The impact of slow military reform on the transition process in the DRC

After nearly three years and a number of delays, the transition period in the Democratic Republic of Congo is now set to come to an end by 31 July 2006. A new constitution was adopted by referendum held in late 2005, paving the way for presidential and legislative elections, which are now set to take place on July 30.

This will be the first Congolese government to have been elected in free and fair elections since the first post-independence government of Patrice Lumumba in 1960. It is not only for this historic reason that expectations are high, however; over 4 million people have died over the last eight years of war and turmoil, most of them because they had been displaced from their homes, were too poor to pay for proper medical care, or because the health infrastructure has simply collapsed. Millions of people are displaced or living in refugee camps in neighbouring countries; the formal economy has disintegrated and is not yet sufficiently recovered to absorb the country’s vast unemployed population. Life has been unbearably difficult for most Congolese and they are waiting desperately for things to finally take a definitive turn for the better. Unfortunately, the holding of elections – however free and fair they may turn out to be – is unlikely to usher in the new era of peace, stability and economic recovery that the country and its people so desperately need.

On 30 June 2006, it will have been exactly three years since the transition government embarked on its assigned task of guiding the country to national elections. According to the All-Inclusive Peace Agreement signed by all parties in December 2002, the transition government had a period of two years to organise elections, but could, if necessary, extend this by two additional six-month periods. In early 2005, it became clear that neither the transition government nor the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had taken any of the necessary steps to organise elections by the original June 2005 deadline, and the election timetable was postponed. The announcement of the postponement was met with widespread popular disapproval and, for the first time, there was real pressure on the transition government to take concrete action.

The organisation of elections has not been the only transition objective to be delayed significantly. Another key task of the transition process was the creation of a new, unified national army out of the various armed groups that had fought one another during the five-year war. While it was stressed consistently that this...
was a priority, in reality the transition government did almost nothing to move this process forward until early 2005. Although the former belligerents have been sitting in the same government in the capital Kinshasa, the animosity between them remains largely intact, and they have made few real efforts to cooperate with one another. This is not really surprising, as there is little reason for them to do so; as long as they maintained their military power in the areas they controlled during the war, they could happily play at ruling the country for the sake of the international community and the Congolese general public without relinquishing any real power.

This situation report addresses a number of serious problems that will impact on the military integration process. These activities will be discussed against the background of the upcoming election and the threat to the transitional process. The current status of the process will be outlined. Suggestions will also be made on a way forward with the DDR and SSR processes.

The legacy of this inaction and unwillingness to create and support a new national army is far more dangerous than any delay in the holding of national elections. If the DDR process is not completed and a new Defence Force is not established, this would contribute significantly to the potential for a resumption of war.

Although the military reintegration process has now been in motion for close to a year, and some progress has been made, a number of serious problems remain: ongoing conflicts; competing loyalties; spoiler armies; human rights abuses and regional instability.

The conflict in the north-eastern Ituri district of the DRC has its origins in a land dispute between Hema and Lendu, which erupted in early 1999. Uganda, which already had troops in the area and largely controlled the district, supported the Hema. Ugandan-backed attacks on the Hema soon led to Lendu retaliation and the conflict escalated, eventually engulfing the whole district. By 2002, Hema and Lendu communities had created organised militia movements with the help of the Ugandans, whose main interest in the area was its vast mineral deposits. This conflict has claimed an estimated 50,000 lives and left thousands displaced.

The Ituri conflict has long been a sub-plot to the main conflict in the DRC and none of the Ituri militia leaders were asked to participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the process that resulted in the Sun City talks in April 2002 and the Pretoria All-Inclusive Agreement of 17 December 2002. The conflict only wound down in early 2005 when the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) issued an ultimatum to the militia groups to disarm following the killing of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers. In the months that followed, more than 15,000 of an estimated 20,000 militiamen and women were disarmed. In spite of this relative success, however, the situation remains volatile: rump elements of the militias, estimated at between 1,500 – 2,000, have maintained their armed struggle and have continued to destabilise the region. MONUC forces are working in conjunction with the FARDC in an attempt to track down remaining elements, but in spite of their ongoing efforts, the militia groups continue to operate. At the moment, MONUC and the FARDC Brigade have been successful in containing the militia groups as shown in Map 1 and 2.

The FARDC brigade in Ituri district is the best the FARDC have to offer, as it was trained by Belgian military. Other deployments of integrated brigades composed of elements of the various former rebel groups, have been less well-trained. In addition, they do not receive adequate logistical support, lack training and, most importantly, are irregularly paid.

While MONUC is currently maintaining pressure on the militias in the lead-up to the elections, it is expected to wind down its operations once the elections have taken place. This will leave the FARDC on its own to mop up remaining militia elements, monitor the border with neighbouring Uganda and restore stability to
the region. This is a tall order, and, unless the FARDC are given adequate support and training, it is unlikely to manage the security situation. This would have serious implications for the region. Although Uganda has denied that it is backing the militia groups in the district, there have been recent statements from high-ranking officials indicating the contrary. If Uganda indeed continues to back the Ituri militia groups it is unlikely that the FARDC will be able to keep them from plunging the area back into turmoil.

The Mai Mai forces represent a similar problem. Originally established as self-defence militias to protect local communities against attacks by foreign invaders,
the Mai Mai, who were concentrated in eastern DRC, later provided the governments of Laurent and Joseph Kabila with important military support during the wars with the RCD-G and FDLR from Rwanda. Mai Mai representatives participated in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and are represented in the government, and several thousand have participated in the army reintegration programme. Many others have resisted the process, however, either because they have developed powerful economic interests that they want to protect or because they do not feel that the transition government has treated them fairly.

There are pockets of Mai Mai resistance throughout the eastern DRC, and skirmishes between the FARDC and the Mai Mai are commonplace. In the last year, however, the region between Pweto, Manono and Mitwaba in northern Katanga has attracted particular attention, as the Mai Mai in this area, which is known as the "Triangle of Death", essentially have taken the civilian population there hostage. Led by Commander Gedeon, the Mai Mai in this area initially turned against the local FARDC in protest against what they considered to be the latter's abuse of the civilian population, a practice of which they have since themselves become guilty.

After months of failed negotiations aimed at integrating the Mai Mai into the FARDC, the latter finally launched an offensive against the group in late 2005. The conflict escalated significantly in December 2005 and January 2006, and an additional 50,000 people have since been displaced by the fighting, bringing the total number of displaced from this region close to 200,000. The FARDC's military campaign has been heavily criticised by locals, who complain that the FARDC are not targeting the proper areas, and that troops are harassing the local population. There have also been reports of corruption and embezzlement of salaries destined for troops operating in the area. Although the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to Katanga province, the total number authorised was only 300, falling short of the requested brigade. In addition, UN troops will be primarily involved in providing support for the elections rather than actively participating in the operations against the Mai Mai, who can be expected to maintain their resistance.

This changed for the better when the UN authorised the deployment of battalions from Benin and a battalion from the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB), to be redeployed from Burundi at the end of March 2006. The Benin battalion was deployed in mid-April to the area. The final deployment of the ONUB battalion is still awaited. The deployment of the Benin battalion had an immediate impact in contributing to the surrender to MONUC of Commander Gedeon, the Mai Mai leader. This will have a major impact on stability in the province. It is now important for MONUC, with assistance of the newly deployed Benin battalion, to regain control over FARDC operations.

Much of North Kivu, generally considered the most volatile region in the DRC, is dominated by senior officials from the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the former Rwandan-backed rebel group which controlled the eastern part of the country during the war. Both the commander of the eighth military zone, Gabriel Amisi, and the governor of the province, Eugene Serufili, were appointed by the RCD. Until 2005, the vast majority of the troops in North Kivu were those who had been fighting with the RCD, many of whom are Congolese Tutsis or Banyamulenge. Of all the areas in the country, North Kivu remains the least integrated into the national government and the overall peace process. Both the civilian and military leaders of the province remain close to senior Rwandan officials, and it is widely believed that Rwanda plays an important role in the province.

North Kivu has twice been the launching point for military operations aimed at destabilising the transition government. In May 2004, Gen Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi from North Kivu and former RCD commander, launched an attack on Bukavu, the capital of neighbouring South Kivu province, ostensibly to halt attacks against the local Banyamulenge community. Nkunda was able to rally
several thousand troops from North Kivu who helped him briefly capture the city. Most of these troops were Banyamulenge or Congolese Tutsi, and rallied to Nkunda's cause along ethnic lines.

Meanwhile, although the governor and the military commander, then Rwabisira Obeid, who has since been replaced by Amisi, denied any involvement in the campaign, it is highly unlikely that they would not have noticed that a massive military campaign was being launched from their backyard. In addition, there is ample proof that they were both aware and supportive of the military campaign. Many people in Goma, the provincial capital reported seeing troops leaving the city, some of them on trucks belonging to an NGO led by Serufuli.

In any case, the transition government did little to calm matters. President Kabila loudly condemned the attack on Bukavu, as did other members of the government, including Azarias Ruberwa, the president of the RCD and one of four vice-presidents in the transition government. The capture of Bukavu was a major violation of the peace process, and indicated that ethnic tensions, which are at the heart of the conflict in the eastern DRC, were far from resolved.

In addition, Gen Nkunda’s ability to rally thousands of like-minded troops loyal and ethnically linked to him indicated that the process of integrating the various rebel forces into a national force was imperative for national security. Despite this glaring reality, however, the transition government failed to accelerate the process of military integration which, at this stage, had not even begun. There was also no concerted attempt to arrest Nkunda, or to sanction any of the troops that helped him in his campaign. Nkunda and his troops gradually retreated to North Kivu, where he went into hiding, reportedly moving freely in and out of Rwanda.

Finally, the transition government made no attempt to question the senior military and civilian officials from North Kivu province. Brig Gen Obeid remained the commander of the military zone until late-2004, while Serufuli still runs the province.

It should come as no great surprise then that Nkunda has renewed his efforts to destabilise the province in recent months. After briefly threatening military action in September 2005 and then disappearing, Nkunda resurfaced in early 2006. Supported by the 83rd Brigade and several hundred deserters, Nkunda waged a military campaign in the area around Rutshuru, 150 kilometres north of Goma, capturing several towns and displacing an estimated 50,000 people. The FARDC and MONUC forces have reacted strongly against the latest outbreak of fighting, and FARDC reinforcements have been sent from various parts of the country to neutralise Nkunda and his troops, who have dubbed themselves the "Popular Intervention Brigade".

There is a risk that armed activities in North Kivu will continue after the elections. The RCD, which is extremely unpopular in the areas it controlled during the war, is not expected to fare at all well in the parliamentary elections, and has no chance winning the presidency. This means that the RCD and its Rwandan allies will lose the remaining power that they have in North Kivu, and therefore in national politics. It seems unlikely that they will accept a wholesale loss of influence.

One of the biggest concerns in North Kivus is the slow pace of brassage and the unwillingness of the hardcore of ex–ANC (National Congolese Army), the military wing of the RCD, and ex–Mai Mai brigades to be integrated. This is specifically applicable among the brigades operating in the Masisi and Rutshuru area. For these units the perspective of brassage and deployment in areas other than the Kivus remains unacceptable. Armed confrontation between FDLR, Mai Mai and ex–ANC creates an excuse for these units not to be integrated into the new FARDC.

The presence in North Kivu of armed elements whose loyalties are to ethnic identities and Rwanda rather than the DRC is a serious threat to the country's stability. Even if the FARDC and MONUC manage to calm the situation in North Kivu
prior to elections, there is no guarantee that violence will not erupt soon thereafter. If anything, there is a possibility that armed opposition to the establishment of a democratically-elected government in Kinshasa will become even more forceful than in current military campaigns. If this scenario becomes a reality, the FARDC will be unable effectively to control the situation, and the eastern DRC will again be plunged into violence.

Katanga, unlike other hotspots in the DRC, has remained largely unaddressed. As in many other parts of the country, the process of integration here has started slowly and very few of the troops in the province have been through the military integration process. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), there are a total of 20,000 former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) and ex-ANC troops in addition to a further 5-8,000 Mai Mai fighters present in Katanga province. According to the same source, there are also a further 1,000 troops belonging to the Special Guard for Presidential Security (GSSP) in the provincial capital Lubumbashi and in Kolwezi.¹⁷

None of the integrated brigades have yet been deployed to Katanga, and, although the commander of the military region hails from the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the former rebel group led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, Kabila loyalists effectively remain in control of military and security issues in the province¹⁸ which has been their stronghold since Laurent Kabila took power in 1997.

In the lead-up to the elections, there has been growing tension between southern and northern Katangans, which has been exacerbated by an ethnic cleavage dating back to Katanga's first secessionist attempt in 1960, when the northerners, led by the Balubakat, Kabila's ethnic group, strongly opposed the secessionist movement of Moïse Tshombe, from southern Katanga.¹⁹ For decades thereafter, southern Katangans dominated provincial politics. When Laurent Kabila seized power, he sought to redress this and appointed predominantly northern Katangans – Balubakat in particular – to provincial and national positions of power, further entrenching the division between the two groups.

The upcoming elections represent an opportunity for southern Katangans to regain control over politics in their province and they are expected to win a sizeable number of parliamentary seats. The Northerners know this and are engaged in a campaign to discredit and sideline southern Katangan leaders.²⁰ On two separate occasions, southern Katangans were blamed for security incidents that are widely believed to have been orchestrated by Kabila's allies, in order to discredit and eliminate them. Given the enormous control over military and security matters still exerted by Kabila loyalists, and the absence of “neutral” integrated FARDC brigades in the province, it cannot be ruled out that northerners will use their power to maintain control after elections if they feel threatened by the southerner' increased power.

Human rights abuses by the FARDC and various armed group are common. According to an overview of the situation by Human Rights Watch,²¹ “...combatants from armed groups as well as government soldiers deliberately killed, raped and abducted civilians and destroyed or looted their property in repeated attacks, in particular in eastern Congo.” Such abuses are partly the result of the culture of impunity in which armed groups have been allowed to operate over the past two decades, and the failure by the transition government to crack down on such abuses or prosecute known war criminals. In addition, the poor socio-economic situation of the majority of FARDC troops,²² aggravates poor discipline and enhances the circumstances in which the military prey on the population.²³

Both Uganda and Rwanda have been involved closely in domestic affairs in the Democratic Republic of Congo for the last decade. Uganda and Rwanda helped oust Zairean²⁴ president Mobutu Sese Seko and bring Laurent Kabila to power in 1996. Both Uganda and Rwanda fell out with their ally a year later and started backing different Congolese rebel groups to oust him, and sending thousands of troops to the country.
Uganda gradually developed considerable economic interests in the areas it controlled, primarily the Ituri district. Uganda was instrumental in the creation of a number of ethnic militias. This allowed it not only to justify its presence in the country, but also to go about its business of exploiting natural resources without interruption or disturbance from the rest of the world. Uganda was eventually compelled to pull its troops out of the DRC in 2002-2003, but it maintained close links to the Ituri militias. According to the United Nations panel on the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, Ugandan traders continue to be active in the region despite the Ugandan Defence Force's withdrawal in 2002.

Uganda denies that it still has links to Ituri militias and, in mid-2005, expelled the leaders of a new militia coalition which had announced its formation from Kampala. Around the same time, the Ugandan government accused the Congolese transition government and MONUC of failing to prevent the Allied Defense Forces (ADF) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), from launching attacks from DRC territory. The accusation came as a surprise, as neither NALU nor the ADF had launched recent attacks, and by the Ugandan government's own admission, these rebel groups did not represent a threat. Some have therefore interpreted the complaint as an attempt by Uganda to challenge the FARDC to address the problem.

Then in late-2005, a new issue emerged: elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Christian fundamentalist rebel group which has been fighting to overthrow the Ugandan government for over a decade, committing atrocious human rights abuses in the process, were discovered hiding in Garamba National Park in north-eastern DRC. The LRA have since refused to leave DRC territory and have resisted being forcibly disarmed. In early January 2006, eight Guatemalan UN peacekeepers were killed trying to evict the LRA from the park, and MONUC has since cancelled follow-up military operations against this movement.

Rwanda has long had security concerns about the DRC as a result of the presence in North and South Kivu provinces of members of the Interahamwe militia responsible for the 1994 genocide, in which up to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. Tracking down this militia was one of the main objectives of their 1996-1997 support for the anti-Mobutu rebellion, and also drove their intervention between 1998-2002. Since pulling its troops out of the DRC in 2002, Rwanda has remained closely involved in the politics of the eastern DRC by harbouring dissident Congolese military commanders and influencing local politics from behind the scenes. At the same time, it has been very open about its concern that the Interahamwe, who formed a political grouping in 2001 known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and are still operating on DRC territory in spite of the Congolese government's repeated commitments to disarm them. In late-2004, the Rwandan government threatened to redeploy its troops to the eastern DRC to disarm the FDLR forcibly. This crisis was narrowly averted, but the threat will remain as long as the FDLR continue to be based in the DRC. In early 2005, Kabila initiated negotiations with the FDLR, which briefly raised hopes for a negotiated settlement of their return to Rwanda. However, the FDLR subsequently made additional demands about political negotiations within Rwanda, which were rejected by the Rwandan government, and prospects for a peaceful resolution of the matter have since faded. In the last few months of 2005, MONUC and the FARDC launched operations aimed at destroying FDLR bases and forcefully disarming them.

The operations have so far been considered a success, restricting the FDLR's movements and cutting them off from their supply lines, but they have a long way to go if all FDLR are to be apprehended. While the joint MONUC/FARDC operations are working, there are limits to what MONUC can do. According to the Contact Group, MONUC cannot be expected to achieve total control over the eastern DRC:

Sadly, the transition government facilitates this type of manipulation by failing to invest sufficient political will and resources into military reintegration. The
Congolese armed forces have long had a terrible reputation for being inefficient, undisciplined, poorly trained and supplied and rarely paid. Uganda and Rwanda, whose armies have fought alongside and against Congolese armed forces know this better than anyone, and know how to take advantage of this weakness not only on the battlefield, but also in the public relations arena.

It was not until May 2005, nearly two years after the inauguration of the transition government that the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) elaborated a strategic plan for the military integration process. In its first phase, the plan envisaged the creation of 18 light infantry brigades, which would help to secure elections. The second phase would involve the formation of a rapid reaction unit, and the third phase, due to be finalised by 2010 would see the formation of a new defence force.

During phase one, troops were to be transported to one of six integration centres in the country: Kisangani (Orientale province), Kitona (Bas Congo province), Kamina (Katanga province), Mushaki and Nyaleke (North Kivu) and Luberizi (South Kivu) where they were to be disarmed, undergo retraining and regrouped into standard-size brigades composed of 4,200 troops. According to the May 2005 plan, a total of twelve integrated brigades were to have been formed by late 2005, 3 integrated brigades were to be deployed to Ituri, 3 to North Kivu, 3 to South Kivu 1 to Kinshasa, 1 to Bas Congo province,1 to Mbuji Mayi, the capital of Kasai Occidental province and 1 brigade as a reaction capability. Unfortunately there have been additional delays and, to date only 3 brigades have been formed and deployed.

The current status of the 18 Integrated Brigades are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Waves</th>
<th>Brigades</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Wave</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Jan – Jun 04</td>
<td>Ituri</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Jan – May 05</td>
<td>North Kivu (Rutshuru)</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>Feb – Jun 05</td>
<td>South Kivu (Bukavu)</td>
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<td>4th</td>
<td>April – August 2005</td>
<td>Ituri Border</td>
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<td>5th</td>
<td>July – September 2005</td>
<td>To be Re-deployed, deployment area not yet decided</td>
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<td>6th</td>
<td>July – September 2005</td>
<td>Ituri mining areas</td>
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<td>2nd Wave</td>
<td>7th, 8th and 9th</td>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Ready and waiting deployment, no equipment to deploy</td>
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<td>10th, 11th and 12th</td>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Not yet decided</td>
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<td>3rd Wave</td>
<td>Next 6 Brigades</td>
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In addition, the entire integration process has been severely abridged as a result of organisational and financial constraints. According to the original plans, combatants were supposed to be regrouped in 25 orientation centres around the country, where they would have undergone an orientation and selection process. As a result of capacity constraints however, the orientation centres were never set up, and combatants have instead been channelled directly into regroupment centres. However these centres, which the FARDC has been setting up gradually since 2004, were severely under-funded and lacked basic hygiene and medical facilities, as well as food supplies and proper shelter. As a result, several thousand troops deserted from the Mushanki and Luberezi camps alone between March and August 2005.

Since then, the Belgian and Dutch governments as well as the European Union (EU) have provided funding for upgrading facilities and payment of salaries to the troops in the centres. South Africa, Angola and Belgium are also providing military training.
Additional training will be provided by MONUC once the brigades have been deployed to their areas of operation. MONUC will engage in six-week training exercises with nine brigades, which will subsequently engage in joint operations with MONUC. This has already been the case in Ituri, where the first integrated brigade is now regularly involved in joint operations with MONUC against recalcitrant militia. It is hoped that the training and subsequent joint operations will enhance these elements’ tactical skills, as well as improve overall respect for the civilian population.

At the same time however, the FARDC faces serious logistical and organisational hurdles, which further complicate the integration process and negatively affect military operations. These problems include inadequate food distribution, poor water supplies, poor medical care, inadequate shelter, insufficient vehicles and the irregular or non-payment of salaries.

It is clear from the evaluation of the current status of the FARDC and the integration process that the DDR process will not be completed before the election, planned for 30 July. At most, 9 brigades can be deployed based on the level of training and equipment available. At the interim the rest must be kept at the brassage centres and under control. The daunting task after the elections is to complete the process of DDR and SSR. For this to happen there needs to be political will and commitment from the new government. The coordination between all role players needs to improve. The FARDC must take responsibility to lead the process. The planning and structures for the DDR process are in place and must be completed after the election. The SSR is one of the most important outstanding reforms that any country emerging from conflict should implement to align all security related structures and instruments with that of governmental vision and policies undertaken to build peace. The generic strategy of SSR is easier explained than implemented, but a proper understanding of SSR reform and what this entails is required.

A strategy for SSR in DRC must be addressed by generic business principles: to evaluate the current and future situation internally as well as externally; then to plan and design an appropriate and affordable solution to the situation, to structure to task, to implement, coordinate and monitor progress and finally to evaluate progress and to implement change where required. These activities must take place in an environment where the DRC government agencies accept responsibility and the donor community provides technical support (knowledge and financial support) to the process to enhance capacity and to establish international principles.

It is very clear from this paper that difficult tasks await the new DRC Government and the international community. The DDR is incomplete and will not be completed before the election. The DRC Government, MONUC and the international community must manage this situation in the interim until after the election to ensure that the integrated brigades do not become a threat to the election process. After the election the DDR of the military groupings must be completed as soon as possible. The existing structures and plan of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration must be used for that. It is vital that immediate after the election the new government appoint officials from the Department of Defence and the FARDC to be part of the MONUC SSR planning and coordination structure. The Congolese government must take the lead and in cooperation with all the role players, MONUC, the European Military section, the Contact group and bi-lateral partners start working on a SSR strategy.

If these very important activities, that of DDR are not completed, and SSR do not start the new government can soon find itself in serious trouble. The international community must take not of these crucial issues. This will need a medium to long-term commitment from the new Congolese government and the international community.
The FARDC brigade in Ituri district is the best the FARDC have to offer, as it was trained by Belgian military, other deployments of integrated brigades composed of elements of the various former rebel groups, have been less well-trained. In addition, they do not receive adequate logistical support, lack training and, most importantly, are irregularly paid.

The distribution of military and provincial leadership posts was worked out over time between the parties in the transition government.

The Banyamulenge are a sub grouping of the Tutsi who speak a variant of Kinyarwanda – Rwanda’s primary language. They are concentrated in the high plateaus of South Kivu, while Congolese Tutsi is concentrated in North Kivu.

The demobilisation and merging process of the different rebel groups into the new FARDC.

UN repels Congo dissident fighters' attack, Reuters, January 23, 2006.

The country was called Zaire until 1996 when Kabila renamed it the Democratic Republic of Congo.