One year after the inauguration of a transition government, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is facing its most serious crisis since war broke out between rebel factions and the government of the late President Laurent Kabila in August 1998. An ethnically-based armed faction led by General Laurent Nkunda, a former officer in the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), is threatening to reignite full-scale war in the eastern part of the country, and the Congolese government has responded by sending tens of thousands of troops to the region. These armed groups now face one another across the frontline in North Kivu and Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province and a city which General Nkunda briefly seized militarily in late-May. In Kinshasa, dialogue between the leaders of the various armed factions which now make up the new government, has all but come to a standstill, and latent mistrust has openly resurfaced. In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that the crisis will be managed politically, and there are strong indications that a flare-up, if not a prolonged bout of fighting, will erupt in the days and weeks to come.

Although the military crisis in the Kivus dominates the political scene at the moment, it is not the only issue which threatens the transition process. In-fighting within the components of the government, as well as between them, has been the main reason for serious delays on key issues such as the re-formation of a national army, the nomination of provincial governors and the promulgation of key laws. Extensive interviews with key political actors in the Congolese capital Kinshasa indicate that these delays can be attributed to a great extent to certain spoiler elements who do not stand to gain from the culmination of the transition process in elections, now tentatively scheduled to take place in July 2005. Although each group pledges its commitment to the transition process and its desire to go to the elections at the scheduled time, all are more than ready to point fingers at their colleagues whom they blame for the various delays. It is clear that the transition government has not managed to consolidate itself, and that the various parties within it are still acting in their own sectional interests.

This situation report will attempt to describe the state of each component as well as their positions on key issues. It will also look at the attitudes that the various components have towards one another and how this impacts the functioning of the transition government. Finally, this situation report will also look at some of the key laws which have been passed and those currently being discussed in parliament, as well as the progress made by the five transition institutions. While recent events in the eastern part of the country will be briefly discussed, this
situation report does not aim to provide a thorough analysis of those events, nor does it aim to provide an in-depth analysis of the ethnic conflict in that area. Instead, it aims to consider the impacts these events have on the effectiveness and viability of the transition government.

The transitional government

The current transition government was inaugurated on 30 June 2003 following the signing in April 2003 of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord in Pretoria. It is composed of representatives of the three main belligerent groups, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the ex-government of Joseph Kabila (henceforth to be identified as members of the Parti Pour la Reconstruction et le Développement (PPRD)), as well as the representatives of smaller armed groups, the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD/Kisangani Liberation Movement (RCD/K-ML) and opposition political parties, civil society and the Mayi-Mayi militia.

The RCD-G, MLC and ex-government components are the largest components in the transition government and hold the majority of senior-level positions in the national assembly and the senate as well as ministerial posts. The other components all have representatives at ministerial level as well as in the national assembly and the senate.

Since its inauguration, the transition government has met with several delays in implementing key aspects of the peace accord, most notably the reintegration of the national army, the nomination of provincial governors and of regional military commanders as well as the promulgation of key laws such as the amnesty law, the nationality law and the military law. These delays have generally been attributed to high levels of distrust among the various parties and the concurrent unwillingness to reach compromise on key appointments, as well as a certain level of technical incompetence within the transition government.

With regard to the extension of the transition government's authority beyond the capital Kinshasa, two achievements have been registered to date: the appointment of military commanders for the country’s eleven military zones at the start of the year, and the nomination and inauguration of new provincial governors in early May. Both of these issues involved extensive negotiations, and the repartition of posts indicates that the three main belligerents at least are still holding on to power in their key constituencies. A case in point is the maintenance of two key senior political and military RCD-G officials in North Kivu province, where RCD-G ally Eugene Serufuili remained governor, and where General Obed, another key RCD-G ally was appointed head of the eighth military region. On the side of the ex-government, the appointment of a member of the PPRD as governor of Katanga province, a post that was to be designated by the Mayi-Mayi component, indicates not only the ex-government's desire to control the important, mineral-rich province, but also the extent to which it has managed to appropriate key elements of other components into its own.

The rebellion in the East

Since the appointment of new military commanders throughout the country, it has become clear, particularly in the eastern part of the country, that the various components have maintained their command and control structures. In Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, the appointment of General Nabiolwa, a former officer in Mobutu's army, quickly misfired when he attempted to disarm Major Kasongo who was discovered harbouring weapons caches in his compounds. Kasongo was subsequently arrested and brought to Kinshasa against the objection of the RCD-G which threatened to drop out of the transition process if he was not returned to Bukavu. Faced with this threat, President Kabila allowed Kasongo to return to Bukavu; this did not fully calm the situation,
however. Subsequent clashes between Nabiolwa and his second-in-command, Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, a former RCD-G officer, plunged the city into fear and cost dozens of lives. Nabiolwa was recalled to Kinshasa and was subsequently replaced by General Mbuza Mabe, also a senior officer in Mobutu's army.

In late-May tensions again erupted when dissident troops led by General Laurent Nkunda joined Mutebutsi's forces and captured the town of Bukavu for several days in spite of the presence of MONUC forces in the city. According to Nkunda, he attacked the town to prevent atrocities against the Banyamulenge (ethnic Congolese Tutsi) community which he accused government forces of committing. Several thousand people, many of them Banyamulenge, fled the city for fear of reprisals against their community. Nkunda later retracted his accusations that government forces were preparing a genocide of the Banyamulenge community, then changed his tune again, demanding an independent enquiry. Meanwhile after over a week of fighting which killed more than 100 people, Nkunda and his forces abandoned Bukavu and retreated to positions north of the city, where he currently remains. Mutebutsi and an unknown number of his troops meanwhile fled across the border to neighbouring Rwanda, where they currently remain.

The Kinshasa government reacted to the crisis by dispatching tens of thousands of Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) troops to the eastern part of the country, and issuing an arrest warrant for Nkunda and Mutebutsi. Meanwhile General Rubiwasiri Obed, the officially-appointed commander of the eighth military region remains in his post in Goma, and his position is unclear. According to one senior Congolese military official, Obed's hands are tied; he has no effective control over the troops supposed to be under his command, but he does not feel safe appealing to Kinshasa for help, or openly denouncing Nkunda's actions.

"Obed is complicit in the events of Goma. He is the commander, but he has mostly Rwandophone and Banyarwanda troops who answer to militia commanders (such as Nkunda). Obed can't come out and say it because he would have to tell the whole story and implicate himself to some extent."²

Others are convinced that Obed is himself closely involved in the rebellion and that he has rallied his troops to Nkunda.³ Either way, the situation is extremely precarious. The transition government will have to reassert its control over the eastern part of the country, an objective it is currently pursuing militarily. Nkunda, however, who is estimated to have at least 10,000 well-trained troops loyal to him is fighting for his life (there is a warrant for his arrest and he has been accused of crimes against humanity for his role in the extrajudicial killings of over 100 civilians and soldiers which followed the May 2002 mutiny in the city of Kisangani)⁴ and is unlikely to surrender. Equally worrisome is the implication of the Rwandan government in the matter. It is widely believed that Rwanda is providing at least logistical and material support to Nkunda and his men, and this is likely to increase as FARDC troops retake key areas and move towards re-establishing control over Goma.⁵ Already other political hardliners such as Bizima Karaha, an RCD deputy who recently defected from the transition government, have accused the FARDC of having Interahamwe troops in its ranks.⁶

The presence of the Interahamwe on Congolese soil was one of the primary reasons for which the Rwandan government became involved in the DRC, and any movement of FARDC troops towards the Rwandan border could provoke the Rwandan government to again send troops to the DRC. In the week prior to 18 July, there were numerous skirmishes between the FARDC and Nkunda's troops in the areas of Kalehe and Minova. On 17 July reports from Goma indicated that hundreds of people had been fleeing the town in the previous days, fearing an outbreak of fighting.⁷ Meanwhile, Obed failed to attend an emergency summit of the leaders of the country's military zones which was held in Kinshasa on 18 July.
Lack of progress on the critical issue of reforming a new Congolese army has been perhaps the most significant failure of the transition government. Military and political observers from the various components officially recognise this, but are simultaneously unwilling to submit themselves to the process. According to one senior Congolese military official, the issue has not yet been seriously addressed in negotiations between the RCD-G, the MLC and the ex-government, the three main belligerents who still control the bulk of the armed forces in the country. “There is no interest in going ahead with the reintegration of the army. The various actors need to balance their power, this balance comes from the military.”

Meanwhile, the various representatives of the components acknowledge that progress on the issue is key, but blame one another for the delay in action. At the same time that they accuse other components in the government of wanting to maintain their military intact as a means of leverage, the various parties themselves tacitly argue that this is necessary for them to survive in the current context of deep distrust between the parties and military and political instability. According to one senior Congolese military official, the events in Bukavu may be an opportunity to impress upon the various actors that they can no longer tread water on the issue: “If the events of Bukavu had not happened, there would not be any discussion of reintegration until after the transition. Maybe now it can happen.” With military clashes occurring daily and civilians beginning to flee Goma for fear of fighting in the city, this is an unlikely scenario, however desirable it may be.

Introduction

The Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma is by far the most isolated component in the government. Having been backed throughout the war by neighbouring Rwanda, which most Congolese blame for the past five years of war, the RCD-G and its leaders have a serious image problem both within the government and with the general population. Since its inception in August 1998, the RCD-G has been perceived as a puppet of the Rwandan government. As a result of its close links with the Rwandan government, as well as the brutal behaviour of Congolese and Rwandan soldiers in the region, the RCD-G is widely detested and has no chance of regaining significant support in the lead-up to an election in the eastern part of the country, which it controlled before the end of the war. In the western part of the country which was under the control of the Kabila governments and the MLC, it faces similar problems. People in these areas blame the RCD-G and Rwanda for the war and, even now, do not consider the RCD-G a legitimate and independent political grouping. This strong dislike for the RCD-G is aggravated by its domination by ethnic Banyamulenge, Congolese Tutsis who have ethnic links to the ruling government in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the current atmosphere in most of the country is such that anti-Banyamulenge sentiment cannot be separated from anti-Rwandan sentiment even though many people from the Banyamulenge community do not feel that the RCD-G represents its interests.

Among members of the PPRD, there is an equal level of resentment and distrust. Senior government officials from this component have clearly indicated that they do not feel that anyone in the RCD-G, and in particular Vice-President Azarias Ruberwa, can be trusted. Such rhetoric is to be expected from the members of government who belong to the PPRD, not least because it is politically expedient, as officials know that such sentiments are shared by the general public. Although such an attitude may help the government in its attempt to further isolate the RCD-G, it has serious repercussions for how the latest crisis in the Kivus and, in fact the entire transition, will be played out, not least because it seriously narrows Ruberwa’s margin for manoeuvre and his ability to act as a mediator between the hardliners in his party and those who despise and distrust him in Kinshasa.
The RCD-G is not unaware of this dynamic. Its leaders know that they are in a weakened position and that they have little political bargaining power. This is one of the reasons that discussions for the nomination of key military and political positions was a problem, and why there has been no progress on reforming the national army: the RCD-G understands that once it has dismantled its military structures, it will have little or no leverage left to negotiate key issues in the transition government. But this is not the only problem, nor is the RCD-G the only component in the government that has little interest in relinquishing its military power. As recent incidents in Bukavu indicate, the RCD-G is now going through an internal crisis which pits hard-line elements ready to scupper the transition process against more moderate ones who still feel that there is something to be gained from remaining in the current transition government.

Vice-President Ruberwa

While members of the PPRD, and even the MLC still harbour great distrust for Vice-President Ruberwa and feel that he still dances to Rwanda's tune, most apolitical observers feel that matters are not quite as clear-cut and see him as a man caught between competing loyalties. Vice-President Ruberwa, who is himself a Banyamulenge, has until now valiantly defended the cause of his community. This was a lot easier to do in his previous position as Secretary-General of the RCD-G than it is as a member of the transition government, where his allegiance should have shifted to the larger goal of the success of the transition rather than the protection of a particular community. Now that he is in Kinshasa many members of his party, both political and military feel that he is not sufficiently defending their cause in the new transition government. Some also feel that they did not, and cannot reap, sufficient rewards from the transition and have lost faith in Vice-President Ruberwa, or simply never believed in the process in the first place. At the same time, he has not successfully taken advantage of his powers in Kinshasa, where he is the head of the political and security commission. Political analysts and members of the government have criticised him for this, saying that he could have done more to consolidate his role as vice-president in the transition government and thereby gain some distance from the Rwandan government.

The situation with Laurent Nkunda has also pushed Ruberwa into a corner. General Nkunda has openly accused the military forces sent to Bukavu by the transition government of committing atrocities against the Banyamulenge community and of planning a genocide of the Banyamulenge. The allegations have already been investigated by MONUC's human rights division and have been rejected as untrue. Meanwhile, the first people to flee Bukavu during the fighting were themselves Banyamulenge, many of whom do not identify with the RCD-G, or feared reprisals by the local community. Nonetheless, in spite of the widespread impression that Nkunda is manipulating the ethnic card in order to cover his military ambitions, he, and now Karaha have positioned themselves as the official guardians of this community. On the other side are Ruberwa and Moise Nyarugabo, an RCD-G deputy in parliament and leading figure in the party. Both are Banyamulenge and seem to feel compelled publicly to demonstrate their solidarity with the community, as evidenced from a Radio France Internationale (RFI) interview with Vice-President Ruberwa on 9 June:

[Boisbouvier, RFI Interviewer]: “You say the crisis is local. But can Rwanda remain passive if the Banyamulenge community is threatened in Kivu?”

[Ruberwa] “I confirm that the Banyamulenge community has lost 15 people, including men, women, and children, in extremely indescribable and inhuman conditions. Some of them were killed with machetes. There have been targeted killings. But now, on the issue of Rwanda's possible reaction, it is a different issue. I think it is the Congolese government's duty to protect the Banyamulenge who are Congolese citizens. I think that within the limits of states, it is up to Congolese institutions to protect the communities who live on its territory.”
Boisbouvier] The two rebel leaders who captured Bukavu are former senior members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma [RCD-Goma]. Is the reputation of the movement, to which you belong, not tarnished today?

Ruberwa] I do not think so. It is not incidents, which are certainly isolated, that can spoil our reputation. Today, these incidents are still minor compared to the other on-going peace processes such as the ones in Cote d'Ivoire or in Burundi where the situation is much more serious. Of course, it is a bad thing. We have condemned this rebellion, but at the same time, I think it was just an accident in our march towards peace.

Boisbouvier] But, is RCD-Goma still a reliable partner?

Ruberwa] Absolutely, Mr journalist. RCD is a reliable partner. Whether people like us or not, everybody knows that when we make a commitment, we are one of those who respect their commitments. And, we, as signatories to the peace agreement, have just held a meeting with the president of the republic. We had to clearly say that the provisions of the agreement should not be amended. It is our tenacity towards the agreement which makes us reliable. As a matter of fact, because we are reliable, we cannot rule out the possibility of incidents taking place. What matters is the attitude during the management of incidents. And we are doing our best in this matter.16

Although many in government as well as the majority of the general public feel that Ruberwa's loyalties lie with the Banyamulenge, some sources indicate that, behind the scenes, he and Nyarugabo are in fact attempting to bridge the gap between the hardliners and the government in order to keep the transition online in spite of tremendous pressure on them not to do so.17 Although he has refrained from expressing any opinion on Rwandan involvement in the events in Bukavu, Ruberwa seems aware that the majority of Congolese are examining him harder than ever and has gone on a public charm offensive to explain his positions.

Rwanda

There is also the significant question of Rwanda's influence on the current situation. Most observers believe that Rwanda is almost certainly involved in at least arming and providing logistical support to Nkunda's forces.18 A recent unofficial UN report leaked to the media indicates that the UN has concrete proof that Rwanda participated actively in the events in Bukavu in late-May and that it is still actively supporting Nkunda and his forces. The report indicates that a UN team of experts charged with investigating compliance with a UN arms embargo recently discovered evidence that Rwanda violated UN Security Council Resolution 1493 of July 2003 which imposed the embargo on all supplies of military material to armed groups operating in the DRC.

"Shortly after the fighting between the Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) and the rebel Colonel Jules Mutebutsi at the beginning of June, the UN experts travelled to Rwanda in the border region of Cyangugu where they were direct witnesses and documented Rwanda's failure to respect the sanctions regime...The group of experts concluded that Rwanda's violations constituted direct and indirect support, both in Rwanda and the DRC, to colonel Jules Mutebutsi's and Laurent Nkunda's mutinous troops during their military operations against the FARDC. Rwanda also exerted a certain level of command and control on Mutebutsi's forces."19

Given the circumstances, it is clear that Ruberwa's influence on the outcome of the situation is diminishing, regardless of his own possible intentions. Some observers have speculated that, under the circumstances, Ruberwa actually fears for his life, as, if he does not toe the line with Kigali, he may be killed.20
Ruberwa's position has been further undermined in recent days by the declaration, in mid-July, by Bizima Karaha, an RCD-G heavyweight who is now an RCD-G member of parliament that he and eight other parliamentarians are boycotting the transition process. Mr Karaha, who also hails from the Banyamulenge community has always been perceived as a hardliner. He is strongly disliked in Kinshasa not only for his ethnic origins, but also because he is seen as a key orchestrator of the 1998 attempt to oust Laurent Kabila, in whose government he had served as foreign minister until the outbreak of the second war which followed Rwanda's failed putsch. The fact that he was not accorded a senior role in the transition government despite his high-level involvement in the movement seems to have been a political concession to these realities. However, observers feel that he was not satisfied with his limited role as a deputy and that this is likely one of the reasons behind his move away from the party mainstream. Whatever the explanation, the confluence of sentiment between the political and the military hardliners (General Laurent Nkunda) has only further complicated matters for Ruberwa. In an open letter to Ruberwa, Karaha criticises elements of the transition government for making anti-Banyamulenge statements and for failing to protect the Banyamulenge community:

"We are horrified by the racist and xenophobic discourse of the political parties, political groupings, associations and the media who claim to be part of the presidency's circles. And, more importantly, we are stunned by the silence and indifference of the head of state and the government who lead one to believe that all of this takes place with their tacit approval, if not their support."

Karaha also accuses members of the PPRD of lying about the ongoing presence of Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in the FARDC.

"When a member of the government, Mova Sakanyi...allows himself to deny publicly and in the international media the existence on our soil of these genocidal elements, we say to ourselves that there is a reason to despair in our transition. But this does not surprise us since we have been able to get, from well-informed sources, information which confirms the active support for these genocidal forces by structures parallel to the military command and which depend solely on the maison militaire of the president. The same information indicates that these genocidal forces constitute the operational advance guard of the troops which are currently being deployed in the east, of which at least 60% are constituted of ex-FAR and Interahamwe."

Karaha goes on to demand that the ex-FAR, the FDLR and the Interahamwe be demobilised, and that concrete action be taken to protect the Banyamulenge community which he fears will be threatened by the deployment of the FARDC to the east. He also demands that the RCD-G hold a general meeting in Goma to discuss the state of the transition and that the transition government be replaced by "an apolitical executive which is not composed of candidates running for election."

The official response of the RCD-G to Karaha's proposals has been reserved. In addition to saying that the founding members of the party will look into his demands and what to do about the eight deputies who have resigned from parliament, Jean-Pierre Lola Kisanga, the former RCD-G spokesman and now minister of Labour and Social Services also said that a commission of inquiry should be constituted to look into the group's allegations of genocidal actions against the Banyamulenge community. However, Lola rejected the possibility that Rwanda would become involved in what he considered a matter internal to the RCD-G and also rejected the theory that there were any links between Karaha's initiative and Nkunda's military campaign. Karaha and the eight other deputies were officially replaced the following week.
The Parti Populaire pour la Réconstruction et le Développement (PPRD) is the political party set up by President Joseph Kabila during the Sun City negotiations in 2003. It comprises 250 founding members, the majority of whom are former members of the government of Laurent Kabila and the pre-transition government of Joseph Kabila, as well as old cronies of the late- Laurent Kabila. To date, the PPRD has neither elaborated a political platform, nor has Kabila addressed any general assemblies. It is essentially a shell-organisation which exists to dole out favours to old friends and to provide Kabila with a political vehicle in the run-up to elections.

Its new secretary-general, Vital Kamerhe, was until recently the minister of information in the transition government and, before that, a key negotiator in the lead-up to the all-inclusive peace accord. His appointment is seen as a first attempt to turn the PPRD into a more legitimate political party in the public eye. Kamerhe, who is originally from Bukavu and who is hugely popular in his hometown, is seen by some as a viable presidential candidate for the PPRD in the 2005 elections.

Although it has not been discussed publicly, and probably will not for some time, there is some feeling that Kabila may want to retire from politics as soon as he can and that he will therefore not run for the presidency in 2005. Others question whether his father's cronies and his close advisors will allow him to stand down, but agree that if he does not, it will not be because he wanted to run for president. Speculation that Kabila is neither interested in, nor capable of, handling his current position has been rife in since he came to power in the wake of his father's assassination in January 2001.

Although the PPRD faction has certainly consolidated its power since the transition government came into power in June 2003, it does not seem that Kabila has himself managed to take the reigns of power firmly in hand. While the one-plus-four transition set-up, which provides for one president and four vice-presidents, could have allowed him to assert himself in a new environment, two factors have effectively prevented him from doing so: the disproportionate influence wielded by figures such as Augustin Katumba Mwanke, Samba Kaputo, and Evariste Boshab, and the deep mistrust which continues to dominate relations between the presidential camp and the RCD-G and MLC.

Old influences – internal problems

Several key figures in Kabila's immediate entourage continue to exert a disproportionate amount of control over the presidency and the president himself. Augustin Katumba Mwanke, who hails from the same ethnic group as the late President Kabila, the Balubakat, is a former governor of Katanga and minister in charge of security matters in both Kabila governments. He is also one of several members of the Kabila government to have been named in the UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Katumba's official title is that of roving ambassador, a sufficiently vague function that allows him to wield considerable influence and to stay involved in key government matters. Evariste Boshab is the president's chief of staff and Samba Kaputo is the presidential advisor on security matters. Along with others such as General John Numbi, the head of the air force, and Didier Kazadi, a key security official, they form an influential, but by no means cohesive, group surrounding Kabila. All of them understand that they will be unable to survive politically beyond elections and that their political fate is intimately linked to that of Joseph Kabila.

There is evidence that although they are engaged in various functions in the transition government, these actors are dissatisfied both with having to share power during the transition, as well as at the prospect of losing power in the future. Consequently, they have set up parallel structures which allow them to continue to exert influence over key issues. The most notable of these structures...
is the *maison militaire*, which was strongly influenced by the president's close advisors, notably Numbi.\(^\text{32}\)

It is this group that has is also widely blamed for the two coup attempts which have taken place over the last six months.\(^\text{33}\) The 28 March coup, which was blamed on a group of exiled former elements of the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) – the army of the late President Mobutu Sese Seko, failed when the 20-odd soldiers involved failed to consolidate their hold on several key military installations. The government sought to place the blame on exiled politicians from the Mobutu regime, but the theory that members of the presidential camp orchestrated the events in order to be able to slow down the transition process has now been commonly accepted and seems the most plausible. In the words of one senior diplomat: "These people wondered how they could consolidate all power in their hands, and the answer was to create a national emergency. The problem was that they did not think the plan through and the back-ups never arrived."\(^\text{34}\) According to the same source, the aim was not necessarily to kill the president, but rather to exert sufficient control over the capital to justify the declaration of a state of emergency and the suspension of the transition.

Meanwhile, when the government presented the captured suspects to the media several days after the coup attempt, the suspects themselves did not seem to understand what they were being charged with. One of the accused stated that he had actually already been in prison for some time, indicating either that he could not have participated in the coup attempt, or that the organisers used imprisoned men to stage the coup.\(^\text{35}\)

A government inquiry into the matter has yet to make its findings public.

A second coup attempt followed in early June coinciding with fighting in Bukavu. During the night of 10 June, Major Eric Lenge, a long-standing officer in the Garde Spéciale de Sécurité Présidentielle (GSSP), the presidential guard, seized the Radio et Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC), the state broadcaster, and declared that he was suspending the transition. He appealed to the population and the political leaders, including the president, to remain calm, warning that if they did not, there would be a bloodbath in the capital.\(^\text{36}\)

Subsequently Lenge, accompanied by some 20 troops, was able to circulate relatively freely in Kinshasa, returning to the Tshatshi military camp by 7:30 in the morning, where he was then allegedly surrounded.\(^\text{37}\) Lenge nonetheless was able to make his escape from the military camp and head towards the Combe part of town, where he attempted to seek asylum at several embassies before disappearing along the main road out of town, in the direction of Bas Congo province. At this point, military officials as well as most of the population of the city were well aware of the events that were taking place. It is therefore highly unlikely that Lenge was acting alone. One intelligence officer speculates that support for Lenge may have come from the Congolese air force, as the helicopters sent to pursue him headed in the opposite direction from where he was known to have fled.\(^\text{38}\) This is a possible scenario, in particular as Lenge had been recruited into the military by John Numbi,\(^\text{39}\) the leader of the youth wing of the Katanga political grouping, Jeffery, of which Lenge is also a member. Numbi is also the current head of the Congolese air force and a key member of the *maison militaire*. The same source indicates that the coup was to have been more extensive, but that Lenge jumped the gun following an argument with the president that day.

Once again, observers have blamed members of the presidency for the Lenge coup, arguing that they were pursuing the same objective in June as they had in March. What remains unclear in both incidents is the extent to which the president himself was aware of what was going on. But senior PPRD figures in the government have acknowledged that disillusioned elements do represent a threat to the president. One senior official acknowledged that is has been a mistake not to replace those officials responsible for security matters, and expressed
disappointment that there were no major changes to that effect in the long-awaited cabinet reshuffle which took place on 11 July. “The president should have replaced all those who are responsible for security matters, the minister of the interior, the presidential security advisor, all the heads of the security agencies, to send a message that he is in control... How can you rely on your existing security when one member of your presidential guard is responsible for a coup attempt? That should have been the occasion to change the structures and the people.”

The same source also acknowledged that Kabila may hesitate to replace existing security officials, many of whom are left over from his father’s days, for fear that they will link up with other disgruntled former officials who still hope that one day they may be able to come back to power. “One of the problems we have here is that the state is the only employer. Once you are out of government, you face extreme pauperisation. Look at people like Mwenze (Kongolo, former minister of justice and later security in both Kabila governments.) Today they are nothing, they have no power.”

Relationship with the RCD-G and MLC

RCD-G

The position of the PPRD on the sincerity of the RCD-G as a component in the transition leaves little room for doubt. One senior government official says: “I have lost all respect for Ruberwa, there is no difference between him and Nkunda or Karaha. He pretends that he is playing the game here. But he is not at all on the side of the transition government. He has to play the Congolese card if he sees that these people are trying to undermine the transition institutions. I don’t believe that he is sincere at all. He is playing the Banyamulenge card.”

That members of the PPRD component should express themselves that way is no surprise. Many genuinely feel that the RCD-G, and by the same token, Rwanda, cannot be trusted and are not interested in finding a durable solution to the problems in the DRC. This type of attitude dates back to 1998, when most of the senior military and security positions in the Kabila government were occupied by Rwandans or Congolese Tutsis who had helped Laurent Kabila oust Mobutu in 1996. When the alliance turned sour and these officials turned on Kabila, it gave birth to tremendous resentment and even hatred, which continues to colour relations with the RCD-G (and Rwanda) to this day. In addition, the PPRD is well aware that the population generally shares this view and has virtually made hatred of the RCD-G and Rwanda its official party platform. In spite of all parties paying lip-service to the idea of reconciliation, there is no chance that there will be any real improvement in relations between the former government and the RCD-G until it is no longer politically expedient to openly revile them. At the moment, the RCD-G and Rwanda remain synonymous entities in the minds of many senior officials from the PPRD, as is demonstrated by Kabila’s reaction to the outbreak of fighting in Bukavu:

“It is clearly an attack on our country by Rwandan troops,” Kabila said on national television Wednesday evening, calling for a “general mobilization” of all human, financial and material resources to “defend the nation.... We must retake control of the town, re-impose order and reinstall the legitimate authorities who were recently appointed,” said Kabila.

and

“In reality, Rwanda’s reaction is aimed at preventing the effective reunification of the country and the re-establishment of state authority across the national territory,” Kabila said in a broadcast address to the nation.”

Antoine Ghonda, the Congolese minister of foreign affairs, who represents the MLC, echoed similar distrust of Nkunda’s official justification for attacking Bukavu
“That would be a shortcut. Congolese Tutsis have no problem, so talking of protecting them is just a pretext to jeopardize the transitional process. Today I believe that instability in the DRC can only contribute to strengthening the Rwandan process, because when you take a close look at things, while attention is focused on tension between the Congo and Rwanda, it is hard for the international community to pay attention to what is happening in Rwanda.”

At the same time, Ghonda ruled out the possibility of finding a negotiated solution to the crisis, and did not even mention discussing the matter with the RCD’s representation in the capital.

“Today, we are resorting to everything. We have been using diplomacy but, unfortunately, we have the impression that force is the best solution. And I think that the best thing to do is for the international community to very clearly condemn these two renegade officers who captured the town of Bukavu [allusion to Col Jules Mutebutsi and Gen Laurent Nkunda], causing the death of more than 100 people. You would certainly not expect us to congratulate them, by saying that we must negotiate.”

But behind the scenes, some senior members of the government seem to have grown tired of the sporadic exchange of accusations between the Congolese and Rwandan governments and want to move on to concrete action. One senior official who has been in both Kabila governments says that it is now time to: “...find the solution to our own problems and take the pretext for Rwanda’s involvement in the Congo away from them. We can do this by dealing with the Banyamulenge question and the Interahamwe question...We have a communication problem, we need to stop looking like we support the Interahamwe, ...and we need to take care of the question of Banyamulenge nationality.”

While the official in question has the ear of the president, it is unlikely that he will be able to outweigh the more hawkish elements of the PPRD who have no interest in bringing a definitive end to chaos.

**MLC**

Relations between the MLC and the PPRD are relatively sound at the moment. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of the MLC and one of the four vice-presidents, has openly aligned himself with Kabila since the outbreak of fighting between Nkunda and FARDC troops. Shortly after the call for reinforcements to be sent to the east, Bemba donned his old military uniform and cut a formidable figure as he rallied his troops to the cause. This has an important impact on the population, which is desperately looking for a leader who will take action and on whom it can rely.

At the moment, the MLC stands nothing to lose from aligning itself with the PPRD and the president in the current situation. It is in fact a politically shrewd calculation, as it not only allows Bemba to demonstrate his patriotism, but it also helps sideline the RCD-G.

Of the three main belligerents to form the government, the MLC seems to have fared best to date. Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba and his number two, Olivier Kamitatu, the president of the national assembly, are widely seen as performing their functions competently and have not been seen to be dragging their feet on key issues such as the nomination of military commanders or provincial governors, two initiatives that were only realised after long delays. The MLC also does not carry the baggage that the RCD-G does. Although it was backed by Uganda, it was and is still now generally perceived to be a Congolese-based movement, and its leaders have managed to escape the stigmatisation that has befallen Ruberwa and other RCD leaders who are still perceived as puppets of the Rwandan government.
There are indications however that Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni still has a strong influence over internal MLC matters. Following the African Union summit in Addis Ababa at the beginning of July, local newspapers in Kinshasa began publishing rumours that Foreign Minister Antoine Ghonda, who hails from the MLC but is seen to have edged closer to the Kabila camp, might be replaced because he disagreed with Museveni on key issues. This was confirmed by a senior MLC official who indicated that the order to replace Ghonda had come from Museveni himself.50

Overall however, the MLC has been maintaining a low profile in the transition government, giving the outward impression that it is cooperating with the process. Within the MLC however, there do not seem to be any illusions about the transition process, nor are there attempts to whitewash its mitigated achievements. One senior MLC official who acknowledges that progress has been slow, attributes the problem of delays in the transition to the fact that the parties are still attempting to operate on a consensus basis. The same source argues that additional problems are the quality of some of the people who are in the transition government and the fact that many of the participants are concerned about their fate in elections.

“We have three problems. One is that we are still trying to operate on a consensus basis. This means that we go around and around because we find ourselves with one or another group imposing a veto right on key decisions. This has lead to many delays. The other problem is that we were not very demanding in the criteria for choosing those who participate in the transition. The result is that we have many mediocre people working in the transition government. The final problem is that none of the transition leaders were chosen by the people. Most are worried about the elections because they know that they will not win. In the meantime they see the transition as a time to collect their reward and to help themselves.”51

According to the official, the desire to cling to the spoils of power is precisely the problem which led to the staging of two successive coups in March and in June 2004. He attributes these to the radical elements in the presidential camp who know that they do not stand to gain from successful elections: “The radical elements in the presidential camp wanted to slow things down. They, the Katangans in particular, feel that Kabila has squandered the power that was given to him after the death of his father.”52

But the official also downplays the importance of such attempts to destabilise the transition: “They cannot succeed in doing this, the MLC and the RCD still have their military, the disgruntled elements cannot alone stop the transition.”53 This statement indicates the extent to which the military power of each group still plays an important role in the current dynamics in government. This is both a cause and effect phenomenon: on the one hand, the unstable security and political situation discourages the groups from effectively dismantling their control over their armed elements, while at the same time, the divided nature of the military and security forces makes it possible for the individual groups to rally their armed elements to their own cause and create instability when it is politically expedient. This is a key obstacle in the transition: as long as the various groups continue to choose to maintain “their own” military powers and command structures in order to use them as leverage in balancing the political game, there can be no effective reintegration of the Congolese army.54

The overall political framework is also off-kilter. This is to a great extent a historical problem: “We have a recurring problem in this country. In 44 years of independence, we have had 11 wars. Just look at the cause of this last war, it was due to the lack of government legitimacy. When access to government is like access to a private club...the only alternative is to take up arms.... If we do not have elections, others will again say why sit back and watch and go and get access by force.”55
This is why he argues in favour of holding elections as soon as possible; "It is not likely that the elections will take place in June 2005 and we will probably have to take a six month delay, but no one wants to say that. The elections won't be perfect, we just started, but they will take care of the problem of the illegitimacy of the political class."56

As stated above, the MLC has openly aligned itself with Kabila since the outbreak of violence in the eastern part of the country. Like the PPRD and the presidential camp, the MLC has accused Rwanda of supporting Nkunda and has condemned its involvement. Senior MLC officials are also unwilling to accept Nkunda’s pretext that he attacked Bukavu in order to prevent a genocide of the Banyamulenge community. "Before the events, Nkunda was in Rutshuru from where he indicated that there was an increase in Interahamwe activity. Then, suddenly he makes an about-face and attacks Bukavu, forgetting completely about the Interahamwe. This doesn't make any sense."57

The same official indicates that Nkunda’s attacks did not come as a surprise, indicating that General Obed, the government-appointed military commander of the eighth military zone, troops of which defected to Nkunda’s camp, had been calling for help in the months leading up to the attack on Bukavu. According to the source, Obed had complained that he was unable to control the troops under his command because many were loyal to Nkunda, in particular those of Banyamulenge origin. According to this theory, Obed, a former commander in the RCD’s army and himself a Banyamulenge, was and continues to be caught between his official duties as the commander of the military zone, and the reality that his troops are far from being loyal either to him or to the FARDC.58

The weary Congolese population has had little reason to be hopeful over the past few months. Two successive coup attempts in the capital Kinshasa and the fall of Bukavu to renegade RCD-G troops have left most with the feeling that the transition is rapidly imploding, that war may again become the order of the day, and that national elections are a dream that is unlikely to come true. Local newspapers are harshly critical of all the Congolese leaders involved in the transition, and the general feeling is one of profound malaise. So far few Congolese, not even those living in the capital Kinshasa have felt the benefits of a transition government. While Congolese are once again free to move throughout the country – prior to mid-2003 travel across the frontlines was impossible – this is a meagre peace dividend for a population that has suffered through two wars in the past decade.

The intense sense of frustration became palpable when Nkunda’s takeover of Bukavu in early July prompted demonstrations in cities throughout the country. In Kinshasa, as in other parts of the country, anger was initially directed at the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC), but quickly spread to include the headquarters of the RCD-G, MLC and several opposition parties. Chanting “Un plus quatre egale zero” (One plus four equals zero – a reference to the presidential and vice-presidential set-up), students also harshly criticised President Kabila. Many believe that the PPRD sponsored the demonstrations, but even if they did, the genuine frustration of the population seems to have turned against it. In addition, sponsored demonstrations do not usually take on the magnitude these protests did, and they are remarkable for the fact that Congolese have not taken to the streets to protest in over a decade.

A recent poll conducted by the Bureau d’études et de recherche (BERCI) indicates that 90% of the population supported the protests, and that an equal number would support similar protests if they were to happen again. Equally interesting is the fact that the majority of those polled placed the blame for the fall of Bukavu primarily on Kabila, followed by the transition government.59 Although most people also believe that the Rwandans are involved in the matter, this outcome suggests that the population nonetheless holds the head of state responsible for maintaining order in the country. The same poll indicates as well that Kabila’s popularity had dropped to an all-time low of 32%.60
Although the president’s approval rating has been acceptable in the past, he has always suffered from an image problem that is to a great extent self-perpetuated. Before coming to power following his father’s assassination, Joseph Kabila held the position of head of the armed forces. On the day of his inauguration, few people knew who he was and many doubted that he was in fact the late Kabila’s son. Because he grew up outside of the country and spoke only poor French, many accused him of being Rwandan. Three and half years later, he has failed to overcome these doubts and prejudices, to a large extent because he remains a distant and mysterious leader who has never established a connection with the population. His rare television appearances are painfully orchestrated and pre-recorded and little of his natural charm comes across.

The international community continues to play a key role in keeping the transition on track, most prominently through the Comité Internationale pour l’Appui à la Transition (CIAT, the International Committee to Accompany the Transition) which includes representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as the ambassadors of Angola, Belgium, South Africa and Canada, and the special representative of the secretary general and head of MONUC. Meetings between the president and the CIAT are to be held every month, but, as several senior diplomats explain, they are in fact far more irregular. The CIAT has not met with the president since April. Nonetheless, the body plays an important role, and the various parties in the transition government acknowledge that they often look to the CIAT to arbitrate and apply pressure in the negotiation of key issues.

MONUC continues to play an important part in the peace process in spite of losing considerable credibility in the public eye since the fall of Bukavu and subsequent protests against its installations throughout the country in early June. The UN Security Council is due to review MONUC’s mandate in late-July. It is widely expected that MONUC’s mandate will simply be rolled over and that requests for increased troops to reinforce their presence in Kinshasa and increase troop numbers in the eastern part of the Congo will be decided at a later date.

Meanwhile, the Rwandan and Congolese government recently agreed on the constitution of mobile teams composed of representatives from the Rwandan and Congolese military as well as UN and African Union (AU) military observers to investigate allegations that there are Rwandan troops in the DRC as well as that the Interahamwe are actively involved in fighting alongside Congolese troops. If properly implemented, this could also have a positive impact on soothing the tempers on both sides of the Rwandan-Congolese border.

In spite of the prevalent impression that the transition government has not achieved much over the past year, it is worth noting that some progress on key issues has been made.

The five institutions of the transition

On 6 June, the law governing the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was officially signed by President Kabila. “According to the law, the IEC will be made up of 21 members who will be proportionally designated by the components and entities that participated in the Inter-Congolese dialogue on the basis of the principles of competence, experience, a high level of morality et provincial representation, in the order of three members per component and two per entity of which at least one member per component and entity will be a woman.” In addition, the law stipulates that members of the IEC must be at least 25 years of age, have a university diploma or equivalent or five years relevant work experience. None of the members of the electoral commission may hold other positions in the transition government, the police or military, public institutions, or the provincial administrations.
The governing law also stipulates that the IEC enjoy complete independence from the other institutions of the republic, and that none of its members can be legally pursued either during or after their employment by the IEC.\textsuperscript{65} To date, 13 representatives have been designated and the remaining eight are expected to be in place before the end of July.\textsuperscript{66}

According to the current electoral schedule, the presidential candidates will be nominated in June 2005. This will be followed by a period of campaigning which will culminate in the holding of elections in July 2005. Final election results are to be announced at the end of July 2005.\textsuperscript{67} However the global and all-inclusive accord provides for two six-month delays if, and only if, there is a logistical problem linked directly to the organisation of the elections. Most observers believe that at least one extension will be necessary and cast serious doubt on the country's ability to organise elections at all. Abbe Appollinaire Malu Malu, the president of the IEC is more optimistic: “We are not going to wait until things are perfect to get started, This year we have set ourselves the objectives of establishing the voters list, that is doing the census and starting on electoral education.... The first elections are not going to be perfect. Their leitmotif should be – Limit the damage and assure a high degree of credibility and accountability.”\textsuperscript{68}

According to a study done by the IEC, there are between 22 and 28 million Congolese who are of voting age.\textsuperscript{69} The IEC plans to set up 64 census bureaus throughout the provinces, each staffed by six people, and Malu Malu expects to employ 36,000 people to conduct the census throughout the country.\textsuperscript{70}

The electoral law is currently being discussed at government level and is on the national assembly's agenda for the current extraordinary session.\textsuperscript{71}

None of the governing statutes for the four other transition institutions – the Media Authority, the Human Rights Observatory, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the Anti-corruption Commission have yet been signed into effect. However, they have been elaborated and are expected to be adopted by the national assembly in the extraordinary session which is currently taking place. In spite of the fact that they do not yet have governing statutes, all four of these institutions have a president, staff, buildings and programmes that are already operational.

\textit{Military law}

The long-awaited law on the organisation of the military was finally adopted in late-June, the main sticking point was the size of the presidential guard. Led by the PPRD’s leading deputy Babi Mbayi, the PPRD delegation walked out of the national assembly to protest against other deputies’ refusal to approve a 15,000 person presidential guard. The issue was later excised from the military law, with the national assembly deferring the decision on the size of the presidential guard until the time when the number of the new Congolese armed forces has been determined.

According to the law, the head of state holds the function of supreme commander of the FARDC. However he must consult with the Superior Defence Council (SDC) and the government before taking key decisions such as declaring war or a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{72} Any such decision must be considered by the National Assembly and the Senate.\textsuperscript{73}

In line with the provisions of the transition constitution, and the law on the organisation of the military, the SDC is composed of the following people: the president, the four vice-presidents, the minister of defence, the minister of the interior, decentralisation and security, the minister of foreign affairs, the chief of staff of the FARDC, and the chiefs of staff of the army, air force and navy.\textsuperscript{74} The SDC is to hold at least once-monthly meetings or when necessary, and can be convoked by the president or any one of the four vice-presidents.\textsuperscript{75} The meetings
of the SDC are presided over by the president; in the event of his absence they are presided over by the vice-president in charge of the political, defence and security commission⁷⁶ (Ruberwa).

**Amnesty law**

The draft amnesty law is currently being discussed by the government and is expected to be adopted in the current extraordinary session. Once adopted, the amnesty law will replace the general amnesty granted by presidential decree in April 2003. According to the draft law, the amnesty is accorded to all Congolese who are being legally pursued or have been convicted of acts of war, political infractions or infraction of opinion. Also benefiting from this amnesty are all Congolese living inside or outside of the country who, in whatever manner, committed the aforementioned infractions.⁷⁷ According to article two of the draft law, acts of war are defined as "...all actions resulting from military operations which are authorised by the laws and customs of war..." Exempt from amnesty are those who have killed or have attempted to kill the head of state. The draft amnesty law also does not cover war crimes, acts of genocide or crimes against humanity. The proposed amnesty law covers the period from August 2, 1998 through June 30, 2003.⁷⁸

**Nationality law**

The law governing Congolese nationality has been elaborated by the commission on political, defence and security matters and is still with the vice-president of that commission. It too is on the national assembly's agenda for the current extraordinary session.

The crisis in the eastern part of the country, and the various parties’ reaction to it has forced the problems of the transition in the Congo into the open. At the heart of the matter lies the transition government’s failure to make the transformation from a heterogeneous group of former belligerents into a cohesive government working to achieve common goals. Instead, the various parties, in particular the three main belligerents – the RCD-G, MLC and ex-government – have clung to their individual spheres of influence, maintaining parallel military and power structures to use as leverage in negotiating defining issues in the transition. This unwillingness to cede power has been the main reason for which there has been no progress on the reintegration of the army, and why essential steps such as the promulgation of the law on the organisation of the military, and the nomination of provincial governors have been taken only after long delays and protracted negotiations.

But the fact that the various actors still regard one another with intense distrust, and attempt to maintain their own power bases to exert leverage on key issues, is not in and of itself surprising; after all, five years of war cannot be forgotten overnight. In addition, the belligerents do not just face the task of trying to coexist peacefully in a unified government, they are also required to govern and reconstruct a country which has been plunged into a black hole of abysmal poverty by years of negligence, corruption and violence. This is a tall order for a group of people who, not long ago, faced one another across the front-line.

The fact that there is lingering distrust and that the components are manoeuvring for key positions also does not mean that there are not at least some individuals in the various components who are interested in the peace process and who could drive it to the election finish line. The real problem arises when those who do have an interest in moving toward election, whether for personal gain or because of a genuine belief in the process, are undermined by those who do not; this is at the heart of the Congo's current problem. Although this dynamic was never far from the surface, the outbreak of actual hostilities between the components has created a rift which will be difficult to bridge as long as the hardliners opt for a military solution which allows them to maintain the upper hand.
The coming weeks are a crucial period in the Congo. If, as many predict, skirmishes between the FARDC and Nkunda's forces erupt into full-scale war in the eastern part of the country, the transition will suffer a serious blow. The reaction of the RCD-G, and vice-president Ruberwa, will play a key role in determining whether or not the transition government survives this crisis in its current configuration. If Rwanda feels threatened, it may choose to become openly involved in the conflict. It will, in any case continue to exert considerable influence on the RCD-G leadership and could push it to withdraw from the government. This would mean a return to the de facto division of the country which would almost certainly mean a delay in the election schedule.

At this crucial moment, the international community can play a key role. If, for example, the UN Security Council chooses to sanction Rwanda on the basis of the findings of the committee to investigate the arms embargo, which has stated that Rwanda violated the embargo by actively supplying weapons to the dissident Congolese troops under Nkunda's control, Rwanda, and with it the RCD-G hardliners, may back down, and the collapse of the transition can be averted.

There have been suggestions that the parties in the transition government should reconvene around the negotiating table to get out of the current impasse. In fact, many observers suggest that the incomplete nature of the all-inclusive peace accord – which left key issues such as the repartition of military zones to be resolved by the transition government – lies at the origin of today's problems. While a reconvening of the factions under neutral mediation would at least get the parties talking, it is not clear whether such a meeting would really be able to address the underlying issue of infighting within the components of the transition government. In addition, by introducing an alternative forum to discuss the problems in the country, such an initiative could further sap the legitimacy of the transition government, and set a precedent for the resolution of conflicts – political or military – which could arise in the future. Consequently, it is imperative that any such initiative have a clear agenda – limited perhaps to the discussion of the urgent military situation in the east, and that it not be seen as a renewal of the negotiations which led up to signing of the all-inclusive agreement. For the same reasons, it may be wiser to limit the participants in such a meeting to the RCD-G and the ex-government, and to have any concrete outcomes officially sanctioned by the transition government and the legislative branch.

1 Stephanie I. Wolters is a freelance journalist and currently writes the Economist Intelligence Unit's DRC Quarterly Country Report. Between 2001 and 2003 Stephanie was Chief News Editor of MONUC's Radio Okapi in the DRC.
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