SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROCESSES IN THE DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) transitional government, in power since June 2003, continues to face significant challenges in implementing crucial aspects of the transition, most notably in the area of security. A key component of the transitional agenda, the terms of reference for security sector reform (SSR) are outlined in the resolutions and provisions of the Global and All-inclusive Accord signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002 (Annex V, article 2a). This accord, a result of input from various Congolese actors, including rebel, political and civil society leaders, aimed at the establishment of long-term peace in the country while countering the decay and disintegration that are the result of 32 years of Mobutist rule and seven years of high intensity conflict.

As the term suggests, “political transition” is an interim stage – it began with the implementation of the Pretoria agreements and will cease with the establishment of a new political system based on a new constitution adopted by referendum, and an elected government in the DRC. Yet, numerous obstacles and often contradictory priorities have characterized the transition period. Since the inauguration of the transitional government, several delays have obstructed the implementation of crucial aspects of the transition. The most significant of these delays have negatively affected the reintegration of the national army, the nomination of provincial governors and regional military commanders, and the promulgation of key laws such as the amnesty, nationality, land and military law. These delays have been attributed to competing agendas between components of the transitional government, deep-seated distrust between them and an accompanying unwillingness by parties to reach compromise on central issues. In fact, this view was recently affirmed by the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) who expressed concern about what it called “delays in implementation of the transition programmes” and “political tensions...
and obstacles observed of late." In addition, a certain level of technical incompetence within the transitional government has also been noted.\(^4\)

From its inception, the success of the interim agenda has been thought to depend on a sequential approach to peace-building so that the end state (long-term peace in the DRC, underpinned by a democratically elected government) is reached in a functional manner, with individual critical components of the transition being regarded as interdependent. Coming to a consensus on the hierarchy of priorities has nevertheless been a highly complex and difficult task – yet, most observers would agree that, in this regard at least, security is of paramount importance.

The current stage of peace-building has therefore been dominated by a discourse focused on security and legal/constitutional concerns. Beyond power sharing in Kinshasa, assuring security and freedom of movement for the Congolese people is regarded as a pre-condition for the effective reunification of the DRC. In this process, the security of people, property and institutions is a prerequisite for the attainment of other peace dividends, such as aid for reconstruction and development, job creation and economic rehabilitation, foreign investment, etc.

However, the most recent developments in the eastern provinces of the DRC (North and South Kivu) and in the Ituri District, where sporadic outbreaks of fighting continue despite the presence of a strengthened UN peacekeeping force, are evidence of the scale of security challenges facing the transitional government. Moreover, the recent threat of a return of Rwandan forces to the east of the DRC has not helped improve stability in the area. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has threatened to send soldiers back to the Kivu provinces should the Congolese government fail to disarm and repatriate the Hutu Forces of the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) considered as active agents during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Kagame has accused the international community (including the United Nations Mission in the DRC, MONUC) of failing to help in disarming these Hutu forces. On 29 November 2004, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda made the following statement before the United Nations Security Council on the Council's Mission to the Great Lakes Region:

...Over the last three months, these genocidal forces have carried out a series of attacks on Rwandan territory. They have killed our people and continue to destroy property. Furthermore, in their planning, these forces do not only intend to attempt to complete the genocide of 1994, they have also targeted key infrastructure, vital for Rwanda's economy.

Ironically, barely a week had passed since, at the end of the Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan had optimistically stated that "people of the region now have every reason to hope". Rwanda alleged invasion of the eastern DRC was met with a rapid mobilisation operation and the deployment of hastily ‘integrated’ Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) to the Kivus. And, even though a verification mechanism had been established between Rwanda, DRC and MONUC (following the Gatumba massacre in Burundi) to investigate instances of border violations between the DRC and Rwanda, the mechanism was not used to verify the alleged invasion of Rwandan Forces into the DRC.

At a time when more than half of the transitional period has lapsed, and only five months until the date agreed upon for elections, the fact that little progress has been achieved in the pivotal area of security sector reform (SSR) is a serious cause for concern. Despite the deployment of Military Regional Commanders (MRCs) in the fall of 2003, tasked with the integration of existing forces into the FARDC, the armed forces in the DRC are far from having been integrated. With the exception of one integrated brigade trained by a Belgian-led team from January to June 2004 MRCs have little control over the armed elements under their command.
The FARDC's poor command and control structures, and lack of regular support and payment of salaries to its forces, contributes to indiscipline among its ranks, which increasingly depend on the local population for their sustenance. Foreign backers of former belligerents remain influential – posing a serious obstacle to the creation of a new, integrated Congolese national army.

The reform of the security sector therefore lies at the heart of the DRC's transformation process – in fact, the lack of progress on military integration has proven to be a significant destabilising factor affecting several other areas of the transition's agenda. The international community has also identified the need to prioritise reform of this sector, not least the European Union (EU), which speaks of SSR as the “priority of priorities” in the DRC.

The following situation report provides a summary overview of SSR processes in the DRC, with emphasis on the integration of military and police forces and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme.

Introduction

As maintained at the outset of this paper, the integration and restructuring of the army is key to the transition process. If achieved, it will contribute to providing a secure environment for elections as well as to the post-transitional stability of the country. The establishment of the nucleus of an integrated and operational defence force from disparate belligerent groups is critical because aside from MONUC forces, these units will constitute the only “legitimate” deterrent to process spoilers. A brief summary of the actors involved is provided below:

- The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) is based in Goma and backed by Rwanda. It is headed by Azarias Ruberwa, who is also one of the country's Vice-Presidents. The RCD-G still controls large stretches of the Kivus. Its military wing is the National Congolese Army (ANC).

- The Mayi-Mayi was supported by the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) during the conflict. (The word "Mayi-Mayi" is a generic term for tribal militia and sometimes for self-defence units organized into a military force in the Kivus.) The Mayi-Mayi is a signatory to the Sun City Final Act, April 2003.

- The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) was launched in September 1990 in Kampala when Wamba dia Wamba split from the RCD-G. Currently led by Mbusa Nyamwisi, the RCD-ML was initially backed by Uganda. Its military wing is the Congolese Popular Army (APC). The RCD-ML, too, has entered into the Sun City agreement.

- The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) is based in Gbadolite and has been backed by Uganda since 1998. Its leader is Jean-Pierre Bemba, currently one of the Vice-Presidents.

- The Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N) is based in Watcha, North Ituri, and acted as a front for Uganda. It was also supported by the MLC in the past. The RCD-N is led by Roger Lumbala and has only a few soldiers.

Parallel Decision-Making Structures

Despite the appointment of an integrated military leadership, and the deployment during 2003 of Military Regional Commanders (MRCs) tasked with the integration of existing forces into the newly created FARDC, parallel decision-making structures inherited from the war period remain a problem and contribute to discrediting the integrated chain of command. There has been no integration (inter-mixing) at unit level, with the exception of the formation of one integrated brigade for Ituri.
Of serious concern is the lack of reliable and verifiable information on the actual numbers or armament of former belligerent forces, while the size of the future defence force has yet to be determined. Meanwhile, the absence of a reliable salary payment system within the existing defence force has created a security hazard of its own when unpaid soldiers prey on the local population for survival. This situation contributes negatively to the stability of volatile provinces such as the Kivus, the Kasais and Katanga where military integration has essentially meant the juxtaposition of the units of the former belligerents under (sometimes merely theoretical) integrated command. These units often remain responsive to the former belligerents, and not to the integrated command structures, as illustrated in June 2004 by the rallying of former RCD-G units from the 8th military region (MR, North Kivu) with dissident RCD-G General Nkunda, and again in September 2004 by the refusal of Mayi-Mayi units from the 8th MR to take orders from the MR commander (a former RCD-G general).

Establishment of a Superior Defence Council

According to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement, Part VI, the signatories (inter alia the FAC, MLC, RCD-N, RCD-ML and the Mayi-Mayi) should be integrated into a new Congolese Army, the FARDC. In addition, the agreement provides for the establishment of a Superior Defence Council (SDC) chaired by the President and charged with guiding and providing advice on the setting up of a restructured and integrated army as well as on the disarmament of armed groups. Furthermore, the SDC is tasked with supervising the withdrawal of foreign troops; drafting of a new defence policy for the DRC as well as giving its assent to a declaration of a state of siege or a declaration of a state of war. Furthermore, as far as army integration is concerned, the Final Act, in Resolution No. DIC/CD/04 of 2 April 2003, provides that a mechanism should be set in place for the formation of a restructured and integrated national army.

February 2004 Deliberations

On 9 February 2004, representatives of the DRC transitional government met with numerous international representatives in New York under the auspices of the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations. These included the governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States and representatives of the EU and the World Bank.

The status of SSR and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants was reviewed while recent achievements of the transitional government and technical assistance initiatives were also examined. The following timetable for the formation of the FARDC (see Figure 1) was offered by Vice President Ruberwa on behalf of the transitional government.

Ruberwa explained that the process had been under way since August 2003. Since then, a deputy minister for integration was appointed, the division of military regions had been effectively implemented and regional commanders designated to their posts, Ruberwa stated.

However, following a series of initial steps towards the formation of an integrated Congolese National Army, including the approval of the draft law on Defence and the Armed Forces by both the Council of Ministers (January 2004) and the National Assembly (June 2004), progress ground to a halt. In fact, the draft law that finally establishes the FARDC, was only recently promulgated (on 12 November 2004). This Defence Law however, fails to provide any clarity on the size, operations or functioning of the future integrated army, rather focusing on the organization and structure of the defence apparatus and clarification of the responsibilities attached to the various sections and posts. The compromise reached by Congolese actors to agree on the Defence Law while postponing critical decisions regarding the overall size of the army and that of the presidential guard indicates a worrying lack of political will within the transition.
According to the Defence Law, the head of state holds the function of supreme commander of the FARDC. In exercising this function, however, he must consult with the Superior Defence Council (SDC), the government, the National Assembly and the Senate before taking significant decisions such as declaring war or a state of emergency.

In line with the provisions of the transitional constitution, the SDC is composed of the following members: the president; the four vice-presidents; the minister of defence; the minister of the interior, decentralization and security; the minister of foreign affairs; the chief of staff of the FARDC; and, finally, the chiefs of staff of the army, air force and navy. The SDC is to hold at least one meeting a month, but meetings may be convened by the president or any one of the four vice-presidents if needed. The President is to preside over SDC meetings or, in his absence, by the vice-president in charge of the political, defence and security commission, a post currently held by Azarias Ruberwa. At the time of writing the SDC is yet to meet for a session.

At the 9 February meeting, Vice President Ruberwa also enumerated the legal instruments relating to SSR and DDR that had been approved:

- Decree No. 03/041 of 18 December 2003 creating the Inter-Ministerial Committee tasked with planning and providing guidance on DDR;
- Decree No. 03/042 of 18 December 2003 creating the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration;
- Decree No. 03/043 of 18 December 2003 creating the Funding Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration;
- Decree No. 4/014 of 26 January 2004 creating the Military Structure for Integration;
- Decree No. 04/013 of 26 January 2004 creating a commission tasked with managing the resources of the military;
- the creation of the Technical Committee for Planning and Coordinating DD&R (CTPC); and finally,
- the signature on 8 February 2004 of a military partnership with Belgium, making this country the driving force in the formation of a new, integrated Congolese national army.

During the 9 February meeting, a common understanding on the way forward seems to have been reached by all involved, with a view to making sufficient progress before the first anniversary of the establishment of the transitional government (June 2004). As such the government was advised to undertake a series of decisions underpinned by relevant legislation to advance SSR and DDR. These included measures directed at itself, the police, the military as well as the donor community. The most pressing of these priorities are summarised below:

| Government | • Develop a comprehensive national security sector policy in an integrated and transparent manner.  
• Ensure budgetary provisions for the establishment and maintenance of security entities. |
| Police | • Elaborate the future role of the police service by holding a national seminar on police issues, with assistance from MONUC.  
• Adopt a decree appointing the national police high command.  
• Adopt a decree establishing a Close Protection Corps.  
• Designate the command structure for the IPU. |
| Military | • Expedite the review and adoption of the law on the general organisation of defence and the armed forces.  
• Establish the Supreme Defence Council as envisaged in the All-inclusive and Global Agreement of 17 December 2002.  
• Adopt and implement a coherent, cost-effective and realistic military integration plan, complemented by a comprehensive national DDR programme.  
• Produce coherent, timely, effective and sustainable plans for the deployment of integrated FARDC units, in close coordination with MONUC. |
| Donors | • EU to facilitate the early completion of the training of the UPI.  
• Set up an advisory group on SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, possibly attached to an SSR cell in MONUC, to assist the DRC transitional government to plan and implement its reform policies.  
• Ensure that sufficient funds are made available for immediate disarmament requirements in places such as Ituri and other locations in the east, pending the implementation of a national DDR programme.  
• Establish a donor coordination mechanism, under the joint chairmanship of the transitional government and MONUC, to review SSR progress every six months. |
On 29 June 2004, the UN Secretary-General convened a second meeting on SSR in the DRC. Representatives from Angola, Belgium, the DRC, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, United States and the EU were present at the meeting, whose goal was to support the principles expressed in the February 9 communiqué and seize the opportunity to provide well-coordinated assistance to the SSR process. Participants agreed on three main preconditions for successful SSR:

- Full commitment and involvement of the transitional government, including transparent command and control structures and the maintenance of security structures;
- Sufficient funding for planning, training and equipping the integrated army;
- Immediate activation of the DDR programme in order to address the question of the excess combatants.

There appears to be little movement in each of these areas, however, and while South Africa and other member states have expressed interest in pursuing bilateral SSR efforts, progress in coordination has been arduous.

In accordance with the 9 February Communiqué, an SSR Coordination Committee was later established in Kinshasa comprising of senior transitional government officials and the Ambassadorial representatives of those member states and organizations present at meeting. Members agreed that the SSR Coordination Committee would assume the tasks of reviewing the formulation of SSR policy, tracking progress in SSR, identifying possible sources of support for training, equipment and other needs, and advising and assisting the transitional government in carrying out SSR activities.

Particular attention has also been given to an SSR Cell at MONUC, tasked with bringing together all the elements, including two teams of police and military experts (seconded from member states) to be co-located in the ministries of interior and defence. Terms of reference were prepared and it was anticipated that embassies would receive requests for personnel during the first two weeks of October.

Subsequent steps entailed coordinating the various players in Kinshasa and focusing technical expertise on reaching consensus between the international community and the Congolese on the composition of the military force, the sequencing of DDR and military integration and establishing a joint MONUC-CIVPOL working group.

At this time, a summary of immediate requirements within the armed forces would in all likelihood identify the following areas:

- the need for national strategic plans (determining the role, size and structure of forces);
- procedures to screen and down-size personnel (DDR);
- Multi-Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)
- preparation of reintegration programmes for both military and police;
- closing of the various resource gaps: equipment, communications and infrastructure; and
- development of phased electoral security plans.
Towards a National DDR Plan

It is important to note that there are currently three ongoing DDR processes in the DRC. The first involves the national DDR process, as part of SSR, to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate the signatories to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement and the Final Act of 2 April 2003. The following numbers indicate the estimated amount of soldiers involved:

- FAC: 100,000
- RCD-G: 45,000
- RCD-N: 10,000
- Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani/Liberation Movement (RCD-K/ML), 15,000
- MLC: 30,000
- Mayi Mayi: 30,000 to 50,000
- Ituri armed groups: 30,000.

The second process is concerned with the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of so-called “negative forces” in the Kivus, such as the former FAR, Interhamwe and FDLR. This entails a voluntary repatriation of these forces by MONUC and the DRC government, and are estimated at around 8,000 to 10,000 combatants.

Finally, the third process involves the demobilisation and community reinsertion (DCR) programme to demobilise and disarm the Ituri armed groups – a programme that was launched during September 2004. In this context, the estimated number of combatants from individual factions is as follows:

- Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC): 3,000
- Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo (PUSIC): 2,000
- Popular Force for Democracy in Congo (FPDC): 300
- Front for National Integration (FNI): 27,000
- Patriotic Forces of Resistance in Ituri (FPRI): 9,000
- People's Armed Forces of Congo (FAPC): 6,000
- APC: 300

In this section we will focus on the first of these processes, that of the national DDR process intended to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate the signatories to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement.

The second draft of what became known as the national DDR plan, dated 5 March 2004, indicates that there are presently up to 330,000 combatants, of which 200,000 need to be demobilised. The plan aims to limit the future combined DRC defence force (FARDC) to no more than 130,000 people – following the recommendations of a workshop held in Kinshasa between the FARDC and Belgium representatives during December 2003, to the effect that the FARDC should have a combined force level of between 100,000 and 125,000 soldiers. Such a force would comprise a Territorial Force of 19 light brigades, a Rapid Reaction Force of 2 to 3 brigades and a Main Defence Force of 3 divisions.
To achieve this desired end state, the joint planning group composed of Congolese and Belgian representatives identified two options. The first, considered a quick impact programme, was based on the opening of 25 orientation centres throughout the country, which would proceed with the identification process in a three-month period. The second option requires a period of at least one year and is based on opening only seven orientation centres. The first option was chosen as the master plan, but the process is being held back due to the absence of required command structures necessary to supervise the leading institution in this regard, the Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER).

Notwithstanding the approval of a final version of the national DDR programme and its official launch at the end of June 2004, implementation has been continuously delayed – not least by the lack of funds for military integration. This is further exacerbated by a perceived lack of financial control mechanisms within the transitional government that would motivate greater donor support to the process. Perhaps more importantly, several donors have pointed to an apparent lack of political will within the transitional government to fully participate and engage in the national DDR programme as different components appear to be more interested in maintaining their individual capacities, certainly until after the general election.

In the national DDR programme, the military reintegration process has been conceptualized in the following way:

![Diagram of military integration process]

**Figure 2** Summary of military integration process

Disarmament is envisaged at locations where there are formed units, at places close to the eleven static orientation centres or through one of the seven mobile orientation centers. Combatants who have given up their military status are to proceed to these orientation centres.

The plan comprises two clearly differentiated tracks: one for candidates for integration into the FARDC, and the other for candidates for demobilization and
socio-economic reintegration, as shown in Figure 2 above. Because both tracks (“integration” and “demobilization”) share a number of common activities, this approach has been termed “tronc commun”. Firstly, there are information and sensitisation activities. Importantly, these activities also include civilian populations affected by conflict, as well as international and national implementing partners. Secondly, the plan involves regrouping combatants in the vicinity of orientation centres, to be followed by the disarmament, release, registration, safekeeping or destruction of combatants’ weapons and the transfer of disarmed combatants to orientation centers for identification. At this stage the individual will be regarded as either a potential candidate for a placement in the FARDC or for reintegration into society as a demobilised combatant. In this regard the plan foresees the following sequence of activities:

- selection of eligible and non-eligible candidates for membership of the FARDC, and demobilisation and reintegration of non-eligible candidates;

- mixing and recycling of unit activities for eligible FARDC candidates;

- retraining of commanding officers in specific centres; and

- deployment of mixed and recycled units to military regions.

**Funding and Other Considerations**

Questions relating to funding for the military reform process have been of major concern for the transitional government. This is hardly surprising since the cost of creating a new, integrated Congolese army is estimated at more than 546 million US dollars. And while the transitional government has yet to approve a budget for 2005, it would seem that US$5 million allocated for defence spending in the 2004 budget have been earmarked for setting up the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI) and the planning process for military integration.

In order to coordinate the funding of the integration and the DDR process, the transitional government held a series of meetings between January and May 2004 with donors, the World Bank's MDRP partners and MONUC. Although funding made available by the MDRP is only for some aspects of the DDR process, consensus was reached on the need for a joint integration-DDR approach. In fact, the donor community has already pledged two million dollars to this process. And, while MDRP/World Bank funding cannot be used to finance military activity, the Multi-Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)/World Bank partnership has agreed to unblock US$5.9 million, to be administered by the UNDP for the operation and functioning of CONADER.

**South African Proposal and the “Emergency Plan”**

Following the Cooperation Accord on Defence signed between South Africa and the DRC government on 17 June 2004, the South African government presented its own proposal to support the integration of the FARDC. The proposal, based on South Africa’s own transition experience suggested the integration of all combatants into the newly established FARDC before embarking on demobilisation.

According to the South African plan, all armed units would be regrouped under the instructions of the Chief of General Staff. Activities in the regrouping centres would include identification, leading to the separation of eligible and ineligible elements, and initial selection and orientation. Combatants would then be moved to *centres de brassage* (CBR) according to a plan drawn up by the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI), where intermixing and retraining would take place. This would be followed by final selection and placement of the new units. Deployment movements would be ordered by the Chief of the General Staff and training at unit level would then commence.
A number of points related to the organization of intermixing and retraining were highlighted. Passing through the CBRs would be obligatory for the combatant and non-specialist soldiers identified in all the units. Instruction Centres (ICs) would be opened at Baka and Baki for members of the Self-Defence Units who had not received any military training. Intermixing would take place after three months of training at one of the ICs. The South African plan proposed that the process begin on 2 August 2004.

Careful scrutiny of the two plans detailed above reveals that they are not very different and are comfortably compatible. In fact, on 13 December 2004 an MoU was signed between the governments of DRC, Belgium and South Africa. The agreement was signed by the defence ministers of the DRC (Jean-Pierre Ondekane), Belgium (André Flahaut) and South Africa (Mosiuoa Lekotha) as part of what has become known as the 'emergency plan'. In view of the delays described above, this “emergency plan” is a short term measure to facilitate the integration of six brigades prior to the elections. It is seen as a solution to the transitional government's immediate need to stabilize the east of the DRC. Training personnel from Belgium and South Africa will be deployed in the DRC between 9 and 29 February 2005. In addition, some of the Congolese officers trained in Belgium earlier in 2004 will also be part of the “emergency plan”.

According to the plan, those soldiers who are to undergo training will be selected from the different components of the FARDC, FAC, RCD-G, RCD-ML, RCD-N and Mayi Mayi. A coordination mechanism will be set up between the three countries to monitor the integration process and training. In addition, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) contingent currently in Kitona under the invitation of the transitional government is preparing to train two integrated brigades also as part of this "emergency plan".

It should be noted, however, that the “emergency plan” is said not to affect the national DDR and integration plan, which will continue as envisaged. To implement the emergency plan for the creation of the six brigades and to ensure the functioning of the six CBs, the SMI has submitted budget proposals of between US$ 8 and US$ 29 million. However, there are currently no prospective donors for these activities.

While it may be possible to accommodate the national DDR plan within the framework of the MDRP/World Bank funding process (on the condition that all parties agree to prior disarmament of combatants), it is increasingly apparent that additional support (from South Africa as well as from European countries, particularly France and Belgium) is fundamental to the military integration process.

The Congolese National Police

Memorandum II on the Army and the Security Forces, signed on 29 June 2003 by the signatories to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement, makes provision for two policing units responsible for security during the transition period. The first is the Close Protection Corps (CPR), responsible for the security of political leaders. The second unit refers to an Integrated Police Unit (IPU), responsible for the general security environment.

The reform and restructuring of the Congolese National Police (PNC) forms an integral part of SSR efforts in the DRC, being therefore a priority transitional government. Vice-President Ruberwa has indicated the following number of personnel as the initial estimates required to start the rebuilding of the police force:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goma</td>
<td>11,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbadolite</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>2,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiro</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lulingu</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>74,631</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is therefore expected that the PNC will be limited to between 70,000 to 80,000 personnel, while MONUC will take the lead on the more technical integration aspects – a task requiring additional support from the international community. In this regard, the UN Secretary-General has already requested an increase of 396 CIVPOL officers to reach an authorized strength of 507.

The PNC, based in Kinshasa, will have at its disposal a base with an estimated 100 cars and specific material to equip 3,000 men for the maintenance and re-establishment of public order. In the meantime, with the aim of enhancing the provision of security for the transition as well as assisting with the up-coming 2005 elections, MONUC and the Ministry of Interior have established a coordination framework to train and deploy 6,000 police officers, including 3,000 Rapid Intervention Police (PIR). The PNC’s strategic goals for the 2005 elections have been defined as follows:

- a unified and integrated police command level;
- 70,000 to 80,000 officers of all ranks;
- 2 PIR battalions (1,000 French-trained and equipped officers) in Kinshasa;
- the Integrated Protection Unit in Kinshasa (1,008 officers/ EU Programme);
- 25 PIR companies (3,000 MONUC trained officers) in 11 main cities;
- a police task force in Bunia (350 officers); and,
- 3,000 officers to manage and train the PNC.

MONUC has also continued to train, monitor and provide technical advice to local police in Bunia, and, at the request of the transitional government, has trained an Integrated Police Unit of 350 officers for Bunia in Kisangani. A total of 327 CIVPOL officers and 18 civilians will be assigned to train, monitor and advise the PNC units (at this stage only 151 CIVPOL members are available). While only 341 additional CIVPOL members were approved for the mission as part of the approved 5,900 personnel, the MONUC decided to take additional troops instead and appealed to the UN to finance the additional police members. A further seven projected training centres will also be established.

*The UPI and the CPR (sub-heading)*

The Global and All-inclusive Accord established that an Integrated Police Unit (UPI) would have the responsibility of assuring the security of the transitional
government and the population, while Memorandum II on the Army and Security Forces signed in Kinshasa on 29 June 2003 clearly defined the UPI and the Close Protection Corps (CPR). Accordingly, the CPR was tasked with responsibility for:

- personal protection of those officials in the transitional government who have been identified as requiring protection;
- ongoing protection of residences, offices and other buildings and sites for the transitional institutions.

This was further strengthened by a Ministerial Decision in late December 2003 (No. 076/2003) allowing for the operationalisation of the CPR. On the other hand, the UPI was given the following mandate:

- securing international entry points to Kinshasa, i.e. airports and marine ports;
- securing the main roads to and from Kinshasa;
- backing up the protection provided by the CPR when necessary;
- supervising the performance of the Military Police; and
- replacing the Neutral Force of MONUC, a phased deployment based on progress with the formation of the UPI.

In addition, two decrees authorizing the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit were also issued towards the end of 2003. The first, the Presidential Decree of 18 December 2003 created and established the organisational parameters of an “Institutions’ Police Unit” with the responsibility of protecting the institutions and high authorities of the transition. And the second called for the creation of a Central Coordination Unit for the Protection of the Institutions and High Authorities of the Transition with the responsibility of coordinating the action of both the UPI and the CPR.

An estimated 1,008 men and women will be required for the UPI, consisting of 48 officers, 96 deputy officers and 856 policemen. It should be pointed out that the size of the planned force was decided largely on the basis of the resources that the international community will be prepared to contribute. In terms of the quota system proposed by MONUC and accepted by all parties, the UPI will be deployed as follows:

- 293 for the Kinshasa Police;
- 271 for the Goma Police;
- 271 for the Gbadolite Police;
- 81 for the Beni Police;
- 51 for the Isiro; and
- 41 for the Lulingu Police.

In addition, and through a bilateral arrangement, the French government has trained and fully equipped a 500-member PIR battalion and has begun training a second battalion.

However, no progress has been made with regard to the training and integration of the CPR. Moreover, due to operational delays, particularly in the selection of personnel, the EU was only able to start with the formation and training of the UPI police unit for Kinshasa during September 2004.
The challenges and delays facing security sector reform in the DRC, in particular the formation of a unified Congolese national army and the necessary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes for the different armed groups, are currently the biggest threats to the transitional government. The renewed and intense fighting in Bukavu and Goma in recent months, is evidence of the inability of the current regime to effectively guarantee security for its citizens.

The agreement between the DRC, Belgium and South Africa as well as Angola to help integrate six brigades before the election (the emergency plan) could in fact help stabilise the east of the DRC as well as support the police in safeguarding the elections in June 2005. An important consideration is whether or not different components of the transitional government will make their best soldiers available for emergency integration. The example of the RCD-G who refused to release soldiers for deployment to the Kitona centre de brassage for training by the Angolans is cause for concern.

In addition, we are left with several unanswered questions regarding the FARDC. Beyond the “emergency plan” what is the strategy for reintegration and retraining of the entire defence force? How is the FARDC to be structured and what will be its ultimate force level? How will the transitional government resolve the issue of payment to FARDC members? What will be the size of the Presidential Guard?

At the same time, the national DDR plan must be implemented so that the reintegration and demobilization of former combatants outside the “emergency plan” can proceed. As the pressure mounts by several groups to be officially integrated into the new FARDC (such as the Mayi-Mayi, many of whom are currently fighting informally as soldiers of the FARDC), the national DDR programme must be regarded as a critical priority for the maintenance of peace in the country. Yet, without a commitment by all involved to finding answers to the questions raised above, the national DDR programme will not move forward. In this regard, it is of the utmost importance that MONUC’s SSR cell become operational and actively and effectively support the coordination of the various initiatives described above.

Herbet Wulf’s analysis of some of the problems and dilemmas affecting the potential for security sector reform is in this regard telling,

...although police and military forces and their weapons in an unreformed security sector are part of the problem, they are usually not the cause of violence but an instrument in such conflicts. Hence security sector reform is a subset of wider political and economic reform... Ambitions to reform the security sector have to consider the underlying causes of violence and wars confronting many societies and laying the basis for peace and development can only be a long-term programme. Security sector reform addresses mainly the symptoms of violent conflicts and aims at short or medium term adjustments to facilitate the long-term process...this reform is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the long-term goal of peace and development, good governance, transparency and accountability.9

1 The author is a military analyst in the African Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.


6 Initially representatives from the Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence; the Etat-Major and CONADER.

7 Three sites in Kinshasa; and sites in Kimbinga, Basankusu, Kisangani, Rumangabo, Shabunda, Kananga, Kamina and Lubumbashi.


9 H Wulf, op cit.