INTRODUCTION

The notion of decentralisation brought with it an epoch of many challenges characterised by conflict that has affected many organisations in the less developed countries. There is a need for local authorities to have the political, administrative, financial and development capacity as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the decentralisation policy. Literature on decentralisation indicates that this capacity has largely been absent in the post-colonial Africa. The question of capacity therefore remains a challenge to any country that aspires to have a successful decentralisation policy.

This paper looks at decentralisation policy in the context of Lesotho and the challenges that await local authorities. It should be pointed out that the paper recognizes the fact that there are different forms of decentralisation, namely; deconcentration, devolution and delegation. These forms of decentralisation will not be explained nor debated here not because they are trivial but because they make no difference in terms of the gist of the paper. Emphasis is placed on the connection between decentralisation, development and conflict as a relationship that is often not clearly articulated when discussing about the decentralisation challenges. It is the understanding of the author that conflict is one of the factors that can cripple development endeavours if ignored by the decentralisation policy.

Firstly, the paper provides a background to Lesotho’s system of governance. This is followed by an examination of the pre-local
government election phase. This is critical as a foundation phase for the successful ushering of decentralisation in Lesotho. Special attention is given to the present situation in Lesotho pertaining to the role of democratic structures and traditional structures. Secondly, the paper brings up the post local government election phase with a look at the legal framework and the envisaged roles and functions to be performed by the would-be local authorities. Thirdly, the paper also addresses the way forward by way of analysing the conflict with specific attention to aspects such as the parties to the conflict, their interests, their relationships, the conflict issues and the history and context of the issues. Finally, the paper suggests options that may be utilised for the resolution of the conflict.

**Decentralisation**

There are various ways in which decentralisation is defined depending on the theories that people use. This paper does not attempt to give a definition of this concept, but adopts the thinking that decentralisation is the transfer of responsibility, power and resources from the central government to local citizens that gives them *inter alia*, an opportunity to formulate and implement their own development programmes. Decentralisation is the distribution of power horizontally not hierarchically in order to gain more effective achievement of locally selected goals. According to Wallis (1999: 96) decentralisation requires special conditions before it can succeed because of the potential for conflict created whenever there are parallel sets of officials who by law, are to some extent independent of each other.

**Development**

Similar to decentralisation, there are many ways in which development is defined by various scholars and practitioners. The commonality in most definitions is that development is regarded as the improvement of the social and economic lives of the people. Max-Neef (1991) suggests that the fulfillment of basic needs does not only lead to development but that development is also another basic need. The tendency to look at development as having to do with the improvement of the lives of the people, both socially and economically tends to omit the fact that conflict is also a factor that hampers development. Development therefore, has to be defined as the improvement of the people’s lives, economically and socially in an environment of well-managed conflict.

**Conflict**

Conflict is defined by Rubin et al (1994:5) as a perceived divergence of interests, or beliefs that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. Conflict, like all social phenomena, can manifest itself in many complicated forms. Some of these may be violent and inflict pain and suffering to parties in conflict and to other people who may not be directly involved due to its spillover effect. In this paper however, conflict is used to emphasise the incompatibility of interests between the parties to the conflict both at the central government level and local government level. Conflict is used in this paper as both the antecedent and the consequent of the incompatibility of interests.

**Background**

Lesotho is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy and her system of governance follows a two-tier structure. The one tier is chieftainship and the other tier is comprised of the representatives who are democratically elected and from
whom the majority of the executive members are appointed. The Parliament consists of two houses, the Senate (also called the Upper House) and the National Assembly (also called the Lower House). As a former British colony, Lesotho has copied a Westminster system under which the Prime Minister is appointed from a party with majority of seats in Parliament to head the government. Most of the ministers of cabinet are appointed from within the National Assembly and there are a few ministers who have been appointed from the Senate. The Senate consists of twenty two Principal Chiefs, two Independent Chiefs\(^1\) and nine other people appointed by the King on the advice of the State Council and the Prime Minister.

The country adopted a new electoral model – mixed member proportional model (MMP) prior to the 2002 general elections. This is a combination of first past the post (FPP) and proportional representation (PR) systems. This change of electoral model was prompted by the 1998 political riots which Matlosa (2003:8-9) suggests almost precipitated a civil war. The conflict was thwarted by the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) armed forces. The National Assembly now consists of one hundred and twenty members. Eighty of these Members of Parliament are elected through FPP model while forty are in Parliament through PR model. The Senate acts as a “watch dog” and among many of its functions in Parliament it is charged with protecting the peoples’ interests. This means that they have to consider the activities of the National Assembly and advise it so that the decisions that are finally made by Parliament do not have a negative effect on the people.

In order for any bill that is approved by the National Assembly to be passed to the King for royal assent, it first has to go to the Senate. According to the Constitution of Lesotho (1993:78) the two houses of Parliament must have a consensus although the “Lower House” can still pass a law even if the “Upper House” does not agree with it. This is one of the problem areas that cause conflict between the two houses. This disequilibrium in terms of the legitimacy of the two houses has a ripple effect at the grass roots level. Members of the National Assembly deem themselves as the “true” representatives of the people having derived their mandate from the electorate while the Senators are there mainly by virtue of their being chiefs.

Legitimacy in this context is accompanied by responsibility. The “Lower House” sees itself as having the constitutional mandate to deliver development. On the other hand, the Senate believes that it has the right to be involved in matters of development because it is not “partisan” and so it is in a better position to address community issues with impartiality. This perception and the whole question of legitimacy can be traced back in history. The chiefs were the authority that dealt not only with administration but everything ranging from culture to security. The chiefs are still associated with culture and are regarded by many ordinary people as symbols of unity. The government officials, such as the police, also acknowledge the fundamental role played by chiefs. They refer to the chiefs as “the first

\(^1\) Below the Principal Chiefs yet very close in terms of status and responsibility are two Independent Chiefs who enjoy an almost similar status to Principal Chiefs by virtue of them being the in-laws of the royal house. They do not get into Senate automatically but form part of the eleven appointees. There are also about five hundred and six Headmen who are answerable to Area Chiefs. At the bottom of the hierarchy, there are about one thousand-two hundred Customary Chiefs.
police officers” in the communities because the chief is the first custodian of law at village level.

PRE-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION PHASE

Administrative Function Versus Developmental Function

The success of Lesotho’s decentralisation policy lies in its ability to draw a clear line between administrative and developmental responsibilities and getting the institutional arrangements right. It has been indicated that there is a tug-of-war in Parliament between senators and members of the National Assembly regarding their powers, roles and functions. The situation in Parliament has had a trickle-down effect, influencing the chiefs and councillors at the local government level. Currently, local administration is effected through chieftainship institution while local issues of development are planned and implemented by the Interim Community Councils in the rural areas and Urban Boards in the urban areas, with the exception of Maseru district whose urban area is under the Maseru Municipal Council “Maseru City Council”. The Urban Boards and Maseru City Council operate under the Urban Government Act of 1983, that will be repealed once the local government elections have been held.

The current Interim Community Councils are already engaged in power struggle with the chiefs. Before 1994, under the military rule, the chiefs were chairpersons of the village development councils as per the Development Councils Order. They were not elected into councils but were ex-officio members. This was changed in 1994 by the Development Councils (Amendment) Act (Development Councils Amendment Act 1994:3). The chiefs could no longer be chairpersons but were still members of the councils. This change made the chiefs very uncomfortable as it affected their status quo. They became an opposition force to the councils, despite the fact that they were still members of those particular councils.

Many chiefs, although prohibited by law, still allocated land without consulting the councils. They deliberately allocated land in defiance of the law. This they regarded as having stripped them of powers to perform their duties and to rule. This also triggered tension between the Ministry of Local Government and the communities as a result of the Ministry’s tough measures against offences related to land. The chiefs and the people who were found to have violated the law on land allocation were prosecuted. The chiefs felt belittled at being prosecuted. The historiography on chieftaincy issues in Southern Africa and elsewhere points to the fact that the chiefs were the prosecutors and not the ones that were prosecuted.

Each of the two tiers of the system of government has its own identity. The advocates of chieftainship institution see it as representing the identity of the people of Lesotho, including the politicians. They regard the modern politics and the politicians as an imported system that is alien to the people. The politicians are nonetheless strongly averse to this perception. There is therefore a conflict of identity, which is one of the deep-rooted kinds of conflict that are often difficult to deal with. It is against this background

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2 The Interim Councils have not been elected but nominated at the village level as a temporary measure while awaiting democratically elected councils anticipated to be in place before the end of 2004. Their jurisdiction will be the district, municipal and community levels respectively.
of overwhelming difference in opinion about each other that the conflict between the chiefs and politicians escalates. Those who favour chieftaincies are afraid that their chiefs, from the Principal Chiefs down to a Customary Chief might be subjected to the administration of “commoners” under decentralisation and that would be derogatory to them.

The fissures between local authorities and chiefs have led to arrested development in some council areas. The situation is aggravated more by the non-intervention of the central government, which appears to have no appropriate mechanisms (except rights based) to respond to any kind of conflict within and between councils. The absence of government intervention is also slowly paralysing the district administration where there is another tug-of-war between Principal Chiefs and District Secretaries. In some cases the conflict is between the District Secretaries and heads of departments, where the latter refuse to recognise the authority of the former and prefer to report directly to the mother ministries. The duties of District Secretary are currently compromised to some extent because the District Secretary has to accommodate the Principal Chief’s interests. The Principal Chiefs still enjoy popular support from the people who see them as their idols.

The administration becomes difficult under this bi-polarity due to lack of clear mode of operation. Also related to this problem is the nature of chieftainship boundaries, which are not contiguous with district boundaries. One of the districts is shared by nine chieftainship wards, which also overlap into other districts thus presenting a coordination problem on the part of the concerned District Secretary. This is yet another mammoth task that faces the local authorities at the district level (District Council) and sub district level (community council). It will be necessary for the local authority to walk on a thin line so as not to antagonise the Chiefs, while at the same time exerting their authority.

The experimentation with the establishment of the Interim Councils has provided indispensable lessons of complexities and contradictions, which pose a threat to operating the Local Government Act. It must be mentioned that although the magnitude of tension in the current situation is not very high, there is a possibility that the conflict will escalate because of the powers, roles and functions that will have been given to the local authorities in the post election phase. The danger that will be posed by its escalation is that the entire term of the councillors could be affected. This is one of the challenges that face the current and future local authorities. This has to be overcome at all costs because failure to do so would frustrate many, if not all, of the development efforts.

**POST-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION PHASE**

In the light of the above background, it is important to focus on the challenges that await the local authorities after the local government elections. As it has been mentioned in the introduction, the pre election and post election phases are very much inter-connected. The successful planning that is imperative in pre-election phase forms the foundation for the successful implementation of local government in Lesotho. There are early warning signs in this phase that indicate the presence of conflict, albeit latent. The signs are also there that this conflict will

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3 The government uses arbitration, which is not ideal in conflicts around development. An ideal mechanism is citizen diplomacy where communities resolve their own conflicts.
escalate further in the post election phase, thus rendering it intractable.

The main thrust of Lesotho’s decentralisation system is to promote the socio-economic welfare of all citizens, targeting two critical pillars of service delivery and good governance. Namely, these are the improvement of services delivery and promotion of popular participation (Ministry of Local Government 2003:2). It is to be expected therefore, that in carrying out their mandate, local authorities have to take care of factors such as:

- Cost effectiveness,
- Human resources capacity,
- Conditions set by donors
- Maximum mobilisation of resources.

**Legal Framework**

In 1997, the Parliament of Lesotho enacted the Local Government Act as a legal framework that is meant to guide the implementation of local government in the country. This was followed by the enactment of the Local Government Elections Act 1998 which provides procedures pertaining to how elections are to be conducted. The objectives of Local Government Act 1997 are:

- To provide for good governance, ownership and accountability in matters of public policy.
- To facilitate democratic control over the development planning process.
- To move decision-making, resource allocation and local level development planning into the hands of the people.
- To provide for equitable distribution of human, institutional, infrastructural and financial resources across the country.
- To enhance the effectiveness of developmental activities by creating opportunities for elimination or reduction of duplication in development efforts.
- To facilitate sustainability through matching development decision with local conditions.
- To facilitate grater speed and flexibility of decision making as a result of reduced central direction and control.
- To facilitate mobilisation and maximisation of local resources, technologies and skill.

**Roles and Functions of Local Authorities**

It is axiomatic that the main purpose of decentralisation is to enhance development and good governance. It follows therefore, that the major responsibility of local authorities is to address the developmental needs of their communities. As Reddy (1999:9) puts it, local authorities are primarily created to provide services within defined geographical areas as a means to close the gap caused by the government’s inability to attend to all issues of government.

The Local Government Act 1997 outlines the functions of local authorities, be they municipal, community or district councils. These functions are and not limited to the following:

- Control of natural resources and environmental protection
- Public health
- Land/site allocation
- Grazing control
- Allocation of burial grounds
- Control of building permits
- Local administration of central regulations an licences
- Care of mothers, young children, the aged and integration of people with disabilities
- Mortuaries, burial of bodies of destitute persons and unclaimed bodies
• Forestry preservation and improvement of designated forests in local authority areas.

These functions are limited so that there is still a need for the central government to continue performing those other functions that are not performed by these councils due to their lack of capacity. The law does not clearly show the implications of the decentralised functions in terms of how the local authorities will relate to the central government in their execution of these functions. For instance, it only says local authorities will control natural resources and environmental protection without differentiating the different types of natural resources and stating which ones will remain with the central government. Ambiguities in the law can be used by people for various reasons to cause disputes.

There is a dire need for government to spell out how its various sectors at the central level will be involved at the local level in order to minimise confusion and duplication of efforts hence conflict that is characteristic of the present situation. The question of central-local relations, if not well defined, can be a source of conflict. The prevalence of conflictual central-local relations in both the pre-local government elections phase and the post-elections phase could become a serious threat to effective delivery of services.

Most of the functions mentioned above are in and of themselves, causes of conflict because some of them have been traditionally the domain of the chiefs. The chiefs fear the loss of the functions to local authorities, whom they already eye with suspicion. The intended transfer of some of these functions to councils look hard to swallow by some chiefs. There is a likelihood that they may mobilise support from their supporters using their residual power to disapprove of the transfer which they may believe threatens their status quo. The challenge to local authorities is therefore, to ensure a successful service delivery through proper planning and implementation so that critics will not regard the transfer of the decentralised functions as a mere ephemeral action. This will also help the local authorities to attract more support from donors who, according to Kabemba (2003:51) are currently reluctant to get involved except to pledge to assist when decentralisation process proceeds positively.

The process leading to the establishment of local authorities has already demonstrated the intricacies of conflict and their potential to affect service delivery. This situation presents a challenge to local authorities to be in a position to carry out their developmental responsibility while at the same time being in control of the conflicts that emanate from the roles and functions that are conflated between administrative and developmental roles. Local authorities should thus be able to determine where their priorities lay in terms of whether they focus on development only or on conflict or whether they deal with both without overstretching limited financial resources.

WAY FORWARD

Analysis of the Conflict

It has been indicated in the beginning of this paper that conflict can be both the cause of sour relations at one level and the result of those relations at another. It has a multiplier effect so that one may have difficulty in trying to indicate a certain incident as the only cause of a conflict. The conflict analysis checklist below (Shale 2004:84) can be used to analyse the cause of the conflict that has been
discussed throughout this paper in the hope of providing some possible solutions to assist the smooth operation of local authorities in Lesotho.

The conflict analysis checklist assists in investigating the underlying issues that are often the real cause of the conflict. It is through this tool that the parties’ interests, power base, relationships, real issues, history and options are revealed for a better understanding of a conflict. The understanding of a conflict leads to adequate measures for its resolution.

**Figure 1: Conflict Analysis Checklist**

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<th>3. THE SUBSTANCE</th>
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<th>5. STRATEGIC ISSUES</th>
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<td>5.1 What forum exists for dealing with the conflict?</td>
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<td>5.2 What is the best alternative for each party?</td>
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**Parties**

The conflict around the decentralisation policy in Lesotho during this interim period has manifested itself between the two main parties; the chiefs, and the local authorities. There is a high possibility that the same situation will prevail in the post local government election phase. It appears that one of the underlying reasons is that the chiefs want to secure their role as leaders of their people, which has been the tradition. They do not want to be subjected to elections for the fear that some people (particularly those who belong to the parties that do not favour them) may actually vote against them.

**Interests**

The chiefs also had economic interests that they felt were threatened. One of the immediate threats pertaining to the conflict in Parliament is the one of allowances and other benefits that the chiefs receive as Members of Parliament. At the local level, the possibility of councillors replacing the chiefs and being in charge of community affairs also threatens the chiefs in terms of the allowances that they get paid as mentioned above. The other interest of the chiefs pertains to land issues. They want the allocation of land and control of cattle post areas in their area of jurisdiction to be their responsibility instead of local authorities. This will allow them to collect pound fees and other land fees as they have done before.

**Relationship and Communication**

Both local authorities and chiefs are entrenched in the constitution and they both command a significant following. The former has political backing and the latter enjoys traditional support. Each of the parties wants to be recognised in their own right as an independent entity. The kind of relationship that exists between the two is adversarial. Communication channels are weak thus making collaboration very difficult.

**Perceptions**

The author has argued elsewhere (Shale 2001:4) that when people in an organisation do not communicate adequately, they will not understand the history of others and their
sensitivities. They are therefore likely to reach at incorrect assumptions about the motives of their belligerents. For instance, the chiefs and local authorities belong to the Ministry of Local Government as one organisation charged with community development. The chiefs however, are concerned that the Ministry is deliberately denying them information on what it is doing in terms of preparations for local government elections.

It is common knowledge that many people are scared during the early phases of significant change. It is to be expected therefore, that the chiefs in this case would not behave any differently. Many chiefs are afraid because they think that if the politicians succeed in making the changes that affect their status quo, the politicians will go on to challenge the King and transform Lesotho into a republic. On the other hand, there are an increasing number of people in Lesotho who believe that the system of inheritance is undemocratic and perpetuates autocracy from which people should be set free and this in itself directly challenges the principle of succession used by chiefs.

**History**

The chiefs substantiate their fear with an example that the ruling party has attempted to change the way in which the senators are appointed to Parliament. The reason for this being that the chiefs should also be elected to Senate according to their abilities not by virtue of being Principal Chiefs. The ruling party believed that in this way, senators could contribute meaningfully to development. This was strongly opposed by the chiefs who felt threatened because they suspected that the politicians wanted to get rid of them.

It can be observed from the analysis above that the conflict is not based on the roles and functions but it is based on values and needs. It is to be expected therefore, that the conflict cannot be handled easily because value based and needs based conflicts are deeply rooted in nature. The conflict between chiefs and local authorities is difficult, especially as there seems to be no mechanism in place to handle the situation, both currently and in the future. It has to be mentioned however, that even in the presence of any mechanism, there is no panacea for conflict. Instead of being avoided, it can only be managed.

**Suggested Solutions**

It has been mentioned that the government becomes involved in conflict at the local level by way of arbitration. Government officials, when called upon to intervene, impose settlements on the conflicting parties. They lack the skill or patience to assist the people in settling their own disputes. This kind of approach is also known as first track or official diplomacy. It has worked on many occasions but the settlements have not been sustainable because the people do not own them. In consequence, new conflicts have sprung up where the other ones left off.

An ideal method for addressing this conflict is second track diplomacy. It is defined by Azar (2003:23) as a participation of individuals with the potential to influence communities in a conflict situation, to work jointly in their professional capacity to find alternative ways of transforming the conflict. The group of people to whom this approach is directed, could also make a meaningful impact at ground level and address the conflict more constructively and creatively. Workshops in conflict transformation skills, trust building, negotiations and facilitation skills for identified role players in the Ministry of Local Government could also contribute in
ameliorating both the already existing tension and that which is expected after the local government elections. This strategy could have a meaningful contribution through reconstruction of the relationships between the chiefs and local authorities thus leading to harmonious co-existence.

In South Africa’s Free State Province there is a programme initiated by the Free State Provincial Government and the Centre for Citizenship Education and Conflict Resolution that is similar to second track diplomacy. This programme is derived from the model called the Integrated Dispute Resolution System (IDRS), and it is designed to provide conflict resolution skills at the grass-roots level. The importance of this programme lies in the fact that local authorities do not have to waste time on resolving conflicts in their area of jurisdiction at the expense of service delivery. This becomes the role of members of the community. The Integrated Dispute Resolution System itself is another option that could be copied from the Free State, which borders on parts of Lesotho. This can be replicated in Lesotho as they both have many similar attributes and a shared culture.

**CONCLUSION**

There are major challenges facing local authorities yet the biggest of them all is service delivery. It has been shown in this paper that local authorities need to have the requisite political, administrative, financial and development capacity in order to carry out their mandate. The paper has painted a general picture of the current situation and has emphasised that the prevalent conflict cannot be underestimated. The paper has also provided an analysis of the conflict indicating some of its underlying causes. The purpose of this paper was not only to present the challenges but also to suggest possible solutions. It is fitting therefore to conclude that the success of Lesotho’s decentralisation policy depends both on the successful management of the already prevalent conflict and the need to have adequate preparations in place to prevent it from escalating after the local government elections.

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The views expressed in this paper are solely of the author and do not in any manner represent the position of the Ministry of Local Government Lesotho nor that of the Centre for Policy Studies.

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