A Discussion Think Piece

THE AU/UN HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR:
Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. This [think] piece seeks to highlight key lessons that the joint AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), presents and their implications for regional peacekeeping training.

2. The piece is informed by the argument that the environment of the African Mission in Sudan-Darfur (AMIS), which was established by the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004, typifies two of the mission scenarios of the African Standby Force (ASF). These are: Scenario 5 (complex peacekeeping with spoilers in which the UN/international community does not act promptly) and Scenario 6 (intervention, e.g., genocide).

3. AMIS (as well as the African Mission in Burundi, AMIB, about 2,700 strong, from 2004-2005; and the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, about 1,200 Ugandans, 2007), are the new breed of AU-led 'pacification/stabilisation' missions that aim, among others, to support regional peace implementation, by creating conditions for the subsequent transfer of the mandate to the UN. AMIS is thus expected to handover the peacekeeping mandate to the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, by the end of 2007.

4. It is arguable that AU and regional missions should be established on principles, procedures and arrangements consistent with those of the UN in order to facilitate smooth mandate transfers. In the final analysis, ASF training should aim to capacitate the RECs/Regions to establish regional brigades (forces) for Scenario 4 (complex multidimensional peacekeeping without spoilers), as well as to deploy Scenario 4 brigade (force) headquarters, by 2010.

5. But such efforts should be informed by real experiences within ongoing missions and operations within the continent, especially those led by the AU System. Incidentally, even though the experiences of these missions, particularly AMIS, are replete with examples for the development of the ASF, not much attention is being paid in regard of the design of ASF training. Given the imperatives of the AMIS operation the piece examines the key parameters of AMIS and UNAMID, and uses these to highlight the challenges to ASF training, continentally and regionally, against emerging ASF training policy frameworks.

6. The piece covers overviews of AMIS and UNAMID, to provide a basis for an assessment of the challenges and implications for ASF regional training. It makes the point that such training policy frameworks should seek to address two broad imperatives. First, enhancement of strategic management capacities for decision-making at the policy level, and second, enhancement of operational capacities to smoothly activate and implement such policy decisions.

7. A working knowledge of the ASF project is assumed and is not examined in any greater detail in the piece. Finally, the think piece is not a template for ASF
regional training. It only highlights salient factors for rethinking and review of existing policies towards effective training.

II. OVERVIEW AMIS PARAMETERS

Overview of AMIS

8. Some of the key parameters of AMIS can be summarised as follows:

   a) UN, AU and international community concern over the compelling humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur at the beginning of 2004 was the fundamental raison d’être for intervention.

   b) The mission was established by the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), following lack of political entry point by the UN and the international community, within the broad ambit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter relating to regional arrangements.

   c) The perception is that the regional actor appeared to have been motivated by the constitutional provisions on the right of AU intervention, and a sense of ‘African solidarity in finding African solutions to African problems,’ more than a practical appreciation of the underpinning factors and dynamics of the conflict, including the expanse of AMIS’ area of operational responsibility, poor road infrastructure and inadequate air assets for communication and mission support.

   d) Lack of comprehensive, respectable ceasefire and/or peace agreement, underscored the dilemmas of a ‘no peace to keep’, even though AMIS was deployed with a veiled ‘Chapter VI’ peacekeeping mandate.

   e) Practically speaking, the AU did not have the means, expertise and resources for intervention involving complex, modern peacekeeping; as opposed to the timid interventions by the OAU (see below), or those at the low-end of the ASF mission scenarios (see next section).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
<th>MANDATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NMOG I (57)</td>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>CFA monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMOG II (70)</td>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>CFA monitoring</td>
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<td>OMIB (47)</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>1993-96</td>
<td>Confidence building; promotion of dialogue</td>
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<td>OMIC (20)</td>
<td>COMOROS</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Monitoring; observation &amp; deterrence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMIC II (14)</td>
<td>COMOROS</td>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>Monitoring arms collection</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMIC III (39)</td>
<td>COMOROS</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Election monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC/NI (10/33)</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1999-2000/02</td>
<td>CFA monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLMEE (34)</td>
<td>ETHIO-ERIT</td>
<td>2000-</td>
<td>Assistance to UNMEE; showing of AU presence</td>
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f) Slow mobilisation, deployment and build-up of the force from the 60 military observers in June 2004 to the now estimated 7,700: 5600 military, police and civilian); the fact being though that the subsequent deployment of about 1331 police was as an after-thought.

g) The lack of any coherent involvement of the RECs/Regions in the force/police generation, as well as the management of the mission, in spite of the fact that the standby brigades (forces) of the RECs/Regions are to be the building blocks of the ASF.

h) Lack of any coherent involvement with the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).

i) Lack of structured frameworks for AU-UN collaboration, until the establishment of the UN DPKO AU Peace Support Team in January 2007.

j) The operational complexities of the functions and composition of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), comprising the warring factions and coupled with the incentives of allowances to representatives of the warring factions.

k) Thus, coupled with the lack of a comprehensive ceasefire and/or peace agreement, as well as other exigencies of the deployment, the AMIS was saddled with a weak, perhaps incoherent mandate, for which it also lacked the capacity and resources, including a demonstrated operational will for force protection and mission accomplishment.

l) The recent violations of the ceasefire in Haskanita (Sector 8, Ad Du'ayn) in September-October in speaks to the critical need for timely operational information (intelligence) and analysis, as well as the need for effective standard operational procedures (SOPs) that are understood by all personnel.

m) Mission management hurdles that arguably owe, among others, to lack of institutional integration at the AU Commission and consequently, lack of an integrated planning approach.

**Broad Observations**

9. The foregoing summary and overview lead to the following broad observations that impact on training:
a) Increasing trends towards AU and regional deployments, well before the policy view of building organic African capacities for peace support interventions.

b) Complexity of mandates, missions and end-states that are affected by new multidimensional and multidisciplinary actors and range of complex issues, such as DDR (and SSR), gender, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), humanitarian assistance (and in other missions, transitional administration, mine action, etc).

c) Effect of spoilers and high Chapter VII 'use of force' threshold.

d) In tandem with other external factors, a concomitant trend towards hybrid operations in its various interpretations, including a dependence on external assistance and support.

e) In spite of these challenging developments, the AU System has lacked strategic management capability, and has been perceived as not being able to utilise donor funding for recruitment and establishment of such a capability.

f) The dearth of planning and management capability was worsened by the AU's preoccupation with numerous complex hot conflicts.

g) Donor dependency syndrome (including multiplicity of donor support agendas: G8, EU, NATO, Arab League, etc.), coupled with lack of financial, logistical and strategic lift capacity, and regional ownership.

h) Paucity of C3IS infrastructure.

10. Perhaps as a result of the combination of these and other factors, the level of peacekeeping expertise of AMIS personnel has been reported as being inadequate. This is a little surprising considering that some of the key personnel of the mission, especially on the side of the military, would have been veterans of UN and other regional peacekeeping. A possible explanation of this reported lack of peacekeeping training would appear to be that the experience of the deployed personnel did not easily translate into mission effectiveness for a regional-led operation.

11. If that be the case, the need will be for the AU/RECs to be able to ensure adequate pre-deployment training for deployed personnel, especially those focusing on the middle and senior levels of leadership. This will only be possible if the lack of strategic management capability is addressed and a concerted effort is made to activate the relevant ASF training policy and infrastructure.

III. OVERVIEW OF UNAMID PARAMETERS

Fundamental role of the UN
12. In respect of the Darfur conflict and the AU intervention, the UN’s role predominantly has been the endorsement of the intervention through a number of Security Council Resolutions and actions. The key ones worth mentioning are:

a) Increasing diplomatic pressure (UN SCR 1556 (2004) relating to the Agreement on arms embargo).

b) Specific commendation of the AU and the encouraged to the international community to support the AU efforts through (UN SCR 1590 (2004).

c) International commission of enquiry relating to ICC jurisdiction for trial of persons accused of war crimes in Darfur, as well as the classified list of 51 names to UNSC (UN SCR 1593 (2004).

d) The establishment of Chapter VII Sanctions (against Musa Hilal (Janjaweed, Paramount Chief, Jalul tribe; Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (GoS Air Force commander, Darfur; Adam Yacub Shant, SLA; and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri (NMRD field commander (UN SCR 1672 (2006); and the additional ICC indictments against Ahmed Haroun (former deputy interior minister) and Ali Kushayb (Janjaweed leader) in February 2007.

e) The initial attempt towards an UNMIS hybrid deployment to Darfur (Chapter VII, involving 17,000 troops, 2300 (?) police and the Light and Heavy Support Packages (LSP and HSP, UN SCR 1706 (2006), a move that was rejected by the GoS and therefore derailed the anticipated AMIS handover to the UN mission in December 2006; and finally

f) The establishment of UNAMID (UNSCR 1769 (2007).

Hybridisation or Hybridism: Elements (Imperatives) of a Common Definition

13. The existing Draft UN Capstone Doctrine does not offer a common definition of hybrid operations. A suggested generic definition (Aboagye 2007:2) is along the following lines:

- A joint multinational and/or multidisciplinary operation in a specific area of operational responsibility.

- Conducted by forces from different organisations and/or states each with its own mandate (objectives, missions, tasks, end states, composition, etc).

- Under different Status of Forces or Missions Agreement (SOFA/SOMA), and host nation agreements.

- With different rules of engagements.

- Each under the command and control of its respective mandating authority.

- Each retaining its organisation’s identity throughout the operation.

- Each undertaking different functional missions and tasks.
But with provision for the achievement will contribute to the management and resolution of the conflict from different coordination of operations, including combat, combat support, combat service support, air support, transport, etc., within that area of operational responsibility.

For the purpose of achieving objectives or end states that may be common or whose political-military perspectives.

14. In spite of the fact that this definition is not universally accepted, the elements do underscore the need for training that focuses on such critical issues command, control and communications; end states, exit strategies and mission essential tasks; the nature of multinational, multidimensional operations; integrated planning and coordination; education on the implications of SOMA/SOFAs; rules of engagement, combat and mission support; etc. It should be obvious that the ability to seamlessly harness all these elements together requires thorough command and control arrangements.

Key Parameters of UNAMID

15. In very broad terms, the UNAMID environment that is about to be inherited from AMIS will be anything but non-permissive. Coupled with this, the key parameters of UNAMID variously involve:

- At the policy level, the processes of mandate formulation, interpretation and transfer, including challenges to synergies between short-term military support operations and follow-on arrangements
- A command and control mechanism that is so unprecedented that it is difficult to fully understand its practical application
- A force mix that is predominantly African, with a sprinkle of UN LSP/HSP, with implications for an effective concept of operations. This raises the possibility of inadequate civilian planning capacity on the one hand, and selective national deployments, or non deployment and commitments gaps on the other. This will also lead to further gaps in mission capabilities
- A high degree of need for force protection, in order to provide for the capacity towards civilian protection; and a careful balance between peacekeeping capabilities around protection, monitoring and verification, and liaison
- Questions around civilian protection includes a clear understanding of the demands of community policing and formed policing, for which there is as yet the UN Capstone doctrine is silent about
- Dilemmas of Intra-AU coordination, and inter-organisation coordination and joint support and coordination
- Overwhelming donor coordination, and unpredictable financing that raise questions around force morale, including discipline
Broad Observations

16. In a nutshell, the UN approach to the Darfur debacle stands in some contrast with that of the AU, which tended to emphasise a ‘softly softly’ stance, on occasions involving public media disagreement. Such media spat only served the interests of Bashir who, since Day 1, has sworn by ‘Allah’ not to hand over any Sudanese to a foreign court and has gone ahead to establish his own Special National Criminal Court on Events in Darfur (complementarity strategy).

17. These developments strongly support the need for regional interventions to be based on a pragmatic appreciation of the nature of conflicts and the political stakes, rather than political euphoria (expectation) over interventions that are likely to lead to ‘missions impossible.’ This in turn demands a more coordinated approach between the AU Commission, the Facilitation and mission leadership, as well as between the AU, the UN and the international community.

IV. OVERVIEW OF KEY ASF PARAMETERS

Missions Scenarios and Deployment Timelines

18. In terms of mission scenarios, critical challenges to ASF mandates and training will be in the areas relating to Scenario 4 (AU/regional Chapter VI peacekeeping force and preventive deployment missions); Scenario 5 (AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low level spoilers); and Scenario 6 (AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly). Scenario 1 (AU/regional military advice to a political mission), Scenario 2 (AU/regional co-deployed observer mission) and Scenario 3 (AU/regional stand-alone observer mission) are not expected to pose huge daunting challenges.

19. The above mission scenarios require the following ASF deployment timelines:
   a) Scenarios 1 – 4. 30 days.
   b) Scenario 5. 90 days.
   c) Scenario 6. 14 days.

20. In determining the ability of the AU, REC/regions to meet these deployment timelines, it is pertinent to recall that in 2003 the EU, which is better-resourced than the AU, took about 42 days to deploy a much smaller (1,300-strong) Operation Artemis. The ability of the AU System will however be affected by its dependence on external capabilities for strategic lift (air and sea), as well as for mission sustainment and to some extent, mission management.

21. ASF training exercises have to factor planning and coordination with such external assistance and support into the requirements of meeting these timelines.

Functions (Missions and Tasks)
22. As opposed to traditional peacekeeping tasks, the top end of the ASF mission scenarios will devolve on complex peacekeeping mandates, missions and tasks, such as those relating to:
   a) Intervention.
   b) Preventive deployment.
   c) Peace-building, including DDR.
   d) Humanitarian assistance.

Management Capabilities
23. The challenges raised by the foregoing critical parameters of the ASF demand the establishment of strategic management capabilities, namely the AU/RECs Planning Elements (PLANELMs) for the planning, organisation and management of training, in order to ensure mission ready multidisciplinary civilian, military and police standby components in countries of origin, ready for deployment at appropriate notice. As stipulated in the ASF Framework document effective training will also devolve on doctrine-based standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are consistent with those of the UN, as well as training infrastructure devolving on regional Centres of Excellence (CoEs), joint and national training exercises.

V. KEY CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

24. The observations from the think piece suggest a number of challenges and implications for training, including but not limited to the following issues.

Standby (Force) Mobilisation and Deployment: Forms/Cycle of Training
25. Even before consideration of the implications of the ASF mission scenarios for training, the fundamental requirements of any ASF deployment are more crucial. A short list of these requirements are:
   a) Applied policy intervention tools, namely: peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, political decision making, mandate analysis and formulation, and integrated mission planning.
   b) Rapid deployment (warning, activation, mobilisation, strategic lift) of mission-ready standby components, including equipment.
   c) Strategic lift by air, sea or land.
   d) Mission management.
   e) Mission sustainment, including logistics.
f) Peacekeeping concepts, issues, practices and procedures (including but not limited to: mandates, SOMA/SOFAs, ROEs, DDR, SEA/SGBV and gender, CIMIC, etc).

26. Even though a perceptible emphasis has been placed on the peacekeeping aspects of training, the preceding requirements are perhaps more crucial to regional mission effectiveness than otherwise.

27. To achieve such effectiveness, especially regarding the intangible aspects of missions and deployments, a sequenced approach to training will yield better results than a mere emphasis on large scale multinational exercises. The following table generically depicts such training that starts with an understanding of the nature of peacekeeping and ends with the application of relevant concepts and practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle (Months)</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Remarks &amp; Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D+3</td>
<td>Study days</td>
<td>Topical, national, single or multidimensional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+3 – D+9</td>
<td>Seminars, workshops, roundtables &amp; Specialist training</td>
<td>Multidimensional Multidisciplinary Multinational Example: UN Senior Mission Leadership (SML) courses Mission planning &amp; management, negotiation &amp; mediation, PR/media, SEA &amp; Gender, DDR/SSR, CIMIC, humanitarian mine action, election monitoring, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+9 – D+12</td>
<td>Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT)</td>
<td>Scenarios-based Individual or syndicate problem solving case studies Out-of-office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+12 – D+15</td>
<td>Map Exercises (Mapex) Command Post Exercise (CPX)</td>
<td>Build-up on TEWT/EWP Scenario-based Ideally multidisciplinary, multidimensional, multinational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+15 – D+18</td>
<td>Field Training Exercises (FTX)</td>
<td>Multidisciplinary multidimensional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+18 – D+24</td>
<td>Evaluation, Validation &amp; Development</td>
<td>Lessons learnt Applied research, publications &amp; dissemination Doctrine development, infusing lessons learnt and research findings into Capstone Doctrine Using AU/RECs experts &amp; participants</td>
</tr>
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</table>

28. The above sequenced training will be additional to the courses presented at CoEs, but should be coordinated with them.

29. In the wake of the UN’s attempt, the AU System should undertake efforts at developing an ASF Capstone Doctrine that is consistent with the UN document. Further to this, however, there will also be need for common Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and Tables of Equipment (TOEs) that are also consistent with the ASF Capstone Doctrine, to facilitate standardised AU/RECs training.

30. Special, urgent efforts should be undertaken to develop (community) police monitoring and formed police unit doctrines that clearly define the spectrum between soft and hard policing, and military use of force operations.

Mission Scenarios

31. Regional training should focus on the lethal end (Scenarios 5 and 6) of the mission scenario spectrum. This is the responsibility of member states to ensure that military and FPU training includes force protection tactics, measures and capabilities.

32. As suggested during the ASF Training Implementation Workshop (Addis Ababa, 29-31 October 2007), RECs/Regions should adopt a common ASF scenario, but one into which all stakeholders, including the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and other research institutions, make inputs. This will help to achieve a more realistic and comprehensive scenario design.

33. A common ASF Capstone scenario should contain all the elements of regional and other peace support operations experiences (ECOMOG, BOLEAS, AMIS/AMIB, OLMEE, AMISOM and others such as the NMOG and OMIC). A comprehensive Capstone scenario for training will help to set minimum, common standards for training.

34. Further to the suggestion at the ASF Training Implementation Workshop, the draft ‘ASF Capstone Scenario’ that is to be developed by the Kenya International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) should be deliberated upon and refined by a RECs/AU workshop. It should subsequently form the framework and basis for regional training.

Mission Command and Control

35. Effective training in this regard will demand the full establishment of the regional PLANELM. While there is nothing wrong with the policy decision to activate a mission headquarters in the event of deployment, the challenges of C² (and C³) strongly suggests a similar need for a standing skeleton brigade (force) headquarters to be involved in pre-mission training, to gain expertise in that field.

36. The need for C² (and C³) expertise also suggests the need for the policy/doctrine on the deployment of these standby structures. Mission consolidation will be facilitated by the deployment of the standing brigade headquarters with a slice of the PLANELM, in order to ensure effective C² (and C³) from the start.

37. Considering that AU/RECs missions will be handed over to the UN at some stage, headquarters organisation and procedures should mirror those of the UN. Until such time that AU/RECs gain sufficient institutional expertise in the planning and management of missions, consideration should be given to headquarters command and staff training within hybrid regional mission headquarters. As was the
case with the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL, 2003) and to a lesser extent with
AMIS and UNAMID (given political difficulties), such headquarters training can involve
the AU/RECs and elements from the UN and the Danish-based Standby High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

38. This arrangement will be consistent with the proposed options for AU/RECs
mission headquarters modules:

a) REC/Region brigade headquarters as the military and/or a police
component command in a mission headquarters established by the
AU.

b) REC/Region brigade headquarters that transforms itself into a regional
mission headquarters.

Military (and Civilian) Observer Component

39. The role of military observers (Milobs) in peacekeeping goes beyond the soft
function of monitoring, observation, liaison, investigation and reporting. Because
they are easy and quicker to deploy, they are able to serve as a ‘mission start-up’
element, including establishing mission and sector headquarters. Regional Milobs
training should therefore include a bit of headquarters functional training. The
framework of such Milobs training should also be extended to police experts and
formed units, as well as key civilian posts.

Mission (Civilian) Leadership

40. Unlike the military and police components, the ‘disjointed’ nature of civilian
institutions does not augur well for effective civilian mission leadership and that of
the civilian component as a whole. The establishment of civilian rosters will also not
necessarily address the dilemma of effective mission civilian leadership. A possible
way of addressing this lacuna is to establish a mechanism that utilises a blend of
the following:

a) Making use of some of the civilian staff of the RECs headquarters, in
the key areas of political, legal, humanitarian, civilian administration,
etc.

b) Making use of some civilian staff at the embassies of SADC/SARPCCO
member states in Gaborone, and keeping such staff on the roster of
civilian capabilities.

c) Making use of other civilians who have been trained by
SADC/SARPCCO partners, and whose competencies have been
sufficiently verified and are rostered as such on an appropriate
regional database of trained civilian personnel.

CoEs and Regional Training Partnerships

41. Regional and other national CoEs are expected to play an important role in
ASF training. The reality, however, is that owing to institutional and infrastructural
limitations, these facilities alone cannot meet the training needs of ASF and regional standby forces. Furthermore, there is a tendency of such centres to focus on military-type peacekeeping training, with little functional training for the civilian and police components, as well as limited allocation of vacancies for members of these components. There is therefore the need for additional facilities for the training of these non-military components.

42. Such training needs may be met by other partners and institutions, both regional and international who have been providing training support and assistance to some of these structures, such as ISS training support for a range of peacekeeping training, and the gender-focused peacebuilding training involving Violence Against Women and Children and HIV/AIDS. Such training and other capacity-building support could also be extended to the newly established Police Women’s Network as one of the SARPCCO sub-committees. An additional contribution of such institutions is in the area of applied (policy) research and doctrine development. Other such regional partners are ACCORD, SAHRIT and SaferAfrica.

43. Within SADC, for instance, SRB Harare has in the past partnered with regional institutions, such as the ISS, for training support in a wide range of disciplines, including peacekeeping. It should therefore come as a logical suggestion that SARPCCO police training framework should continue to serve the requirements of SADCPOL. However, this should be done through coordination of policy guidelines, planning and implementation of all police training between SADCPOL, and the SRB and the SARPCCO Training Sub-Committee, as the implementing agencies.

VI. CONCLUSION

44. The operations of the AU-led mission in Darfur, AMIS, and the transition to the AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur, UNAMID, have provided ample lessons and challenges that should critically inform efforts at the operationalisation of the ASF. One such area that the lessons, challenges from Darfur are most relevant is that of training.

45. ASF training has undoubtedly received much needed attention, but that attention has ignored any coherent use of the lessons and challenges from Darfur, even though they have implications for effective ASF training.

46. This think piece has therefore aimed at highlighting salient issues that need to be factored into training and other approaches towards the operationalisation of the ASF.

47. In conclusion, we must all agree that it has taken too long to develop and formulate the concepts around the ASF. We must start doing something concrete, no matter how small those things are, but in a structured way.
References:


