

# electionsynopsis

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## Focus on South Africa's 2004 national and provincial election results

Many commentators deemed the 2004 elections to be a big yawn. They contended that the ANC's victory was a foregone conclusion, and that there was very little difference between the competing parties' manifestoes; to the extent, some argued, that a national consensus had been achieved.

However, the articles in this final edition of *electionsynopsis* illustrate that these commentators were wrong, and that the actual results of the elections point to enormous complexities and nuances within voting behaviour, and dynamics between and within parties. They challenge some of the arguments presented in previous editions of *electionsynopsis*; for example, those which asserted that citizens continue to be locked into identity politics, and that the "liberation dividend" of the ANC was beginning to lose its value.

Although **Southall** agrees that the extent of the ANC's triumph may have been only mildly surprising, it was the nature of its victory that is remarkable. He identifies a number of factors, such as the ANC's campaign; the repackaging of President Thabo Mbeki; the disorganisation of the opposition, and the extent to which the ANC exploited this; and the ANC's aggressive defence and promotion of its performance to date; as factors responsible for its electoral achievement.

However, results speak louder when placed in the context of voter turnout. **Sachs** provides an analysis of actual voter turnout, relative to the number of eligible voters and registered voters. The preliminary breakdown presented here, limited due to constraints of space, but coupled with the other contributions and the tables compiled by Jones, begins to demonstrate just how complex South African politics really is.

**Rule et al.** raise questions concerning the reliability of opinion polls in predicting voting patterns and party gains and losses. Although when the HSRC poll was undertaken in September 2003, it suggested a higher turnout than the actual results for the NNP, it also suggested that levels of political disengagement are higher among whites, coloureds and Indians (as these groups constituted the highest proportions of "unknowns" in response to questions concerning their voting intentions). These results predicted actual voting behaviour, as demonstrated by the statistics presented by **Sachs**. As he has pointed out, this is a worrying trend, as, if certain racial and class categories disengage from the political system, how then will they express their needs and represent their interests, if not through the ballot? And what implications does this raise for the system of South African democracy?

**Faull** traces the decline of support for the NNP in the Western Cape, and documents the history of the party as a serial monogamist, advancing through a number of partners in rapid succession, and confusing its constituents. He also addresses the issue of "the coloured vote", demonstrating the decompression of racial identity in relation to party allegiance, both in the plummeting turnout of coloured voters, but also the spread of their votes across a number of parties.

Contrary to the flux of party support in the Western Cape, **Cherry** documents the consistency and stability of the African urban vote in Kwazakale in the Eastern Cape. Although interviews with ANC supporters indicate that disillusionment with the ANC is prominent and relatively wide-spread, they continue to vote for the ANC as the party which founded democracy. Such voting behaviour can be interpreted as defending democracy, rather than supporting the party: to choose the ANC is to vote for, and participate in, democracy. This echoes questions

previously raised in *electionsynopsis*, concerning the choices which opposition parties present to the electorate, and why people vote. Another issue raised by **Cherry's** contribution is the importance of the provincial vote : some voters do not distinguish between a national and provincial vote, and national and provincial party policies and performance. This seems to suggest that the 'liberation dividend' of the ANC retains its currency in some constituencies, regardless of its performance nationally and provincially. The move away from the NNP to the DA among white, coloured and some African voters in the Eastern Cape, tends to suggest that the DA is now seen as the new representative of conservative interests.

Besides the IFP being routed by the ANC in KwaZulu/Natal, another new provincial dynamic is the coalescence of Indian support for the ANC in that province, and the gains that the ANC made from the stay-away of traditional IFP supporters. **Daniel** notes that the increase in Indian support for the ANC is, however, not confined to KZN, but represents a national shift. Another racial realignment of political support for the ANC came from white voters in Pietermaritzburg who abandoned the DA in protest against the party's support for Ulundi as the capital. Contrary to suggestions from the Eastern Cape that some voters do not distinguish between the provincial and national vote, **Daniel** argues that one of the reasons for the IFP losing support was their dismal performance at provincial level. However, these two arguments may not be entirely contradictory : **Cherry** is referring to ANC supporters, who are driven by concerns different to those from IFP supporters. Whereas the ANC is viewed by many of its supporters as a symbol of democracy, **Daniel** argues that, on the contrary, for many of its erstwhile and younger potential supporters, the IFP is seen as a pre-democracy party.

**Pienaar** presents a profile of one of the four women Premiers appointed by President Thabo Mbeki – Beatrice Marshoff in the Free State. He also examines some of the dynamics behind her appointment, which surprised those who assumed that Ace Mugashule would fill the post. This analysis clearly points to the President's hand behind the provincial thrones. Although the appointment may assist in neutralising the factionalism within the ANC in the Province, and furthering the President's national objectives, it raises questions concerning the representivity of provincial premiers, and the extent to which they are able to harness regional support.

What are the implications of the ANC's decisive victory? **Landsberg** explores this question, arguing that it will provide for greater stability and continuity over the next five years, and afford the ANC the space to consolidate and implement its major policy objectives. Although tensions within the alliance will persist, and although social movements and COSATU may continue to criticise macro-economic policy, the ANC has been granted an overwhelming mandate to continue on its current policy course. However, the ANC is also obliged to honour the social contract with its supporters, and to deliver on its promises. This, argues **Landsberg**, is likely to result in greater public spending, social delivery, job creation and skills development.

**Moore** extends this argument to the implications of South Africa's foreign policy. Her co-authored contribution in the previous *electionsynopsis* examined the role of foreign policy, both in principle, as articulated in the ANC's manifesto; and in practice, examining the role of President Mbeki in foreign policies and intervention. According to **Moore**, the ANC's overwhelming mandate from the electorate is likely to result in the consolidation and continuity of existing policies. South Africa's domestic and foreign policies mirror each other; thus, there will be less focus on foreign policy formulation, and more on implementation; regional and continental socio-economic development and relevant policy implementation will be prioritised to underscore and grant legitimacy to political liberation.

## Goliath's victory

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*There was never any doubt that the ANC would win the 2004 election by a large margin. However, argues **Southall** it is the nature and extent of the victory which has confounded and astounded analysts and observers. He offers a number of explanations for the unexpected triumph of the ANC, including the form and content of its campaign, and the weak and fluid dynamics of the opposition.*



It wasn't meant to happen like this! The 'liberation factor' was over, and disillusioned ANC voters were going to stay away from the polls! Voter turnout would be down, as South Africa settled into democratic 'normalcy'! The ANC would win, but the DA would consolidate as the principal party of opposition! Goliath would win his latest round in the ring, but plucky David would give him a bloody nose! However, when the results were in, it was the ANC and its cohorts who had won all the prizes, taking nearly 70% of the vote from an impressively high turnout of nearly 77% of the registered voters, as well as securing effective victories in all nine provinces. Meanwhile, an increased vote for the ANC meant that the DA's hopes of positioning itself as an alternative government were dashed, even though its hitherto major rival, the NNP, was subjected to a bitter humiliation which seemingly destines the party to an unlamented death. Elections 2004 also confirmed the IFP's status as merely a regional player, and even undermined its capacity to bargain its way into government by threatening to make trouble. All said and done, Goliath hadn't read the script, or certainly not the one or ones penned by the opposition!

## THE ANC'S VICTORY

Everybody knew that the ANC was going to win this election, but it was the *manner* of its winning that confounded observers.

There had been many predictions that the party would experience a drop in support. Two main reasons were regularly cited. The first was its declining salience as the party of liberation. The second was that failures of 'delivery' were likely to have eroded its constituency. Other factors, from Thabo Mbeki's alleged lack of magnetism through to the ANC's perceived flaws around job creation, HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe were all regularly thrown into the pot, as even –let us admit it – a quick flip through the back pages of *electionsynopsis* will testify.

What happened, in contrast, was that the ANC's proportion of the vote increased from 62.65% in 1994 and 66.35% in 1999 to 69.68% in 2004, increasing its national representation from 252 to 266 to 279 in the latest parliament. And although its national vote of 10.88 million was well down from the 12.24 million votes it received in 1994 (when voters were not pre-registered and the only qualification to vote was possession of an ID book), it received another 277 000 votes compared with 1999 (when voters did have to be registered and the franchise was restricted to citizens). Yet what gave the ANC particular pleasure was its performances in the provincial elections in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, where in the previous contests it had been outsmarted by the opposition. Although failing to secure outright majorities in both provinces, it now established political control over all nine provinces.

Careful analysis will be required before we understand fully the reasons for the nature of the ANC's victory. However the easy answer lies in the strength of its own campaign and the weaknesses of those of its opponents.

Of course, the ANC started from a strong base, as the historic standard-bearer of democracy, and as the party of the racially oppressed black majority, of the working class and of the wider poor. Yet these were all advantages that might have been imperilled by various aspects of its performance in government since 1994. Whilst none have questioned its majority status, various commentators have accused the ANC of misusing its dominance to secure unjustified party advantage (as through its introduction of floor-crossing legislation during the last parliament, which seduced opposition members into its own ranks and enabled it to unseat the DA as government of the Western Cape). It has been accused at various times of using the 'race card' at cost to its commitment to non-racialism, whilst its Black Empowerment strategies have received a mixed welcome amongst Coloureds and Indians, some of whom claim to be newly disadvantaged relative to Africans. Throughout the last parliament, there were numerous tensions between the ANC and COSATU, its most powerful partner in the 'Tripartite Alliance', largely around the government's commitment to macro-economic policies which trade unionists and leftists claimed were responsible for the destruction of jobs and the growth of unemployment. And as the party of power, it was often accused during the last parliament – even from those within its own constituency of impoverished citizens – of multiple failings of 'delivery', of water, electricity, housing, healthcare and welfare. In any case, said the analysts, the legacy of apartheid in terms of social deficits was so great that no government which had been in power for ten years could hope to face an electorate impatient for improvements without some unavoidable costs.

In the event, the ANC met these and other challenges head-on by a remarkable feat of organization and electoral mobilization. This had three major elements:

- *A highly organized and united campaign:* Long-term governments often lose power because of internal divisions and loss of energy. In contrast, the ANC presented a united front and mounted a vigorous and effective campaign. Despite denials of lack of solidarity, differences between the ANC and its tripartite alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, had caused significant policy rifts and bitter arguments during the last parliament. The government was also the butt of increased criticism from new social movement organizations, such as the Treatment Action Campaign and local 'crisis groups'. Numerous observers saw these divisions within the 'ANC family' as potentially productive of a new opposition initiative to the ANC's left. Even if the longer-term significance of these predictions cannot be discounted, the ANC dealt with them in this contest with skill and aplomb. Months before

the election it had cosied up again to the COSATU and SACP leaderships, hinting at a shift towards a more redistributive economic strategy. Differences were either buried or resolved, and COSATU threw its undivided weight behind the party. Meanwhile, the ANC brushed aside all that the social movement organizations could throw at it, labelling such bodies as the Landless People's Movement (which called for a boycott of the election) irrelevant and irresponsible.

Undistracted by internal divisions, the ANC played its trump card of membership in depth to trounce the opposition. Prior to the poll, it had revitalized its branches, which are spread throughout the length and breadth of the land. During the campaign, ministers, MPs and provincial legislators were all deployed alongside ordinary 'cadres' in a house to house campaign which reached deep into the townships and countryside. Importantly, too, it also re-packaged Thabo Mbeki.

Before and after he had become president, Mbeki had come over to the voters as a well-meaning, but austere and intellectual leader, who in contrast to the universally loved Madiba lacked the popular appeal which could touch the heart of ordinary voters. However, during this campaign, Mbeki was transformed. Building on the earlier success of presidential 'imbizos', the president now joined the house-to-house campaigning, showing a humility and concern for ordinary citizens, from diverse communities, which belied his previous lofty image. He presented himself effectively as a caring and responsive 'man of the people'. Some said this was a campaign device forced upon the ANC by a relative lack of campaign finance. If this was so, then it was a fortunate impoverishment, for the emergence of 'the new Mbeki' proved a masterstroke which perhaps even the ANC itself had not anticipated.

- *The Vigorous Defence and Sale of its Record:* Before the election, the government was deemed to be vulnerable, particularly around the issues of slow economic growth, the increase in unemployment and the lack of improvement in living standards for many amongst the poor. The ANC's response combined intellectual riposte with populist appeal. Its manifesto and party heavyweights proclaimed the government's triumphs and contested criticisms. Growth had been consistently positive since 1994, the economy had become more internationally competitive, and although many jobs in 'old' industries had been lost, 2 million new employment opportunities had been created in 'new' industries such as services, IT and finance. Meanwhile, workers' rights had been protected, the social security net had been vastly extended, R50 billion in assets had been transferred to the poor through housing and land reform, and the economy was becoming increasingly deracialised. This message was taken to the middle classes via the media. More importantly, it was sold to the working class and the poor via the ANC's more popular campaigning, with again, Mbeki taking the lead. His consistent theme was to acknowledge that high levels of poverty and unemployment remained, but to promise that the ANC was absolutely committed to their relief.

Equally important was the ANC's argument that, for all the limitations of its record, there was no other party which was so devoted to the interests of the poor.

- *The Exploitation of the Opposition's Vulnerabilities:* The principal parties of opposition were all fair game for the ANC's hunting pack. The major problem for the established parties that could be said to really matter – the DA, NNP, IFP and UDM – was that they combined an inability to launch a convincing attack upon the government's policies, notably upon the economy, with their appeal to only limited segments of the population. All the major parties' economic platforms were, in essence, so similar, that the opposition was simply reduced to saying, and saying unconvincingly, that 'we could do better'. Where they differed significantly, as for instance with the DA's criticisms of ANC policy on Zimbabwe and Mbeki's controversial support for President Aristide of Haiti, they ran against anti-colonial sentiment that remains deeply entrenched amongst black voters.

Importantly, too, the ANC had chipped away at their constituencies, and rendered the reasons for voting for them – or the NNP, IFP and UDM in particular – less convincing.

## THE OPPOSITION'S WEAKNESS

The task facing the opposition parties in this election was always unenviable. With the ANC's hegemony guaranteed, the problem was how to convince voters of their relevance. As ever, the proportional representation system encouraged a wide array of hopefuls to throw their hats into the ring, although in the national elections it was only Patricia de Lille's Independent Democrats (ID) party that was thought likely to make its way into parliament to join the DA, NNP, IFP, UDM, ACDP, FF+, UCDP and PAC on the opposition benches. Of this raft of aspirants, the ACDP, UCDP and FF+ were all looking to expand very narrow constituencies on grounds of values or identity, but none failed to break out of their chains. The UDM, the 1999 elections' most virile newcomer, had had its locks shorn during the previous parliament



by internal dissidence, seat losses during the floor-crossing saga, and the ANC's largely successful wooing of the chiefs, and as a result had lost significant ground. The PAC, never happier than when engaged in internal ideological battles of supreme insignificance, had so divided its own constituency that it did remarkably well to hang on to its miserable quota of just three seats. And the big winner amongst this otherwise widespread tale of woe was the ID, which secured a credible 1.73% of the national poll. Yet thereby hangs a tale relating to the poor performance of the NNP, DA and IFP.

- *The Demise of the NNP and the ANC's Capture of the Western Cape:* The predictions that the NNP would haemorrhage support had been widespread, but few predicted that its collapse would be so absolute and comprehensive. In 1994, the former ruling party had secured 20.4% of the vote, and played a proud and not unconstructive role in the Government of National Unity (GNU). Following its withdrawal from the GNU in 1996 and the subsequent resignation from its leadership of former President and Nobel Prize Winner F.W. de Klerk, it was always struggling to keep hold of its constituency, which apart from its appeal to 'minority rights' had long been glued together by its position in government. After the 1999 election, its new and largely untried leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, proceeded to engage in what now looks like a dance with death. First he teamed up the party with the then Democratic Party in the DA, only to find that he and his ilk were unable to stomach playing second fiddle to the more cerebral and feisty Tony Leon and engaging in the politics of vigorous opposition. Then he took his party out of the DA to join up once again with the ruling party in a loose coalition which enabled the ANC and NNP together to seize control of the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town as a result of the floor-crossing saga of 2002-03. Yet when it came to elections 2004, Van Schalkwyk – nicknamed Kortbroek or 'Short Pants' for his lack of political weight and experience – found to his wholly predictable cost that it was the ANC which was wearing the trousers.

Love them or loathe them, you know what Tony Leon and the DA stand for. Leon takes delight in pinning his criticisms of the ANC to the mast, and sailing into battle. He loves the smell of blood, the electorate senses it, and some buy his fighting message gladly. But poor old Kortbroek had got the NNP into a corner where it had nothing really to sell. Was it in opposition? Or was it in government? If in government, did it really have influence? Yet most damaging of all for the NNP in election 2004 was the DA's cruelly pointed barb: a vote for the NNP was in reality a vote for the ANC, and those of its supporters who wanted to vote for an opposition should vote for the real thing. By the end of the campaign, Van Schalkwyk's pants were distinctly threadbare, utterly unable to hide his political impotence.

Of course, the ANC had got the NNP precisely where it was wanted. What the ridiculous and inept Kortbroek had never realized was that the ANC had courted the NNP out of political convenience and contempt. If the renewed links between the ANC and the NNP was a marriage, then it was a blatant case of a cynical, up-and-coming bridegroom marrying a vainglorious elderly widow for her tawdry wealth. The ANC had long pined for control of the Western Cape, where in 1999 it had stolen large numbers of Coloured votes from the NNP to emerge as the single largest party, only to be denied control of the province by a post-election coalescence of the DP and NNP. From its own perspective, the Western Cape remained un-liberated, and a brutal affront to the spirit of South Africa's new democracy. Hence it was that during the floor-crossing saga, the ANC played to the NNP's susceptibilities: Kortbroek's personal ambition for office, his party's lack of commitment to principled opposition, and its lingering lust for power. The ANC's hug of alliance with the NNP was therefore that of the bear, and its smile that of the crocodile. It was scarcely surprising that NNP's disgruntled voters got greedily gobbled up in a ruthless feeding frenzy of ambitious competitors.

Meanwhile, the NNP's dizzying flight from government to opposition and back again, and its overwhelming preoccupation with the Western Cape, had comprehensively undermined its status as a party of national significance. Voters scurried away like rats from a sinking ship, conservatives to the right in the form of the DA, others to the left in the form of the ANC. And many Coloureds followed the siren call of the ID.

All that now remains is for the once formidable party of Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd to be absorbed into the party of Luthuli, Tambo and Mandela, two nationalisms joined together.

President Mbeki has many remarkable qualities. Not least is his delicious sense of historical irony!

- *The Failure of the DA to consolidate opposition into an alternative government:* Leon's vision as a political leader has always been consistent. It has been to defy the odds by turning a minority, white, liberal political tradition into an electable, center-right, multi-racial voting bloc. His strategy in the first instance was to appeal to minorities through vigorous opposition to the ANC. This was termed 'Fighting Back' in 1999, and was dramatically successful, increasing the DP vote from 1.7% in 1994 to 9.6% in 1999, the latter result earning his party the mantle of 'official opposition'. His next step, the construction of the DA, was dressed up as merger, yet designed to absorb the NNP, a bid so blatant that it soon sent Van Schalkwyk (although by no means all of his followers) scuttling into the outstretched arms of the ANC. Bloodied, but by no means unbowed, Leon thereafter cranked up efforts to repudiate ANC claims that the DA was polarizing the electorate on racial grounds. He took its campaign to the townships, whilst also seeking to secure an African partnership by striking

up a working relationship with the IFP, whose always awkward coalition with the ANC in the GNU was by the 2004 election campaign becoming unstuck.

The DA's campaigning was far from unimpressive. Leon himself, an articulate and forceful speaker, was packaged as an alternative president, the unquestioned leader of the leaders of opposition. Although his bid for pre-eminent status was foiled by Mbeki's refusal to take him on head-to-head in a US-style, televised debate, his campaigning in the townships had razzmatazz, colour and the aura of a party on the move. Black supporters wearing DA T-shirts and waving party flags were constant companions to Leon as he trawled for African votes and paid less attention than previously to the party's traditional support base in the green and leafy suburbs. ANC attacks upon the DA as a party which was racially divisive and reactionary only served to firm conviction that Leon was its principal enemy. Yet the DA undermined its own good work by other facets of its strategy.

Its principal error was that, in seeking to widen its support base, it moved to the right and vacated space for the ANC as a party of the center. Leon's opportunistic u-turn on capital punishment, which he now embraced as an antidote to crime, was a crude and clumsy appeal to the conservative vote which offended the DA's traditional constituency on a cardinal point of liberal principle. His entering the alliance of convenience with the IFP, dubbed the 'Coalition for Change', likewise linked the DA with a party which many regarded as an apartheid collaborator, and ethnically chauvinist to boot. And finally Leon's unmanly assaults on the ID as a one-woman party identified it as a threat to the DA's monopoly of vigorous opposition, and reminded the electorate of Verwoerd's similar derogatory assaults upon Helen Suzman – who, for her part, was not slow to condemn Leon on his about-turn on the death penalty.

The DA, optimistically, had projected the 'Coalition for Change' as heading for 30% of the vote. However, when the chips were down, it secured only 12.4%, which together with the reduced 6.97% of the IFP fell far short of the target. Although the DA put on a brave face, and correctly noted that it had gained over 400 000 votes, in private it must have been bitterly disappointed. The increased votes it secured appeared to have come very largely from whites and Coloureds who had abandoned the NNP and opted for the DA as the conservative alternative to the ID. Far, far fewer Africans than it had hoped for had chosen to abandon the ANC. And a slim but significant slice of its traditional white supporters had jumped ship in favour of De Lille. Yet what was predictable, and raised a major question about Leon's political acumen, was that after the election, the IFP – earmarked as a future partner in opposition – demonstrated its acute reluctance to relinquish its faltering grasp on power.

- *The ANC's Capture of KwaZulu-Natal and the regionalisation of the IFP:* Mangosuthu Buthelezi is a long-term political survivor, and South Africa's most slippery political customer. He has based his career, not just on the cultivation of Zulu ethnicity, but also on calculated ambiguity: the Christian moralist who opposed the ANC's armed struggle, yet claimed no knowledge of his party's covert links with apartheid death-squads, tribal warlords and shady securocrats. A Zulu traditionalist who has constantly engaged in tussles with his king. A homeland leader who claimed to be weakening 'separate development' by fighting it from within. A committed democrat whose party has been dedicated to electoral brinkmanship, and deployment of the fact and threat of violence to secure its share of the vote. And after 1994, Buthelezi had been simultaneously a member of the cabinet within the GNU yet leader of a party of opposition.

In 1994, the IFP had imperilled the democratic transition by threatening to boycott the election until the very last minute. Against a background of more than a decade of violent conflict between the ANC and IFP throughout Kwazulu-Natal, the threat was a serious one, only averted by a last minute deal on which (Buthelezi was to claim thereafter) the ANC failed to deliver. An uneasy peace was secured by a notoriously 'negotiated election result', whereby – although a final count of the votes might have pointed otherwise – the IFP was awarded a narrow majority of the vote in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial election, and hence allowed to assume control of the government. This was much to the dismay of the provincial ANC, which was admitted into the provincial government only as a junior partner.

A weary population enjoyed the benefits of the absence of war and some evidence of 'delivery' by mainly ANC-led departments. The wind-down in conflict eroded the control of the rural areas by IFP chiefs and warlords. Hence in 1999 the IFP's slip was showing, as support began to drain away to the ANC. The IFP's vote in the second provincial election dropped to 41.9%, the ANC's support increasing from a recorded 32.3% to 39.4%. A hairsbreadth separated the parties, but the force was by now clearly behind the ANC, even though the IFP again retained the premiership. Subsequently, the ANC's crude attempt to seize control of the province by wooing floor-crossers in 2003 was only foiled by the IFP's threatening a return to mayhem if it was to be rudely tricked out of power. However, by



election 2004, Buthelezi and the IFP knew very well that their long-established dominance of their own backyard was under severe and serious threat.

Buthelezi's political tightrope dance since 1994 had seen him simultaneously basking in glory as a senior national minister (of Home Affairs) and sulking in public because of the ANC's unscrupulous treatment of him in cabinet. By 2004, mounting tensions had seen personal and political relations between himself and Mbeki reaching breaking point. Given the looming situation in KwaZulu-Natal, he therefore bid to broaden the IFP's options by forging the 'Coalition for Change' with the DA, a linkage which had its origins in the floor-crossing drama whereby the latter saw potential to substitute itself for the ANC as the IFP's partner in government. The 'Coalition' also claimed continuity with the old Progressive Party's espousal of Buthelezi as an African leader of peace, a relationship which was as doubtfully founded as Leon's latter day embrace of Buthelezi as a principled democrat. However, what Leon reckoned without was the IFP's umbilical attachment to the politics of patronage, which – as for the NNP – constitutes its lifeblood.

During the 2004 election, the ANC moved in for the kill. Symbolically, it launched its national campaign at King's Stadium in Durban, taking its fight deep into the heart of enemy territory. Buthelezi, the old lion, was visibly weakening. IFP rumbles of war were subdued by the widespread deployment of security forces. For the first time, the ANC was enabled to position its party agents at every voting station in the province, which it believed was a major deterrent to fraud. Long-term demographic shifts of population from rural to urban areas had begun to take their toll, drastically eroding the IFP's foundations in the countryside. White conservatives, fair numbers of whom had thrown in their lot with the Inkatha since 1994 to dish the ANC, had by now condemned the IFP as tribalist and thrown in their lot with the DA, alienated by the costly absurdity of splitting the provincial administration between the isolated royal outpost of Ulundi and more practical urban seat of Pietermaritzburg. History was pulling the rug from under the feet of the IFP, and there seemed little that the latter could do about it.

The voters confirmed these trends with a 47.0% vote for the ANC. It was not a majority, but it was ahead of even the combined vote of the IFP (36.8%) and the DA (8.4%). If push came to shove, it was clear that the ANC could cobble together a majority with the support of the Minority Front and the UDM, with the ACDP standing on the sidelines proclaiming it would cast its vote in line with Christian principles.

The IFP – active in government since the 1970s – was facing ejection from power. Its quandary was whether to retain access to influence and resources by playing humble supplicant to the ANC, or striking out boldly into the wilderness of opposition. For its part, the ANC matched strength with conciliation. It offered to continue its provincial partnership with the IFP, yet Mbeki appointed his party's provincial leader, Sibusiso Ndebele, as premier, without consulting Buthelezi, who reacted by withdrawing IFP appointees from the provincial cabinet. As negotiations continued, Mbeki offered two national deputy minister posts to Musa Zondi and Vincent Ngema. However, whilst keen to accept, they were ordered to delay taking their oaths of office as Buthelezi himself was regarding his own exclusion from the cabinet as a calculated insult. The IFP's brinkmanship may have reached its limit. However, for the moment, the future of the 'Coalition for Change' rests less on the IFP's enthusiasm for re-shaping South African politics than on whether Buthelezi – who may now retire completely or opt to head the KwaZulu House of Traditional Leaders – can stomach the prospect of his juniors serving in office after he himself has been left out in the cold.

## THE ELECTION AND THE FUTURE

The ANC is peculiarly sensitive to charges that its political and electoral dominance constitute a threat to democracy. It argues that it cannot be responsible for the fragmentation of the opposition, nor for the fact of its own popularity. Yet the risk that analysts foresee is that a party which has no threat of being deposed by the electorate is a party which can become unaccountable. It was therefore heartening that in his victory speech President Mbeki spoke of the danger of arrogance, and re-committed the ANC to the service of the nation, and most notably to the interests of the poor. However, the outcome of an election was to leave the opposition as divided and as far from unity as before. 2004 merely confirms that it will take a political rupture of historic significance before David can deal serious damage to Goliath.

# Voting patterns in the 1999 and 2004 elections compared

Michael Sachs, research coordinator of the African National Congress

## INTRODUCTION

Despite many dire warnings of 'voter apathy' and electoral disengagement, 2004 witnessed another demonstration of the extent to which democratic citizenship is valued in South Africa, especially amongst the poorest. Not only did turnout figures remain very high by international standards, but also the numbers of people who voted for the African National Congress increased. Although not keeping pace with population growth the ANC's gains in percentage and absolute terms were particularly strong amongst the poorest sections of black and rural electorate.

In this article we consider swings in turnout and party support in comparison with 1999, focussing largely on the absolute number of votes cast rather than proportions. Although 1994 provides a useful baseline, it should be remembered that (a) unlike 1999 and 2004, there was no requirement to register, (b) some categories of non-citizens, such as permanent residents and migrant workers were allowed to vote but disbarred subsequently, and (c) it was South Africa's 'founding election', which theory suggests would call for a larger turnout than 'normal'.

A second methodological caveat worth making is that estimates of turnout as a ratio of the 'Voting Age Population' (VAP) should be treated with great caution, since (a) they rely on census 2001 figures which may be unreliable in respect of the age distribution of the population and (b) the VAP is quite different from the population of eligible voters, since the latter excludes undocumented migrants, permanent residents and others without citizenship rights. The number of undocumented migrants in particular is a matter of speculation.


## LOWER TURNOUT

Voter turnout was somewhat lower in the 2004 election. The 1999 poll saw 16.2 million South Africans voting. Since then, the voter's roll grew from 18.2m to 20.7m. Despite this increase, about 400,000 fewer people voted in 2004 (see figure 1). Nationally 77% of registered voters were polled in 2004, compared with 88% in 1999.

This national average hides important variations according to geographic, class and racial patterns. Table 1 shows turnout by province in 2004 and 1999. The drop in turnout was particularly high in the two largest provinces, KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng. In both around 200,000 fewer people cast their ballots. In the Free State too, there was a substantial drop in the number of votes cast compared with 1999. On the other hand, the Eastern Cape saw substantial increase in votes cast in 2004.



**FIGURE 1: REGISTERED VOTERS AND VOTES CAST IN 1999 AND 2004**



**TABLE 1: TURNOUT BY PROVINCE IN TWO ELECTIONS**

	2004 ELECTION		1999 ELECTION		Difference in Number of votes cast (1999 - 2004)
	Turnout of Registered Voters	Total votes cast	Turnout of Registered Voters	Total votes cast	
Eastern Cape	81%	2,310,226	91%	2,224,289	85,937
Free State	79%	1,042,120	91%	1,115,029	-72,909
Gauteng	76%	3,553,098	90%	3,748,739	-195,641
KwaZulu-Natal	74%	2,807,885	87%	3,011,337	-203,452
Mpumalanga	80%	1,157,963	90%	1,152,914	5,049
Northern Cape	76%	329,707	89%	335,067	-5,360
Limpopo	77%	1,686,757	92%	1,691,243	-4,486
North West	77%	1,353,963	87%	1,333,421	20,542
Western Cape	73%	1,621,835	87%	1,616,179	5,656
<b>TOTAL/AVERAGE</b>	<b>77%</b>	<b>15,863,554</b>	<b>89%</b>	<b>16,228,462</b>	<b>-364,908</b>

Aside from the much expected 'voter apathy', several contingent factors that may have influenced turnout on the day. In the urbanised provinces, especially Gauteng where the population is highly mobile and patterns of circular migration remain strong, it is possible that the Easter holiday period had a significant negative affect on turnout. The long weekend of Friday 9<sup>th</sup> – Monday 12 April was separated from the election day holiday (Wednesday 14<sup>th</sup> April) by a single working day. In these circumstances, many people were either given a day off on Tuesday 13<sup>th</sup> April or took extended leave.

In KwaZulu Natal more effective monitoring, including the deployment by the ANC of party agents in the IFP heartland for the first time, may have succeeded in curtailing the extent of electoral fraud and reducing the extent of political intimidation of various kinds. Previously, in the rural areas north of the Tugela turnout was uncomfortably close to 100% in unmonitored voting stations. Take the Ulundi Municipality for example: turnout dropped from 94% in 1999 to 82% in 2004, even despite a significant reduction in the number of registered voters. (See table 2). In this context, lower turnout, rather than being interpreted as a sign of 'voter apathy' or disengagement from electoral politics may, on the contrary be an indication of greater citizen capacity to exercise democratic choice in areas where the voting public has long been regarded as the 'subjects' of IFP rule.

**TABLE 2: EROSION OF IFP HEARTLAND: VOTES IN 1999 AND 2004 COMPARED**

	KZ266		KZ265		KZ244	
	Ulundi		Nongoma		Msinga / Pomeroy	
	1999	2004	1999	2004	1999	2004
Registered Voters	84,010	79,002	68,311	68,496	54,682	62,059
Valid Votes Cast	79,361	64,410	55,393	52,937	46,563	45,730
Turnout	94%	82%	81%	77%	85%	74%
IFP	76,542	59,606	53,715	49,253	41,426	37,490
ANC	1,638	2,744	829	2,052	3,018	5,433
DA	568	945	470	705	837	1,040
ACDP	242	281	170	252	467	468
UDM	178	166	90	134	253	203
OTHER	193	668	119	541	562	1,096

Source: compiled by author from IEC data.

It is also important to note the differences in levels of turnout amongst racial groups. Table 3 shows the author's estimates based on the isolation of wards with racially homogenous populations according to census 2001. Turnout was significantly higher in the African community, both urban and rural, than amongst Indians and Coloureds. These patterns of lower turnout amongst minority communities are also reflected in the large declines in the votes cast for parties that have traditionally sought to represent such groups (see below).

**TABLE 3: ESTIMATED TURNOUT BY DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORY**

Demographic group	Estimate of % Turnout of Registered Voters
Eastern Cape Metro Africans	84.9
Western Cape Metro Africans	82.3
Gauteng Metro Africans	76.7
Limpopo Rural Africans	75.6
KwaZulu Natal Metro Africans	74.3
Northern Cape Rural Coloureds	73.6
Gauteng Metro Indians	68.4
Western Cape Metro Coloureds	62.0
KwaZulu Natal Metro Indians	61.5

### ANC GAINS, OPPOSITION LOSSES

Although turnout dropped when compared with 1999, the number of people who cast votes for the ANC increased by about 275,000 (see table 2).

The increase in votes cast for the ANC was particularly pronounced in four provinces. In KwaZulu Natal, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape the ANC garnered more votes than in any previous election, including 1994.

- In the Eastern Cape an additional 188,000 people voted for the ANC as those who had voted for the UDM in the last election returned to the ANC en masse. Of all municipalities, the largest swing the in favour of the ANC was seen in King Sabata Dalindyebo, where the ANC scored only 36% in 1999, but increased to 59% in 2004.
- In KwaZulu Natal votes cast for the ANC increased by 11.5% (135,000 additional votes compared with 1999), even in the context of lower voter turnout in the province as a whole. Small but significant increases for the ANC in traditional IFP strongholds can be seen in table 2 above, a pattern that is even more pronounced in peri-urban areas. But more than half of the ANC's increase came from the eThekweni metro, reflecting important shifts amongst minority communities, but also the effectiveness of campaign work amongst the ANC's core constituency.
- In the Western Cape 57,000 more voters chose the ANC than in 1999. In the Northern

Cape too the ANC appears to have consolidated and advanced on the gains made in 1999, mobilising an additional 5% to vote ANC, despite a drop in the overall level of turnout.

In both Free State and Gauteng, the number of people voting for the ANC declined by about 5%. This drop is particularly notable in Gauteng, where in the context of significant increases in the population over the last five years, especially the population of Africans, one would expect increases in the ANC's vote. Nevertheless, as noted above, it would be hard to disentangle 'voter apathy' from the more contingent "Easter Weekend holiday". In most other provinces the position remained largely static, reflecting a downward trend in relation to population growth.

**TABLE 4: VOTES CAST FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN THREE ELECTIONS**


	1994	1999	2004	DIFFERENCE 1999-2004
Eastern Cape	2,411,695	1,617,329	1,806,221	188,892
Free State	1,059,313	887,091	838,583	-48,508
Gauteng	2,486,938	2,527,676	2,408,821	-118,855
KwaZulu-Natal	1,185,669	1,176,926	1,312,767	135,841
Mpumalanga	1,072,518	962,260	979,155	16,895
Northern Cape	201,515	211,206	222,205	10,999
Limpopo	1,780,177	1,483,199	1,487,168	3,969
North West	1,325,559	1,052,895	1,083,254	30,359
Western Cape	714,271	682,748	740,077	57,329
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,237,655</b>	<b>10,601,330</b>	<b>10,878,251</b>	<b>276,921</b>

Compiled by the author from data available at [www.elections.org](http://www.elections.org)

Overall, while the ANC's vote increased slightly, the number of votes cast for opposition parties declined substantially (see figure 2). On the one hand it is true that in comparison with the performance of the DP in 1994 and 1999, the DA has made substantial gains in 2004, scoring an additional 400,000 votes. Many of the former white voters of the NNP would have cast their ballots for the DA and its growth mirrors the NNP's fall.

However, the DA failed to realise the full potential released by the NNP's precipitous decline, especially amongst white voters. The combined total of the DP, NNP and FA in 1999 amounted to 2.71 million votes, which we regard as the potential limit of an 'anti-ANC' opposition platform. In 2004, the DA only netted 1.9 million votes, failing by a long shot to capture the full potential of that bloc. Much of the explanation for this is likely to be lower turnout amongst the white and coloured community, with many former NNP voters deciding not to vote.

**FIGURE 2: VOTES CAST FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THREE ELECTIONS**



## CONCLUSION

In 2001 the parliamentary election in Poland yielded a voter turnout of 46% of registered voters. This must surely be cause for worry about the future of representative democracy in Poland, which underwent democratic transition at the same time as South Africa.

By contrast, electoral participation in South Africa remains very high. Announcements of voter disengagement from a 'low intensity democracy' must be regarded as somewhat premature.

Ideally, long-term trends in electoral participation should be analysed over the course of three comparable elections. Since there was no requirement to register in 1994 this is not yet possible in South Africa, and so any conclusions we reach here can only be tentative. Nevertheless, comparing the results of 1999 with 2004 show:

- Voter participation remains very high, especially amongst Africans and in very poor communities, both rural and urban.
- The ANC has increased not only the proportion of the votes it received, but also the absolute number of votes cast in its favour;
- Opposition parties have seen a steep decline in the votes cast in their favour amongst their core constituency, while at the same time failing to extend support into new demographic groups. This is reflected in very low levels of turnout amongst minority voters.

Disengagement from the electoral process, if it can be observed at all, appears particularly strong amongst the more affluent sections of the population, and the racial minorities. Far from the abandonment of democracy by the poor it is those with assets and wealth that appear less inclined to vote. Whites may have moved from 'laager' of rejecting democracy in favour of late apartheid to the less violent apathy of the cluster home, where social separation finds its counterpart in electoral disengagement. If this is the case then the question could be posed: what other (non-electoral) methods would such communities develop in order to protect their political and economic interest.

On the other hand, lower voter turnout amongst minorities could be related to the bankruptcy of style of muscular 'anti-ANC' oppositions exemplified by Tony Leon. In this reading, the picture of 2004 is contingent of the subjective weaknesses of opposition parties at the moment of the election. Electoral participation amongst minorities would then be expected to pick up once the long awaited 'realignment of opposition politics' delivers a political vehicle that inspires re-engagement with the vote.

## Polls and predictions: where the NNP lost its votes

Stephen Rule, Director; Khangelani Zuma, Senior Research Specialist; Udesch Pillay, Executive Director, in the Surveys, Analysis, and Modelling and Mapping Programme, and Mark Orkin, CEO of the HSRC

*The central question raised by Rule et al. is the reliability of opinion polls and predictive methods used to generate data. This contribution traces the results of an HSRC poll conducted in September 2003, which predicted a relatively large imputed vote for the NNP. The authors account for this over-estimation.*

The 2004 election has come and gone and 400 new or returning members of the National Assembly are ready to serve the needs of the populace for the next five years. Little substantial change has occurred in the political composition of parliament, with the ruling African National Congress increasing its numerical dominance from 266 to 279 seats. Much of the media focus was on the demise of the New National Party as its supporters deserted en masse for the Democratic Alliance, the ANC and the infant Independent Democrats.



One of the surprises was the relatively high turnout of 15 863 554 voters, almost 77% of the 20 674 956 registered voters. Nevertheless, this comprises less than 60% of adult South Africans who are eligible to register and vote, a proportion closer to that which turns out to vote in the longer established democracies, and in that sense indicative of the achievement of a degree of "maturity" ten years since the inception of our democracy.




*Voters still queuing to vote at 19:00 on Election Day, Osizweni, KwaZulu-Natal*

The HSRC, in collaboration with Markinor, conducted interviews with 14227 voters emerging from voting stations on the 14<sup>th</sup> April and made the hugely encouraging finding that more than 98% of voters were satisfied that election procedures had been "free and fair". The Independent Electoral Commission was able to announce this at the same time as the finalisation of the election results, less than three days after the closing of voting stations. Further findings from the study will be released shortly.

Queues of voters varied in length between voting stations and at different times of the day during one of the authors' fourteen-hour trip between stations. At schools in Soweto's Pimville and Orlando East, the queues amounted to several hundred before 09:00 on Election Day. At Johannesburg's Yeoville Recreation Centre more than 800 were waiting to vote at 10:00 and at least 300 at Bakerton, Springs at 13:00. By mid-afternoon in Leandra, the queue stood at about 80 and there were only a handful by 17:00 at the Newcastle Farmer's Hall. In contrast, Sesiwabonga High School at Osizweni, KwaZulu-Natal still had a queue of about 200 waiting patiently in the dark at 19:00.

Projections of the outcome of the election made by the HSRC on the basis of its South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), conducted in September 2003, were not far off the mark. Using discriminant analysis to predict the voting behaviour of survey respondents who did not declare their intentions, the HSRC made a forecast that the ANC would win 67,8% of votes cast and 271 seats, followed at some distance by the DA with 10,5% and 42 seats. This statistical technique used the biographical characteristics of SASAS respondents who indicated the party for which they intended to vote, to impute the probable votes of the one-third (33%) of SASAS respondents who did not reveal their voting intentions. Whereas the proportion of "unknowns" was only 28% amongst black Africans, it was much higher for the other groups (coloured 45%, white 50%, Indian 60%). The HSRC's predicted result was thus a relatively large imputed vote for the NNP in relation to the numbers who stated up front that this was their party of choice. The subsequent downward trajectory of NNP support was tracked by successive public opinion surveys by Markinor in November 2003 (5,5%) and February 2004 (4,5%). In the event, it is clear that many of these "unknowns" actually voted for other parties, the NNP ending up with only 1,7% of votes cast.

**SURVEYS OVER TIME VS ELECTION: MINORITY PARTIES**



The realised 69,4% (279 seats) for the ANC and 12,4% (50 seats) for the DA constituted electoral successes for the two main parties in excess of what our model predicted. The haemorrhage of potential support for the NNP during the months between the SASAS survey in September 2003 and the election seven months later accounted for the substantial gains of the ANC and DA. The other major beneficiary of this trend was the ID, which at 1,7% (7 seats) emerged with significantly more than the HSRC's predicted 0,4% (2 seats). In addition, the Inkatha Freedom Party won precisely the 28 seats predicted, indicative of the power of discriminant analysis in imputing for the distinctive rural isiZulu-speaking support base for this party. The African Christian Democratic Party and Freedom Front Plus performed substantially better than their predicted outcomes, with 6 and 4 seats respectively, instead of their anticipated 2 each.

Political Party	HSRC prediction from SASAS, September 2003 survey	Actual election result, April 2004
ANC	271	279
DA	42	50
IFP	28	28
NNP	35	7
UDM	7	9
PAC	2	3
AZAPO	2	2
FF+	2	4
ACDP	2	6
ID	2	7
UCDP	2	3
MF	1	2
AEB	1	0
"Other"	3	0



# How the west was won (and lost)

Jonathan Faull, Political Information and Monitoring Service, SA (PIMS-SA) IDASA

*Faull provides a comprehensive disaggregation of the 2004 poll in the Western Cape, and the dynamics of electoral support for various parties. He challenges a number of predictions and assumptions concerning voting behaviour: for example, the much vaunted "coloured vote", popularly perceived as a monolithic block, which allegedly determines the outcome of elections in the Western Cape. He also picks up on the issues raised by the Rule et al. piece on the reliability of poll predictions. Finally, he explores the impact of the electoral poll and assumptions about apathy, on representivity in a PR system.*

According to most analysts, and some political leaders, the elections of 2004 have marked a substantive remaking of the political landscape of the Western Cape. It has become common cause to cite the ascendance of the African National Congress (ANC) in the province as evidence of a swing within the coloured vote towards the ruling party.

This brief will interrogate this assumption through in-depth analysis of the election results, focussing on the cross-currents of language, class and race that have shaped the course of political identity in the province through our first ten years of democracy.

## THE APATHY IMPACT

In the weeks leading up to the election SABC/Markinor polls reported that the Western Cape contained the highest number of undecided voters in the country. The last elections-related Markinor poll came out of the field in February 2004 and it indicated that 7.9% of the sample remained undecided; an additional 9.7% of respondents refused to answer the voter intention question.

The issue of voter apathy, and especially, apathy among youth (i.e. 18-25 year olds) preoccupied analysts in the weeks and months running up to the election. Concerns for the effects of apathy were especially high in the Western Cape where polls indicated widespread disaffection with the politics of the province and state. SABC/Markinor's opinion survey on election registration and participation reported that nationally almost 85% of the estimated 27,5 million potential voters had indicated that they wanted to vote and that they were likely to vote. By comparison, only 51% of British voters said they would vote in a general election, and only half of all potential voters said they were interested in politics according to a Mori poll released in the same month (March 2004). It appeared that turnout would be healthy, and in line, or better than, recent turnout in so-called established democracies: 77% in the Spanish presidential poll; 62% in the 2004 French regional elections; 76% in the Greek general elections, etc.

However, pollsters highlighted the fact that 44% of those who said they did not want to vote fell into the 'youth' category; voters aged between 18 and 24. In addition, 56% of those who indicated that they did not have the bar-coded Identity Document fell within the same group.

IEC registration backed up expectations of a good showing: 3.5 million South Africans registered during the first registration weekend of 8-9 November 2003. In the second registration period a further 1 million people registered to vote. The IEC reported that youth accounted for nearly 60% of all new registrations over the two registration weekends. This represents a substantial improvement when compared to the youth registrations for the 2000 Local Government Elections where only 30% of young people eligible to vote signed up. When registration closed, 48% of all potential youth voters had registered. In other words 52% of youth voters were unable to participate in the April election. The final tally of voters on the voters roll recorded just over 20 000 000 voters, a gap of just over 7million from the estimated number of potential voters calculated using census data. Over 25% of potential voters were AWOL.

In the Western Cape registration went very well, with the provincial voters' role recording 2.2million potential voters – an increase of 19.1% – the highest across the nine provinces.

But the outcome was disappointing. Nationally 15 863 554 votes were cast representing 76.73% of the voters' roll. Relative to the census estimate of 27.5million eligible voters, turnout falls to 57.69%. In the Western Cape turnout of 73.05% of registered voters for the national vote was the lowest of any province. The figure falls to 71.27% in the provincial poll.

Registered voters in a proportional representation system impact on the final result whether they vote or stay at home. Regardless of turnout, the 100% pie to be divided out among representatives in the

numerous legislatures remains up for grabs. If 2 people vote or if 20 million people vote, the sum of the votes is formulated into a 100% figure and divided up proportionately. When people stay at home they thus increase the proportional "power" of every vote that is cast. Voters who stayed at home in the Western Cape had a substantial impact on the election results.

If one compares IEC statistics for the province from 1999 to 2004, one can grapple with the broad-strokes of the province's election outcome. In 1999, 1 601 922 valid votes were cast in the province; in 2004 this number increased by 3 094 to 1 605 016. In real terms (1999=100) this is relatively insignificant, representing a 0.19% increase on the 1999 figure.

The table below shows the relative gains and losses for the five major parties<sup>1</sup> in the province:

<b>WESTERN CAPE:</b>				
<b>Party</b>	<b>1999 Votes</b>	<b>2004 Votes</b>	<b>Difference</b>	<b>Real % Gain/ Loss</b>
ANC	682748	740077	57329	8.40%
DA	227087	432107	205020	90.28%
NNP	550775	151476	-399299	-72.50%
ID	NA	127991		
ACDP	49807	60613	10806	21.70%
<b>TOTAL*</b>	<b>1601922</b>	<b>1605016</b>	<b>3094</b>	<b>0.19%</b>

\* total votes cast in the province excluding spoilt votes.

These stark figures highlight the extent of the New National Party's (NNP) decline. In real terms, the NNP shed 72.5% of their support in the recent poll. Rural municipalities confirmed the extent of the party's bleeding: In the Breede River district, the NNP's taking declined from 47.15% in 1999 to 19.13%; in Robertson the figure fell from 37.81% to 8.59%; in Worcester results indicated a decline of more than 66% in real terms for the party; and in Hermanus the party lost more than 75% of their 1999 support.

In the metropole, the locus of 65% of the province's vote, declines were similarly pronounced: In a voting district in Salt River, the NNP's takings fell from 41% to 15%, in Maccassar from 57% to 34%, in Mitchells Plain one ward showed a real loss of 68%, in Hanover Park 71% of 1999 support was lost. In the suburbs the haemorrhaging was even more extensive: at a voting station in Bothasig the NNP shed over 1000 votes, a decline of 91% in real terms, in Welgemoed the party's taking fell from 72% to 24.15%, a decline of 70% from 1999, in Parow North the NNP fell from 75% to 6.25%, etc.

## CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD

The decline of the NNP is well documented. In 1994, they emerged from the national election as the official opposition to the ANC with just over 20% of the national vote. Moreover the then-NP won the Western Cape outright in the provincial poll, and ran close to the ANC in the Northern Cape, eventually forming a coalition government with the ANC in Kimberley. In 1996 F.W. de Klerk led the NP out of the Government of National Unity (GNU) to function explicitly as the opposition to the ANC.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, the NNP then launched a policy of "constructive engagement" with the ANC at a national level, but remained at loggerheads with the ANC in the Western Cape, where the relationship between the parties was characterized by acrimony. The then-Democratic Party's Fight Back campaign in 1999 exploited this gap in the NNP's opposition makeup, and the DP toppled the NNP from their perch, assuming the role of the Official Opposition in the second parliament. After the 1999 elections the NNP entered into a coalition pact with the DP in the Western Cape granting the DP disproportionate powers in the provincial executive, whereby three of their five MPLs were appointed as MEC's in the Province. The deal did not help to dispel perceptions of a sinking ship.

In the run-up to the Local Government Elections in 2000, the DP orchestrated a series of NNP defections, each of whom shuffled before a press-conference singing the praises of Tony Leon and maligning their erstwhile leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk. Increasing political pressure forced the hand of the NNP to join the DP and form the Democratic Alliance.

The marriage did not last long, and the NNP, never having legally constituted itself within the DA at a national level, formalised their divorce, ironically, through the very floor-crossing





legislation that had been instigated to allow the DA to legally “unite” in the National Assembly. But even this “triumph” rang hollow as eight NNP MP’s shuffled across the back-benches to join the new-fangled DA in the National Assembly, reinforcing the perception of van Schalkwyk as incapable of leading a united party. The party’s straggling remnants entered into coalition with the ANC in the Western Cape, handing the province to a provincial government including the ANC for the first time since 1994. Far from stalling the decline, the capitulation continued.

In 2004 the NNP threw the political dice once more. The NNP contested the elections with their incumbent partners, the ruling ANC. Having nourished their voters on “swart gevaar” rhetoric to “keep the ANC out” in 1994 and 1999, it was an act of faith to call on the same voters and ask them to return the party to power as the bed-fellows of the ruling party. Not surprisingly, the DA exploited these difficulties, challenging NNP voters with the question “You wouldn’t vote ANC, so why vote NNP? The ANC and the NNP are now together”.

In the final analysis the voters didn’t buy the message and the NNP’s core constituencies either voted elsewhere or stayed at home. The DA and the Independent Democrats (ID) managed to mop up many of the votes that bled from the NNP’s implosion. The DA, especially, benefited from their anti-ANC/ NNP alliance strategy, almost doubling the takings of the DP in the 1999 election.

## SWINGING AT HOME

Voting stations in African neighbourhoods recorded exceptional turnout at or above the provincial average of 71.27% in the provincial contest: On the border of Nyanga and Gugulethu, in a ward characterised by widespread poverty and informal housing, turnout for the provincial ballot was 73.19%; in Gugulethu proper, turnout was exceptionally high, touching 98.02% and in another Gugulethu ward characterised by RDP housing, turnout was 104.11%<sup>2</sup>, in New Crossroads (formal) turnout was 75.23%, and in Nyanga (formal/hostels) 73.3%. In each of these wards between 85 and 95% of valid votes cast went to the ANC.

In white English speaking, Southern Suburbs upper middle class voting districts, turnout hovered at or below the provincial average: In Tamboerskloof turnout stood at 67%, in Upper Claremont 69%, Rondebosch/Little Mowbray 70.8%, Rosebank 68%, Bergvliet 74% and Newlands 69.65%. The trend in these wards was a majority for the DA of between 53% (Rosebank) and 70% (Little Mowbray), with substantial support for the ID in traditionally “liberal” areas (Rosebank: 14%; Newlands: 15%; Tamboerskloof: 18.4%) and the ANC (Rosebank: 20%; Tamboerskloof: 10%; Newlands 13%; Claremont: 12%).

In English wards further down the class slope, turnout and consolidation behind the DA increased respectively: In Edgemoed in a 78.61% poll, the DA won just over 80% of the vote; in a predominantly English ward in Parow, the DA won 68.54% in a 82% poll.

In wealthy Afrikaans areas, where support for the NNP averaged between 60 and 70% in 1999, turnout was excellent, with the vote congealing behind the DA: In Welgemoed, the DA won 58.2% to the NNP’s 24.15% in a 80.73% poll; in Durbanville, the DA won 57% (NNP: 17%) in the context of 80.7% turnout; in Parow North, the NNP fell from 75% (1999) to 6.23% in a 69% poll where the DA won 68.84% of the vote; and in Durbanville the DA won 65% in the context of 77.86% turnout, the NNP running second with 13.8%, down from 61% in 1999.

In petty middle-class and white working class areas, voters supported the DA in higher numbers with good turnout: In Bothasig, the DA won 80.78% of the vote in a 83.89% poll; and in Goodwood, the DA won 68% in the context of 79.9% turnout.

In traditionally coloured areas, turnout plummets and the vote spreads: In Athlone no one party won more than 30% (ANC: 19%; DA: 28%; ID: 20%; NNP: 17%) in a 60.42% poll. Kasselsvlei (Bellville): the ANC and DA won 32 and 33% of the vote respectively with the NNP third with 13.9% in the context of 54.96% turnout. In Macassar turnout reached 57.7% (ANC: 32%; DA: 7.8%; ID: 19.6%; NNP: 34%). In Elsies River turnout was 60.75% (ANC: 21%; DA: 18%; ID: 11%). In Belhar the ANC won 31% in a 65.9% poll (DA: 20.7%; ID: 20.1%; NNP: 15.08%). In Heathfield turnout staggered at 49.74%, with the ANC and DA sharing the majority of the spoils with 43 and 30% of the vote respectively. Interestingly, the ID won no votes in Heathfield. In Hanover Park, fetishised by the media in the run-up to the elections as an NNP stronghold, turnout was 60.41% with the DA winning 35%, the NNP 28%, the ANC 14% and the ID 8.7%.

## CONCLUSION

Contrary to the rhetoric of racial census theorists, IEC results have consistently debunked the notion of the coloured vote as a homogenous block firmly entrenched behind the NNP. While the NNP has won the majority of working class coloured votes in previous elections, the ANC, and in 1999, the DP have scored consistently across coloured voting districts (ANC support is higher in more middle class, English speaking coloured areas and as one moves closer to the city centre).

Tony Ehrenreich of COSATU, writing in the Labour Bulletin<sup>3</sup> cited the following demographic breakdown of voters in the Western Cape:

	% of Voters
White	22
African	24
Coloured	52
Other	2
Total	100

The effect of the demise of the NNP is evident in the low turnout of voters in coloured neighbourhoods. The effect within these wards was a proportional increase in votes for the ANC. Given the implosion of the NNP and the failure of opposition parties to win over all of these traditionally non-ANC votes (i.e. those who stayed at home), the ANC who managed to get their voters to the polls in high numbers - in large part due to the revival of ANC branch structures and using COSATU infrastructure - scored proportionately higher.

One ward in Salt River, although very small, illustrates the impact of apathy very well: In 1999, 582 people cast their vote; in 2004, 412. Turnout for the ward was 58% for the 2004 election. The ANC received 134 votes in 2004, or 33% of the votes cast at the voting station. What is interesting is that in 1999 the ANC won 170 (i.e. more) votes in this ward, but in the context of higher turnout scored proportionately less, 29% of votes cast. Thus in Salt River fewer votes in the context of lower turnout won the ANC a higher proportion of the votes in that ward. This trend, extrapolated across the province, accounts for large "swing" to the ANC, who got their voters to the polls in large numbers.

Cumulatively, the NNP, then-DP and ACDP won 827 669 votes in the 1999 election. In 2004 these three parties and the ID won 772 187 votes between them. The net loss for the non-ANC camp is 55 482 votes, a number reflected almost exactly by the gains made by the ANC: 57 329 votes or 8.4% in real terms. A superficial analysis of these figures would suggest that the ANC won over these voters from the opposition camp or swayed the core of "undecided" voters polled by Markinor in February this year. A close analysis of voting districts in the Cape metropole, however, paints a different picture and turnout therefore becomes the defining feature.

<sup>1</sup> In 1999, the four parties listed gained just over 94% of the province's votes; in 2004 these four plus the ID again accounted for just over 94% of valid votes.

<sup>2</sup> It was possible for voters outside of their voting district to vote at another voting station under section 24(A) of Electoral Act.

<sup>3</sup> April 2004.

## Third time lucky: the ANC's victory in KwaZulu/Natal

John Daniel, Director, Democracy and Governance Programme, HSRC.

*Daniel* analyses the dynamics which lead the ANC to victory in the highly contested province of KZN. He argues that the disaffection of voters from the IFP, DA and NNP; and the newly-gained support of the Indian electorate, played a significant role. Other dynamics such as the aggressive and strategic campaign of the ANC, as compared to the ossified IFP, contributed to the ANC's decisive win.

It took ten years and five elections (three national/provincial and two local government) for the ANC to become the majority party in KwaZulu/Natal. Throughout the election campaign the ANC had predicted victory but it had also done so in 1994 and 1999, thus one was entitled to a degree of scepticism. But this time the ANC's optimism turned out to be well founded, gaining 46.98% of the provincial vote in contrast to the IFP's 36.82%. This impressive ten-point spread translated into 38 legislative seats for the ANC to the IFP's 30.



Overall, the ANC picked up an additional 125,000 votes over its 1999 tally in KwaZulu Natal. According to Carol Paton in the *Financial Mail* (30.04.04), the source of the new votes were twofold. One was the IFP stronghold of Northern Natal where the ANC's share of the vote grew from one to two percent in 1999, to ten percent in what for that area was a surprisingly low voter turnout. What this suggests is that large numbers of previous IFP voters sat out the election. As Paton put it, it was the 'opposition voters who didn't vote while the ANC still drew its supporters to the polls'.

The other gain for the ANC came from the so-called Indian vote and here the ANC, along with its Minority Front (MF) ally, turned around the 1999 result in spectacular fashion. In the process it routed the DA at the provincial level. In its traditional Indian stronghold of Reservoir Hills and environs, the ANC improved its position, winning 15 of 18 voting districts, while in nearby Newlands it captured all eight districts. But the real gains were made in areas like Phoenix, Chatsworth, Umkomaas on the south coast and Stanger along the north coast. In both Phoenix and Chatsworth, the DA emerged from the 1999 poll as the largest party but in this election in Chatsworth: the ANC and MF took over 69% of votes compared to the DA's 17.3%, a 50% drop over 1999. Much the same was true of Phoenix where the ANC grew its 1999 vote of 8.9% to 25.4%, overtaking the DA in the process. It was not, however, only the DA vote which shifted mostly to the ANC (some went to the IFP) but also the NNP Indian vote which gravitated to the ANC in numbers. This is suggested by the fact that the NNP's provincial vote in KZN slumped from 97,077 in 1999 to just 14,218 in 2004.

Many factors account for this swing in Indian support to the ANC. One was the slick nature of its campaign for the Indian vote which, according to Adam Habib as quoted in the *Sunday Times* (18.04.04), spoke directly 'to issues affecting the Indian community. They also began to treat the Indian people as citizens, rather than as a cultural group'. The DA was also negatively affected by its positions on the Iraq war and Palestinian issue where it was perceived as pro-American. The ANC on the other hand, was seen by the Indian community, and particularly by Muslim voters, as being on the 'right side'. The other Indian constituency which the ANC skilfully courted was that of the Tamils. Its hosting of a delegation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) early in the year and the presence of Thabo Mbeki at the Tamil New Year's day celebrations only four days before the election paid off handsomely. This attention to detail was also evidenced by the fact that the eThekweni city manager and ANC stalwart, Mike Sutcliffe, addressed an estimated 10,000-strong crowd at the Hare Krishna festival in Durban over the weekend prior to the election.

It is worth noting that this ANC surge in the Indian vote was not confined to KZN; it formed part of a national pattern. This is borne out by the fact that the ANC secured the largest share of the vote in Bo Kaap and Lansdowne in the Cape and in Lenasia and Laudium in Gauteng. In Lenasia, for example, the ANC won nine out of ten voting districts, growing its share of the vote from 41% in 1999 to 55.7% in 2004. The fact that the ANC's position on the Middle East paid off handsomely in voting terms was reflected in the comment of one of the ANC's winning candidates in Lenasia, Ismail Vadi, who attributed the ANC's victory to 'its foreign policy in support of the Palestinian movement and against the unilateral US-led war of aggression in Iraq' (*Sunday Times* 18.04.04).

According to the *Natal Witness* (18.04.04) there was also a third source of new ANC supporters in the form of largely white voters in Pietermaritzburg who switched from the DA to the ANC as a protest at the DA's support for Ulundi as the region's capital. This was a key issue in the IFP's election platform which the DA must have felt obliged to support in its role as coalition partner to the IFP. However, it badly alienated the predominantly white Pietermaritzburg business community which formed a special campaign committee focussed on generating support for the ANC. Exactly how many whites in the area voted for the ANC as a result of this issue is not known but one analysis estimated the figure at 15,000. Speaking at an impromptu victory rally as the results came in, The KZN ANC leader, S'bu Ndebele, noted how well the party had done in Pietermaritzburg and commented that 'the capital issue cost the DA very, very dearly' (*Sunday Independent* 18.04.04).

So, how did the ANC put together this impressive victory and persuade 125,000 new supporters into its ranks? A number of factors here are pertinent.

The first is the impressive nature of the ANC's election campaign. Elsewhere in this edition Roger Southall develops this point in some detail so it will not be belaboured here. However, it is clear that the ANC had a carefully thought-out and sophisticated campaign strategy and that the capturing of KwaZulu Natal was a priority. Thus it was that the ANC chose Durban to launch its whole election campaign with a high-profile rally at Durban's Kings Park rugby stadium. It took the fight to the enemy, so to speak, with a series of *imbizos*, some them deep in the heart of IFP territory. It also deployed all its big guns, including the President himself, former President Mandela and the province's favourite ANC son, deputy President Jacob Zuma. The ANC campaign had a buzz and energy to it with a clever exploitation of the province's cultural nuances. The embracing of the Tamil celebration was a case in point.

By contrast, the IFP's campaign was lacklustre and 'same-old', so to speak. Long tedious rallies trumpeting the well-worn Zulu nationalist issues were the norm. There was nothing new or innovative in the IFP approach. Nor did the party appear to try to reach into any new pockets of support. In my home area of Glenwood in Durban's southern suburbs, which in the last local government elections elected

an NNP councillor, not a single IFP poster was visible. By contrast in my street alone, there were over 300 ANC lamppost posters (it's a long street), over half of which were in Afrikaans. This was accompanied by two pamphlet drops. Of course, the ANC had the resources which the IFP may not have but it seems as if the IFP was content to rely on its rural base and on its chiefs to get out that vote. When that failed to materialise, they had no plan B.

Perhaps the decisive turning point in the election came in January when President Mbeki and his entourage en route to an *imbizo* were confronted by spear-wielding IFP impis in the IFP stronghold of Msinga. A *Business Day* analyst commented that 'a shocked and angry Mbeki finally realised the kind of primitive politics still presiding over the province. It precipitated an influx of security forces which began visibly covert operations to eradicate violence and intimidation, something the ANC's provincial leadership had been demanding for years' (*Business Day* 21.04.04). Complementing this heavy security-force presence was an army of ANC electoral agents. The net effect was that the ANC was able to station agents in every polling station in the province and blanket the hot spots with security personnel. What this did was to encourage the ANC vote in those areas to show their hands for the first time while it also significantly reduced the potential for intimidation and voter fraud.

A final factor that worked against the IFP was its generally poor record as a government, one which the Durban daily, *The Mercury* (26.04.04) commented editorially, constituted '10 years of indifferent service delivery and a general churlishness that has squandered the support it once had from many outside its traditional support base'. In similar vein, the editor of the Zulu-language paper *umAfrika*, Cyril Madlala, described the IFP's leadership as a 'dynasty that is crumbling' and one which 'no longer has the legs to endure this tough political race' (*Business Day* 26.04.04).

What these comments suggest, accurately in my view, is that as a party the IFP is out of touch with the times and led by a group of grumpy old men whose sell-by dates have passed. As essentially a vehicle for the political ambitions of an ageing Zulu prince and his aristocratic acolytes, the IFP is simply not suited to the requisites of a democratic era. It is locked in a time warp which essentially ended with apartheid and anyone who has tried in recent years to make the party over has found himself rapidly consigned to the wilderness (for which read South Africa's embassy in Tokyo). As Madlala noted, 'the party seems to have a particular aversion to rejuvenating itself, to adapting its profile and manner of conducting business to suit the modern times we live in' (*Business Day* 26.04.04). Consequently, as he goes on to argue, that amongst young voters in KwaZulu Natal today 'it is just not cool to be an IFP member or supporter'.

And so for the IFP the future looks grim. Its next serious crisis will develop in September when the next round of floor-crossing is due and one hardly needs to be a rocket scientist to imagine that a number of current IFP representatives, especially a pair of frustrated would-be deputy ministers, could well take a walk. Indeed looking ahead over the next five years what stands out as a very real possibility is that that vehicle of a pan-South African nationalism, the ANC, will swallow up what remains of those vehicles of the now outmoded and particularistic Afrikaner and Zulu nationalisms of yesteryear.

## We shall *never* go back to **Pharaoh**: defending democracy in the Eastern Cape

Janet Cherry, Senior Research Specialist,  
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*Cherry* explore three sets of dynamics in the E. Cape elections : the battle between the UDM and ANC for Umtata; the shift towards the DA and ID from white and coloured voters; and the stability of the urban African vote, represented by Kwazakele. Arguably the most interesting exploration is of ANC voters' stalwart support of the Party, articulated in their own words.

The 2004 election saw the ANC consolidate its enormous support in the Eastern Cape, its political heartland. Obtaining just short of 80% of the vote, the ANC's majority in the province has increased from 74% in 1999. In the provincial legislature, based in Bisho, the ANC's majority increased from 47 to 51 out of the 63 seats. The UDM, which had gained most of the 10% of the vote lost by the ANC in 1999, only just retained its position as official



opposition, with its previous nine seats decreasing to six. The DA gained one seat and ended up with five, disappointed with not having seized the opposition position from the UDM. Of the 'left opposition', only the PAC made a showing, just squeezing in with enough votes to gain the last seat in the legislature. The NNP fell off the political map in the province, gaining only 0.63% of the vote, less than both the ID and the ACDP, and resulting in long-standing NNP MPL Anne Nash losing her seat. The ID put in a brave showing, but did not gain enough votes to make it into the provincial legislature.

Three areas of interest emerged in the elections, which will be examined below: The battle between the UDM and the ANC for King Sabata Dalindyebo/KSD (Umtata); the shift towards the DA and the ID from white and coloured voters in the Western part of the province; and the stability of voting patterns in the one metropolitan area in the province, the NMMM.

### **UMTATA: THE BATTLE BETWEEN ANC AND UDM**

The shift in voting patterns in King Sabata Dalindyebo (KSD) municipal area – which includes Umtata and surrounding areas – reflects the changing fortunes of the UDM, and the ANC's concerted attempt to win back voters lost in the 1999 elections, through delivery of services and accommodation of traditional leaders. In 1999, the UDM gained 59% of the vote in KSD, with the ANC losing its majority and gaining only 37% of the vote. This UDM support base was reaffirmed in the 2000 local government elections, when UDM gained control of the KSD municipal council – the only UDM-controlled council in South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

In 2004, the ANC regained its majority, gaining 57.9% of the vote to the UDM's 39% - an almost precise reversal of positions. The only other party to gain any support was the PAC, which maintained a consistent 1.3 to 1.4% of the vote from 1999 to 2004. Voter turnout dropped, however, from 89.5% in 1999 to 70% in 2004 – indicating either disillusionment with the political strife in the area, or serious logistical problems. Given severe election disruptions due to power failures in Umtata, combined with other logistical problems such as the safe storage of ballot boxes, the lower poll can be accounted for in this way – however, the legitimacy of the elections may still be disputed by the UDM, which will again hotly contest the local government elections next year.

### **THE 'WHITE FARMING AREAS' OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE PROVINCE:**

Election results for three municipal districts in the Western part of the Eastern Cape – the old 'white farming areas' – illustrate the changing fortunes of the NNP in the Eastern Cape, and the dismal failure of its strategy of election alliance with the ANC. These districts are commercial 'white' farming areas, where white voters supported the NP/NNP in the 1994 and 1999 elections, and where black and coloured township dwellers and impoverished farm workers split their vote between the ANC and the NP in previous elections. In the Kouga district – around the town of Humansdorp – the election was hotly contested in 1999, with the NP gaining 39% of the vote to the ANC's 45%, with the UDM and DA obtaining a meagre 6.3% and 4.5% of the vote respectively. In 2004, the ANC increased its share of the vote to obtain a decisive majority of 56%, while the NNP gained a mere 2.5% of the vote. The UDM lost almost all its support – indicating that the 'moderate vote' which Roelf Meyer had brought to the party has been lost with his retirement from politics; while the ID gained nearly 5% of the vote, and the DA share rose dramatically from 4.5 to 32% of the vote.

A similar pattern can be seen in the shift in voting patterns from 1999 to 2004 in elections in the Kou-Kamma (Joubertina) and Baviaans (Willowmore) districts, similarly small towns surrounded by commercial farms. In Kou-kamma, the ANC share of the vote rose from 62% to 67%, the DA's rose from 11.5 to 16%, and the ID gained a surprising 9.5% of the vote. The NNP, by contrast, fell from 16.5% to 2% of the vote. The UDM, which had gained nearly 6% of the vote in 1999, fell to below 1%, and only the ACDP and VFP managed to get a tiny share of between 1 and 1.5% of the vote each. In Baviaans, the ANC share rose from 45% to 56%, the DA's from 4.5% to 32%, the ID gained nearly 5% of the vote while the UDM lost its 6% of the vote, and the NNP fell dramatically from 39% to 2.5%.

From analysis of these three areas, it can clearly be seen that the 'moderate' vote – from white, coloured and perhaps a handful of African voters – has moved decisively away from the NNP and has been shared between the DA and the ID. The UDM, which used to be seen as a moderate, non-racial alternative in these communities, has lost its support, which is now consolidated only in the former Transkei area – and among a small percentage of urban African voters, as is shown below.

Yet, overall, the provincial voting patterns are still much the same as in previous elections: the overwhelming majority of African people in the province continue to vote for the ANC. A detailed analysis of the township of Kwazakele, in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan municipality, confirms the extent of loyalty to the ANC among urban African voters. A post-election survey of residents of Kwazakele was conducted in the two weeks following the election, and analysis of the survey results gives an interesting indication of the beliefs and expectations and urban African voters.<sup>2</sup>

## KWAZAKELE: THE URBAN AFRICAN VOTE

Firstly, it should be noted that despite gloomy predictions of voter apathy, there was a very high level of participation, consistent with previous surveys conducted in 1994 and 1999, and amounting to a poll of over 90%. Voters were overwhelmingly enthusiastic about the process of voting, and praised the IEC for its good organisation – especially appreciated was the special vote for those who were housebound and the accommodation of elderly people by bringing them to the front of the queues. Kwazakele residents generally expressed confidence in the democratic process and their understanding of it:

*People understand democracy, they did not have a problem voting, they were certain as to what they were voting for.*

The following quote indicates just how important democracy is to ordinary people:

*I take elections very seriously because we never had this opportunity before. With regard to the electoral process itself I was satisfied because the IEC staff and the SAPS did a very good job. Also I voted because I wanted to defend majority rule in South Africa.*

Although an age profile of voters is not available, researchers were impressed by the enthusiasm of young voters, indicating that there is little truth to the notion that the youth are apathetic about politics – at least in working-class townships such as Kwazakele. This positive attitude is illustrated by an 18-year-old young man who said

*To me, voting was very exciting as it was for the very first time. I cast my vote. I left home knowing very well which party I'm going to vote for.*

Even those who had been cynical about the effectiveness of casting their vote were induced to participate by the enthusiasm of others; as one middle-aged woman voter explained:

*Initially, I told myself I'm not going to vote, for I was very angry with the ANC government. Just about past 18h00, my conscience overcame me. I saw young people returning from voting. I changed my mind. I decided to go and vote.*

It should also be noted that this voting constituency does not make a distinction between provincial and national elections, and so the provincial government system does not have a great significance for most people. One respondent who was a party agent noted that elderly people did not understand why they should mark two ballot papers, and that this caused some tension between ANC and AZAPO party agents. In addition, all those who voted indicated that they voted for the same party as in 1994 – in other words, their voting preference had not changed over three elections, and their loyalties are very strong. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of residents of Kwazakele remain loyal to the ANC, and more than 94% of those surveyed voted for it on April 14 this year – consistent with results from the IEC for the Voting Districts which cover Kwazakele. The IEC results indicate consistently that between 92% and 97% of voters in Kwazakele voted for the ANC, with the UDM gaining between 1% and 6% of the vote, and AZAPO and the PAC being the only other parties to gain over 1% of the vote in any voting district.

It is patently clear that parties such as the DA and NNP are perceived as 'old apartheid parties' or as 'non-African parties' despite their claims to non-racialism and broad support; neither they nor new parties such as the ID or the ACDP are able to make any inroads into this urban African constituency.

While cynical commentators might see this as supporting their fear of the consolidation of a dominant party state, it should be counterbalanced by the high level of political participation in communities such as Kwazakele, where the survey indicates that people participate not only by voting for their elected representatives, but many other party activities.

In addition, the overwhelming electoral support for the ANC does not indicate that people are uncritical of the ANC: the post-election survey of residents of Kwazakele indicate that while still highly politicised and critical of the ANC's economic policies, the African majority simply do not see any viable alternative to the ANC. In some cases – especially among older voters - this loyalty is based on the history of struggle:

*I have made up my mind that I'm going to vote ANC, although it has not delivered on some of its promises. I grew up in the ANC tradition, from Korsten, the whole of my life I belonged to the ANC; my family was Congress. (67-year old woman)*

*My child, it is tough, I am old now but I won't change, I'll vote ANC till I die. I vote for Tata Mandela – he sacrificed for us to get free. (73-year-old woman)*



In other cases, people continue to vote for the ANC despite their deep frustration at the high level of unemployment and the lack of delivery in some respects:

*Brother, to tell you the honest truth, I like ANC but I was not going to vote for it, I wanted to vote UDM. I'm angry for what is happening, leaders are corrupt here locally... I stay at KwaNodkwenza (hostel) – there is a lot of corruption in that place. I changed my mind to vote ANC because I was voting for it all these years. (42-year-old man)*

*I'm voting because most people are voting; I'm not satisfied with what is happening. There are no jobs. I completed my matric long ago – I could not further studies due to financial problems. Nevertheless, I voted for the popular party. (33 year old man)*

*All these years I voted ANC, so even I have voted for it. I cannot vote for another party now, for the sake of continuity the ANC must be given another chance. (28-year-old woman)*

This consistent loyalty to the ANC is also explained by the fact that despite desperately high levels of unemployment, the government has delivered something to its urban constituency, and life has changed for the better for most people in Kwazakele in the last ten years. 60% of survey respondents said their lives had changed for the better; 35% said their life was the same as before; while only 5% said that their life was worse than before 1994. When asked whether the ANC government had met their expectations since 1994, there was a similar distribution, with 62% answering yes, and 34% no. However, when asked to list the expectations met and not met, most respondents qualified their answer by giving examples of each. By far the most responses to expectations not met was the expectation of being gainfully employed, as expressed by just a few of the residents:

*There is no work – our children are educated but cannot get jobs. We do not know what is happening*

What will the people of Kwazakele do if their ANC government fails to meet their expectations in the second decade of democracy? Over 40% of respondents said that their loyalty to the ANC would not change; they would or could do nothing, they would wait for delivery and would continue to vote for the ANC – 'until they die'. 17% said they would not vote at all in the next election – disillusioned with their leaders, they could not envisage voting for anyone but the ANC. 13% said they would take some form of direct action – such as protests, petitions to government, marches etc:

*People must return to the old ways of doing things and shake up government using strikes, marches and if there is no response people must use violent means to express themselves.*

and an equal number argued that they would put their case within the structures of the ANC or the tripartite alliance:

*I will remain a loyal member of the ANC but communities must exert pressure on government to deliver on unfulfilled election promises*

*I will actively involve myself in the structures of the ANC and raise issues within it and mobilise people. There is only one thing I would not make, to leave the ANC, the only thing would be to strengthen it so that it can do what I want from it.*

A mere 6% of respondents said they would vote for another party – indicating that while Kwazakele residents do acknowledge the importance of electoral democracy, they simply do not see any viable opposition party worth voting for.

## CONCLUSION: VOTING TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY

In summary, the voting behaviour of Eastern Cape citizens has changed very little over the past ten years, and voter choice is still primarily along racial lines. In a population where 87.5% of people are black (African), we see 88% of the vote going to the ANC (79%) and the UDM (9%). The UDM is the only party which can command a meaningful minority of African voters in the province; and this support has dropped, as indicated above. No other party, with the exception of the PAC which has retained 1% of the vote, has managed to make any inroads at all among African voters. The remaining 12.5% of the provincial population – white, coloured and Indian voters – have swung from the NP (in 1994 the NP gained 6 seats in the Provincial Legislature) to the DA and to a lesser extent to the ID and ACDP.

Despite this lack of a viable opposition party, for the majority of people in the Eastern Cape, democracy continues to be taken seriously. Participating in elections is seen as essential to the consolidation of democracy, even to the defence of democracy against the possibility of reversion to authoritarian rule. Explaining his continued political activism, one 43-year-old unemployed man said:

*It's more because a black man must govern until I die. If I cannot participate, things will not be fine, we will return to where we were because some are rejoicing and want us to go back to apartheid days – that I will not allow.*

Another young man defended his decision to vote for the ANC explicitly in these terms:

*I have voted because I am a South African citizen, though we were having issues with the government delivery but we wanted to defend democracy.*

The critical loyalty to the ANC expressed by Eastern Cape voters is perhaps best summed up in the phrase used by a number of voters from Kwazakele:

*We shall never go back to Pharaoh!*

- a phrase that indicates that in the minds of the majority of African voters, there is no viable alternative to the party of liberation, the ANC, that liberated the people of the Eastern Cape from oppression.

<sup>1</sup> Election results from the IEC website and from the SABC Election Results website. Many thanks to the SABC for giving me access to these results, both during the elections, and in the past week since the IEC took the disappointing decision to remove the detailed election results from public access.

<sup>2</sup> All quotes are taken either from the HSRC survey of 100 residents of Kwazakele conducted in the two weeks following the election, or from interviews conducted on election day at Kwazakele polling stations by independent researcher Thami Mkongi.

## The *right* man for the job is a *woman*<sup>1</sup>: gender, ethnicity and factionalism in the Free State.

Daniel Pienaar, Researcher, Democracy and Governance Programme, HSRC; Ntobeko Buso, Researcher, Democracy and Governance Programme, HSRC.

*Pienaar and Buso* presents an analysis of the appointment of the Free State Premier, arguing that it was informed by attempts to neutralize factionalism within the ANC in the Province, and improve gender and ethnic representation.

The 2004 General election saw the continuation of African National Congress dominance in Free State politics. The party has retained 25 of the 30 seats in the provincial legislature, despite evidence of growing poverty in the province. By contrast, opposition parties saw a realignment of support reflecting national trends. The New National Party lost its two members in the legislature, meaning that the party now has no representation in the province where it was founded in 1912. The Democratic Alliance gained one seat (bringing its total up 3), and the Freedom Front Plus retained its single seat despite an increase in the number of people who voted for the party. The African Christian Democratic Party is the newcomer in the legislature, with one seat.

The new Premier, Frances Beatrice Marshoff, was born on 17 September, 1957 in Bloemfontein in the Free State. She grew up in the Heidedal suburb, originally reserved for coloured people under Apartheid legislation of that period. In 1975 she matriculated from the Dr Blok Secondary School with distinction. From there on she trained as a professional nurse and completed diplomas in the fields of midwifery, intensive care nursery and operating theatre nursing science. She married in 1976.

Between 1977 and 1982 she worked in Johannesburg as a professional nurse. Her time in Johannesburg also marked an intensification of her political involvement. She returned to the Free State in 1986 and took up employment at the Pelonomi Hospital near Bloemfontein. During this period she served on the executives of several trade unions, including the Health Workers Association and the South African Health and Social Services Organisation. Ms Marshoff was also a founder member of the National Health and Allied Workers Union in the province. After former President De Klerk repealed the ban against the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990, she served in Free State Health and Welfare Transitional Facilitating Organisation and in the Community Health Committee. After the 1994 elections she became a member of the National Assembly for the ANC and





was appointed to serve in several Parliamentary committees. These include the standing committees on Health, Finance and Public Accounts. By 1998, she chaired the Reconstruction and Development Portfolio Committee and the Sub-Committee on Health Financing. She also served on the following Ad Hoc Committees: Surrogate Motherhood, Termination of Pregnancy and the Equity Bill. In June 2001, she was appointed as a Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) in the Free State for Social Development<sup>2</sup>.

Prior to the 2004 elections, she found herself 37th on the ANC's provincial list, however, she was later moved to number 23<sup>3</sup>. Her appointment was unexpected as most commentators were of the opinion that it would go to Mr Mugashule, who had been passed over twice for position. Certain branches of the ANC were extremely unhappy with the decision and took the unusual step of threatening to boycott the local government elections in 2005<sup>4</sup>. Speculation had it that one the reasons that Mr Mugashule was not offered the premiership was that the Free State ANC, which he chairs, placed Deputy President Jacob Zuma a the top of its party parliamentary list and the President Mr Thabo Mbeki, fourth<sup>5</sup>.

Furthermore, the province has a history of intense 'regionalism' and interest group in-fighting within the ruling party. It is commonly held that Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, former premier of the province (from May 1994 to December 1996) and Minister of Defence has the support of interest groups located in Kroonstad and in the South of the province. The other coalition faction was purportedly based in the eastern and northern parts of the province (around the towns of Parys and Sasolburg) and led by Mr Mugashule. Perhaps in an attempt to defuse these differences, and to deflect issues away from competing 'regionalisms, Maarshof had been appointed in 2001 by the outgoing premier Mrs winkie Direko, assumed to be a Lekota ally, as Member of the Executive Committee for Social Development.

However, Ms Marshoff's appointment was also seen to be part the President's broad thrust in premiership appointments following the 2004 elections. Hereby more effective poverty alleviation and service delivery as well as increased representation of women, was considered to be important criteria for the premierships. Ms Marshoff is one of four women to assume a premiership, the others being Ms Nosima Balindela in the Eastern Cape, Ms Edna Modise in the North West and Ms Dipuo Peters in the Northern Cape<sup>6</sup>. Some also suggested that her appointment would send a message of political inclusivity to the coloured community<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Ms Beatrice Marshoff as quoted in the Volksblad, 27 April, 2005

<sup>2</sup> Profile of Ms Marshoff provided by the political desk of the Volksblad

<sup>3</sup> Volksblad, 25 November 2003; Volksblad 23 April 2004

<sup>4</sup> Volksblad, 22 April 2004

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.suntimes.co.za/2004/4/25insight/in14.asp>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.suntimes.co.za/2004/04/25politics/politics01.asp>

<sup>7</sup> Volksblad, 23 April 2004

## The socio-political implications of South Africa's 2004 election results

Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

**Landsberg** explores the socio-economic and domestic and foreign policy implications of the ANC's landslide victory. He argues that there is likely to be more continuity than change over the next five years; and that the stress will be on policy implementation rather than reformulation. Although detractors will advocate a fundamental overhaul of macro-economic policy, government will pursue certain changes; reprioritise issues; and manage tensions, within this framework. Major shifts in policy focus are likely to occur in the realms of job creation, rural development and urban renewal.

In many ways, the 2004 election results were a foregone conclusion. Many of us predicted that the governing ANC was almost certain to repeat its 65% performance, and that it would top the two-thirds mark. The ANC's two-thirds majority has several implications.

1. The ANC is a diverse movement and is unlikely to split for as long as internal differences are tolerated.
2. Differences over macro-economic policy will continue, but a leftward swing is unlikely to come about.
3. While the ANC will show a greater willingness to negotiate with its alliance partners, it is not clear whether the ANC will show the same willingness to other social partners, such as social movements.
4. Agreement and constructive relations with the labour movement and other social partners,

including social movements, is more possible than the ANC leadership may realize. 5. the ANC should have little doubt that social partners, notably labour and social movements, will be determined to hold it to the promise of a 'people's contract'.

What would all of this mean in practice? We should brace ourselves for greater tensions between government and civil society, including COSATU, and social movements like the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, and the Landless People's Movement. But while many outsiders will continue to hail South Africa's 'macro economic fundamentals', critics in the social movement quarters will continue to charge: 'sell out'/'neo liberal'.

Critics will often feel emboldened. A major problem for the ANC will be its job creation promises. In 1994, it pledged one million jobs through the RDP. In 1996, it did the same as far as GEAR is concerned, and in 2004 it did so through undertaking to implement a massive public works programme; yet this will remain its Achilles heel. Social movements and opposition parties will increasingly smell blood over the joblessness and unemployment issue. Government will make reference to, and invoke the RDP, if for no other reason than to placate critics, notably those on the left.

Another source of tension will be that, whilst, the ANC will increasingly interpret its overwhelming victory as an affirmation of its policies; critics will insist that its commitment to a 'peoples contract' demand a reformulation of policies.

We can anticipate continuity and change in government's macro economic framework. It will remain constant in the sense that the free market dictates: the quest for FDI; and consolidating a climate friendly to business growth. Government will also continue to emphasise its policy of privatization of non-essential enterprises, while COSATU and others will demand that it departs from such an approach. The change will come in that government is likely to stress stronger public spending, greater co-operation between it and the private sector to address poverty, inequality, and social delivery; a greater role for government in skills development; a push for empowerment; making finances available for empowerment; the Job and Growth Summit; mass accumulation as opposed to accumulation by small pockets of elites; making products available to the masses; and the development of small and medium enterprises. According to Joel Netshitenzhe, we are in the post-GEAR phase in that the state will play a more direct role in pushing for the economy to respond to the needs of the poor, the unbanked and unemployed. Thus, the Mbeki-government will continue to stress the Third Way philosophy: market-led growth, but a more distributive government.

The economy, and broadening of the economy, will receive greater emphasis. Government will stress skills development, and make participation of workers in Sector Education Training Authorities (SETAS) compulsory. It will advocate higher rates of domestic and foreign investment in key sectors. The automobile industry, tourism, information technology and communications, and construction will be key investment areas. People's contract will mean things like 'banking the unbanked', producing more affordable products like cars, making the tourism sector more affordable and accessible to black communities, outsourcing more to black enterprises. Government will hold companies more accountable to empowerment commitments. Expanded public works with direct job creation spin-offs will receive added attention. Broad based Black Economic Empowerment will remain a vehicle to address economic inequality. This will include Employment Equity, for Blacks, Coloureds and Indians, as well as women and the physically disabled to enjoy a greater share of the employment opportunities in the country in order to address decades of discrimination.

COSATU, and its key civil society partners will adopt a different attitude. COSATU has already given notice that it expects a rethink of government's state asset policy; and we have seen tensions with government over this issue. COSATU released a statement soon after the election that it expects government to terminate its policy of privatization, and government declared that this was premature. While government said a rethink of the policy was on the cards, it warned that this does not mean that privatization is over. While economists and merchant bankers expect a recommitment to privatization, COSATU and other social movements expect government to bring the policy to an abrupt halt. COSATU and its social movement partners will continue to blame joblessness and unemployment on such policies. These are the kinds of tensions we are going to see between government and its social partners.

COSATU will remain the biggest civil society organisation with significant political and economic influence. A serious challenge for business is that COSATU will continue to stress the need for protection of jobs while fighting what is seen as capitalist globalisation. Workers will persist in looking to COSATU and labour federations for job protection. COSATU will continue to fight on the issues of unemployment and inequality. Strikes will be contained, but occasionally erupt. Tensions over dissent will persist as COSATU argues for the right to protest. Rhetorically there will be lots of emphasis on unity within the ranks of the tripartite alliance; but in reality tensions will endure.



In order to address these problems, South Africa urgently requires policy for a, to facilitate participatory commitments by government, the private sector, labour, social movements and organisations of civil society.

### **MORE CONTINUITY, LESS CHANGE**

In the main, there will be continuity with the first five years of the Mbeki presidency, with limited but significant shifts. A dominant theme will be that policies are good and plentiful, and the challenge is that of implementation. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Mbeki government will again stress service delivery, transformation, economic empowerment of blacks, and vigorously pursue the 'African Renaissance' discourse and programmes.

While policy will stress that civil society organisations should become partners with government, ambivalence will continue from both sides. Another shift will be the emphasis on increased sensitivity to the needs of ordinary citizens. The President will continue to emphasize enhancing the capacity of the public service to deliver more effectively to learners, pensioners, the old and the sick.

Another new focus is likely to be on rural development and urban renewal, coupled with fighting crime and corruption.

### **FOREIGN POLICY**

In terms of foreign policy, we can expect more continuity than change. During his state of the nation address in February this year, and again in his victory speech, Mbeki said the emphasis would fall on implementation. As with domestic policy, there is the assumption that foreign policies are correct; and that the problem lies with adequate implementation.

Southern Africa in particular and Africa in general, will remain the country's foreign policy priorities. Southern Africa and Africa policies and strategies will continue to stress political, economic and trade partnerships, not dominant relations, and Pretoria will continue to reject the idea that South Africa is a regional 'superpower' or hegemon. It will continue to see itself as a regional ally and partner of southern African states.

## **South Africa's foreign policy after the 2004 general election: towards a better life for all?**

Candice Moore, Researcher, Centre for Policy Studies

*Moore argues that foreign policy priorities will mirror domestic concerns: just as the government intends to focus on domestic policy implementation over the next five years; so too will it focus on main areas of foreign policy implementation, especially regional and continental policy regimes. And, as the domestic focus shifts from political liberation to social and economic empowerment, so too will economic and social development of the region and the continent, top SA's foreign policy agenda.*

In delineating the course of the foreign policy of the Mbeki administration for the next five years, three themes become overwhelmingly apparent, namely: 1) That the time has come for political liberation to be underlined with economic and social liberation; 2) That South Africa's foreign policy will be called upon increasingly to reinforce domestic imperatives; and 3) That the implementation of policies, whether in the form of NEPAD, or the various protocols agreed to at regional level, must now proceed apace. As contended by Yul Derek Davids in the previous edition of electionsynopsis, this third democratic election saw a greater focus on the delivery of socio-economic goods. Political liberation, painstakingly carved out in the first ten years of freedom within the country, must be underscored by economic and social liberation on a larger scale in the years to come, as unemployment and crime topped the list of voters' concerns prior to the April 14 election. The delivery of socio-economic goods will bestow legitimacy on the liberators, both those at home and in Africa at large. The inception phase of programmes such as NEPAD (projected to be five years, encompassing the two phases 'Visioning and Development of Policy Framework' and 'Preparing for Programme Implementation'; and the beginning of a third, 'Programme Implementation'<sup>1</sup>) and the creation of the African Union must be followed up with the actions required to finance development and social regeneration. In terms of the priority list drawn up by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) at Abuja in November 2002, these actions should include, amongst others in the socio-economic field: co-ordinating a common African position

on market access at the WTO, strengthening and rationalising RECs, the implementation of transboundary infrastructure projects, and implementing the health and education declarations agreed to at Abuja and Dakar, respectively<sup>2</sup>. While the world has not yet been won over comprehensively by the new doctrine of African responsibility for African problems, albeit within a framework of international assistance, the time for preaching this doctrine is over and the time for action has arrived; a time when 'what is' should be better focused to bring about, 'what ought to be'.

The ANC Manifesto for the 2004 Election, in spelling out the modalities of 'a people's contract to create work and fight poverty', has upped the rhetorical ante of 'a better life for all', the theme of the 1999 campaign. The ruling party's foreign policy pronouncements are included in this rubric<sup>3</sup>, as implementation and delivery become central themes of foreign policy. According to the Manifesto, the practical steps highlighted to achieve the ANC's goals of consolidating peace, security and development in southern Africa, Africa, the Global South and worldwide are as follows:

- Speeding up economic integration in southern Africa; strengthening democracy, peace, stability, economic growth and development, with Zimbabwe (facilitation of dialogue); DRC (safeguarding the tenuous peace, especially in view of the pending cessation of the MONUC mandate in July 2004); Angola (post-conflict reconstruction) and Swaziland (supporting democracy) as priority areas.
- Realisation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and NEPAD
- Improvement of co-operation among countries of the South
- Strengthening of economic and other relations with industrialised countries, including inward investment and tourism, trade and transfer of skills and technology
- Democratisation of international institutions, such as UN, IMF, World Bank; and ensuring that the development and environmental goals of humanity are pursued and met.

Concomitant with these goals is the evident commitment to popularising the AU and NEPAD and improving public education on continental institutions and programmes<sup>4</sup>. There are, however, certain contradictions and conflicts inherent to the concepts of both 'a people's contract' and 'a better life for all', when applied to South Africa as one component of the wider African continent, as what is good for South Africa may not always be good for Africa. Competition for foreign investment is one case in point. The trend of greater expectation following political liberation should, however, ideally span the continent, as statements of African political independence are followed up with plans to accelerate development progress on the continent. Trade, aid and debt relief should be the voluble refrain of African development activists, in civil society and in government. The concepts of 'A Better Life for All' and the 'People's Contract' should traverse the continent and spur leaders into action.

President Thabo Mbeki, the visible champion of African issues abroad, has spearheaded the ANC's 'People's Contract' electoral campaign in the 2004 General Election. While much has been made of the fabled social contract of Hobbes, Rousseau and others, little attempt has been made to clarify the terms of this contract, both within South Africa's domestic arena and in the wider international society of African states. Domestically, the great economic divide that has spawned Mbeki's 'two nations within one country' complicates the notion of a social contract because immediate questions of security may bear different connotations for black and white, rich and poor. While the ANC manifesto refers to its concept as a 'people's contract', it bears many of the hallmarks of the social contract idea. These include: government as protector of rights and citizens as claimants of rights; and, government as provider of security which renders the industry of citizens possible. However, with regard to the latter, the industry of some citizens (business) may harm the wellbeing of others (labour) and this is the dilemma that the government continues to face in the tightrope it walks between business and labour; and labour and the unemployed, among others. Hence the 'People's Contract' is far from being an unproblematic notion.

Following the author's jointly-written piece with Landsberg and Mackay in the second edition of *electionsynopsis*, the ANC's resounding victory in the April 14 election will serve to sanction existing policies, even if only by default. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the delicate question of Zimbabwe will be approached differently. Further, the imperatives of South African foreign policy will remain unchanged. These continue to hinge on the pursuit of the domestic goals of development and transformation, as 'the primary objective of the South African government is to develop a better life for all citizens by generating wealth and providing security. South Africa's foreign policy objectives are therefore essentially an outward projection of the country's domestic imperatives'<sup>5</sup>. But the practice of foreign policy may begin to be informed by a greater urgency to provide the macroeconomic environment that can offer employment and create opportunities to learn skills for many more South Africans. A call was made in a national newspaper some weeks prior to the elections for greater constructive partnership with the 'movers' in the Global South, particularly China and India; as opposed to the 'deadweight's' of Haiti and Zimbabwe - China as a burgeoning market for South African industrial raw materials such as iron and steel; and India as a development partner able to share experience and guidance. Strengthening the South-South alliance will be an important objective of the next five years of the Mbeki administration. In some small ways, inroads have already been made in this regard. As noted by Trade and Industry Minister Alec Irwin upon the disintegration of the Cancun trade talks in September 2003, this was the first time that developing countries had converged around well-articulated positions, rather than ideology, marking at least one point of optimism in an otherwise unsuccessful meeting. South Africa's membership of the Group of 20+ along with states such as China,



Brazil and Nigeria, bestows upon it a global mantle of development responsibility through the further aggregation and articulation of positions on international trade among the states of global south and the strengthening of trade infrastructure with other developing countries.

It is important to note the wider currents within which the stream of South African foreign policy runs: A world trading order that, in spite of recent improvements in world trade figures, remains under threat from the protectionist policies of certain industrialised countries; and, another current, the pervasive threat of international terrorism. The threat of terror attacks has been a double-edged sword in Africa. It has been a scourge for those African states which have suffered terror attacks on their soil, such as Tanzania and Kenya. However, the heightened interest in creating a safer world through social justice is also a dividend of this threat, and may result in concerted effort in the North to end global poverty<sup>6</sup>. The lengthy delay in the UN Security Council's decision whether or not to become involved in Burundi by assuming the expenses attached to peacekeeping in the unstable country, is a remnant of the 1990s reticence of the Big Five to become involved in 'local' African conflicts. This issue has become more heated recently because of the large sums of money earmarked for international peacekeeping in the South African budget; and the number of South Africans killed in action, a figure that recently increased by six, owing to the deaths of six servicemen in the DRC, at Lake Kivu.

While the broad trends of ANC foreign policy are ruminated upon, the narrower significance of trouble-free elections cannot, of course, be underestimated. South Africa is an international icon of the triumph of human rights, and just as Rwanda commemorates 10 years since the genocide that claimed up to a million lives, South Africa celebrates 10 years of democracy in 2004. Although it is South Africa's third legislative election, there is no less significance for national and regional stability. In addition, the success of NEPAD in terms of fund-raising for development depends as much, if not more, on free and fair elections in South Africa, as anywhere else on the continent. While sufficient amounts of moral currency may be derived from the fact that the UN, EU and Commonwealth all declined to send electoral observers to South Africa for its third democratic election, it has, correctly, not been Mbeki's style to capitalise on this. The power of example will stand him in good stead, however, as one of the initial expanded group of Peer Review volunteers.

As far as the modalities of the conduct of foreign policy are concerned, there is little reason to think that President Mbeki will not continue his brand of 'personal' foreign policy. By this is meant the President's often-criticised personal involvements in continental crises and NEPAD campaigning in the West. After all, as we are reminded by the South African Yearbook, 2004 (published by the Government Communication and Information Service, GCIS), 'the President is ultimately responsible for the foreign policy and international relations of South Africa', in accordance with the Constitution. The application of the 'people's contract' principle to foreign policy should not be overlooked, however. Notwithstanding the 'unwritten principle' that the public is not sufficiently informed or interested to hold an opinion on foreign policy, this debate has not been sufficiently engaged in the government's foreign policy circles. The lack of direct public participation (through seminars, polls and even referendums, for example) and the incapacity of Parliament in this regard, due to its domestic focus and the greater technical expertise availed to the President's Office, has left foreign policy firmly ensconced in the Union Buildings<sup>7</sup>. The continuity of personnel within the Department of Foreign Affairs in the aftermath of the election appears to be of negligible importance given the centrality of the President to foreign policymaking. A personnel change in another Department, however, that of Home Affairs, facilitated by the ANC's overwhelming election victory, may expedite matters relating to the free movement of people in the region.

South Africa must negotiate the delicate balance between supporting the ideals of Pan Africanism and reaching out to the African diaspora on the one hand; and the defence of principles that do not have an ethnic or racial basis, the principles of democracy and human rights. The perceived overstepping of this balance fuelled the controversy over President Mbeki's visit to Haiti to celebrate the bicentenary of the Haitian revolution against France. In its most recent five-yearly national conference, held at Stellenbosch in 2002, the ANC underlined its commitment to the harnessing of the economic, political and intellectual power of the African Diaspora. More recently, President Mbeki has outlined, in his bi-weekly column on the ANC website, 'Letter from the President', four priority areas of ANC foreign policy, and the Diaspora features among them. The other three complete the concentric circle of South Africa's foreign policy focus: the African continent, the North, and the Rest of the World, through multilateral and international forums<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> NEPAD Annual Report 2002: Towards Claiming the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Resolutions adopted by the 51<sup>st</sup> National Conference of the ANC, on-line document. Accessed on 18 April 2004, at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference51/resolutions.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> South Africa Yearbook 2002/03. Government Communications and Information System (GCIS), Pretoria.

<sup>6</sup> British Development Secretary, Hilary Benn, commenting on Britain's efforts to assist Africa in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The Star, Thursday 22 April, 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Philip Nel and Jo-Ansie van Wyk. 2003. 'Foreign policy making in South Africa: from public participation to democratic participation'. Politeia. Vol. 22 No.3. pp 49-71

<sup>8</sup> International Work Advances the Interests of Our People, ANC Today, Volume 4 No. 4, 30 January – 5 February 2004. On-line document, accessed at: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2004/at04.htm>.

## NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: RESULTS AND RECORD OF PARTIES STANDING IN 2004

Party	Election	Total		Eastern Cape		Free State		Gauteng	
		Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	88,104	0.45	10,879	0.38	4,523	0.33	20,329	0.48
	1999	228,975	1.43	24,344	1.11	10,031	0.92	43,359	1.17
	2004	250,272	1.60	17,682	0.78	13,488	1.32	56,520	1.61
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	1994	12,237,655	62.65	2,411,695	84.39	1,059,313	77.42	2,486,938	59.10
	1999	10,601,330	66.35	1,617,329	73.91	887,091	81.03	2,527,676	68.16
	2004	10,878,251	69.68	1,806,221	79.31	838,583	82.05	2,408,821	68.74
AZANIAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	27,257	0.17	2,743	0.13	1,919	0.18	5,293	0.14
	2004	41,776	0.27	3,784	0.17	3,450	0.34	7,930	0.23
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	17,619	0.11	1,228	0.05	665	0.07	5,663	0.16
DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	338,426	1.73	35,435	1.24	7,365	0.54	126,368	3.00
	1999	1,527,337	9.56	139,520	6.38	64,262	5.87	655,883	17.69
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	1994	1,931,201	12.37	165,135	7.25	90,609	8.87	712,395	20.33
	2004	1,931,201	12.37	165,135	7.25	90,609	8.87	712,395	20.33
INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	269,765	1.73	19,203	0.84	6,259	0.61	60,501	1.73
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY	1994	2,058,294	10.54	6,798	0.24	8,446	0.62	173,903	4.13
	1999	1,371,477	8.58	6,511	0.30	4,938	0.45	131,296	3.54
	2004	1,088,664	6.97	4,712	0.21	4,352	0.43	92,556	2.64
THE KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND SIMPLE PARTY	1994	5,916	0.03	900	0.03	403	0.03	1,107	0.03
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND SIMPLE	1994	6,514	0.04	557	0.02	294	0.03	1,154	0.03
	2004	6,514	0.04	557	0.02	294	0.03	1,154	0.03
MINORITY FRONT	1994	13,433	0.07	981	0.03	490	0.04	1,575	0.04
	1999	48,277	0.30	750	0.03	351	0.03	1,271	0.03
	2004	55,267	0.35	420	0.02	182	0.02	1,692	0.05
NASIONALE AKSIE	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	15,804	0.10	1,361	0.06	1,071	0.10	4,153	0.12
NEW LABOUR PARTY	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	13,318	0.09	523	0.02	240	0.02	475	0.01
NATIONAL PARTY	1994	3,983,690	20.39	302,951	10.60	198,780	14.53	1,160,593	27.58
	1999	1,098,215	6.87	72,639	3.32	54,769	5.00	142,749	3.85
NEW NATIONAL PARTY	1994	257,824	1.65	14,421	0.63	8,380	0.82	25,842	0.74
	2004	257,824	1.65	14,421	0.63	8,380	0.82	25,842	0.74
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA	1994	243,478	1.25	56,891	1.99	23,310	1.70	52,557	1.25
	1999	113,125	0.71	21,978	1.00	11,300	1.03	25,412	0.69
	2004	113,512	0.73	22,314	0.98	13,277	1.30	28,524	0.81
PEACE AND JUSTICE CONGRESS	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	15,187	0.10	1,542	0.07	568	0.06	3,100	0.09
THE EMPLOYMENT MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	10,446	0.07	1,647	0.07	732	0.07	1,029	0.03
THE ORGANISATION PARTY	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	7,531	0.05	910	0.04	458	0.04	1,186	0.03
THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF AZANIA	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	9,062	0.06	741	0.03	838	0.08	1,718	0.05
	2004	14,853	0.10	2,584	0.11	1,129	0.11	2,534	0.07
UNITED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	125,280	0.78	2,528	0.12	8,019	0.73	7,619	0.21
	2004	117,792	0.75	2,603	0.11	6,730	0.66	8,964	0.26
UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	546,790	3.42	281,748	12.88	18,073	1.65	79,627	2.15
	2004	355,717	2.28	202,964	8.91	9,785	0.96	35,499	1.01
UNITED FRONT	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	2004	11,889	0.08	1,092	0.05	685	0.07	3,855	0.11
VRYHEIDFRONT/FREEDOM FRONT	1994	424,555	2.17	18,656	0.65	50,386	3.68	154,878	3.68
	1999	127,217	0.80	6,822	0.31	19,210	1.75	40,782	1.10
	2004	139,465	0.89	6,488	0.28	21,107	2.07	42,000	1.20
TOTAL VALID BALLOTS	1994	19,533,498		2,857,710		1,368,251		4,208,301	
	1999	15,977,142		2,188,184		1,094,776		3,708,318	
	2004	15,612,667		2,277,391		1,022,044		3,504,363	
SPOILT BALLOTS	1994	193,112	0.98	17,432	0.61	14,748	1.07	29,632	0.70
	1999	251,320	1.55	34,210	1.54	20,550	1.84	40,509	1.08
	2004	250,887	1.58	32,835	1.42	20,076	1.93	48,735	1.37
TOTAL BALLOTS	1994	19,726,610		2,875,142		1,382,999		4,237,933	
	1999	16,228,462		2,222,394		1,115,326		3,748,827	
	2004	15,863,554		2,310,226		1,042,120		3,553,098	
REGISTERED VOTERS	1994	22,709,152		3,176,970		1,636,581		4,862,117	
	1999	18,172,751		2,454,543		1,225,730		4,154,087	
	2004	20,674,926		2,849,486		1,321,195		4,650,594	
PERCENTAGE POLL	1994		86.87		90.50		84.51		87.16
	1999		89.30		90.54		90.99		90.24
	2004		76.73		81.08		78.88		76.40

**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: RESULTS AND RECORD OF PARTIES STANDING IN 2004 (cont)**

KwaZulu-Natal		Limpopo		Mpumalanga		North West		Northern Cape		Western Cape	
Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
17,122	0.46	5,042	0.26	4,474	0.34	3,901	0.25	1,294	0.32	20,540	0.97
53,799	1.82	18,151	1.09	12,415	1.10	11,774	0.90	5,295	1.61	49,807	3.11
49,823	1.80	20,340	1.23	11,321	1.00	14,503	1.10	5,982	1.85	60,613	3.78
1,185,669	31.61	1,780,177	92.73	1,072,518	81.87	1,325,559	83.46	201,515	49.80	714,271	33.60
1,176,926	39.77	1,483,199	89.30	962,260	85.26	1,052,895	80.53	211,206	64.40	682,748	42.62
1,312,767	47.47	1,487,168	89.72	979,155	86.34	1,083,254	81.83	222,205	68.75	740,077	46.11
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
4,525	0.15	8,121	0.49	1,059	0.09	1,426	0.11	1,237	0.38	934	0.06
6,562	0.24	8,603	0.52	2,149	0.19	3,624	0.27	1,582	0.49	4,092	0.25
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
4,562	0.16	1,020	0.06	662	0.06	927	0.07	202	0.06	2,720	0.17
60,499	1.61	3,402	0.18	5,492	0.42	5,826	0.37	5,235	1.29	88,804	4.18
288,738	9.76	28,116	1.69	56,114	4.97	48,665	3.72	18,952	5.78	227,087	14.18
276,429	10.00	63,236	3.81	81,313	7.17	72,444	5.47	37,533	11.61	432,107	26.92
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
20,656	0.75	3,204	0.19	3,927	0.35	6,645	0.50	21,379	6.61	127,991	7.97
1,822,385	48.59	2,938	0.15	20,872	1.59	7,155	0.45	1,902	0.47	13,895	0.65
1,196,955	40.45	5,389	0.32	15,868	1.41	5,929	0.45	1,448	0.44	3,143	0.20
964,101	34.87	2,923	0.18	11,730	1.03	3,827	0.29	709	0.22	3,754	0.23
1,010	0.03	365	0.02	415	0.03	548	0.03	293	0.07	875	0.04
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,197	0.08	515	0.03	263	0.02	349	0.03	195	0.06	990	0.06
6,410	0.17	662	0.03	503	0.04	772	0.05	494	0.12	1,546	0.07
43,026	1.45	653	0.04	401	0.04	362	0.03	182	0.06	1,281	0.08
51,339	1.86	405	0.02	298	0.03	271	0.02	87	0.03	573	0.04
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,391	0.09	1,967	0.12	740	0.07	1,194	0.09	333	0.10	2,594	0.16
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
1,013	0.04	445	0.03	263	0.02	297	0.02	196	0.06	9,866	0.61
591,212	15.76	69,870	3.64	134,511	10.27	160,479	10.10	169,661	41.94	1,195,633	56.24
117,107	3.96	28,559	1.72	26,779	2.37	31,072	2.38	73,766	22.49	550,775	34.38
16,145	0.58	7,865	0.47	4,878	0.43	5,687	0.43	23,130	7.16	151,476	9.44
23,098	0.62	20,295	1.06	17,800	1.36	24,233	1.53	3,941	0.97	21,353	1.00
8,414	0.28	20,070	1.21	6,929	0.61	8,878	0.68	2,083	0.64	8,061	0.50
5,712	0.21	15,776	0.95	8,675	0.76	10,428	0.79	1,384	0.43	7,422	0.46
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,792	0.10	1,229	0.07	606	0.05	719	0.05	291	0.09	4,340	0.27
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,400	0.09	1,311	0.08	719	0.06	1,158	0.09	282	0.09	1,168	0.07
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,112	0.08	862	0.05	411	0.04	595	0.04	174	0.05	823	0.05
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,658	0.09	1,285	0.08	516	0.05	750	0.06	167	0.05	389	0.02
4,110	0.15	1,313	0.08	1,056	0.09	1,307	0.10	214	0.07	606	0.04
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
2,671	0.09	1,684	0.10	2,393	0.21	97,755	7.48	830	0.25	1,781	0.11
4,235	0.15	2,375	0.14	1,795	0.16	86,476	6.53	994	0.31	3,620	0.23
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
38,080	1.29	42,643	2.57	15,807	1.40	18,574	1.42	3,092	0.94	49,146	3.07
23,099	0.84	27,512	1.66	11,480	1.01	14,274	1.08	1,346	0.42	29,758	1.85
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
3,334	0.12	872	0.05	626	0.06	753	0.06	156	0.05	516	0.03
17,092	0.46	29,000	1.51	45,964	3.51	49,175	3.10	17,480	4.32	41,924	1.97
6,044	0.20	8,835	0.53	14,687	1.30	15,106	1.16	5,229	1.59	10,502	0.66
9,424	0.34	8,655	0.52	12,025	1.06	15,029	1.14	4,827	1.49	19,910	1.24
3,750,606		1,919,790		1,309,993		1,588,255		404,579		2,126,013	
2,958,963		1,660,849		1,128,648		1,307,532		327,950		1,601,922	
2,765,203		1,657,596		1,134,092		1,323,761		323,201		1,605,016	
46,407	1.22	17,964	0.93	16,614	1.25	19,822	1.23	4,663	1.14	25,830	1.20
52,769	1.75	30,760	1.82	24,712	2.14	26,326	1.97	7,227	2.16	14,257	0.88
42,682	1.52	29,161	1.73	23,871	2.06	30,202	2.23	6,506	1.97	16,819	1.04
3,797,013		1,937,754		1,326,607		1,608,077		409,242		2,151,843	
3,011,732		1,691,609		1,153,360		1,333,858		335,177		1,616,179	
2,807,885		1,686,757		1,157,963		1,353,963		329,707		1,621,835	
4,585,091		2,287,105		1,552,775		1,763,445		439,149		2,405,919	
3,443,978		1,847,766		1,277,783		1,527,672		377,173		1,864,019	
3,819,864		2,187,912		1,442,472		1,749,529		433,591		2,220,283	
	82.81		84.73		85.43		91.19		93.18		89.44
	87.45		91.55		90.26		87.31		88.87		86.70
	73.51		77.09		80.28		77.39		76.04		73.05

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SEATS WON BY PARTY 1994 - 2004													
PROVINCE	ELECTION	ACDP		ANC		DA		FA		ID		IFP	
		Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
EASTERN CAPE	1994	0	0	48	85.71	1	1.78	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	0	0	47	74.60	4	6.35	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	0	0	51	80.95	5	7.93	-	-	0	0	0	0
FREE STATE	1994	0	0	24	80.00	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	0	0	25	83.33	2	6.67	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	1	3.33	25	83.33	3	10.00	-	-	0	0	0	0
GAUTENG	1994	1	1.16	50	58.14	5	5.81	-	-	-	-	3	3.49
	1999	1	1.37	50	68.49	13	17.81	1	1.37	-	-	3	4.11
	2004	1	1.37	51	69.86	15	20.55	-	-	1	1.37	2	2.74
KWA-ZULU NATAL	1994	1	1.23	26	32.10	2	2.47	-	-	-	-	41	50.62
	1999	1	1.25	32	40.00	7	8.75	0	0	-	-	34	42.50
	2004	2	2.50	38	47.50	7	8.75	-	-	0	0	30	37.50
LIMPOPO	1994	0	0	38	95.00	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	1	2.04	44	89.80	1	2.04	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	1	2.04	45	91.84	2	4.08	-	-	0	0	0	0
MPUMALANGA	1994	0	0	25	83.33	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	0	0	26	86.67	1	3.33	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	0	0	27	90.00	2	6.67	-	-	0	0	0	0
NORTH WEST	1994	0	0	26	86.67	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	0	0	27	81.82	1	3.03	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	0	0	27	81.82	2	6.06	-	-	0	0	0	0
NORTHERN CAPE	1994	0	0	15	50.00	1	3.33	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	0	0	20	66.67	1	3.33	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	1	3.33	21	70.00	3	10.00	-	-	2	6.67	0	0
WESTERN CAPE	1994	1	2.38	14	33.33	3	7.14	-	-	-	-	0	0
	1999	1	2.38	18	42.86	5	11.90	0	0	-	-	0	0
	2004	2	4.76	19	45.24	12	28.57	-	-	3	7.14	0	0
TOTAL	1994	3	0.70	266	62.59	12	2.82	-	-	-	-	44	10.35
	1999	4	0.93	289	67.21	35	8.14	1	0.23	-	-	37	8.60
	2004	8	1.86	304	70.70	51	11.86	-	-	6	1.39	32	7.44

VOTING FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ALL PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES: 1994, 1999 AND 2004									
Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Total Votes Cast for:		Difference	Total Votes Cast for:		Difference	Total Votes Cast for:		Difference
	National Assembly	All Provincial Legislatures		National Assembly	All Provincial Legislatures		National Assembly	All Provincial Legislatures	
Total valid ballots	19,533,498	19,485,730	47,768	15,977,142	15,903,753	73,389	15,612,667	15,303,142	309,525
Spoilt ballots (number0)	193,112	147,841	45,271	251,320	221,153	30,167	250,887	213,081	37,806
Spoilt ballots (%)	0.98	0.75	(0.23)	1.55	1.37	(0.18)	1.58	1.37	(0.21)
Total ballots	19,726,610	19,633,571	93,039	16,228,462	16,124,906	103,556	15,863,544	15,515,223	348,321
Registered voters	22,709,152	22,709,152	-	18,172,751	18,172,751	-	20,674,926	20,674,926	-
Percentage poll	86.87	86.46	0.41	89.30	88.73	0.57	76.73	75.04	1.69

## NOTES

With the exception of the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga in 1994, in each election, in each province, the total number of votes cast in the NA election has exceeded the total number cast in the PL elections together.

With the exception of Gauteng in 1999, in each election, in each province, the proportion of ballots that have been spoilt has been greater in the NA election than in the PL elections taken together.



PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SEATS WON BY PARTY 1994 – 2004 (cont)															
IFP		MF		NNP		PAC		UCDP		UDM		VF/FF		Total Seats	
Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%		
0	0	—	—	6	10.71	1	1.78	—	—	—	—	0	0	56	
0	0	—	—	2	3.17	1	1.59	—	—	9	14.29	0	0	63	
0	0	—	—	0	0	1	1.59	0	0	6	9.52	0	0	63	
0	0	—	—	4	13.33	0	0	—	—	—	—	2	6.67	30	
0	0	—	—	2	6.67	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.33	30	
3	3.49	—	—	21	24.42	1	1.16	—	—	—	—	5	5.81	86	
3	4.11	—	—	3	4.11	0	0	0	0	1	1.37	1	1.37	73	
2	2.74	—	—	0	0	1	1.37	0	0	1	1.37	1	1.37	73	
41	50.62	1	1.23	9	11.11	1	1.23	—	—	—	—	0	0	81	
34	42.50	2	2.50	3	3.75	0	0	—	—	1	1.25	0	0	80	
30	37.50	2	2.50	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.25	0	0	80	
0	0	—	—	1	2.50	0	0	—	—	—	—	1	2.50	40	
0	0	—	—	1	2.04	1	2.04	—	—	1	2.04	0	0	49	
0	0	—	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2.04	0	0	49	
0	0	—	—	3	10.00	0	0	—	—	—	—	2	6.67	30	
0	0	—	—	1	3.33	0	0	0	0	1	3.33	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	3	10.00	0	0	—	—	—	—	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	1	3.03	0	0	3	9.09	0	0	1	3.03	33	
0	0	—	—	0	0	0	0	3	9.09	0	0	1	3.03	33	
0	0	—	—	12	40.00	0	0	—	—	—	—	2	6.67	30	
0	0	—	—	8	26.67	0	0	—	—	0	0	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	2	6.67	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.33	30	
0	0	—	—	23	54.76	0	0	—	—	—	—	1	2.38	42	
0	0	—	—	17	40.48	0	0	—	—	1	2.38	0	0	42	
0	0	—	—	5	11.90	0	0	0	0	1	2.38	0	0	42	
44	10.35	1	0.24	82	19.29	3	0.70	—	—	—	—	14	3.29	425	
37	8.60	2	0.46	38	8.84	2	0.46	3	0.70	14	3.25	5	1.16	430	
32	7.44	2	0.46	7	1.63	2	0.46	3	0.70	10	2.32	5	1.16	430	

Are the discrepancies between the NA and PL vote in 1999 and 2004 attributable to the regulations that allow people to vote outside the voting district in which they are registered? A voter away from home on polling day may cast a vote only for the NA if they are voting in another province, but may also vote in the PL election for their home province if they are voting within the province. It is usually assumed that a proportion of people voting away from home will be voting outside their home province and, thus, the number of NA special votes will exceed the number of PL special votes.

In 2004, this was the case, on aggregate: there were 6,176 more NA special votes than PL special votes. However, in four of the nine provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Western Cape), the number of PL special votes was greater than the number of NA special votes. Nationally, the total number of NA votes exceeded the number of total PL votes by almost 350,000. In this context, the difference in special votes is insignificant.

In each of the three elections, when voters have entered a polling station, they have been able to vote in both the NA and PL election. Why is it that more people have voted for the national parliament than for their provincial parliament?

## NUMBER OF PARTIES CONTESTING DIFFERENT LEGISLATURES

	1994	1999	2004
1 National Assembly	19	16	21
1.1 Standing for National Assembly only	4	1	4
1.2 Standing for National Assembly and some Provincial Legislatures	7	5	7
1.3 Standing for National Assembly and <b>all nine</b> Provincial Legislatures	8	10	10
2 Standing for Provincial Legislatures only	8	10	16
Total of Parties Standing	27	26	37

## ANALYSIS OF PARTIES CONTESTING PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES 1994 - 2004

Parties	E. CAPE			FREE STATE			GAUTENG			KZN		
	94	99	04	94	99	04	94	99	04	94	99	04
<b>1. NA Parties</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>
a Standing for NA and all Provincial Legislatures	8	10	10	8	10	10	8	10	10	8	10	10
b Standing for NA and several Provincial Legislatures	-	-	3	1	2	2	3	3	5	1	2	3
c Standing for NA and only one Provincial Legislature only	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1
<b>2 Provincial parties</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
a Standing for several Provincial Legislatures	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
b Standing for only one Provincial Legislature only	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	3	-	1	3
<b>Total non-grand slam parties</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>

## THE "GRAND-SLAM PARTIES": (1.3) CONTESTING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND ALL NINE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

1994	1999	2004
African Christian Democratic Party	African Christian Democratic Party	African Christian Democratic Party
African Democratic Movement	<i>Did not stand at all</i>	<i>Not standing at all-</i>
African National Congress	African National Congress	African National Congress
<i>Did not stand at all</i>	<i>Stood for NA and 5 PLs</i>	Azanian People's Organisation
-	Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	<i>As Nasionale Aksie*is fighting NA and 6 PLs</i>
Democratic Party	Democratic Party	Democratic Alliance
<i>-The Federal Party fought the NA and one Province – were they the same?</i>	Federal Alliance	<i>Not standing at all-</i>
<i>Did not stand at all</i>	<i>Did not stand at all</i>	Independent Democrats
Inkatha Freedom Party	Inkatha Freedom Party	<i>Standing in 8 provinces. Has pact on 9<sup>th</sup>.l</i>
National Party	New National Party	New National Party
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
<i>Did not stand at all</i>	<i>Stood for NA and three PLS</i>	United Christian Democratic Party
<i>Did not stand at all</i>	United Democratic Movement	United Democratic Movement
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	Vreiheidsfront/Freedom Front Plus
8	10	10

Do any of the newcomers, or any of the smaller parties that have fought before have a chance of grabbing a seat and saving their deposit in the NA or PL elections? Will they have a still small voice in the deliberations of these forums?

### ANALYSIS OF PARTIES CONTESTING PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES 1994 – 2004 (cont)

LIMPOPO			MPUMALANGA			N. WEST			N. CAPE			W. CAPE		
94	99	04	94	99	04	94	99	04	94	99	04	94	99	04
9	11	12	8	12	12	8	11	12	8	11	11	9	11	14
8	10	10	8	10	10	8	10	10	8	10	10	8	10	10
1	1	2	-	2	2	-	1	2	-	1	1	1	-	3
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
1	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	4	6
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
1	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	4
2	3	3	1	3	3	0	1	2	0	1	2	6	5	10
10	13	13	9	13	13	8	11	12	8	11	12	14	15	20

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SEATS WON BY PARTY 1994 - 2004													
PROVINCE	ELECTION	ACDP		ANC		DA		FA		ID		IFP	
		Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
EASTERN CAPE	1994	0	-	48	85.71	1	1.78	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	0	-	47	74.60	4	6.35	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-	-				
FREE STATE	1994	0	-	24	80.00	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	0	-	25	83.33	2	6.67	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
GAUTENG	1994	1	1.16	50	58.14	5	5.81	-	-	-	-	3	3.49
	1999	1	1.37	50	68.49	13	17.81	1	1.37	-	-	3	4.11
	2004							-					
KWA-ZULU NATAL	1994	1	1.23	26	32.10	2	2.47	-	-	-	-	41	50.62
	1999	1	1.25	32	40.00	7	8.75	0	-	-	-	34	42.50
	2004							-					
LIMPOPO	1994	0	-	38	95.00	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	1	2.04	44	89.80	1	2.04	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
MPUMALANGA	1994	0	-	25	83.33	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	0	-	26	86.67	1	3.33	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
NORTH WEST	1994	0	-	26	86.67	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	0	-	27	81.82	1	3.03	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
NORTHERN CAPE	1994	0	-	15	50.00	1	3.33	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	0	-	20	66.67	1	3.33	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
WESTERN CAPE	1994	1	2.38	14	33.33	3	7.14	-	-	-	-	0	-
	1999	1	2.38	18	42.86	5	11.90	0	-	-	-	0	-
	2004							-					
TOTAL	1994	3	0.70	266	62.59	12	2.82	-	-	-	-	44	10.35
	1999	4	0.93	289	67.21	35	8.14	1	0.23	-	-	37	8.60
	2004												

PARTY GAINS AND LOSSES 2004: SEATS				
	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES		
		EC	FS	G
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	13	4	0	1
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	12	1	1	2
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1	-	1	-
MINORITY FRONT	1	-	-	-
VRYHEIDSFRONT/FREEDOM FRONT	1	-	-	-
INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS	7	-	-	1
AZANIAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION	-	-	-	-
UNITED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	-	-	-	-
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA	-	-	-	1
UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT	(5)	(3)	-	-
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY	(6)	-	-	(1)
NEW NATIONAL PARTY	(21)	(2)	(2)	(3)
Seats "Lost" by Parties not standing in 2004	(3)			(1)

This table reflects the transfer of 1 NA seat from AZAPO to the ACDP, subject to an Electoral Court ruling

#### Comparison between seats won in 1999 and those won in 2004.

Twelve parties won seats in the NA and PL elections in 2004. Eleven of them had won seats in 1999. Of these, five held on to all of the seats they won in 1999 and made gains. Three parties maintained their overall 1999 position: two kept all their 1999 seats, making no gains and suffering no losses; for the other a loss was cancelled out by a gain. That left three parties that made no gains and suffered only losses. Overall, then, there were six winners and three losers, with three parties coming out even.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SEATS WON BY PARTY 1994 – 2004 (cont)**

MF		NNP		PAC		UCDP		UDM		VF/FF		Total Seats
Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	
-	-	6	10.71	1	1.78	-	-	-	-	0	-	56
-	-	2	3.17	1	1.58	-	-	9	14.29	0	-	63
												<b>63</b>
-	-	4	13.33	0	-	-	-	-	-	2	6.67	30
-	-	2	6.67	0	-	0	-	0	-	1	3.33	30
												<b>30</b>
-	-	21	24.42	1	1.16	-	-	-	-	5	5.81	86
-	-	3	4.11	0	-	0	-	1	1.37	1	1.37	73
												<b>73</b>
1	1.23	9	11.11	1	1.23	-	-	-	-	0	-	81
2	2.50	3	3.75	0	-	-	-	1	1.25	0	-	80
												<b>80</b>
-	-	1	2.50	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.50	40
-	-	1	2.04	1	2.04	-	-	1	2.04	0	-	49
												<b>49</b>
-	-	3	10.00	0	-	-	-	-	-	2	6.67	30
-	-	1	3.33	0	-	0	-	1	3.33	1	3.33	30
												<b>30</b>
-	-	3	10.00	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	3.33	30
-	-	1	3.03	0	-	3	9.09	0	-	1	3.03	33
												<b>33</b>
-	-	12	40.00	0	-	-	-	-	-	2	6.67	30
-	-	8	26.67	0	-	-	-	0	-	1	3.33	30
												<b>30</b>
-	-	23	54.76	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.38	42
-	-	17	40.48	0	-	-	-	1	2.38	0	-	42
												<b>39</b>
1	0.24	82	19.29	3	0.70	-	-	-	-	14	3.29	425
2	0.46	38	8.84	2	0.46	3	0.70	14	3.25	5	1.16	430
												<b>427</b>

**PARTY GAINS AND LOSSES 2004: SEATS (cont)**

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES								Total net Gains/Losses
KZN	L	M	NW	NC	WC	Net Gains/Losses		
6	1	1	0	1	1	15	28	
-	1	1	1	2	7	16	28	
1	-	-	-	1	1	4	5	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
-	-	-	-	2	3	6	13	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	(1)	-	-	-	(4)	(9)	
(4)	-	-	-	-	-	(5)	(11)	
(3)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(12)	(31)	(52)	
						(1)	(4)	

SEATS WON BY PARTIES: 1994 – 2004					
PARTY	Election	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES		
			EC	FS	G
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	2	0	0	1
	1999	6	0	0	1
	<b>2004</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	1994	252	48	24	50
	1999	266	47	25	50
	<b>2004</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>51</b>
AFRIKANER EENHEIDS BEWEGING	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	1	0	0	0
	<b>2004</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>
AZANIAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	1	DNS	DNS	0
	<b>2004</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	7	1	0	5
	1999	38	4	2	13
<b>2004</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	2	0	0	1
	<b>2004</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>
INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	<b>2004</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY	1994	43	0	0	3
	1999	34	0	0	3
	<b>2004</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
MINORITY FRONT	1994	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	1	DNS	DNS	DNS
	<b>2004</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>
NATIONAL PARTY	1994	82	6	4	21
NEW NATIONAL PARTY	1999	28	2	2	3
	<b>2004</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA	1994	5	1	0	1
	1999	3	1	0	0
	<b>2004</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
UNITED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	3	DNS	0	0
	<b>2004</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT	1994	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
	1999	14	9	0	1
	<b>2004</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
VRYHEIDSFREONT/FREEDOM FRONT	1994	9	0	2	5
	1999	3	0	1	1
	<b>2004</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
TOTAL SEATS	1994	400	56	30	86
	1999	400	63	30	73
	<b>2004</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>73</b>

This table reflects the transfer of 1 NA seat from AZAPO to the ACDP, subject to an Electoral Court ruling.

**SEATS WON BY PARTIES: 1994 – 2004 (cont)**

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES							TOTAL
KZN	L	M	NW	NC	WC	TOTAL	
1	0	0	0	0	1	3	5
1	1	0	0	0	1	4	10
<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>
26	38	25	26	15	14	266	518
32	44	26	27	20	18	289	555
<b>38</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>583</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
0	0	0	DNS	0	DNS	0	1
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
2	0	0	0	1	3	12	19
7	1	1	1	1	5	35	73
<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>101</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>
41	0	0	0	0	0	44	87
34	0	0	0	0	0	37	71
<b>30</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>60</b>
1	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1	1
2	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	2	3
<b>2</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>DNS</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>
9	1	3	3	12	23	82	164
3	1	1	1	8	17	38	66
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>
1	0	0	0	0	0	3	8
0	1	0	0	0	0	2	5
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
DNS	DNS	0	3	DNS	DNS	3	6
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>
DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
1	1	1	0	0	1	14	28
<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>
0	1	2	1	2	1	14	23
0	0	1	1	1	0	5	8
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>
81	40	30	30	30	42	425	825
80	49	30	33	30	42	430	830
<b>80</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>830</b>

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: EASTERN CAPE**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	14,908	0.51	0	20,857	0.96	0	17,372	0.78	0
African Democratic Movement	4,815	0.16	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	2,453,790	84.35	48	1,606,856	73.80	47	1,768,987	79.27	†51
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,673	0.17	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,884	0.17	0
Democratic Alliance	59,644	2.05	1	136,859	6.29	4	163,785	7.34	†5
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,575	0.16	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	17,314	0.78	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	5,050	0.17	0	7,166	0.33	0	4,373	0.20	0
Merit Party	2,028	0.07	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Nasionale Akisie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,672	0.07	0
New National Party	286,029	9.83	†6	70,141	3.22	2	14,084	0.63	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	59,475	2.04	1	24,837	1.14	*1	22,324	1.00	†1
The Socialist Party of Azania	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,356	0.15	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,707	0.12	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	296,015	13.60	*9	205,993	9.23	†6
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	23,167	0.80	0	7,287	0.33	0	5,692	0.26	0
Number of parties standing			9			10			13
Total seats			56			63			63
Total valid ballots	2,908,906			2,177,266			2,231,543		
Spoilt ballots	13,248	0.45		30,469	1.38		28,360	1.25	
Total ballots	2,922,154			2,207,735			2,259,903		
Registered voters	3,176,970			2,454,543			2,849,846		
Percentage poll		91.98			89.94			79.31	
Quota to win a seat	51,034			34,020			34,868		

† National Party allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* Pan Africanist Congress and United Democratic Movement each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African National Congress, Democratic Alliance, Pan Africanist Congress and United Democratic Movement each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.



PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: FREE STATE												
Party	1994			1999			2004					
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats			
African Christian Democratic Party	6,072	0.45	0	9,827	0.90	0	13,119	1.30	±1			
African Democratic Movement	2,008	0.15	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS			
African National Congress	1,037,998	76.65	†24	881,381	80.79	25	827,338	81.78	25			
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,390	0.40	0	DNS	DNS	DNS			
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,571	0.35	0			
Democratic Alliance	7,664	0.57	0	58,163	5.33	*2	85,714	8.47	±3			
Dikwankwella Party of South Africa	17,024	1.25	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	9,806	0.97	0			
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	8,798	0.81	0	DNS	DNS	DNS			
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,289	0.52	0			
Inkatha Freedom Party	6,935	0.51	0	5,119	0.47	0	3,563	0.35	0			
Nasionale Aksie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,224	0.12	0			
New National Party	170,452	12.59	†4	56,740	5.20	*2	8,295	0.82	0			
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	24,451	1.81	0	12,548	1.15	0	11,969	1.18	0			
The Socialist Party of Azania	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,235	0.11	0	DNS	DNS	DNS			
Unemployment Labour Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,974	0.27	0	DNS	DNS	DNS			
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	8,543	0.78	0	7,825	0.77	0			
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	18,194	1.67	0	8,947	0.88	0			
Vryheidsfront/Freeform Front	81,662	6.03	†2	22,996	2.11	*1	24,946	2.47	±1			
Number of parties standing			9			13			13			
Total seats			30			30			30			
Total valid ballots	1,354,266			1,090,908			1,011,606					
Spoilt ballots	10,286	0.75		16,943	1.53		15,795	1.54				
Total ballots	1,364,552			1,107,851			1,027,401					
Registered voters	1,636,581			1,225,730			1,321,195					
Percentage poll		83.38			90.38			77.76				
Quota to win a seat	43,687			35,191			32,633					

† African National Congress, National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* Democratic Party, New National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Alliance and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: GAUTENG**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
Africa Muslim Party	12,888	0.31	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African Christian Democratic Party	25,542	0.61	†1	42,621	1.16	*1	55,991	1.64	1
African Democratic Movement	4,352	0.10	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	2,418,257	57.60	50	2,488,780	67.87	50	2,331,121	68.40	†51
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	11,450	0.31	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,896	0.16	0	8,670	0.25	0
Black People's Convention	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,236	0.04	0
Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	7,773	0.23	0
Democratic Alliance	223,548	5.32	†5	658,236	17.95	13	708,081	20.78	15
Dikwankwella Party of South Africa	4,853	0.12	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Economic Freedom Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,862	0.05	0
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	32,494	0.89	*1	DNS	DNS	DNS
Federal Party	16,279	0.39	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	51,921	1.52	1
Inkatha Freedom Party	153,567	3.66	3	128,807	3.51	*3	85,500	2.51	†2
Labor Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,096	0.03	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Luso-South African Party	5,423	0.13	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Nasionale Akisie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,712	0.14	0
New National Party	1,002,540	23.88	†21	142,579	3.89	*3	25,992	0.76	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	61,512	1.47	1	26,781	0.73	0	29,076	0.85	†1
Peace and Justice Congress	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,208	0.09	0
Pro-Death Penalty Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,825	0.05	0
The Socialist Party of Azania	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,990	0.05	0	3,191	0.09	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	8,642	0.24	0	8,857	0.26	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	71,630	1.95	1	33,644	0.99	†1
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	258,935	6.17	5	45,750	1.25	*1	45,648	1.34	†1
Women's Rights Peace Party	7,279	0.17	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Ximoko Progressive Party	3,275	0.08	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Number of parties standing			14			14			18
Total seats			86			73			73
Total valid ballots	4,198,250			3,666,752			3,408,308		
Spoilt ballots	25,383	0.60		40,843	1.10		43,917	1.27	
Total ballots	4,223,633			3,707,595			3,452,225		
Registered voters	4,862,117			4,154,087			4,650,594		
Percentage poll		86.87			89.25			74.23	
Quota to win a seat	48,256			49,551			46,059		

† African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party and National Party each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* African Christian Democratic Party, Federal Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party, New National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African National Congress, Inkatha Freedom Party, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, United Democratic Movement and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: KWAZULU-NATAL**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
Africa Muslim Party	17,931	0.49	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African Christian Democratic Party	24,690	0.67	†1	53,745	1.81	1	48,892	1.78	‡2
African Democratic Movement	8,092	0.22	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	1,181,118	32.23	26	1,167,094	39.38	*32	1,287,823	46.98	38
Afrikaner Eerheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,801	0.20	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,052	0.17	0	7,061	0.26	0
Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,980	0.18	0
Democratic Alliance	78,910	2.15	‡2	241,779	8.16	*7	228,857	8.35	‡7
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	9,762	0.33	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent African Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,546	0.06	0
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	13,556	0.49	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	1,844,070	50.32	41	1,241,522	41.90	*34	1,009,267	36.82	‡30
Izwe Lethu Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,858	0.18	0
Mass United Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,261	0.08	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Minority Front	48,951	1.34	1	86,770	2.93	2	71,540	2.61	2
New National Party	410,710	11.21	9	97,077	3.28	*3	14,218	0.52	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	26,601	0.73	†1	7,654	0.26	0	5,118	0.19	00
Peace and Development Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,154	0.12	0
Royal Loyal Progress	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,141	0.11	0
The Socialist Party of Azania	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,451	0.12	0	5,023	0.18	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,921	0.14	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	34,586	1.17	*1	20,546	0.75	‡1
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	18,625	0.51	0	6,804	0.23	0	7,764	0.28	0
Workers International to Rebuild The Fourth International (SA)	4,626	0.13	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Number of parties standing			11			14			18
Total seats			81			80			80
Total valid ballots	3,664,324			2,963,358			2,741,265		
Spoilt ballots	39,369	1.06		46,141	1.53		41,300	1.48	
Total ballots	3,703,693			3,009,499			2,782,565		
Registered voters	4,585,091			3,443,978			3,819,864		
Percentage poll		80.78			87.38			72.84	
Quota to win a seat	44,687			36,585			33,843		

† African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* African National Congress, Democratic Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, New National Party and United Democratic Movement each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party and United Democratic Movement each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: LIMPOPO**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	7,363	0.38	0	18,281	1.10	*1	20,418	1.26	§1
African Democratic Movement	3,662	0.19	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	1,759,597	91.63	†38	1,464,432	88.29	44	1,439,853	89.18	845
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	6,598	0.40	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	9,933	0.62	0
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	8,931	0.54	0	8,204	0.51	0
Dabolorihwua Patriotic Front	DNS	DNS	DNS	8,229	0.50	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Democratic Alliance	4,021	0.21	0	23,486	1.42	*1	57,930	3.59	§2
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,365	0.32	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,730	0.17	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	2,233	0.12	0	5,644	0.34	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Nasionale Aksie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,213	0.14	0
New National Party	62,745	3.25	1	28,159	1.70	*1	7,443	0.46	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	24,360	1.27	0	23,325	1.41	*1	15,222	0.94	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,477	0.22	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	41,700	2.51	1	27,780	1.72	§1
United People's Front	10,123	0.53	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	41,193	2.15	†1	10,727	0.65	0	9,724	0.60	0
Ximoko Party†	4,963	0.26	0	13,817	0.83	0	9,587	0.59	0
Number of parties standing			10			13			13
Total seats			40			49			49
Total valid ballots	1,920,260			1,658,694			1,614,514		
Spoilt ballots	13,702	0.71		25,137	1.49		21,947	1.34	
Total ballots	1,933,962			1,683,831			1,636,461		
Registered voters	2,287,105			1,847,766			2,187,912		
Percentage poll		84.56			91.13			74.80	
Quota to win a seat	46,836			33,174			32,291		

† Stood as Ximoko Progressive Party in 1994

‡ African National Congress and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party, New National Party and Pan Africanist Congress each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

§ African Christian Democratic Party, African National Congress, Democratic Alliance and United Democratic Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	6,339	0.48	0	12,586	1.12	0	12,065	1.09	0
African Democratic Movement	5,062	0.38	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	1,070,052	80.69	25	954,788	84.83	26	959,436	86.3	†27
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,520	0.40	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,090	0.10	0	2,113	0.19	0
Democratic Alliance	7,437	0.56	0	50,421	4.48	1	77,119	6.94	2
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	9,019	0.80	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,406	0.31	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	20,147	1.52	0	15,901	1.41	0	10,643	0.96	0
New National Party	119,311	9.00	†3	27,909	2.48	*1	5,122	0.46	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	21,679	1.63	0	7,296	0.65	0	7,668	0.69	0
Right Party	921	0.07	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Sindawonye Progressive Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,318	0.38	0	5,925	0.53	0
The Socialist Party of Azania	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,424	0.13	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,553	0.23	0	1,878	0.17	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	16,013	1.42	*1	11,161	1.00	0
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	75,120	5.66	†2	19,170	1.70	*1	13,732	1.24	†1
Number of parties standing			9			13			13
Total seats			30			30			30
Total valid ballots	1,326,068			1,125,584			1,111,692		
Spoilt ballots	12,631	0.94		21,502	1.88		17,792	1.57	
Total ballots	1,338,699			1,147,086			1,129,484		
Registered voters	1,552,775			1,277,783			1,442,472		
Percentage poll		86.21			89.77			78.30	
Quota to win a seat	42,777			36,310			35,862		

† National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* New National Party, United Democratic Movement and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African National Congress and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: NORTH WEST**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	5,570	0.35	0	12,227	0.94	0	15,138	1.17	0
African Democratic Movement	3,569	0.23	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	1,310,080	83.33	†26	1,030,901	78.97	*27	1,048,089	80.71	27
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	6,637	0.51	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,718	0.29	0
Democratic Alliance	7,894	0.50	0	42,593	3.26	1	64,925	5.00	†2
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	7,157	0.55	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	5,709	0.44	0
Inkatha Freedom Party	5,948	0.38	0	6,759	0.52	0	3,211	0.25	0
Nasionale Akisie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,389	0.11	0
New National Party	138,986	8.84	†3	29,931	2.29	*1	5,592	0.43	0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	27,274	1.73	0	9,613	0.74	0	10,923	0.84	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	124,874	9.57	3	110,233	8.49	†3
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	16,785	1.29	0	12,513	0.96	0
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	72,821	4.63	1	17,964	1.38	*1	17,123	1.32	†1
Number of parties standing			8			11			12
Total seats			30			33			33
Total valid ballots	1,572,142			1,305,441			1,298,563		
Spoilt ballots	18,974	1.19		21,722	1.64		23,224	1.76	
Total ballots	1,591,116			1,327,163			1,321,787		
Registered voters	1,763,445			1,527,672			1,749,529		
Percentage poll		90.23			86.87			75.55	
Quota to win a seat	50,715			38,396			38,194		

† African National Congress and National Party each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* African National Congress, New National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ Democratic Alliance, United Christian Democratic Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

Party	1994				1999				2004			
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	1,610	0.40	0	5,004	1.53	0	5,995	1.88	0	5,995	1.88	‡1
African Democratic Movement	734	0.18	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	200,839	49.74	15	210,837	64.32	*20	219,365	68.83	21	219,365	68.83	21
Afrikaner Eenheds Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,722	0.53	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,360	0.41	0	1,645	0.52	0	1,645	0.52	0
Democratic Alliance	7,567	1.87	‡1	15,632	4.77	1	35,297	11.08	3	35,297	11.08	3
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,735	0.53	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	22,485	7.06	2	22,485	7.06	2
Inkatha Freedom Party	1,688	0.42	0	1,728	0.53	0	751	0.24	0	751	0.24	0
New National Party	163,452	40.48	12	79,214	24.17	*8	23,970	7.52	2	23,970	7.52	2
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	3,765	0.93	0	2,158	0.66	0	1,381	0.43	0	1,381	0.43	0
The Cape People's Congress	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	392	0.12	0	392	0.12	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,042	0.33	0	1,042	0.33	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,936	0.90	0	1,431	0.45	0	1,431	0.45	0
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	24,117	5.97	‡2	5,446	1.66	*1	4,948	1.55	‡1	4,948	1.55	‡1
Number of parties standing			8			11			12			12
Total seats			30			30			30			30
Total valid ballots	403,772			327,772			318,702			318,702		
Spoilt ballots	3,534	0.87		4,897	1.47		5,192	1.60		5,192	1.60	
Total ballots	407,306			332,669			323,894			323,894		
Registered voters	439,149			377,173			433,591			433,591		
Percentage poll		92.75			88.20			74.70			74.70	
Quota to win a seat	13,025			10,574			10,281			10,281		

‡ Democratic Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* African National Congress, New National Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African Christian Democratic Party and Freedom Front each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

**PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE RESULTS: 1994, 1999 AND 2004: WESTERN CAPE**

Party	1994			1999			2004		
	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats	Votes	% vote	Seats
Africa Moral Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	9,513	0.60	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Africa Muslim Party	20,954	0.98	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	11,019	0.70	0
African Christian Democratic Party	25,731	1.20	†1	44,323	2.79	1	53,934	3.44	‡2
African Democratic Movement	1,939	0.09	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
African National Congress	705,576	33.01	14	668,106	42.07	18	709,052	45.25	19
Afrikaner Eenheds Beweging	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,854	0.18	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Azanian People's Organisation	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,455	0.09	0
Democratic Alliance	141,970	6.64	‡3	189,183	11.91	5	424,832	27.11	‡12
Federal Alliance	DNS	DNS	DNS	4,153	0.26	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Independent Democrats	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	122,867	7.84	3
Inkatha Freedom Party	7,445	0.35	0	2,895	0.18	0	2,222	0.14	0
Islamic Party	16,762	0.78	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Moderate Independent Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	953	0.06	0
Nasionale Aksie	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,248	0.14	0
National Coalition Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,126	0.07	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
New Labour Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	10,526	0.67	0
New National Party	1,138,242	53.25	‡23	609,612	38.39	*17	170,469	10.88	‡5
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	22,676	1.06	0	7,708	0.49	0	6,524	0.42	0
Peace and Development Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	789	0.05	0
Peace and Justice Congress	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,278	0.21	0
People's Liberation Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	915	0.06	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
South African Women's Party	2,641	0.12	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
The Cape People's Congress	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	1,960	0.13	0
The Government by the People Green Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	2,453	0.15	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
The Green Party	2,611	0.12	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
The Green Party of South Africa	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,317	0.21	0
United Christian Democratic Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	3,575	0.23	0
United Democratic Movement	DNS	DNS	DNS	38,071	2.40	1	27,489	1.75	‡1
Universal Party	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	735	0.05	0
Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front	44,003	2.06	1	6,394	0.40	0	9,705	0.62	0
West Kaap Federaliste Party	6,337	0.30	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Workers International to Rebuild The Fourth International (SA)	855	0.04	0	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS	DNS
Workers International Vanguard League	DNS	DNS	DNS	672	0.04	0	DNS	DNS	DNS
Number of parties standing			14			15			20
Total seats			42			42			42
Total valid ballots	2,137,742			1,587,978			1,566,949		
Spoilt ballots	10,714	0.50		13,499	0.84		15,554	0.98	
Total ballots	2,148,456			1,601,477			1,582,503		
Registered voters	2,405,919			1,864,019			2,220,283		
Percentage poll		89.30			85.92			71.27	
Quota to win a seat	49,715			36,930			36,441		

† African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party and National Party each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

\* New National Party allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.

‡ African Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Alliance, New National Party and United Democratic Movement each allocated one seat by highest remainder mechanism.