The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement

—Richard Barltrop—
ABOUT THE HD CENTRE

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) is an independent Swiss foundation dedicated to helping improve the global response to armed conflict. It attempts to achieve this by mediating between warring parties and providing support to the broader mediation community.

The HD Centre is driven by humanitarian values; its goal is to reduce the consequences of violent conflict, improve security, and ultimately contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflict. The HD Centre began operations in 1999 and has since become one of the world’s leading conflict mediation organisations. Operational engagements are complemented by policy and analytical work focused on civilian protection, mediation techniques, transitional issues and arms and security matters.
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Negotiating Disarmament explores issues surrounding the planning, timing and techniques of a range of security issues, including violence reduction, weapons control, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities and justice and security sector transformation, in the processes of peacemaking—negotiations, agreements and implementation strategies. Through expert meetings, specific peace process reviews, perception studies, interviews and analysing experiences over the last two decades, as well as drawing upon the HD Centre’s own operational engagements, it aims to:

- provide practical and accessible guidance on a range of security issues to those actively engaged in peacemaking, including mediators, government officials, armed groups, donors, civil society and UN officials;
- demystify concerns through identifying strategies, trends and lessons over time;
- identify and describe common obstacles faced in addressing security issues in peace processes, and suggest ways these may be tackled; and
- contribute to the generation of analysis and the building of linkages within the violence reduction and prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and arms control communities.

The project is supported by the Governments of Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For more information, go to www.hdcentre.org
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Acknowledgements

Over the course of the ‘Negotiating Disarmament’ project, the Governments of Canada, Norway and Switzerland have been steady supporters. The trip to Sudan for the interviews was funded by Norway. External reviews and publication production was funded by Canada. The Centre is appreciative of this support as well as the advice, input and other assistance from officials of these governments.

Gratitude is extended to Julian Hottinger and Fabienne Hara for their valuable feedback and review of the report. Their constructive and collegial input was greatly appreciated.
INTRODUCTION

The agreement that ended the second Sudanese civil war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, is in many ways a singular document. Although it represents the culmination of a long, difficult process of negotiation and mediation, it cannot be said to truly resolve the long-running conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Indeed, a number of crucial questions at the root of the conflict were left unaddressed by the agreement, and remain open today.

This report focuses on how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement deals with issues of guns and violence. It outlines how the parties’ lack of trust led to a deliberate avoidance of commitments related to security and weapons control—not only in relation to their forces, but in relation to other groups and individuals—in order to retain military capacity. While Sudan remains the focus of widespread international attention, this report seeks to illuminate the pressures and perspectives of key actors in the peace talks, and how they approached the multiple tasks of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of rebel and government forces; the disarmament of the multitude of armed civilians that were organised into militias by all sides; security sector reform; the control of vast quantities of weapons in circulation throughout the country after decades of militarisation; and strategies for assisting those traumatised and disabled by armed violence.

How these questions were managed—or not—in the peace negotiations has important implications for human security, development and prosperity in Sudan. This report seeks to highlight those connections, and reflects on the experience to gain insights for future peace processes.

This Country Study is one of three country reports—the others consider El Salvador and Burundi—for the ‘Negotiating Disarmament’ project. The project is part of a commitment by the HD Centre to refining the practice of peacemaking and mediation, and enhancing the positioning of security concerns within those processes. The project explores how guns and violence, those who hold and use them, and the impacts of armed violence are understood and addressed around the peace negotiation table. As one observer noted, “many peace agreements contain ‘silences’ on key issues. Although such silences may be a means to avoid derailment, they also may result from negotiators not appreciating what is involved in disarmament and demobilisation.” Most parties to armed conflicts by definition have little experience of negotiation, having been enemies for often lengthy periods; therefore, mediators can make a significant contribution in this area. However, little information exists for mediators, facilitators, and negotiating parties on public security, weapons control and violence reduction issues. It is hoped that this Country Study contributes in some way towards filling this critical gap, both building knowledge and identifying lessons. The report however, does not attempt to provide detailed review of the implementation of various security elements, as this is the focus of detailed scrutiny by others.

To inform the analysis, through late 2007 and early 2008 Richard Barltrop conducted interviews with some of the individuals who negotiated various agreements and accords, as well as advisers; those who mediated or assisted with the process; and individuals who watched the process closely (see Annex 1 for a list of interviewees). It is important to note that this was not an exhaustive process, and provides only a sampling of viewpoints. Respondents were asked to reflect on:

- the timing and sequencing of the negotiations related to security concerns, and the relevance or importance of where these issues were situated in the overall process;
the models or approaches that were ultimately agreed on, and how this unfolded in practice;
the relationship between disarmament and arms control in the peace negotiations;
the process of security sector transformation;
the attention given to regulating and reducing the number of guns in the hands of civilians;
consideration of violence reduction strategies; and
provisions to promote the rights, protection and needs of victims and survivors of armed violence.

The Centre is appreciative of the time people gave to these inquiries: the report is richer for the reflections offered.

Finally, it is important to note that because of the uniqueness of the Agreement, its creation of a six-year interim period, the elections due in 2009, and the referendum on southern independence due in 2011, the peace process remains a work in progress. This report thus inevitably draws upon time-limited information.

— Cate Buchanan
Editor, March 2008
The last twenty years have seen a broad evolution in the collective understanding of, and approach to, the resolution of violent conflict and the multiple strands of human security. This ongoing evolution has fundamentally altered how the simultaneously complex and simple processes of taking up and laying down arms are conceptualised and framed. Terms in this report are used by a wide range of constituencies—including violence prevention, human development, security, disarmament, mediation, and peacebuilding, amongst others. The terms are not used consistently across disciplines, and sometimes overlap. With these caveats in mind, this report uses the following definitions:

**Weapons control**—includes efforts to regulate, control and manage small arms and light weapons, ammunition, bombs and explosives. ‘Small arms’ include grenades, landmines, assault rifles, handguns, revolvers, and light machine guns. ‘Light weapons’ generally refers to anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, and recoilless rifles. The control, regulation, management, removal, storage and destruction of weapons is understood to be distinct from disarmament in peace processes, which is usually directed at removing weapons permanently or temporarily from fighting forces. Weapons control can include a range of measures directed at numerous actors including civilians, paramilitaries, militias, police, other security forces, private security companies, and fighting forces. It can entail:

- developing new standards, laws and policies related to the use, possession, sale and movement of weapons;
- banning certain types of guns and ammunition or particular uses;
- banning particular types of people from using or possessing weapons;
- new techniques and standards for the storage of state-held (police, military) weapons;
- removing weapons from circulation—annual destruction events, for example, or amnesties for handing in illegal weapons;
- implementing a ‘weapons in exchange for development’ scheme;
- creating ‘gun free zones;’ and
- awareness campaigns targeted at particular populations or actors to stigmatize weapons possession and/or misuse, or to advertise changes to laws and policies or other events and processes.

In this report the terms ‘guns,’ ‘arms,’ and ‘weapons’ are used interchangeably.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**—is defined in the United Nations (UN) Integrated DDR Standards as:

- **disarmament** is “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population.”
- **demobilisation** is “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designed for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.”
- **reintegration** is “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”
Security Sector Reform (SSR)—is defined in the UN Integrated DDR Standards as “a dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private–military companies, correctional services and civil society ‘watch-dogs’.” A key goal of such reform efforts is to instil or nurture the development of democratic norms and principles of good governance in justice and security sectors. More simply, SSR has been described as a “process for developing professional and effective security structures that will allow citizens to live their lives in safety.” In the course of this report, reference to SSR implicitly entails judicial and justice-related processes and components.

Survivors and victims of armed violence—encompasses combatants and civilians who have survived war-related violence with trauma, injury or impairment. In all the Country Studies efforts were made to assess whether survivors were recognised as legitimate stakeholders in the peace process, and the extent to which measures to address their needs were highlighted in the peace talks and agreements. Such recognition can take several forms and may include access to physical or psychological rehabilitation services and long-term care or special consideration of injured fighters in the reintegration phase of DDR. It may also entail dedicated truth and accountability seeking processes, and attention to efficient justice mechanisms.

Violence reduction—is understood to include both implicit and explicit recognition of the need to contain and reduce violence over a set of time periods: short, medium and long term. It is understood to be separate from the ceasefire and demilitarisation process, and casts a spotlight on cultures of violence and weapons misuse that may be prevalent amongst a range of actors, including interpersonal, gang, youth, family, gender, ethnic and identity-based violence. It may entail a variety of processes such as research and policy development, changing laws, and awareness-raising, and can include a range of disparate strategies such as youth programming, employment schemes, town planning, challenging gender roles, tackling urbanisation and rural decline and promoting sustainable development.

Acronyms

CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR  Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
GoNU  Government of National Unity
GoS  Government of Sudan
GoSS  Government of Southern Sudan
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JDB  Joint Defence Board
JEM  Justice and Equality Movement
JIU  Joint Integrated Unit
NCP  National Congress Party
NDDRCC  National DDR Co-ordination Council
NSDDC  Northern Sudan DDR Commission
NUP  National Unionist Party
OAG  Other Armed Group
PDF  Popular Defense Forces
SAF  Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF  South Sudan Defense Force
SSDCC  Southern Sudan DDR Commission
UNIDDRU  UN Integrated DDR Unit
UNMIS  UN Mission in Sudan
PEACEMAKING IS RARELY IF EVER SIMPLE, AND IN SUDAN IT HAS NEVER BEEN SO. NONETHELESS, THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA) SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN (GOS) AND THE REBEL SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A) IN JANUARY 2005 WAS A LANDMARK IN PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN. FORMALLY, AT LEAST, THE AGREEMENT ENDED THE WAR, WHICH HAD STARTED IN 1983.


THE CAUSES OF SUDAN’S SECOND CIVIL WAR ARE COMPLEX, WITH UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER AT ITS ROOT—AS WITH MOST OF THE COUNTRY’S MANY VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND GRIEVANCES. SUDAN’S POWER CENTRE HAS LONG BEEN DOMINATED BY A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE, DRAWN MAINLY FROM TWO TRIBES IN THE NORTHERN NILE VALLEY REGION, TO THE EXCLUSION AND DISADVANTAGE OF OTHER GROUPS AND REGIONS. THE RESULTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AND MARGINALISATION HAVE REPEATEDLY SPURRED SUDANESE ARMED UPRISINGS. AS MOTIVATING CAUSES, THE INEQUALITIES HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, FACTORS THAT HAVE BEEN OF VARYING CONSEQUENCE DURING THE COUNTRY’S CONFLICTS.11

Militias into which armed civilians were mobilised also proliferated, although their participation in national or local armed conflict was not new. Militias fought in Sudan’s first civil war after independence (usually dated as running from 1955 until the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972). From the start of the second civil war, the use and role of militias grew significantly, fostered by the GoS and an influx of small arms and light weapons. In the states of South Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, for example, Murahilin and Rizayqat militias regularly fought in support of the government, raiding settlements that they or the SAF believed were supporting the SPLM, and escorting trains that intermittently ran from Babanusa to Wau.

In 1989 the new government of Omar al-Bashir established the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) as a mechanism to mobilise more forces for the war, as well as to bring some of the militias (or at least some of their members) more directly under the government’s command. The total figures for PDF forces have never been publicly available, but for much of the war, and since the CPA was signed, they appear to have numbered some tens of thousands of combatants. Some of the PDF who were not from tribal militias—typically youths and students, who were poorly trained and equipped—were used as cannon fodder on the war’s bloodier fronts in the south, as too were youths and students doing their national service in conventional SAF units. But many of the PDF remained paramilitary, acting in the war principally when their tribal militias were mobilised by the GoS, but also sometimes acting independently in direct pursuit of their own interests.

“The model in Sudan is popular security. It is more like the United States than Britain [in this respect].”

—Senior official, Northern Sudan DDR Commission, 2007

Politically, the war was presided over by two parties, the GoS and the SPLM. The government changed three times during the course of the war: first in 1985 from the rule of the military leader Ja’far Nimeiri to the interim Transitional Military Council of General Sawar al-Dhahab; then in 1986 to the democratically-
elected coalition government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Umma Party; and then in 1989 back to a military regime, led by Omar al-Bashir and backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) party. In some respects President Bashir’s government then went through its own change in the late 1990s, from an avowedly revolutionary Islamist government directed by the NIF’s Hasan al-Turabi (who was eventually ousted by Bashir in 1999) to a less ideological and more straightforwardly autocratic government led by the National Congress Party (NCP) and held in place by the twin forces of the security apparatus and the army.25

The SPLM also went through transformations, albeit less visible and without changes in primary leadership. Always led by John Garang, a former SAF officer with a doctorate in agricultural economics, the SPLM in its early years was nationalist and weakly Marxist in ideology. In 1991 the movement partly fragmented when an internal challenge to Garang and the loss of the movement’s bases in Ethiopia led to the formation of first one and then two splinter groups (see Box 1). During the 1990s the movement explored alliances with other Sudanese opposition groups through the region-wide National Democratic Alliance, but otherwise contended with managing its own internal divisions and fighting the SAF. Basic civilian administration structures were established in the ‘liberated’ parts of Sudan controlled by the SPLM, and in the early 2000s the main breakaway factions rejoined the mainstream movement, still under Garang.26

Box 2

Sudan historical timeline27

- 1820: Muhammad Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt, conquers Sudan.
- 1881: Start of Mahdiyya rebellion against Turco-Egyptian rule.
- 1882: British invasion of Egypt leads to start of British involvement in Sudan.
- 1885: Under Muhammad ibn Abdalla, self-appointed Mahdi (‘guided one’), Mahdists capture Khartoum.
- 1899: Following Battle of Omdurman, Anglo-Egyptian Condominium is established, ending Mahdist rule.
- 1954: Britain and Egypt sign treaty guaranteeing Sudanese independence.
- 1955: Anticipating independence and growing domination by the north, army mutiny breaks out in the south, marking start of conflict leading to first civil war.
- 1956: Sudan becomes independent from Britain.
- 1958: General Ibrahim Abbud leads a military coup toppling the civilian government.
- 1962: Southern rebel guerrilla movement, the Anya Nya, is formed.
- 1964: Popular uprising (the ‘October Revolution’) leads to replacement of Abbud’s military regime with transitional civilian government.
- 1965: Elections marred by low turn-out, confusion, and insecurity in the south; coalition government formed under Umma Party and National Unionist Party (NUP).
- 1968: Tensions within the Umma Party led to the dissolution of the coalition; two separate, opposing governments appear.
- 1969: Ja’far Muhammad al-Numayri seizes power in a military coup.
- 1971: Numayri survives attempted communist coup.
- 1972: Following peace talks sponsored by the World Council of Churches, the Addis Ababa Agreement is signed, ending the first civil war.
- 1977: Numayri neutralises threat from northern opposition through a ‘national reconciliation’ campaign and divides the south; oil deposits are discovered in Bentiu, in the south.
- 1983: Numayri introduces sharia law for entire country; a group of army soldiers led by John Garang form the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); the second civil war begins.
- 1985: Numayri is overthrown in a popular uprising and his government is replaced by a Transitional Military Council led by General Sawar al-Dhahab.
- 1989: Military coup led by Omar al-Bashir and backed by National Islamic Front (NIF) overthrows government and declares a ‘National Salvation Revolution.’
The human cost

In the same way that the scope of the war in Sudan tended to be misleadingly simplified (as ‘north versus south,’ ‘Muslim versus Christian/animist’), the costs of the war also tend to be simplified. It is commonly claimed that 1–2 million lives were lost from 1983 to 2005, and the conflict is often described as Africa’s longest civil war. These numbers must be considered rough estimates made in the absence of reliable data, but informed by the awareness that wars—especially prolonged wars involving humanitarian crises—have terrible costs. The war resulted in direct deaths: government and SPLA troops clashed in ambushes, raids, prolonged battles and sieges, killing soldiers and civilians. Direct deaths also occurred when government aircraft bombed settlements and when the SPLM/A split and turned against itself. However, the war also caused indirect deaths when agricultural land and livestock were destroyed or looted, and when civilians fled their homes (because of actual or threatened violence, or economic need), and thereby became likelier to die from disease or malnourishment than would otherwise have been the case.

The human cost of the war was compounded by recurrent drought and flood crises, inside and outside the war zones, to which Sudan has always been susceptible. Indeed, because of their visibility and costs, the country was often known more for these humanitarian crises than for its war, even though the war contributed...
to these crises and partly prevented the Sudanese government from concertedly addressing them. The famines in Kordofan, eastern Sudan and Darfur in 1984–85 and 1988; the famine crisis in 1990–1991; the crisis in Bahr el-Ghazal in 1998—these and other crises were the face of Sudanese suffering that the outside world saw, and which made the country the scene of the world’s largest prolonged international relief effort, Operation Lifeline Sudan, which ran from 1989 until, effectively, the CPA.

Vast numbers of people (especially southerners) became internally displaced or fled across Sudan’s borders. Some moved and settled in new areas in the south and the north, often (but certainly not always) in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs); others fled to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. Already by 1989 some one million southerners had moved to the north, many of them to Kordofan and Khartoum, while around 400,000 were in Ethiopia and 40,000 in Kenya and Uganda. By 2005 the total number of IDPs had risen to around 4.5 million, excluding the growing number of displaced in Darfur.²⁹ Throughout the war, Sudan was also host to large numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia.

At the economic level, the exact costs of the war are unknown. These included the military costs (often estimated at ‘more than a million dollars a day’ for the government); the toll of the destruction and disruption of the livelihoods and lives of several million civilians; and lost opportunities for spending on education, health and infrastructure, and industry, trade and investment.³⁰ Historically, the parts of Sudan directly affected by the war had already been economically and politically marginalised, and the two decades of war after 1983 exacerbated this relative under-development. As of 2005 Sudan was ranked only 147th out of 177 countries in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index.³¹ At the same time, although average real GDP growth strengthened in the last years of the war (to around 6 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2005), the benefits of growth remained overwhelmingly concentrated in Khartoum and the surrounding region.³²
Sudan’s history of failed peace talks and agreements, the scale of the conflict, and the depth of the divisions between the parties meant that negotiations were always going to be challenging. Over the course of the long war, numerous attempts to achieve peace were made. Roughly, these were of four types: domestic attempts; mediation by prominent individuals; peacemaking by regional organisations and other actors in Africa; and internationalised mediation, involving regional and other international actors. What is striking is that so many attempts at peacemaking largely failed to contain the war, let alone end or resolve it, until the CPA in 2005. Undoubtedly there were weaknesses and problems in the various attempts at peacemaking, such as poor timing, under-preparation and weak commitment from mediators. But the larger and more important determinant of the failure of the various efforts at peacemaking was rather the warring parties’ own lack of determination to reach a peaceful negotiated settlement to the war.33

The first and most promising period of domestic peacemaking occurred between 1986 and 1989. In March 1986, the Umma Party and the SPLM signed the Koka Dam Declaration, which offered a basis for further negotiations and a constitutional convention. However, the agreement did not receive the buy-in of the Umma Party’s coalition partners and was not built on. Then in November 1988 the Democratic Unionist Party (one of the Umma’s partners) reached its own accord with the SPLM, which in turn the Umma Party failed to decisively embrace. Just at the moment when Sadiq al-Mahdi had reshuffled his coalition and appeared to be on the verge of accepting the accord and allowing a breakthrough in negotiations with the SPLM, an army coup overthrew Sadiq’s government and brought Omar al-Bashir into power. The arrival of Bashir, followed quickly by the banning of political parties, led to a period of peacemaking attempts by prominent individuals using their ‘good offices.’ Former US president Jimmy Carter, the former Nigerian head of government (and future president) Olusegun Obasanjo, and a former Sudanese diplomat and later UN envoy, Francis Deng, all made attempts. But the circumstances were far from propitious: Bashir’s government had seized power in part to block an expected peace agreement, and because it felt that the SPLA could be defeated militarily. At the same time, the government had a revolutionary Arab-Islamist agenda that exacerbated the conflict with the SPLM/A while alienating Sudan’s erstwhile Western allies and some of its Arab allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

“The idea was to seem to be talking peace, while the real intention was war.”

—Aldo Ajo Deng, former government adviser on dialogue, 200434

The failure of peacemaking attempts by individuals and ‘good offices’ led to a period of regional efforts in the 1990s, instigated partly by the (admittedly weak) impulse among Sudan’s neighbours and internationally to ‘do something.’ These attempts were encouraged by the interest of the warring parties in at least appearing ready to negotiate and in the potential benefits, such as a tactically beneficial ceasefire of limited duration and scope, or an agreement with a faction of the SPLM/A (as occurred in January 1992 between the government and SPLM/A-Nasir). As a result, two rounds of peace talks (known as Abuja I of 1992 and Abuja II of 1993) were held in Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity. But neither set of talks was well-placed to succeed, because at the time the SPLM/A was divided and the government was intent on defeating the SPLM/A militarily—albeit while making side-agreements with
splinter groups such as the SPLM/A-Nasir, with whom it then tried to combat the mainstream SPLA.35 As one government official described it, in hindsight: “The idea was to seem to be talking peace, while the real intention was war.”36 All the same, following the failure of Abuja I and II, responsibility for mediation of the war was taken up by a regional East African co-operation body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).37

In the absence of any other substantial effort to negotiate a resolution to the conflict, IGAD became the primary forum for peace talks. But when in 1994 the third round of talks under IGAD produced a Declaration of Principles welcomed by the SPLM/A but rejected by the government, the latter refused to participate in further IGAD talks until 1997. In the interim, it launched its own internal peacemaking project, called ‘Peace from Within’. In reality, this was a continuation of its efforts to break off and turn factions of the SPLM/A in order to weaken Garang’s mainstream movement. The GoS succeeded to the extent that it concluded the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the Fashoda Agreement in 1997 with groups that had split from or opposed the SPLM/A. But these agreements did not weaken the SPLM/A mainstream, which in the meantime had strengthened its military challenge to the government. By the late 1990s, the SPLM/A had provided support to the regional rebellion in eastern Sudan and had consolidated its control over almost all of the south, except for the main urban centres of Juba, Malakal and Wau, and some other towns, control of which changed hands several times during the ebb and flow of fighting.

In October 1997, under pressure internationally and beginning to moderate its external politics (a ‘charm offensive’ of sorts), the government returned to the IGAD forum and accepted further rounds of talks on the basis of the earlier Declaration of Principles. All the same, the talks still yielded no agreements and no progress, and the responsibility of IGAD for peacemaking in Sudan was challenged when a joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative was launched in late 1999. Both the government and the SPLM/A accepted this parallel initiative, and even though no talks bringing both sides together were ever convened under the initiative, the effect was that for two years there was no consensus about the forum for peace talks, nor was there the kind of concerted focus that was needed for progress to be made.

In time, the drift in efforts to make peace in Sudan attracted attention. In the late 1990s, donor governments established an IGAD Partners Forum which was intended to strengthen IGAD’s conduct of peace talks for Sudan. At the same time, international advocacy for peace in Sudan was growing, coming from a range of voices (including religious and human rights campaigners, NGOs, and UN agencies) and from an incomplete awareness that humanitarian crises and accompanying relief efforts—the mainstay of Western direct response to the war and the situation in Sudan—should not be allowed to continue indefinitely. The United States was already looking at how to increase its engagement with Sudan when the attacks of September 11, 2001 strengthened US interest in the peace talks. The first outcome of these various factors was a ceasefire agreement for the Nuba Mountains (a region in central Sudan), brokered by Swiss and US mediation teams at talks in Switzerland in January 2002. Then, after a new round of IGAD-sponsored talks under its new chairperson for peace talks for Sudan, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the breakthrough Machakos Protocol was reached in July 2002.

The Machakos Protocol was the birth of the internationalised peace process for Sudan, which, between 2002 and January 2005, culminated in the CPA. Sumbeiywo, a former head of the Kenyan army, chaired the talks, supported by an IGAD secretariat and a small number of specialist resource persons.38 The IGAD Partners Forum and a ‘troika’ of Britain, Norway and the United States observed and strongly encouraged the talks.39 This was done through bilateral discussions, and through individual representatives of the troika sometimes attending or staying at the talks. Nonetheless, as with many long peace processes, the intrinsic difficulty of the issues to be negotiated ensured that the progress was not quick, and disputes about continued fighting and ceasefire violations, changes of delegates, rejections of drafts, and other complaints led to numerous delays.

To bring the parties to the peace table and keep them there, those providing mediation assistance faced the challenge of constructing talks that would move forward, even if slowly, and that would gain at least enough of the parties’ confidence for them to keep returning to the table. They needed to find and manage a practical and effective agenda that the parties would agree to negotiate on, and that would cover what they considered the fundamental issues. The
mediators were under pressure to secure an effective ceasefire agreement; to keep the parties talking even while the ceasefire was violated; to keep the talks going when the Darfur conflict escalated and drew international attention; and as the talks stretched on for longer than expected, they needed to bring the process to a successful and credible end.

The parties themselves faced other challenges. Both sides needed to carry their supporters and constituencies with them on their decisions. For example, the NCP needed to persuade its supporters—or at least its inner core of decision makers—that it and the national government should support the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. Similarly, the SPLM/A needed to convince its leaders and supporters to accept a six-year interim period, rather than the much shorter period that the SPLM/A had initially proposed. The SPLM/A also faced the practical obstacle of paying its officials and fielding competent negotiators who could match the government’s seasoned delegates, problems that did not affect the government, with its access to public funds and a wider pool of trained officials.

Building on the Machakos Protocol—a more significant agreement than any other since 1988—the talks progressed, though more slowly than most participants and observers expected. The parties discussed and gradually agreed on a series of agreements, covering the cessation of hostilities, security, wealth-sharing, the disputed areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, power-sharing, a permanent ceasefire, and implementation modalities. Mediator-set negotiation deadlines were repeatedly missed, until a special session of the UN Security Council in Nairobi in November 2004 set the end of that year as the final deadline for a conclusive peace agreement. The parties barely met this deadline, concluding the last agreement completing the CPA on 31 December. Following this, on 9 January 2005, the parties signed the consolidated agreement at a ceremony in Nairobi.
Box 3
Timeline of agreements

The CPA is an amalgam of nine agreements reached during the negotiations under IGAD auspices between 2002 and the end of 2004:

**Machakos Protocol**
Signed 20 July 2002. A short document, whose most important features were an agreed framework for self-determination for southern Sudan (with a referendum to be held after a six-year interim period), and agreed principles on the state and religion.

**Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities**

**Agreement on Security Arrangements**
Signed 25 September 2003. Only seven pages long, its most important feature was that it set out a framework for the maintenance of two separate armies and the establishment of Joint Integrated Units after the final agreement; also, it set out broad guidelines for redeployment and other military matters.

**Agreement on Wealth Sharing**
Signed 7 January 2004. The agreement set out the principles for the management and sharing of national wealth, in particular revenues arising from the extraction of oil. It specified that 2 per cent of net oil revenues should go to the oil producing states/regions, and 50 per cent of the remaining net revenues derived from oil wells in the south should go to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) established after the CPA.

**Protocol on South Kordofan and Blue Nile**
Signed 26 May 2004. The agreement set out a framework for the governance of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states during the interim period.

**Protocol on Abyei**
Signed 26 May 2004. The agreement assigned the area of Abyei a special administrative status and provided for a referendum, to be held at the end of the interim period, to determine whether it should be part of the north or the south. It also set out sharing arrangements for revenues from oil from Abyei. For the parties, the sensitivity of Abyei lay chiefly in the fact that a sizeable share of national oil output is produced in the area.

**Protocol on Power Sharing**
Signed 26 May 2004. The agreement set out the government structures and linkages to apply to the national and southern governments that were to be formed at the start of the CPA six-year interim period, and specified the shares of power between the ruling NCP, the SPLM, and opposition parties.

**Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements**
Signed 31 December 2004. The agreement set out the implementation modalities for the permanent ceasefire and security arrangements in the pre-interim and interim periods.

**Implementation Modalities**
Signed 31 December 2004. This document (in the form of tables) outlined the schedule, targets and responsible parties for implementing the protocols on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Coupled with the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire, these implementation modalities made the CPA technically complete and in one sense comprehensive.

Formally, the CPA was a historic compromise: the government in Khartoum was guaranteed sharia law in the north, while the south gained the right for self-determination after six years, with a Government of National Unity (GoNU) and a Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) formed. With its provisions for a permanent internationally monitored ceasefire, as well as for power-sharing, access to oil wealth, separation of religion and state, southern autonomy, and a separate army, the CPA responded to key southern grievances. The country embarked on a six-year interim period which was due to lead to general elections in 2009 and a referendum on self-determination for the south in 2011.

The CPA, however, did not—indeed could not—bring about an immediate transformation in relations between the NCP and the SPLM. Nor, of course, did it affect the violence in Darfur. Confidence in the CPA peace was fragile, as it still is today and may be for the coming years. Critically, the parties sought to maximise the power they would have after the CPA was reached. During the CPA's implementation, the behaviour and strategies of the parties reflected their uneven commitment to the agreement. The ruling NCP’s overarching strategy was, in effect, to comply with the CPA just enough to keep the agreement alive. Reflecting its weaker position, the SPLM’s overarching strategy was to do as much as it could to ensure that the CPA was implemented more rather than less. It was in this uneasy context that the practical post-agreement security issues arose. Unsurprisingly, the parties tended to give little priority to these issues, and co-operated only faltering on the technicalities, much as they had done during the peace talks.
The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement

SECTION 3
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

The evolution of DDR in the past twenty years into a detailed doctrine has been the subject of intense analysis and debate. The three components are largely considered to be sequential, although there is increasing fluidity around the order and overlapping nature of the components. There is also a growing shift at the conceptual level to recognise the overtly political nature of DDR, questioning the largely technical status it is assigned in peace processes. Though at the operational level, this has yet to consistently unfold.

Broadly speaking, DDR is a set of procedures introduced after a violent conflict to move fighting forces through the transition to civilian status or integration into state security forces. These transitions entail the decommissioning of armed groups, their collective disarmament, and efforts designed to ‘reintegrate’ former fighters into new occupations. In practice, DDR—especially reintegration—faces multifarious challenges in fragile post-war nations, including:

- coordination problems;
- sequencing issues;
- an absence of reliable baseline data;
- under-funding or delayed funding;
- omission of some armed actors;
- an overemphasis on short-term disarmament; and
- a tendency to neglect substantive reintegration measures.

DDR programmes are typically facilitated by actors such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The political and financial commitment of the recovering country is widely considered to be essential to a positive outcome, though this is not always forthcoming.

DDR serves not only to integrate ex-combatants, but also to address key security issues in the post-war phase. While DDR is typically conceptualised as one discrete ‘package’ of processes and measures, it has clear linkages to other doctrines, concepts and processes. In effect, DDR is one in a series of steps logically followed by, or undertaken concurrently to, further weapons reductions and controls and longer-term, systemic efforts to create lasting security. It is often undertaken—either explicitly or implicitly—as a precondition for or complement to larger institutional reforms, particularly security sector reform (see Section 5: Security Sector Reform).

“The gap was not only between the technicians and the politicians. It was between the agreement and good political theory. The agreement produced a strange result: one state, two systems and two armies.”

—Senior official, Northern Sudan
DDR Commission, 2007

In examining how DDR was addressed in the CPA, it is worth bearing in mind that the agreement is only binding for six and a half years—an ‘interim period’ from the signing in January 2005 to mid-2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south is due to be held. During the negotiations, many southern Sudanese, not least within the SPLM/A, doubted whether the NCP (and other political forces in the north) would ultimately honour the right to self-determination, if southern independence were definitely to be the outcome. Fundamentally, therefore, both parties (the GoS and the SPLM) negotiated at the talks—and have subsequently acted during implementation—on the underlying assumption that armed conflict might be necessary once more, either during the interim period.
or subsequently. In the peace talks, they therefore tacitly sought to avoid provisions or terms that would unduly constrain their abilities to maintain, re-equip and augment their armed forces. Thus, although DDR is addressed in the agreement, it seems—at least in retrospect—that this was done largely *pro forma*. In this respect, the lack of great detail found in the relevant sections of the agreement is telling.

“From the beginning the technical teams discussing DDR were well aware that there needed to be a holistic approach to DDR and disarmament. But it didn’t translate into commitments.”

—UNDP staff member, 2007

The mediators, however, had little incentive to push DDR (or arms control, for that matter) to the fore: their priorities were to keep the talks alive and to progress towards a credible final agreement. The mediators had the challenge of ensuring that enough was done to give the agreements sufficient credibility for the parties to persevere with the talks and be willing to implement the eventual CPA. The risk that they needed to avoid was that the talks would stall or collapse. These basic realities of the CPA talks had implications for the timing of the process and how issues were addressed, for the challenges that the talks faced, and for the strategies that the mediators used.

Some participants in the talks were aware that DDR was inherently important and would pose challenges during the implementation of the CPA. But, as one government participant in the DDR discussions observed, there was “no discussion about what concepts of security should apply in Sudan,” and “discussion between the technical people and the politicians was weak.” As it was, the more immediate challenges of the peace talks left little or no interest in detailed discussion and agreement on those issues. This is not to say that there was not enough time to negotiate security issues; rather, from the parties’ perspectives it was not the right time and
place to negotiate major post-agreement force reductions. Both parties wanted to keep their armed forces intact, and the agreed six-year interim legitimised this preference. The negative aspect of this framework was the wide scope it offered for consolidating and using armed forces for tactical or belligerent purposes. The CPA specified only that the parties should “begin . . . negotiations on proportionate downsizing” once redeployment was complete, which was due by mid-2007.49

After the CPA was signed, the many challenges of the early stages of its implementation demanded attention and hindered greater action on DDR.50 With hindsight, some individuals who participated in the talks—and others who did not—have expressed regret about what was and was not discussed or agreed at the talks. But there is also considerable understanding and acceptance of why major matters were negotiated as they were. This applies, for example, to the question of why the CPA talks led to a peace with two armies rather than one. The government’s preference had been for ‘immediate integration’ of the SAF and SPLA. But during 2003 it agreed that this was not acceptable to the SPLM/A, which argued that integration after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first civil war, had meant that the south had ended up without a means of self-defence.51 All the same, some on the government side still saw the outcome as unsatisfactory. As one official at the talks and later member of the NSDDRC saw it, “[T]he gap was not only between the technicians and the politicians. It was between the agreement and good political theory. The agreement produced a strange result: one state, two systems and two armies.”52

One challenge at the talks was for the ‘technical advisory teams’ to convince the primary negotiators to understand what the CPA ideally needed to cover on DDR (and other security issues). Reading back from the content and omissions of the agreements that the parties signed, and from the fact that technical teams discussed these concerns during 2004, it is evident that the teams did not or were not able to prevail on the primary negotiators to include detailed provisions in the agreements. One UNDP staff member who participated in the security-related discussions at the peace talks concurred: “From the beginning the technical teams discussing DDR were well aware that there needed to be a holistic approach to DDR and disarmament. But it didn’t translate into commitments.”53

After the signature of the breakthrough Machakos Protocol in July 2002, the next agreement to be reached was the renewable six-month ceasefire agreement, signed in October 2002.54 In February 2003 the parties agreed to establish a ceasefire Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), which bolstered the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) set up in 2002 to monitor abuses against civilians. In September 2003 the parties concluded the security agreement in Naivasha (the Agreement on Security Arrangements). This sequence of agreements is perhaps an indication of the priority and importance that the parties attached to some security issues. But although the negotiation of security arrangements was vexed, it was not the sole reason for the slow progress in negotiations. Other matters (the subjects of the protocols eventually signed in 2004) were also being negotiated at this time and, collectively, these matters were more far contentious: wealth- and power-sharing.55

“In Sudan we ended up with two very strong military institutions, whereas in most peace processes you end up with one. Could this have been avoided? I doubt it very much. DDR wasn’t really part of the agreement.”

—Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, head of the Northern Sudan DDR Commission, 200756

In the months after the Machakos Protocol, talks were set back first by fighting (for example around Torit) and then by poor co-ordination between international observers of the talks, the secretariat, and the parties. This led to changes in resource persons at the talks and the tabling in July 2003 of the Nakuru draft framework, which IGAD had not adequately negotiated with both parties. The Nakuru draft was intended to help resolve all the main issues, namely power- and wealth-sharing, security arrangements and the three disputed areas. Instead, it temporarily jeopardised the talks.57 The SPLM/A accepted the Nakuru draft as a basis for further negotiations, but the government firmly rejected it on the grounds that it did not sufficiently respect the aims of the Machakos Protocol. In particular, the government took exception
to the security arrangements proposed in the Nakuru draft, arguing that the parties had not had the same opportunity to discuss these matters as they had for other issues. In rejecting the Nakuru draft, the government reiterated its position that in the context of a united Sudan, there should be a single united National Armed Force, and not (as the draft proposed) separate Sudan People’s Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Armed Forces. The Nakuru draft did not outline any objectives for security concerns, except in stating without detail that a comprehensive ceasefire could encompass agreements on force strengths and DDR, among other military and security matters.58

In time the bad feeling caused by the Nakuru draft subsided, and the talks made progress towards the Protocol on Security Arrangements, which was reached in late September 2003. The agreement was notably short, its seven pages briefly covering:

- the status of the two armed forces;
- ceasefire;
- redeployment;
- the idea of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs);
- command and control of the two armed forces;
- military doctrine; and
- the status of ‘Other Armed Groups’ (OAGs).

Despite the brevity of the document, the most striking aspects of the CPA security arrangements were already in place: the restriction of the legitimate forces to the SAF and the SPLA alone; the corresponding requirement that all other armed groups align and be absorbed into one of the two armies or be incorporated into the security sector; an agreement to “the principles of proportional downsizing” of both forces; and a pledge to institute DDR with assistance from the international community for “all those who will be affected” by force reduction, demobilisation, and downsizing.59

The parties did not discuss the details of these subjects further until the second half of 2004, during the negotiation of the permanent ceasefire and implementation modalities. At that time the parties formed a sub-committee for security which, with the assistance of several resource persons, worked on agreeing and preparing the mechanisms for implementing the security arrangements. The details were eventually set out in the Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, signed at the end of 2004.

This agreement was a substantial amplification of the 2003 security agreement. The first part of the agreement concerned ceasefire arrangements, covering general principles, violations, disengagement, integration or DDR of OAGs, foreign armed groups, and the role of bodies such as the Ceasefire Political Commission, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, and the UN peace support mission (the UN Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS). The second part of the agreement concerned the armed forces, covering their military mission and mandate, the role of the Joint Defence Board, redeployment, optimal sizing, JIUs, funding, policing and public security. The third and shortest part of the agreement (only four pages long) concerned DDR and reconciliation, covering principles, institutions, previous contractual obligations in DDR, and some brief humanitarian and general provisions.

“Aware of the fact that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are crucial components for a secure and peaceful Sudan, [the parties] commit themselves to credible, transparent and effective DDR processes which will support the ex-combatants’ transition to a productive civilian life.”

—CPA, Preamble to ‘Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices,’ 31 December 2004

The last part of the ceasefire agreement, intended to support implementation, was rather general. It set out the institutional framework for DDR, and outlined the division of labour between the three primary bodies that were to be set up to deal with DDR: a National DDR Co-ordination Council (NDDRCC), a Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and a Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC). But it specified few targets and contained little detail, such as current or planned numbers for force sizes.60 Furthermore, although this part of the agreement came under the heading ‘DDR and reconciliation,’ it glossed over the
fact that the parties themselves were not going to embark on substantial DDR: the primary targets, for demobilisation at least, were members of aligned armed groups. As the first two parts of the agreement show, the priority of the parties was to retain—and even strengthen—their armies and manage the ways in which this was done. Also, despite the heading, ‘reconciliation’ was mentioned only in the last paragraph of the agreement, in a statement by the parties calling for governments, civil society and the international community to assist an otherwise unspecified ‘reconciliation process.’ Another omission in the agreement was determination of the status of the paramilitary PDF and the militias in the north.

These deficiencies cannot be blamed on a failure by the parties to raise and discuss the issues. In late 2004, teams from each side were meeting to discuss DDR, with the government team headed by Sulafeedeen Salih Mohamed (who subsequently headed the NSDDRC after the CPA was signed), and the SPLM/A team headed by Arop Mayak Monytok (who subsequently headed the SSDDRC). But as time passed and no closure was reached on key issues, it was primarily the technical people, of secondary rank in the peace talks, who recognised these deficiencies—but they were not in a position to fight for their inclusion. In essence, the DDR advisers had been delegated to discuss issues that the chief negotiators saw as of secondary importance to the fundamental elements of the ceasefire and security arrangements. During the talks, a tacit agreement emerged to postpone any idea of major disarmament or demobilisation at least until well into the CPA’s implementation, if not indefinitely. By the end of 2004 it was too late for anyone to do anything about the written content of the CPA. As one member of the SSDDRC reflected: “Where things weren’t addressed during the negotiations, it is very difficult to find the room to negotiate those issues now.”

As far as DDR was concerned, a set of basic terms was settled on, but the lack of detail is telling. The agreement is far more detailed in its treatment of arrangements for troop redeployments, the formation of the JJUs, power-sharing arrangements and constitutional matters. In retrospect, the terms of DDR, falling on the last few pages of the protocol on security arrangements, have the appearance of an afterthought, little more than a placeholder. As the head of the NSDDRC observed, with hindsight: “In Sudan we ended up with two very strong military institutions, whereas in most

Box 4

**CPA institutions and provisions for DDR**

The CPA assigned responsibility for DDR to three institutions to be set up once CPA implementation began:62 the National DDR Co-ordination Council (NDDRCC), the Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC).63

- **NSDDRC**: the CPA gave the council “prime responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination and evaluation of progress of northern and southern DDR commissions.”64

- **NDDRCC and SSDDRC**: the CPA mandated the commissions “to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.”65 The CPA required pre-CPA DDR activities and ‘contractual obligations’ to be transferred to the commissions.

- The CPA also called for state DDR commissions to be “entrusted with the responsibility of implementing programmes at the state and local levels” (Sudan is divided into 25 states).

The CPA specified that DDR should take place within “a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country.” However, it did not specify requirements for this process.

The CPA required each party to set up an Incorporation and Reintegration Ad-hoc Committee to manage the integration or demobilisation of OAGs; a joint OAGs Collaborative Committee (with three representatives from each party and one observer from the UN) was to oversee the process.66 Within this framework, the CPA specified that a “DDR programme for OAGs shall be worked out” by the SSDDRC by the end of the pre-interim period (9 July 2005). To this was added the diluting provision that “[a]ll integration options shall be open in that programme.”67 Furthermore:

- The CPA did not specify or give examples of groups that were to be considered OAGs, leaving unresolved the question of the status of the PDF and some tribally-based militias.

- Implicitly, OAGs in northern Sudan were the responsibility of the national authorities, including the NSDDRC. But the absence of explicit recognition of existence of OAGs in the north, or any specification of role of NSDDRC, left it open for the GoNU to act as it pleased in this regard.

The CPA did not contain any requirement for DDR of members of the SAF and SPLA. Instead, it contained only an open provision stating that after completion of redeployment (due by mid-2007), “the parties shall begin negotiations on proportionate downsizing,” while the parties were to “allow voluntary DDR of ‘non-essentials’ (child soldiers and elderly, disabled) during the first year of the Interim Period.”68
peace processes you end up with one. Could this have been avoided? I doubt it very much. DDR wasn’t really part of the agreement.”

The implementation of DDR

At the time of this study’s conclusion, Sudan was barely half way through the six-year interim period scheduled by the CPA. As of early 2008, large-scale DDR plans were beginning to be discussed. In most peace processes, negotiations in fact continue informally into the implementation phase as various hurdles need to be tackled. This is certainly the case in Sudan with the establishment of the relevant institutions to address DDR. However, as noted in the introduction to the report, this Country Study does not examine implementation of the CPA in significant detail, and this section attempts to provide the reader with an overview of the key challenges.

“The co-operation between the two commissions has been below minimum. After thirty months we still hadn’t even reached a national DDR strategy, and there has been very little progress on the disputed areas.”

—Senior official, Northern Sudan DDR Commission, 2007

After the CPA was signed, the practical responsibility for DDR passed to the relevant authorities: on one side the GoNU (or NCP), the SAF and the NSDDRC, and on the other the GoSS (or SPLM), the SPLA and the SSDDRC. What those authorities made of the CPA was not solely determined by what the agreement contained: what happened during the CPA’s implementation depended at least as much on the spirit of the implementation as the letter of the law. It also depended partly on the surrounding context and international efforts to support the CPA’s implementation. Inevitably, there were numerous setbacks and challenges. These ranged from problems in the establishment of the DDR commissions and their financing to the terminology and methods of DDR, as well as practical difficulties in attempts at civilian and OAG disarmament.

During 2005 and 2006, the parties gradually established and put into operation the panoply of entities and mechanisms stipulated by the CPA. These included the Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, a Joint Defence Board (JDB), an OAGs Collaborative Committee, and other entities. Delays were common, and sometimes had knock-on effects; for example, the delayed formation of the JDB contributed to delays in the formation of JIUs. At the same time, the parties gradually redeployed their forces, albeit behind schedule, with the result that redeployments were still not complete as of 9 January 2008—six months after the initial deadline.

Meanwhile, the formation of the core DDR institutions and a national programme also fell markedly behind schedule. President Bashir authorised the formation of the NDDRCC in February 2006, but the council did not meet until December of that year. An Interim DDR Programme was only endorsed by the GoSS in January 2006, and by the national government in May 2006. The aims of the programme were institutional capacity-building and DDR for target groups such as women, children and disabled combatants. Meanwhile, the SSDDRC was only properly established in May 2006, and even after this, progress remained slow, partly because both DDR commissions faced problems in funding and staffing.

The start-up of the various DDR institutions did not proceed smoothly. In one observer’s opinion, divisions between personnel in the SSDDRC led to its virtual “collapse,” while the NSDDRC suffered “an internal coup” as the army sought to take control of the commission from civilian officials. These problems were partly matched by a “UN collapse on DDR,” as divisions appeared within the UN Integrated DDR Unit; the latter became the subject of much criticism from both inside and outside the UN system in Sudan. The unit was based at UNMIS and was made up of staff mainly from the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations and from UNDP. However, the officials who initially led the unit attempted to impose a single, UN-led approach which the DDR commissions, and UNDP staff felt disregarded the context in Sudan and the knowledge of those already working on security issues. In time, senior staff were replaced, and co-operation between Integrated Unit agencies and the DDR commissions improved. Nonetheless, staff turnover, delays in recruitment, and the physical separation of the institutions were persistent obstacles to co-operation on DDR policy and programming.
These institutional problems hampered progress during the first two years of the CPA’s implementation. For example, those involved in the interim DDR programme found it difficult to get senior political support from within the GoSS for the programme, although there was visible GoSS support for child soldier demobilisation, for example. In the words of one UNDP official, “messages about DDR were not being passed up the line.”

In the north, some officials considered the creation of two separate DDR commissions a serious mistake. As one NSDDRC official put it: “The co-operation between the two commissions has been below minimum. After thirty months we still hadn’t even reached a national DDR strategy, and there has been very little progress on the disputed areas.”

Eventually, in late 2007 the NDDRCC approved the Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan. However, even then the strategy contained little detail. For example, although it set the targets of the ‘first phase’ of SAF and SPLA force reduction at 45,000 troops apiece, it did not contain a detailed schedule or budget for these reductions. Nor indeed did it contain second phase targets, or numbers for the SAF and SPLA current or final intended force sizes.

“What we have in Sudan is not DDR, it is force reduction. Disarmament is for when you have defeated someone.”

—Kuel Aguer Kuel, Southern Sudan DDR Commission official, 2007

A further practical and internal problem for the DDR commissions was financing. With so many institutions being set up as part of the CPA’s implementation, the DDR commissions struggled to establish themselves and obtain national funding. The availability of international funding through the UN DDR Unit did not resolve this problem, in part because the commissions found it difficult to bring their programme plans into line with the eligibility criteria for international funding. As one commission official put it, although the UN DDR Unit oversaw a pool of almost USD70 million in available funding, in practice the DDR commissions could access only about USD6-7 million because their programmes did not meet “the international standards.” For the DDR Unit, the standards were a way of reducing the risk of squandering money. All the same, to avoid depending on bilateral donor funding and requirements, the NSDDRC therefore tried to secure its full budget from the national Ministry of Finance.

A less obvious challenge for the implementation of DDR lay in the methods and terms involved. For example, the application of the 2006 UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)—a 770-page set of policies, guidelines and procedures for DDR programmes—was considered problematic by some involved. Some senior Sudanese officials saw the IDDRS as a misguided attempt to apply a standardised approach to DDR in Sudan that did not take account of the particularities of the situation, such as the existence of the interim period and the fact that major disarmament of the core armed forces was not going to occur.

The conventional terminology of DDR also led to problems. The NSDDRC found the word ‘disarmament’ problematic. As one commission member described it: “People consider disarmament as something that is done to someone who has been defeated. It is something humiliating, and did not apply to them.”

As a result, outside Khartoum, in the north, the NSDDRC did not use its formal name in Arabic but instead another name meaning Northern Sudan Commission for Arms Control and Reintegration of Combatants in Society.

The southern commission similarly found that terminology posed problems, for the same reasons. As one interviewee from the SSDDRC commented: “What we have in Sudan is not DDR, it is force reduction. Disarmament is for when you have defeated someone.”

Overall, both commissions felt that their respective armed forces and governments gave them less authority and responsibility than was appropriate. Indeed, the SAF and the SPLA carried out some disarmament and demobilisation activities with little or no involvement from the commissions. The weakness of the commissions was also evident in the struggle they had to obtain confirmed numbers for SAF, PDF and SPLA members who would participate in future force-resizing. As of early 2008, the expectation was that disarmament of agreed numbers of SAF and SPLA members would be carried out as part of a multi-year DDR programme, the first phase of which was envisaged to begin later in 2008; pre-registration for this was being carried out. Inevitably, there were still problems of definition, in particular whom to define as ‘ex-combatants.’ As one
UNDP official commented, “[T]here was no way you could use a standard DDR definition of ex-combatant, unless you wanted to count millions as ex-combatants.”

In the view of one NSDDRC official who participated in the technical discussions at the peace talks, responsibilities for security and protection should also have been better defined in the CPA. Instead, there were “no clear definitions,” and the agreement had made a fundamental mistake by not considering what was or should be the model of public security in Sudan.

Another challenge was the complexity of DDR in the disputed areas, especially South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The northern commission argued that it alone should have responsibility for DDR in these areas, while the southern commission argued that there should be a jointly managed programme. The matter was therefore referred to the national DDR council; after it failed to resolve the matter, it was referred on to the presidency. In the meantime, the northern commission and the SAF slowly undertook their own efforts to demobilise OAGs in the areas concerned.

At the time of writing there was little to show that either the national or the southern governments had any serious intent to undertake large-scale DDR of their own forces. In addition to this fundamental constraint, the limited DDR efforts that had been made had been constrained by problems of conflicting priorities, inertia, mismanagement, lack of co-ordination and communication, and under-financing. As a result, although a national DDR policy had been approved, little more than the pre-registration of special needs groups, and some training and capacity building had so far occurred. The most co-ordinated, organised DDR had been of child soldiers and (to a lesser extent) disabled former combatants and women who had been associated with armed groups. This involved the DDR commissions and UN DDR actors, and built on work that had begun before the CPA was concluded.

Plans for large-scale DDR of the SAF and the SPLA in the future were being made, at least on paper, with a project addressing the poorly considered issue of reintegration, expected to be agreed in mid-2008. How this focus or plans more generally will translate into actions over the coming years will almost certainly depend more on political factors than those of a technocratic nature.
“The general neglect of public security provisions in peace accords reflects the logic of peacemaking: the parties and outside mediators tend to focus on the post-settlement security of the warring parties, since this is what will make or break a peace process in the short run. Indeed, inattentiveness to public security issues has seldom, if ever, caused renewed civil war. It has, however, contributed to extreme hardships, and undermined longer-term prospects for both peace and democracy.”

—Charles Call and William Stanley, 2002

As the nature of contemporary armed conflicts has changed, so has the definition of ‘combatants.’ Gone are the clearly defined opposing lines of uniformed armed forces. Instead, violent conflicts over the last twenty years have featured a range of armed actors other than traditional soldiers: civil defense forces, militias, paramilitaries, criminal groups, armed gangs, child soldiers, mercenaries, and inadequately demobilised and reintegrated combatants from previous cessations of war and hostilities. In addition, a wide range of people may not have been involved in direct combat, yet possess an array of weapons for hunting, sports shooting, self-protection or other reasons. Indeed, civilians hold nearly 75 per cent (650 million) of the world’s small arms and light weapons (of a total of 875 million).

The impact of arms in civilian hands is significant. Civilians who are armed have been a feature of the violent conflicts in, among others, Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Turkey. The guns they carry partly explain the spikes in violent crime and the rise of armed criminal gangs observable in the wake of armed conflict. Indeed, in “the aftermath of virtually all civil wars in the 1980s and 1990s, civilians perceived greater insecurity, often as a result of documented increases in violent crime. Ironically, in places such as El Salvador and South Africa, civilians faced greater risk of violent death or serious injury after the end of the conflict than during it.” Meanwhile, high levels of arms in the civilian population during and immediately after conflict are often accompanied by low levels of confidence in the police services. These twin sources of insecurity drive non-armed civilians to acquire guns, because they believe that in doing so they are better able to provide for their own and their families’ security.

In the face of post-war insecurity, weapons control and reductions programs are necessary to reduce the incidence of violence and to build public confidence. Many governments have come to this realisation, albeit sometimes belatedly. Cambodia and Sierra Leone are prime examples of nations recovering from lengthy civil wars where large numbers of civilians were armed; the governments of both have recognised that DDR programmes must be followed by and consolidated with strong gun control laws. In South Africa, where the collapse of apartheid was associated with increasing levels of armed violence and crime, the first democratically-elected government quickly focused on a series of reforms to address guns in the hands of civilians, private security firms, the military, and other armed actors. Approved in 2000, these legislative reforms, informed by a series of transparent public consultations, included stringent new licensing requirements, limits on the kinds and quantity of arms an individual could own, and tough new penalties for violations.

Weapons arms control and reduction—which, similarly to DDR, goes by many names—is a goal and process in and of itself, with a growing coherent conceptual basis. It has become a standard feature in societies emerging from war, as recognition increases that residual weapons—left in the hands of the military,
law enforcement agencies, private security companies, and civilians after various weapons collection initiatives—need to be controlled through legislative and other normative processes, including assertion or re-evaluation of cultural and social values. Thus governments, the UN, NGOs and regional bodies have actively promoted the strengthening or revision of outdated gun laws, through a combination of regulating the gun itself, the user, and the use of weapons.

Weapons reduction programmes have evolved slowly in the last decade, largely in recognition that DDR does not provide enough focus and mandate for arms control in post-war contexts. As a result, weapons reduction efforts often pick up where official disarmament processes end, typically addressing groups left out of the peace agreement as well as weapons that have not been fully declared. Such management and reduction efforts are commonly thought to ‘fill in the gaps’ after the end of a DDR process, which in fact refers to the end of the disarmament and demobilisation components, though they may be initiated before the completion of the formal reintegration process.

Weapons reduction efforts differ from context to context in terms of their scope and tactics. However, most settings involve a mixture of reduction, control and management techniques and objectives. These may include incentive-based efforts to drain the pool of excess weapons from the conflict area or entail the development of legislative frameworks, border controls, and other efforts to decrease access to the tools of war that often become tools of armed criminality in the post-war period. Activities can occur concurrently, and include:

- revising and strengthening outmoded laws and policies regulating access, holding, storage and criteria for owning or using arms by a range of actors—civilians, police, military, private security actors;
- devising national action plans to coordinate across government agencies and civil society with agreed benchmarks of progress;
- voluntary and coercive weapons collection and destruction of surplus or illegal arms (deemed illegal following changes to the gun laws);
- amnesties to allow individuals time to comply with new laws and policies or to hand in illegal weapons;
- public awareness campaigns and education to reduce gun violence and illegal or inappropriate weapons holding and use;
- securing state held stockpiles to control movement and avoid ‘leakage’ into illicit markets;
- agreements and plans with neighbouring states to tackle cross border arms flows;
- handing in guns and ammunition in exchange for development assistance; and
- establishing arms-free zones (effectively, in peace process parlance, multiple localised ceasefires).

Weapons control and reduction programming is used both preventively and reactively in a variety of contexts: peaceful settings, situations of urban armed violence, nations recovering from war, and those teetering on the brink of armed conflict. Timeframes are more in the medium to long term as opposed to the short to medium term of DDR. Although DDR looms largest in peace processes, there is considerable room for arms reduction efforts to be utilised as a flexible set of measures to complement and multiply the impacts of DDR and SSR.

Disappointingly, weapons control and reduction—as distinct from disarmament of official forces—remains largely ignored in the peacemaking process. However, for those around the peace table it is no longer possible to ignore or overlook the need for explicit provisions in agreements to control guns in the hands of civilians. As peace agreements provide the legal basis for post-war security gains, they are an appropriate place for the authorisation of dedicated weapons control efforts. Leaving their discussion to the post-agreement phase can hinder the timing and follow-on aspects of these interventions, creating dangerous gaps that allow for the re-circulation and re-supply of arms.

“The two DDR commissions are now dealing with the armies, not with the more serious problem of small arms.”

—Senior official, Northern Sudan DDR Commission, 2007

Small arms and light weapons in civilian hands are a complex problem in Sudan. Under the combined effects of two civil wars, conflicts in neighbouring countries, the Cold War, and the large expansion of Sudan’s own arms industry since the mid-1990s, civilian
gun ownership in Sudan has surely grown, as too has the number of arms in formal military hands. But estimates for the total number of guns in circulation in Sudan remain rough. For example, one 2007 study estimated the total at between 1.9 million and 3.2 million small arms, of which it was estimated that two-thirds are held by civilians and 20 per cent by the GoNU, with the remainder split between the GoSS and current and former armed groups. The continuation of conflict since the CPA was signed, notably in Darfur and north-south border areas such as Abyei, adds to the difficulty of forming a single overall picture of small arms levels.

Within this rough overall picture, across Sudan there is certainly enormous variation. During the war between the GoS and the SPLM/A, civilians could carry arms freely in almost all of the south and in rural areas of other regions, especially the states of Kordofan and Darfur but also to a lesser extent in the eastern states. Since the CPA was signed, the only change in this regard has been a reduction in the degree to which civilians can carry arms freely in urban and semi-urban areas of the south, as the end of the war and the gradual development of the GoSS’s security capabilities have reduced the scope for civilians to bear arms on grounds of self-protection. Levels of civilian arms ownership therefore still vary as widely as at any time in the past twenty years. One interviewee in the NSDDRC conjectured that perhaps fewer than one in a hundred civilian men in Khartoum owns a gun, but in parts of South Kordofan as many as one in two civilian men may own a gun. Such variation undoubtedly exists elsewhere in Sudan, for example between the large towns of the south and insecure rural areas.

The picture is further complicated by variation in how privately-owned arms are held and used, and by the difficulty of drawing clear lines between civilians, members of militias, members of classified OAGs, and members of official armed and security forces. A civilian in Sudan who owns a gun could hold and use it independently, typically on the grounds of self-protection; she or he could hold and use it with others, for inter-clan or inter-tribal purposes; she or he could do so as a member of a militia; or use it with others as part of an OAG, such as the SSDF. It is also possible that a member of the SAF, SPLA and respective police and security forces may privately hold a gun, legitimately or not. These blurred boundaries of identity and gun ownership have implications for the targeting of disarmament and arms control campaigns.

These points notwithstanding, serious concern about civilian gun ownership in Sudan is justified. Such ownership of weapons for the purposes of individual and community security is far from new in Sudan; historical records and accounts from the Turkiyya, the Mahdiyya and the Condominium attest to the wide civilian ownership and use of weapons of one kind or another. But the post-independence era has seen a proliferation of lethal automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and in a context of fluctuating and uneven government control and regulation of arms there have been few constraints on who has ended up with new arms. The proliferation has been the result of many contributions, including the GoS’s repeated distributions of arms to Missiriya and Rizayqat militias in South Kordofan and Darfur in the late 1980s, to southern tribal militias during the 1990s, and to janjaweed militia in Darfur in the early 2000s; the GoS and the SPLA’s importing of weapons from abroad; and the growth of Sudan’s own arms manufacturing industry, exemplified by the Military Industry Corporation, from which Sudan had become one of the largest arms manufacturers in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2007.

Civilian disarmament in southern Sudan: blurred mandates and actions

In the late 2004 lead-up to the security arrangements agreement, teams from each side were meeting to discuss weapons control and disarmament issues, headed (as in the case of DDR) on the government side by Sulafdeen Salih Mohamed and on the SPLM/A side by Arop Mayak Monytok. A joint sub-committee on small arms reported to the DDR plenary meetings. Efforts were made to encourage and advance the work of these teams; for example, a two-week workshop on small arms was convened away from the peace talks, and officials from each side were brought to the secretariat of the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons to learn more about the protocol. Throughout this process, the teams developed a paper on small arms issues, which in principle was expected to contribute to the peace agreement.

All the same, these efforts did not lead to an “explicit recognition of small arms in the CPA,” and the agreement barely mentions the subject of armed civilians. The one reference in the CPA that appears to refer to civilian rather than OAG arms control and disarma-
ment is the statement that empowers the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMT) to “monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed.”

“It’s impossible to control small arms in Sudan. . .in the north-south border areas people are looking at 2011 and thinking there could be more conflict there, if the border is fought over.”

—Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, head of Northern Sudan DDR Commission, 2007

This statement of responsibility did not bring clarity to three important matters. First, what was to constitute ‘illegal’ arms-holding in the post-CPA context, in the absence of clear and agreed gun laws? Second, how was the boundary between civilians and armed groups to be drawn? And third, where did civilian disarmament and arms control lie between the mandates of the OAGs’ Collaborative Committee (OAGCC) and the disarmament commissions? One consequence of the lack of clarity was that the DDR commissions were left trying to deal with two armies that essentially did not want to disarm, and “not the more serious problem of small arms.”

The lack of clarity in the CPA about differentiation between civilians and OAGs as well as about mandates and responsibility for arms control did not stop the SAF and SPLA from moving to unilaterally disarm and demobilise OAGs. This disarmament was carried out loosely within the framework of the relevant OAG mechanisms set up by the CPA, but generally outside the framework of the NSDDRC, the SSDDRC, and UN assistance. In May 2007, for example, the SAF unilaterally demobilised and disarmed some 975 former members of OAGs in Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria, and claimed that there were now no more SAF-aligned OAGs in the south. Up to March 2008, the SAF claimed to have demobilised and disarmed a total of 2,178 OAG former combatants in Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria and elsewhere in the south. However,
only about 970 of these were verified. Furthermore, the SPLA argued that in areas in the south from which the SAF redeployed during 2005–2008, it deliberately left many demobilised soldiers still holding weapons and able to act as a readily deployable reserve. Whatever their number and original status, such former combatants are effectively armed civilians, although they may not be seen as such by the SAF.

For their part, the SPLA also sought to disarm or integrate OAGs. The most notable political result of their efforts was the Juba Declaration of January 2006, which merged most of the SSDF into the SPLA, while SAF-aligned OAGs were gradually demobilised or withdrawn from the south. Coinciding with the Juba Declaration, after preparations in late 2005, the SPLA embarked on a series of attempts at (variously) coercive or voluntary disarmament in Jonglei State. The first campaign began in northern Jonglei State around the time of the Juba Declaration in January 2006 and continued until May 2006. Its objective was to eliminate resistance from remnants of the SSDF and associated groups that opposed the SPLM/A, such as the Nuer militias sometimes known as the White Army. However, the campaign was opposed by the militias and deteriorated into open conflict, with disastrous consequences. Although the SPLA collected around 3,000 arms, fighting led to the loss of an estimated 1,600 lives, the large majority of them on the side of the Nuer militias. The SPLA’s forced disarmament campaign in Jonglei coincided with a separate voluntary civilian programme in Akobo county (central Jonglei State) during the same period. With the threat of forced disarmament in the background, this programme took place peacefully, albeit not easily, and led to the collection of around 1,200 weapons. The SSDDRC played only a nominal role in this campaign, and no role in the earlier SPLA campaign in northern Jonglei. As of this writing, the SPLA is preparing for a six-month civilian disarmament campaign across southern Sudan which is slated to run from July through December 2008.

Despite the SAF’s claim to have completed demobilisation of OAGs, and despite the Juba Declaration and the SPLA’s repeated disarmament campaigns in Jonglei and Lakes states, the question of OAGs was still not yet completely resolved. The redeployments required by the CPA had spurred the SAF and the
SPLA to demobilise and integrate some militias in the areas from which they were redeploying. However, due to the difficulty of preventing new groups from forming, and tensions in the implementation of the CPA, OAGs or militias continue to exist and be active within the parts of Sudan covered by the CPA, for example in South Kordofan, Abyei, and the north-south border."
Dr is often undertaken, either explicitly or implicitly, as a precondition for or complement to larger institutional reforms, particularly security sector reform. SSR is a set of procedures designed to bring the security organs (the police, military, and private security forces) into conformity with internationally accepted norms. While the relationship between dysfunctional justice and security sectors and the demand for guns in the population is not yet clearly understood, it is clear that corrupt security sectors—whether through misuse of weapons themselves or failures to prevent weapons misuse by civilians—will leave civilians with a sense of injustice and insecurity that can drive individuals to take the law (and the gun) into their own hands or to hold on to weapons as a form of ‘insurance.’ While more research is needed to better understand this relationship, in recent years it has been acknowledged that justice and security sector reform is closely linked to violence prevention and peacebuilding.

In contrast to DDR, which benefits from relatively codified formulas, there is no hegemonic recipe for SSR, and approaches vary considerably across contexts. SSR can include the application of regional and international agreements, standards, or legal instruments, such as guidelines on the use of force and firearms by police forces; civilian control of the armed forces; transparency and accountability policies; steps to downsize security forces; vetting of personnel for past transgressions; and/or the creation of oversight mechanisms and institutions. All such steps are widely seen as crucial to enhancing security in post-war contexts, to addressing the structural bases of violence, and to helping to lower demand for weapons through restoring a measure of civilian confidence in the military and/or police.

At the same time, scholars and practitioners increasingly recognise the need to include the revitalisation of slow, unrepresentative or unjust judicial processes in the concept of security sector reform. Judicial reform often moves more slowly than police and/or military reform, due to the length of time required to recruit and train judges, prosecutors and defenders, reduce backlogs, upgrade infrastructure, and improve the management and conditions of penal institutions. As a consequence, it is all the more important that judicial reform be addressed as early as possible in peace processes—an arena from which, unfortunately it generally is omitted, as "civil war adversaries do not typically view the establishment of dispassionate judicial institutions as a priority."120

“Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.”

—2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period121

Security sector reform was never a primary aim of the negotiators at the CPA talks, nor were its elements negotiated in detail.122 Because the agreement granted a measure of autonomy to the south, it in effect created a second set of security actors, at least for the interim period. However, the CPA did not stipulate that the security sector, at either the overarching or local levels, should be brought under civilian command; nor did it require conformity with international norms about the use of force, or other policies that are typically associated with SSR. Nor for that matter did the agree-
ment contain detailed arrangements for police reform. Judicial guidelines were limited mainly to somewhat standard commitments to fairness and due process, enumerated in the Protocol on Power Sharing.\textsuperscript{123}

Nevertheless, a few provisions of the security arrangements are relevant here. First, having stated that both the SAF and the SPLA should “be considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces during the interim period,” the parties agreed in the CPA that “the National Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.”\textsuperscript{124} This point was bolstered by provisions for the parties to develop “a common military doctrine” which would be the basis for the JIUs and a post-interim national army, and “a code of conduct for the members of all armed forces based on the common military doctrine.”\textsuperscript{125} These provisions were in line with one of the common basic aspirations of SSR, namely for armies to refrain from political activities and acts of intimidation, and for internal security and law enforcement to be the responsibility of civilian security services, such as the police, the intelligence service, and the prison and wildlife services. According to the 2003 security agreement, provisions for these bodies were meant to be covered by the 2004 Protocol on Power Sharing: “Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.”\textsuperscript{126}

As it was, the 2004 protocol did set out arrangements for national security entities, and for the national and southern judiciaries, but it did not specify any detailed arrangements for the police. It provided for the formation of a National Security Council and for there to be

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**Box 6**

**Women’s involvement in the CPA**

“Even when women were consulted about gender issues or directly included in the peace negotiations, it was only a gesture to showcase democracy and inclusiveness: their perspectives and their experiences in peacebuilding and negotiation were not recognized or fully utilized.”

—Dr. Anne Itto, SPLM Deputy Secretary General, 2006\textsuperscript{127}

Women played significant roles in the civil war, as members of the PDF; as SPLA combatants; associated with armed groups or attached to OAGs; and, as mothers who encouraged sons to fight in the war. Women fought, carried supplies to the front, and cared for the wounded, among a range of tasks. Their roles included voluntary efforts, for example building and maintaining camps, as well as coerced sexual ‘services’ for fighters. Since the CPA was signed, some improvements in the position of women in Sudan have been realised, notably in women’s representation in public office, although this is not explicitly linked to any impetus enshrined in the CPA. In general there has been little change in the status and regard for women’s abilities.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security outlines obligations for parties to a peace process to “adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.”\textsuperscript{128}

During the CPA peace process, the government and SPLM delegations contained several women; and women were otherwise invited to the talks and were consulted, after a fashion. For example, in December 2003 a delegation of Sudanese women from the civil society group Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace visited the talks in order to lobby for women’s needs to be addressed in the nascent peace agreement. Ultimately, however, the CPA took very little account of women’s interests, needs or contributions.

The CPA does call for the equal rights of men and women to be “ensured,” in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\textsuperscript{129} It also briefly mentions women as one of a number of groups to be targeted by DDR. But despite the CPA’s extensive provisions for power sharing, the CPA did not stipulate any requirements for women’s representation in public office, either in the national or southern governments, or in the many institutions set up by the CPA and the civil service.\textsuperscript{130} The CPA made no mention of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, or of gender-based violence against women and girls.

The failure of the peace talks to ensure a greater degree of gender representation around the negotiating table provides a lesson for others to absorb. The parties by and large treated women’s roles and needs as an ‘internal matter,’ one which they could deal with—or, more accurately, ignore—separately, away from the negotiation table.
The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement

one National Security Service (NSS), in which southerners were to be “equitably represented.” New arrangements for policing were developed properly after the CPA was signed, in the interim national constitution and subsequent police bills. Inevitably, the development of these measures took time, with the first National Police Bill only approved by the national cabinet in June 2007. The NSS was established largely on the basis of the existing internal security and external intelligence services, and SPLA officials were appointed to its ranks. However, as with the pattern of power sharing between the NCP and the SPLM in the Government of National Unity, the NCP held on to key positions and overall control of the NSS. In return for this comparative weakness in central institutions, the SPLM gained a controlling position in all security sector institutions in the south.

In the first years of the CPA’s implementation, an obvious security sector challenge for the SPLA and GoSS was merely to establish and organise the police, prison and wildlife services, and to try to prevent their payrolls becoming too unwieldy or implausible. Under the CPA, OAGs were to declare their allegiance to either the SAF or the SPLA, and then to either formally integrate into those armies, or become members of the police, prison and wildlife services. In the context of southern Sudan in 2005–2008, positions in these services were among the only secure job opportunities and were therefore highly desirable. The absorption of OAGs—especially following the Juba Declaration of 2006, which called for the largest umbrella of OAGs, the SSDF, to be absorbed into the SPLA—therefore contributed to the over-inflation of southern security bodies, with inadequate attention paid to the quality and competency of former OAG combatants being integrated into these services. This trend was much less of a problem in the north, where civilian security and law enforcement agencies already existed and had relatively well-developed capacities.

In contrast to this fattening of certain security sector departments was the trend of both the SPLA and the SAF—strictly armies, but also organisations that fulfil many traditional security roles—to reorganise and restructure themselves as more professional forces. This was not identical to the “proportional downsizing” mandated in the CPA, but rather, at least in the case of the SPLA, a modernisation and “right-sizing” to bring the army under civilian political command and control.

These restructurings responded to internal pressure for the GoSS seeks to legitimise itself as a civilian-run authority, to cut non-essential personnel, and to be ready for possible future defensive or offensive operations in Sudan. But they also responded to concerns and pressures from the international community. Such steps in Sudan have variously been labelled security sector reform and security sector transformation.
In Sudan, as in other violent conflicts, an important consideration is whether those who survive armed violence are recognised as legitimate stakeholders in the peace process, and the extent to which measures to address their needs are highlighted and addressed in peace talks. Such measures may include access to physical and psychosocial rehabilitation services and long-term care; special consideration for survivors and victims in the reintegration phase of DDR; and dedicated welfare and medical services for those who have been the victims of sexual violence.

As it is, despite the enormous suffering directly and indirectly caused by Sudan’s civil war, the CPA barely addresses the needs and concerns of survivors of armed violence. As the titles of the CPA’s various components indicate, the parties were focused on the terms of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security arrangements. Where vulnerable groups were mentioned at all, it was only as part of the DDR of groups, such as children, women and the handicapped. Even after the CPA was signed, neither the national nor the southern interim constitutions made any mention of services for survivors. Internationally, Sudan has signaled some intention in this area with the March 2007 signature of the UN Disability Convention, although as of early 2008 it has yet to ratify it.
All the same, local and national charities and organisations, and international aid agencies, have provided some assistance to survivors of armed violence. In northern Sudan, the Al-Shaheed Organisation (the Martyrs Organisation)—the largest such organisation—aims to help families that lost family members during the war, as well as people who were injured in the war. In the south, the Ministry of SPLA Affairs appears to be moving slowly towards providing support for SPLA war veterans and “wounded heroes,” and some local governments have pursued schemes to help widows and orphans. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, has run an assistance programme for war-wounded amputees, in which it has developed the capacity of the national authority for prosthetics and orthotics in Khartoum as well as the Juba Orthopedic Workshop.

Effective major reconciliation processes to address past armed violence do not yet exist in Sudan. In northern Sudan, there is no national reconciliation commission for victims of violence, and official interest in ‘reconciliation’ is limited to its use as a tool for forming party-political alliances. The Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission held its first planning meeting in mid-2007, but ‘south-south’ dialogue has otherwise been confined mainly to the political level, with the exception of inter-tribal initiatives, for example in the mould of the 1999 Wunlit Agreement, between Dinka and Nuer groups in the south.

Given the political and security priorities that prevailed at the peace talks, it is unsurprising that more was not done then to anticipate and address the needs of survivors of armed violence. In basic terms, the parties did not have a stake in what each other did or did not do about the war wounded and survivors of armed violence: it was, in short, an internal matter for each side. It is also not a surprise that subsequently, during the CPA’s implementation, other political and spending priorities meant that government funding for assistance to the survivors of violence was minimal.
Three years after the signing of the CPA, the agreement continues to hold, despite ongoing, mostly localised disputes. An appreciation of CPA’s successes is nevertheless accompanied by recognition of its peculiarities and deficiencies. The relationship between north and south, and between the NCP and the SPLM, remains temporary, and uncertainty about the 2011 referendum on self-determination hangs over the entire process. Today, the SAF and the SPLA remain two separate national armies, and in some ways are stronger and better equipped than they were in 2005.

Three major failures or omissions regarding security issues should be highlighted. First, the talks (and the CPA) failed to prevent or reduce the Darfur conflict, which placed a limitation on the extent of security issues the parties to the CPA were ready to tackle. Second, as indicated, the parties did not set concrete targets and definitions for basic details, such as force strength and the status of the PDF. Third, neither the parties nor the CPA identified civilian arms control or community security as substantive issues demanding attention.

Outside observers may be tempted to criticise the lack of detail in the CPA’s DDR provisions, and the absence of detailed clauses covering arms control, SSR and assistance to survivors of armed violence. But could mediators, security experts and other peace process supporters really have helped secure better terms in these areas? Based on the opinions of Sudanese who were involved in the negotiations, and on an analysis of the dynamics of peacemaking and security in Sudan, this paper has argued that there were few obvious opportunities for outside actors to dramatically change the course or broaden the scope of the negotiations. In the end, the parties obtained an agreement that they found satisfactory—even as they deferred certain key questions, and bluntly ignored others.

In light of this, what lessons does the CPA process hold? In fact, the Sudan peace process highlights a number of challenges and pitfalls to bear in mind when assisting the negotiation of security issues in future processes.

**Standard language is sometimes not enough . . .**

Clauses related to DDR, SSR and arms control in the CPA are extremely modest in the overall scheme of the agreement, lacking significant detail on basic terminology, modalities, timelines, roles, funding and final outcomes. In some cases, standard language is enough to bring the parties to the next step, implementation, where these details are worked out, often with input from the international community. But when the basic negotiating positions of the parties is set against implementation of the terms, the lack of fundamental clarity can lead to inertia in the agreement phase. This appears to have been true in Sudan, where three years after the agreement was secured, only a handful of groups have been pre-registered or pre-processed for DDR, and where the bulk of the forces appear not to intend to demobilise. Since 2005, the DDR process has been marked by incoherence, confusion and lack of movement.

**Guns in the hands of civilians**

The CPA provides no guidance whatsoever on arms control or civilian disarmament outside a vague reference to the disarmament of “civilians who are illegally armed.” Yet this vagueness has not prevented the SPLA from engaging in a series of sometimes repressive civilian disarmament campaigns in the south, often aimed at ethnic groups with which it has a history of strained relations. Despite support from civilians, these campaigns have resulted in significant loss of life.
Updating and strengthening Sudan’s national gun laws is crucial as there is no legal framework for civilian arms possession in southern Sudan, and thus no criterion by which to judge whether civilians are legally or illegally armed. Yet in mid-2008 the SPLA will set out to disarm communities across the south over a six-month campaign. In northern Sudan the boundaries between armed paramilitary forces, armed militias and armed civilians are also unclear.

**The consequences of exclusion**
The decision relatively early on in the process to limit the negotiating parties to the GoS/NCP and the SPLM/A—thereby shutting out groups in Darfur and the east, as well as the proxy forces operating in the south—profoundly shaped the course of the negotiations and limited the prospects of the agreement and its implementation, as well as having a substantial impact on other events in Sudan. The GoS would have favoured this step as a means to ‘divide and conquer’ rebellious forces across the country. The strategy was partly successful; the SPLA immediately dropped its connections to both the eastern and Darfur conflicts, contributing to the crumbling of the eastern rebellion and a peace agreement there largely favourable to the GoS. But the concurrent upsurge of the Darfurian rebellion was partly fuelled by the fear and anger its leaders felt at being left out of the CPA process and a new distribution of power at the centre of the country. Today, the Darfur conflict in turn has implications for how the GoNU approaches the demobilisation of its own forces.

The SPLA, too, appeared to gain by the decision to exclude other rebels, which enabled them to position southern armed group leaders as ‘outside the law,’ undermining their sometimes significant local power bases. The absorption of those allied armed group forces into the SPLA and the southern security sector has been one of the most challenging aspects of CPA implementation for the SPLA and the GoSS.

**Building common understanding**
Peace talks can be a useful forum for discussion of security issues and development of common understandings, for example in the form of declarations of principles and memorandums of understanding. Even if the discussion does not lead to commitments in the peace agreement, the talks (especially if they are protracted) may be a better opportunity for such discussions than later, during the difficult task of implementation. A declaration of principles or a memorandum of understanding on security issues can also be a good tool for civil society and the international community to take up and use in their work during the implementation phase.
SUGGESTED FURTHER RESOURCES


Gallab, Abdullahi A (2008), The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan, Ashgate.


Stiansen, Endre (2006), How Important is Religion? The Case of the Sudan Peace Negotiations, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.


Websites


Sudan Open Archive: a digital archive of Sudan documentation, including peace agreements: www.sudanarchive.net

UN Peacemaker: resource for peace agreements, documentation from peace processes, and articles: http://peacemaker.unlb.org


United Nations Sudan Information Gateway: this site provides regular reports and statistical data on the situation in Sudan, as well as information on the UN’s programs in Sudan: www.unsusdanig.org
ANNEX 1
LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews were undertaken by Richard Barltrop in Khartoum and Juba through October–November 2007. The report also draws on past interviews conducted with senior officials in Khartoum and at the peace talks in Naivasha in March-May 2004 as part of his doctoral research. Interviewees include:

- Omer Ishag, UNDP Sudan, Khartoum
- Maximo Halty, UNDP Sudan, Khartoum
- Anonymous, southern Sudanese DDR adviser, Khartoum
- Ambassador Hassan Adam, Head of CPA Technical and Administrative Unit, Khartoum
- Anonymous, southern Sudanese MP and journalist, Juba
- David Lochhead, UNDP Sudan, Juba
- Anonymous, European consultant, Juba
- David Charles, Secretary-General of Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, Juba
- Anonymous, head of INGO, Juba
- Kuel Aguer Kuel, Director of Programmes, SSDDRC, Juba
- Anonymous, SPLA Brigadiers General, Juba
- Faisal Abdalla el-Mahjoub, Central Sector Director, NSDDRC, Khartoum
- Khaled A. Hassan, Central Sector Project Manager, NSDDRC, Khartoum
- Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, Commissioner of NSDDRC, Khartoum
- Omer Abdel-Aziz Ali Mohamed, NSDDRC, Khartoum
- Saeed al-Khateeb, Director of Centre for Strategic Studies, Khartoum
- Hassan Talib, Centre for Strategic Studies, Khartoum
- Elham Malik, SPLM Secretary for Women's Affairs, Khartoum
There were direct and indirect connections between the GoS-SPLA. Negotiating Disarmament


As part of the ‘Human Security Baseline Assessment’ project, the Small Arms Survey based in Geneva has published a series of reports on weapons availability, armed groups and security arrangements in Sudan. For more detail see www.smallarmsurvey.org; also see the Institute for Security Studies Sudan pages at www.iissafrika.org


UK Department for International Development (2003), Security Sector Reform Policy Brief, p. 2.


There were direct and indirect connections between the GoS-SPLA civil war, the CPA peace process and the escalation of conflict in Darfur after 2003. For example, there is evidence that exclusion from the CPA talks encouraged other groups in Sudan to resort to conflict. The SPLM/A initially provided assistance to one of the Darfur rebel groups, while the GoS took advantage of the CPA peace process to redeploy forces to Darfur. There were also independent factors behind the actions of the Darfur rebels, as there were too for the eastern rebels (the SPLA was a crucial ally to the Eastern Front until the CPA obliged the southern army to drop their support).


Similar rebel groups from Chad also operated inside Sudan in Darfur, both in the 1980s and in the early 2000s, when the Darfur conflict escalated.

This short list excludes the Darfur militias and rebel groups which emerged in 2003 during the CPA peace talks, namely the janjaweed, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).


For more information see www.hdcentre.org/projects/negotiating-disarmament

See Young, John (2006), pp. 15–18.


One plausible estimate is around 20,000 active forces and 90,000 reserves. See Salmon, Jago (2007).

Interviewed in Khartoum, 10 October 2007.


On the history of Sudan during the Turkiyya, the Mahdiyya, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and since independence, see Holt, P M (1972), A Modern History of the Sudan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Woodward, Peter (1990), Sudan 1888–1989: The Unstable State, Lester Crook; Lesch, Ann Mosley (1998); and Johnson, Douglas H (2003).


The total number of displaced in Darfur rose to around 2.5 million in 2007. For an overview of recent data, see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre at www.internal-displacement.org. On the 1989 estimate, see Alier, Abel (1990), Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, Ithaca Press, p. 265.

See Alier, Abel (1990), p. 266; Verney, Peter (1999), Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan, Sudan Update, p. 6; and Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile: Sudan, 2004, p. 37.


A single national measure of economic inequality (e.g. a Gini coefficient) is not available for 2005. For GDP data, see Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Sudan, quarterly 2002–2007.

Interviews with NCP, SPLM and opposition officials, Khartoum and Naivasha, March–May 2004.
Wealth sharing, power sharing and the three disputed areas (Abyei, 55
Although technically a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation
Interview with UNDP staff member, ibid.
Major implementation tasks in the first three years of the CPA
Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, paras. 1c and 3e.
The agreement specifies instead that the parties should negotiate proportionate downsizing after completion of SAF redeployment to the north.
Interview with Kuel Ager Kuel, director of programmes, SSDRC, Juba, 24 October 2007.
See CPA Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, 31 December 2004, para. 23ff.
In the CPA the commissions were abbreviated as NDDRCC and SSDRC. Although these abbreviations have sometimes been used during the CPA’s implementation, this paper uses the abbreviations NDDRCC and SSDRC, as these have become more common and, amid the alphabet soup of Sudan’s CPA, are perhaps slightly clearer.
CPA Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, para. 25.1.1.
CPA Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices, para. 25.1.2.
‘Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices,’ 31 December 2004, para. 11.6.
ibid., para. 19.
Interview with Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, ibid.
For more detail, examine the HSBA reports from the Small Arms Survey; the analysis of the Institute for Security Studies; Bonn International Center for Conversion (2007), Services, Return, and Security in Four Counties in Southern Sudan; as well as the newsletters and quarterly reports on the ‘Sudan Interim DDR Programme,’ published by the UN DDR Unit for Sudan.
Interviewed in Khartoum, 10 October 2007.
Interview with Kuel Ager Kuel, ibid.
Interview with Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, SSDRC, Khartoum, 10 November 2007.
See NDDRCC (2007), Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan, section 8.
Interview with Kuel Ager Kuel, ibid.
Interview with Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, ibid.
ibid.
The head of the NDDRCC, Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, commented that if he had to read all of the standards, it would be two years before he got round to his job. Interview, 10 November 2007.
Interview with Faisal Abdalla el-Mahjoub, Central Sector Director, NDDRCC, Khartoum, 24 October 2007.
Interviews with various NDDRCC officials, Khartoum, October and November 2007.
Interview with Kuel Ager Kuel, ibid.
Interview with UNDP staff member, ibid.
Arguably, one model of public security in Sudan has been ‘popular security,’ in the sense of sub-state groupings of people taking a large share of responsibility for local public security where the provision of conventional security by the police or army is weak or absent.
Interview with senior NDDRCC official, Khartoum, 10 November 2007.
Major implementation tasks in the first three years of the CPA included the formation of the GoNU, the GoSS, and numerous committees and commissions; the implementation of ceasefire and redeployment requirements; the start of oil revenue sharing; preparation and passing of laws; and conduct of a census and election preparations.
Interview with member of government delegation at CPA talks, Khartoum, 12 November 2007.
Interview with senior NDDRCC official, Khartoum, 10 November 2007.
Interview with UNDP staff member, ibid.
Although technically a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities,’ this has commonly been referred to as a renewable temporary ceasefire agreement.
Wealth sharing, power sharing and the three disputed areas (Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan) were the subjects of the four agreements reached during the first half of 2004.

94 Interview with senior NSDDR official, ibid.

95 This estimate has a mid-range total of 2.6 million small arms. See Small Arms Survey (2007), *The Militarization of Sudan: A Preliminary Review of Arms Flows and Holdings*, Sudan Issue Brief no. 6, April, p. 9.

96 Interviewed in Khartoum, 10 October 2007.

97 In September 2007 Sudan’s Minister of Defence claimed that Sudan was now the third largest arms manufacturer in Africa. This claim has not been verified, but it is clear that Sudan’s arms industry has grown significantly. The Military Industry Corporation (MIC) is Sudan’s centre of arms manufacturing, producing heavy armoured vehicles, tanks, guns and ammunition. GIAD is an industrial complex producing metal products and vehicles, such as lorries, buses and cars. On MIC, see http://sudaninside.com/military-industry-corporations/

98 One of the core objectives of the Nairobi Protocol is to ‘encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small arms held by States Parties and civilians.’ Each of the 12 East African nations—including Sudan—is responsible for incorporating into their national law: (i) prohibition of unrestricted civilian possession of small arms; (ii) total prohibition of civilian possession and use of all light weapons and automatic rifles, semi-automatic rifles, and machine guns; (iii) regulation and centralised registration of all civilian-owned small arms in their territories; (iv) provisions for effective storage and use of civilian-held firearms, including competency testing of prospective owners; (v) monitoring and auditing of licenses held and restriction of the number of guns that may be owned by individuals; (vi) prohibitions on pawning or pledging of small arms; (vii) registration to ensure accountability and effective control of all guns owned by private security companies. See www.recsasec.org

99 Interview with Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, ibid.

100 Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation, section 14.6.5.5.

101 Interview with senior NSDDR official, ibid.

102 Interview with senior NSDDR official, ibid.

103 The relevant mechanisms were the OAGCC, the Incorporation and Reintegration Ad-hoc Committee, and the CJMC. However, the OAGCC did not become fully functional until late July 2006, when the SPLA nominated members to it.


106 As of early 2008, SAF figures for redeployment out of the south indicated that 7,521 ‘voluntarily demobilized’ SAF soldiers had remained in Southern Sudan (see UNMIS, *The CPA Monitor*, March 2008). This figure had not been verified by UNMIS and was contested by the SPLA. In late 2007 the SSDRRD claimed that there were a total of around 30,000 such SAF ‘remnants’ across the south (with around 4,400 in the Juba area) who had been demobilised but not disarmed, some of whom were still receiving salaries. Interview with SSDRRD official, 23 October 2007.


108 One estimate is that 1,200 militia/White Army members and 400 SPLA troops were killed in the coercive disarmament campaign, and that 200 or more civilians were killed. Small Arms Survey (2007), *Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State*, Sudan Issue Brief no. 3, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, p. 4.

109 The Akobo programme was led by the state and county authorities, not the SSDRRD, and was assisted by the UN.

110 This does not include the armed groups present and active in Darfur, which did not fall under the scope of the CPA and were, in effect, non-CPA OAGs.

111 Interview with SSDRRD official, Juba, 23 October 2007.

112 Interview with Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, ibid.


115 Ibid., p. 47.

116 Ibid., p. 7.

117 Emile Le Brun and Cate Buchanan drafted elements of this section.


121 CPA Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 8.

122 For more on SSR in Sudan, see the ongoing project by the North-South Institute, available at www.nsi-ins.ca/english/research/progress/54.asp

123 CPA Protocol on Power Sharing, paras. 1.6.2.5, and 2.4.5.5. Despite the lack of detailed provisions for police and judiciary reform, some activities were undertaken (particularly in the south) as part of donor-supported ‘rule of law’ programmes, and through support from UNMIS. Activities included police training (e.g. in human rights and crime investigation), and capacity building of the national and southern judicialities.

124 CPA Protocol on Security Arrangements, points 1h, id. The point is further elaborated in the agreement to develop a code of conduct in Section 16.7 of the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices.

125 CPA Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 6; Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, para. 16.6.

126 National security organs and police forces, CPA Agreement on Security Arrangements, para. 8.

127 CPA Protocol on Power Sharing, para. 2.7.2. The NSS was the new name for the National Security Organisation, which was Sudan’s existing internal security and external intelligence services up to 2005.


129 CPA Security Agreement, para. 8.


133 Protocol between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing, Naivasha, 26 May 2004, para. 1.6.2.16.

134 The interim constitution for southern Sudan that was drawn up pursuant to the CPA made some amendment for this, setting a 25 per cent quota for women’s representation in the southern national assembly and executive.

135 This section was drafted by Cate Buchanan.


137 Bradbury, Mark et al. (2005), *Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study*, Rift Valley Institute report commissioned by DFID.