INTRODUCTION

Southern Africa is a region that has historically experienced civil and military conflict. In the two decades preceding democratic change in South Africa, the region easily earned the honour of being one of the most violent on the African continent. Much of the conflict in the region was directly or indirectly related to the apartheid situation in South Africa.1 Examples of either the direct or indirect relationship between the apartheid regime and conflict in the region included: the Mozambican civil war between the ruling party Frelimo and the rebel movement Renamo, which ended with the signing of the Rome peace accords in 1992, and the Angolan civil war between the MPLA government and the rebel movement Unita led by Jonas Savimbi. In both countries, the war was intense, and its effect on peace and security in the region was quite profound, with refugees and the inflow of arms to the regions among the consequences. The rest of the region suffered from periodic incursions into its territory by South African forces, resulting in insecurity in affected countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

Historically, Tanzania has been an important player in peace and security in southern Africa. Because of its proximity to South Africa and the former Portuguese colonies; and as it was the first country in the region to gain independence in 1961, Tanzania became the automatic and preferred destination for all who went north to escape apartheid or colonial rule. All liberation movements in the region had their offices in Dar es Salaam. Liberation movements such as Frelimo of Mozambique and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa had their military training camps in Tanzania. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), predecessor to the African Union (AU), established the headquarters of its liberation committee in Dar es Salaam in the 1970s. Tanzania’s importance to the architecture of peace and security in southern Africa was underscored by its leading role in the establishment of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), in 1979, an organisation whose primary objectives were to reduce the economic dependence of the region on South Africa; to forge links to create conditions for regional integration; and to coordinate regional economic policies for purposes of economic liberation.2

Tanzania was one of the first countries to embrace the wave of multiparty politics and democratisation that swept the region in the early 1990s. For a long time, Botswana was the only country in the region that had a multiparty political system, although the dominance of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had effectively made Botswana a one party state.3 Zambia was the first country in the region to embrace multipartyism in 1991 when President Kenneth Kaunda succumbed to political pressure and allowed the formation of the opposition party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). To the surprise of most observers in the region, including Kaunda himself, MMD soundly defeated the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which had ruled Zambia since independence in 1964.4 Even though Tanzania had constitutionally been a one party state since 1965, the pressure for political change had been considerably less than it was in neighbouring countries. Historically, this could be explained by the political ‘accommodationist’ nature of the regime, where the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), had allowed considerable participation within the framework of the one party system.5 It was not surprising therefore that a commission appointed by the government in 1991 to study the implications of adopting a multiparty political system, on conducting a poll across a wide spectrum of Tanzanian citizens, found that less than 20% of the population actually wanted to change the political system.6 In spite of these results, the ruling party confidently opted to adopt a multiparty political system beginning in...
July 1992. CCM has continued to be the dominant political party. This paper will put that dominance in two basic contexts: first, it will critically examine CCM’s dominance of the Tanzanian political scene and whether this in any way raises questions about democracy in the country in the light of political discontent in Zanzibar. Secondly, it will assess the implication of the CCM victory on peace and security in southern Africa, by emphasising the personal role of President Jakaya M Kikwete. The paper will argue that the December 2005 election results in Tanzania presents Kikwete’s regime with an opportunity to play an increasingly important role in regional politics and security, and relaunches Tanzania’s pivotal role in regional security, a role that may have faded slightly in the post-Nyerere era (1985 – 2005) under the leadership of presidents Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Benjamin W Mkapa.7

Electoral politics in Tanzania since 1995

In the first multiparty elections in Tanzania in October 1995, the ruling party CCM scored a resounding victory. Besides winning the presidency, CCM gained 78.1% of the total seats in parliament. The balance of the seats were shared by the political opposition consisting of the Civic United Front (CUF) – 10.2%; the National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) – 6.09%; United Democratic Party (UDP) – 1.5%; Chadema – 1.1%; and others – 2.2%.8 Mkapa was elected president of the country, receiving 61.8% of the votes in a contest that involved three other candidates: Augustine Mrema (NCCR-Mageuzi), Ibrahim Lipumba of CUF and John Cheyo (UDP). President Mkapa was re-elected in 2000 with even higher numbers. His party CCM received 71.7% of all votes cast, with CUF trailing far behind with 16.3%. The Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and UDP received 7.8% and 4.2% respectively. Thus within five years of a multiparty system, the dominance of CCM had already been established.

In the 2005 general elections, the electoral victory of CCM was so thorough that one of the presidential candidates remarked that Tanzania should go back to a one party system because in essence that is what it has become.9 During the campaigns, CCM supporters were talking of the ‘tsunami’ effect, meaning that CCM would simply overwhelm the opposition. The following tables are a summary of the election results.

As Table 1 shows, CCM’s victory was simply devastating to the opposition. Kikwete received 80.28% of the total votes cast. In post election interviews, he admitted that although he had been confident of winning, the margin of victory came as a surprise.10 The nearest candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba of CUF, had only 11.68% of the votes. The final results were in line with pre-election polling data – the respected and reputable Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (Redet), a research arm of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Dar es Salaam had predicted in September 2005 that the CCM candidate would get 75.4% of the total vote, followed by 13.2% for CUF.11

| Table 1: Results of presidential elections in Tanzania 2005 |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Candidate       | Political party | Votes            | % of votes  |
| Jakaya Kikwete  | CCM             | 9,102,952        | 80.24       |
| Ibrahim Lipumba | CUF             | 1,327,125        | 11.7        |
| Freeman Mbowe   | Chadema         | 668,736          | 5.89        |
| Augustine Mrema | TLP             | 84,901           | 0.75        |
| Sengondo Mwungi | NCCR-Mageuzi    | 55,819           | 0.49        |
| Christopher Mkil | DP              | 31,083           | 0.27        |
| Emmanuel Makoaidi | NLD            | 21,574           | 0.19        |
| Anna Senkero   | PPT-Maendeleo   | 18,783           | 0.17        |
| Leonard Shayo   | Makini          | 17,070           | 0.15        |
| Paul Kyara      | SAU             | 16,414           | 0.14        |

* Under Tanzania’s electoral system, which allows for proportional appointment of women members of parliament to reflect parliamentary election results, CCM will have 58 women’s special seats, while CUF and Chadema will each have eleven and six seats respectively.

Source: http://www.kurayako.com/2005

Table 2 is a summary of the national parliamentary elections, which again show an overwhelming tsunami victory by CCM. Out of the 232 contested seats, CCM won 206. The closest competitor, CUF, won only 19 seats. In Pemba, the small island that is part of Zanzibar, I will discuss the case of Zanzibar in detail further below. In essence, to paraphrase Leonard Shayo, one of the presidential candidates, Tanzania had rapidly reverted to a one party regime albeit through the electorate and the ballot box. Unlike in the 1960s, the ruling party had not pushed a constitutional reform to make Tanzania a one party state.
Election monitors, both local and foreign, declared the 14 December 2005 general elections largely free and fair. Foreign monitors included groups from the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Union (EU), and the East African Community (EAC). Local monitors were led by an independent Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Temco). In its preliminary statement on the elections, Temco observed that in spite of a few irregularities, “the 2005 general elections in Tanzania should be accepted as being broadly free and fair”.12 Remarkably, there was almost no challenge to any of the election results, the one exception being a statement by Augustine Mrema, presidential candidate of TLP, claiming some irregularities in one constituency in Kilimanjaro region, north eastern Tanzania. The TLP parliamentary candidate lost in a constituency that had been expected to go to the opposition.13 Instead, the CCM candidate won, again, demonstrating the tsunami effect.

With such an overwhelming victory for CCM, the obvious question is whether democracy is being well served in Tanzania. Arguably, the presence of multiple voices is healthy for any democracy. Thus on its face, single party dominance of a political system would tend to undermine the ability of the system to accommodate and entertain alternative political voices. In Tanzania’s specific case, this question can be approached in two different ways. First, by analogy, one could argue that what the electorate has done in Tanzania mirrors what the electorate has done in South Africa in the last two elections, where the ANC has been given a broad mandate to govern the country with bigger margins than when the country became democratic in 1994. As much of the opposition in South Africa has weakened, the ANC has become more dominant, making significant inroads into previously hostile territory such as the Western Cape. And yet it would be a stretch to argue that South Africa is less of a democratic polity today than it was in 1994. Although the future is difficult to predict, the indications are that South Africa will continue to be the most democratic polity on the continent in spite of ANC dominance.

Secondly, we have to examine why the electorate in Tanzania chose CCM over the competition. Numerous newspaper reports and political commentaries before and after the elections indicate that the majority of people in Tanzania do not think that the political opposition is mature enough to govern the country. All opposition presidential candidates are heard from only during election campaigns. It is therefore difficult for the electorate to say with any confidence that they know the candidates well. Further, all opposition parties have done a poor job of organising their parties across the country and none has an elaborate, countrywide party structure. One or two have pockets of support in a particular district or constituency, but that is more a reflection of an individual candidate’s qualities or a localised issue such as an unpopular CCM candidate. In the circumstances, it is fair to say that CCM’s dominance is a result of the electorate’s will, and therefore fundamentally democratic.

The Zanzibar question and electoral politics in Tanzania

Since the advent of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992, and the first elections under the new system in October 1995, Zanzibar has been the aberration in terms of peaceful elections. If anything, the expectation among political observers is that Zanzibar will continue to be a trouble spot given its political history, which relates to the configuration of ethnicity, race and class, and the consequences of the 1964 revolution on the islands that overthrew the sultanate.14 In discussing the Zanzibar political question, it is important to have a grasp of what constitutes Zanzibar.15 It consists of two main islands, Unguja (the big island) and Pemba, jointly with a total land area of 2,332 square kilometers. Unguja has an area of 1,464 square kilometers (63%) and Pemba has 868 square kilometers (37%) of the total area. Zanzibar has a multiracial population of close to one million people, 58% in Unguya and 42% in Pemba. The history of the Zanzibar revolution has been well covered by a number of authors but there is still a major dispute as to whether the 1964 revolution should be viewed in ethnic (ie African/Shiraz versus Arab) or class terms.16 However, it is clear at the moment that the political divide in Zanzibar is between followers of the former Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) in Unguja, and those of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), with a smattering of the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP). ZNP and ZPPP have their primary support in Pemba. The 1964 revolution led by ASP pushed the political differences between the two sides to the background through the control of state machinery by ASP. Mohammed Bakari argues that the post-1964 period was the height of authoritarianism in Zanzibar, and that people in Pemba were punished for having been ZNP/ZPPP supporters, although there is little evidence that opposition to ASP in Pemba was racially motivated, that is, less support for an African based party by people of mixed heritage.17 Bakari further argues that the post-1992 period in Zanzibar has to be understood not in terms of ethnic/racial politics, which are now being carried out by the CCM government in Zanzibar. Rather, he

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The three elections in Zanzibar in the multiparty era (1995, 2000 and 2005) have all been won by CCM. Electoral politics on the islands however, have to a large extent mirrored the political divide of the nationalist politics and geographical divide between Unguja and Pemba. CCM (successor to ASP) has been predominant in Unguja, while the opposition CUF has dominated in Pemba. The result is that Zanzibar elections have actually become census elections, simply reflecting the population distribution between the two islands. In these circumstances, for CCM, the electoral strategy becomes a simple one – hold on to Unguja and win the elections. Similarly for CUF, the election strategy is straightforward – to win the elections hold on to Pemba and make inroads into Unguja. So far, the result has been a stalemate, with CCM winning the elections. Table 3 is a summary of the 2005 presidential elections in Zanzibar.

In the local (Zanzibar) parliamentary elections, CCM won 30 of the 49 seats while CUF won the rest, thus ensuring another five years of CCM leadership on the islands. Elections in one constituency had to be postponed. Predictably, CUF has consistently argued that the elections in Zanzibar have not been free or fair, and that this was the case in 1995, 2000 and 2005. In its report for the local parliament and presidency of the islands, CUF boldly stated that:

“(t)he general election in Zanzibar on Sunday 30 October 2005 was not free and fair. The Civic United Front does not recognise the government of Amani Karume and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM party of the revolution).”

The leadership must now make CUF members feel part of the political process, ensuring their full participation.

The legal consequences of the CUF position on governance on the islands are interesting. CUF members of parliament (MPs) were sworn in with CCM MPs in early November 2005, and the Zanzibar government has proceeded to discharge its governance responsibilities. Interestingly, CUF members of parliament have confirmed their status by availing themselves of loans totalling Tsh 10,000,000 (roughly US$10,000) which are available only to members of parliament. Further, in spite of CUF’s complaints that the elections were neither free nor fair, international observers, with the exception of the US based National Democratic Institute (NDI), all declared otherwise. Indeed the East African Community (EAC) observer mission vehemently criticised the western media for unwarranted negative reporting on the elections. Temco, the local (independent) election monitoring group also declared the elections largely free and fair and concluded its report by observing that:

“(t)here was a noticeable, marked improvement in terms of political space [since 2000], a reorganised electoral commission, and a more transparent voting process with [political] party agents, and secret ballot. It is the considered opinion of Temco that the Zanzibar elections were by and large free and fair.”

Thus whilst it is important for both the local Zanzibar political leadership, particularly within CCM, and the national leadership in the Tanzania government to recognise and deal with the political discontent in Pemba, the legality of the election results is clear: CCM won in Zanzibar. However, in the national (Tanzania) parliament, the strength of CUF was demonstrated when it won all 18 seats allotted to Pemba in the national assembly. The leadership must now make CUF members feel part of the political process, ensuring their full participation in decisions that affect their political, social and economic wellbeing. Kikwete seems to recognise this. In his maiden speech to parliament on 30 December 2005, he noted that he will ensure that the Zanzibar question is handled with care, with an eye to resolving the political stalemate.
The Southern African region could benefit in terms of peace and security because of political developments in Tanzania

The advent of multipartyism however, does not mean that the importance of individual leaders in diplomacy and fashioning security arrangements has diminished. Indeed we could argue that South Africa, and Mbeki in particular, is in desperate need of assistance from other leaders in the region to deal with the continuing crises, whether it is the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi or Zimbabwe. Such assistance can be given only by a credible leader; a leader who is democratically elected, has the total support of his own country and is accepted internationally. Kikwete is such a leader. Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC crisis, even though it was technically at the behest of the SADC, was seen as increasingly problematic because of Mugabe’s own domestic problems. Towards the end of Zimbabwean troops’ presence in DRC, speculation was rife that Mugabe was externalising his domestic problems while contributing to the plunder of DRC.
resources. Peace and security cannot be established in the region in those circumstances.

In terms of peace and security in the region, South Africa's dominance appears problematic. These concerns relate to security in traditional military terms and in relation to economic security. The statistics on South African dominance are staggering. It accounts for one quarter of the population but for more than 75% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Its economy is 3.4 times larger than the combined economies of the other members of SADC. This fact has led to subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, grumblings among SADC countries. The fact that South Africa also has the strongest military force in the region simply compounds the problem. Yet the country can legitimately argue that both its military and economic power is good for the region, and by implication, that it takes special interest in the security and economic wellbeing of the region because of its own interests and vulnerability. The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates the point. Ben Cousins has noted that:

“(a) recent study estimates that in the three years between 2000 and the end of 2002, Zimbabwe’s crisis cut the growth of South Africa gross domestic product by 1.3% and led to between 20,000 and 30,000 actual and potential job losses. It resulted in the weakening of the rand, higher inflation and higher interest rates. These effects came through reduced exports of goods and services, a drop in tourism, failure by Zimbabwe to service its debt and reduced foreign direct investment.”

Thus, as South Africa continues to dominate the region militarily and economically, the emergence of a strong northern anchor by democratic means provides a psychological release for South Africa, as well as presenting a potential strong and effective partner in the resolution of regional crises.

As already noted above, although foreign and security policy making in the region is systematically being institutionalised within state structures, and policy making is increasingly subject to many interests, individual leaders still make a difference. Tanzania has just elected a leader who for ten years (1995-2005) was foreign minister of his country. During those years, Tanzania was an active participant in efforts to bring peace in Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Angola. Kikwete is a well known quantity among the major players in the security and foreign policy world of southern Africa. His election therefore provides an opportunity for continuity within SADC, and much more broadly within the AU. One cannot expect to go back to the

Julius Nyerere years where it seemed that all the major decisions regarding security in the region involved Tanzania, but Kikwete’s election gives the region a seasoned diplomat who will not need to learn the ropes before taking on the tough issues of security policy, particularly regarding DRC and Zimbabwe. Indeed Kikwete’s election should be equated to that of Mbeki in 1999. Having served as deputy president to Nelson Mandela (1994 – 1999), all the major players in the region were familiar with Mbeki’s style and gravitas within the South African establishment. With South Africa’s pre-eminent position, his transition to the most important player in foreign and security affairs in the region was assured by this background. Kikwete’s inauguration on 21 December 2005 attracted 18 heads of state and leaders of government throughout the region. There cannot be a more eloquent statement of confidence in a new leader.

The fact that South Africa and Tanzania may provide the southern and northern anchors of political and military stability in the region does not in any way suggest that the interests of the two countries will always be congruent. Indeed there is evidence that the two countries may have different perspectives on Burundi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Partly, the differences are based on geographic proximity. For example, Tanzania’s position on Burundi is informed by its decades-long relationship with the country and by the thousands of refugees streaming into Tanzania from Burundi. South Africa entered the diplomatic and negotiation scene on Burundi only after the 1999 death of Nyerere, who had served as Burundi mediator for many years. Similarly, Tanzania may not have the same perspective on Zimbabwe as South Africa. Nonetheless South Africa and Tanzania can provide the basis for regional cooperation that might be useful in creating political stability and peace in the region.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed two principal questions: what impact will the election of Kikwete have on the political stability and democratisation of Tanzania, and what role will it play in creating a viable peace and security architecture in southern Africa. The analysis suggests a positive result on both fronts. Whilst the Zanzibar question is still problematic for Tanzania’s democratic profile, the overwhelming support for Kikwete’s presidency provides him with a unique opportunity to deal with the problem substantively, and he has shown willingness to do so. His maiden speech to the national assembly is a fresh start in that direction. Under Kikwete, CCM’s dominance

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in Tanzanian politics has been demonstrated. The paper has argued that the recent elections in Tanzania catapult Kikwete into a regional leader who should be able to use his experience as Tanzania’s minister of foreign affairs to be a proactive regional leader and establish Tanzania as an important player in regional peace and security arrangements. The two-anchor theory of southern African security based on southern and northern democratic regimes should receive serious consideration.

Endnotes

1. For a fuller examination of this phenomenon see Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid’s second front: South Africa’s war against its neighbours, New York, Penguin, 1986.
7. The 2005 general elections in Tanzania had been slated to take place on 30 October 2005. Four days before the elections, Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, a vice presidential candidate on the CHADEMA ticket, died. His death prompted the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to postpone the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections to 14 December. Elections for the Zanzibar presidency and parliament were allowed to proceed on schedule, however, as the death of Jumbe was inconsequential to the local elections on the islands.
14. S G Ayany, A history of Zanzibar: A study in constitutional development 1934-1964, Nairobi, Kenya Literature Bureau, 1970; Michael F Loichie, Zanzibar: Background to revolution, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1965. It is fair to say that in terms of electoral politics, what happens in Zanzibar has little effect on the rest of the country, except that it is an irritant and creates bad publicity on human rights. This point will be elaborated further below. The newly elected President Kikwete, in his maiden speech to parliament on 30 December 2005, pointed to the need to address the Zanzibar question as one of his priorities.
15. For this summary, I have freely borrowed from Mohammed Ali Bakari, The democratisation process in Zanzibar: A retarded transition, Hamburg, Institute of African Affairs, 2000; Ayany, op cit.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party in mainland Tanzania, merged with the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP), the ruling party in Zanzibar, in February 1977 to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM. However, Zanzibar CCM to a large extent runs its own affairs on the islands.
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About this paper

This paper examines the significance of the recently concluded general elections in Tanzania for the consolidation of democracy in the country, whilst highlighting the political difficulties in Zanzibar. It also examines how the election outcome in Tanzania, which in essence solidifies the dominance of CCM, emboldens President Jakaya M Kikwete’s hand in tackling regional peace and security issues, and in the process, repositioning Tanzania within southern Africa.

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