When we started this process and when we signed the agreement on Security Arrangements, we thought we had reached the peak, the top of the hill, but then we discovered that there were more hills and we surmounted those but then we discovered there were more hills and we surmounted all those, tonight we have surmounted the last hills. There are no more hills as I talk. I believe the remaining is flat ground. But we will walk with speed rather than run, lest we fall down.3

It wasn't long ago that throngs of well-wishers from south Sudan descended upon Khartoum to greet John Garang De Mabior, the former rebel leader and long-time Achilles' heel of the National Congress Party (NCP) government, on the occasion of his inauguration as vice-president of Sudan. The symbolism of former enemies sharing a common political stage spoke of a society not only war-fatigued but expectant of the dividends of peace. Observers described the mood as a "rare moment of hope" for the deeply fractured country.

As this situation report was being written, news of the sudden death of the new vice-president made the headlines. This event immediately called into question the durability of the most recent peace agreement, and the way forward for the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), particularly in the light of the immediate violence that erupted in Khartoum and Juba resulting in the death of some 130 people. Since then, analysts have put forward numerous scenarios regarding the implications of John Garang's death for peace in Sudan. This is not surprising since, in the last four decades, many other peace deals have littered the Sudanese political landscape, only to be partially implemented or completely disregarded. It was hoped that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January this year, with its provisions for sharing power and wealth, security guarantees and the separation of state and religion would finally bring the 23 year old war between the NCP and the SPLM to an end.

The most negative of the scenarios put forward was that the country would return to generalised civil war. This scenario was largely based on the assumption that Garang represented the “face of moderation” favouring the unity of Sudan, in contrast to the secessionist view historically taken by his second in command, Salva Kiir. However, as recent political developments have indicated, by succeeding Garang as vice-president of Sudan, Salva Kiir seems to indicate his commitment to guarding the “flame” kindled by Garang. Furthermore, as some observers have indicated, Kiir may perhaps have an even greater willingness to
The Devastating Impact of Sudan's Civil War

engage other southern actors like the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) than the former leader.

Taking the apparent stabilisation of the political situation between North and South as an indication of some level of continuing implementation of the CPA, this situation report focuses on the reconstruction and development priorities affecting the country, particularly the South. In fact, and outside the immediate political implications of the death of John Garang, the challenges of reconstruction may offer some insight into the sustainability of the peace process, particularly in the longer (six-year) term before the planned referendum on secession. These include a complete lack of infrastructure in large parts of the south; a high degree of militarization of communities; the world's lowest indicators for health and education; and, last but not least, deeply entrenched suspicion between communities of the North and South. Not surprisingly, southerners often point out that what is needed in South Sudan is construction rather than reconstruction.

Moreover, the practical application of the wealth sharing agreement as it relates to the considerable oil revenues monopolised by the central government may yet exacerbate localised tensions. Issues surrounding water and land rights, which directly affect the livelihoods of the rural population, have also been ignored in the peace deal - it is in fact suggested that these "second-tier" conflicts involving local access to resources will continue unresolved.4

In the pages below, we will focus on some of these issues, including existing patterns of poverty in the country, the wealth sharing agreement, and the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This situation report also provides a brief discussion of the role and activities of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM); the role of local government during the transitional period; and, finally, the challenges confronting the SPLM as it changes from a military organization to a civil administration. It is based in large part on a review of secondary literature, and a limited number of interviews with a range of political analysts and relief workers, with the main aim of drawing attention to potential challenges to human security and peace in post-war Southern Sudan.

Introduction5

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with a total land area of 2.5 million square kilometres. The country is divided into three major geographic areas, and is traversed by 9,000 kilometres of the Nile and its tributaries. An estimated 50% of the country, mainly in the North, is semi-arid or arid, and often experiences long periods without rain. The northern zone consists of the Libyan Desert in the west and the mountainous Nubian Desert, which extends to the Red Sea in the east. The central zone comprises the fertile rain-fed areas of Kassala and Gezira, Darfur and the gum forests of Kordofan. The third is the Southern Equatorial zone, which is marked by rich soils and good rainfall patterns. This area is also known for its large swamps, which are a "vital ecological and climatic zone for Sudan and the surrounding region"6.

While this richness of ecological terrain should theoretically provide the basis for a thriving economy, the South's historical marginalization and political disenfranchisement has meant that these natural resources are chronically underdeveloped. In 2001 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranked Sudan 138th out of a total of 162 countries, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. Sudan's protracted conflict has constrained economic development and eroded traditional coping mechanisms. The savings level is low, and has not exceeded 15% of GDP in any one year. While the country displays a steady level of macro-economic growth, this has largely been driven by oil and manufacturing exports and cuts in social services such as education and health under the structural adjustment programmes adopted in the 1990s. The officially
reported growth figures exceeded the estimate of 8.5% in 2004. This recent spurt in the country's economy has been driven principally by oil exports, but as the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) report points out, agriculture still remains the main source of income for the majority of Sudan's people. Estimated poverty rates remain high. There are wide regional variations, and poverty is correlated with lack of services and of income-generating opportunities, as will be detailed below. Poverty in the south and the Three Areas is estimated at 90%, although there is little reliable information in the form of comprehensive baseline surveys of these regions. Also, as a result of the expansion of mechanised agricultural schemes and recurrent natural and manmade disasters, the most fertile areas of Sudan continue to need food aid. It is estimated that 1.5 million people in Southern Sudan have been dependent on such aid since the Bahr El Ghazal famine of 1988/9.

The United Nations Common Country Assessment and Development Assistance Framework outlines the socio-economic profile of the Sudan in substantial detail, using what it calls a "rights-based" perspective to analyse current trends. The reason given is that "poverty is a condition characterised by serious deprivation of basic rights and needs in terms of food, nutrition, water, health, shelter, education and a lack of opportunities to change the situation". Using this definition, the regional disparities and unequal access to resources (whether financial or natural) between different parts of Sudan suggest a high level of poverty. Sudan's low human development indicators confirm this. As has already been noted, according to the 2001 UNDP Human Development Report, Sudan ranks 138th out of 162 countries. It is also ranked the second-lowest Arab country on the Human Development Index, just above Mauritania. Of course there is no single cause of poverty. Rather it is a manifestation of the breakdown of various elements of social and political governance, not least as a result of many decades of civil war.

The depth of poverty varies geographically between the centre and periphery, and also between urban and rural areas. The devolution to the federated states the responsibility for social services, without the provision of adequate funding, has added to the breakdown of local services. Consequently, Sudan has experienced a massive flight of qualified teachers and health personnel, to neighbouring Arab states in particular. The most needy and vulnerable groups of the population are the poor rural communities, those most affected by the war, the displaced and women and children.

Women and children have borne the brunt of the war in terms of the social trauma caused by the widespread activities of militia groups. Women and girls are also most affected by lack of access to education and other services. As can be expected in a zone of conflict, Sudan now has a high proportion of female-headed households. A 1999 census undertaken by the Save the Children Fund Denmark among displaced people in Khartoum found that 34% of households have female heads. Statistics for the South are expected to be much higher. Southern Sudan also has the lowest ratio of female to male primary school enrolment in the world, with three times as many boys as girls attending school, and a youth female illiteracy rate of 84%. Recent data suggest that a woman in South Sudan is more likely to die in childbirth than to finish eight years of school. In addition, women's positive role in maintaining food security is constrained by the lack of both credit and extension services. It is clear that the burden of productive and reproductive responsibility is severely hampering the ability of Sudanese women to rise above the double oppression of inequality and poverty.

As will be outlined below, the pattern of elitist and overly centralised government that has characterised Sudanese politics for centuries is largely to blame for the breakdown of previous attempts to build peace. In the case of the South, Darfur and the extreme Northern territories, there is, in consequence, a severe lack of
competent and responsive local government. Large-scale agricultural projects driven from the centre have taken precedence over rain-fed traditional farming. This has meant that while the agricultural sector is the principal provider of employment in the country, and the main contributor to GDP, it has a skewed impact upon development and human security. Again, the lack of infrastructure has constrained both growth and access to social services, especially in the South, the Three Areas, and disadvantaged parts of the North.

Food security is another major challenge to be addressed as part of the transition from humanitarian relief to local capacity-building. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) suggests that about half of the counties in the South are “highly” or “moderately” food insecure as the result of ongoing conflict, environmental degradation and adverse weather conditions. More fundamentally it is attributable to a failure in government to cater for the needs of the local agricultural economy.

It is important not to confuse the complex emergency in Darfur with that in the South, which reflects the fact that the Khartoum government has been fighting “multiple civil wars” at once. This means that the CPA is far from comprehensive, but clearly a tactical agreement between the major military protagonists. As one analyst argues, “to have opened the door to a debate about the relationship between the central authority and the marginalised peoples throughout the country would have been tantamount to political suicide for the narrowly-based Sudanese regime”.

What little infrastructure existed in the outlying regions of Sudan was destroyed, limiting access to markets and severely reducing investment. Again, basic human rights, like education and food security, have been severely affected. Certainly the restriction of access to education in the South will hamper the region’s ability to take full ownership of local government structures. In this context it is pertinent to remember that the capacity of local administration to formulate and implement policy is extremely weak at present. The SPLM began to plan for the creation of a civilian administration in the mid-1990s. In 1994 the difficulties attending the creation of the Civil Administration of New Sudan (CANS) made it clear that a switch from being a guerrilla movement to a political organization comes with its own set of challenges and tensions. This factor is particularly relevant today, as Salva Kiir, the leader of the armed forces, takes on the task of vice-president of Sudan and leader of the SPLM/A.

A Pyramidal Society and the Manipulation of Ethnicity

The first task ahead is reconciliation among adversaries, along South-North to clear the manmade divides, within South and within North and wherever conflict is smouldering in our country so that we can say farewell to arms all over the South and bury all homicidal instruments of destruction and replace them with the instruments of construction.

The extremely diverse cultural and ethnic make-up of the country has been at the centre of the politicization of identity. It is estimated that Sudan is made up of 19 major ethnic groups and some 600 sub-groups. The total number of languages spoken is around 122. The official language is Arabic, though English is widely used in the South. Sixty percent of the population can be classified as Muslim, while the remaining 40% are Christian or follow indigenous cultural beliefs. Crocker and Esposito note, “in this extraordinarily diverse country of 37 million people, it is difficult to speak of a common regional identity, let alone a common national one.”

Moreover, the frequently-used explanation of Sudan’s civil wars as primarily based on ethnic and religious antagonism is insufficient, if not inadequate, in explaining patterns of exclusion and underdevelopment in the country. The crisis
in the state of Darfur and intermittent violence in the eastern Beja region illustrate the limitations of focusing solely on the “Arab-African” and the “North-South” polarity. It is increasingly clear that the political patronage system that created and now sustains an elite in Sudan lies at the heart of the economic and social deprivation experienced by the majority of the population. Certainly this core-periphery pattern draws heavily on the historical foreign domination of the country by Egyptian-Turco powers - a pattern later institutionalized by the “southern policy” imposed by the British and exploited to the maximum by successive governments after Sudan gained independence.

For nearly two centuries access to resources, economic opportunities and power has been mediated through exclusionary central government policies. Ethnicity (“Arab” versus “African”) and religion (Muslim versus those of other faiths) have been politicised in the service of regime security. Emeric Rogier has described the divisions of class and power in Sudan as a “pyramidal society”. His formulation reflects the exclusivity of patronage that exists both between the Arab North and African South and between the Northern classes themselves. Briefly, the pyramid consists (in descending order) of:

- a bourgeois elite with connections to the formal economy at the top;
- the remnants of the traditional Arab bourgeoisie, who survive with difficulty and are excluded from the productive sector;
- the Sudanese Arab masses, who are largely petty traders and peasants who survive on the margins of the economy;
- the marginalized Muslim populations of the west and east, whose position has been further worsened by the conflict in Darfur; and
- the southerners, who either survive in the war-torn South or who live in extremely precarious circumstances as displaced people in the North.14

In fact, in his discussion on designing an integrated strategy for peace, development and security in post-conflict Sudan, this author maintains that “the problems presented by the Three Areas and the rebellions in Darfur and Eastern Sudan illustrate that the North-South paradigm is largely outdated”15. He also argues that a strictly balanced distribution of oil revenues between North and South is inappropriate, as it is unlikely to reduce regional disparities.16

The ideologies of race, ethnicity and religion have been thrown into sharp focus by the policies of exclusion practised by successive Sudanese regimes. Despite the feelings of antagonism between the “Arab” and “African” communities, particularly in the aftermath of John Garang’s death, it is important that attention be moved towards an understanding of social exclusion. Zachariah Mampilly notes that while the war has ostensibly been between African Christian Southerners and Arab Muslim Northerners, this formulation ignores the significant number of Africans, both Christian and Muslim, in the North. It also glosses over the presence of Muslims in the South. Worst of all, it fails to recognise dissenters in the North, many of whom have been brutally dealt with by the military dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir.17

In his authoritative analysis of the “root causes of Sudan's civil war”, Douglas Johnson writes that academic studies and news reporting on Sudan often fail to recognize that the country is a collection of regions. Moreover, popular descriptions of the war frequently use the words “tribe” and “clan” interchangeably. Political representation is thus taken to be based on, or organised along lines of, primal blood relationships. However, “tribe” in both administrative and anthropological usage in the Sudan is a political term. One cannot, therefore, speak of the Dinka tribe, or the Nuer tribe, rather of the Dinka or Nuer peoples, each of which are organised into a number of different tribes.18

Alex de Waal also makes special mention of the fluidity of identity in Sudan when...
he explains that his first work on famine in Darfur in 1984 (entitled *Famine that kills*) did not make a single reference to “African”, whether “black” or “indigenous”. In his words, “the terminology and the concepts that underlie it were simply not in use. Identities were complex and overlapping. Individuals and groups could shift from one category to another”.19 This is important to contextualizing current fears about both the restructuring of the SPLM/A on ethnic lines and the question of Dinka domination. The promotion of an ethnocentric analysis of Sudanese politics has assisted the Khartoum government to pursue its divide and rule politics. These must now be counterbalanced by development initiatives that promote reconciliation.

*Humanitarian Impacts of the War*

It is estimated that since 1983 between 500,000 and 2 million civilians have died as direct and indirect casualties of the civil war. In 2001 the total population was estimated at 32 million, with a large percentage of young people and women. However, the distribution of population differs extensively across the country.20 The disproportionate number of women and children are a direct result of the war, which has created a significant number of female-headed households, as previously mentioned. These demographics also imply a high rate of dependency, and thus “an overburdened social service sector”.21

The urban-rural divide is starkly reflected in terms of population distribution. Khartoum has the largest concentration of people, with about 5 million inhabitants including around 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the South. According to the UN Development Assistance Framework for the period 2002-2006, the urban population has increased by 75% since 1975, and is expected to rise by a further 50% by 2015.22 Despite the vast landmass that makes up Sudan, settlements tend to cluster around the water sources, the Nile and its tributaries, leaving the inland areas sparsely populated.

Sudan has highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. An estimated four million people live outside their places of origin, and some 1 million people have fled to neighbouring countries because of insecurity and violence at home. The introduction of wage labour brought about by the expansion of mechanised agricultural schemes in the central and western parts of the country also added significantly to high number of displaced.

The UNHCR have anticipated that a large-scale repatriation process will be stepped up in the immediate future. However, repatriating refugees and IDPs represents just the first step in the right direction for the new interim government. The real test for both the government and its international partners has to do with reintegrating the returnees into their communities of origin, without creating the perception that they are giving returnees preferential treatment. Certainly the expectations raised by peace and the promise of life “at home” will be high, and may not correlate with what is currently possible in Southern Sudan. Also, access to services such as health care and education is often better catered for in UN-administered refugee camps if we consider that an estimated 86 doctors, 600 nurses, and 23 judges serve the 5 million people in South Sudan.23 Thus the return of the displaced will require both resources and preparation of those repatriated to temper unrealistic expectations.

As the JAM notes, the poverty and human development situation is further complicated by the sheer size of Sudan’s displaced population. It is estimated that 3 million of the 4 million Sudanese IDPs and refugees are of Southern origin. Aside from being physically and psychologically traumatised by the need for constant economic assistance, IDPs are also subjected to illegal taxation, for which there is no legal recourse. In Khartoum large numbers of IDPs have been evicted as part of the government’s efforts towards urban renewal. Thus the relationship between southerners living in the capital and northern “Arabs” is underscored by a deep sense of distrust and mutual suspicion. Taking these
factors into account, it is unsurprising that violence erupted between these two groups shortly after the news of Garang’s death.

Most IDPs were forced to leave their areas of origin between 1983-1992 as a consequence of violence and a series of natural disasters. Over this period, the UNDP notes that little progress was made in assisting equitable integration into the communities of refuge. Since the majority of IDPs had originally been engaged in the farming or agro-pastoralist sectors, moving them to urban areas has limited their opportunities to find work to seasonal labour or the unskilled labour market. In the rural areas many communities are fearful of the rampant lawlessness of various militia groups, which makes it even more difficult for IDPs to claim land and resources. The presence of landmines laid during the war, primarily in the South, adds another serious obstacle to the safe return of IDPs. De-mining activity must be made a priority for areas in which mines were laid if infrastructure is to be restored and agricultural development to take place.

The government has created several “peace villages” in areas around Southern Kordofan in particular. These in theory should have helped to house IDPs. However they have been criticised as being a source of cheap labour for the regime’s many labour-intensive agricultural schemes. The South will soon find itself overwhelmed by the needs of returning refugees if mechanisms for their safe return and reintegration are not devised and implemented. Moreover, planning for the socio-economic rehabilitation of these individuals will be crucial to building peace. It must also be remembered that IDPs and refugees represent political constituents who are likely to be manipulated by both the GoS (Government of Sudan) and the GoSS (Government of South Sudan) in the run-up to the referendum.

In their comprehensive discussion about the challenges to peace in post-war Sudan, Bathsheba Crocker and Dana Esposito highlight that “political jockeying” around IDP movements is likely to be intense. They emphasise that while many in the GoS will be eager to see the northern-based IDPs depart, they also have a vested interest in ensuring that some southerners remain in the north: they provide cheap labour and attract donor resources. Both sides will see the IDPs as potential swing who could influence the outcome of the referendum.24

Presence of Militias

Since the outset of the second war in 1983, successive regimes have used and supported militia forces to destabilise areas of opposition. These were mainly recruited from southern communities, but also came from elements within western Sudan and other areas that have traditionally conducted raids on SPLM/A-controlled parts of the South. There are an estimated 32 militias in Southern Sudan, ranging in size from a few dozen armed men to as many as a few thousand. Crocker and Esposito describe these groups as the most unpredictable element of the security picture, and are arguably among the greatest threats to the peace accord.25 The proliferation of small arms in the area has been exacerbated by instability in neighbouring areas like the Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Uganda and eastern Chad. All of these factors make demobilisation a particularly challenging task in the post-agreement environment.

The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), created in 2001 by bringing together 12 smaller southern groups, is one example of a militia grouping that could do much to undermine the current commitment under the CPA to demobilising for peace.26 The SSDF has been aligned with the government and utilised by Khartoum as a means of ‘divide and rule’ in the South. Importantly, it was also used by the government to protect both the oil fields in Unity State and the military train used to supply Aweil and Wau in the West. The SSDF’s “central command” area is divided according to three strategic zones - Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-El Ghazal.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have consistently documented attacks on civilians, destruction of property and the looting of cattle and grain by these armed militias. Three successive UN Special Rapporteurs and a report commissioned by the Canadian government have chronicled the extent of human rights abuses committed against civilians by the militias in order to clear certain areas for oil exploration. As Shannon Field notes, the majority of these reports refer to the scorched-earth strategy used by the GoS in the oil regions, and the co-ordinated attacks launched on civilian settlements that involved the burning of villages and crops.

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework report indicates that the most serious devastation has been wrought by a militia group known as the Murahaleen from western Sudan, where there is a “conjunction of interest between various Baggara sections and the military”. According to this document, the Baggara have become increasingly marginalized by scarcity of grazing land, the development of mechanised agricultural schemes, drought, and the barring of their people from dry season pasture along the Bahr-al-Arab.

However, having been used extensively as a government proxy, the SSDF was not party to the Naivasha process and it remains unlikely that this group will demobilise without particular guarantees. While it is difficult to accurately estimate the size of the SSDF it can be safely assumed that it enjoys a following of several thousand people including a large number of Nuer. The Nuer make up the second largest tribe in Southern Sudan and have often been pitted against the predominantly Dinka orientation of the SPLM. Thus as an African Security Analysis Programme situation report published in 2004 notes that ‘given the SSDF’s size, strategic location, and propensity to fight and resist, whatever the odds, a viable and sustainable peace process that does not have its support (and that of a large majority of the Nuer in particular) is hard to imagine’. Recent developments (August 13) have however suggested that the SSDF are more willing to engage with Salva Kiir than they were with his predecessor that might signal a new political commitment to the implementation of the CPA. This will certainly depend on the ‘concessions’ the militias might gain by joining the SPLM and relinquishing economic and military aid from the NCP.

The history of Sudan is as much a history of peace agreements as it is of continuous war. Certainly the ‘stop-start’ rhythm of political engagement between various regimes in Khartoum and forces in the South has meant that war affected populations have found little comfort in the signing of new peace deals.

The long list of ceasefire agreements and declarations of principles began as far back as October 1965 when a Round Table Conference on the war in the South was held. This meeting included various political parties, civil society and community leaders together with observers from Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Algiers, Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania. The Conference led to the formation of a committee of twelve who were to forward recommendations to the government on ways of resolving the conflict in the South. But these recommendations remained mere advisory points until some of them were incorporated in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The latter Agreement was seen as a significant turning point for the North-South relationship bringing the first civil war with the Anya Nya rebels to an end, and was the first ever recognition of regional self-rule for the South.

Nevertheless, with the discovery of oil in the Bentiu region in 1978, Jafar Numeiri divided the South into three regions creating a new state in the oil rich region (Unity State) and imposing Sharia’ah law in the North in clear violation of the Addis Ababa agreement. Moreover analysts contend that a major failure of the Agreement was its weak economic provisions and the southern regional government’s dependence on Khartoum for financing. As a recent IRIN feature on Sudan highlights, ‘during the interim period of peace between 1972 and 1983,
Southern Sudan never established an internal revenue base but relied almost exclusively on grants from Khartoum and was virtually bankrupt throughout this period.33

After the resumption of war in 1983 and the formation of the SPLM, numerous attempts were made to bring the conflicting parties to constructive dialogue. After two failed attempts with the Nigerian Peace Conferences (Abuja I and II) in 1992, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development resumed mediation efforts in 1994. The decade long process resulted in the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2004 which forms a key part of the ‘bundle’ of Agreements making up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The significance of the CPA lies in the provision on wealth sharing which marks a fundamental gain for the SPLM. According to this agreement it will now (in theory at least) be an active partner in the economic destiny of the marginalised South. The Wealth Sharing Agreement will be discussed in more detail further on. Some of the key points of the CPA are summarised below.34

The **Power Sharing Agreement** provides for a largely autonomous government for Southern Sudan, as well as a share for Southern Sudan in the Government of National Unity (GNU), with a view to making unity attractive to the Southern Sudanese population before it votes in six years on whether to remain unified with the North or to become independent. The Agreement provides the basis for broader participation in government and the civil service, the restructuring of critical national institutions (e.g. the judiciary), and a new national constitution. It also recognizes the right of the Sudanese to elect their representatives in free and fair mid-term elections at all levels of government, and emphasizes internationally acknowledged human rights and freedoms, including a commitment to a bill of rights and basic freedoms of expression, religion and association.

The **Wealth Sharing Agreement** provides a framework for resource allocation and sustainable decentralization, and establishes comparative underdevelopment and war-affected status as the key criteria for prioritization of public revenue allocations. The Agreement assigns a share of all revenue (including oil) to the South, and grants it the rights to collect additional domestic revenue, solicit external assistance, and have its own banking system within the framework of the Central Bank of Sudan.

The **Security Protocol** outlines a collaborative approach to security issues by providing for two armed forces and joint integrated units that will become the nucleus of a future national army, enabling the parties to gradually scale their forces down. It will also allow the GoSS to mobilize resources for the SPLA. In addition, the particular factors that precipitated conflict in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (also referred to as the Three Areas) are recognized by special power and wealth sharing arrangements. These include the establishment of State Land Commissions, special provisions on education and security, the right to solicit external aid, consultation rights for the local population, and a unique administrative status for Abyei which allows for the holding of a referendum to decide whether it should belong to the North or the South.

The peace process has regularly been criticised by political analysts and communities within Sudan who believe that the Naivasha process was essentially an exclusive agreement by two dominant military forces, which will not necessarily bode well for the spirit of democracy in Sudan's post-war future. The presence in the South of large numbers of government-affiliated militias who were not party to the Naivasha process poses an additional and related security threat. Certainly the provision for maintaining a separate army in the South as stipulated in the CPA was inserted as a safety guarantee to guard against the failure of the political settlement. In addition, it has to be emphasised that civil society participation in the structuring of new institutions that will directly affect
them is fundamental to the success of such bodies. A recent report on the impact of the Darfur conflict emphasises that social protection and livelihood strategies should take precedence in ‘conflict resolution’ initiatives saying that,

*Livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict and the impact it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict. Moves to find a peaceful solution must take account of livelihoods, while efforts to support livelihoods must consider the political economy of conflict and the implications for livelihoods and livelihood interventions.*

The violence that broke out following the news of Garang's helicopter crash represented a warning of the continuing high level of mistrust and suspicion between the North and South, making the need for reconciliatory initiatives even more imperative. In this regard the outcome of the referendum as either pro-unity or pro-independence should not come to dominate the discussion on reconstruction (even though it is likely to influence disbursement of aid in the long term). Instead, it is becoming clearer that a stable united Sudan and independent Northern and Southern Sudan(s), will require not only political openness but also a country-wide civil society dialogue on social redress.

Moreover, implementation of the CPA is in the interests of both the weak central government (GoS), which is facing growing opposition on various fronts, and the SPLM. Some analysts argue that the CPA has weakened the central government by its provisions on sharing wealth and power, which force it to share the “resource cake”. But it could also be said that the CPA has thrown a life-line to the regime of Omer Al Bashir, who is backed by the elite. As Richard Cornwell notes,

*...a guarantee of six years in power would allow most regimes the opportunity to arrange the domestic political and economic environment to their advantage, entrenching patronage and internal security networks. This would be particularly true if the end of the fighting opened the way for foreign investment and further oil exploration and exploitation.*

Furthermore, the steps taken by Dr Garang during his 21-day tenure in the vice-presidency have ensured in some measure the continuation of the status quo. During this time the interim constitution was adopted; a caretaker government was set up; ten governors were appointed to states in the South, and the SPLA was restructured into a formal army.

**Introduction**

*Underlying development problems around petroleum are not inherent in the resource itself—oil is merely a thick, viscous black substance. None of the potential ‘curses' of petroleum or minerals are inevitable. Well-designed policies can limit or prevent them.*

This paper maintains that the marginalisation of communities across Sudan from the locus of elite power has been at the heart of the conflict - to the extent of creating a fertile playing-ground for the manipulation of religion and ethnicity. It is therefore unsurprising that the role of oil and the wealth attained from oil rights have fiercely exacerbated the already existing tensions. For this reason, the IGAD process emphasised the inclusion of a wealth sharing element to the comprehensive peace agreement.

Certainly oil wealth will have to be linked to reconstruction and rehabilitation of the South in order to meet the high expectations of the Southern Sudanese. But all too often natural resources have turned out to be a curse rather than a blessing for developing countries - they are closely associated with corruption, conflict and severe environmental damage. Increasingly, analysts are arguing that the discovery of oil and minerals in such countries often comes at a price for
local industry and agricultural producers in particular. The rapid surge in revenue created by the exploitation of natural assets such as oil or diamonds is accompanied by the risk of what economists term the “Dutch disease”.\textsuperscript{39} which causes losses in other revenue-producing sectors because of the higher exchange rate, and neglect on the part of the government. The latter is more likely to focus its attention —and its investment— on the sectors that bring in most revenue. Such a pattern can stimulate a rapid, but distorted growth of services, transportation, and construction, while at same time slowing down or discouraging agriculture and certain types of industrialisation.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, the discovery of a highly profitable source of revenue has been shown to have severe political side-effects. Governments often become less transparent and accountable for their dealings to civil society. As Lunde and Brand note in their report on the impact of oil and mineral discoveries on developing countries, 

\begin{quote}
Far from helping weak states become stronger, natural resources tend to undermine their political foundations. Recent research suggests that mineral wealth may actively promote a “predatory” style of government whose rulers prey off their subjects rather than promoting development.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

History has shown that regimes in countries that are rich in resources tend to avoid creating mechanisms such as taxation, in order to avoid accountability to those taxpayers. Those governments already inclined towards authoritarianism are likely to use oil or mineral revenues to buy off political opponents, strengthen their personal praetorian guards and suppress dissent.\textsuperscript{42}

The Sudanese case has been no different. Interest in Sudan and its conflict has become more acute in the wake of the discovery of oil reserves in that country. The first discovery in 1978 in the Bentiu region in the south of Sudan gave a new and more aggressive dimension to the struggle for power over the South. The identification of other oil-producing sites, mainly in the Unity State area, soon followed. This region became a state in its own right, owing to Numeiri’s revision of the Sudanese map. This ensured that the earnings generated by the oil-producing regions would benefit the central government directly to the detriment of the South, despite the fact that the oil fields were in South Sudan. A further “division of labour” was the development in the North of oil refineries, from which the fuel would be exported via Port Sudan.

The SPLM/A began attacking oil installations as a way of protesting against the monopoly by the central government of resources in the South. In the 1980s the main thrust of the SPLA’s activities was against Western oil companies operating in the South who were described by Garang as “mercenaries working for the Islamic regime”. This in turn saw a further proliferation of government-aligned militias. While the centrality of oil to the Sudanese conflict should not be exaggerated, the global demand for this commodity certainly raised the stakes. Sudan’s balance of payments in 1998 (before significant oil production started) and 2000 (when nearly 200,000 barrels a day were being produced) shows that oil will take on an even greater prominence in Sudan’s future. According to the Joint Assessment Mission in 2003, oil revenue accounted for 9.6% of Sudan’s GDP and 56.6% of total revenues, compared with 0.6% and 7.6% respectively in 1999.\textsuperscript{43}

Currently, Sudan produces some 310,000 barrels of oil per day. The highest proportion comes from the Muglad basin fields in the south, which are being exploited by the Greater Nile Operating Company (GNOPC). It is clear that oil will take on greater prominence in the domestic economy and also shape foreign policy strategy in the immediate future. It is estimated that 45% of Sudan’s oil exports are destined for China and Japan, followed closely by France, Sweden, the UK, Italy and Germany.\textsuperscript{44}
The Chinese government’s close association with Khartoum is clearly a direct result of China’s need for foreign sources of oil to support its domestic modernisation plans. The relationship between Sudan and China offers numerous benefits to the Khartoum government by way of infrastructure investment in Khartoum’s refineries, hydroelectric power stations, dams and agricultural schemes. China is also one of the principal suppliers of arms to Sudan, and a source of financing through “soft loans” to help the country’s pay off its enormous external debt to international financial institutions. At the end of 2004, Sudan’s external debt stood at approximately US$ 26.5 billion, with 11% of GDP going to financing interest arrears alone. Moreover, China has been explicit in its defence of Sudan at the UN Security Council, blocking any attempts to discredit Bashir’s regime, particularly on the Darfur question. The nexus between regime security and international interest in oil is thus a complicated one.

But China is not the only player in the oil game, and balancing the competing interests of foreign businesses with the need for domestic development in the South and the Three Areas will be the crucial test for the government in the interim period. In this context, monitoring oil revenues through a transparent manner will be key to ensuring that the money received will go to appropriate development projects and not used for political patronage. Moreover, the oil exploration sites that are being developed represent only a small fraction of the probable oil reserves of the country. Many express fears that the GoS will displace communities further in the oil-rich areas without providing any means of redress for those affected. It is no coincidence that the area with the greatest potential for economic development has been most badly damaged by the war. While the South, Beja and Southern Blue Nile have been severely marginalized politically, they nevertheless form a major proportion of the North’s revenue.

**Highlights of the Wealth Sharing Agreement**

The wealth sharing agreement signed on 7 January 2004 represents, at least in theory, the boldest step towards the North’s recognition of the rights of the South as both a political and an economic entity. Most important, it acknowledges that “all parts of Sudan are entitled to development”. The parties agree that Southern Sudan faces serious needs to:

- perform basic government functions;
- establish and build civil administration; and,
- rehabilitate and re-construct or construct the social and physical infrastructure in post-conflict Sudan.

The agreement also recognizes that revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and decentralization of decision-making with regard to development, service delivery and governance. To this end, the protocol addresses four main issues: revenue division, banking and currency, land, and foreign funding for reconstruction:

- The formula for sharing oil revenues is based on a **50-50 split** after two deductions. Two percent will go to the oil-producing state, and a second deduction will be made for the **Oil Stabilization Account** if oil prices rise above a certain level;
- The sharing of other revenues (not generated by oil) will be done through the **National Revenue Fund**;
- A **National Land Commission** (NLC) will be appointed to arbitrate between willing contending parties on claims to land, and to decide on appropriate land compensation where necessary. (This is based on the historical pattern of land ownership derived from the 1970 Land Act, which regards all land on which oil is produced and explored as government land. All matters pertaining to oil therefore fall within the authority of the central government);
- A **National Petroleum Commission** (NPC) composed of members of the national government, the GoSS and not more than three representatives of the oil-producing region in which petroleum development is being considered, is to be established. The NPC will formulate policies and guidelines in relation to the development and management of the petroleum sector. It will also negotiate and approve all oil contracts, including those for exploration and development. However, all oil contracts signed before the CPA’s formation will stand and are non-negotiable;

- A **Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission** (FFAMC) will be appointed to monitor and ensure that the equalisation grants from the national revenue funds are promptly transferred to the appropriate levels of government. It is also responsible for guaranteeing transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds to the GoSS and states or regions according to ratios or percentages agreed;

- A **Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund** and a **National Reconstruction Fund** will be created to raise and collect funds for reconstruction of infrastructure and reintegration of internally displaced and refugee populations from domestic and international donors. The National Fund will be responsible for developing both war-affected areas and the least developed regions outside Southern Sudan;

- In order to support rapid capacity-building, institutional strengthening and investment costs, two **Multi-Donor Trust Funds** (MDTFs) will be established. In theory, the national funds will be principally financed by the two governments of North and South, while the MDTFs will provide a channel for international assistance. In practice, money flows between the multi-donor to the national funds are expected; and, finally,

- A **dual banking system**. This would allow the North to maintain the Central Bank of Sudan, which operates according to the principles of Islamic law (which does not allow the charging of interest). The Bank of South Sudan will be created as a branch of the Central Bank, but follow western banking regulatory practices. Moreover, two **currencies** will be used in the interim before the introduction of an overall national currency. The North will use the Sudanese dinar, while the South will adopt the Sudanese pound.

**Questions arising from the Wealth Sharing Agreement**

While the wealth sharing agreement is certainly an improvement on all previous attempts at recognising the South’s right to economic development, some outstanding issues remain. These include the following:

- The status of existing contracts needs to be investigated. The SPLA and national government have recently been playing a tug-of-war over oil concessions given to the White Nile Company (in which the SPLM has 50% of shares) previously granted to the French Total company by the Khartoum government. Total withdrew from Sudan at the height of the fighting, but continued to pay for its concessions in the hope of returning after the war had ended. Unbeknown to Khartoum, however, the SPLM had awarded Block Ba to its own Nile Petroleum Company in August 2004. When the peace deal was signed, the SPLM insisted that this contract must stand, and promptly transferred 60 per cent of the Block Ba oilfield to White Nile. The contention lies in the fact the SPLM’s contract with the White Nile Company was concluded before the CPA came into force. This makes it “non renegotiable”.

- The Agreement allows for parties whose rights have been violated to claim compensation. But it is still unclear what constitutes a violation, and indeed how these rights are to be protected. This will be most pertinent for companies starting out in undeveloped regions, where the risks attending investment must be accurately established in advance. Moreover, the agreement does not make mention of a national energy policy, which means that companies entering Sudan for the first time will not know what the tax or regulatory regimes are.
• The North-South paradigm for interpreting Sudanese politics must be overcome if, as Rogier argues, Sudan's problems are to be resolved. However, the existence of two separate MDTFs might encourage donors to continue to think in terms of this dichotomy.

• The issue of sustainability also needs to be addressed if accountable investment that will assist development is to be encouraged. The question is therefore: Will the legal frameworks set up for the interim period apply if the South decides to go it alone? As the CSIS puts it, “a six-year deal is insufficient in a 30-year business”.

Issues not addressed

Unequal access to water and land poses a significant challenge to peace because it denies the rights of many to a sustainable livelihood. Nine countries, with a total population of 300 million people, are affected by questions relating to the availability of water from the Nile basin. While some analysts have gone so far as to say that this “often-neglected resource even sustains the potential of putting an end to the armed conflict”, this writer takes a more cautious approach. However, the failure to address the pressing issues of land and water is certainly a flaw in the wealth sharing agreement.

Tensions between the East African countries of Tanzania and Kenya and Egypt have run high in recent times as a direct result of their claims to water from the Nile. These have even been accompanied by military threats from the Egyptians who enjoy “superior rights” to the Nile in terms of treaties signed between Egypt and Britain in 1929 and 1956. According to these agreements, Egypt can prevent other Nile Basin countries from initiating projects that may significantly reduce the volume of water reaching it. In the event of South Sudan's seceding, these regional tensions might be exacerbated, because the Sudanese national government has exclusive rights over water management in Sudan at present.

With regard to land, it is important to remember that Sudan has an estimated 4 million IDPs and 1 million refugees, all of whom will need to be accommodated if they are to be successfully reintegrated into their original communities. Competing land claims between settled populations and returnees are made even more complicated by the use of both customary and state legal systems. Thus the task of the New Land Commission's (NLC) mandate of “arbitrating between willing contending parties on claims over land” must be seen to be impartially carried out if it is to be regarded as a credible conflict resolution institution.

The GNU will also have to balance the interests of the business elite, which has been at the forefront of developments in mechanised farming, and the needs of local communities. The expansion of mechanised farming and rain-fed agricultural schemes to cater for the export market has contributed significantly to the displacement of populations and the “fragmentation and extension of the current civil war in the North”. This is especially the case in the Darfur area, where they have contributed to the impoverishment of its inhabitants. Douglas Johnson notes that the establishment of the schemes hastened social and economic dislocation. Customary rights in land for both small-holders and pastoralists in Kordofan and elsewhere have been eroded by the legal backing given to the schemes by the Sudanese courts.

Transforming the SPLM/A into a civilian administration

In the aftermath of the death of John Garang it has become apparent that continued international support and especially the disbursement of donor funds will be essential to keeping the CPA's implementation on track. Even more pressing will be meeting the challenge to institute participatory and responsive government at local level since neither the GoS nor the SPLM are known for a democratic approach to governance. It should be noted that decentralization has
been at the heart of political demands for autonomy in the South and also plays an important role in addressing the perceived ethnic factionalism within the SPLM/A. As Branch and Mampilly posit,

...the conflict between Southern ethnic groups led the SPLA leadership to recognise that decentralisation of the political apparatus was essential if they were to retain support from non-Dinka ethnic groups and were to build national and international legitimacy. The military ethos underpinning the SPLM's civil administration has often been the subject of criticism in recent times...for example, Riehl's view that "the administrative structure is not democratically based, but rather reflects a militaristic top-down approach [sic]".51

Moreover, the South is a politically contested space with no unified Southern Sudanese identity. The binding factor seems to be based primarily on the common experience of repression by, and resistance to, the Khartoum regime.52 Thus, the establishment of the Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS) in 1996 at the Conference on Civil Society and Civil Authority in Himman-New Cush was an important step towards dispelling the notion of the SPLM/A as an "authoritarian animal". As Mampilly notes, from 1996 the rhetoric of civil society engagement in South Sudan increased significantly. It is most manifest in the SPLM's Peace through Development document, which was published in February 2000.

During the conference, the SPLM outlined the most important task facing the movement as being "the establishment of an effective, democratic, participatory and accountable civil authority, the central purpose of which is the empowerment of civil society to become productive and the driving force of our struggle". The CANS is premised on the principle of separation of powers, and comprises three tiers: the legislature, in the form of Liberation Councils; the executive; and the judiciary. Except for the judiciary there is a vertical and horizontal bi-directional chain of authority from the small unit (the boma or village), upwards to the national level. In this way the CANS represents an evolution of both local government and the movement's service provision structure. The latter will be the litmus test for the SPLM in the months and years ahead. The County Development Committee (CDC) will also take on increasing prominence in the period immediately following the end of the conflict. The CDCs are responsible for planning, co-ordinating and evaluating development programmes in each county, and serve as mechanisms through which the activities of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) are transferred to the local authorities.

In this regard, the absorptive capacity of local institutions must be addressed immediately. This is particularly important for the SPLM agenda, since the provision of services fell largely on NGOs during the war. In the early 1990s, the vacuum created by the weakness of the SPLM structure for local governance was partially filled by individuals and NGOs. These non-governmental entities undertook training and other local government building activities on a project basis, and operated outside the purview of the Secretariat of Local Government in Southern Sudan.53 The resultant duplication of activities and lack of co-ordination of agency activity across the vast region led some to describe the situation as the "INGO-isation" of Southern Sudan.54

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) came into being in 1989 as the first collaboration of its kind between a guerrilla movement, the state and the international humanitarian community to organize humanitarian aid. The OLS attempted to bring various agencies together under one umbrella body, thereby creating a mechanism through which aid could be negotiated with both the SPLM/A and the GoS. Yet, while the operation has been running for over 15 years, it has come under criticism for what is seen as its politicization during the war. Riehl argues that "rather than being a tool for INGOs to provide logistic[al] and material resources to facilitate their operations legally and technically, OLS has become a
politically operating end in itself. This “anarchic” situation was later brought under some control through the introduction in 1995 of ground rules that governed operational activities, and in 2000, of a Memorandum of Understanding on the relationship between the SPLM’s humanitarian wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the GoS.

In the context of rebuilding it will be essential for the GoSS to co-operate with international donors and agencies, without allowing state ownership of the reconstruction agenda to be weakened. Moreover, there is always a risk that donor funding will itself be used as a form of patronage to consolidate the SPLM’s support base. This would serve only to heighten tensions among southerners themselves, and threaten the durability of peace in the South. The author of this paper therefore supports the view eloquently put forward by Branch and Mampilly in their discussion of the SPLM/A’s civil administration. They argue that addressing the issue of community-wide democratic representation within local government structures will be crucial to the success of South Sudan’s immediate future. The stress point is likely to be the composition of the boma, payam, and County Development committees.

The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)

It seems the scale of Sudan’s reconstruction and development needs has not been lost on the Inter-Governmental Association on Development (IGAD), its partner forum (the donor governments of Norway, Italy, the US and the UK) and other international actors (such as the World Bank and the UNDP). This explains the setting up of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in 2003 to determine the country’s development needs for the six-year interim period. The findings of the Mission were presented at the April donors’ conference during which US$ 4.5 billion was pledged for the 2005-2007 phase. It is expected that the JAM’s findings will guide further international donor involvement in post-war Sudan. To use its own words, the JAM Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication is,

...an ambitious but realistic plan that has been developed jointly with development partners and civil society to address the urgent task of meeting the basic aspirations of our people and accelerating progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals [MDG].

The Framework foresees two phases of implementation, the first of which is a recovery phase spanning the first two years after the signing of the CPA. During this time the most immediate rehabilitation and recovery needs will be addressed. There will also be an emphasis on local capacity-building. The second development phase (from 2008-2011) will focus on the implementation of a poverty alleviation strategy. These goals will be pursued by creating macro-economic stability and decentralized governance structures; initiating major infrastructure programmes; promoting the private sectors; building capacity on a comprehensive scale; strengthening institutions; and practising sound natural resource management.

The Mission comprises a Core Co-ordinating Group (CCG), which is composed of representatives from the GoS and the SPLM, the UN system, the World Bank and IGAD. The CCG is assisted by two JAM Core Teams, each of which covers either the GoS or SPLM territories. Each co-ordinating team includes representatives from the relevant party and from the international community (one from the UN and one from the World Bank), and is supported by a secretariat. Co-ordinating teams also consult members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and the private sector.

The Framework paper was produced after a year of research and consultation. This describes a focus on eight thematic clusters:
• **institutional development and capacity-building** (including public service, local government and service delivery, decentralization framework, civil service assessments);
• **governance/rule of law** (including the rule of law, police, security, human rights, anti-corruption measures, media and transparency, peace-building and democratisation);
• **economic policy and management** (including macro-economic policy, fiscal policy, public expenditure management and central banking);
• **productive sectors** (including agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, irrigation and private sector development);
• **basic social services** (including health, HIV/AIDS and education);
• **infrastructure** (including transport and civil works, communication, water and sanitation and energy);
• **livelihoods and social protection** (including demobilisation, demilitarization and reintegration — DDR, IDPs and refugees, community-driven development, employment generation and demining); and
• **information** (including data collection and analysis, monitoring and evaluation).

**Critiques of the JAM**

It is important to note the valuable work done by the JAM in terms of providing much-needed information on parts of Sudan that have been largely undocumented in recent times. Particularly significant are data related to planning for infrastructure and development and on the local economies of these regions. However some critiques of the JAM point to the divided nature of the work of the assessment teams, who operate purely within their own areas. These criticisms suggest that the Mission’s findings do not reflect a “shared vision” of the Sudan's reconstruction.

In addition, Emeric Rogier points out the following limitations in the JAM assessment:

• The Framework used the North-South paradigm, but was unable to visit the Darfur area because of the continuing conflict. As a result, the needs assessment for the North and therefore for the country as a whole is partly incomplete and probably outdated. Also, the crisis in Darfur has stimulated regional competition for donor attention and funds, which in turn makes adjustments to assessments of comparative needs necessary. “Without such an adjustment, donors might opt for a rough estimate (for example 50-50) that may not necessarily help to redress regional disparities adequately”.

• The JAM’s focus on structural deficiencies meant that it paid little attention to critical security and political issues. The failure of the JAM to consider demobilization as a pivotal part of the peace process is seen as a major weakness. “States, like peace processes, do not fail because of structural shortcomings but because of the decisive actions and policies of political leaders”.

While the author agrees with these observations, it is also worth emphasizing that building peace requires contributions from both the security and development sectors. However, showing a political commitment to improving the lives of the marginalized may go some way towards fostering reconciliation between the antagonists.

Sudan in its bifurcated state of war and peace enjoys prominence in the international media, which in turn has created renewed interest in the challenges facing the country. However, we should be wary of falling into the trap of short-sightedness. Several country experts and analysts caution that the current focus on Sudan by both the local and international media suggests a loss of
“institutional memory” of the country’s socio-economic history. It is here that we need to consider Sudan as exemplifying a long-term complex emergency. This term may seem paradoxical at the outset, since an emergency usually refers to pressing, immediate needs. In this context, it underscores the notion that while short-term emergencies like massacres, disease and destruction have an immediate cause, they are a “direct result of the political and military situation”. Thus, as suggested by John Ashworth, who has been involved in human security issues in the Sudan since before the outbreak of the war, strategies like famine mitigation rather than just famine relief should inform the new round of donor and aid interaction in Sudan. Recent commentaries on Burundi’s reconstruction efforts after its civil war offer instructive lessons for Sudan. One of these explains that “development is a finely woven net of endless small changes. It is delivered by equipping millions of individuals at countless different levels. And it needs to happen without too much dogma about where the cycle ‘ought’ to begin”.

In summary the key issues facing Sudan can be divided into immediate security concerns and longer-term livelihood protection and social rehabilitation. The former refers in large part to the demobilisation of militia groups and the restructuring of the SPLA to take up its role as the army of the South. The latter concerns the more complex job of repatriating and reintegrating IDPs and refugees, creating viable employment in both urban and rural areas, investing in basic infrastructure and social services, and prioritising education for both men and women of Sudan. Setting aside the question of ‘sequencing’ both security and socio-economic processes will be dependent on a more inclusive South-South political and civil dialogue. Furthermore, compliance with the wealth-sharing agreement by Khartoum will be a fundamental part of granting substantive legitimacy to the Government of South Sudan. In this regard the implementation of real federalism through the strengthening of local government, the democratization and restructuring of the SPLM and a concurrent emphasis on the ownership of the reconstruction agenda by civil society will greatly enhance the quality of post-war development in Sudan to ensure that the country is indeed walking on flat ground, as John Garang hoped.

1 Mariam Jooma is a Researcher (Humanitarian Relief and Development Issues) at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies.
2 The author would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Emeric Rogier, Zachariah Mampilly and Dr Joao Porto in writing this report.
5 Sudan Common Country Assessment (CCA), op cit.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Sudan Common Country Assessment (CCA), op cit.
9 The socio-economic dimension of poverty manifests itself in Sudan’s: high infant and maternal morbidity and mortality rates; high prevalence of malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory diseases; high rate of malnutrition; high level of illiteracy and low level of education; high unemployment rate; reduced immunisation coverage and frequent outbreaks of epidemics; high percentage of chronically poor households; number of displaced people and refugees (4 million IDPs and 300,000 refugees); severe gender inequality; and low level of respect for basic human rights.
10 Joint Assessment Mission Sudan, op cit.
11 Cornwell, op cit.
14 Rogier, op cit, p.33.
16 Ibid.
20 16 % of the population is under the age of 5, and 45 % is below the age of 15.
21 Sudan Common Country Assessment (CCA), op cit, p 10.
22 Ibid.
23 Esposito & Crocker, op cit, p 8.
29 Sudan Common Country Assessment (CCA), op cit, p 11.
31 ISS Situation Report, The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), Ibid. p 2.
33 IRIN, Sudan: Wealth-sharing -Tougher economic issues than oil to address, <www.irinnews.org/sudan>.
37 in J Bray & L Lunde, Oil and Mining Revenues: From curse to blessing for developing countries?: Challenges to governments, companies & NGO's, Norwegian Church Aid Occasional Paper No 3/04, <www.nca.no>, date accessed 3 August 2005.
38 Ibid. 
39 The phrase derives from the experience of the Netherlands during the expansion of the country's natural gas industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Natural gas revenues prompted increased government spending, which in turn led to a rise in the value of the Dutch guilder against other currencies. Dutch exporters—and therefore Dutch industry outside the gas sector – lost out, and foreign importers benefited.
41 Bray and Lunde, op cit
42 bid.
43 Joint Assessment Mission Sudan, op cit.
44 Field, op cit.
45 Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, Naivasha, Kenya, 7 January 2004.
46 Rogier, op cit, p 39.
47 X Rice, White Nile Duo hope for oil on troubled waters in South Sudan, Times Online, 13 August 2005, <www.timesonline.co.uk>.
48 These countries consist of Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
49 Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, op cit.
50 Johnson, op cit, p 49.
52 Ibid.
55 Riehl, op cit, p.7.
56 Branch & Mampilly, op cit.
57 Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, op cit.
58 Rogier, op cit.