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TERRORISM AS A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS

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# TERRORISM AS A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

## DEFINITIONS

1. To begin a lecture by defining the terms may seem like agreeing to play a game of tennis and then drawing up one's own code of rules, such as deciding to take both side and service. But if ever the practice can be justified it is with a subject such as today's. 'International relations' may seem obvious enough, but I found, at a conference of voluntary societies recently, that it meant to them cooperation between their branches in different countries. To many it means the United Nations at New York, or any other international organisation dealing with a particular problem, economic or financial, of communication or education, of health or development with which they are familiar. Our own Institute here prefers the phrase 'international affairs' which has always seemed to me to invite the inclusion of the letter 'e' between the final 'r' and 's'. I suggest that we take 'international relations' this evening, to mean, quite simply, 'relations between states.' This will enable us to disregard such complicating factors as human rights, the rule of law, or the overriding claims of religion.

2. But 'international relations' presents few problems of definition compared to 'terrorism'. It was, I think, Machiavelli who wrote 'men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of others', and drew the conclusion that any government would therefore be wise to make its subjects, and other governments, fear it. Certainly few, if any, of us could be relied upon to pay our income tax if it was left to our own free choice to do so: we pay it because we fear the consequences if we don't. So in the best of states there is the sanction of force in the background, the element of terror in enforcing conformity. We accept it, and over thousands of years men have tried to decide what are its acceptable limits. In most countries it is also accepted that, for breaches of the rules, men and women may be arrested, imprisoned, and condemned to years of hard labour or even to death; in some countries it is also accepted that, without having been guilty of any such breach, men and women may be deprived of their property, separated from their families to work where there is greater need, and obliged to put up with a level of wages which may seem, to the inhabitants of other states, to be quite inadequate. Periodically, the men at least in most states may be called upon to bear arms, to be killed or wounded, to kill or wound, as the result of decisions for which they can be considered to have no direct responsibility, and with which they may even totally disagree. Yet such employment of force, such compulsion to violence, does not usually occur to us as being a form of terrorism. It is, if you like, acceptable terrorism.

3. What then is unacceptable terrorism? Clearly this will vary with the conditions obtaining at any particular time and place. The ancient world accepted that the defeated in war, whether soldiers or civilians, could be killed, sold into slavery, or

allowed to ransom themselves at the will of the victor: Rome is said to have taken as slaves all the 150,000 inhabitants of Corinth, and to have lined 100 miles of road in Italy with crucifixes to which were nailed the slaves who had taken part in the rebellion of Spartacus. The medieval world of Europe saw the hand of God in the slaughter of Moslems in Spain or Syria, of pagans in Prussia or Poland, and of heretics in Provence or Bohemia. In Provence a bishop was asked how the knights should distinguish heretics from true believers: his answer was 'kill them all, God will know his own;' an attitude which is perhaps easier to understand in the light of the message from one of the greatest of the medieval Popes that 'the stars shall fall from heaven and the rivers shall turn to blood sooner than the Pope shall change his purpose.' Aztecs and Incas, West Africans and Malays, were unaware of any Renaissance when they came into contact with Europeans and found that it meant centuries of slavery for them. The Thirty Years War reduced the population of Germany by about a third; Fouché, the Chief of Police during the French Revolution, thought that it would probably be necessary, in order to ensure the reign of Virtue, to reduce the population of France by rather more than one-half. Deaths among service personnel alone in World War I reached ten millions, in World War II twenty millions. Between them, Stalin, in what the 'Rand Daily Mail' referred to on Saturday at the 'almost panic stampede into the industrial programme of the Five Year Plans and the collectivisation of agriculture,' -- note the 'almost' -- reduced the population of Russia in the late twenties and early thirties by about 19 millions. In World War II the Germans killed or gassed about 6 million Jews; hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed or injured in Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Leningrad, Hamburg and Dresden; and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by atom bombs. Yet each age and each people which has suffered would probably have been horrified at the slaughter inflicted at other times and in other places.

4. For the past 20 years the world has known a Cold War, and it is a tribute to our modern barbarism that, for the first time in history, there has been a condition of living known as the 'balance of terror.' The U.S.A. alone possessed the atomic bomb during the first of these years; then Russia not only developed it but went ahead of the U.S. with guided missiles with which to deliver it. The U.S. produced the hydrogen bomb, and the Russians the megaton bomb. Space satellites were developed, enormous arsenals of atomic weapons stockpiled in the ground, submarines designed to stay submerged in the depths of the sea so that their presence could not be detected or their atomic missiles destroyed. Early warning systems now crisscross the Arctic, and we are waiting, each year, to learn which of the contestants will first develop an effective defence against atomic attack and so upset the balance once again. Nuclear weapons have been produced by other countries, Britain, France and China; still more countries have the know-how and the resources to develop them, and the two colossi have been driven to agree to a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in a last desperate hope of preventing another 20 or so countries becoming nuclear powers in the course of the next five to ten years. As it is, the risk of the unforeseen accident, or the lunatic-in-charge of the

firing mechanism has led to the installation of 'hot-lines' between Washington and Moscow, and their prospective installation between London and Moscow. We are familiar with the idea that all the hot-line might succeed in achieving might be agreement to accept the destruction, by U.S. atomic weapons, of New York as acceptable proof that the similar destruction of Leningrad had not been intended, or of Moscow, by Russian atomic weapons, to compensate for the earlier destruction of Washington. But if there were to be twenty fingers on the triggers no quantity of hot-lines might prevent an isolated atomic attack escalating into full-scale nuclear war: it is doubted if one-third of the population of continental states like the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. might survive such war. China counts on breeding so many hundreds of millions that, however many millions of Chinese may be killed, China would still have enough left to dominate a thinly-peopled, post-atomic war world. But would there be even a thinly-peopled world left to dominate; would the survivors be other than physical or mental wrecks, would they be able to produce healthy children, would the soil and the sea be too contaminated to produce natural food, would the earth's atmosphere be so disturbed that it drifted off into space, or that its protective layers failed to intercept cosmic radiation? The doubt arises whether there is really much reason to believe that men who, in such circumstances, cannot agree to a disarmament treaty, have any justification for thinking that they ought to survive. This, for the moment, is the ultimate in unacceptable terrorism.

5. To revert to the nation state it is possible to distinguish lesser degrees of unacceptable terror. These will vary in different countries, according to whether individual life is believed to be sacred or expendable. If it is sacred then no individual has the right to destroy it and no government has the right arbitrarily to demand it; and the exercise of anything approaching mass terror in such states is impossible. In them the execution of a man for a crime which he did not commit can produce strong criticism, for example, the executions of Sir Thomas More by Henry VIII, of the duc d'Enghien by Napoleon, or of Sacco and Vanzetti by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. So can imprisonment of intolerable duration, having regard to the known crime - such as the continued imprisonment, after the evidence was discredited, of Major Dreyfus, or imprisonment which is regarded as unjust whatever the duration, because, for example, the crime was not recognised by the mass of the people as a crime at all - such as the frequent imprisonment by the Government of India of Mahatma Gandhi for passive resistance. But such isolated examples of over-harsh action are more likely to lead to changes of government than to revolutions.

6. If, on the contrary, life is expendable then it is only the number of expended lives, considered as part of the nation's human capital, which matters, and in these states the government will have much more latitude. In Spain, for example, it was held until the eighteenth century to be quite proper for the authorities to burn those condemned by the Inquisition, and in the twentieth the motto of the Spanish Foreign Legion was still 'down with intelligence, long live death.' In Ottoman Turkey the Sultan

could execute his viziers at will, let alone his ordinary subjects, and Abdul the Damned undertook to eliminate the whole Armenian people. In the U.S.S.R. Stalin could 'purge' (a typical twentieth century euphemism for murder) the Communist Party, his colleagues or the High Command of the army. Out of 80 members of the 1934 Military Soviet only 5 were left in 1938, all 11 commissars for defence had been 'liquidated'; so had every commander of a military district, 13 out of 15 army commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195 divisional commanders and 220 out of 406 brigade commanders, to go no further down the Army List. To this day it has not been thought necessary in Russia to condemn the deportation of the kulaks, the forced labour camps, or exile to the Siberian mines. The difference in standards may lead individuals in other states to protest, or cause the representatives of other states to draw attention publicly, or within international organisations, to what is happening but that is about all. Mr Gladstone, for example, condemned the Sultan for the massacres in his Bulgarian province and described his rule as 'the negation of God erected into a system of government' but he stopped at this. India drew the attention of the United Nations to the ruthless treatment by the Chinese government of the Tibetans, but it was not India which later moved her troops into Tibet but China which moved hers into India. The entire Western World was moved to protest in 1956 at the suppression by Russian tank forces of the revolt in Hungary, but the U.N. reserved action for Suez. The most which neighbouring states are usually prepared to do is to give the resisters asylum, if they are forced to flee, (as India did the Tibetans, or Austria the Hungarians). And since Napoleon showed, with his 'whiff of grapeshot' that a ruthless government can suppress riots easily at an early stage, such governments do not have to worry unduly about internal resistance without external support.

7. Internal resistance to oppressive government is indeed only likely to escalate where a country consists of a number of geographically distinct areas, of differing religions and traditions, or alternatively where the government is inexperienced or has been weakened by a foreign war. The Congo, and Nigeria, and to a less degree, the Sudan, are examples of the first group. We have not yet seen the end of the risings in Katanga or Biafra, and local rivalries were in both assisted by the inexperience of the federal governments. The Philippines and Malaya were both countries which had been occupied by enemy forces, and in the former the restored Philippine government in 1945 was slow in re-establishing contact with the people, while in the latter the Colonial Government was hardly representative of the Malays. In the Philippines the Huks were finally overcome by the efforts of Ramon Magsaysay, at first Minister of Defence and later President, who combined effective military action with a policy designed to improve the conditions of life of the peasants, whose confidence he won. He achieved success only to be assassinated soon afterwards. In Malaya the Chinese opponents of the Japanese occupation, like the Huks, turned their arms against the restored government but were eventually suppressed by strong British forces, while the Malayan peasants were won over by the prospect of self-government. Both the Huks and the Malayan terrorists lacked secure bases and any foreign aid. Success, on the other hand, attended Fidel Castro's revolt in Cuba against the government of Colonel Batista; over ten

thousand of Batista's forces were killed or wounded as against one thousand of Castro's. Castro's successful resistance indicated that military success was likely to be followed by something more revolutionary than a mere change of government.

8. A preliminary stage in the growth of an internal resistance movement in a developed country with a strong government can be seen in the United States. Two years of rioting in nearly every major American city (Boston, New Haven, New York, Elizabeth, (N.J.) Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Rochester, Detroit, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Houston, Los Angeles, Berkeley, and so on, would seem to constitute the beginning of an organised resistance movement, and Rap Brown called on the Negroes of the U.S., after the riots in Detroit, to unite, arm themselves and make the effects of the Detroit riots 'look like a picnic'. Not only the National Guard but the Army have already had to be called in to suppress these riots, and while there is very little doubt, if any, that such rioting will be more effectively dealt with in future, it may necessitate the provision of improved living conditions and work prospects for the Negro minority before resistance is once more limited to constitutional channels.

9. A further stage is reached when conditions in a given country have become so disturbed, or there exists or is believed to exist such a volume of dissatisfaction within it, that a state, neighbouring or otherwise, sees advantage to itself in stimulating the process of disintegration in a neighbouring state where a resistance movement has already developed, and can do so at little risk to itself. It may then decide actively to assist the resistance movement. If the intervention is unprovoked, although of course provocation will be alleged, such interference in the domestic affairs of the other state is contrary to international law, which regulates the relations between states, and is specifically prohibited by Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. Its objective will be either to force the government to change its policy, or, more often, to provoke its overthrow and replacement by a government more acceptable to the intervening state. I suggest that to keep our minds clear we limit the use of the word subversion to this process. The means used to achieve such subversion are propaganda, stimulation of both passive and active resistance by the infiltration of agitators and terrorists, and provision of weapons and other necessary supplies to the active resisters. To frighten the government threats will be made against its members and violence and even assassination attempted; to weaken the forces at its disposal, and particularly their morale, these will be subjected to assault in as many places and as simultaneously as possible. To strengthen the resistance the government forces will be provoked into taking such counter-action against the civilian population as will lead sections of it to react against those forces, whose morale will suffer further. Those captured and executed by the government forces will be built up as martyrs to the cause of freedom, and those operating against them denounced as the brutal hirelings of a corrupt and oppressive government.

10. This is the stage in which Rhodesia and South Africa find

themselves at the present time. In South Africa spasmodic and ineffectual internal resistance, culminating in bomb explosions which produced strongly adverse reactions (as the result of the victims being elderly women and children) was followed by the assassination of the Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd (by a psychotic failure), which provoked an even more adverse reaction, was denounced by all parties and brought all overt resistance to an end. The precedent proved to be the assassination of President Lincoln, not that of King Feisal II of Iraq. When internal resistance, however externally stimulated, collapses in this fashion, the country or countries responsible for trying to organise it can follow one of two courses: they can admit defeat as Eire did in Northern Ireland, or they can increase their effort. It is when the latter course is chosen that the next stage in intervention is reached.

11. This is the stage of guerrilla action. Agitators or terrorists may still be infiltrated, but the main effort is directed to sending in groups sufficiently numerous and well-armed to challenge the police and security forces, and, if necessary, to harass but elude the military forces. Guerrillas are so called after the armed Spanish peasants who rose against Napoleon's brother Joseph, and, supported by British units sent to their assistance, increasingly challenged his French army. How bitter such warfare can be, with guerrillas sniping at any detachment of police or soldiers small enough for them to challenge it with safety, and the police and army, in desperation, shooting out of hand first any guerrilla whom they capture, then any peasants suspected of helping them, and later on the inhabitants of whole villages by way of reprisals, Goya's 'Disasters of War' drawings show only too realistically: men impaled on stakes, women disembowelled, and children with their brains dashed out against any convenient wall. Even worse atrocities, and in infinitely greater number, were committed in the course of the partisan war behind the German lines in Russia between 1941 and 1945. To jump to last weekend you may have seen the report in the press last Saturday of a party of young Englishmen who drove from London to Cape Town; on both sides of the Ethiopian-Kenyan border the road had been mined by Somali Shiftas; they eventually were sent on to Nairobi by the Kenyan authorities and their truck driven there for them by a military driver; four other trucks were subsequently destroyed, seeking safety by driving in their tracks in which the Shiftas had already laid and concealed further mines. The Vietminh, the Vietcong, and the Vietnamese have over long bloody years made us as increasingly familiar with the tactics of both guerrillas and country-guerrillas. In Vietnam the number of village headmen, teachers, doctors and other leaders murdered already exceeds tens of thousands. (I have dealt with this aspect in another talk). On 24th August this year it was announced in Vietnam that Vietcong terrorism had reached a peak during the previous week; 167 Vietnamese civilians had been killed, including 12 working on the development programme, 252 had been wounded, and 26 abducted. The weekly average in 1967 has been 61 killed, 111 wounded and 84 abducted. The aim is to destroy all persons who might help to restore government control within a district once occupied by the guerrillas. In the towns bomb-throwing at cafes and cinemas, dance halls and hotels; delayed action explosives in the saddle-bags of bicycles, in parcels innocently delivered, and in railway carriages and buses; farm workers stabbed as they gather their rice, or killed in their huts,

these have become features of everyday life. Counter-action is equally nasty: units infiltrated in their turn and betrayed, children, given candy, giving away the location of hide-outs or of wounded recuperating in the village; approaches to villages made hazardous with pits sown with sharpened bamboo stakes; prisoners interrogated with rifle-butts, advances led by shackled prisoners who will be the first to detonate their own mines.

12. It is a method of warfare which imposes the greatest strain on the government forces. In Malaya it took ten British troops to fight each guerrilla and the cost of killing one worked out at over £10,000. In Vietnam nothing like this ratio has yet been achieved (and nothing like the success of the counter-guerrilla forces in Malaya), and the cost of each guerrilla killed is nearer \$200,000. The terrain in South East Asia is ideal for guerrilla operations; they can appear without warning from the dense jungle and disappear into it, and they can mingle indistinguishably in what a Chinese leader has called the peasant sea of Asia. But above all the existence of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, provides them with hundreds of miles of frontier behind which they can, if the worst comes, always take refuge, where they have their bases and whence they draw their supplies. (If you want to learn more of the bitter struggle in the Philippines, Malaya, Laos and Vietnam, I would suggest that at the end of this talk you buy a copy of the paperback on 'Revolutionary Warfare in South East Asia' written by Brian Goodall, one of my students in the Department of International Relations, and published last month by the South African Institute of International Affairs.)

13. I have said enough for you to be able to realise the menace which such warfare could be to this country. In Rhodesia the stage of individual infiltrators and subversion from within has already given way to it. Groups of heavily-armed, carefully-trained guerrillas have recently shown themselves almost too ready (from the point of view of a successful guerrilla operation) to shoot it out with the police, security or military forces - too ready for it cannot be over-emphasised that the correct tactics for guerrillas are hit and run raids, quick dispersal when attacked, and living to fight another day. In a pitched battle, of whatever size, the odds are all on the regular forces. The explanation of the tactics in Rhodesian is, I think, the terrain. There is first the Zambesi, which has to be crossed at night by whole groups who must then make their way across 50, 100 or 150 miles of difficult, hilly, sparsely-populated country, covered with scattered trees and brush, but open to air reconnaissance by day in winter, and particularly difficult to break through in summer. The security forces know it far better than the guerrillas, and since they have had continuous control of it, have been enabled to canalise the infiltrators and counter-attack them where they wished. Sometimes the local Africans appear to have been actively hostile to the guerrillas, and at most to have supplied food to them under duress. The Rhodesian Minister of Justice was able three days ago to announce that so far over 200 terrorists had been killed or captured. It had been announced that 34 have been caught and sentenced in Botswana (another was found dead), 37 are

on trial after being arrested in South West Africa. The fact that specially-formed military units, convoys of army trucks, helicopter spotters, jet fighters, fast police boats, and one striking force alone of over 150 troops in camouflaged uniforms have been reported in action in the last week or two in Rhodesia alone will indicate the scale of the fighting. This is guerrilla war.

14. The final stage in escalation is civil war, in which each side uses any foreign aid and any foreign forces which it can obtain in order to reach a decision, and both are ready to engage in battle. This is the stage which was reached in Spain; the Republican government was backed by Russia, and the Foreign Legion of volunteers drawn from many countries of Europe, and from the U.S.; Franco was backed by a German air-force, 100,000 Italian troops and an Irish brigade. The same stage was reached in Vietnam some seven years ago; the U.S. will soon have over 500,000 troops serving there, and the Vietminh are using nearly 300,000 troops (not all in Vietnam at one and the same time). Civil war combines all the horrors of war, guerrilla war, subversion and resistance. Nigeria must now be considered to have reached the stage of civil war, having skipped the preliminary stages of guerrilla warfare and subversion, if not of resistance. It is possible that in Nigeria, because, in a sense, the foundations have not been laid, the civil war will end quickly with the collapse of Biafra; it could not end quickly with the collapse of the federal government because this would probably lead to the northern region taking up arms against any new Biafran federal regime. With the staged withdrawal of the British forces from Aden, between now and the 1st January next, guerrilla warfare against the British is being transformed into civil war between the forces of the National Liberation Front (NFL) and the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). The latter is supported by Egypt from the Egyptian controlled area of the Yemen and the former will inevitably turn towards King Feisal of Arabia for support, just as the Royalist Yemenis had to do. Having failed (as the result of Israel's victory) to secure the northern prong of his planned advance to the oil-fields of the Persian Gulf, Nasser is not likely to surrender his hopes of the southern prong until he has to; indeed, the Sudan-sponsored agreement between Nasser and Feisal over the Yemen may be seen by Nasser as one means of reducing, temporarily, his commitments in the Yemen (getting in return financial aid from Feisal) in order to be able to strengthen his support for FLOSY during the next critical few months. And finally, the civil war stage must, I think, be admitted to have been reached in both Angola and Moçambique, against rebels armed and supplied from the Congo and Tanzania respectively, and the struggle has escalated from resistance through subversion and guerrilla warfare. Only yesterday the Portuguese authorities announced that 109 Frelimo had been killed recently in north western Moçambique and 81 wounded.

15. In Southern Africa in recent weeks a new development has been seen. The fact that the incursions from Zambia have been directed at Rhodesia, at South West Africa, and at South Africa itself, and that Botswana has been involved by attempts to transit its territory, indicate dispersal of effort by the terrorists, a tactic probably dictated by the need to show action against all the countries concerned to the Organisation of African Unity Conference at Kinshasha, upon which the terrorists are largely dependent for financial support. It has led to simultaneous action by the

police forces of Rhodesia, South Africa and Botswana, with the logical development first of exchange of information, and then of cooperation, limited so far as direct cooperation has been concerned, to Rhodesia and South Africa. It has also led Chief Jonathan to pledge Lesotho to act against any terrorist attempts to make use of its territory and Prince Dhlamini, the Swazi Chief Minister, to announce that Swaziland will do likewise. In other words, the counter-revolutionary forces have been consolidated. Mr Vorster summed up the position, so far as South West Africa was concerned, in a speech at Windhoek on the 29th August. He said: "these people responsible for sending terrorists here must not think that we are not aware of why they are doing it. They are doing it in the first place because it is in their nature to create chaos and confusion, so that they can come here later and act as so-called saviours of the chaotic situation. They are doing it in the second place because they not only hope to cause confusion but because they want to terrify our people into giving up their standpoint and their principles ... They are sending terrorists here in the third place so that they can be able to say 'look what is going on in that country - it is time that we intervene.'" On 8th September Mr Vorster disclosed that South African Police were already fighting side by side with the Rhodesian forces to combat massed terrorism and acts of subversion against the two southern African countries, and added: "we shall act in any country where we are asked to act by the government of that country." It may well be that the terrorists have reduced any prospects which they may have had by letting political, not military, considerations dictate their policy.

16. The Rhodesian Government towards the end of August sent a note to the British Government drawing its attention to the terrorist activity in Rhodesia, the position of the terrorists in Zambia, and the movement and storage of arms and ammunition there for use by terrorists. The Zambian Government had since mid-1966 progressed from a policy of ignoring or condoning terrorist activities to one of offering direct encouragement, and the note drew attention to the complete absence of any protest by the British Government to that Government. The British Government returned the note because it had not been sent through Sir Humphrey Gibbs, but Sir Dingle Foot, who had been Solicitor-General in Mr Wilson's Government until the previous week, has said publicly that instead of protesting to Zambia the time was coming when Britain should give aid to the African guerrillas in Rhodesia: "after all, they and we are on the same side. Like resistance fighters in the last war these fighters are fighting for a very similar cause - against alien rule and against the doctrine of the master race." This remark produced a strong adverse reaction in Rhodesia and outside, and it was at this point that South Africa sent police aid to Rhodesia. I should like to draw your attention to one possible consequence: just as the abolition by the United Nations of the mandate over South West Africa can be argued to have left that territory 'res nullius' to which South Africa has subsequently been building a new legal claim by occupation, administration, and protection of the inhabitants, so the refusal of Britain and the United Nations to recognise Rhodesia as a state can be argued to have left Rhodesia, in the absence of effective British administration also

'res nullius'. Britain's claim that Rhodesia is her colony may well have lapsed through two years of failure to occupy or exercise effective control of the territory in question. By sending in South African Police the South African Government has been taking action to preserve the peace and security of Rhodesia, and might by so doing also have begun to establish a claim, albeit a tenuous one, to that territory. It will be interesting to see the terms of any exchange of notes on the subject between Britain and South Africa.

17. The examples of terrorism and terrorist activity which I have quoted are, I think, sufficient to show -

- (1) that terror is as much a factor in international relations at the present time as it has ever been, and has indeed become so dominant that we all live in its shadow;
- (2) that terrorism has been developed as an instrument for the overthrow of legal governments by minorities, and by other governments which desire to achieve this in particular countries for reasons of their own;
- (3) that there is a regular escalation from resistance, through subversion, to guerrilla action and finally civil war;
- (4) that the end result of the full process is disastrous for the population of the country concerned, and inevitably sets back its development possibly for a generation or more; and
- (5) that if we really wish life again to become, in Hobbes' phrase, 'nasty, brutish and short' we can readily achieve this by failing to recognise the danger and to take action to end it.

The ~~terrorist~~ is the gunman using the clichés of communist jargon to achieve the same object: take-over by violence.

The slogan given by Stokeley Carmichael to the American Negroes is perhaps the best conclusion to this talk -

'Burn, baby, burn!'