RHODESIA RIDES A TIGER

by

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WARNING

Members are reminded that this address was given in a private meeting and that any statements or declarations made by the Speaker may be repeated but must not be linked with the Speaker's name nor with the name of the Institute.

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UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
JOHANNESBURG

December, 1966
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The Rand Daily Mail's correspondent in London commented this morning that "there is, as every journalist knows too well, nothing like a deadline to clarify a man's mind." He was, of course, paraphrasing Dr. Johnson's remark that there is nothing like the knowledge that he is to be hanged in the morning to clarify a man's mind. With noon as Mr. Smith's deadline (and 5.15 as my deadline this afternoon) I could not but feel that it was Dr. Johnson who had hit the nail on the head. Neither newspapers nor newscasts had given, it seemed to me, reading or listening to them through the weekend, any information at all about what was happening on H.M.S. Tiger. I wondered what I could say this evening and felt inclined to echo the gentleman in Bunyan's 'Pilgrim's Progress', who, you will remember, when he passed from this world, said "as for my feeble mind, that I will leave behind me: it is not worth bestowing upon the poorest pilgrim."

Unfortunately for you, at this point habit intervened and I reminded myself that I had not yet done my homework: I settled down to read again everything which had appeared on Rhodesia in newspapers and periodicals during the past four weeks, and then tried to sort the bits and pieces into some sort of pattern. Ten hours' work later it seemed to me that some deductions were just possible about the approach to the present negotiations and the circumstances in which the meeting on the Tiger had been agreed. I still had no idea which way the cat would jump, but it seemed to me that ultimately the decision - if there was one - would depend on who had the keenest brain and the strongest nerves, Mr. Wilson or Mr. Smith, and while I was inclined to give Mr. Wilson the credit for the former, I thought that Mr. Smith might just have the edge on the latter. When we know what was drafted on the Tiger as the basis of agreement, and what the Rhodesian reply has been, I will try to include a section dealing with them in the text of this lecture which will be circulated, I hope, later this week. If it does not correspond exactly with what I say this evening I hope you will forgive me: I will do my best not to include any ex post facto forecasts!
A. The time-table

The following is the time-table of events during the past month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 15</td>
<td>The British proposals were sent to Salisbury</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 4</td>
<td>The Rhodesian reply was sent to London</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>It was announced that Mr. Bowden would go to Salisbury</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Mr. Smith met Mr. Bowden</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mr. Bowden returned to London</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1</td>
<td>It was announced that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith would meet</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Talks on H.M.S. Tiger</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith return. The latter takes with him a document which must be accepted, as a whole and without amendment, by midday on 5th December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Rhodesian and the U.K. Cabinets met</td>
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I have included the communication of the British proposals on 15th October in the November timetable because it makes evident the 20-day gap between the communication of the British proposals and the receipt of the Rhodesian reply on 4th November, and the gap of exactly the same number of days before it was announced that Mr. Bowden would take the British comments to Salisbury on 24th November.

B. The first 20-day gap

In the U.K., it was emphasised after 15th October that time was running out, and that either Mr. Smith must accept the U.K. proposals ("the six principles and nothing but the six principles") or the U.K. would ask the United Nations in November to impose mandatory sanctions, as they had in September pledged the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to do. It was further emphasised that sanctions were 'biting', and that the collapse of the Rhodesian economy was inevitable in 1967. The U.K. was said to be making diplomatic approaches to all Rhodesia's customers to urge them to make sanctions watertight. Portugal was reported to have been warned that the blockade of Beira could be extended to Lourenco Marques, and could be widened to cover base-metals and tobacco, in addition to oil. South Africa was reported to have been reminded that the U.N. might seek to impose sanctions against her over South West Africa and that only an U.K. veto might prevent this; it was therefore stressed that it was vitally important to South Africa to get the Rhodesia issue out of the way before the South West Africa issue became urgent. In this connection it was added that the wisdom of pointing out to Mr. Smith that a settlement would be welcomed by South Africa was obvious.

As the days went by, however, there were growing signs of unease that Rhodesia appeared to be in no hurry to reply, /and was ...
and was obviously not being influenced by the 'huffing and puffing'. Mr. Smith, on the 9th November, made a casual comment which showed that the Rhodesian Government were well aware of what was happening: "The regime headed by the British Prime Minister is," he said, "exploiting the British penchant for devious psychological assaults aimed at creating a split among the people of Rhodesia," and he let the delay in sending Rhodesia's reply speak for the equanimity with which Rhodesia was viewing the assaults.

C. The second 20-day gap - Mr. Wilson's tit-for-tat

(i) The first two weeks - During this period the line was taken that there was "consensus in the (U.K.) Cabinet that there was little point in further negotiation with Mr. Smith on the basis of his response to British proposals." And it was reported on 17th November that "about all hope had been abandoned for a Rhodesian compromise."

At the same time there was an escalation of threats; mandatory sanctions would be enforced by blockade ships which would stop the export of base-metals from Rhodesia; there would be restrictions on all communications, including postal communications (as the result of action by the Postal Union); tighter financial measures would include action by international bankers to cut off facilities to Rhodesia; and action would be taken against individuals helping Rhodesia in any way.

It was insinuated that there were divisions in the Rhodesian Cabinet, and that Messrs. Smith and Howman would like to make concessions while Messrs. Lardner-Burke, Partridge, Rudland and Harper and Lord Graham were all opposed to so doing.

And it was finally stated that the U.K. was under increasing pressure from the U.S. not to make a settlement.

(ii) The last ten days - During this period the British propaganda line changed again, and it is possible to see some of the reasons which led to this:

(a) Firstly, there was growing scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions, based on the continuing accumulation of evidence that not only was Rhodesia obtaining those imports which were essential, but was being increasingly successful in selling her exports.

Tobacco sales permitted the distribution in November of a further £1 million to farmers, increasing the distribution from the original promise of £21.8 million to £24.5 million (against £34 million in 1965). It was reported that in the first six months of 1966 the United Kingdom took £3 million against £2 ¾ million in the same period of 1965, the United States £300,000, Europe £6 million and South Africa £5½ million.

The Union Carbide Company of the U.S. had stock-
piled 140,000 tons of chromite in Mocambique and continued
to draw from this, and the Company had refused to promise
that when the stockpile was exhausted it would not buy more.

The Continental Ore Corporation had bought £1 million
of pig-iron from Rhodesia.

Tourism which had brought in £6 million 1964, had been
increasing.

Sales of the special U.D.I. celebration sets of coins
- 14,000 sets at £100 each - would bring in £1.4 million.

Exports of manufactures had also kept up surprisingly
well. Those to Malawi were expected to reach £519 million
(against £7.4 million in 1965) and to Zambia, £23 million
(against £32 million in 1965), while exports to South
Africa had considerably increased.

It was significant that the President of the Transvaal
Clothing Association called, during the month, for a
revision of the Rhodesia/South Africa Trade Agreement
because "South African manufacturers had to pay on their
fabrics constantly increasing duties imposed by the Govern-
ment to protect the local textile industry" and Rhodesian
clothing therefore was undercutting them.

On the 9th November Mr. Smith was able to announce
that "today we are no longer dependent on any one country's
goodwill for an economic well-being," and two days later
that "we can stand on our own feet and we do not have to go
round the world begging-bowl in hand."

The view that sanctions had failed was also endorsed
by the U.K. press. Colin Legum wrote, on the 21st November,
that "sanctions cannot work unless they are total and
enforceable ... all Mr. Wilson is doing is to erect at great
cost and with great effort a blockade with a built-in sieve."
The 'Times' stated, on the 21st November, that "significan-
tly the spate of optimistic assessments on the effect of
sanctions has died away. It is evident that the commercial
arrangements built up over the past year to beat voluntary
sanctions on Rhodesian exports are now in good trim to blunt
mandatory sanctions." And the 'Sunday Express' on the 27th
November noted that "it was said by a number of far-sighted
observers at the time of U.D.I. that Mr. Wilson could not
hope to gain whatever happened, and this is proving all too
ture."

Perhaps most interesting of all, while the Treasury
and the Board of Trade had produced official figures of
about £14 million for the cost to the U.K. of sanctions
against Rhodesia, it was admitted in November that Mr.
Wilson, in trying to convince the Commonwealth Conference
in September of the magnitude of Britain's effort, had
mentioned £30 million, and that the figure of £100 million
was now estimated to be reasonable (£200 million was
quoted in one newspaper).

(b) Secondly, there was growing realisation in the U.K. of the
/danger of ...
danger of escalation. If the question went to the U.N. and mandatory sanctions proved ineffective, it was believed that there would be a demand for the use of force which would initially lead to resolutions being passed for blockades, etc., whether or not the U.K. asked for them. The latter might, if repercussions such as the breaking-off of trade with South Africa occurred, so threaten the U.K.'s balance of trade and therefore her solvency, that the U.K. Government could be faced with alternatives of collapse of economic and financial policy or vetoing in the Security Council a resolution intended to bring an end to U.D.I. Even so a veto might merely lead to similar action by the Assembly under the Uniting for peace procedure. If the U.K. were to go along with those demanding forceful action, however, then there was a risk of the U.K. being pushed into war with Rhodesia and possibly South Africa.

The results were to be seen in a series of reports that the economic and finance ministers in the U.K. Cabinet were opposed to carrying the Rhodesian issue to the U.N., and in the decision of the Conservatives to take a clear line in opposition both to the use of force and reference to the U.N. Mr. Maudling, the Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party, said: "the opposition's attitude was that force should not, in any circumstances whatever, be used to try to obtain a solution. They did not consider it right to hand over the problem to the U.N."

Finally there was a clear warning from Labour's own paper, the "Sun" (11th November) that "no government could take Britain into such a war unless Parliament and the nation were firmly and clearly behind them: there is no such unity." This was confirmed by a public opinion poll on the 17th November which showed 31% approved of the Government's handling of Rhodesia, 39% disapproved and 30% "don't know."

(c) A third factor was the warnings given by South African Ministers. Mr. Vorster said on 10th November that "South Africa has clearly stated her attitude towards boycotts - we do not take part in them and we do not allow ourselves to be forced to take part in them," Mr. Schoeman, at Witbank, on 19th November, had no doubt that the Security Council would agree to the application of sanctions: "not only will they agree but the matter will get completely out of hand and they will almost certainly ask for total mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. If this happens South Africa and all other members of the U.N. would have the same sanctions applied against them if they did not fall in with the U.N. plan. I want to give the Prime Minister of Britain a serious word of warning and that is that he must consider carefully the consequences not only for South Africa but particularly for Britain if such a step is taken. He was referring to the R370 million of British exports and the R1,900
million of British investments in South Africa, and his warning was featured on the front pages of the 'Times,' 'Daily Telegraph,' 'Daily Express,' and other London papers. There were probably also warnings through diplomatic channels to Rhodesia as well as the U.K. It was reported on the 24th November, that South Africa's 'accredited diplomatic representative in Rhodesia, Mr. Montgomery, had "cut short a visit to Pretoria to bring back a message."''

(d) Fourthly, there were signs that the initiative had passed to Rhodesia. The 'Sun', on the 2nd November, reported that "the British Government is convinced that Mr. Smith is playing a cat and mouse game. This so that when ... Mr. Wilson takes the crisis to the U.N. at the end of this month, the Rhodesians can blame Britain for breaking off the talks."

How seriously this was taken was seen in the consternation with which official spokesmen greeted the report that Mr. Smith had accepted an invitation (provided Mr. Wilson agreed) to come to the U.K. to be interviewed on I.T.V. by David Frost.

But it was not only that Rhodesia was dictating the time-table. Mr. Smith was deliberately defining Rhodesia's position in a series of interviews in the press and on T.V. On the 9th November he informed the Umtali Post that "we have not been negotiating with the British to regularise our independence - that is an established and irrevocable fact and is something we will never surrender": on the 4th November 'Noticias' (Lourenco Marques) that: "if the case of his country was taken to the U.N. by the British Government it would be considered as expulsion from the Commonwealth and he would have no option but to proclaim a republic", and on the 10th November, on T.V., that "there is no doubt that irresponsible elements have gained control of the Commonwealth and it is one of the classic examples of the tail wagging the dog ... I hesitate to show respect for such a body." He had also told 'Noticias' that "Rhodesia was in favour of the creation of a common market with South Africa which could possibly be later extended. It should be started with Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and the former British Protectorates." On the 22nd November he informed a New Zealand journalist that "it was a 'good guess' that certain countries might feel freer to trade with Rhodesia and perhaps even recognise it if it became a republic": and on the 10th November on T.V. that "I don't now see a stronger political link with South Africa: I believe we are an independent nation. As I see things in the future we shall stay this way."

But he was careful always to keep the door open. On 11th November he suggested, at the U.D.I. celebrations in Salisbury, "man-to-man talks in a final effort to bridge the gap," and admitted on the 22nd November, to the same New Zealand journalist, that "he had a feeling that such a meeting was on the cards ... the first meeting would possibly be with the Commonwealth Secretary, leading to a meeting between the two Prime Ministers." One is left wondering whether Mr. Smith was being prophetic or whether /his earlier ...
his earlier suggestion had already been accepted by Mr. Wilson. If so, the 'Guardian' had had no hint, for it forecast on the 24th November that "unless Mr. Bowden had miraculous powers he will come back from Salisbury as empty-handed as he did before, and as Mr. Wilson did before that."

(e) Fifthly, the intervention of Sir Humphrey Gibbs. It was first reported that he had insisted that there must be further talks between British and Rhodesian ministers, or he would resign. It was then explained that as the Queen's Representative Sir Humphrey would never take any action which might be embarrassing to Her Majesty, still less threaten to do so. But his intervention appears to have saved Mr. Wilson's face by enabling the latter, while admitting in the House of Commons on the 24th November that there was still "a very wide gap on principle" to add that Mr. Bowden would go to Rhodesia "in response to an earnest appeal from Sir Humphrey Gibbs, rather than on any rising hopes that Mr. Smith and his regime now have the political will to bridge it."

It was subsequently reported, on the 28th November, that the main factor in bringing about the proposal for a meeting between Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson had been a man-to-man letter brought back from Salisbury by Mr. Bowden, which was believed to contain Mr. Smith's personal proposals for a settlement including the acceptance of a guarantee written into the Constitution that there should be eventual majority rule in Rhodesia: "the time of its achievement might be flexible." On 2nd December it was announced that Mr. Smith and Mr. Wilson would rendezvous in the Mediterranean on H.M.S. Tiger.

D. The two parties take up their position for the final discussions

Once the meeting had been agreed both sides began to take up position. The U.K. was ill-advise d enough to begin with threats. On the 26th November it had been reported that the R.A.F. had undertaken a study of the possibility of bombing the Rhodesian supply lines, and that "behind British plans belatedly to fly troops to Rhodesia as part of any settlement was this double motive: a British contingent would inject reality into, and re-assert, Sir Humphrey Gibbs' authority, would provide the assurance that Mr. Smith or his successor could not lightly embark on another U.D.I. and would allow Britain to mount guard over the prized Kariba dam power installations and to head off the risk of their destruction." If this had really been the intention it might have been added that it must have been designed to prevent any agreement!

This appeared to be realised in London and British ministers concentrated on giving assurances that there would be no concessions of principle. On 24th November Mr. Callaghan said: "whatever our opponents would do we cannot condone a system in Rhodesia which gives a small group permanent power over a small nation." On the same day Mr. Wilson said: "it is clear, after
Mr. Smith's reply to the London proposals of October 15th, that it is possible for all parties to accept the basic principles without agreeing on how far they should be fulfilled": he would therefore require "copper-bottomed guarantees." Mr. Wilson referred in particular to Mr. Smith having "jibbed at the London formula for Rhodesia's return to legality. During the transitional period, of unknown duration, control of the Rhodesian police and military forces would pass to the Governor." This condition would, if insisted upon, mean that the Governor could order the Rhodesian police and military forces to take such action as he chose, or as he might be ordered from London to tell them to take. It would scarcely need the presence of the British Grenadiers, also reported from London as being planned, to make U.K. control absolute. It will be noticed that British ministers seemed to be much more concerned about reassuring their left-wing supporters that no concessions would be made at the forthcoming meeting than in indicating possible compromises which might be offered to Mr. Smith in the hope of obtaining a settlement. The key may prove to be how long the transitional phase period will be (Mr. Smith is said to have suggested as little as one hour). It is significant that reference to this point has recurred in the reports of the talks on H.M.S. Tiger.

Conversely, the Rhodesian version of majority rule was said to be the steady enfranchisement of "mature (over 30) Africans" with a good deal of influence being exercised by the chiefs. On the 22nd November Mr. Smith had told the New Zealand journalist that "we believe we can satisfy British thinking but we know we can never satisfy the Afro-Asian bloc which demands immediate black rule." On 27th November he told the press that "African rule must eventually come, under the present constitution. Even on the A roll Africans would eventually gain control. The record shows that the Africans would not be fit to take over at the next election, and possibly not for another 5 years (5 elections) after that." Mr. Smith said that what was wanted was a long-stop change in the constitution so that in the event of things going rotten we can step in and stop it.

E. The discussions on board the Tiger

The line initially taken in London was that "the difficulty is that they (Mr. Smith's proposals) appear to come from Mr. Smith personally and there are grave doubts in Whitehall whether he can carry his colleagues with him."

Clearly there was also unease in Rhodesia at Mr. Smith being accompanied only by Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Sir Hugh Beadle, Mr. Howman and Mr. Clarke, but reports over the weekend that steps had quietly been taken to deal with this by sending out M.P's to talk to party gatherings in the districts, and statements by Mr. Wrathall, the Deputy Prime Minister, and by 'Boss' Lilford on behalf of the Rhodesia Front, that Mr. Smith had the full support of both ministers and party would appear to imply that this had been foreseen, and plans made in advance to deal with it. It is easy to see that there could be advantage in the course which Mr. Smith took: without key ministers he was undoubtedly in a better position
to argue that he must refer back any draft agreement to his Cabinet. The speed with which all of his ministers, even Mr. Lardner-Burke from Cape Town, gathered in Salisbury would also seem to indicate that they had expected to be consulted before anything was finally settled. Mr. Wilson may have sought to check such a move by suggesting that Mr. Smith should call his Cabinet together by radio, and consult it in the same way (which would have enabled him to read a transcript of the exchanges), and the cancellation of the "radio-Cabinet" may, again, have implied that Mr. Smith prolonged discussions so as to be able to argue that so much more had been discussed that he would need to consult his ministers in person. The fact that Mr. Wilson insisted (hardly Mr. Smith!) on acceptance in toto by midday on the 5th December implied that he may have been suspicious throughout of Mr. Smith's tactics and feared that the Rhodesian Cabinet would insist on further concessions. It could, of course, also have been that he felt that he could only face Parliament with the concessions he already had made if their announcement could be combined with the information that the Rhodesian Government had accepted the settlement as a whole. Possibly both motives were present.

There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson was in dilemma: on the one side he faced his economic ministers who had pointed out that escalation of sanctions could be a severe threat to the success of the Government's economic and financial policy; on the other, he faced his left-wing in Cabinet and Parliament, already disgruntled over his support for the U.S. in Vietnam and his failure to cut expenditure on defence in order to spend more on social services, who would regard any agreement with Mr. Smith, other than one involving the latter's complete surrender, as acceptance of white domination and apartheid, which to them is anathema. It may be significant that Mr. Bottomley, who has been committed, for the past year, to forcing Mr. Smith to surrender, did not attend the vital Cabinet which met on the 4th December to approve acceptance of the terms of settlement over Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson had indeed very little space left in which to manoeuvre or time to finesse: his sense of urgency was such that it impelled him to hold a three-hour Cabinet immediately after his return at which he secured the support of his ministers for acceptance of the Tiger draft, although some of them are said to have wished to reject it.

Mr. Smith was in an equally difficult situation. U.D.I. was always a gamble, but it had not been obvious in 1965 quite how much of a gamble. Now there is no doubt about the size of the stakes, and he probably found himself on board the Tiger in the awkward situation of having to make, in order to get a draft agreement, concessions which could involve his having to trust Mr. Wilson to play fair at some crucial point in the future; for example, during the so-called period of transition to legality. In this connection the presence of Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle may have been designed as much to ensure that they would know the intentions of the agreement, so that they could refuse to be parties to misinterpretation later, as to bring in two men who probably would have vital roles to play in the
working out of any agreement. Mr. Bowden could play a similar role within the U.K. cabinet. I drew attention some time ago to the fact that in Mr. Bowden Mr. Smith seemed to have found a Commonwealth Secretary whom he could trust and that it would be ironical if this had happened too late to influence the course of events.

We have learned little today. Mr. Wilson's sense of urgency has been shown by his determination to exercise every ounce of pressure on Mr. Smith. Not only did he announce that at the first possible moment the British Government had accepted the draft, but he repeated that Mr. Smith had only until noon on the following day to do so. His tenacity is almost terrifying and there is no doubt that he will do what he has threatened. Mr. Smith has continued to play it coolly; he had only the briefest talk with his ministers late on the evening of the 4th December and it was simply announced that the Rhodesian Cabinet would meet on the morning of the 5th, as if the loss of 8 hours out of 14 did not matter. The Cabinet met at 8 a.m. only for Mr. Smith to appear at a window at 11 o'clock to tell the crowd that ministers had just stopped to have tea. At 12.30 (half an hour after the deadline) it was announced that the ministers had not sent a reply, and were going to have lunch, and it was added, for good measure, that they would not meet again until 3 o'clock (a 2½ hour lunch is not even a businessman's idea of urgency!). It was also repeated that the U.K. had been asked to agree to an extension of the deadline.

I conclude, as I began, with a quotation from John Bunyan (although this time from the 'Holy War'):

"Then the Lord Secretary (so Mr. Wilson's predecessors were known in the 17th century) said to them: "What petition is it you would have me draw up for you?" They said "Our Lord knows best the state and condition of the town of Mansoul (Mr. Valiant-for-Truth came, you may remember, from 'Darkland') and how we are backslidden and degenerated from the Prince (Her Majesty)."

"Well," said the Lord Secretary, "I will draw up a petition for you and will also set my hand thereto. True the hand and pen shall be mine, but the ink and paper must be yours, else how can you say it is your petition?"

And the Lord Secretary adds (very much as it would, I think, be in character for his successor to add) "Nor have I need to petition for myself, because I have not offended."
A. The Six Principles

The approach of successive British Governments towards the problem of granting independence to Rhodesia has throughout been governed by certain basic requirements. These have been formulated as five principles, to which the present Government subsequently added a sixth. These are as follows:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

6. It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting

2. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in September this year the British Government notified to the Conference their decisions as regards a settlement of the Rhodesian problem, and stated that they proposed to communicate their intentions through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia, and to inform the illegal regime that, if they were not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion was brought to an end and executive authority was vested in the Governor, certain related consequences would ensue. The section of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communiqué relating to Rhodesia is reproduced in Appendix A.

Discussions in Salisbury

3. The Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General visited Salisbury from September 19 to 28 for the purposes explained in the communiqué. During the course of their visit they met under the aegis of the Governor, a cross-section of representative opinion in the country, including Mr. Smith and members of the regime. In these talks they made clear the British Government's requirements for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem and what the consequences of rejection of the British proposals would be.

4. Discussion of those proposals continued during a visit to Rhodesia in October by Sir Morrice James, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office; and in a further effort to resolve /the problem ...
the problem the Commonwealth Secretary again visited Rhodesia between 25 and 27 November, 1966.

5. In the light of the Commonwealth Secretary's report on his return, the British Government decided that a further meeting with Mr. Smith should be arranged with the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a settlement of the Rhodesian problem could be reached, on the basis of the principles and within the programme of action to which they were committed by the communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting.

Prime Minister's Meeting with Mr. Smith

6. The meeting took place in H.M.S. Tiger off Gibraltar from December 2 to 4, 1966. There were present the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and the Attorney-General: the Governor and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia; and Mr. Smith and Mr. Howman representing the illegal regime. The meeting resulted in a working document covering all the essential elements of the problem. A statement was signed by the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, in the presence of the Governor, on December 4, indicating that this document was without commitment on either side and that both sides would decide by 12 noon (Salisbury time) on Monday, December 5, whether it was accepted in its entirety. The texts of the statement and of the document are reproduced at Appendix B.

7. In the view of the British Government the document forms the basis for an acceptable settlement. It sets out proposals for an independence constitution which satisfy the six principles. It provides for unimpeded progress to majority rule (i.e., the first principle), while finding a means of introducing European reserved seats (to give effect to the sixth principle). It meets the second principle by establishing an effective blocking mechanism in a Senate and Lower House voting together, and by providing a right of appeal against the amendment of specially entrenched clauses of the constitution, in the first instance to a Constitutional Commission in Rhodesia and from that commission, as of right to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It meets the third principle (i.e., an immediate improvement of the political status of the Africans) by an extension of the "B" roll franchise to cover all Africans over 30 years of age; by increasing "B" roll seats in the Lower House from 15 to 17, and by a total of 14 African seats in the Senate of which 8 would be elected and six would be chiefs.

8. The fourth principle is met by a Royal Commission to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination and land apportionment.

9. Finally, satisfactory arrangements are suggested, within the requirements indicated in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' communique, for a return to legality by means of the appointment by the Governor of a broad-based administration, and for the testing of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole as required by the fifth principle after constitutional Government has been restored.
10. The British Government accordingly instructed the Head of the British Residual Staff in Salisbury on the evening of December 4 to inform Mr. Smith, through the Governor, that they accepted the document in its entirety.

11. On the evening of December 5, the Head of the British Residual Staff in Salisbury was informed by the regime that they were unwilling to accept the document in its entirety. As was made clear to Mr. Smith in H.M.S. Tiger, and as he recognised in signing the document at Appendix B, the illegal regime have thus rejected that document.

Conclusion

12. Throughout the constitutional discussions before the illegal declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, and in the exploratory talks which have taken place since that event culminating in the meeting in H.M.S. Tiger, the British Government have sought a solution which would be fair to Europeans and Africans alike and which would win the acceptance of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. If such a solution could have been agreed they would have been prepared to commend it to the British people and Parliament as a just and honourable settlement which would be calculated to establish Rhodesia as an independent State with the general goodwill of the world community. By their refusal to accept in its entirety the document which the British Government have accepted the illegal regime have made it clear that they are not prepared to take the necessary steps to bring the rebellion to an end. The responsibility for the situation which now arises rests wholly upon them. The related consequences foreshadowed in the communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in September will now ensue.

B. APPENDIX A

EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING IN LONDON 1966 (Cmd. 3115) RHODESIA

1. The Commonwealth Conference devoted a major portion of its discussions to the problem of Rhodesia.

2. As at Lagos, in January of this year, the members of the Conference reaffirmed that the authority and responsibility for guiding Rhodesia to independence rested with Britain, but they acknowledged that the problem was of wider concern to Africa, the Commonwealth and the world.

3. They reaffirmed the view expressed in the communiqué issued at the end of the Lagos Conference as follows -

"The Prime Ministers declared that any political system based on racial discrimination was intolerable. It diminished the freedom alike of those who imposed it and of those who suffered under it. They considered that the imposition of discriminatory conditions of political, social, economic and educational nature upon the majority by any minority for the benefit of a privileged few was an outrageous violation of the fundamental principles of human rights. The goal of future progress in Rhodesia should be the ..."
be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment. To this end several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed."

4. They further reaffirmed the statement made in their London Communique of 1965 and repeated in Lagos that "the principle of one man one vote was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia."

5. They remain unanimous on the objective that the rebellion in Rhodesia must be brought to an end speedily. In order to achieve this objective, most of the Heads of Government expressed their firm opinion that force was the only sure means of bringing down the illegal regime in Rhodesia. Others, however, shared the British Government's objections to the use of force to impose a constitutional settlement, while agreeing that it was not ruled out where necessary to restore law and order.

6. Most Heads of Government urged that Britain should make a categorical declaration that independence would not be granted before majority rule is established on the basis of universal adult franchise and that this declaration should not be conditional on whether the illegal regime agreed to surrender or not. They further urged that Britain should refuse to resume discussions or to negotiate with the illegal regime.

7. The British Prime Minister stated that the British Government would not recommend to the British Parliament any constitutional settlement which did not conform with the six principles; that they attached particular importance to the fifth principle, namely that any settlement must be, and be seen to be, acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; that they regarded it as implicit in this fifth principle that the test of acceptability must enable the people of Rhodesia as a whole to indicate whether or not they were prepared to accept any settlement which provided for the grant of independence before majority rule was achieved; and that there would be no independence before majority rule if the people of Rhodesia as a whole were shown to be opposed to it.

8. The conference noted the following decisions of the British Government:

(a) After the illegal regime is ended a legal government will be appointed by the Governor and will constitute a broadly based representative administration. During this interim period the armed forces and police will be responsible to the Governor. Those individuals who are detained or restricted on political grounds will be released and normal political activities will be permitted provided that they are conducted peacefully and democratically without intimidation from any quarter;
(b) The British Government will negotiate, with this interim administration, a constitutional settlement directed to achieving the objective of majority rule, on the basis of the six principles;

(c) This constitutional settlement will be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by appropriate democratic means;

(d) The British Parliament and Government must be satisfied that this test of opinion is fair and free and would be acceptable to the general world community;

(e) The British Government will not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it.

9. Most heads of Government made it clear that in their view political leaders and others detained should be immediately and unconditionally released before an interim representative Government was formed, in which they should be adequately represented. They further expressed the view that any ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Rhodesia as a whole should be by a referendum based on universal adult suffrage, i.e. one man, one vote.

10. The heads of Government also noted that the British Government proposed immediately to communicate its intentions as indicated above through the Governor to all sections of opinion in Rhodesia and to inform the illegal regime there that if they are not prepared to take the initial and indispensable steps whereby the rebellion is brought to an end and executive authority is vested in the Governor, the following related consequences will ensue:

(a) The British Government will withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement which have been made; in particular they will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule.

(b) Given the full support of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, the British Government will be prepared to join in sponsoring in the Security Council of the United Nations before the end of this year a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

11. The conference had before it an analysis of the working of economic sanctions prepared by the Sanctions Committee set up in Lagos. It was agreed that, though sanctions had undoubtedly depressed the Rhodesian economy, they were unlikely at their present level to achieve the desired political objectives within an acceptable period of time. Accordingly, the heads of government were generally agreed on the need for stronger and mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Most were convinced that mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive character should be applied under Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, and should cover both exports and imports. Others favoured /sanctions...
sanctions on selected individual commodities important to the economy of Rhodesia. The Heads of Government recorded their appreciation of the work of the Sanctions Committee and requested it to continue its work.

12. There was unanimity of view that Commonwealth countries should continue to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the pursuit of these objectives for Rhodesia notwithstanding some differences of opinion as to the most effective means of achieving them.

13. It was also agreed unanimously that assistance should be given to Zambia to produce a more complete cut-off of trade with Rhodesia and to assist her to withstand any serious effect on her economy resulting therefrom. To this end they requested that the Zambian Sub-Committee of the Sanctions Committee should continue its efforts in coordinating further Commonwealth assistance. Continuing consideration should also be given to the problems of Malawi.

14. The heads of government agreed that the problem of Rhodesia should be kept under constant view, and that they would meet again soon if the illegal regime were not brought to an end speedily.

15. The heads of government have had one overriding purpose in their consideration of the Rhodesian situation; a consideration which has now extended over four meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. That purpose is to end the perpetuation of power in that country in the hands of a minority, with only ineffective and inadequate guarantees of the political rights of the majority. Such a situation must be replaced by an arrangement based on a multi-racial society in which human and political rights will be vested in all the people without discrimination and in accordance with the true principles of democracy.

C. APPENDIX B

The attached document was worked out by the British Prime Minister and Mr. Smith in H.M.S. Tiger off Gibraltar on December 2/3, 1966.

It is without commitment on either side and both sides will decide by 12 noon (Salisbury time) on Monday, December 5, 1966, whether it is accepted in its entirety.

HAROLD WILSON
I. DOUGLAS SMITH

Signed in my presence

HUMPHREY GIBBS (Governor)
On board H.M.S. Tiger
December 4, 1966

RHODESIA - INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

The following are the principal changes which are to be made in the 1961 Constitution to meet the first, second, third and sixth principles:

1. The Governor: Governor-General to be appointed on the advice of the Rhodesian Government.

/2. ...
2. The Legislature: The composition to be:

Legislative Assembly 33 "A" Roll seats, 17 "B" roll seats, 17 Reserved European seats. Each block of seats to cover the whole country.

Senate The composition to be:
12 European seats (elected by Europeans on the "A" Roll. Six members to represent Mashonaland and six members to represent Matabeleland).
8 African (elected by Africans on the "A" and "B" rolls voting together. Four members to represent Mashonaland and four members to represent Matabeleland).
6 Chiefs (elected by Chiefs' Council).

3. Franchise: The "B" Roll franchise — to be extended to include all Africans over 30 who satisfy the citizenship and residence qualifications. Reserved European seats — to be elected by the European electorate. Cross voting to be retained and applied to all seats.

4. Delimitation — Alteration in the composition of both Houses and in number of seats to be effected by special entrenchment procedure. But the terms of reference of the Delimitation Commission are to incorporate the agreed formula as follows:

The overriding objective of the commission is to divide the constituencies that the proportion of those with a majority of African voters on the "A" Roll at the time of delimitation is the same as the proportion of African voters then on the "A" Roll for the country as a whole. Subject to this, the commission is to take into account the factors specified in Section 38.

5. Terms of Office of Senators — 20 Elected members — as for Legislative Assembly. 6 Chiefs — as for Legislative Assembly although a Chief will vacate his office as a Senator if he ceases to be a Chief. Chiefs are only to be removed from office on the recommendation of an impartial judicial tribunal.

6. Powers of Senate — The powers of the Senate will be:
(a) Review of legislation. (b) Special legislative powers in respect of Tribal Land, Law and Custom. (c) Amendment of Constitution — see below. Members of the Senate may be appointed as Ministers.

7. Executive Powers — The Governor-General will act on Ministers' advice in all matters.

8. Amendment of the Constitution — Ordinary amendments of the Constitution will require, as now, a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly. The amendment of the specially entrenched provisions of the constitution will require a vote of at least three-quarters of the total membership of both Houses voting together. In addition there will be a system of appeal against such an amendment. The amendment will not come into force until the time for appeal has expired ...
has expired or the appeal has been finally disposed of. The appeal will lie in the first instance to a constitutional commission in Rhodesia, consisting of the Chief Justice and other judges; with further appeal as of right to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The permitted grounds of appeal will be that the amendment discriminates unjustly or has the effect of discriminating unjustly between the races or contravenes any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights contained in the Constitution.

9. Fourth Principle: As a minimum requirement to give effect to the fourth principle, a Royal Commission will be set up without delay to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination, in particular Land Apportionment in Rhodesia, and the possibility of extending the competence of the Constitutional Council to embrace pre-1961 legislation; and a Standing Commission will keep the problems of racial discrimination under regular review.

10. Return to Legality and the Fifth Principle: An Order in Council will be made as soon as possible permitting the appointment by the Governor of a Prime Minister and other Ministers in Rhodesia.

11. The existing legislature will be dissolved. The Governor will be invested with legislative powers, to be used on the advice of Ministers except in those cases where he is empowered to act in his own discretion. No later than 4 months from the date of dissolution of the Legislature, and on the assumption that the test of acceptability referred to in paragraph 17 will have been completed in that interval, new elections will be held. If that test has shown that the new constitution is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, a further election, on the basis of that constitution, will be held as soon as possible either immediately before or immediately after independence.

12. As soon as the Order in Council mentioned in paragraph 10 is made, the Governor, in the full exercise of his constitutional powers, will invite Mr. Smith to head a broad-based interim Government which will include, in addition to representatives of existing political parties, independent members and Africans.

13. This Government will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion.

14. The restored constitutional government will be based upon the 1961 Constitution, modified (by Order in Council which will be made as soon as possible) to provide that during the interim period before the first election is held Rhodesian Ministers will be appointed by and responsible to the Governor, who will normally act on their advice in all internal matters of administration but, as regards his ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, and the protection of human rights, will be advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, by a Defence and Security Council, comprising the responsible Ministers, together with the heads of the Defence Forces, the Chief of Police, and a representative of the British Government.

/15. ...
15. During the interim period, and before any testing of opinion under the Fifth Principle is carried out, censorship will be removed; and normal political activities will be permitted, provided they are conducted peacefully and democratically and without intimidation from any quarter. In this connexion, an impartial judicial tribunal, appointed by the Rhodesian Government, but including one British representative nominated by the Lord Chancellor, will be set up to consider the detention and restriction of persons on security grounds. Such detention and restriction will not be authorised unless the tribunal are affirmatively satisfied that the persons concerned have committed, or incite the commission of, acts of violence and intimidation.

16. As soon as possible after the return to legality, the British Government will negotiate with the legal Government the details of the constitutional settlement for an independent Rhodesia in accordance with the arrangements already agreed informally and described in Part 1 of this document.

17. The agreed settlement will be submitted to the test of acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole by a Royal Commission whose composition and terms of reference will be agreed by the British Government with the legal interim administration.

18. If the settlement is shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the British Government will at the earliest possible date introduce the necessary legislation to grant independence to Rhodesia on this basis and will commend this legislation to Parliament.

19. The two Governments will also negotiate the terms of a Treaty guaranteeing the independence constitution. They will also enter into discussions on the desirability of negotiating an appropriate Defence Agreement for the purpose of regulating future defence relations between the two Governments.