

SAIIA ARCHIVES

DO NOT REMOVE

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT

VAN

INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

1971 No. 2

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE

OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NUUSBRIEF / NEWSLETTER

1971 No. 2

Alle standpunte ingeneem in artikels in hierdie Nusbrieff
is die verantwoordelikheid van die skrywers en nie van
die Instituut nie.

All opinions expressed in articles in this Newsletter are
solely the responsibility of the respective authors and
not of the Institute.

Huis Jan Smuts/Jan Smuts House
Posbus/P.O. Box 31596
Braamfontein
Johannesburg

Mei/May 1971

S.A.I.I.A.

Nasionale Voorsitter - Dr. Leif Egeland - National Chairman

Voorsitters van Takke Chairmen of Branches

WITWATERSRAND

Mnr./Mr. Gideon Roos

KAAPSTAD/CAPE TOWN

Mnr./Mr. W.T. Ferguson

OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE/EASTERN PROVINCE

Mnr./Mr. A.J. Karstaedt

NATAL

Prof. E.N. Keen

PRETORIA

Mnr./Mr. Leon Coetzee

STELLENBOSCH

Prof. W.B. Vosloo

Direkteur - Mnr./Mr. John Barratt - Director

S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

1971 No. 2

INHOUD/CONTENTS

EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM	1
W.B. Vosloo	
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LESOTHO	16
Wynand van Graan	
KORT VERSLAE/BRIEF REPORTS	
(i) Red China Moves Towards African and World Acceptance	20
(ii) Pres. Felix Houphouet-Boigny se Dialoog-Voorstelle	22
(iii) The Difference Between Arab and African Military Regimes	23
(iv) Chile: Allende's Socialists Win Another Election	23
(v) Argentina: New President, Old Problems	24
(vi) United States/South Africa Relations	25
NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE	27
PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FOR MEMBERS	28

EXTERNAL CHALLENGES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Professor W.B. Vosloo

"No man is an island" is an oft-quoted aphorism. Its truth lies beyond dispute, for as Aristotle noticed, man is a social animal. In a variety of ways, and for an infinity of purposes, the individual is linked with other individuals.

Yet, if man is not an island, no nation or country, regardless of its size, can in splendid isolation be master of its fate. All nations are to some degree interdependent in terms of economics, politics and strategy. Every nation in the world, including our own, must take very much into account what "foreigners" are doing -- and, as South Africans see it, most of the world is inhabited by "foreigners". That is, of the world's 3,500 million people, fewer than 20 million -- less than one in 175 -- are South Africans.

These "foreigners", however, are infinitely diverse in terms of languages, cultures, religions, philosophies, ideologies, living standards, socio-economic organisation and systems of government. But the South African population itself is in many ways a reduced reflection or microcosm of the world's population. Therefore each category of "foreigners" tend to relate to and react to the domestic S.A. situation in accordance with certain shared characteristics and interest of South African population groups. Population groups in South Africa, for their part, tend to look abroad for friends and protectors. Herein lies the rub of the matter. Dissatisfied groups thus become actors in international politics and contribute significantly to the challenges imposed on existing socio-economic and political institutions and to pressures for more or less drastic change. In this way foreign and domestic politics are being pushed and pulled in several contradictory directions at once, and the safety and prosperity of the country, and even the survival of the existing system, may depend on the outcome of these contests.

A. THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

The pressures imposed on the South African political system take various forms and emanate from four major sources:

Concerted action on the part of independent African countries by means of trade sanctions, isolation campaigns, sport boycotts, and aid to so-called "liberation movements".

Communist subversion by Moscow, Peking and other communist sources by means of belligerent propaganda, training and arming of guerilla terrorists and by infiltration of non-white political and cultural organisations.

Harassment by the United Nations, particularly through the leverage offered by the South-West Africa issue.

Diplomatic and other forms of pressure on the part of the Western powers.

Although the ultimate objectives of the various strategists of pressure on South Africa diverge, their efforts exert a constant strain on the foundations upon which the South African political system rests.

1. Independent Africa

The hostility on the part of independent Africa towards South Africa has been spurred by the Pan-African movement, initially led by Ghana, which became independent in 1957. The first conference of political parties linked in the All-African Peoples' organisation met in Accra (December 1958) and called for economic sanctions and a trade boycott of South Africa. This call was subsequently answered by virtually all the independent African states.

Especially since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in 1963, independent African States have been engaged in a campaign for the exclusion of South Africa from regional and world-wide bodies. Their first success was South Africa's expulsion from the CCTA (Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara), of which South Africa was a founding member. Later followed the International Labour Organisation, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Olympic Games and the World Sports Federation. (South Africa had withdrawn from UNESCO at an earlier stage.) Exclusion from the United Nations Organisation still remains a major Pan-Africanist objective.

The banning of the ANC and PAC after Sharpeville in 1962, resulted in the formation of a group of South African Bantu exiles whose energies are directed toward intensifying external pressures on South Africa. They operate mainly from bases

in Zambia, Zanzibar, Cairo, London, New York and elsewhere.

One of the more recent expressions of African hostility towards South Africa is contained in the so-called "Lusaka Manifesto" adopted by the Organisation for African Unity (O.A.U.) in Addis Ababa in September, 1969. Paragraph 22 of this "Manifesto" contains the following statement:

"South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracised from the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. Certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent."

In large measure the "cold war" provided many opportunities to play off East and West and to embark on political crusades at the expense of more urgent domestic matters. In addition, the complicated issues of white-black relations in Southern Africa provided themes for politicians to divert attention from more pressing local problems. There are signs, however, of a growing disillusionment of many Africans with the antics of their leaders in their involvement in external relations, the side-tracking of local interests and the band-wagon of pan-African slogans. Events in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda are clearly indicative of the popular demand being made that local needs and interests be given primary attention. Despite all the heroic talk in the O.A.U. and the U.N. about the liberation of Southern Africa, a growing number of Black African countries, both French and English speaking, now show signs of giving more attention to their own domestic problems than to the wider issues expounded by some political leaders.

2. Communist Powers

In the past two decades a particular conjunction of circumstances seemed to make Africa a fertile ground for activity by the Communist powers. The independence movement in Africa had created

opportunities for the Soviet Union and China to take up the postures of champions of a liberation that had to be wrested from reluctant colonial oppressors. Communist powers capitalised to the utmost on this propaganda advantage. The social and economic discontents of African populations offered scope for the propagation of Communist-type "solutions".

The freely proclaimed objective of communism both in its Moscow and Peking versions is nothing less than the establishment of communist regimes everywhere else in the world. But since the death of Stalin in 1953 world communism has increasingly divided over the question of what grand strategy to follow. One group follows the Russian "coexistence" line as laid down by Khrushchev and continued by his successors. It is based on the premise that communism must coexist with capitalism until the latter, with a few helpful nudges from its enemies, eventually collapses from its own internal contradictions and the so-called misery it brings its people. The other group follows that "hard" Chinese line with its single-minded orthodox emphasis on the revolution: capitalism will fall only if Communists make incessant war on it everywhere. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the differences between the Chinese and Russian versions of communism sharpened and deepened and the monolithic Moscow-commanded world communism seems to have ended.

The schism in world communism has resulted in rivalries in the imperialist strategies of Moscow and Peking in Africa. Russia has found that whereas it attempted during the past few years to divide the world, in African eyes, between the imperialists and the exploited, with the Communist world as the champions of the exploited, China has divided the world, apparently with greater success, between the "have" nations (who are all white), and the "have-not" nations (none of whom are white). In this way the white skins of the Russians are made suspect in the eyes of black racists. The Chinese theme is that white men are born oppressors, constantly motivated by the uncontrollable desire to exploit and oppress anybody not possessed of a white skin. For these reasons the Chinese racists are taking the initiative in the drive to end white rule in Rhodesia, the two Portuguese territories and South Africa. This campaign is conducted from bases in Tanzania, Zambia and the Congo. It takes the form of training and arming guerilla fighters and other infiltrators.

Ostensibly these quarrelsome groups are supposed to be under the direction of the Organisation for African Unity, which has a committee at Dar-es-Salaam for the purpose. In point of fact they are now entirely trained and armed by the Communists, some on the Angolan borders by the Soviet bloc, but the majority by the Chinese, aided by Cuban guerilla experts. There are fourteen known training camps in Tanzania and Zambia. Although their exploits have been greatly exaggerated owing to partial propaganda on their behalf, their importance lies in their propaganda value. They are the symbols of a supposed eternal struggle between the Coloured Peoples and the White "Imperialists", which it is part of the essential strategy of Communism to exploit.

Because the African and Communist "liberation" movements both have overt militant objectives, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish clearly between the ultimate objectives of the two camps. The methods employed are essentially the same.

Within South Africa the communist onslaught in both its Russian and Chinese varieties employs various tactics: infiltration, subversive propaganda, sabotage and espionage.

The major targets for infiltration by communist agents are the various non-white political-action groups and trade organisations. In the past various organisations succumbed in various degrees to these efforts, e.g. the various members of the so-called "Congress Alliance", such as the A.N.C., P.A.C., S.A.I.C., the "Congress of Democrats", the "South African Coloured Peoples Congress" and other "front" organisations. Examples of subversive propaganda can be found in the various publications of the now banned Congress Movements, the "Freedom Charter", radio broadcasts from stations in Tanzania and Cairo, and numerous pamphlets and leaflets distributed clandestinely from time to time. It must be borne in mind that in line with the so-called "agitprop" techniques of mass persuasion, Communists believe that face-to-face communication is bringing about the desired attitudes in the masses -- particularly when a considerable proportion of them are illiterate. In South Africa they concentrate on fomenting tension among racial groups and economic classes. Apart from the various sabotage attempts in 1961, detailed plans for similar activities were found in the headquarters of the "secret" Communist Party at Rivonia in 1963. Part of

the espionage network was uncovered in 1968 with the arrest of Yuriy Loginov.

Communist infiltration and influence has undoubtedly produced a considerable effect on the outcome of the so-called African "revolution", but on the whole, the results have not been commensurate with the energy expended.

Care must be taken to avoid the common fallacy of attributing all forms of opposition against white rule in Southern Africa to the conspiratorial machinations of communists. But the concealment of the Communists' clandestine activities behind many non-communist protest movements makes efforts to detect it and stamp it out difficult and creates the real danger of crushing civil liberties and the right to express preferences for political views and institutions different from the established ones. Thus the Communist tactics create for all free nations a particularly difficult problem of reconciling freedom with security.

3. The United Nations

The debate on South Africa in the United Nations has dealt with the treatment of Indians, initiated by India in 1946, with South-West Africa, and, beginning in 1952, with the broader question of the so-called "racial situation". Since the 1950's the wave of new African states joined with the Asian and other non-Western states to make their views heard on world affairs. The United Nations General Assembly provided them with an excellent forum and they strived to make that organisation increasingly important as the chief focus of opposition to South Africa. The perennial and impassioned debates have come to proclaim as their objective the imposition of sanctions and South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations.

Beginning in 1950 the General Assembly called on South Africa to modify its racial policies and bring them into co-ordination with its obligations under the Charter. Following the Sharpeville incident in 1960 the Security Council for the first time considered South African racial policies, repeated the Assembly's call, and asked the Secretary-General to intervene. He visited South Africa and consulted with government leaders but could report no agreement.

Resolutions recommending specific sanctions failed to win a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly in 1960, but succeeded on November 6, 1962. The resolution recommended that members should break off diplomatic relations, close their ports to South African ships and their facilities to South African airplanes, and boycott all trade. It called also for the appointment of the "Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa" to keep policy developments under review. The sanctions have been implemented by only a few states and pressures were constantly increased to put them into general effect.

On the question of South-West Africa various international legal complications existed due to the "international character" of its status. It was assigned to South Africa as a mandated territory under the League of Nations in 1920, and subsequently virtually became a fifth province. South Africa refused to transform it into a trust territory after World War II, and, in so doing, escaped supervision by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. The U.N. had recourse to advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which declared in 1950 that South Africa had no legal obligation to submit a Trusteeship Agreement, but that it must submit to General Assembly supervision, an equivalent to the supervision exercised by the old Mandates Commission. South Africa continued to dispute the Court's opinion that the League of Nations mandate had not lapsed and that it was obliged to submit reports to the U.N.

In 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia, which had been members of the League of Nations, asked the Court to declare that South Africa had violated the mandate since it had "failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory". Although South Africa disputed the Court's jurisdiction in the case, it continued its defence after the Court decided (8 to 7) in 1962, that it had jurisdiction. The anti-climax came in 1966 when, with the deciding vote of its president, Sir Percy Spender, the Court decided that the plaintiffs, Liberia and Ethiopia, had no locus standi to bring the case. The Court did not decide on the merits of the case.

In reaction to the 1966-decision of the International Court, the U.N. General Assembly, under pressure of the Afro-Asian bloc, adopted a series of far-reaching resolutions. Most important of these is

Resolution No. 2145 of October 27, 1966, by which the General Assembly purported to terminate the Mandate of South West Africa and to assume direct responsibility for the territory, now renamed Namibia, until its independence. Since that time, South Africa, in the eyes of the U.N. has been in illegal occupation of the territory. An 11-member Council for Namibia was established by the General Assembly in 1967 to act as an interim government for the territory.

In view of South Africa's refusal to accept the validity of these resolutions, the matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. The Security Council, on its part adopted a number of resolutions, inter alia, No. 269 of August 12, 1969, in which South Africa was called upon to withdraw its administration from the Territory before October 4, 1969, or face possible punitive actions provided for under the U.N. Charter. The United States, Britain and France abstained from voting on this resolution.

Faced with South Africa's refusal to withdraw, some U.N. members tried a new approach by arguing that the S.W.A.-situation was a threat to international peace and security. The motive here was to secure the use of coercive measures against South Africa, including possibly armed force. At this point the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 284, of July 29, 1970, asking the re-constituted International Court of Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion on "the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia".

This action appears to be directed towards laying the legal basis for collective action against the Republic so that those countries which had sought to protect South Africa against the more radical intentions of the Afro-Asian group, could be brought under U.N. pressure. South Africa's main argument rests on the contention that because Britain and France - both permanent members of the Security Council - abstained from voting, the resolution asking the court for its advisory opinion was invalid. Moreover, this resolution itself is based on the 1966-resolution of the General Assembly which goes beyond its jurisdiction.

4. The Western Powers

The Western powers have over a number of years tried to press the

South African government to change its course in the regulation of intergroup relations. They have done this by way of both formal and informal exchanges on the diplomatic level, by several condemnatory public statements on the part of government spokesmen and senior officials and by imposing restrictions on armament sales. These unfavourable reactions on the official level are generally augmented by a constant barrage of negative reports and editorial condemnations in the newsmedia. The main intention behind these efforts seems to be to persuade the ruling white community to make concessions in the field of civil rights and to mitigate what they consider to be the "injustices" of apartheid.

Despite the uneasy relationship between South Africa and the major Western powers, South Africa has remained an important Western ally. Because of its position at the southern end of the African continent, between the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, the strategic importance for the Western world of its economy, defenses and sea lanes, cannot be ignored.

Particularly since 1968 the Soviet Union has launched an ambitious campaign to expand its influence in the Southern Oceans. The Russian presence is now well established in Aden at the entrance of the Red Sea, at Socotra near the Gulf of Aden, in Oman near the Persian Gulf and in Somalia. The Soviets have also made significant advances in the negotiation of shore facilities in Madagascar, Mauritius and India. Of the more than 15,000 ships that rounded the Cape in 1970, close to 4,000 were flying the Russian flag. Although the bulk of these were part of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets, it is estimated that a considerable proportion were warships and "spying" vessels. This growing Soviet maritime activity in the Indian ocean represents a serious threat to Western security and brought in its wake a revived awareness of the crucial importance of the Cape sea route whereby more than half of Western Europe's oil is carried.

B. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES

There are certainly no easy answers to South Africa's dilemma in the field of external relations. There are however a number of avenues for action along which the scope and intensity of external pressure could be mitigated. These are economic development and trade, outward-directed diplomacy, defence strategy and judicious domestic policies.

1. Economic Development and Trade

The South African economy is fairly well-balanced, rich in gold and industrial minerals and highly industrialised. It has a well-developed structure of basic services such as transportation and power and a highly trained class of managers and technicians.

It is rated within the top twenty trading nations in the world and an important feature of its trading position in the world over the past decade has been increasing diversification.

Despite these sources of strength in South Africa's economy, it is highly vulnerable to external circumstances over which it has only partial control. The avoidance of economic stagnation and the continuation of a high rate of economic growth depends to a large extent also upon foreign capital investment and expanded foreign trade. This is due to the fact that South Africa's balance of payments account is still highly dependent on gold exports - a commodity which is subject to continuing controversy in international monetary affairs. In addition, South Africa is highly dependent on the import of earthoil.

It is imperative that the bastion of South Africa's strength, its economy, must continue to grow as vigorously as possible. One does not have to accept the Marxist thesis of materialistic determinism to realise that political stability ultimately depends on economic factors. There are still vast numbers of non-whites in South Africa living barely above subsistence level, there are vast numbers to be trained in technical and managerial skills, the stretches of Bantu Homelands are still virtually undeveloped and industry must be developed either within or near them to attract surplus population from the land.

South African prosperity depend largely on its external trading and financial relations. Therefore South Africa's trade with Western Europe, the Americas, Africa and the East must be expanded.

What the strategists of economic sanctions and trade boycotts seem to overlook is that by damaging the prosperity and growth of the South African economy, they are undermining the very foundation of pacifying and unifying forces in South Africa. They would, to argue from their own premises, precipitate the looming tragedy they profess to avoid.

The factors that could mitigate the use of sanctions against South Africa are the following:

- (a) A realisation that it tends to unify and solidify opinion in South Africa and to divide the international community;
- (b) The difficulty of applying sanction without damaging "friendly" territories, such as Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland;
- (c) The ability of S.A. to offset sanctions by stockpiling, rationing, substitution, repatriation of foreign labour, replacement of foreign markets by the domestic market and the establishment of industries to provide strategic items;
- (d) The ill-effects of sanctions on S.A.'s trading partners and on international liquidity in view of the key role of S.A.'s gold (barring the introduction of reforms in international financing).
- (e) The possibility that the imposition of sanctions by means of a blockade could readily provoke a shooting or cold-war conflict of global proportions.

2. Diplomacy and Communication

To counter the systematic isolation campaigns it is imperative that South Africa should pursue its "outward policy" as vigorously as possible. South Africa must use every opportunity to influence the attitude of other countries toward it by explaining to the world what is understood by "separate development" or "separate freedoms", and how this is intended as an equitable response to diversity in Southern Africa.

There are significant accomplishments in this direction already. New contacts have been established with neighbouring black states, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi in the form of medical and technical assistance. But much more remains to be done because the Republic, by virtue of its location and circumstances is in many ways better equipped to understand and help its neighbours than are some of the more developed countries of the world. It is particularly important that the South African electorate should be educated to its proper task on this sub-continent.

In addition, there should be greater communication and diplomatic exchange with other African countries. There is a paucity of knowledge in both "black" and "white" Africa concerning each other's attitudes and circumstances. Dialogues are prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.

3. Defence Strategy

Since 1960 the Republic has been building up a defence force capable of repelling invasion and maintaining internal order in the event of invasion. Yet, apart from the Simonstown agreements of 1955 and 1967, South Africa has no publicly acknowledged defence alliances with other countries, nor is it a member of any regional defence pact. This state of affairs is largely due to the tendency of the major Western nations to avoid identification with South Africa's domestic policy.

With increasing Soviet and Chinese interest in Black African states, South Africa has good reason to fear that these outsiders may actively support an attempt by black guerillas to overthrow the government. Precautionary measures against this has been taken - among them the construction of a computerised, electronic air defence system near Pretoria as well as a radio communications network near Cape Town. But what is needed is a firm alliance with N.A.T.O. - countries as well as with other South Atlantic and Indian Ocean countries. The growing Soviet presence in the Southern Oceans seems already to have fostered in important circles a reappraisal of the Western World's defence interests - in particular with reference to the protection of their seaborne trade.

4. Domestic Policy

In few other countries, do external affairs hinge as crucially as they do in South Africa upon the central elements of domestic policy. It is therefore on this level that serious reflection and calculated action on the part of all responsible citizens must continue.

The existing political reality in South Africa is dominated by the problem of diversity. The Whites, as a result of many historical factors, have come to control all effective formal political and economic power. Now formulas are sought according to which institutionalised power could be transferred to and shared with the respective non-White ethnic groups. The policy of the government is predicated on the assumptions that territorial separation will eliminate the domination of one race by another; that it will remove discrimination, friction and unrest; and that it will create conditions allowing each group to fulfil its own destiny in accordance with its own traditions and values. In essence, the policy of separate development aims at the gradual and systematic disentanglement of the various ethnic groups, making it

possible for each group to exercise political rights and to enjoy unhampered economic opportunities within its own territories, and to develop into independent states. In the place of the present-day single South African constitutional unit, several constitutional units are to be established. The government rejects policies of integration which would lead to a majoritarian "common society" on the grounds that it would give rise to unbearable tensions, to an intense power struggle and to chaotic conditions in which the Whites would be swamped culturally and politically as a result of the numerical preponderance of the non-Whites. To support the thesis that the white man has the right to social, economic and political control, several arguments are usually advanced: progress along the road of civilisation, feeling for law and order, scientific knowledge, achievements in the many fields of technology, share in the capital investment and economic development of the country, biblical doctrine, and the ethical right to continue to exist as a being with his own character in his own area.

But the path of implementation of this policy is strewn with obdurate obstacles: some on the level of grand policy design and others on the level of application in specific instances. Among the main problem areas surrounding the general implementation of the policy of separate development proposed by the South African government are the following:

- i) arriving at equitable bases for territorial partition acceptable to the principal participants;
- ii) making "Bantu Homelands" economically and politically viable;
- iii) reconciling the tension between the forces of traditionalism and modernisation;
- iv) developing acceptable and equitable social, economic and political arrangements in urban areas for sub-groups like the urbanised Bantu, the Coloureds and the Indians whose aspirations are not likely to be absorbed by the system of "separate freedoms" on a nation-state basis; and
- v) mitigating international opposition.

But apart from these wider problem areas of grand policy design, there are a number of more specific problems relating to the practical everyday lives of many South Africans. They refer to personal hardships non-whites have to suffer which, in doctrinal terms, can be ascribed to

transitional maladjustments following upon the fundamental reconstruction of the South African society on its way to a better deal. It is precisely in relation to measures and incidents in this category that belligerent propaganda campaigns abroad tend to converge, that potential friends of South Africa are alienated and non-white countrymen are antagonised.

The examples of grievances or causes of discontent most often quoted in this regard include the following:

- i) Differential salary scales and wages for employees doing the same work and having the same qualifications.
- ii) Inequities in the provision of public services such as education, technical training, residential areas, entertainment, recreation and transportation.
- iii) Officious and injudicious application of the various measures dealing with influx control and the ordinary criminal code.
- iv) Definition of permissible employment for population groups.
- v) Injuries to personal dignity in situations of interpersonal contact with officials and private individuals.
- vi) The removal of long-settled people from their homes for the purposes of group areas planning without adequate alternatives.
- vii) The lack of facilities and opportunities for orderly interpersonal and intergroup social contact and communication.
- viii) Disruption of family life resulting from migratory labour practices.
- ix) The application of discriminatory measures within the Bantu Homelands.
- x) The exercise of arbitrary discretionary powers affecting individual freedoms such as movement, speech and assembly, association and due process of law.

It would be a distortion of facts to attribute all the alleged inequities, constraints and hardships solely to the government's policy of separate development. Moreover, the white man cannot be held solely responsible for the impediments imposed by cultural factors. In large degree, these conditions are part and

parcel of the traditional South African way of life which has been shaped and moulded by a variety of historical forces. Some measures are designed to preserve internal order and to protect national independence against the onslaughts of hostile ideologies. Nevertheless, on the level of personal irritations and annoyances, our society must do better and it can do better. The major groups in South Africa cannot be allowed to become unchanging antagonists, each fixed in frozen postures of deterrence and retaliation. Anxieties over the preservation of group identities and interests, must not be allowed to blind us to the possibilities of changing reactions, moderating attitudes and adjusting policies.

In the final analysis it must be realised that the interaction between domestic problems and foreign relations are too complex to be understood at a glance. Yet, as responsible citizens we must look at the heart of matters in order to be able to cope with the emergencies of our time. In this day of the shrinking world, international challenges are too important to be ignored.

Professor W.B. Vosloo is Head of the Department of Political Science of the University of Stellenbosch. The above address was given to a meeting of the Cape Town Branch of the Institute on 17 March, 1971.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LESOTHO

Wynand van Graan

In size Lesotho is only two-thirds of the Transkei. Two-thirds of Lesotho is mountainous. Some parts in the mountains are barren, with only a few inches of soil covering the basalt-rock - areas unsuitable for agriculture. Only one-third of the country is suitable for limited agriculture and two-thirds of the population is living there. Due to a shortage of employment possibilities, the land is overcrowded, and many people who are not really farmers are on the land in order to be able to eat. The country is overgrazed with too many animals - a result of lack of agricultural training, and also because of the traditional view that not quality but the number of animals indicates wealth.

To a great extent, therefore, the basic agricultural products are bad in standard. This fact, together with an ancient system of marketing due mainly to a lack of communications, results in the Basutho farmers getting very little from their efforts. The average annual income per person is one of the lowest in the world - about R 50. In the USA it is R 3,000.

Nearly 400,000 people of a total population of 1 million are unemployed or only partially employed. More than half of the male labour force has had to leave Lesotho to find work in the Republic.

The Republic has one doctor to 1,800 people. In Lesotho there is one per 27,000, and the situation is deteriorating. Malnutrition among children is one of the biggest medical problems.

If one considers the population increase (2.4% p.a.) in relation to the very slow rate of development, the country could, in fact, be going further backwards. It has been calculated that Lesotho would need 8,000 extra new jobs per year, outside agriculture, just to cope with the population increase - in other words, just to keep the country from slipping further backwards. A massive effort is required to make it go forwards.

A United Nations Agency some time ago calculated that it would take 270 years for countries like Lesotho to reach the standard of living now enjoyed by middle range developed countries. It is quite obvious now that these young countries cannot wait that long. In the world of today a situation cannot

be tolerated where, for instance, in Lesotho a man's income - if he has one - is as low as R 50 per year, while the president of a large American motor company last year had a bonus alone of R 500,000. He probably has a salary even bigger than that. People in the developing countries must be given the opportunity to earn an income of some kind, otherwise the world will never be at peace.

So what do we have to do? We have to compress the 270 years into possibly 25 years without letting things go wrong. This lands one in some unorthodox situations which make the theoretical economists' hair stand on end. In one of our two industrial areas in Lesotho, a new factory is on the point of starting production and another is about to be completed, while our only water supply comes from a bore hole. The permanent supply will be installed at a later stage. In Maseru we were completing a 120 room luxury hotel, when, in mid-summer we did not have sufficient water to allow people to wash their cars. The Maseru water supply was doubled before we opened the hotel.

The Lesotho Electricity Corporation (of which the author is Chairman) is expanding electricity supplies and campaigning to make people use more electric power. At the same time we have a candle factory which is expanding work at a brisk pace!

We simply have to bend certain established rules and practices to suit our particular circumstances.

For developing countries to improve their situation, they need lots of aid of the right kind. Chief Jonathan realised this from the outset, that is why he has gone out of his way to find the right kind of assistance. It is through his efforts that Dr. Anton Rupert became honorary industrial adviser to the Prime Minister of Lesotho. A direct result of this was the establishment of the Lesotho National Development Corporation which in 3½ years has established seven factories and a R 1.6 million tourist hotel. It has also contracted with two of the world's largest mining groups for diamond prospecting in the Malutis. It has another four projects under construction at the moment, while eight others are with the architects. Another two large diamond prospecting contracts are under negotiation, again with leading international groups.

These projects involve an investment of R8 million at this stage, that is R 8.00 per head of the population. In the Republic this would have been the

equivalent of R 172,000,000.

Another effect of Chief Jonathan's approach to Dr. Rupert was the introduction of the free weekend services in Lesotho of South African medical specialists. In exactly three years these doctors, now popularly known as the "mercy men", performed more than 1,200 major operations and 3,000 consultations without any charge, thereby performing what is probably the biggest aid effort of this kind in the world. This is practical help which shows results. It is not a senseless handing out of money.

This brings me to a point on which there is a general misunderstanding. It is not money that these countries need. It is sound basic organisation that is required. And, for this, experienced people with the urge to get things done are required. There is more money available in the world today than the developing countries can use. The World Bank and its agencies alone have funds begging for projects that do not come forward. But the projects cannot come forward without an organisation in a country that can identify the needs, compile requests that make practical and economic sense, and that can assure the lender that the money will be spent.

Some countries give some relatively meaningless aid, because they are not really interested in the welfare of developing countries. They do it for politics, or they do it because an overseas aid programme seems to have become fashionable. Very valuable and indispensable aid to Lesotho has, however, been forthcoming from various sources. The British have, for instance, financed most of the capital projects. And they are still doing this. They have over the years also been responsible for a substantial part of the recurrent budget and they have also supplied good people to help. The World Bank, various Church organisations, Oxfam and the United Nations Development Programme, Catholic Relief Services, etc., have all contributed substantial aid. South Africa has a team of experts in various fields giving enormous assistance in Lesotho.

In Lesotho we are past the stage where all so-called aid is acceptable. Meaningful aid is welcome, but there is much of the aid which we can do without, simply because it is not really aid at all.

Perhaps it is already a sign of advancement that we from the developing countries do not come like beggars and take what is going. We are already discriminating between the kind of assistance which is really no assistance at all, and aid which would help us to bridge in a few short years that gap

which separates us from economic self sufficiency.

It is of utmost importance for South Africa to assist Lesotho in various ways so that the country can reach economic self sufficiency soon. With Lesotho right in the middle of South Africa, it is imperative for South Africa that its neighbour enjoy peace and stability. Economic progress is one of the greatest single factors that would ensure lasting stability.

Lesotho has a long, tough road ahead, but I think we have broken the ice. We have broken through a thick psychological barrier which separated that country from progress and a respectable standard of living. The people now believe that it can be done. That is why it is going to be done.

Mr. Wynand van Graan is Managing Director of the Lesotho National Development Corporation.

The above article contains excerpts from an address by Mr. van Graan to the Institute of Civil Engineers (O.F.S. Branch) in Bloemfontein on 1st February, 1971.

K O R T V E R S L A E

- Voorberei deur die Instituut se Personeel -

(i) RED CHINA MOVES TOWARDS AFRICAN AND WORLD ACCEPTANCE

The foreign policy of the Peoples' Republic of China, which virtually disintegrated in the turmoil of the cultural revolution, is well on its way to recovery. Peking's image in the Western World is rapidly gaining respectability; and its influence in developing Asian and African countries is again on the increase.

Peking's success in Africa is remarkable, for even before the cultural revolution its policies had proved a disaster. Its emissaries had sought to mobilise Africa for the third world crusade against the capitalist west; and in so doing Peking hoped to outstrip Moscow for leadership of the 'anti-colonial' forces. It was not prepared to compromise with those many African leaders who sought to maintain close links with the former colonial countries and chose rather to support opposition, illegal or underground parties, for example the Lumumbists in Congo (Kinshasa) and the Kenya Peoples' Union of Oginga Odinga.

Peking's first conspicuous defeat was the collapse of the rebel regime in Stanleyville in 1964. Then the Government of the Niger Republic, which was officially on good terms with Peking found that terrorists of the outlawed Sawaba party had been financed by and trained in China. As a result the OCAM states, led by Pres. Houphouet-Boigny, led a drive to rid Africa of the Chinese. In January, 1966, Pres. Bokassa expelled the Chinese from the Central African Republic, and on 24th February, 1966, the very day Pres. Nkrumah arrived in Peking on a goodwill visit, he was overthrown by a military coup at home.

Now apparently the Chinese have learnt from these experiences and are utilising far more flexible and sophisticated tactics. Peking now seeks good relations with Asian and African leaders, whether they be radical, moderate or conservative; and has decided to combat Western and Soviet influence by concentrating its limited aid on a few selected countries.

Projects are usually small and unambitious, but usually well suited to the stage of development of the recipient country. Frequently small factories are established, which use machinery and technology, obsolescent by western standards, but capable of absorbing much more labour than modern techniques. Technicians and advisers are generally kept to a minimum and terms of credit are more generous than those given by the Soviet Union or the West: one-fifth of aid consists of gifts, the remainder of interest-free, long-term loans, the

repayment of which need not begin before 10 years have elapsed.

An interesting example of the new Chinese tactics is the establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait which is trying desperately to diversify its markets and put its economy beyond the reach of Arab radicals. The Chinese, in an attempt to gain influence in the Persian Gulf are quite prepared to praise Kuwait as 'a young nation fighting imperialism' and so bolster the emirate's conservative ruling family.

In Africa Peking has concentrated aid on Zambia, Guinea, Mali, Algeria and Mauritania; more recently on Somalia and the Sudan; and has been very active in Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania. They have improved the yield of rice paddies in Mauritania; helped build radio transmitters and a textile factory in Zambia; advised on tobacco farming and public health services in Somalia; and become chief advisers to the Tanzanian army.

But they needed something bigger - a major prestige project that could parallel the Soviet building of the Aswan Dam. And this they found in the 1,166 mile Tan-Zam Railway project, for which an interest-free loan of R 300 million was made available. It has been said that China hopes "the railway line will be both a Trojan horse for Chinese trade and a conveyor belt for the spread of Mao thinking". Nevertheless, Africa has so far been impressed, not only at the progress of the line, but at the behaviour of the Chinese.

Recognition by inter alia Nigeria and Ethiopia and the changed voting at the UN of former adversaries like Libya, Burundi and post-Nkrumah Ghana, are clear signs of a growing shift in African sentiments away from Taiwan and towards Peking; this in spite of Taiwan's own intensive programmes of technical and agricultural assistance in African countries, including several in Southern Africa.

This same trend is attested to in the rest of the world by the recognition of the Peoples' Republic by countries such as Canada and Italy, by the 1970 General Assembly's 51-49 vote in favour of Mainland China's inclusion in the UN, the remarkable success of Peking's "ping-pong diplomacy", and Pres. Nixon's general warming to the possibility of relations with Communist China.

Add this to the already strong and rapidly growing belief that Peking's inclusion in the UN is essential if her relations with the rest of the world are to be normalised, and one can understand the deep feeling of potential isolation which is sweeping diplomatic and government circles in Taiwan.

NOTE:

According to recent reports, the following 22 African countries have diplomatic relations with Republic of China (Taipei): South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Madagascar, Rwanda, Congo (Kinshasa), Gabon, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Senegal and Libya.

The following 20 countries have recognised Communist China (Peking): Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauretania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

(ii) PRESIDENT FELIX HOUPHOUËT-BOIGNY SE DIALOOG-VOORSTELLE

In November 1970 het pres. Houphouët-Boigny van die Ivoorkus sy belangrike voorstel oor dialoog tussen Afrikastate en Suid-Afrika gemaak. Op 28 April 1971 het hy by 'n perskonferensie in Abidjan breedvoerig sy standpunt verduidelik.

'n Paar dae na sy perskonferensie van 28 April het pres. Houphouët-Boigny in 'n onderhoud met 'n plaaslike koerant, "Fraternité-Matin", onder andere gesê dat ander Afrikalande nie verontrus behoort te wees oor die dialoog-voorstel nie.

"Daar is geen gronde vir vrees dat die Organisasie vir Afrika-teenheid verdeel sal word deur ons voorstelle vir vrede in Afrika en algehele neutraliteit nie, aangesien apartheid, hoe afstootlik dit ook vir ons waardigheid as Afrikane mag wees, slegs 'n betreklike geringe aspek is."

"Dit is nie apartheid as sodanig wat Afrikane kan verdeel nie. Rasseongelykheid waarvan Negers die slagoffers is, meer so in Suid-Afrika as elders maar ook in baie ander lande, het nog nooit die wêreld verdeel of die vrede bedreig sover ek weet nie. As 'n mens jou egter deur gebrek aan erns of blinde fanatisme laat betrek in 'n oorlog teen Suid-Afrika weens die apartheid wat daar toegepas word, sal 'n mens aan kommunisme, wat altyd op die loer lê, 'n nuwe geleentheid bied om in te gryp met al die treurige gevolge wat dit sal hê."

Pres. Houphouët-Boigny het na Afrika-leiers verwys wat hulle aan Rooi Sjina se kant skaar in 'n wêreld wat verdeel is deur geweld en haat en waarin 'n nuwe soort oorlog, van feitlik onbeperkte aard, gevoer word teen "die bewind van ekonomiese liberalisme wat weier om uit te sterf".

"Solank kommunisme met alle oorloë inmeng, selfs met dié wat aanvanklik geen ideologiese kleur het nie, sal ons jong Afrikalande nie in staat wees om die aaklige tragedie vry te spring wat Asië in sy greep het nie, tensy hulle 'n beleid van waaragtige neutraliteit aanvaar."

(- 'n Volledige oorsig van onlangse ontwikkelinge in verband met die dialoog-voorstelle sal binnekort aan lede van die Instituut gestuur word. -)

(iii) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARAB AND AFRICAN MILITARY REGIMES

The recent coup in Uganda once again brought to light an interesting division in African government, namely that Arab military regimes are generally radical in orientation, while Black African military regimes, on the other hand, tend to be conservative.

The nature of the military profession, its dedication to law, order and discipline, and its distrust of subversion, ideological or otherwise, all should serve to increase the right-wing orientation of military regimes. It is therefore the radicalism of the Arab leaders which needs an explanation.

Ali Mazrui, Professor of Political Science at Makerere University, Uganda, in an article in the London Times, 24th May, 1971, suggests some explanatory factors for this division:

Firstly, the Arabs, in so many ways influenced by Nasser, have followed his example and modelled themselves on the regime he structured in Egypt. Secondly, the United States is the most important ally of the Arab's chief enemy, Israel. As the US is the leader of the western world, Arabs will tend to turn to the east for diplomatic, economic and military support. Thirdly, because the Middle East has become so much an area of competing external forces, which serve to reduce the Arab sense of autonomy, Arab regimes are far more preoccupied with opposition to imperialism, than are Africans. And fourthly, Professor Mazrui suggests that the nature of the regime replaced is important. The traditionalism of the regimes in Egypt under Farouk and Libya under Idris help to make the regimes which replace them anti-traditionalist. In Black Africa, by contrast, the governments overthrown have generally been led by radical civilians like Nkrumah and Obote. In other words "if the coup in Uganda had replaced a Government headed by the late King Mutesa instead of replacing a government headed by President Obote, the coup might well have sounded more radical than it has done".

(iv) CHILE: ALLENDE'S SOCIALISTS WIN ANOTHER ELECTION

In September, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende's Popular Unity Coalition won 80 seats
24/ out of ..

out of the 200 in the two houses of congress. This gave him more voters than any other leader and on 24th October he was elected President. He thus became Latin America's first freely elected Marxist President.

Now for the second time in under a year the people of Chile have demonstrated - this time in their municipal elections held in April 1971 - that marxist- socialism can triumph through the ballot box. President Allende's Popular Unity coalition received 1,375,063 votes representing 49.75% of votes cast. The three main opposition parties, the Christian Democrats, the National Party and the Democratic Radicals received a combined total of 1,343,484 votes, or 47.5% of the total. (In September, 1970, Dr. Allende received 36.3% of the vote.)

Traditionally these municipal elections are the first test of a new leader's popularity, and Allende is the first President in twenty years to emerge from them with his position strengthened. These results can only strengthen his government's hand in its fairly cautious, but nevertheless determined, experiment with socialism. - a difficult task in the face of US pressure, economic problems, intra-coalition tensions and an opposition majority in Congress.

Le Monde (Weekly Edition) of 8-14 April, 1971, comments:

"But, as important as the polling victories themselves, was the fact that the elections took place at all, and without serious incident. Right-wing propaganda last year sought to convince the Chileans - whose democratic traditions are the most deeply rooted on the continent - that a vote for Mr. Allende would mean their last visit to the polling booths. The president proved that their charges were without foundation and the Chilean people delivered their own response at the ballot box."

(v) ARGENTINE: NEW PRESIDENT, OLD PROBLEMS

On 23rd March, 1971, only nine months after he had replaced General Ongania, President Roberto Levingston was himself forced to stand down. Levingston had sought to break with the politically liberal and monetarily orthodox line of his predecessor and move the country out of its economic stagnation. He failed.

In 1970 the working class cost of living rose by 23% and the first two months of 1971 saw this increase by a further 10%. The cost of bread, meat and wine doubled in three years. Workers demanded a 35% rise in salaries, and when Levingston put a ceiling at 19%, serious rioting broke out in Cordoba, Tucuman, Salta and Rosario. As a result of the rising price of meat and a further tax

on the sale of meat, farmers refused to bring cattle for slaughter and meat exports dropped rapidly, worsening the budget deficit and threatening an already weak external trading position.

In addition, urban terrorism grew unchecked, with attacks on police stations, government offices, banks and commercial premises becoming daily occurrences. The armed forces became discontented with the lack of backing from Levingston in their fight against subversion, and with his support for politicians who abused sections of the army. Finally, he tried to sack General Alejandro Lanusse, Chairman of the Committee of Commanders-in-Chief. The army remained solidly behind Lanusse and Levingston had to resign.

Lanusse replaced him, with the advantage of being in control of both administration and army, which would enable him to give more coherent backing for policies. On 10th May, Lanusse had to suppress an attempted military coup in Tucuman, illustrating that he has some way to go yet before he can eliminate his opposition in the army, let alone in the rest of the country. Besides the extremity of Argentine's economic problems, he has a serious political problem. The army has attempted to find a political formula for return to civilian government, which will exclude the supporters of exiled ex-President Juan Domingo Peron. This has not proved possible. Should Lanusse, who is strongly anti-peronist, think of compromising and seeking the co-operation of the peronists, he may well find that the army is not prepared to go along with him.

(vi) UNITED STATES/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

In April, 1971, a 12-member caucus of Black Congressmen, led by Charles Diggs, in a document containing sixty recommendations, called on President Nixon to follow a harder line in the fight against apartheid.

On 19th May, President Nixon replied. In the most detailed defence of his South African policies since entering the White House he, in effect, rejected their demands.

He is reported to have said that "unilateral cutting of US economic and diplomatic ties, while it would be regretted and a cause for concern in South Africa, would isolate the US from the forces of change in South Africa.

"Isolation, even if it were achievable, could well produce undesirable results.

Not only would we be deprived of the means to influence developments in a constructive manner, but we would also be cut off from the people we wish to help - the non-Whites."

He said that while he could not condone "the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid", he nevertheless did not believe that isolation would meet the purpose of encouraging non-violent change. South Africa, he added, was "sensitive to the attitudes of other nations and particularly desirous of a good relationship with the United States".

He rejected the Congressmen's recommendation that he should discourage private investment in South Africa: "It is highly unlikely that the discouragement of investments or trade would have any effect on South Africa's racial policies."

He also refused to accede to their call for withdrawal of South Africa's sugar quota and its reallocation to other African countries: "The Administration does not support the elimination of the quotas for any countries on political grounds alone."

NUUS VAN DIE TAKKE

STELLENBOSCH

'n Nuwe tak van die Instituut is op 23 April 1971 in Stellenbosch gestig. Mnr. Gideon Roos (Onder-voorsitter van die Instituut en Voorsitter van die Witwatersrand-tak) en mnr. John Barratt (Direkteur van die Instituut) het die stigtingsvergadering bygewoon, wat onder die voorsitterskap van prof. W.B. Vosloo van die Departement Staatsleer van die Universiteit, gehou is. Daar was ongeveer 40 belangstellendes teenwoordig.

Die volgende bestuur is aangewys:

Voorsitter: Prof. W.B. Vosloo
Sekretaris: Mnr. G.K.H. Töttemeyer
Bykomende lede: Proff. F.C. Fensham, J.L. Sadie, A. Nel, D.J. Kotzé,
J.P. Jansen, Dr. J.J. Fouché. mnr. I. Potgieter
en G. Roux.

PRETORIA

On 3rd May, 1971, an annual general meeting was held by the Pretoria Branch. Professor Charles Niewoudt, Vice-Chairman, was in the Chair and presided over the election of new office-bearers.

Die komitee wat vir 1971 gekies is, bestaan uit die volgende persone:

Voorsitter: Mnr. L. Coetzee
Onder-Voorsitter: Mnr. D.F.S. Fourie
Sekretaris-Tesourier: Mnr. M.A. Barnard
Bykomende lede: Kapt. W.N. du Plessis, SAV
Mnr. C.R. von Egidy
Mnr. T.D. Venter

Dit word beplan om binnekort 'n program vir die tweede helfte van 1971 aan lede te stuur en dit word vertrou dat bywoning van vergaderings sal toeneem.

- - - - -

PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FOR MEMBERS

A limited number of copies of the Papers listed below, which have not been circulated to all members, are available on request at no charge to members. (These Papers can be purchased by non-members for 30 cents.)

Resolutions of the Third Conference of Non-Aligned States (Lusaka, September, 1970.) With Selected Conference Statements and Documents.

The Commonwealth: Heads of Government Meeting (Singapore, January, 1971).

The United States and World Strategy by Kurt Glaser (Issued March, 1971).

Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations, 1970. Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions and Voting.

Members are reminded that the booklet (published 1970) "United States Foreign Policy in a Regional Context", containing the papers presented at a Symposium organised by the Institute, is available at the special price for members of R1-40 (Non-members R1-75).

Also available is Margaret Doxey's paper (published 1969), South Africa's External Economic Relations: New Initiatives in a Changing Environment, at 30 cents to members (Non-members 35 cents).
