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POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Khabele Matlosa
Kebapetse Lotshwao

EISA RESEARCH REPORT No 47
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PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

BY

KHABELE MATLOSA
KEBAPETSE LOTSHWAO

2010
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Regional integration has been a major preoccupation of states in the Southern African region from time immemorial. The oldest regional integration scheme is found in this region in the form of the Southern African Customs Union (Sacu), established in the late 19th century. Sacu promotes economic integration among South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established on 1 April 1980 with a view to promoting coordination of policies aimed at advancing socio-economic development and reducing dependence of member states on the then apartheid South Africa. While the focus of SADCC was primarily on socio-economic issues with priority given to lessening economic dependence on South Africa, security and defence issues were integral to the agenda for regional integration. Security and defence issues were handled by a separate body, the Frontline States (FLS), which was established in 1974.

During the 1989 SADCC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe, it was decided that SADCC should be more formalised to give it an appropriate legal status that would replace the then existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Following the epochal liberation of Namibia in 1989 and as the process of liberation and majority rule loomed larger in the then minority-ruled apartheid South Africa, SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 17 August 1992 during a summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia. It was during this summit that SADC member states adopted the current Treaty. Although SADC has established national focal points, in the form of SADC national committees (SNCs) in each of its 15 member states, its headquarters are located in Gaborone, Botswana. The Treaty (as amended in 2001) is not only the founding document of SADC, but also its constitutional foundation which also defines its mandate and vision. It identifies the following guiding principles for its regional integration agenda:
• Sovereign equality of all member states;
• Solidarity, peace and security;
• Human rights, democracy and rule of law;
• Equality, balance and mutual benefit; and
• Peaceful settlement of disputes.

The principal objectives of SADC are, inter alia, to:

• Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
• Promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate and effective;
• Consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability;
• Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of member states;
• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
• Mainstream gender in the process of community building; and
• Strengthen and consolidate the long-lasting historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.

As the above principles and objectives vividly illustrate, SADC now places a lot more emphasis on democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, elections and peaceful settlement of conflicts as much as it does on defence, security and economic integration issues as will become clearer in the next section.

The Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) initiated this project with a view to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of SADC in executing its regional governance architecture and make appropriate policy recommendations. The specific objectives of the study are:
To ascertain the inter-relationships between the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SIPO) in SADC’s pursuit of its three-pronged regional integration agenda;

To review the implementation of SIPO, since 2004, highlighting success, challenges and possible future directions;

To assess SADC’s mandate and strategies towards ensuring the credibility, integrity and legitimacy of elections;

To evaluate the internal capacity of the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in promoting the SADC regional governance architecture;

To investigate levels of external support for SADC’s regional governance architecture and the effectiveness of such assistance.

In order to promote political integration and advance democratic governance in the region, various institutions are in place, key among which are the SADC Summit, SADC Organ Troika Summit, the Ministerial Organ Committee, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee and the Directorate of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. How effective are these structures in advancing the SADC regional governance agenda?

SADC has developed its own normative framework that defines the form and content of its regional governance architecture. This framework has taken the form of the founding treaty, policy documents, declarations, protocols, strategic plans. The five key ones that will be discussed in some detail in this study are (a) the 1992 SADC Treaty, (b) the RISDP adopted in 2001; (c) the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation adopted in 2001; (d) the SIPO), adopted in 2004 and (e) the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections adopted in 2004. Furthermore, to what extent does the SADC regional governance agenda dovetail into other related regional initiatives by other non-state actors?

This report is divided into various sections. Following these introductory
remarks, the second section provides the contextual background for regionalism and regional integration in Southern Africa. The section focuses mainly on historical and contemporary trends of regional integration, with special attention paid to political integration through democratisation. The third section of the report reviews SADC’s institutional framework and evaluates how these structures drive the political integration agenda. The fourth section interrogates the normative framework in place for SADC to pursue political integration through its regional democracy and governance mandate as defined in its 1992 founding Treaty. The fifth section outlines the democracy and governance initiatives by two regional bodies, namely the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Electoral Commissions Forum of the SADC Countries. The sixth section presents the democracy and governance initiatives of selected regional civil society actors. The seventh and concluding section is an overview of the key research findings and recommendations.
This study is concerned with the concept and praxis of regionalism in Southern Africa with a deliberate focus on the deepening of political integration through democratisation. According to Gilbert Khadiagala, a renowned authority on this subject, ‘regionalism is the process of building multilateral institutions to enhance political, security and economic interaction among states. Around the world, regionalism has been built on the foundations of functional states, at the same time striving to transcend them. Thus, while states are the locus of regionalism, regionalism often seeks to overcome the deficiencies of states by erecting mechanism that diminish states’ salience’ (Khadiagala, 2008:1).

Regional integration is at the heart of efforts underway in Southern Africa in pursuit of regionalism. Southern Africa has a long history of regional integration dating back to the early 1900s when Sacu was born. Sacu is still in existence and has ensured the economic integration of five countries, namely South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. A much broader regional integration scheme in the region is SADC, whose roots are traceable to the formation of the FLS in 1974 (Khadiagala, 2007) and the formation of SADCC in 1980.

The FLS evolved over the period 1970-74 through the Mulungushi Club comprising Tanzania (Nyerere), Uganda (Obote), Zaire (Mubutu), and Zambia (Kaunda). Established in 1974, the FLS was an informal grouping of countries which saw their primary role as support to the liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. It comprised Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Zimbabwe joined the FLS after attaining its independence in 1980 (see Le Pere and Tjonneland, 2005; Hansohm and Shilimela, 2006; Khadiagala, 2007). Interestingly, even Nigeria – a West African country – was a member of the FLS and this development underscored the strong linkage of the grouping with the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
It was on the foundations of the FLS that SADCC was established in 1980. The six members of the FLS were joined by Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland to constitute SADCC. The main thrust of regional integration within the SADCC framework was the political liberation of the Southern Africa region, including the need to react to then increasing regional dependence on the minority-rulled South Africa. Much of the attention of SADCC, therefore, was to pursue functional economic integration and in that sense focused its attention more on harmonisation of economic policies and coordination of the implementation of such policies. To the extent that SADCC did not have a legally binding treaty, it remained, to a large degree, an informal grouping. While the FLS focused its attention on political liberation, SADCC saw its primary mandate as two-pronged, namely (a) policy coordination and (b) reduction of dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. At the regional level, SADCC coordinated its programmes and strategies through the Secretariat in Gaborone, a trend that the new SADC has inherited. At the national level, SADCC established sectoral coordination units (SCUs) through which each member state was responsible for the harmonisation of policies and initiating programmes in a specific sector. While the SADCC division of labour among its member states was based on SCUs as illustrated in the table below, SADC has introduced the notion of SADC SNCs instead.

Table 1: SADCC Sectoral Division of Labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sectoral Division of Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Arid lands cultivation; foot-and-mouth disease control; headquarters of Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Land utilisation and soil conservation (with Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Fisheries and wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Manpower development and training facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Industrialisation programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Development fund proposals; mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Food security; land utilisation and soil conservation (with Lesotho); air transport including regional airports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Richard Weisfelder, 1982:82.
It was in the early 1990s that Southern African countries decided to fundamentally rethink the thrust and focus of regional cooperation in the region. To this end, there was a deliberate move away from simple economic coordination towards deep regional integration aimed at promoting sustainable human development (SAPES, 2000). According to Dirk Hansohm and Rehabeam Shilimela, SADC ‘‘has, as its aim, deeper political and economic integration’ (2006:1). SADCC was transformed into the SADC in 1992 at a historic meeting held in Windhoek, Namibia.

As argued in the Introduction section, the key objectives of SADC, as enunciated in the 1992 Treaty, clearly demonstrate that its regional integration mandate is fundamentally three-pronged. Firstly, economic integration is pursued to achieve development, promote growth and alleviate poverty. Secondly, security cooperation is promoted with emphasis on defence, state security and the human security issues facing the region. Thirdly, political integration is also being promoted through the deliberate pursuit of good governance, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes. This three-pronged strategy is important because SADC believes that regional economic integration may not succeed unless democracy and good governance as well as peace and security prevail in the region. Even its 2003 RISDP recognises this stark reality by acknowledging that its vision of regional economic integration is dependent on peace, security and political stability. Encompassing the above three forms of regional integration, the three principal objectives of SADC are as follows:

- Deeper economic co-operation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for enhanced investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of production, and goods and services across borders;
- Common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for rule of law and guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty; and
- Regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony (www.sadc.int).
It is within this context that SADC has given priority to the promotion of good governance, democracy and elections in its member states. Thus, SADC has been observing elections in each one of its member states since 1999.

This report focuses its attention mainly on the political integration mandate of SADC and less on economic integration and security cooperation. However, it should be recognised that the three focus areas above are intertwined and interwoven. It is principally in pursuit of political integration that SADC has progressively evolved its own distinctive regional governance architecture. The SADC regional governance architecture includes (a) protocols, declarations and principles agreed upon in pursuance of democratic governance; (b) structures, institutions and regulations agreed upon for the realisation of these declarations, principles and guidelines for democratic governance; and (c) the manner in which SADC member states translate these declarations, principles and guidelines into enforceable law, policies and political practice at both the national and regional levels.

Between 1980 and 1992, SADC did not have a clearly defined governance agenda, as its focus was more on supporting liberation struggles in various countries. Until the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992, economic integration was considered paramount over imperatives for political integration (SAPES, 2000; Oosthuizen, 2006). However, since the transformation of 1992, SADC now pursues political integration in conjunction with both economic integration and security cooperation, as highlighted earlier in this section. Hansohm and Shilimela remind us that ‘the attainment of independence by Namibia in 1990 and the start of political transformation in South Africa implied that the political anti-apartheid agenda started to lose relevance and it was then regarded as high time that the region embarked on programmes that strove more for economic and social welfare through a deeper regional integration in wider sectors, ranging from socio-economic and political to security’ (2006:1-2).

SADC’s vision of deep integration is spelled out in more detail in the 1992 SADC Common Agenda and SADC Treaty of the same year. Both
the SADC Common Agenda and the Treaty were adopted at the inaugural SADC Summit in Windhoek, Namibia. The SADC vision is ‘one of a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa’ (SADC, 2005:19). Its mission is ‘to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance; and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the world economy’ (SADC, 2005:19). In both its vision and mission, SADC recognises the significance of democracy and good governance for the attainment of both economic development and peace and security.
With the transformation of SADCC to SADC, a restructuring process was initiated which brought about new structures and mechanisms for the implementation of SADC’s new regional integration mandate. The new SADC structure comprises five directorates tasked to promote regional integration in their respective sectors, as demonstrated in the table below.

**Table 2: SADC Directorates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directorate</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment</td>
<td>Industry and trade; finance and investment; mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Crop production, food, agriculture and natural resources; agricultural research and training; livestock production and animal disease control; inland fisheries; marine fisheries and resources; forestry; wildlife; environment and sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure and Services</td>
<td>Transport, communication and meteorology; energy; tourism; water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Human Development and Special Programmes</td>
<td>Combating illicit drug trafficking; human resources development; employment and labour; culture, information and sport; health; HIV &amp; AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
<td>Politics; defence; international relations; security; public security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the day-to-day coordination of the SADC governance agenda is the responsibility of the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, there are various institutional arrangements that directly influence this agenda and how it is implemented. These institutional structures are vividly illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Structure of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security

- Summit of Heads of State & Government
  - SADC Organ on politics, defense & security
    - Council of Ministers
      - Committee of Ministers
        - Inter-state politics & diplomacy committee (ISPDC)
          - political cooperation
          - international relations
          - diplomacy
          - democracy & human rights
        - Inter-state defense & security committee (ISDSC)
          - defense & security
          - conflict prevention
          - management & resolution
        - Sub committee on defense
        - Sub committee on public security
        - Sub committee on state security
        - Sub committee on public security
THE SADC SUMMIT
The SADC Summit is established by Article 10 of the SADC Treaty as the organisation’s supreme policy-making body. Comprising of all Heads of State or Governments of SADC member states, the summit provides policy direction and oversees the organisation’s functions. It is the summit that adopts protocols, declarations, conventions and other legal instruments. The summit elects the SADC Summit Troika, namely the current chair (Democratic Republic of Congo), out-going chair (Zambia) and in-coming chair (Namibia). The SADC Troika rotates every year. The summit also appoints the executive secretary and his/her deputy. The current executive secretary is Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão from Mozambique. The second-in-command is Eng João Samuel Caholo (from Angola) who is the SADC deputy executive secretary for regional integration.

The admission of new member states and the creation of new organs and committees are also the responsibilities of the SADC Summit. Decisions within the summit are taken on the basis of consensus and the decisions taken are binding on the member states. The summit is held once a year although extraordinary summits can be called when the need arises. Power to make decisions even on democracy and governance matters is centralised within the SADC Summit and this situation denudes the effectiveness of the SADC Secretariat as a whole and the Organ Directorate in particular.

THE ORGAN TROIKA SUMMIT
The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) is also established by the SADC Treaty. In terms of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the general objective of the Organ is the promotion of peace and security in the region (SADC 2001). At the summit level, the Organ is run by a Troika consisting of the current chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (Mozambique), the incoming chair of the Organ (Zambia) as well as the outgoing chair of the Organ (Swaziland). The Organ convenes its own summits (Organ Troika Summit) which are chaired by the chairperson of the Organ. The Organ Troika Summit is the Organ’s decision-making body which is also charged with the resolution of political conflicts experienced by any SADC member state. As with the SADC Summits, the Organ can also convene extraordinary summits whenever the need arises.
THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ORGAN
The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation provides for a Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO). The MCO consists of foreign affairs, defence and public or state security ministers of the members of the SADC Organ on Politic, Defence and Security (OPDS). The MCO Troika coordinates the work of the Organ and its structures and reports to the Organ chairperson. The MCO Troika is chaired by a minister from the same country as the SADC chairperson (currently Mozambique) and its meetings are held at least once annually, although the MCO chairperson is empowered to convene meetings if requested by the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) or the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (SADC, 2001).

THE INTER-STATE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE (ISPDC)
The ISPDC is one of the two committees that service the OPDSC. The ISPDC comprises of foreign affairs ministers of SADC member states and performs functions deemed necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ with regard to issues of politics and diplomacy. Its core areas include political cooperation, international relations, diplomacy, democracy and human rights. The committee is chaired by a minister from the same country as the SADC chairman. The chairpersonship is rotational on a yearly basis. The ISPDC reports to both the Organ chairperson as well as the ministerial committee of the Organ and its meetings are also held once annually. The ISPDC chairperson is, however, empowered to convene meetings if necessary or if other members of the committees demand such (SADC, 2001).

In discharging its functions, the ISPDC faces a challenge of the diversity of political and administrative systems of SADC countries, owing to the region’s diverse colonial history. This incoherence of systems thus undermines the effectiveness of the ISPDC. The other challenge relates to the need for the ISPDC to establish and consolidate regional standards beyond elections, as democracy and good governance are broader than elections.

THE INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (ISDSC)
The ISDSC is the other committee of the Organ whose core areas include
defence and security and conflict prevention, management and resolution. The ISDSC consists of public security ministers and state security ministers of SADC member states. The committee is charged with the performance of functions necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to defence and security (SADC, 2001). In order to perform such functions, the ISDSC is empowered to establish other structures it deems necessary. As with its counterpart the ISPDC, the ISDSC is chaired by a minister from the same country as the SADC chairperson. The chairpersonship is rotational on an annual basis. Its meetings are also held at least once a year, although the chairperson is also empowered to convene meetings when he/she deems necessary or if any minister serving on the committee requests for a meeting to be convened. The ISDSC also reports to the ministerial committee of the Organ as well as the chairperson of the Organ.

THE ORGAN ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (OPDSC)

The OPDSC is the key implementing institution of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. Although the Organ was created in 1996, it was largely dysfunctional until after the signing of the Protocol. This inertia related to the differences between SADC leaders as to how the Organ should operate and relate to SADC (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001; Zacarias, 2003). The main functions of the Protocol have thus been to operationalise the Organ (Williams 2001) and subordinate it to the mainstream SADC structures (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001; Fisher and Ngoma 2005). Among others, the objectives of the Organ include securing the region against political instability, the evolution of common political values and institutions, development of common foreign policy as well as peaceful resolution of inter-and intra state conflicts (SADC, 2001). Furthermore, the Organ seeks to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the SADC member states. Overall, the objectives pursued by the OPDSC are summed up in Table 3.

Based in the Secretariat and headed by a director, the Directorate is the Organ’s administrative and coordination arm. Its main function is to ensure the realisation of the mandate of the Organ (SADC 2001). The Directorate comprises of four sectors, being political and diplomatic affairs, defence, security and the regional peacekeeping training centre.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military/Defence</th>
<th>Crime Prevention</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protect against instability</td>
<td>Close cooperation to deal with cross-border crime</td>
<td>Close cooperation in the sharing of intelligence information</td>
<td>Promote cooperation and common political value systems and institutions to deal with cross-border crime</td>
<td>Develop democratic institutions and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop collective security capacity</td>
<td>Promote community-based approach</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>Develop common foreign policy</td>
<td>Encourage observance of universal human rights conventions and treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclude a Mutual Defence Pact</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Conflict prevention, management and resolution</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a regional peacekeeping capacity</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Early warning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage and monitor international arms control disarmament conventions and treaties</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate participation in peace operations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Address extra-regional conflicts which affect the region</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fisher and Ngoma, 2005:3.
Overall, the Directorate has a staff complement of about 20 people, specialising in different fields such as politics, military and police. A majority of the Directorate’s staff is male, as fields such as politics, military and policing are male-dominated. However, the Directorate’s staff complement of around 20 is not adequate, thus limiting the extent to which SADC can realise its democracy and security objectives. There is thus a need to increase the Directorate’s staff for the objectives to be realised. The need for the increase of the staff complement of the Directorate of the OPDSC becomes even more urgent in light of SADC’s efforts to establish new structures, such as the SADC Electoral Advisory Council and the SADC Mediation Support Unit.

SADC NATIONAL COMMITTEES (SNC)
SNCs have been established as part of the transformation of SADC from the old SADCC. The SNCs have replaced the national-level sectoral coordination units which existed as national structures of SADCC. Their existence is provided for in article 16A of the 1992 SADC Treaty. They comprise national stakeholders that are critical for the implementation of all regional integration and coordination strategies, programmes and policies. The key stakeholders that form part of the SNCs include government, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector. The three main responsibilities of the SNCs as spelled out in the SADC Treaty are to:

- Provide input at the national level in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programmes of action;
- Coordinate and oversee, at the national level, implementation of SADC programmes of action; and
- Create a national steering committee, sub-committees and technical committees (SADC Treaty, 1992 as amended).

Additional guidelines developed by the SADC Secretariat provide that SNCs, over and above the above responsibilities, need to:

- Promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in member states;
- Facilitate information flows and communication between
member states and the SADC Secretariat; and
• Coordinate the provision of inputs for the development of the RISDP and monitor its implementation (see Nzewi and Zakwe, 2009:10).

Although the SNCs report to the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, their stewardship is the sole responsibility of the governments. In this way, SNCs are fundamentally state-directed. Various studies have found that SNCs are dysfunctional in many SADC countries and non-existent in others (Landsberg and Mackay, 2005; Balule, 2009; Nzewi and Zakwe, 2009). According to Nzewi and Zakwe, although SNCs exist in some SADC member states, they are ‘largely non-functional with gross technical capacity and resource problems and ineffective coordination mechanisms’ (Nzewi and Zakwe, 2009:10).

In part as a result of the paralysis of SNCs and the inherent weaknesses of the Secretariat in Gaborone, SADC lacks visibility at the national level of its member states. It is not well known by ordinary people of the region. Thus, its relevance for the promotion of democratic governance, peace, security and political stability is not easily appreciated by the peoples of Southern Africa besides the political elites. Even among the enlightened political elites, it is the ruling groups that tend to have more confidence in SADC’s efforts in promoting democratic governance. Often, the political elites in SADC member states who happen to belong to opposition parties have raised concerns that the regional economic community is purely a club of ruling parties whose main preoccupation is to provide political solidarity to each other and are less inclined to criticise one another in cases where authoritarian tendencies threaten democratic governance, constitutionalism and human rights.

NEW STRUCTURES IN THE PIPELINE
New SADC structures that were in the pipeline at the time of writing this report included the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), which will deal with multivariate conflicts that threaten peace, security and political stability in the region.

It is recognised, quite correctly, by the SADC member states that without
peace, security and stability, deep integration cannot be realised and sustainable human development cannot be achieved. An Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) will coordinate all election-related work by the Organ Directorate and the SADC Election Support Unit (SESU) which will essentially act as the administrative unit of the Seac. We introduce the SEAC in more detail below.

During its Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2005, SADC took a firm decision on the creation of a SADC electoral advisory council in terms of Article 9.2 of the SADC Treaty. This decision was further discussed during the ministerial committee of the Organ Troika held in February 2006 in Windhoek, Namibia which recommended the constitution of the Organ Troika Task Group assisted by the Secretariat to, inter alia:

a) Discuss with the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries modalities for the creation of SEAC;

b) Plan and convene the constitutive meeting of the SEAC during the month of February 2006.

It was during its Summit held in Maseru, Lesotho in August 2006 that SADC approved the establishment of the SEAC and mandated the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation to implement this decision based on the report submitted by the task group.

The SADC Secretariat engaged the ECF on the matter and received the following feedback:

- The ECF fully supported the idea of establishing a SADC electoral advisory council;
- The ECF was prepared to fulfil the advisory role to SADC;
- The ECF envisaged a relationship along the following lines:
  a) The ECF shall provide advice to SADC on electoral matters through the ECF Secretariat
  b) SADC creates its own electoral unit which will interface with the ECF Secretariat on electoral matters/issues;
c) The ECF Secretariat shall refer all matter of crucial importance to the ECF for directions;
d) A memorandum of understanding detailing the interface between SADC and ECF shall be entered into;
e) The ECF should retain its structures, identity and independence.

During a consultative meeting that was held on 13 November 2007 in Pretoria, South Africa and attended by representatives from the Organ Troika member states, the ECF and SADC Secretariat, the following issues were agreed upon:

- SADC should formulate the SEAC’s terms of reference;
- SADC should formulate the memorandum of understanding between SADC and the ECF outline the relation on matters pertaining to electoral issues;
- A task team comprising representatives from ECF and two members from each Organ Troika member state and officers from SADC Secretariat would be established.

The composition and terms of reference of the SEAC were agreed to and adopted during a meeting of senior officials of the ISDPC held in Swaziland on 16 March 2009. During this meeting, senior officials recommended as follows:

- That the SEAC should be established as a matter of urgency;
- That the SADC Organ Secretariat should work on the concept note outlining activities of SEAC as well as its budget;
- SADC member states should submit two nominees each for the creation of SEAC, taking gender equality into consideration;
- That the current task force should continue to be operational until SEAC members are nominated, appointed and functional;
- That SEAC should develop its own structures, rules and procedures to be approved by Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO); and
- That SEAC should report to MCO of the Organ.
Since its 2009 annual summit held in Kinshasa, DRC, efforts towards the establishment of the SEAC and its administrative arm, the SADC Election Support Unit, have been progressing at a painstakingly slow pace.
THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SADC’S DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE MANDATE

THE 1992 SADC TREATY
With the end of apartheid in sight in the late 1980s, regional policy-makers identified a need for a more effective organisation with legal status and powers (Isaksen and Tjonneland, 2001:1). This led to the adoption of the SADC Treaty in 1992 at the Windhoek Summit. The Treaty transformed SADCC to SADC and broadened the scope of regional integration from development coordination to economic, security and political integration. Article 4 of the Treaty outlines sovereign equality of member states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights and the rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit as well as peaceful settlement of conflicts as the guiding principles of SADC.

The broad objectives of SADC are contained in Article 5 of the Treaty. These objectives include the achievement of development and economic growth, alleviation of poverty, evolution of common political values, systems and institutions and, perhaps most importantly, the promotion and defending of peace and security in the region. In order to achieve these objectives, the Treaty obliges SADC member states to harmonise their political and socio-economic policies with plans of the member states. Article 21 of the SADC Treaty identifies the areas upon which regional cooperation shall be based. Among others, these areas include politics, diplomacy, international relations as well as peace and security. Article 9 of the SADC Treaty creates various institutions through which SADC shall perform its objectives. These institutions are the summit, the Council of Ministers, the commissions, the standing committees of officials and the Tribunal.

THE REGIONAL INDICATIVE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (RISDP)
The SADC RISDP represents a broad development and regional integration framework for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and eradication of poverty. Adopted in 2001, the RISDP is a 15-year integration and development plan setting priorities,
outlining policies and framing strategies for the achievement of the SADC vision, mission and the common agenda outlined in the preceding section. Its five main objectives are as follows:

- Review of the main cooperation and integration areas;
- Defining the priority integration areas for the next 15 years;
- Setting up a logical implementation program of the main activities necessary for the achievement of the region’s broader goals;
- Ensuring effective sectoral linkages and enhancing synergies among the sectors; and
- Providing member-states, the SADC Secretariat and other institutions, regional and international stakeholders with a coherent and comprehensive long-term implementation agenda (SADC, 2003:3a).

It is instructive that the RISDP recognises the reality that development will not be possible without peace and security and without democracy and good political governance. SADC acknowledges that ‘economic growth and development will not be realised in conditions of political intolerance, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, civil strife and war. SADC member states are cognizant of the fact that poverty thrives under such conditions, nurturing further political instability and conflict, creating a destructive repetitive cycle, which perpetuates under-development and extreme deprivation’ (SADC, 2003:3a).

With a view to addressing these challenges, the RISDP commits SADC member states to the following:

- Creating opportunities for the poor to create wealth for themselves;
- Promoting economic growth (GDP growth of at least seven per cent per annum) and redistribution;
- Expansion and diversification of regional and international markets;
- Promoting foreign and domestic investment to stimulate growth;
• Employment creation for the poor;
• Reducing risks such as conflicts, crime, diseases and socio-economic crisis (SADC, 2003a:56)

More importantly, the RISDP is very specific that ‘a key strategy in eradicating poverty is facilitating the empowerment of poor people by laying the political and legal basis for inclusive development, promoting public administrations that foster economic growth and equity, promoting inclusive decentralisation and community development, promoting gender equality, addressing social barriers and supporting poor people’s social capital’ (SADC, 2003a:56).

The concerns of the RISDP in regard to democracy and development dovetail neatly with the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. SIPO emanates from the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation adopted in 2002 whose objectives include the following:

• Protection of the people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
• Promotion of political cooperation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
• Prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflict by peaceful means;
• Development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of the state parties and observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU/African Union and United Nations respectively; and
• Enhancement of regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance (SADC, 2004:56).

The combination of the RISDP and SIPO represents a comprehensive strategy by SADC towards deepening democratic governance and
advancing sustainable socio-economic development in Southern Africa, with priority given to poverty eradication. While the RISDP states that poverty eradication is a key priority, its implementation framework has not clearly identified specific poverty-focused interventions and thus mainstreaming of poverty eradication has not been highlighted. This constitutes a major weakness of the RISDP if the commitment of SADC member states towards eradication of poverty and achievement of the MDGs is to be achieved.

THE SADC GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT PROTOCOL

One of the most important dimensions of the advancement of democratic governance in Southern Africa relates to gender equality. The momentum in this direction has been underway since the 1995 Beijing International Women’s Conference. At the continental level, during its 2003 Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique, the AU adopted a policy position that committed the continental inter-governmental body to gender parity in all its key decision-making organs. While the first president of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was a woman, the AU has also ensured gender equality in the recruitment of commissioners heading various key departments.

In 1997, SADC adopted a Declaration on Gender and Development that set a target of 30 per cent women in decision-making positions by 2005; the only concrete target set in the declaration. This, however, was not underpinned by any implementation mechanisms. Lobbying and advocacy by non-governmental organisations led to this target being increased to 50 per cent at the Heads of State Summit in 2005 in line with the AU target. In August 2008, SADC Heads of State elevated the declaration to a protocol with 28 legally binding targets for achieving gender equality. Those relevant to governance are summarised in the box below:

Key targets in the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development

Representation

- By 2015, at least 50 per cent of decision-making positions in the public and private sectors should be held by women.
• Any measures taken (to increase representation), legislative or otherwise, should be accompanied by public awareness campaigns which show the importance of the equal representation and participation of women and men in decision-making and that this is integral to democracy, good governance and citizen participation.

**Affirmative action**

• State parties should put in place affirmative action measures in order to eliminate all barriers that prevent women from participating meaningfully in all spheres of life and create a conducive environment for such participation.

**Participation**

• State parties should put in place policies, strategies and programmes to ensure equal participation of women and men in decision making.

Source: SADC, 2008

SADC countries have made great strides in increasing the levels of representation of women in parliament with a regional average of 23.7 per cent, five per cent higher than the global average of 18.6 per cent, although the record still remains a mixed bag. The table below demonstrates this observation in relation to women’s representation in parliament (upper, lower houses and combined) and local government. The countries are ranked according to the highest performing (South Africa at 42.7 per cent) to the lowest performing (Botswana at six per cent) in terms of percentage representation of women in parliament (combined houses). We highlight, in particular, the cases where the 30 per cent target has been achieved and exceeded. It is worth noting that all the countries which have achieved the 30 per cent target and more have one form of gender quota or the other.

Table 4 illustrates that of the five countries that have achieved 30 per cent, four of them (South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia) use the proportional representation (PR) system combined with voluntary party
quotas (which are in fact implemented). The fifth best performing country (Tanzania) operates the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system and combines this constituency-based system with a constitutional gender quota applied which reserves 30 per cent of seats for women only. These are distributed to parties according to their share of the vote (ie on a PR basis).

The table also demonstrates that countries with constituency-based systems and no quota are the ones with the lowest levels of women’s representation. The exception is local government in Lesotho, with 58 per cent women (the highest level of women’s representation in any political body in SADC). This is a result of a legislated quota in a constituency system in which one-third of the seats are reserved for women only. This one-third will be rotated for a total of three elections, after which the situation will be reviewed. In the 2006 local elections in Lesotho in which this came into effect, 33 per cent women came in through the quota and the other 25 per cent women won through contesting seats in the open elections, giving a total of 58 per cent. The quota withstood a high court challenge. It is an important reminder that with the necessary political will, women’s political representation can be increased in *any* political system in SADC.

**THE PROTOCOL ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

During its 2001 Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Blantyre, Malawi, SADC adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. This protocol laid the basis for all SADC activities and initiatives aimed at regional political integration. Through the Protocol, SADC aims to achieve the following objectives, among others:

- Protecting people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
- Promotion of political cooperation among member states and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
- Development of common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advancing such policy collectively in international fora;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% women in parliament</th>
<th>% women in local govt</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>% women in parliament</td>
<td>% women in local govt</td>
<td>Electoral System</td>
<td>Quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Const/ FPTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional average</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* At national level it is a straight PR system but at local government it is a mixed system
• Preventing, containing and resolving inter-and intra-state conflicts by peaceful means; and
• Promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of member states and encouraging the observance of international human rights instruments.

It is this Protocol that defines clearly the mandate, functions and structures of the SADC OPDSC. Such initiatives as the 2004 Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO), the 2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the on-going efforts to establish the SADC Electoral Advisory Council all have their basis within the Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC INDICATIVE PLAN OF THE ORGAN (SIPO)

During its annual Summit of Heads of State and Government convened in Mauritius in 2004, SADC adopted a new regional strategy, the OPDSC’s SIPO, adopted in 2004. The SIPO provides a framework for institutionalising democracy and good governance and promoting peace and security for, among other things, the attainment of integration and socio-economic development. One of the objectives of SIPO is to ‘promote the development of democratic institutions and practices by State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights’. In order to achieve this objective, SIPO outlines the following strategies:

• Establishing common electoral standards in the region, including a code of electoral conduct;
• Promoting the principles of democracy and good governance;
• Encouraging political parties to accept the outcome of elections held in accordance with the AU and SADC Electoral Standards;
• Establishing a SADC Electoral Commission for the promotion of and respect for human rights; and
• Strengthening member states’ judicial system.

The first line of the foreword of SIPO reads as follows: ‘Peace, security and political stability are the linchpins for socio-economic development’
The principal objective of SIPO is to ‘create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives’ (SADC, 2004:5). It is evident, therefore, that SIPO and RISDP neatly dovetail into each other and aim to play a complementary role in ensuring regional integration and advancing socio-economic development broadly, but more specifically, combating poverty. This is as it should be, because development and poverty eradication require political stability and a peaceful environment wherein even if conflicts prevail, they are managed constructively.

SIPO is divided into four main clusters, namely:

- The Political Sector (democracy and good governance);
- The Defence Sector (military component of security);
- The State Security Sector (policing and intelligence);
- The Public Security Sector (human security).

SADC’s ambitious developmental objectives as outlined by RISDP are unrealisable in an environment of conflict and political instability. As SIPO states, peace, security, and political stability are the linchpins for socio-economic development (SADC 2004). The core objective of SIPO is thus to create a peaceful and stable political and secure environment through which the region will endeavour to realise its socio-economic objectives as embodied in RISDP. Adopted by the 2004 summit held in Mauritius, SIPO’s four sectors provide the necessary framework and strategies for the achievement of peace, security and political stability in the region. SIPO is thus an implementation framework for the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

Among others, the political sector seeks to promote the evolution of common political values and institutions, promote democracy and human rights and develop a common foreign policy approach on issues of mutual concern. The defence sector seeks to promote regional co-operation on matters related to security and defence, to consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact as well as to develop peacekeeping capacity. The objectives of the state security sector are to develop close co-operation between the police and state security services as well as developing regional capacity to respond to...
external military threats. As for the public security sector, the objectives include the development of peacekeeping capacity, observing conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament and to develop close cooperation between the state security and defence forces. The four sectors share the overall objective of protecting the people and safeguarding the region against domestic instability (SADC 2004). SIPO operates through ministerial committees, meetings of defence and security chiefs (e.g., the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and an intelligence-based early warning system.

SIPO’s most notable achievement has been the adoption of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in 2004. On the basis of SIPO, SADC has also made strides in intervening in some member states with a view to mediate their intra-state conflicts. These include conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar.

However, the main criticism that has been levelled against SIPO is its obsession with state security at the expense of human security. Rather than focus on issues of state security and defence, SIPO needs to pay more attention to issues of human security such as disaster management. As with RISDP, SIPO faces some resource constraints. SIPO’s resource constraints are compounded by the fact that SADC member states are reluctant to allow financial support from the International Co-operating Partners. According to the SADC Secretariat, this is because SIPO deals with sensitive political and security matters which are at the core of state sovereignty.

THE SADC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES GOVERNING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections aim at advancing democratic governance and political stability in the SADC region through the promotion of peaceful, credible and democratic elections that deliver legitimate and accountable governments. These principles and guidelines which were adopted in Mauritius in 2004 during the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government are basically part and parcel of the SIPO. In a nutshell, the SADC principles and guidelines have five main components:
• Basic elements for levelling the election playing field;
• Establishment and deployment of SADC election observer missions (SEOMs);
• Code of Conduct for SEOMs;
• Rights and responsibilities for SEOMs; and
• Responsibilities for member states holding elections.

In Table 5, the key principles and guidelines that SADC member states have embraced since 2004 are outlined.

Table 5: Summary of the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in the SADC Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full participation of citizens in the political process</td>
<td>Constitutional and legal guarantees of freedom and rights of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of association</td>
<td>Conducive environment for free, fair and peaceful elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political tolerance</td>
<td>Non-discrimination in voters’ registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular intervals for elections as provided for by the respective national constitutions</td>
<td>Existence of updated and accessible voters’ roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media</td>
<td>Timeous announcement of election date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for</td>
<td>Transparent funding of political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions</td>
<td>Polling stations should be in neutral places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter education</td>
<td>Counting of votes at polling stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by competent national authorities in accordance with the law of the land</td>
<td>Establishment of the mechanism for assisting the planning and deployment of election observer missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge of the election results as provided for in the law of the land</td>
<td>Deployment of the SADC election observer mission at least two weeks before voting day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since their adoption in 2004, the SADC principles and guidelines have been used by SADC in observing elections in all the member states that have held elections thus far.

It is clear that SADC countries have improved their management of elections especially by the introduction of election management bodies (EMBs) as principal interlocutors mediating election contests. However, the effectiveness of the EMBs is also highly influenced by whether or not they are independent, semi-independent or governmental. Be that as it may, the principles still face challenges in that SADC member states ought to translate them into domestic law through deliberate law reform efforts. This will ensure that they are not merely a voluntary instrument, but become a binding proclamation with legal teeth.

The guidelines also define the responsibilities of SADC member states holding elections, as follows:

- Taking measures to ensure the scrupulous implementation of the Principles and Guidelines;
- Establishing impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national EMBs staffed by qualified personnel;
- Safeguarding the human rights and civil liberties of all citizens, including the freedoms of movement, assembly, association and expression, and the right of all stakeholders to campaign and have access to the media during electoral processes;
- Providing adequate logistics and resources for democratic elections;
- Ensuring that adequate security is provided to all parties participating in the election;
- Encouraging the participation of women, the disabled and youth in all aspects of the electoral process; and
- Ensuring the transparency and integrity of the entire electoral process by facilitating the deployment of representatives of political parties and individual candidates at polling and counting stations and by accrediting national and other observers/monitors (SADC, 2004).
With a view to ensuring effective implementation of the SADC principles for democratic elections, SADC has embarked on election observation since 2004. In 2009, SADC observed six elections: in South Africa (April), Malawi (May), Angola (September), Botswana (October), Mozambique (October) and Namibia (December). Once a SADC member state holds an election, a SADC observer mission is invited to witness the credibility and legitimacy of the process. SADC member states face not only the challenge of domesticating the election guidelines into enforceable national laws, but they are yet to show determination and commitment to implement recommendations of election observer missions (including the SADC observer mission) through electoral reforms aimed at political stability and entrenching democratic governance, both of which are a necessary pre-condition for development and poverty eradication. In order to further improve on its election-related work as defined in SIPO, SADC is in the process of establishing the SADC Electoral Advisory Council whose primary mandate is to advise SADC on issues pertaining to electoral processes and foster cooperation amongst stakeholders, including electoral bodies of SADC member states. Its specific objectives are to:

- Facilitate lessons-learning and experience-sharing on electoral processes among SADC member states;
- Encourage the understanding of cost-effective elections in the SADC region;
- Conduct training on election administration and management; and
- Enhance capacity of EMBs, to enable them to deliver credible elections.

In a word, there is a growing momentum towards credible and quality elections in the SADC region in pursuit of political stability. It is worth noting that election-related violent conflicts have great potential to generate political instability.

However, the Principles and Guidelines have several limitations and criticisms have been directed at them. The first limitation relates to the legitimacy of the Principles and Guidelines, as their adoption was largely state-dominated at the expense of the regional civil society (Matlosa,
Secondly, on the basis of state sovereignty, the principles are not binding on SADC member states while there are also no mechanisms in place to hold member states breaching them accountable. In order to have legal status and a binding effect on member states, there is a need to transform the principles and guidelines into a protocol. The Principles and Guidelines are subordinate to national laws and are also mostly devoted to election observation at the expense of election management (Matlosa, 2005). As with RISDP and SIPO, the lack of financial resources by some SADC countries might hamper their ability to implement the principles and thus conduct credible, democratic and peaceful elections.

The point that should not be lost sight of is that, for the first time, the regional states have made a public declaration that they will adhere to certain best practices in conducting elections. This said, however, let us hasten to add that the SADC has proved itself over the years to be extremely good at progressive declarations, but these declarations are hardly ever turned into the political commitment that is necessary to translate them ultimately into implementable policies and political reforms. Thus, the challenge that faces the SADC today is the extent to which the supranational regional body will set out to implement the Declaration adopted in August 2004 and adhere to its letter and spirit, assessing whether or not a country holding an election has complied with the Principles and Guidelines. This has become clear since the principles began to be put into effect from 2004.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES BY OTHER RELATED REGIONAL BODIES

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PARLIAMENTARY FORUM (SADC-PF).
Established in 1997 and based in Windhoek, Namibia, the SADC-Parliamentary Forum is a regional inter-parliamentary body comprising of SADC parliaments. SADC-PF seeks to improve regional integration in the region through the involvement of SADC parliaments. While the Forum has several objectives aimed at advancing regional integration, its most important objective with regard to democracy and governance is its determination to promote peace, security and political stability in the SADC region, thus also contributing to the creation of an environment conducive for socio-economic development.

SADC-PF operates through standing committees. Its Standing Committee on Democratisation, Governance and Gender Equality strengthens the Forum’s peace, security and political stability mandate as it seeks to contribute to the deepening and evolution of sustainable democracy and regional norms that advance peace and political stability, among others. In an attempt to achieve these objectives, the Forum has observed elections in some SADC member states. In observing elections, the Forum seeks to determine their openness, freeness and fairness (www.sadcpf.org).

The SADC-PF has developed Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region since 2001 and has used these guidelines to observe all elections in the region since that time. The SADC-PF norms and standards for elections cover the following areas (a) Elections and individual rights; (b) Elections and the government; (c) and Fostering transparency and integrity in the electoral process.

The first section on elections and individual rights covers the rights of citizens in electing their government of choice, voting and secrecy and freedom of association and expression. The second section on elections and
government covers the following areas: commitment to pluralism and multiparty democracy; date of elections; misuse of public resources and funding of political activities; government, political parties, NGOs and the media; and electoral commissions (SADC-Parliamentary Forum, 2001).

Much more extensive coverage is devoted to the third section on fostering transparency and integrity of the electoral process and the section covers the following areas: registration of voters; voter education; boundary delimitation commissions; nomination process; election campaign; funding of political campaigns; role of the courts; electoral commissions and the media; polling stations; ballot boxes; counting of votes; acceptance of election results; managing post-election conflicts; role of observers; role of the SADC Parliamentary Forum in election observation; code of conduct for the Forum’s regional observers; and reform of electoral laws (SADC-Parliamentary Forum, 2001)

The driving motive for the SADC-PF Norms and Standards is principally the advancement of democratic governance by parliamentarians as elected representatives and political actors and desire to redress political instability in the region. The specific objectives of these Norms and Standards are to (a) strive towards best practices for election management; (b) institutionalise democracy even in between elections; (c) enhance the institutional capacity of parliaments in the governance process; (d) entrench democratic culture and institutionalise mechanisms for constructive management of election-related disputes; (e) develop a peer review mechanism for parliaments on election management with a view to ensure quality of elections; and (f) develop a common standard for election observation through a specific manual that members of Parliament use during observation missions.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS FORUM OF SADC COUNTRIES
The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC (ECF) was formed in 1998 by the region’s electoral commissions. Its objectives are to strengthen cooperation and support among member countries on electoral issues and democracy building, to promote conditions conducive to free, fair and transparent elections in SADC, to promote democracy as a political system of responsible government through the electoral process and finally to
encourage active participation of a citizenry which is well informed about the electoral process.

Since its inception, ECF has observed elections in several SADC countries. As Zibani Maundeni (2007) observes, the ECF is perhaps the organisation most suited to election observation as its observers come from the regional election management bodies (EMBs) which have practical experience in the running of elections. Despite its contribution to democracy and peace and thus the creation of a secure and politically stable environment conducive for socio-economic development and realisation of the RISDP, ECF has no links with SADC as it has been formed as an autonomous regional organisation operating outside SADC structures. The ECF is thus not accountable to SADC and its views and opinions are not binding on SADC and the Organ whose mandates it seeks to advance or contribute towards.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES BY REGIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY AGENCIES

A strong case for a participatory approach to regional integration which opens an avenue for organised civil society and ordinary people to become subjects and not objects of the process has been consistently canvassed in the extant literature (see Landsberg and Mackay, 2005; Rakner, 2009; Osei-Hwedi, 2009; Balule, 2009). In the handbook entitled *Engaging the New Pan-Africanism: Strategies for Civil Society*, published in 2005, Landsberg and Mackay argue for a new participatory paradigm in regional integration processes through deliberative policy-making involving not only the political elites and civil society elites, but ordinary people themselves through their community-based organisations (Landsberg and Mackay, 2005:3). They write, ‘the cost for non-engagement is to leave Africa’s inter-state bodies as mere extensions of governmental interests; not to engage is to leave these institutions untransformed and undemocratic. The challenge is transformation and this can only happen by means of critical and independent engagement by civil society. Such a transformative paradigm could be found in a deliberative policy-making approach’ (2005:3).

The SADC region is still far from embarking upon this process of transformation and democratisation of its regional integration agenda. Lack of broad-based civil society engagement with the SADC agenda is ironical given that chapter 7, article 23 in the 1992 Treaty clearly stipulates that ‘SADC shall seek to involve fully the people of the region and key stakeholders in the process of regional integration. SADC shall cooperate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the region and key stakeholders … in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and people of the region’ (SADC, 2003b:19). The SADC Secretariat has not yet made strides to live up to this noble commitment. In like manner, organised civil society has not mounted sufficient political pressure to exhort the SADC ruling elites to live up to the expectations of this noble principle.
SADC COUNCIL FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (SADC-CNGO)

The SADC-CNGO was established in 1998 with the main purpose of coordinating civil society engagement with SADC in the process of regional integration. It is based in Gaborone, Botswana where the SADC Secretariat is also based. It kicked off with the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (Bocongo) acting as its interim secretariat. It comprises all national umbrellas of NGOs in all the 14 SADC member states. Its main objectives are to:

- Collect and disseminate information on activities of NGOs throughout the region in order to participate effectively in contributing towards national and regional development processes and initiatives;
- Facilitate information-sharing on experiences and best practices among civil society formations;
- Represent NGO interests and perspectives on SADC institutions and other bilateral arrangements with international cooperating partners;
- Provide a platform for NGOs in the region to develop common positions on areas of interest, and to advocate and petition governments for a better enabling environment at national and regional levels.

A careful reading of these objectives reveals while the SADC-CNGO aims to engage SADC and the donors (referred to as cooperating partners), there is no reference whatsoever to community-based organisations. This means that SADC-CNGOs may have fallen into the same trap of perceiving regional integration through statist and elitist lenses. Until and unless SADC-CNGOs develop a specific strategic objective that focuses on how to bring ordinary people, through community-based organisations, into the process of regional integration as subjects with a voice, its efforts towards a critical engagement with SADC is bound to be severely limited.

In 2003, the SADC Secretariat and the SADC-CNGO entered into a formal partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding signed in December 2003. The principal goal of the partnership is to contribute to
the improvement of the standard of living for the peoples of the region through eradication of poverty and creation of employment opportunities. The specific objectives of the Memorandum of Understanding are to:

- Provide a framework for cooperation between SADC and SADC-CNGO;
- Promote cooperation and collaboration in the implementation of SADC-CNGO programmes; and
- Provide a framework which will enable NGOs in the SADC region to cooperate and collaborate in programmes for the well-being and progress of the people of Southern Africa (Memorandum of Understanding between SADC and SADC-CNGO, 2003).

The partnership between SADC and SADC-CNGO as envisaged in the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding exists in the world of theory. It has not yet been translated into practical reality. There is still no formal consultative process between SADC and civil society formations around various critical components of the integration agenda. For instance, SADC civil society did not make inputs formally considered by the SADC Secretariat and other relevant policy organs when the RISDP, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, SIPO and the SADC Elections Principles and Guidelines were conceptualised and ultimately adopted. Despite the existing Memorandum of Understanding, the SADC-CNGO does not have an effective space to critically influence the annual SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government.

Since the recent past, the SADC-CNGO has evolved a tradition of holding parallel civil society forums back-to-back with the annual SADC Summits. Thus far, few of these forums have been held. On 14-16 August 2005, the first civil society forum was held parallel to the SADC Summit in Gaborone, Botswana under the theme ‘Civil Society and the Southern African Development Community: Engaging Southern African Interstate Institutions’. The second civil society forum was held parallel to the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in Maseru, Lesotho on 14-16 August 2006 under the theme ‘Democratic Governance and Regional Economic Integration in Southern Africa’. The third civil society forum
took place in Lusaka, Zambia parallel to the SADC summit in August 2007 under the theme ‘Ensuring Effective Participation in Regional Development and Democratic Governance in Southern Africa’. How effective these forums are in terms of promoting civil society engagement with the SADC agenda is yet to be established. To this end, SADC-CNGO is well advised to undertake a review of its work including these annual forums and assess its overall impact on SADC’s integration project.

ELECTORAL INSTITUTE FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (EISA)
Since its inception in July 1996, EISA has established itself as a leading institution and influential player dealing with elections and democracy-related issues on the African continent (see Maundeni, 2007; Seirlis, 2008). The organisation’s strategic objectives are:

- To enhance electoral processes to ensure their inclusiveness and legitimacy;
- To promote effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness;
- To strengthen governance institutions to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes;
- To promote principles, values and practices that lead to a culture of democracy and human rights;
- To create a culture of excellence that leads to consistently high quality products and services;
- To position EISA as a leader that consistently influences policy and practice in the democracy and governance sector.

The vision of EISA is ‘an African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment’. This vision is executed through the organisational mission of ‘striving for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, a human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa’ (www.eisa.co.za).

In pursuit of the promotion of democratic governance and credible elections in Southern Africa, EISA has embarked on applied research, capacity
building, policy dialogue, technical assistance, election observation, publishing and the dissemination of information electronically. All these initiatives have proved extremely valuable to relevant democracy and governance stakeholders in the region and have therefore, in a modest way, demonstrated EISA’s contribution to political integration in the region.

Furthermore, in collaboration with the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries (ECF), EISA developed the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC Region. Adopted in 2003, these principles seek to improve the legitimacy of elections, thus avoiding election-related disputes and consolidating democracy in the region. PEMMO covers the period before, during and after the elections (EISA-ECF 2003), thus not only ensuring democratic elections but the peaceful resolution of election disputes. EISA has also conducted research relating to democracy and governance in the region (Maundeni 2007). However, SADC and its member states have not implemented EISA recommendations emanating from its research exercise (ibid).

In order to expand its utility throughout the region in terms of best electoral practices, PEMMO is available in three languages, namely English, French and Portuguese. EISA has also used these principles in observing almost all general elections in the SADC region since 2004. EISA observation missions are coordinated by its own staff forming a secretariat and comprise electoral commissions, CSOs, political parties, academics, political parties, members of parliament and faith-based organisations etc.

PEMMO, like the SADC-PF instrument mentioned earlier, outlines problems facing SADC countries in elections and offers best practices for improvements to be introduced. PEMMO covers a wide gamut of the electoral process, as follows: (a) the institutional framework; (b) pre-election phase processes; (c) election phase processes; (d) post-election phase processes; and (e) election observation and monitoring.

The institutional framework covers the following areas: constitutional
and legal framework; electoral systems; election management body; and conflict management (EISA/ECF, 2003). The section on the pre-election phase covers challenges and best practices around, among others, constituency delimitation, voter registration, nomination process, campaign process, use of public resources, role of security forces, political party finance; and civic and voter education (EISA/ECF, 2003).

The third section on the election phase deals with polling stations, secrecy of the ballot, ballot papers, ballot boxes and election materials, and counting. The fourth section on post-election phase outlines problems and offers best practices around announcement of overall results, acceptance of results, post-election review and post-election disputes. The fifth and last section covers election monitoring and observation. Overall, the EISA/ECF PEMMO is surely the most technically robust election management instrument in the region, compared to the other existing instruments. Yet, to be sure, it is also less robust and thorough when it comes to election monitoring and observation. It should be noted that EISA/ECF initiative, unlike the SADC-PF, does not have as comprehensive an election monitoring and observation guide as its election management component.

Like the SADC-PF Norms and Standards and the SADC principles discussed above, PEMMO is aimed at ensuring a distinctive contribution of civil society and election management bodies to democracy building and consolidation in the region. Specifically, PEMMO is meant to achieve the following, among others: standardise election management systems in the SADC region; promote democratic culture and practice in between elections; suggest best election management and observation practices; provide technical nuts and bolts for electoral audits and electoral reforms in the region; and encourage peer review by electoral management bodies with a view to ensure procedural certainty while guarding against substantive uncertainty in electoral contests.

Besides undertaking its own election observation missions using PEMMO as its guide, EISA also supports domestic observation by local NGOs. Between 1998 and 2009, EISA acted as the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN), which is a regional body comprising national
organisations dealing with electoral issues. Currently, SADC-ESN has its own secretariat based at the Zimbabwe Election Support Network in Harare. Although EISA is no longer the secretariat, it continues to collaborate and partner with individual members of the SADC-ESN through bilateral arrangements in pursuit of deepening democratic governance through peaceful, credible and legitimate elections in the SADC region.
SADC INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
While the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992 was a positive development for the SADC region, the institutional effectiveness of this new body still leaves a lot to be desired. First, the SADC Secretariat remains weak without the requisite political gravitas to implement the regional integration mandate of the regional economic community. Power is centralised in the Heads of State and Government. This undermines the supra-nationality that SADC requires in order to make headway in pursuing political integration. If this problem is to be redressed, the executive secretary and the SADC Secretariat should be accorded meaningful political power to drive the regional integration process while still exercising accountability to Heads of State and Government. The overwhelming powers of the Heads of State and Government have to be curtailed if this is to be achieved.

Secondly, the pursuit of regional integration in the SADC region evolves largely on the basis of each member state pursuing its own national interests and goals and in that process national sovereignty becomes paramount and a hindrance to the pursuit of the regional purpose (i.e. regional integration). This problem can be redressed only if SADC member states are willing and prepared to share or pool together sovereignty. In a word, SADC member states should be prepared to cede a portion of their sovereignty to SADC as a regional body. Although this may seem easier today under conditions of globalisation and the increasingly eroding value of nation-states, national sovereignty is still a powerful tool in international relations and the way states relate to each other at regional levels.

Thirdly, part of the problem in implementing the SADC regional mandate around political integration, especially through democratisation, rotates around the institutional weaknesses of the Directorate of the OPDSC. The Directorate does not have adequate resources including human, financial and technological resources. Besides its lack of resources, the
Directorate, just like the Secretariat, also lacks the requisite political power to implement the various declarations, conventions and decisions of SADC. Every programme/project that the Directorate has to embark upon has to have the blessing, first and foremost, of the SADC Organ Summit, if not of the SADC Summit proper.

Fourthly, the SNCs are either dysfunctional or non-existent in some countries. These committees should be revamped, strengthened and provided with the requisite resources to drive SADC regional mandates, including democratisation at the national level. They can prove to be a good vehicle for the visibility and popularisation of SADC initiatives among SADC citizens.

Fifthly, another problem confronting SADC’s institutional arrangements in pursuit of political integration relates to membership of SADC member states to other regional economic communities (RECs). This results in the commitments of SADC member states to the regional agenda competing with their commitments to agendas of the other RECs in which they hold membership.

RELEVANCE AND APPLICATION OF THE SADC POLICY FRAMEWORKS
One area where SADC has really excelled is in evolving a comprehensive normative framework aimed at facilitating regional political integration through democratisation. This normative framework is impressively comprehensive and covers a broad array of issues that are both relevant and germane to the advancement of democratic governance, peace, security and political stability in the region. It is one thing to evolve a comprehensive array of progressive protocols and conventions and it is quite another to demonstrate the political will and commitment to implement them.

A number of challenges still remain in relation to the meaningful application of the existing normative framework. First, all the protocols, conventions, norms and standards developed thus far are not binding on member states, but rather declaratory, voluntary and non-committal, as it were. This situation results in a lack of political commitment by SADC member states to implement the agreed conventions, norms and
standards. SADC needs to transcend the declaratory and voluntary nature of its conventions, principles, norms and standards aimed at advancing democratic governance, peace, security and political stability. These normative frameworks should be made binding and compulsory on all member states and to this extent they should be given adequate legal teeth.

Secondly, SADC member states hardly, if at all, take measures to translate regional protocols, norms, principles, guidelines and standards into practice through appropriate constitutional, legal and electoral reforms. For instance, after holding their elections, few countries undertake post-election audits or reviews informed by reports of both international and domestic observer reports, which process in turn drives appropriate electoral reforms with a view to improve the quality of elections and legitimacy of their outcomes.

Thirdly, the most glaring failure of the SADC normative framework actually relates to the strides made, thus far, in achieving gender equality in the governance arena at the regional level and within each one of the member states. While the adoption of the 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development was a commendable step in the right direction, very few SADC member states have achieved 30 per cent and above in relation to representation and participation of women in their organs of governance. The majority have registered a dismally poor performance. If SADC states are to achieve 50 per cent gender parity in governance by 2015, they need to demonstrate political commitment in this regard, undertake appropriate electoral reforms and introduce gender quotas.

Fourthly, both the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and SIPO tend to define security in state-centric terms and fail to incorporate human security dimensions. Regional security issues should be defined in a broader framework that combines both state and human security and the political integration process should also be perceived as a responsibility not only of states, but of the SADC peoples as key actors, not passive observers on the margins.

Fifth and finally, SADC should endeavour to strengthen its sanctions
regime in case of breach of its protocols and conventions relating to the advancement of political integration through democratisation such as the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.

**VALUE OF PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS**

The integration agenda still remains state-centric, elite-dominated and exclusionary. Ordinary people still remain objects, and not subjects, in a regional project ostensibly aimed at improving their lives. One of the tragedies of regional integration in Southern Africa, therefore, is the lack of critical and independent engagement of organised civil society and ordinary people with the state-driven regional policies and strategies. The state-driven integration process driven by the SADC Secretariat does not adequately open space for civil society to influence the common regional agenda (see Landsberg & Mackay, 2005). Civil society on its own does not mount adequate political pressure to claim its own space within the frameworks of RISDP and SIPO. All things being equal, civil society organisations ought to play a vital role in both the governance and development dimensions of regional integration in Southern Africa. Regional integration should not be the exclusive preserve of the ruling elite, the private sector and the donor community alone. Thus, regional integration, of necessity, has to involve a wide array of actors and stakeholders playing complementary (mutually reinforcing), but at times contradictory (mutually exclusive), roles.

Regional integration should aim at achieving democratic governance and human development. It should aim at democratising the systems, institutions, procedures used in the running of the national affairs of a country. It should involve improving people’s livelihoods especially in terms of providing for the fundamental needs of every human being, namely food, shelter, clothing, health and education, among others. This is what the renowned Indian political economist and Nobel Prize winner, Armatya Sen (1999a; 1999b), aptly terms ‘democracy as freedom’. Meaningful regional integration may not be realised without democratic governance. By the same token, people-centred regional integration may not be achieved without the material improvements of people’s socio-economic status through sustainable human development. Thus, achieving regional integration should be a fairly inclusive process.
marked by collective responsibility between and among the following actors/stakeholders: state/government, private sector, labour, donors and CSOs.

Until and unless regional integration is marked by social inclusiveness, citizen participation and popular control, its positive effects are not likely to trickle down to the ordinary person in the lowest social strata of society. To a considerable degree, the inclusion and participation of CSOs in regional integration go a long way in bridging the gap between state-to-state integration and people-to-people integration. Thus, one of the key policy questions to pose today is not whether or not CSOs ought to be involved in regional integration, because ipso facto they should be key players in this process. Instead, a pertinent policy question to pose is how best to involve CSOs in regional integration in such a way that their programmes and activities complement efforts by the states/government, private sector and the donor community. For purposes of effective policy engagement with regional integration, civil society should be organised at both national and regional levels.

In order to foster mutually beneficial partnerships between SADC and civil society formations, quite a number of initiatives need to be embarked upon. First, SADC should shift, much more fundamentally, the persisting mindset that NGOs represent an opposition to governments and that NGOs drive external foreign policy agendas that do not accord with national interests. SADC member states should perceive NGOs as key stakeholders (subjects rather than objects) in the pursuit of regional integration.

Second, SADC should open up adequate space for civil society contributions and participation in the conceptualisation, development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of its strategies, programmes and policies aimed at achieving regional integration.

Thirdly, SADC’s efforts in pursuing credible, peaceful and democratic elections through the newly established SADC Electoral Advisory Council should be complementary and not duplicative of the efforts thus far made by the ECF. To this end, the SADC Secretariat and the ECF Secretariat should coordinate their efforts much more closely than is the case now.
Fourthly, SADC should facilitate the transformation of the SADC Parliamentary Forum into a fully-fledged regional parliament along the lines of the East African Legislative Assembly. The current gulf between SADC and SADC-PF should be bridged. It is becoming a major cost to efforts towards political integration. SADC-PF should play more of a watchdog role holding SADC Heads of State and Government to account, the same way that national parliaments do to their own national governments.

Fifthly, SADC must endeavour to turn the Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC-CNGO into a living document through partnerships on selected programmes that advance political integration through democratisation.

Sixthly, the progressively evolving partnership between the SADC Secretariat on one hand and such regional think tanks as EISA, the Formative Process Research on Regional Integration in Southern Africa and Centre for Conflict Resolution around regional integration, governance, peace and security should be deepened and further consolidated. These institutions, together with many others, must coordinate their efforts towards providing SADC with the requisite technical assistance to deliver on its regional democracy and governance mandate.
The purpose of this study was to assess the progress, problems and prospects of political integration and democratic governance in the SADC region. In particular, attention was directed at SADC’s efforts towards political integration. We reviewed the institutional and policy frameworks that anchor and drive political integration in the region with a view to advancing democratic governance and achieving sustainable peace, security and political stability. In particular, we noted that SIPO seeks to create a secure and peaceful environment within which the socio-economic goals of RISDP could be realised.

Whereas the institutional framework exists for the realisation of the objectives of SIPO and thus RISDP, the study has found some limitations that deserve attention if the SADC region is to become democratic, peaceful and achieve sustainable human development successfully. Among others, SIPO lacks the financial, technical and human resources to drive the region’s political integration and governance ambitions. Absolute state sovereignty also militates against deep political integration as member states have not and seem not willing to cede part of their sovereignty to SADC.

The member states also continue to remain the dominant players in the political integration exercise of the SADC. Other stakeholders such as regional and national civil society do not play any significant role partly because the member states are somehow hostile towards their participation but also because they are themselves in a dysfunctional state. Some have even collapsed. This makes the political integration project in the SADC region both state-centric and elite-driven, thus lacking citizen participation and popular legitimacy.

For political integration and democratic governance to be realised in the SADC region, not only does SIPO require financial and resource strengthening but there is a need for the member states to cede part of
their sovereignty to SADC. Additionally, SADC member states need to deliberately engage and involve civil society in decision-making processes at both regional and national levels.

Although state security is important, there is however also a need for SADC to pay more attention to human security issues. At the present moment human security issues are by far eclipsed by concerns about state security. Furthermore, the SADC protocols and other conventions, such as the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, should be binding on the member states, who should be encouraged to domesticate them and incorporate them into their national laws and policies. The breach of SADC protocols and other agreed-upon conventions should also attract some sanctions. Finally, some institutional reforms are also necessary. Most importantly is the need to empower the SADC Secretariat to effectively drive the organisation’s political and development objectives while also incorporating SADC-PF into mainstream SADC institutions as a regional parliament.
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He was commissioned by the African Union (AU) between 2005 and 2007 to develop the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which was adopted by the AU Heads of State and Government in January 2007. He was part of the APRM Country Review Mission to Uganda in February 2008 which produced that country’s APR Review Report and the National Programme of Action endorsed by the APRM Heads of State and Government Forum in Egypt during the AU Summit. He was part of a three-person expert team that worked with the African Union Peace and Security Division in 2008 to develop a strategy for the AU Panel of the Wise to develop a strategy for the effective prevention, management and resolution of election-related conflicts in Africa which was adopted by the AU Heads of State and Government summit of June 2009 held in Sirte, Libya.

Dr Matlosa is a democracy and governance specialist and has researched and written widely on various governance and development themes including electoral system reforms, political parties, regional security, conflict management, democracy and development, election observation/monitoring, regional integration and migration. His most recent publication is ‘The Role of the Southern African Development Community in the Management of Zimbabwe’s Post-Election Crisis’, *Journal of African Elections*, Vol 8, Number 2, October 2009.
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ANNEXURE 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

ENHANCING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IN IMPLEMENTING ITS DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMES

RESPONDENT’S NAME:

INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION:

DESIGNATION:

INTERVIEWER’S NAME:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

PLACE OF INTERVIEW:

1. General

1. What factors led to the transformation of SADC in 1992?

2. What are the main benefits of this transformation thus far?

3. What are the main challenges of this transformation thus far?

4. As part of the transformation, SADC underwent restructuring. What are the positive and negative results/impacts of the restructuring process?

5. How does democratic governance fit into the broader mandate of regional integration pursued by SADC?

2. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)

6. Explain the main goals, objectives and key elements of the RISDP?
7. Is political stability important for the achievement of the goals and objectives of RISDP? If so why and how?

8. Is democratic governance important for the achievement of the goals and objectives of RISDP? If so why and how?

9. What progress has SADC made in achieving the goals and objectives of the RISDP?

10. Does SADC have adequate resources (financial, technical, human etc) to achieve the goals and objectives of RISDP?

11. What additional resources do you think SADC needs to achieve the goals and objectives of RISDP?

### 3. Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO)

12. Explain the main goals, objectives and key elements of SIPO?

13. Explain how SADC has implemented the four main elements of SIPO since 2004 namely: (a) the political sector; (b) the defence sector; (c) the state security sector; and (d) the public security sector?

14. What are the main achievements within the four sectors of SIPO?

15. What are the main challenges within the four sectors of SIPO?

16. Do SADC member states make an effort to translate the principles enshrined in SIPO into national laws and policies? If so how?

17. What measures does SADC take in case of a breach of SIPO principles by a member state?

### 4. SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

18. What factors led to the development and adoption of the principles and guidelines governing democratic elections in 2004?

19. What steps did SADC take in developing these principles?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Which stakeholders participated in the development of the principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. What success stories does SADC have thus far in the implementation of the principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. What challenges is SADC faced with in implementing the principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Do SADC member states make an effort to translate the principles into national laws and policies? If so how?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. What measures does SADC take in case of a breach of the principles by a member state?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. SADC-Civil Society Engagement

25. In its efforts to achieve the goals of RISDP, SIPO and the principles and guidelines governance democratic elections, how does SADC engage civil society organisations at both national and regional levels?

26. What are the main achievements of SADC-Civil Society Engagement in implementing its democracy and governance mandate?

27. What are the main challenges in SADC-Civil Society Engagement in implementing its democracy and governance mandate?

28. What are the main achievements and challenges of SADC’s interactions with the election management bodies at both national and regional levels?

29. What are the main achievements and challenges of SADC’s interactions with legislative bodies at both national and regional levels?

30. In what ways, does the general public in each SADC member state get involved in SADC’s democracy and governance programmes?
### 6. Resource Mobilisation

31. How does SADC mobilise its resources for its democracy and governance programmes?

32. What resource constraints does SADC have in implementing its democracy and governance programmes?

33. What is the proportion of external funding vis-à-vis member-states contributions towards implementation of the SADC democracy and governance programmes?

34. In what ways can SADC resolve the resource constraints relating to the implementation of its democracy and governance programmes?

### 7. Institutional Effectiveness

35. What is the full staff complement of the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation broken down by gender?

36. Is this staff complement adequate for SADC to realise the goals and objectives of its democracy and governance programmes?

37. What is the specialisation of the current staff complement within the Directorate?

38. What is the specific mandate of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)?

39. What were the main achievements and challenges facing the ISDSC over the past five (5) years?

40. What is the specific mandate of the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC)?

41. What were the main achievements and challenges facing the ISPDC over the past five (5) years?

**ON BEHALF OF EISA, I THANK YOU SINCERELY FOR YOUR TIME.**
## ANNEXURE 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Designation</th>
<th>Email-address</th>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
ABOUT EISA

EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance fields throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values and practices and to enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes: electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA was formerly the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is currently the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

VISION
An African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment

MISSION
EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa
VALUES AND PRINCIPLES
Key values and principles of governance that EISA believes in include:

- Regular free and fair elections
- Promoting democratic values
- Respect for fundamental human rights
- Due process of law/rule of law
- Constructive management of conflict
- Political tolerance
- Inclusive multiparty democracy
- Popular participation
- Transparency
- Gender equality
- Accountability
- Promoting electoral norms and standards

OBJECTIVES

- To enhance electoral processes to ensure their inclusiveness and legitimacy
- To promote effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness
- To strengthen governance institutions to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes
- To promote principles, values and practices that lead to a culture of democracy and human rights
- To create a culture of excellence that leads to consistently high quality products and services
- To position EISA as a leader that consistently influences policy and practice in the sector

CORE ACTIVITIES

- Research
- Policy Dialogue
- Publications and Documentation
- Capacity Building
- Election Observation
- Technical Assistance
- Balloting
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