirds majority is needed. When alterations are far reaching the proposal adopted by parliament must be submitted for public debate and voted on in a referendum.

Mozambique’s parliament has been working towards becoming a more open and accessible institution. All parliamentary committee meetings and plenary sessions are open to the public and there seem to be several channels that could increase public engagement between parliament and the general public, as well as with civil society. Parliament advertises in local mass media when it is to meet, issues to be debated and session times. In consultation with parliament, committee meetings are to some extent monitored by CSOs. Official summaries of proceedings and copies of documents submitted to or presented at these meetings are made available in the parliament library, published in newspapers or broadcast on radio; but most Mozambicans do not have access to mass media, particularly newspapers.

The independent print media and state (and private sector) television reach only a fraction of the population, concentrated mainly in Maputo; although government has increased television coverage to most major cities. Given the high levels of illiteracy in Mozambique, newspaper readership is low (especially in rural areas where circulation is limited) while in urban areas the problem is compounded because many cannot afford to buy daily newspapers. The print
media themselves are limited, facing constraints in terms of accessing material (e.g. proper equipment, high input costs), financial resources and well-trained professionals. The private media is seen as mainly pro-opposition and its circulation covers mostly major cities.

As in other African countries, radio is a more effective medium given that it can cover a wider range and can broadcast in the diverse local languages. Mozambique has seen an increase in the number of FM national and regional radio stations broadcasting to a larger national audience, with eight in ten (79%) Mozambicans surveyed saying they get their news from radio at least “a few times a month”, compared to the high number of “never” for television or newspapers.  

However, information regarding parliamentary activities (opening ceremony, debates) and working committee discussion summaries is usually published in the press or discussed on television and radio in Portuguese and not in local languages.

There is no specific parliamentary radio service. In general, what radio does is to follow live debates or to promote occasional debates with parliamentarians on issues that do not have consensus among the two benches in parliament.

Other forms of communication, education and learning that could be delivered by cultural groups (e.g. theatre, dance and music groups) have not yet been exploited by parliament, although they are being used effectively to pass on information on such issues as AIDS and the electoral process.

In sum then, few links exist between parliament and the greater part of the Mozambican population, which means that these people are denied the opportunity to follow what is debated in parliament and passed as law. Given the degree of state dominance of the electronic media, however, government, the ruling party and those CSOs with strong links to the ruling party have a clear advantage when it comes to campaigning and lobbying for policies.
4. Civil society's engagement with parliament

According to Przeworski et al., a number of variables are critical to the sustainability of democratic regimes. First, is the choice between a parliamentary and a presidential system, with the former alleged to be superior because it is less likely to result in government paralysis. Second, the economy should be such that it can generate a per capita income earning of at least $5,000. Third is the external political environment; obviously, new democracies are more likely to flourish in regional, continental and global environments that are themselves democratic. A fourth variable could be added, namely, the extent to which there is a well-organised and vibrant civil society that is able to check the power of government, hold the leadership accountable, make effective input into policy debates and promote a strong sense of citizenship among the public.

In Africa, civil society comprises non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, churches, trade unions and voluntary associations. The civil societies of Africa face myriad formidable obstacles, including sustained campaigns of official intimidation and repression.

The good news is that despite continued and severe material and organisational deficiencies, civil society in some African countries flourishes today as never before and exercises influence in the political arena.

After years of marginalisation and repression, CSOs in Mozambique have begun to emerge as key institutions in the process of consolidating the country’s democratic transition. CSOs’ sphere of influence varies, as do their geographical reach and representativity: some organisations are active at national or provincial levels only, while others have branches and operate at grassroots district and local levels. Still others are essentially local and work within a restricted area of influence and activity. Some categories of organisations (e.g. membership organisations and social non-profit organisations) overlap. Some are small religious congregations with NGO status that have to work within the limitations imposed by Mozambican legislation. Most non-profit organisations in Mozambique are legal entities. This can be in the form of membership-based associations or foundations, with the latter rarely used as there are special restrictions, for example with funding. Most non-profit entities in Mozambique are legalised as associations.

The new liberal constitution has substantially improved the legal and political powers of civil society groups by equipping them with rights that allow them to
act as watchdogs for citizens' rights and to promote democratic governance. However, although the constitution has improved the legal status of Mozambican CSOs, many are still fragile, poorly organised, donor driven, lack lobbying skills and are ignorant of their political rights. This undermines their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the state and Mozambican society in general.

However, many of these CSOs operate in communities with no significant tradition of social pluralism. A survey carried out by the Centre for Population Studies (CEP) in 2001 indicates a low level of general tolerance for criticism of the government. Indeed, nationally many more people believe that those who speak "badly about the government and the system of government" should not enjoy the right to vote, demonstrate, work in the civil service, talk on television or radio or teach school, than believe that critics of the government should have such rights.

**Civil society's relationship with parliament**

Parliament has begun to emerge as a key institution in Mozambican governance; yet parliament will continue to face serious challenges in its attempts to foster better governance. CSOs can assist to consolidate the role of parliament by, among others: helping to educate citizens regarding democratic culture and the functions of parliament; assisting parliament in terms of information, skills and proposed laws that reflect citizens' needs; monitoring the executive; assisting with local auditing; and measuring government performance.

In order to strengthen CSO and citizen inputs into parliament, a number of donor-assisted programmes have focused on technical assistance to parliament. This has helped parliament to develop instruments that would improve contact between parliamentarians and their constituencies, as well as with CSOs in general. For instance the SUNY project, in cooperation with parliament, developed the following instruments:

- A database was compiled with information on more than 700 organisations and associations, their roles and representatives, categorised according to their respective overlaps with parliamentary committees.

- An opinion poll on specific topics was carried out with CSOs, the results of which are available for committees to use when commenting or elaborating on legislation or for general information purposes.

- Summaries of current legislation were compiled that explain in simple language how such legislation impacts on citizens.
These three instruments can be the basis for committees to organise: public hearings with CSOs where organisations can present their opinions on public policy that a committee will be analysing; and/or public debates for discussing issues that affect the community and for formulating possible solutions.

**Public hearings**

These instruments have allowed parliament to organise a number of public hearings with CSOs and citizens. Public hearings are aimed at obtaining input from different stakeholders (business, CSOs, public officials and the general public) about proposed or existing policies, bills, regulations and other issues or changes that would significantly affect the public if introduced.

Before holding a public hearing the relevant portfolio committee needs to ascertain whether or not a public hearing should be held and, if so, to determine and clearly define the hearing’s purpose, intention and objectives.

The committee must advertise the hearing in different mass media channels at least one week before the public hearing is to be held. The advertisement must provide information in terms of data, starting times, venue and subject of the public hearing. Over and above the advertisement, the committee must send invitations to specific stakeholders, CSOs and other influential persons one week before the hearing.

The committee must start the hearing on time, as indicated in the hearing notice, and it should endeavour to give all participants an opportunity to be heard. Those who are unable to make presentations should send written submission to the committee.

However, these procedures are not always followed. Some members of the public stated that they were not aware of public hearings being conducted by different parliamentary committees. If they had been aware and had participated in public hearings, some complained that the hearings did not start on time and participants were not given enough time to present their views.

In sum, then, public hearings generally occur at short notice and are not easily accessible to most Mozambicans. There is a critical gap between what happens in Maputo and in rest of the country; this implies that the public, particularly those in the central and northern parts of Mozambique, can give only limited input when it comes to public hearings.

Public hearings on legislation or nationwide consultation by parliament to gauge public opinion on important legislative questions are not common in Mozambique. It was found that parliamentarians would rather listen to the advice of experts or consultants than to the public. Despite this weakness, parliamentary
committees carried out 105 public hearings (see Table 6) during the period 1994–2001.

Apart from organising public hearings and promoting internal debates, parliamentary committees are supposed to translate citizens' views into law. In Mozambique, however, legislation making is largely the purview of legal experts, technocrats and the executive. During the period 1994–2004, parliament approved 117 laws, including those dealing with land (1997), the environment (1997), forestry and wildlife (1999), labour (1998), the general state budget and accounts (1999), and tax (2002).

Within the scope of the land law (1997) the following organisations were consulted: the National Peasants' Union (UNAC); Rural Assistance Organisation of Mozambique (ORAM); General Cooperative Union (UGC); Vida Nova; religious institutions; lawyers and academics. In terms of the labour law (1998), the following organisations were consulted: trade unions (OTM and SLIM); National Organisation of Teachers (ONP); Mozambican Women's Judiciary Association (AMMCJ); Mozambique Private Enterprise Association (AEPRIMO); Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique (CTA); and the Mozambique Industrial Association (AIMO). Table 7 shows the number of public hearings and laws approved by parliament during the period 1994–2001.

Many CSOs express disappointment with parliamentary functions vis-à-vis public hearings and consultation processes. The speaker and committee chairpersons reportedly fall short in their role as vehicles in educating civil society
Table 7: Public hearings held versus the number of laws approved by parliament, 1994–2001

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laws (approved)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public hearings</td>
<td>n/h</td>
<td>n/h</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
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n/h = no public hearing were carried out


about the functions and duties of parliament. General opinion is that the speaker and chairpersons make little effort to bring their work closer to the people (e.g. advertising public hearings). They seem to have neither insight into what is needed nor the political will to provide education on the workings of parliament.

In terms of CSOs' involvement in public hearings or consultations, interview respondents said that working committees did not allow CSOs to prepare and discuss a proposed bill with their branches at the various levels. The head offices of many CSOs are in Maputo and the organisations therefore need time to consult and discuss with their delegations in the provinces and districts. But the time allocated to consult with provincial and district delegations and to hold discussions with working committees is too short. Some CSOs opted not to participate in consultations or debates organised by the working committees, and when they did participate, they did not air their views.

In terms of the working committees themselves, in the scope of the consultation process there was a tendency for them to consult only with powerful organisations such as professional bodies, trade unions and middle-class civic associations. Organisations representing other spheres of society were marginalised, particularly rural groups which have rarely been included in the network of civic activists, such as rural women, peasants and informal networks.

The marginalisation of these CSO groups is in part explained by their lack of organisation, skill and financial support: rural CSOs are not sufficiently organised to influence and lobby parliamentarians. In general, the impact of CSOs currently involved in policy, draft legislation or bills can only be judged negatively.

The only good example of CSO involvement in draft legislation is the Land Campaign which mobilised different groups and citizens in the country. The campaign ran from January 1998 to December 1999 and is considered the biggest civic movement in Mozambique’s recent history, having achieved wide geographic coverage and involving many people and organisations. The campaign
focused on guaranteeing land security and possession (on the basis of historical land occupation even without written/official possession of proof), preventing conflicts and attracting national and external investments. The Land Campaign was invited by parliament and government to represent CSOs in the process of elaborating the laws and regulations on land, urban soil, forests and wild fauna, environment, water, the law on petitions, complaints and claims, and the preliminary draft of the law regarding local government.

**Petitions, claims and complaints**

The first multiparty parliament (1994–1999) opened the door for CSOs and citizens to make petitions, claims and complaints, but it was the second multiparty parliament (1999–2004) through Law No. 6/2001 that institutionalised the Petitions Committee responsible for the management of petitions, claims and complaints.

On reviewing the petitions that have been submitted to parliament, it seems that Mozambicans do use this instrument to exercise their rights, with a reported increase in the number of petitions, claims and complaints by the public, particularly in 2001 when the new law was introduced.\(^9\)

According to the 2003 Petitions Committee report,\(^9\) the committee received some 210 petitions, claims and complaints from different parts of the country. Many of these related to conflicts between state institutions and citizens, as well as to land conflict. But the 1997 CEP public opinion survey reveals that Mozambicans are far behind when it comes to exercising their rights through petitions, claims or complaints, with 89.6% of respondents saying they had never contacted or presented petitions to parliamentarians and only 2.2% saying they had.\(^9\)

A recently study demonstrates similar trends. According to a 2001 CEP survey study, 93% of respondents had never exercised their right to petition, claim and complain, with only 3% saying they had contacted or written to parliament. People had, to some extent, contacted their local authorities (grupos dinamizadores and traditional leaders),\(^9\) but the survey results reveal that parliament is not adequately rooted in the general population.

In 1997, 92.6% of women and 84.4% of men did not know the names of their MPs. Only about 14.7% of men and 6.5% of women were able to name at least three MPs.\(^9\)
5. Opposition parties in Mozambique

Scholars who study political parties argue that the modern political party must meet four criteria, namely: continuity (that is, a life span exceeding the dominance of the party founders); nationwide organisation; the desire to exercise power; and consistent efforts to garner popular support.96

In terms of garnering popular support, Kuenzi et al argue that “a party’s ability to survive reflects its ability to maintain support in the population”.97 Without popular support political parties cannot survive and cannot have political power to govern or represent the people in parliament.

Many African political organisations do not even meet the first criterion. Quite often, a political party south of the Sahara is little more than a platform for a single individual; a structure whose rules can readily be changed to suit its founder, whose charisma and money are its main engines.98

Do political parties in Mozambique, in this case opposition parties, fulfil the four criteria of modern political parties; and is the opposition able to gain and maintain popular support?

The 1990 Mozambican constitution and democratic dispensation afforded parties the requisite support to attain representation in parliament and to pursue the interests of their constituents. The political parties that contested the first and second democratic elections fell into two broad categories: parties linked to the liberation struggle (Frelimo); and parties relying on the mobilisation of regional or ethnic factors for their political subsistence (Renamo). Some opposition parties are represented in parliament, but they are generally conceived as overwhelmingly weak, fragmented and disorganised. They struggle with major questions of tactics and strategy; they espouse no ideology that is fundamentally different from the ruling Frelimo’s philosophy and are divided on grounds of history, ethnicity and region – some, of course, more than others.

Renamo

The origins of Renamo, known initially as Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), date back to the period immediately after Mozambican independence. Its history is complex. In 1975, a war-weary Portugal offered early independence, without elections, to select nationalist parties in all of its African colonies; in Mozambique, the beneficiary was Frelimo.
Those Mozambicans not happy with this choice either left the country or remained to oppose the Marxist-Leninist experiment in social reorganisation advanced by Frelimo. Anti-Frelimo factions, many exiled in apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, formed the original core of Renamo, receiving international support from those countries as well as from right-wing groups in Western Europe and the United States.

The appearance of MNR was thus part of the logic of regional confrontation which existed at the time between the ‘white powers’ and ‘liberation movements’ and states which supported them. During the initial years of its existence, Renamo’s military action served ‘white’ Rhodesian interests, as well as South African interests after 1980 when Zimbabwe’s independence forced the movement to seek new outside bases of strategic support. Like many other organisations around the world, Renamo was at that time caught up in the international context of the anti-communist struggle.

This is, however, not to say that Renamo can be reduced to an external dimension, as if it were a simple expression of foreign interests. In fact, Renamo support within Mozambique, particularly from the early 1980s (expressed by the generalisation of its military activity to all Mozambican provinces) shows that it operated as a catalyst for opposition to the Frelimo state by significant segments of rural societies.

Several studies have shown how Frelimo’s polarisation of the rural population in Mozambique reinforced historical conflicts stemming from the colonial state, and how the Frelimo state was in many aspects a continuation of the colonial state. Thus Renamo was not simply an instrument of foreign aggression against the independent Mozambican state, but also the expression of discontent on the part of peasants and some urban sectors (particularly in regions where identification with Frelimo on ethnic/regional grounds was less) towards this same state.

In addition, the sociological composition of Renamo’s leadership shows that this movement bears witness to the fundamental tension between the elites in the south and those in the centre and north of the country. This characterised the whole history of Frelimo prior to independence, and still marks Mozambican political life today. For instance, current Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama was a former Frelimo soldier from Mozambique’s central region who abandoned the ruling party to join MNR; and the famous Renamo military commander Andre Matsangaissa, who was killed during the war, had a similar background.

MNR was initially formed by individuals, the great majority of whom had served the colonial power before putting themselves at the service of the ‘white’ powers’ regional strategy. The movement, however, eventually acquired an internal dynamic, as suggested by the alteration of its acronym.
But Renamo’s fight against ‘communism’ and for ‘freedom’ never led it to take a clear position in favour of political pluralism for Mozambique. Indeed, the question of multiparty democracy was only posed when the Rome negotiations began. Contrary to popular opinion at the time, Renamo managed to make a successful transition from military movement to political organisation over the 1992-1994 period, and proved to be a formidable electoral force. Renamo’s former guerrillas succeeded in gaining legitimacy among broad sections of the population, mounting a serious electoral challenge to the ruling party.

Over the years, however, Renamo has shown a poor capacity to organise and evolve internally, as well as a weakness in gaining urban support and in mobilising intellectuals to its ranks. This has contributed to its poor capacity for political analysis, as well as to the rather unfavourable image of Renamo in urban areas (including among diplomats) that it is a highly unpredictable force, short on competence. This negative image is strengthened by the treatment it receives from most national media.

Minor parties

Although minor parties have practically no influence on the political evolution of the country, not even locally – at least in the current phase which is dominated by the confrontation between the former ‘armed parties’ – they reveal the cleavages that characterise Mozambique’s elites. In terms of their origins, and dating back to the early 1990s, four groups are evident:

• The first group comprises organisations whose leadership is made up of former members of Frelimo. Among this groups is Palmo (Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique), set up at the initiative of former Frelimo students trained in Eastern European countries; SOL (Social Liberal and Democratic Party), which resulted from a split in Palmo; Panade (National Democratic Party), set up by a former Frelimo member who was jailed in the early 1980s on charges of spying for America’s Central Intelligence Agency; and Pademo (Democratic Party of Mozambique), formed by a Foreign Ministry cadre and a former guerrilla in Frelimo’s armed struggle.

• Another group comprises two parties led by political figures who opposed the colonial regime but who did not join Frelimo at independence, seeking exile in Portugal for many years: Domingos Arouca formed Fumo (Mozambique United Front); and Maximo Dias formed Monamo (Mozambican Nationalist Movement) – both men are lawyers.
A third category of parties has emerged from the mobilisation of young people who attended university in Mozambique post independence. This includes the PCN (National Convention Party) and FAP (Patriotic Action Front).

A fourth category is the group of parties whose origins are located among long-time Mozambican emigrants in East African countries such as Kenya. Included here are Padelimo (Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique) and the PPPM (Mozambican People's Progress Party).

These parties are separated by the diverse trajectories and social origins of their leaders rather than by their political or ideological differences. In fact, on analysing the parties' political programmes (when these exist) and public statements made by their leaders, one may conclude that there are no fundamental differences at all.

The most significant cleavage is that which divided them initially into two main camps: that is, those who defended a unitary state; and those who advocated the establishment of a federal state (Pademo, PPPM). But even from this perspective one can note on closer observation that the federal proposals of some parties were vague and resembled more the desire for a political-administrative decentralisation of the Frelimo state dominated by southerners, than the expression of any real federalist aspirations. Ten years down the line these federalist references have all but disappeared.

The question of decentralisation as an expression of the desire to end the hegemony of the 'southerners' is not a concern restricted only to those groups forming the 'federalist' parties. In reality, newer parties reveal a fundamental and historic rift among Mozambique's elite. They express opposition to the hegemony of the Frelimo leadership (which is today much less 'southern' than during its Marxist-Leninist period) by representatives of those elites marginalised since the independence struggle; that is, by individuals mostly from the country's central and northern provinces.

One reason why the minor parties are notoriously weak is doubtless the fact that Mozambican intellectuals, and in general the bureaucratic elite which grew in the shadow of the Frelimo party-state, are in a phase of re-conversion and installation into the world of business and the nascent national business class. For this, their main capital is precisely their links with Frelimo and its state. It is people in this stratum – including, for instance, army officers from the armed struggle – who have benefited most from the privatisation of companies and services that were once under state control, as well as from bank credits granted with no expectation of repayment, or at nominal interest rates.
Strengthening parliamentary democracy in SADC countries

The minor parties are thus merely the factions historically excluded from positions of power in the economic and state apparatus who, motivated by the desire to gain access to the state and thus get their “piece of the cake”, mobilise politically in the current phase and challenge Frelimo’s power. But their poor social representation, their divisions and splits and their organisational and financial difficulties prevent them from unsettling the two major parties. The total number of officially registered parties (and there are others whose formation is reported in the press, but who do not register) is currently 32, including Frelimo and Renamo.

The country’s major political cleavage is in fact that which separates the two political forces that faced each other militarily, and later obtained the best results in the 1994 and 1999 elections — that is, Frelimo and Renamo. It is true that Renamo ran in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections in a coalition with some of these minor parties (Renamo-EU), and elected as deputies some of the minor party leaders. But these minor parties did not really bring many votes to Renamo, and simply enjoyed the ride.

Minor parties occupy a marginal position on the political stage and are practically unknown to voters, with most Mozambicans unable to name any minor parties. For example, a 1997 study showed that 85% of women and 65% of men said they did not know any parties other than Frelimo and Renamo. Only about 20% of men and 7% of women could name at least three other parties.

The only minor party with the potential for growth is Pimo (Independent – or Islamic – Party of Mozambique) due to its religious character; however, considering that Muslims account for only 17% of the population, even with broad mobilisation and funding this party would be unable to achieve major weight on the national political scene. It could, however, become a local political force in areas with strong Muslim influence, such as in the Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula provinces.

While the minor parties are politically insignificant since they have no social base or constituency, this is not to say that their existence can be completely ignored. In effect, they have a ‘disturbance’ effect on the political system, especially because they cause the splitting of votes during elections.

It should be stressed that this splitting does more damage to Renamo and its presidential candidate, whose images (symbols and photos) are less well known among the population, than to Frelimo. Such is the reading that can be made from a comparative analysis of the 1994 presidential election results when there were 12 presidential candidates, and the 1999 results when only Dhlakama and Chissano competed.

The electoral law – through the 5% threshold for national votes – hinders the
representation of smaller political forces; however, it encourages the participation of these same forces by not penalising them financially – that is, a party does not have to pay a deposit recoverable only on positive results, as is the practice in many other countries as a way to discourage less serious candidates. Consequently, smaller parties often enter into artificial coalitions, which contribute little or nothing to consolidating national political life.
6. Summary and recommendations

In order for democracy to be sustainable, it requires strong institutions and the full participation of citizens in the political, social and economic life of the country. A key institution in this regard is parliament.

This study analysed parliament in Mozambique and showed that, first, despite various initiatives by donors to promote and strengthen parliament, the institution is still weak and unskilled with an executive that continues to dominate the legislature and the judiciary. The dominance of the executive means that it drafts and proposes most bills put before the legislature for consideration. Second, civil society is weak, poorly organised and unskilled, and comprises mainly urban organisations with no strong links to rural civic movements. CSOs also lack financial sustainability and thus cannot be a valuable or credible interlocutor between parliamentarians and citizens. Third, although parliament has opened various channels for citizen involvement, these are ineffective. The absence of programmes similar to that of the SUNY project to orientate the work of committees is a great weakness vis-à-vis parliament’s engagement with civil society. Finally, the opposition parties are also weak, poorly organised, poorly financed, fragmented and lack trained staff, with the result that they do not present a viable alternative to the incumbent party. Opposition parties have largely failed to perform their critical role in the democratic process in terms of providing checks and balances on the operations of the incumbent party, preventing abuse of power and ensuring, inter alia, that the incumbent does not neglect the public interest.

Three focus areas are therefore recommended in order to strengthen parliament in Mozambique over the next five years:

- **Lack of organisation and skills.** The general problems that face parliament, CSOs and the opposition in Mozambique are lack of organisation and skills. Capacity-building programmes should therefore be designed and developed that would help strengthen parliament, CSOs and opposition parties’ roles and functions. The projects should address the demands of these organisations, primarily by training and providing technical information regarding law making and budget formulation.

- **Lack of financial support.** Financial sustainability is a key problem affecting
parliament, CSOs and, in particular, opposition parties in Mozambique. Emphasis should be placed on donor and state funding, as well as on improving party mechanisms since viable opposition parties would strengthen parliament’s role, function and importance in Mozambique.

• Lack of information and political culture. Radio, television and school programmes also involving traditional leaders and religious institutions should be designed and developed to educate citizens about the role and functions of parliament.
Notes

1 The PPI, on which preparation began in 1978, was drawn up after countrywide discussion. It was classified as a mega-plan, claiming to end under-development in ten years.


3 Machel S, Discurso no 1 de Maio, Noticias, 4 May 1981.

4 When Frelimo in 1983 appealed for food aid because of drought, international donors reduced rather than increased aid. Mozambique had to make three concessions to obtain vital food aid and prevent starvation, namely: sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa under which Mozambique agreed to stop backing the ANC and in return South Africa would stop backing Renamo; agree to join the World Bank and IMF; and agree that international NGOs could distribute and begin development work in Mozambique, working independently of the government. Once Mozambique agreed to the structural adjustment programme, aid jumped from $360 million in 1985 to $700 million in 1987 and to more than $1 billion in 1990. In the five years, 1990-1994, Mozambique was the largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa, with aid of over $1.1 billion a year.


7 Pitcher A, p 132.

8 Wuyts M, The Agrarian Question in Mozambique’s Transition and Reconstruction, op cit, p 7.


11 Wuyts M, The Agrarian Question in Mozambique’s Transition and Reconstruction, op cit.

12 Coelho called this process a ‘principle of purification’ whereby the Frelimo government was trying to create a ‘pure society’. This led to the direct marginalisation of thousands of people who had been involved with the colonial regime. Coelho J,


When the liberation war started, Frelimo introduced grupo dinamizadores as its lowest rung of party organisation. As a result of their loyalty to Frelimo, grupos dinamizadores were introduced in all urban and rural areas of the country. These groups had various functions: they provided the first level at which people could organise the struggle against colonialism (sabotage and subversion, mobilisation for the first campaigns of nationalism, etc.); they were the first organisations that popularised the Frelimo line; and they helped to compensate for the breaking down of the colonial state apparatus, especially at local level.


17 The Frelimo regime saw itself as the representative of ‘the people’ and enjoyed strong popular support. The social components that were the object of repression and marginalisation did not demonstrate any ability to oppose the dominating impetus of the project. Cabaco J, The long march of Mozambican democracy, Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development, Elografico, Maputo, 1996, p 83.


19 In 1975 110,000 Mozambican miners were working in South African. As a result of Mozambique’s support for the ANC and the liberation process in Rhodesia, the apartheid regime cut this number to 40,000 in 1976.

20 The logic of regional confrontation between the apartheid regime and the former Portuguese colonies had different expressions in Angola and Mozambique. In the case of Angola, the absence of links of regional economic dependence dictated a strategy of direct military intervention by the South African armed forces into Angolan territory, also backing the internal opposition movement UNITA. In Mozambique, however, the strategy was essentially based on using economic ‘weapons’ together with support for the armed internal opposition movement (Renamo).


23 Politically, Renamo was poorly organised and driven largely by the priorities of its foreign backers. However, its military superiority in key areas was clear, and contrary to government propaganda the rebels’ intelligence and command structures were often highly effective.


27 Before the peace agreement neither domestic rebels nor social movements had emerged. This may have been partly due to Mozambique’s lack of resources vis-a-vis political activities and civic associational life.


30 Cabaco J, The long march of Mozambican democracy, op cit.

31 CRM, art. 74, para. 1.

32 CRM, art. 74, para. 3.

33 CRM, art. 75.

34 CRM, art. 76, para. 1.

35 CRM, art. 77, para. 1.

38 Law No. 9/91 of July 1991.
40 Law No. 13/92 of 14 October.
41 See Electoral Law, art. 10, para. 2 and art. 11, para. 1.
43 At the time, Renamo was convinced that Frelimo had chosen the electoral system because it could do better out of a winner-takes-all, constituency based system.
44 Protocol III, Principles of the Electoral Law, V, para. 5b.
45 The first step of the d'Hondt method is to determine the quotient by dividing the total number of registered voters by the total number of seats available in parliament. For the 1999 parliamentary elections this was: 7,099,105 registered voters (85.5% of the potential voters), divided by 250 seats, giving a quotient of 28,396. The second step is to divide the total number of registered voters in each province (the electoral circle) by the quotient. The result gives the number of seats each province can elect. If the result of the division is more than half the general quotient (28,396), the electoral circle can elect an MP for one more seat. Lundin I, Towards Stable Electoral Laws in Mozambique, 2004, http://www.accord.org.za/aicr/2004-2/AJC%2020_2004%20pg97-118.pdf.
46 Electoral Law, arts 13-14.
48 On this point, see Electoral Law, art. 15.
49 Electoral Law, art. 19.
50 Mazula B, op cit, p 41.
51 The CNE supervises registration and election activities, while the STAE (an executive and technical body) executes all the registration and election plans and activities that have been approved by the CNE.
52 The other opposition parties that were not represented in parliament were excluded from the CNE.
55 Notwithstanding the sound legal framework, effective political competition is limited because of inequalities among parties in terms of human and material resources, ignorance concerning political rights as well as by the party list system used to elect MPs. The elected deputies tend to have greater allegiance to their political parties than to their constituents.
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57 Pereira J, As primeiras eleições multipartidas e o comportamento eleitoral no distrito de Marromeu, op cit, pp 1–30.
60 Renamo, Pamfleto eleitoral, distribuido na Cidade da Beira, 1999.
62 2004 election campaign speech, tape recording by Joao Pereira.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Eighteen political parties and 12 presidential candidates registered for the 1994 elections. The political parties were: AP; Unamo; PT; Fumo-PCD; Frelimo; SOL; Pimo; Renamo; PRD; Pacode; Pademo; PPPM; PCN and UD. The presidential candidates were: Joaquim A Chissano; Afonso MM Dhakama; Carlos A dos Reis; Carlos JM Jeque; Casimiro M Nhamitambo; Domingos AM Arouca; Jacob NS Sibindy; Mario FC Machele; Maximo DJ Dias; Padimbe MK Andrea; Vasco CM Alfaizema; and Wheia M Ribua.
68 Ironically, if the electoral system used in 1994 had been FPTP and not PR, Renamo would have won an absolute majority in parliament. It has been calculated that with the same number of votes and provincial constituencies, Renamo would have won 152 seats as the most electorally popular party in Tete, Manica, Sofala, Zambezia and Nampula, and not their actual 112 seats. Frelimo would have won only 98 seats, instead of 129. The UD would have won no seats, instead of the 9 it received.
70 Nine political parties and a coalition of three parties registered for the 1999 parliamentary elections. These were: Fimo; Palmo; Frelimo; PT; Padelimo; Panaoc; SOL; Pasomo; PPLM (political parties); and UMO; UD and Renamo-EU (coalitions). The presidential candidates were: Joaquim A Chissano and Afonso MM Dhakama.
71 Fifteen political parties and five coalition parties registered for the 2004 parliamentary
elections. These were: Frelimo; PDD; PT; Pimo; Palmo; SOL; PEC-PT; Pasomo; Parema; Parede; PPD; Padelimo; and PAZS (political parties). Renamo-EU; FAO; UD; MBC; and Usamo (coalition parties). The CNE rejected two political parties (Pamomo; PPLM), two coalitions (GO; BIS) and the only group of citizens (Democratic Movement for Social Change). Pamomo was only noteworthy because its leader, Albano Maiope, was once a judge. The PPLM – which once called itself the Progressive Liberal Party of Mozambican religious communities, although not a single community supported it – is led by the eccentric figure of Neves Serrano. Its most successful feat was to take $50,000 from a US-run trust fund for political parties in 1994, and then failed to provide a single candidate for that year's elections. GO and BIS were rejected because they failed to register with the Ministry of Justice, while the stated argument for rejecting the Democratic Movement for Social Change was because, according to the law, no citizen groups can stand for general elections. EISA, Election Update 2004, EISA, Johannesburg, 2004.

The Constitutional Council accepted five of the eight presidential nominations for the 2004 elections. Three were rejected because they did not present at least 10,000 valid supporting signatures from registered voters. The five approved candidates were: Armando Guebuza (Frelimo); Afonso MM Dhlakama (Renamo-EU); Raul Domingos (PDD); Carlos Reis (Coalition for Change and Good Government); and Jacob NS Sibindy (Pimo). The three rejected candidates were: Neves Serrano (PPLM); Joaquim Nhota (Padelimo); and Jose Chicuara Massinga (Panade).

In the 1994 and 1999 elections, smaller parties that did not pass the minimum threshold won 13% of the vote, which means that only 87% of the electorate was represented in parliament. Carbone C, Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique, op cit, p 15.

72 Resolution No. 15/2000 of 26 July.
73 Resolution No. 3/2000, of 29 February.
74 Resolution No. 22/2000 of 6 December.
75 Resolution No. 19/2000 of 6 December.
76 Although international observers had considered the elections to be free and fair, some irregularities had been experienced with vote counting and the announcement of results came only after the 15 days provided by law.
78 The parliament library works as an information centre and is supposed to play a pivotal role in terms of: enhancing public participation in the legislative process; strengthening the capacity of MPs to contribute more effectively to parliamentary proceedings; and providing a base for parliament-generated information on such documents as order papers and forthcoming bills.
80 According to Faria et al 81% of the national media in operation is in the print sector and mostly based in Maputo. Only five of the 37 national media houses are operational outside Maputo City (two in Maputo Province, one in Nampula and two in Sofala). See Faria F et al, Promoting the Involvement of Civil Society Actors in the Programming of European Union Aid to Mozambique, EU, Maputo, 2001.
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83 These cultural groups are considered effective. They exist throughout the country and receive no support from donors or the government.


87 Faria et al, op cit.


89 Many observers have expressed disappointment at the results of donor programmes aimed at assisting parliament since the 1994 elections. The USAID technical assistance programme, which when active dramatically improved the quality of parliament’s legislative analysis and drafting, was not sustained by parliament after the official programme ended. This was partly because government lacked the interest and political will to invest state funds in continuing initiatives originally financed by international donors. It also seems to reflect parliamentary leaders’ desire to focus on their own private interests rather than on institutional development.

90 The SUNY Project (1995–2001) was a parliamentary technical support project backed by the US government through USAID/Mozambique.

91 There is, however, a low level of response to petitions by the Petitions Committee due to lack of capacity.

92 See Comisao de Peticoes, Informacao da comissao de peticoes a VII sessao ordinaria da Assembleia da Republica, AR-V/Infor./486/02.05.2003; Ibid, Anexo 1 e 2: peticoes, queixas e reclamacoes.


97 Ibid.


99 Only urban areas were spared from Renamo military activity; and it was only in the final years of the war that Renamo was able to occupy some district capitals for relatively long periods.

100 Ten years and many millions of dollars (in international assistance and coaching
programmes) later, many observers question whether Renamo has made proper and credible transformation in terms of a political party. On the one hand, the party has reasonably coherent national structures: representatives can be found in remote places and do receive communication through a hierarchy. On the other hand, Renamo continues to be dominated by a single charismatic person, Afonso Dhlakama, whose mercurial and occasionally paranoid style has inhibited the emergence of a broader-based leadership or a coherent political programme. Renamo remains largely closed to internal discussion, and still less to creative dissent from within; hence a growing restiveness within the party, and frequent expulsions of senior members who are perceived to pose a threat (in the broadest sense) to the supremacy of Dhlakama and the former Renamo military commanders who have his ear – as well as his promise to share with them the spoils of power.

101 This expression was used by one of the party leaders.
103 All parties received money from a trust fund for the first elections since it was not possible to gauge how each party might fare. The law should have been changed thereafter to ensure greater political responsibility.
Appendix: List of interviews conducted*

MPs
1. Abel Mabumda, member, Ad hoc Committee for Revision of Electoral Legislation, Renamo Electoral Union Parliamentary Group, 1999–2004
2. Chico Francisco, MP, independent
3. Francisco Rupansana, member, Committee of Agricultural, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Power (CADRAPPL), Renamo-EU Union Parliamentary Group, 1994–1999
5. Luís Videira, member, CADRAPPL, Frelimo Parliamentary Group, 1994–1999
7. Raul Domingos, MP, independent

Parliamentary staff
1. Flavio Arthur V, parliamentary assistant, CADRAPPL and Ad hoc Committee for Revision of Electoral Legislation
2. Titos Jeque M, parliamentary assistant, Petitions Committee
3. Carlos Caixote B, parliamentary assistant, Petitions Committee
4. Vasco Abreu V, parliamentary assistant, Committee of Social Issues, Gender and Environment

CSOs
1. Boaventura Buene, Common Help Rural Association of Mozambique (ORAM)
2. Ismael Ossemane, coordinator, National Peasants’ Union (UNAC)
3. Luís de Brito, Mozambique country director, EISA
4. Inacio Chire, Institute for Peace and Democracy and Development (Ipade)
5. Salomão Moiane, editor, Zambeze
6. Jose Moine, trade union representative, OTM

* Some names may have been changed or deleted to protect the identity of interviewees.
Academics
1. Erculano Manuel de Abreu, lecturer, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University
2. Luis de Azevedo, lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University
3. Pedro Joao Capece, lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University
4. Jennifer Garvey, Law Faculty, Eduardo Mondlane University
5. Joao Sengulane, lecturer, Department of Sociology, Eduardo Mondlane University
6. Taquidir Manuel Vasco, Faculty of Law, Eduardo Mondlane University
References


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### List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alimo</td>
<td>Independent Alliance Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Patriotic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Social Insertion Block</td>
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<td>CADRAPPL</td>
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<td>Economic Issues and Services Committee</td>
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<td>CAJDHL</td>
<td>Juridical Issues, Human Rights and Legal Committee</td>
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<td>CDOP</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>United Congress of Democrats</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Centre for Population Studies</td>
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<td>CNE</td>
<td>Comissão Nacional de Eleições – National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First-past-the-post</td>
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<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>Fumo</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>Grand Opposition</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Manu</td>
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<td>Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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<td>MP</td>
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<td>Pacode</td>
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<td>Pademo</td>
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<td>Party-Land Movement</td>
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<td>Popular Democratic Party</td>
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<td>PPI</td>
<td>Prospective Indicative Plan</td>
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<td>Mozambican People’s Progress Party</td>
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<td>PR</td>
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<td>PRD</td>
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<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>Social Liberal and Democratic Party</td>
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<td>STAE</td>
<td>Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration</td>
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<td>UD</td>
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<td>Udenamo</td>
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