INTRODUCTION

Having failed to reach agreement on the structure of an inter-African force for the military aspects of conflict management, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) occasionally undertook or endorsed less complex ceasefire monitoring missions such as the Bamako Ceasefire Commission (1963). The Pan-African peacekeeping force that operated in Shaba Province of Congo (Kinshasa) in 1978–79 was the first OAU peace support undertaking; followed by the Chadian operation (1979–82), which was also the only OAU peacekeeping venture of a complex nature during this period.

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the OAU re-examined its security and peace agenda. It recognised the prevalence of destabilising conflicts that would seriously impede collective and individual efforts to realise the continent’s political and socioeconomic objectives. The outcome of the 1990 summit was the “Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World”, according to which leaders agreed to work together towards the peaceful and rapid resolution of all conflicts on the continent. To this end, African Heads of State adopted the Cairo Declaration of 1993 establishing the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which marked the beginning of the organisation’s second-generation peace and security agenda.

The OAU Mechanism was instrumental in enabling the organisation, through the Central Organ, the Secretary General and the Conflict Management Centre (CMC), to react more promptly and effectively to the numerous existing and new conflicts. It thus facilitated the intervention of the OAU in a number of conflicts (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Somalia), as well as the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and conflict. In the field of peacekeeping, the mechanism endowed the OAU with the capacity, though limited, to mount observer missions and small operations in five countries, namely Rwanda (NMOG I and NMOG II); Burundi (OMIB); the Comoros (OMIC I, II and III); DRC (JMC); and Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). The budgets for these very limited operations ranged from US$105,000 to around US$3 million.

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The rather unsatisfactory record of the ad hoc mechanisms for intervention called for a reappraisal in subsequent years. On the one hand, the UN Security Council’s early commitment to Africa ran into problems in Somalia in 1993; and this factor contributed to its disgraceful inaction during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. After Somalia and Rwanda, the UN showed less interest, responsibility and commitment to resolving conflicts in Africa than Asia, the Americas and Europe. It took several years and a new Secretary General before the UN returned to peacekeeping in Africa. On the other hand, regional organisations in west and southern Africa, led by countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe, began to show much greater willingness and capacity to launch peace operations when no action was forthcoming from the UN or the OAU.

The OAU was formally transformed into the African Union (AU) in Durban in 2002. Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, replacing the OAU Mechanism. Within the framework of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the AU Commission is mandated to establish an African Standby Force (ASF).
The PSC Protocol provides for the conversion of the existing situation room at the Commission into a fully fledged mandating headquarter to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts.” It also provides for the creation of a Panel of the Wise, made up of African elder statesmen and women, to advise the council, the chairman of the Commission and to undertake preventive action. Should prevention fail, or an emergency develop, the protocol makes provision for the African individual states to be ready to undertake peacekeeping or intervention missions, while a Military Staff Committee would advise and assist the council in this and other matters. The Peace Fund, inherited from the OAU, is to be increased in size and used “to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security.”

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the progress that has been made towards the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) at continental and regional levels. The text necessarily draws heavily on a number of official documents that have been produced in the wake of a series of recent planning meetings at various levels across the continent.

The first section provides a review of the continental framework as it has evolved to date and been adopted by the AU. Subsequent sections deal with progress in three regions in Africa, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The conclusion highlights the most salient challenges to be overcome if the ASF is to become a meaningful and effective conflict management tool in the hands of the PSC.

The Continental Policy Framework for the African Standby Force (ASF) 8

Following two meetings of African Chiefs of Defence Staff in Addis Ababa (in May 2003 and January 2004), as well as a meeting of African Ministers of Defence on 20 January 2004, the policy framework of the ASF and the military staff committee was approved by African Heads of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004. 9 The force is to consist of standby brigades in each of the five regions, supported by civilian police and other capacities.

The final concept adopted ... provided for five standby brigades, one in each of Africa’s five regions, supported by civilian police and other capacities. Also requested that the chairperson of the Commission conclude memoranda of understanding between the AU and the regions to guide relations between the various bodies on peace and security.

Whereas the original concept had called for substantive progress by mid-2004, delays in the approval of the policy framework, which had first been submitted to Heads of State in 2003, the absence of substantive follow-up consultations and exchange of information between the AU and the regions/regional economic communities (RECs), as well as the process of transformation within the Commission of the African Union, impeded progress at continental level. Regions such as ECOWAS and IGAD proceeded with their own arrangements, some of which are not in accordance with the guidelines approved at the continental level. Regions also developed other arrangements in the absence of substantive guidance.

Key planning assumptions

Whereas the concept presented to the OAU in 2003 proposed a single standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) type of arrangement at continental level and the subsequent development of standby brigades at sub-regional level, the final concept adopted by Heads of State provided for five standby brigades, one in each of Africa’s five regions, supported by civilian police (CivPol) and other capacities. In doing so, the concept for peacekeeping in Africa reverted to that agreed to by two earlier meetings of African Chiefs of Defence Staff in July 1996 and October 1997.

When fully established, the ASF will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Africa (or beyond) at appropriate notice. Effective command and control of the ASF will therefore require the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS) infrastructure, linking deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as the AU, planning elements (PLANELMs) and regions. To elaborate on its strategic and operational requirements, the AU will host a technical workshop on C3IS in the latter half of 2005. Similarly, the ASF will require an integrated logistics system that will enable interoperability, a common doctrine, uniform training standards, a single integrated standby system and the like. All of these are to be reviewed in a series of high-level expert workshops during the remainder of 2005.

As stipulated in the policy framework, the standby brigades in each of the five regions will, as a guideline, be composed of:

- a brigade (mission level) headquarters and support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles;
- a headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel;
- four infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles;
- an engineering unit of up to 505 personnel;
- a light signals unit of up to 135 personnel; a reconnaissance company (wheel and foot) of up to 150 personnel, 150 vehicles and four helicopters;
- a military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles;
- a multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles;
- a level II medical unit of up to 35 personnel and ten vehicles;
- a military observer group of up to 120 officers;
- a civilian support group consisting of logistical, administrative and budget components.

The policy framework sets the following additional military, police and civilian standby list targets to be maintained centrally by the AU:

- 300–500 military observers (MIObs);
- 240 civilian police (CivPol); and
- an unspecified roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, demobilisation, disarmament, internal security and reconstruction roles.

The AU has decided that the civilian roster of experts is not a Phase 1 priority because UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements do not require a UN Security Council mandate, could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission.

The ASF structure is informed by the following six missions and scenarios:

- Scenario 1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution;
- Scenario 2. AU regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution;
- Scenario 3. Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution;
- Scenario 4. AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building). Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution;
- Scenario 5. AU regional peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days;
- Scenario 6. AU intervention, for example in genocidal situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force in 14 days.

According to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases:

- Phase 1 (up to 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective would be to establish a PLANELM for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions, while the five regions would establish regional standby forces up to brigade size to achieve capabilities up to Scenario 4.
- Phase 2 (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged that by 2010 the AU will have developed the capability to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4, involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces.

These dates have proven ambitious, and while substantive progress has been made in three of the five regions will not be met.

Planning elements and brigade headquarters

To provide for multidimensional strategic-level management capacities, the ASF policy framework requires the establishment of a 15-person PLANELM at the level of the Commission of the African Union and an initial nucleus of five officers within the PLANELM at each of the regional headquarters responsible for pre-deployment management of the ASF and its regional standby brigades during Phase 1. 10

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The core functions of the PLANELMs are planning, preparation and training, including the verification of brigade headquarters and standby elements. This is considered a full-time requirement, implying that the PLANELMs should be staffed on a permanent basis, while the brigade headquarters could be staffed on a part-time basis – although the planners recognised that readiness levels of 30 days and less will require full-time brigade headquarters. Where possible, the regional PLANELMs should be co-located with the regional brigade headquarters for ease of command, control and communications. This is not the case everywhere, as we will note with the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRG) which depends on the nature of the standby brigade headquarters.
To establish the AU headquarters PLANELM, the AU Commission has requested the secondment of five experts, well-versed in specific African member states for an initial period of one year from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 to be located in Addis Ababa and to constitute the AU PLANELM for Phase 1. They will work under the PLANELM chief of staff.

To achieve set targets for Phase 1 of the ASF, the AU PLANELM is expected to complete the following tasks before 30 June 2006:

- Convene a series of workshops with participation by the regions and major donor partners, to provide a costed continental logistic system, continent’s C5’s and continental training concept and the initiation of key recommendations in this regard;
- Develop standard tables of organisation and equipment (TOE), in conjunction with regions;
- Develop and implement a continental standby system, and link it to the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSSA);
- Initiate and coordinate the drafting of memoranda of understanding and letters of exchange;
- Draft standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the ASF;
- Elaborate/draft doctrine for the ASF;
- Elaborate/develop standardised training modules, as well as command post exercises (CPX).

The ASF concept requires the establishment of a mission headquarters management capability in the form of a brigade headquarters within each region. During Phase 1 it was agreed that a nucleus of three to five officers augmented by non-permanent brigade headquarters staff on standby should be formed in the regions. The AU noted that some regions may decide to combine their PLANELMs with this nucleus, and others may wish to base the standby brigade headquarters on an existing brigade headquarters in a member state. Other regions may decide in favour of a skeleton brigade headquarters based on an existing brigade in a member state. Against this background, it has been agreed that:

- Each region would confirm the location, concept and staffing of the brigade headquarters and its relation to the regional PLANELMs by 1 July 2005, and report to the AU; and
- The regions will constitute a nucleus brigade headquarters capacity under a chief of staff of the rank of brigadier-general by 31 December 2005, and provide appropriate office space and associated facilities.

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The ASF policy framework provides that missions deployed for Scenarios 1–3 should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4–6 missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-sustainability. Thereafter the AU or UN must take responsibility for the sustainment of the missions or, if lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability of the AU to start reimbursing troop-contributing countries (TCCs) so that these countries can continue to sustain their contingents.

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- The nucleus of the brigade headquarters will verify and report on the operational readiness of the brigade for Phase 1 requirements, in conjunction with the regional PLANELMs, to the AU PLANELM before 30 June 2006.
- The AU and regions will negotiate with donors for support to cover the costs of the establishment of brigade headquarters and regional PLANELMs.

In the case of the military and police capabilities required for Phase 1, each category of ASF mission component is to consist of observers, individuals and formed units, on standby in their countries of origin ready to be deployed, using a system of on-call lists. The AU PLANELMs will undertake the development of the ASF standby system.

It was thus also agreed that the following tasks would be completed before 31 October 2005:

- Member states should nominate the standby brigade headquarters staff, populate the standby database, and submit this data to the regions.
- Member states should nominate standby units, including the completion of the standby database, and forward this data to the regions.
- Member states should nominate and populate the CIVPAl standby database, and forward it to the regions.
- Member states should nominate and populate the MOCs standby database, and forward it to the regions.
- The regions will forward all databases collected from member states to the AU.

The routine selection, preparation and training of the ASF components would be a national responsibility.

Logistics

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- The AU will organise workshops to develop a set of standardised SOPs based on its draft generic SOPs, as well as those existing within the regions.
- The AU will facilitate doctrinal coherence and dissemination of lessons learnt.
- The AU and regional PLANELMs will harmonise ASF training cycles with UN and external initiatives, as well as feed into these initiatives, to enhance and synergise ASF capacities.
- Regions are to adopt an appropriate training policy providing for cycles of national, regional and AU-wide training; this should be coordinated with major donor initiatives. While ASF training is to be consistent with UN doctrine with a view to standardising doctrine, based on the standard process training modules (SGTM), ASF training beyond this level would be regionally coordinated and enhanced through regional peacekeeping centres of excellence.
- Regions should streamline the establishment of centres of excellence/use of existing national training institutions within the various regions to optimise their regional profile and use.

The policy framework also proposed a system of AU military logistical depots, consisting of the AU Military Logistic Depot in Addis Ababa and regional logistical bases.

One of the vehicles through which African institutions can extend lessons learnt, and share training experiences is the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA). The objectives of APSTA are as follows (from its articles of association):

- "The African Peace Support Trainer’s Association is a voluntary association of individuals, institutions working in Africa in peacekeeping capacity building, whose principal core activity or function delivers practical training. Its objectives are:
  - to facilitate the ability of peace support training centres to dialogue with each other as a matter of routine;
  - to facilitate meetings and the exchange of information and teaching materials;"
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Collaboration and cooperation

The ASF will ensure that the AU's traditional collaboration with its bilateral and multilateral partners be maintained and deepened. For the AU, the collaboration with the international community will aim at following broad priority areas:

- establishment of the pre-deployment structures of the ASF, namely PLANELMs and regional brigade groups;
- establishment of the pre-deployment structures of the ASF, including the development of pre-deployment activities such as training, and the activities of the PLANELMs and regional brigade groups;
- establishment of the AU's traditional logistics depots and, in default, mechanisms for the committal of donor-held equipment to ASF missions, including strategic air and seaborne; and
- training, planning and conduct of command post exercises as well as allocation of vacancies to ASF staff for external training.

Funding

Funding is important for the success of any mission. It is agreed that before 31 October 2005 the AU regions will:

- assess the detailed cost of the structures of the ASF, including pre-deployment activities such as training, and the activities of the PLANELMs and regional brigade groups;
- assess the cost of the types of ASF mission, based on the relevant levels of forces, including mandate, with an average mission timeframe of between one and two years, a period which is long enough for the follow-up deployment of a UN mission or operation, and more limited operations in support of peace processes of between six months and one year only;
- encourage the AU member states to contribute to the endowment of the AU Peace Fund;
- sustain negotiations with external partners (donors) for assistance.

Additionally, external partnerships will be developed further to provide assistance towards the establishment, stocking, maintenance, and strategic airlift of equipment and vehicles for ASF pre-deployment training and missions.

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The ECOWAS Main Brigade will comprise 5,000 soldiers within pre-determined units and upon order be prepared to deploy within 90 days and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.

The ESF is to consist of 6,500 troops,207 pledged by contributing nations, and coordinated through the Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC). The idea is for the Task Force to have the capability to deploy rapidly to meet initial contingency requirements. If the military effort requires an expanded force, the main brigade will be deployed.

It is assumed that all forces committed to the ESF will meet the criteria and standards209 set out in an ECOWAS memorandum of understanding. A further planning assumption is that the ESF Task Force will have the capability to deploy for up to 90 days; after which one of the following options will be implemented:

- The Task Force elements will return to the troop-contributing nations.
- The Task Force will remain deployed as an element of the ESF Main Brigade.
- The Task Force will become an element of an AU or UN mission.
- The Task Force will hand over to a UN or AU mission.

An operational framework for the ESF was developed by the ECOWAS Secretariat (specifically the Mission Planning and Management Cell, or MPMC208), in conjunction with military advisors from donor nations, in late January/early February 2005. The operational framework aims to specify all the activity strands and benchmarks for the establishment of the ESF. The purpose of the document is to assist ECOWAS in the sequencing and coordination of activities, while providing a coordination tool for donors to identify and target assistance to support the early and efficient establishment of the ESF. The operational framework aims to concentrate on developing a capability for peacekeeping operations. Guidance was provided by the Defence Staff, the ECOWAS military member states, and the ECOWAS military benefactors.

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Member states have so far pledged 6,200 troops of donor contributions. The nature of which will depend on the level provided by a mix of member nation and ECOWAS. The resources for nation, language and capability. The goal is to achieve the entry level of certification. Within 30 days NTM. The remaining 3,500 troops will be based on the operational requirements. The option of a readiness cycle based on a predefined Task Force was analysed, but was rejected because of practical and political considerations. However, units that join the Tier 2 pool should be named in the operational framework document. The concept of a joint review of the logistics infrastructure, training and logistic requirements. ECOWAS has already indicated its intention of basing logistics support at two depot locations, one on the coast and one in the central interior of the region.

A great deal of work must be done on defining and meeting the training and logistic requirements of the ESF. The Task Force working group, once established, needs to pursue this requirement and report to the Defence Staff Commission on other key issues such as force generation visit to all the ‘pledging’ nations to identify specific pledged units, assess their operational capability, and allocate Task Force and other brigade roles as appropriate. The secretariat should conduct further discussions with pledging nations to fill any shortfall in the proposed ESF structure. The secretariat should approach donors for assistance with this requirement. Britain has already offered to support the necessary doctrinal development.

The Defence and Security Commission (DSC) has been requested to consider approving the next series of activities to be undertaken by the ESF Secretariat and supported by donors, so that momentum is maintained. In particular, Defence Staff Commission endorsement is sought for the following key actions:

- **Appointment of a Task Force chief of staff**. The immediate appointment of a chief of staff to the ESF will be considered to fill the role of a departmental liaison authority of the ESF, but will remain under operational command of member nations as they can attain. Tier 2 units will be under the direct liaison authority of the ESF, but will remain under operational command of member nations as they will be unengaged with national tasks while held in readiness for ESF deployment.

- **Tier 3**: The protocol states that the Task Force must be able to commence its mission within 30 days. Hence a permanent core Task Force headquarter will be established within Tier 3. Operational capability will be achieved after the Task Force has assembled for a specific mission, and it will be based on the operational requirements of that mission. The 30-day timeframe Task Force headquarter is required to deploy within 30 days.

The current version of the ESF operational framework focuses on the deployable elements of the ESF, particularly the Task Force. Further iterations of the operational framework document will examine in more detail the requirements for the main brigade. A great deal of work must be done on defining and meeting the training and logistic requirements of the ESF. The process involves the development of an operational task statement, the specification of training objectives for each task, and ultimately a training policy that addresses individual, collective and inter-service training needs for all the elements of the ESF. It is currently envisaged that the initial two phases of the project will be completed in 2005 with the subsequent design and conduct of training and evaluation taking place in 2006/07.

**Next steps in West Africa**

The Force and the whole ESF will be national capacity and political will. However, major factors regarding the availability of ECOWAS, they must be capable of achieving a baseline or an entry level of operational readiness. The MPMC will produce a detailed breakdown of capabilities and specify the required levels of readiness. Rotation to Tier 2 will be coordinated by the MPMC in consultation with member states.

- **Tier 2** will consist of a pool of 3,000 ESF soldiers, from which the Task Force of 1,500 will be constituted and trained on an ‘in-case’ basis, after strategic direction has been given. This approach provides the flexibility required to produce a mission-specific Task Force within the likely constraints of national will. The option of a readiness cycle based on a predefined Task Force was analysed, but was rejected because of practical and political considerations. However, units that join the Tier 2 pool should be named that are formed at company level or above, and kept in ‘role’. This is to ensure that the Task Force is interoperable and sustainable at least at company level. As a guideline, rotation of units from Tier 1 to Tier 2 should be a minimum period of two years to bring units up to standard. Funding by donors will be major limitation to the level of capability and readiness that the Task Force can attain. Tier 2 units will be under the direct liaison authority of the ESF, but will remain under operational command of member nations as they will be unengaged with national tasks while held in readiness for ESF deployment.

- **Tier 1**: The protocol states that the Task Force must be able to commence its mission within 30 days. Hence a permanent core Task Force headquarter will be established within Tier 3. Operational capability will be achieved after the Task Force has assembled for a specific mission, and it will be based on the operational requirements of that mission. The 30-day timeframe Task Force headquarter is required to deploy within 30 days.
Improving the numbers and quality of resources for peacekeeping operations is most effectively achieved by supporting national capacity-building programmes. Of course, this need to be tied to a regional approach at operational level to prepare capacities to command, control and direct those national contributions to a mission, but this is possibly a lesser task.

Financing remains a challenge for all regions, and ECOWAS is no exception. According to Article 36 of the Protocol on the Mechanism, the Secretariat shall make provision in its annual budget for funds to finance the activities of the mechanism (including PSO). A percentage of the proposed community levy (0.5% of each member state’s GDP) is to be earmarked for such activities. Other potential sources of funding have been noted as the UN and other international agencies, the AU, and voluntary contributions and grants from bilateral and multilateral sources.

By comparative standards the ECOWAS Peace Fund is quite healthy at the moment, thanks to a US$5 million special allocation for Liberia, which has not been used, because the UN took over the mission.

However, no automatic percentage has been levied on member states for contribution to the fund, and assessments are only made annually. To date, external donors have not been forthcoming with contribution to the Peace Fund.

Greater financial visibility is needed. ECOWAS has agreed in this millennium that future missions should have one finance cell, which would include finance officers from ECOWAS as well as donor countries, to plan, coordinate, and manage financial matters associated with peace support plan, coordinate, and manage financial ECOWAS as well as donor countries, to plan, coordinate, and manage financial matters associated with peace support operations.28 During pre- and post-peacekeeping periods this cell can, among other duties, maintain a prioritised list of peace support operations related personnel and materiel requirements. Such a list can be quite long and is an indication of what is still being sought (an unfinanced requirements list). This will be of great help to partners seeking to assist ECOWAS. Additionally, the finance cell can be responsible for tracking the material and resources donated by partners to the ESF. Having a capable financial management team will significantly expedite partner support.

It has also been recommended that member states should contribute to the ECOWAS Peace Fund without further delay. All member countries, including Nigeria, are donor-dependent. In short, they are in no position to convene a donor conference on their own, or to contribute substantially to a country-specific post-conflict fund or the ECOWAS Peace Fund. However, the prospects of ECOWAS eliciting donor contributions to the Peace Fund is also an indication that member states are seen to be paying their dues.29

EASBRIG and IGAD in East Africa

East Africa contributes to UN peacekeeping on a much smaller scale than West Africa, but the region currently hosts two ongoing and expanding missions: the UN Mission in (South) Sudan (with a mandated strength of up to 10,000); and the AU Mission in Sudan [Darfur] (with a mandated strength of up to 6,671 staff and a request to increase this to 12,300 by the first half of 2006). At the time of writing the AU had approved a mission in Somalia, to which Uganda and Sudan will contribute troops. It is thus not inconceivable that contributions to peacekeeping from this part of Africa are set to increase substantially in the foreseeable future. Currently Ethiopia is the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping with some 4,321 military and police staff deployed, followed by Kenya with 1,483. The only other contributors are Djibouti and Uganda with 24 and 22 military/police staff respectively.30

In contrast with West Africa, East Africa has a plethora of overlapping regional organisations including the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community. Although the AU defines East Africa as a region composed of some 15 countries, it does not have an overarching and integrated conflict prevention, management and mitigation framework similar to West Africa. As a result, the AU mandated the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), on an inter-governmental basis, to coordinate the efforts of the region towards the establishment of an East African Standby Brigade. EASBRIG.31 Whereas IGAD itself is composed of seven countries, the discussions on EASBRIG initially included all 13 countries in the region, the recent decision by Tanzania and Mauritius to contribute to the ASF as part of IGAD. Since Somalia cannot currently contribute, EASBRIG will not be composed of contributions from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Seychelles – although the latter two countries did not attend any of the associated preparatory meetings.32

In the absence of a legal framework for conflict management, EASBRIG is to operate on the basis of a memorandum of understanding that provides for an Assembly of Heads of State and Government for EASBRIG, a Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, a Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff, a standby brigade headquarters, a planning element and logistic base.

EASBRIG has decided to separate the locations of the planning element from the brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and the logistic base in Addis Ababa. The decision to locate the logistic base in Ethiopia has the benefit of potentially co-locating with the AU logistic depot, but is possibly not an optimal choice in terms of the regional transport infrastructure or of benefiting from the region’s extended coastline.

The assembly serves as the ‘supreme authority’ for EASBRIG and authorises deployment for missions mandated by the PSC.33 Unlike the ECOWAS military component (ESF), EASBRIG, in terms of its memorandum of understanding, can only deploy with a mandate from the AU. On deployment, the brigade will come under the operational control of the AU or the UN, as applicable.34

The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security is to manage all aspects relating to EASBRIG, and only “appoint the commander of EASBRIG upon recommendation of the Committee of East African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) for stand-alone missions within the East Africa region”.35 Where the AU mandates a deployment, the PSC will appoint the brigade commander.36

The EASBRIG Headquarters in Addis Ababa will serve as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command. It is also responsible for the provision of secretarial services to the Committee of EACDS and is to be composed of seconded officers from all EASBRIG member states.37

In terms of capabilities, EASBRIG aims to optimise its structure towards participation in traditional peacekeeping tasks that is, in accordance with Scenario 4 of the AU doctrine and Chapter VI of the UN Charter, although the planning framework provides for sealift capabilities and additional fire-support capacity in Scenarios 5 and 6.

The functions of the Committee of East African Chiefs of Defence Staff are to serve as an advisory military committee for the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security and the assembly, and to oversee, direct and manage the PLANELM, EASBRIG headquarters and the logistics base.38

The head of the PLANELM also serves as the chief of staff of EASBRIG and is located in Kenya.39 The PLANELM will be composed of a regional military and civilian staff on secondment from all EASBRIG member states, and is being equipped at its location at Karen, outside Nairobi, close to the existing Peace Support Training Centre (KIPSTC), with funding from Britain. The function of the PLANELM is to serve as a multinational full-time planning headquarters for EASBRIG and it is empowering to enter into agreements with national and other training institutions.

The function of the logistics base, which is located in Ethiopia (with proposed outposts in member states as and when required), is to serve as the central regional base for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of EASBRIG. It also coordinates all activities involving logistics, “including but not limited to performing functions mandated by the African Union and/or the United Nations managing external assistance”.40

Through the EASBRIG fund, IGAD is able to collect contributions from all member states assessed in accordance with the AU mode of contributions, and grants, donations and contributions from member states and other sources. Funds may also be used for...
In February 2004 member states offered the following troop and equipment contributions to EASBRIG:

- Rwanda: two light infantry battalions with organic transport; one mechanised battalion (with ten armoured personnel carriers and four infantry combat vehicles); one signals platoon; one provost company; one engineer squadron/company; one medical company; one special forces company; and public information and legal officers.
- Sudan: one light infantry battalion, including organic transport.
- Kenya: one light infantry battalion, including organic transport; one medical company; and one squadron of engineers.
- Djibouti: one light infantry battalion (consisting of three sub-units) with organic transport composed of 130 personnel, including a support command company; two infantry companies; and one demining team.
- Uganda: one light infantry battalion, including organic support.

In July 2004 the following additional pledges were made:

- Ethiopia: one light infantry battalion with organic transport; one company of engineers; one de-mining company; one signals platoon; and one level I medical unit.
- Madagascar: one light infantry battalion with a medical component as from 2006.

Preparations for the establishment of a peacekeeping brigade in SADC pre-date the current initiative towards the ASF by several years.

The SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) is currently hosting the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC)46 with an approved annual budget of $37,894,000. South Africa is the largest UN troop contributor from this region, with 2,336 military and police personnel deployed, followed by Namibia (880), Mozambique (193), Zambia (132), Zimbabwe (86), Malawi (55) and Madagascar (1).

South Africa, the current chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, has prioritised the establishment of a regional early warning system, the SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) and support to the peace process in the DRC for 2004/5.

Following the various decisions by the AU on the establishment of the ASF, the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) met in Maputo, Mozambique, in April 2004 to consider the establishment of SADCBRIG. Consequently, a Ministerial Defence Sub-Committee was mandated by the ISDSC to set up a technical team to plan the establishment. Recent meetings of the technical team, composed of military planners, took place in April and May 2005, including the establishment of an interim PLANELM at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. Although the outcomes of these and subsequent meetings are being treated with a high degree of confidentiality, the region is known to be finalising the memorandum of understanding between member states that will regulate the establishment and maintenance of SADCBRIG. Member state troop contributions have been pledged, and a proposed management and PLANELM structure completed, as well as a structure for SADCBRIG. The planners aim to gain approval of their planning at the SADC Summit in August 2005.

Subsequent years saw two regional military operations into Lesotho (including troops from South Africa and Botswana) and the DRC (including troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) that initially appeared to accentuate rather than reduce regional differences. In 1999 Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa and the launch of his African renaissance project, premised on solidarity among African countries, set the region on a new course or regional collaboration and integration. Like ECOWAS, SADC has an integrated economic and security structure. The consolidation of these developments, however, is quite recent. Although SADC Heads of State agreed to the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation on 28 June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana, the protocol was several years in the making before being signed by SADC leaders on 14 August 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi. Beyond sometimes bruising regional divisions, the finalisation of the Organ and its associated structures was delayed by the decision, in August 1999, to restructure all SADC institutions (since SADC had previously been restricted to a development mandate) including the Organ. This process was completed in 2001.47

The Protocol on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation includes the following specific objectives:

- To consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
- To develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.

At an extraordinary meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, in January 2003, the summit mandated the SADC Organ to prepare a strategic indicative plan for the
The precise relationship between SADCBRIG, its PLANELM and standby brigade headquarters and the SADC Secretariat is not yet clear.

The SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government – the mandating authority for SADCBRIG. All contributions to AU peace operations will be subject to the approval of the SADC Summit on the recommendation of the country that chairs the SADC Organ. The chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. This is currently South Africa with Namibia next in line; The Ministerial Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Security and State Security (plenary) from all SADC countries that have signed and ratified the Organ protocol. This committee will manage all aspects relating to SADCBRIG.

According to the SIPO, a key challenge under the defence sector is “developing policies and capacities to ensure that the region maintains trained units ready to be deployed in peace support operations in the region or under the auspices of the African Union or the United Nations”. One of its objectives is a commitment “to develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in International and Regional Peacekeeping Operations (through the following) Strategies/activities:

- Develop a regional peace support operational capability based upon the individual member state’s standby arrangements.
- Consolidate and develop the activities of the regional peacekeeping training centre.
- Finance the regional peacekeeping training centre (RPTC) according to the capacities of member states or through possible foreign partners.
- Design and establish a regional peace support operational structure with appropriate means.
- Promote the interoperability of military equipment to be used in peace support operations.
- Train regional forces for peace support operations.
- Conduct joint multinational exercises.

The region has also committed itself to developing the peacekeeping capacity of national police services and promoting the joint training of civil police for this purpose as well as establishing a regional database of trained personnel.

SADC expects that SADCBRIG or its components will typically be deployed under a UN or AU mandate. Planning and preparations, however, do cater for deployment under the mandating authority of SADC. The specific components of the applicable strategic management structures will consist of:

- A Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy that will coordinate the participation of State Parties in International and Regional Peacekeeping Operations.
- A new SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff.
- The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, which will also fall under the department. Set up in October 1996, the RPTC is adjacent to the Zimbabwe Staff College. It gained substantive support from the government of Denmark between 1997 and 2002. For a number of years the RPTC nominally fell under the SADSO, but was managed by the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence. In 2001 its staff became multinational with personnel seconded from six SADC countries, but shortly afterwards the institution lost its support from Denmark and other partners, and effectively became moribund until a recent decision was made to reconfigure the centre. It now reports to the SADC Secretariat and will be funded by contributions from member states, although discussions with donors are continuing. The intention is also to restructure the concept of a SADC clearinghouse for peace support training activities at the RPTC.

Like IGAD, SADCBRIG will be a true multinational standby force, with contingents assigned for up to six months for any in-country assignment. Even the standby brigade headquarters will have a multinational structure and the commander and deputy/chief of staff may not necessarily be from the same country. The downside of such an arrangement is that the region will not be able to base the brigade on a reserve or active bridge structure in countries such as South Africa, Angola or Zimbabwe.

SADC guidelines stipulate that the force or member states should support/sustain the force for the first three to six months and that the force should be able to negotiate and conclude host-nation support agreements and contracts with civilian authorities and commercial companies for its initial requirements. The region has apparently not yet concluded its discussions on the location and composition of a military logistic depot.

Earmarked units will remain in their countries of origin on an on-call system and the region has adopted the response times defined by the AU – although smaller contingents of multinational rapid reaction/early entry forces should be available on a much higher 14 days state of readiness.
More recently, two additional financing proposals were approved: a three-year agreement for an amount of €6 million for capacity building of the Peace and Security Department of the AU, and €80 million for Darfur (for the expanded mission, AMIS II).

Under the current arrangement, the EU could agree to the use of the Peace Facility for a peacekeeping operation by the AU or a regional organisation based on an application from the EU with support from the UN Security Council. The reason for this could be take the form of a statement by the UN Secretary-General. For peace enforcement, however, the EU requires a UNSC resolution if funds from the Peace Facility are to be made available.

In conjunction with generous assistance from individual countries such as the USA, the Peace Facility provides an important tool for meeting the operational costs of African peace missions as well as limited start-up funds for the ASF concept. The problem is that it does not guarantee ongoing support – hence the importance of moving to a system based on assessed contributions and the integration of peacekeeping in Africa with the UN system. Even the EU Peace Facility is inadequate to meet current demands and at the existing rate of commitment will shortly be exhausted – although there are plans in the EU to provide substantial funds under the Stability Instrument as from 2007.

Against this background there are probably seven options for meeting regional peacekeeping operational costs:

- Funding regional operations as part of the assessed scale of peacekeeping contributions as proposed by two recent UN reports. By implication, missions funded in this way would have to be mandated by the UN Security Council. This arrangement would probably require the regional organisation to present and defend the budget for a particular mission to the UN Security Council working with and through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and to establish oversight and financial accountability structures to the satisfaction of key UN contributors such as the United States.

- Voluntary contributions from international organisations and/or bilaterally to a special trust fund. IGAD and SADC are already considering an increase in the establishment of a regional peace fund. The establishment of a trust fund for the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) set a precedent for such an arrangement. The most recent attempt under the EU Peace Facility is already under way.

- Non-UN support from organisations such as the EU for the AU or regional organisations. An example is the EU/ACP Council of Ministers’ decision of 11 December 2003 to allow €250 million to be earmarked for the AU Peace Facility.

- UN/UEFA support to provide for the AU Peace Facility. The AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have made significant progress towards establishing a viable regional peace support capability. However, the gap between aspiration and implementation remains extremely wide. Protocols and framework documents are in place, and institutional structures are being built, but operational capacity remains limited in the face of rising demands and expectations.

Ultimately, Africa and its friends have to be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term by relatively young organisations that lack institutional experience and capacity and comprise some of the world’s poorest and least developed countries. Building effective peacekeeping operations capacity in Africa will take time, and it does not offer a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa for the international community.

This has been said, the single biggest impediment to peacekeeping in Africa by Africans is funding – and there has been remarkable innovation and progress in this regard in recent years.

At its annual summit in Maputo, the AU requested the EU to establish a peace facility “to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU”. The facility should be “based on the principle of solidarity among African countries and should be financed from resources allocated to each African state under existing co-operation agreements with the EU”. The EU-AU Council of Ministers subsequently decided on 11 December 2003 to allocate €250 million to be earmarked for the AU Peace Facility.

The first operation to be funded through the Peace Facility was the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) when the EDF Management Committee Meeting agreed to provide €12 million for operations in Darfur, as against the original budget for the operation amounting to €21 million.

The exit strategy for the AU remains a UN operation since only the UN can provide a response to the types of complex emergency that characterise conflict in Africa.

Closing the capability gaps will require a hard-headed approach to the challenge, one that disregards outcomes that result from mere wishful thinking, particularly regarding mission support and sustainment, where the first need is for realistic joint planning between the AU, the UN, the African regions and donors to reach consensus on a viable approach to the future of the ASF in its various guises and regarding logistics in particular. This will not be easy.

For example, the soundness of present plans to establish regional and continental logistic support bases is open to challenge. Storing vehicles and equipment in harsh climates requires heavy investment in infrastructure and climate control if stores are to be operational when needed. All of the investment falls on the users, slow, to protect civilians and halt ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region.

Importantly, the Sudanese government has not objected to the presence of troops from African countries, but rejects deployment of non-African troops. AMIS is therefore an essential part of the solution to the humanitarian crisis and the broader Sudanese peace process. The AU therefore richly deserves credit for taking the lead in exploring new and creative solutions to Darfur in the face of UNSC paralysis and inaction, but these laudable efforts will inevitably cause ASF establishment timelines to slip as the Commission and the troop-contributing nations grapple with the demands for more rapid deployment and expanded mission management.

A further complicating issue is that the ASF architecture dictates that it will be entirely dependent on the regions for force generation and operational capability. The member states of these regions are already committed to providing troops and police to AMIS, as well as ongoing UN operations, and may also be contributing to their own regional operations when called upon to mobilise for future ASF operations. Moreover (as discussed earlier in this paper) the regions are developing their standby capacities at different rates and with different levels of linking to a continental framework and standards.

Universal standards therefore need to be developed as a matter of urgency, taking into account that the ASF is likely to operate as a bridging force for UN deployments rather than a replacement. In other words, the exit strategy for the current operation since only the UN can provide a response to the types of complex emergency that characterise conflict in Africa. This was true of Bunundi and of recent Ecowas experiences.

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For example, the soundness of present plans to establish regional and continental logistic support bases is open to challenge. Storing vehicles and equipment in harsh climates requires heavy investment in infrastructure and climate control if stores are to be operational when needed. All of the investment falls on the users,
and maintenance is a challenge to in-house staff. On the other hand, most developed nations and many UN members are moved to a much greater degree of reliance on the commercial sector to provide logistic solutions for peace operations. The US company Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) has provided substantial support to several ECOWAS operations, and commercial logistics contracting merits serious consideration. It places much of the investment and management load on the commercial sector rather than on overstretched regional organisations, and avoids the need for the recruitment and training of a cadre of additional personnel. Strategic Lift requirements can be met in the same way. The cost of investing in a dedicated pool of heavy lift transport aircraft and the appropriate logistics infrastructure to support them is clearly disproportionate. The UN itself relies entirely on contracts not only for airlift, but also for all non-combat aviation support to its missions in Africa. The aspiration of Africans to have control of key enablers is understandable, and a commercial solution will inevitably depend on developed world companies. Nigeria has already proposed that the AU develop a policy that would prioritise African companies. Nigeria has already proposed that the solution will inevitably depend on developed world missions in Africa. but also for all non-combat aviation support to its of maintaining them, is clearly disproportionate. The aircraft and shipping, accompanied by the challenges of investing in a dedicated pool of heavy lift transport and security reforms. For the foreseeable future, only the UN has the capacity to implement multifunctional mission mandates in Africa. The biggest danger with any approach that seeks to simplify de-escalation in Africa is that this will strengthen the ‘Band-Aid’ solution. An end to widespread armed conflict is a prerequisite for development – but it is no more than that. Without an effort that replaces a conflict cycle with one that reinforces peace and development, African peacekeeping probably has less chance of success than UN peacekeeping and has great potential to approximate offensive military operations in the absence of sufficient resources.

Notes

1 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), Volume II: Annexes, Annex C.
2 In West Africa the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) similarly opted into a financial agreement, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone.
3 Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002. Article 21(3) of the PSC Protocol reads as follows: “In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of primary military contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”
5 Ibid, Article 12(1).
6 Ibid, Article 21(1).
7 In this paper the term ‘continental’ is used to refer to the level of the African Union and the term ‘regional’ to refer to regions within Africa such as East or Southern Africa.
10 The entwined OAU recognised five main regions in Africa, and prioritised one corresponding regional economic community (REC) to advance the peace and security in each: The Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) in the east; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the north; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the south; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African region.
11 Within the framework of Article 14.2 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.
12 The regional PLANELMs would also expand to 15 over time.
13 Current members include the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAPICT), the Zambuko Peacekeeping Training School, the Cairo School of Peacekeeping, the AADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Kenya Peace Support Training Centre, the South African National War College, the African Centre for the Constitutive Resolution of Disputes and the CEBDRP Secretariat. The latter is also responsible for secretariat functions.
15 Note that the regional West African UNCT in Guinea has been substantially reduced to 5,000. The first force are due in the mission area in June 2005.
16 There was not a single political adviser to the SREIS in Liberia, while in Côte d’Ivoire, one military officer was appointed to the staff of the SREIS.
17 An agreement was agreed under the ‘9th Defence and Security Commission (DSC) in 2004.
18 This total comprised,500 for the Task Force, a further 3,500 to add to the Task Force to form a military brigade, and a further 1,500 to form the strategic reserve.
19 As defined by the ECOWAS Secretariat, but based on UN standards wherever appropriate.
20 While the AU and the other regions talk of PLANELMs, ECOWAS has set up the MPMC with a staff of ten military officers (with Canadian support) to deal with strategic and operational planning. The intention is for the MPMC to operate on a permanent basis. Its task will be to plan for mission deployments, and after that, to oversee their management from the perspective of the ECOWAS Secretariat.
22 At the 10th DSC meeting. Troops are to be drawn from all arms of service in order to create a balanced force.
23 The ECOWAS structure defines this as a ‘logistical unit’, although it includes combat support elements such as engineers and signals.
24 EFS Framework, op cit, par 16.
26 Ibid, par 8.
27 The complexities of creating a training policy for the deployable forces and associated staff of the ESF should not be underestimated. The latter is to be composed of a number of national contingents that are trained according to different national doctrinal and performance standards.
28 The absence of this capability markedly slowed financial support from partners for the ECOWIL mission. It was rectified when financial technical advisers from UN and EU peace support operations were dispatched to assist ECOWAS.
30 All figures for March 2005 are available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ dpko/contributors/.
31 The process to approve the EASSIRG structures and framework was as follows: a preparatory meeting of EASSIRG military experts and a subsequent meeting of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence (EACDS) in Addis Ababa, Uganda, from 13 to 17 February 2004. This was followed by a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of Eastern Africa on 16–17 July 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A second meeting of regional experts took place from 16 to 20 August 2004, in Jinja, Uganda, and a third meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff and then of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security were held in Kigali, Rwanda, from 7 to 10 September 2004. The Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of EASBRIG was held in Addis Ababa on 11 April 2005 concluded the approval process. The latter meeting, in turn, affirmed the earlier AU decision regarding the role of IGAD as interim coordinator.
32 Djbouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya.
33 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Articles 3 and 5.
34 The policy framework does refer to ‘stand-alone missions’. The first commander of EASSIRG, an Ethiopian brigadier-general, was appointed recently.
35 Article 7(i).
36 EASBRG Policy Framework, Par 8g.
37 Article 9.
38 Article 8(2).
39 Considered by the Kenyan Col R Kiboho.
40 Article 11.

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41 The salaries of officers, professional civilians and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs), who staff specific positions at the headquarters, the PLANEM and the logistic base, will be paid by member states. EASBIRG will cover mission allowances. EASBIRG itself will cover costs of civilian support staff employed at the various structures.

42 The policy framework creates the impression that EASBIRG is entirely to be coordinated by IGAD.

43 At the meetings in Jinja, Uganda.


45 Authorized maximum strength: military personnel: 16,700; civilian police personnel: 473. Civilian personnel include specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical and administrative support. Current strength: 16,270 total uniformed personnel, including 15,332 troops, 561 military observers, 175 civilian police supported by 734 international civilian personnel and 1,154 local civilian staff. Method of financing: assessments in respect of a special account.

46 The Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and

47 At the various structures.

48 SIPO, political sector objective 6.

49 This would continue the practice established with earlier exercises, notably Blue Houndwe (1996), Blue Crane (1999), Tanzania (2002) and Blue Angel (2003).

50 See Articles 3 to 8 of the Organ Protocol.

51 Unlike the AU and ECOMI, SADC does not have a Peace and Security Council or committee with reduced membership that acts on behalf of member states. Instead, all countries are involved within its peace and security framework below heads of state level.

52 This is roughly equivalent to the ECOMAS meetings of the Mediation and Security Council at ministerial level. Note that the SADC Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) consisting of all Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not part of the SADCBRIG strategic management structure. The first meeting of the Interstate Political and Diplomatic Committee opened in Maputo on 17 May 2002, but the committee has not succeeded in meeting regularly.

53 The ISPDC previously had three sub-committees: on defence; state security; and public security. The SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff is a fourth committee.

54 It will serve as an advisory committee to the Ministerial Committee of the Organ and, if necessary, the SADC Summit, oversee and manage the PLANEM, and be responsible for readiness levels, etc.

55 SIPO, par 8.3.1.

56 SADC has been careful to emphasise that member states have the final say in the participation of their earmarked forces in any particular mission.


58 Somewhat optimistically, the financing proposal anticipated that it would be able to finance a minimum of six operations from this amount. The Peace Facility can not be used to fund ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries for soldiers and military training for soldiers. The expectation was that funding would be focused on operational costs such as per diems, rations, medical consumables, transport, fuel and troop allowances (AIDC/04/04-

59 Within the EU Commission the financial proposal was subsequently considered at length at the European Development Fund (EDF) Management Committee Meeting on 30 March 2004. After a long debate, the final compromise language roads as follows: “Each operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will have to be initiated by the African Union (AU) and/or the sub-regional organization. As a general rule, when a sub-regional organization takes an initiative, this initiative shall have the political approval of the AU. Peace support operations will be implemented by the AU and/or the relevant sub-regional organization” (Par 7.2.2 of the Financing Proposal AIDC/04/04-

60 On 9 June 2004.


62 AIDC/04/04-EN, EDF Committee Brief on Peace Facility Operations, Brussels, 15 October 2004. The largest part (87%) of the funds is for the recruitment of 25 additional staff members for the AU Commission.

63 The total budget foresaw by the AU for AMIS II at that point was €177 million and the request to the EU followed the decisions by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 20 October 2004 to strengthen the mandate of AMIS. AIDC/04/04-EN, EDF Committee Brief on Peace Facility Operation Darfur Sudan AMIS II, Brussels, 21 October 2004.

64 Although neither AMIS nor AMIS II can be conceived as enforcement operations, there is strong UN endorsement, and even a Chapter VII element in Resolution 1556, with the Security Council determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region, and, “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, … endorses the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force envisaged by the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership of the African Union …” Resolution 1556 goes a bit further, with Council again “Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”, and welcoming and supporting “the intention of the African Union to enhance and augment its monitoring mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, and [encouraging] the undertaking of proactive monitoring” (UN Security Council, Resolution 1556 (2004), S/RES/1556(2004), 30 July 2004, par 2. UN Security Council, Resolution 1564 (2004), S/RES/1564(2004), 18 September 2004, par 2).


66 United Nations General Assembly, A more secure world: our shared responsibility: Report Of The High-

67 And historically, Nigeria, in support of other ECOMAS troop contributors in Sierra Leone and Liberia,
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About this paper

This paper provides an overview of the progress that has been made towards the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), at continental and regional levels. The first section provides a review of the continental framework as it has evolved to date and been adopted by the African Union. Subsequent sections deal with progress in three regions in Africa, namely the Economic Community for West Africa (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The conclusion highlights the most salient challenges to be overcome if the ASF is to become a meaningful and effective conflict resolution tool in the hands of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

About the author

Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the Institute for Security Studies and has published widely on regional security issues. Mark Malan is head of the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Department at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Funder

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