Security and Development in the Horn of Africa:
Emerging Powers, and Competing Regionalisms

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Executive Summary

Emerging powers are becoming centers for varieties of conflict as well as development. With a focus on the complexities of the Horn of Africa, we highlight non-traditional security (NTS) – transnational challenges including ‘fragile states’, terrorism, migrations and viruses – which continue to undermine contemporary state and governance structures inside & around the region. We argue that NTS challenges demand alternative and creative ways to address them: a challenge to IPSS & other African think tanks. We show how the Horn of Africa1 illustrates all these and other emergent factors in differing proportions over time. Further, we also argue that the BRICS’ and TICK’s (Turkey, India, China and Korea) internal and regional ‘transnational tensions’ and ‘informal’ flows will impact global governance & human security for the foreseeable future. In short, the Horn needs to be rethought. A return to securitization would be unhelpful.

Key Points

● Emerging power engagement in the Horn has negatively impacted the security landscape of the region, consequently complicating human security and non-traditional transnational security especially at micro and meso levels.

● Turkish military expansion in the Horn has generated complex inter-regional relations and coalitions involving the Gulf States that have impacted both the region and state-building process in Somalia.
Introduction

The Horn of Africa is marked by many notable non-traditional and transnational security challenges including fragile states, civil war, ‘ungoverned spaces’, migrations, transnational organized crime (TOC) (piracy, terrorism, human and drug trafficking especially qat), and climate change related effects – drought, hunger, disease, and viruses. In this policy brief, we explore how emerging powers – particularly Turkey – involvement has negatively impacted the region’s peace and security landscape. We highlight how Turkish allies (Turkey is a member of NATO) and adversaries’ expansion in the region has contributed to its fragility, so making the Horn susceptible to both intra- and inter-state conflicts. We posit that intensified Turkish and Gulf States military activities in the Horn may lead to the militarization of the region which inevitably will reduce the priority previously given to NTS issues. Therefore, we argue that increased emerging power engagement in the region has drastically changed its geopolitical dynamics resulting in complex inter-regional relations and security challenges that further undermine both state and human security.

Emerging Powers in the Horn of Africa

Although the BRICS have led trade, investment, and development in Africa, a novel emerging power has come on the scene. Since ascending to power in 2002, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party or AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) has drastically reoriented the country’s foreign policy towards Africa. Under the AKP, Africa has become essential in Turkish economic, political, and foreign policy endeavours causing competition for the BRICS, especially China. Turkish engagement in Africa is focused on the Horn of Africa, making the region a center for emerging and regional power plays. The area is strategically located, giving access to the continent, the Middle East, and Europe. Consequently, it offers many economic and security possibilities. Up until 2016, Turkish engagement was restricted to investment, development, and humanitarian aid, particularly in Somalia. However, in the last two years, Turkey has changed its approach to include security cooperation. It is the latter that has negatively impacted the security landscape of the Horn. While many positives are seen in the economic and humanitarian aid arenas, the political and security of the region has become more volatile, while NTS is relegated to the sidelines.

Inter-regionalisms

Turkish military expansion in the Horn has facilitated complex inter-regional relations and coalitions with the Gulf States that have negatively impacted the region. The Horn of Africa and Middle East states have for centuries influenced each other economically, politically, and socially. Their relations oscillate between cordial partnerships and hostile relations. However, geopolitics have been a major divisive factor for the regions. During the Cold War for instance, the two regions were forced to pick sides between the United States (US) and Soviet Union. The superficial divide saw Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen and Sudan fight each other in the 60s, 70s and 80s. Yet during the last phase of the era, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia fought Libya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the Middle Eastern oil boom in the 70s and the end of the Cold War reconnected the regions again as each country leveraged resources, location, trade, and investments. Today, Horn of Africa states continue to actively seek trade partnerships, investments, and aid from Gulf States by leveraging resources and location. Economically, the Middle East is a major Horn of Africa trading partner. Besides China, the Horn’s most significant export and import partners are Gulf States. Meester, J. et al (2018) in the table...
below summarize major Gulf States investments in the Horn between 2000-2017.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National alignment of investor</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
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Therefore, it should not be a surprise that developments on either one side of the region easily influence and impact politics, economy, and social landscape of the other. As such, it is not uncommon for Horn of Africa states to pick sides when there is a conflict or disagreement among states in the Middle East. In the 2017 Gulf Crisis, Sudan was the first country to declare its support for Kuwait, thus lending its support toward the Saudi-led coalition. Eritrea, Djibouti, and the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland downgraded their ties with Qatar and joined the Saudis. While Ethiopia and the Somali federal government (SFG) remained neutral.7

Nonetheless, the rise of Turkey in the region and its close ties with Qatar has promoted a resurgence of Gulf regional power plays in the Horn, more so following the war in Yemen and the 2017 Gulf crisis. In September of 2017, Turkey opened the largest military base outside its borders in Mogadishu. According to an Al-Jazeera report, the base is worth $50m, with the capacity to train 1,500 soldiers at a time.8 The base is a welcome contribution to strengthening the Somali army. At the same time, it represents a reliable indicator of the change in Turkish engagement with the region to include military/security, causing concern among its Gulf adversaries (United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia).

In December of 2017, Turkey also entered into another strategic agreement with Sudan. The duo signed a US$650m contract to rehabilitate the Red Sea port island of Suakin in northeast Sudan. The goal of the agreement is to assist in the fight against terrorism in the greater East Africa region. However, the agreement also comes with exclusive docking rights for Turkish civilian and military vessels on the west coast.9 Thereby giving Turkey an army presence in the Red Sea via Sudanese territorial waters. The Suakin rehabilitation has ignited a regional power play between Turkey and UAE/Saudi Arabia, putting the Horn in crossway of inter-regional geopolitical conflicts.

Following the Sudanese agreement, Turkey was invited to open a military base in Djibouti, the small Horn of Africa country closest to the Middle East. Reports that the strategically located country may be home to another foreign military base – US, France, Japan, China and Saudi Arabia already have bases - came after Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh visited Turkey in December 2017.10 Perhaps Djibouti did not hesitate to open its doors to Turkey due to its high debt levels. In the last two years, the country’s external debt has increased to 85 percent of its GDP making it the highest of any low-income country.11 Djibouti owes most of its debt to China under the Belt and Road Initiative raising concerns among analysts that it may follow Sri Lanka into a Chinese debt trap.12

While the UAE and Saudi Arabia are alarmed by swift Turkish expansion in the Horn, it is the Suakin Island restoration and possible military presence that has angered the pair. They have interpreted the move as a calculated plan to station troops close to Jeddah, the Saudi city nearest to Sudan. Turkey has had strained relations with the duo over Qatar, Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, the pair is concerned about Turkish military expansion
given its close ties with Iran and support for Qatar.13

Since the Gulf crisis started in June 2017, Turkey has stationed more troops in its Qatari military base. The South China Morning Post indicates that Turkey intends to increase its forces to about 3,000 in 2018.14 Adding to the tension is Turkish suspicion of UAE, Voice of America reported president Erdogan accusing UAE of supporting a failed coup to oust him in July 2016,15 However, president Erdogan categorically denied that his country is constructing a naval base on the Island. 16 Nonetheless, the Sudanese-Turkish agreement can be construed as a comment on Turkish strategy to dominate the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia and UAE also value the Horn for its strategic location to expand their capabilities in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea to support operations in Yemen.17 The Saudis and eight other Sunni Arab countries (UAE included), with logistical support from the US, France, and United Kingdom (UK) are engaged in a proxy war with Iran in efforts to counter the Iranian-backed al Houthis in Yemen.18 The Saudis have acquired a military base in Djibouti, while the UAE have a 30-year concession with 51 per cent ownership of Berbera port (under a state owned maritime company - DP World) in the self-proclaimed independent Somaliland. 19 The newly negotiated Berbera port agreement brings Ethiopia into the picture further complicating Somali state-building, and the general security and politics of the region as the proceeding sections elucidate. As such, recent emerging power engagement in the Horn has opened an already fragile region to intense, complicated geopolitical rivalries and possible inter-state conflicts. Even though the real Turkish intentions in the Horn may not be apparent at this point, its renewed engagement in the region has changed its geopolitical and security landscape.20

Conflicting inter-regionalisms

The Gulf crisis which started in 2017 has expanded into the Horn of Africa as the Saudis and their allies rush to counter Turkish-Qatari influence in the region. In fact, the whole continent has in some way been caught up in the crisis and power politics. The rivalry between Turkey and the Gulf States has expanded into mainland Africa as the Saudi coalition rushes to establish relations with African countries to counter Turkish expansion. James Dorsey observes that competition for influence among the Gulf States includes the Sahel, Central, and West Africa. 21 He further notes that Qatar's Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani visited six West African countries in 2017 to garner support for his country in the crisis. Nonetheless, using data from various sources, Stratfor analysis summarised in the map below shows how the three regional powers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – have in the past ten years increased their economic and political influence across the continent.22


More importantly, the extension of the Gulf crisis to the Horn has fuelled previously tense interstate relations with the potential to trigger regional conflicts and undermine Somalia’s weak federal system. After Eritrea and Djibouti supported the Saudi coalition and reduced ties
with Qatar, Dorsey observes that Qatar withdrew its 400 troops peacekeeping contingent from the Red Sea island of Doumeira. Eritrea seized the opportunity to grab the island which Djibouti also claims as its own. This action could have pulled Ethiopia into the conflict if it had not mended its relations with Eritrea. As of July 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea resumed diplomatic relations following 20 years of animosity. The new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed surprised the whole world when he relinquished claims to the disputed Badme territory. Bruton (2018) argues that the two countries have rushed toward peace because they face a common powerful enemy; hardliners within the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). TPLF have exercised unrestrained power in Ethiopia for the past two decades. Therefore, the pair fear that they will not surrender their power willingly. Eritrea is more fearful of the group because it is under their rule that it fought Ethiopia, leading to its confrontation at Badme in 1998. Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrea forced the country to be under a state of emergency till today. Nonetheless, the new Ethiopia-Eritrea relations are a positive move in a fragile region with many border disputes and tense inter-state relations.

Following enhanced Turkish ties with Sudan, Egypt became concerned given its tense relations with Sudan over a border dispute in the region of Halayeeb and the Nile River waters. Sudan complained to the United Nations (UN) that the 2016 Egyptian-Saudi maritime agreement infringed on its waters. Further, Sudan accused Egypt of stationing soldiers and warplanes on the Sudanese side of the border. Nevertheless, after reports that Egypt supported by the Saudis had sent troops to Eritrea, Sudan closed its border with Eritrea.

Similarly, Egypt is enraged by the Turkish military presence in Suakin because it is concerned that Sudan might renew its claim to the disputed Halaiab Triangle on the Red Sea. The pair has disagreed over the territory for over 60 years, each claiming it to be theirs. However, Egypt has maintained control of the area since the 1990s. Given Turkish military support to Sudan, Egypt is concerned that Sudanese military strength will be boosted in so doing, creating the impetus to reconsider its claim to the land.

Further, Gulf power politics in the Horn have rekindled an intense cross-border water conflict - the Nile River conflict that concerns eight countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Congo DR, and Tanzania. Egypt has capitalized on the ensuing Sudanese-Turkish-Qatari partnership to rekindle its fight over the Nile River, protest the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) construction located on the Blue Nile, and to dispute a border with Sudan. Nevertheless, Turkey and the Gulf States’ military expansion in the Horn may open the region to further transnational organized crime that will further weaken NTS and human security should Turkey and Gulf States’ conflicting regionalisms be allowed to take root.

Emerging powers undermine state-building in Somalia

While Somalia has benefited tremendously from Turkish and Saudi-Emirati financial support in counterterrorism and humanitarian aid, the rivalry between these countries has further weakened Somali’s loose federal system. Turkish and Saudi-Emeriti political and military engagement in the country has exacerbated tensions between Somalia and its federal states; Somaliland and Puntland. Whereas the Somali Federal Government (SFG) under President Farmajo has remained neutral throughout the recent Gulf crisis, the Saudis-Emirati coalition has used financial aid to pressure Somalia to cut ties with Qatar. They offered $80 million for the country to sever diplomatic relations with Doha and threaten to pull out all financial assistance if Somalia remained neutral in the crisis. When Somalia insisted on being neutral, the UAE recalled its ambassador to Somalia and deported...
Somali citizens as punishment for its neutrality. Meressa Dessu at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) notes that the UAE has since stopped giving humanitarian aid and financial support for capacity building in the security sector.\(^29\) Given that the UAE is one of the main financial contributors to the Somali security sector, Dessu argues that the move will significantly impact the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 2020/2021 exit strategy because the Somali national security forces may not be ready to take over from AMISOM. Without the UAE funding for security institutions, AMISOM will encounter constraints in preparing the Somali forces to take over before they leave. At the same time, the situation could create a gap in the country’s security apparatus that could be exploited by Al-Shabaab.\(^30\) Also, Dessu notes that the gains in the political process toward universal suffrage could be lost.

Nonetheless, Somali’s federal states support the Saudi-Emirati alliance against Qatar in the crisis. Somaliland and Puntland announced their support for the pair and re-proclaimed their independence from Somalia in June 2017. President Farmajo’s government criticized the two states for cutting ties with Qatar. The fallout between the SFG and its states is the latest disagreement resulting from emerging power engagement in the country. At the start of 2017, the UAE signed a 30-year contract to lease the Port of Berbera in Somaliland for trade and military purposes, without the approval of the SFG. In March this year (2018), the agreement was modified to include Ethiopia as a co-investor with 19 per cent, Somaliland retained 30 per cent and the UAE has 51 per cent ownership.\(^31\) Null declarations, protests, and requests by the SFG to rescind the contract have fallen on deaf ears. As already alluded to above, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are using the port to further their cause in Yemen. Nevertheless, Yemeni al Houthi movement threatened to bombard the port after Emirati military ships docked.\(^32\) The Economist reports that port construction under DP World has begun, it also confirms plans to build a military base. The same issue also says the SFG seized an Emirati plane carrying $9.6m cash intended to pay soldiers in Puntland.\(^33\) Therefore, it can be argued that emerging power political and military engagement in Somalia has exposed weaknesses in the federal system and intensified previously strained relations between the SFG and its states which have fundamentally undermined the central government’s authority and state-building process spearheaded by the African Union under AMISOM.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

We have shown how the Horn of Africa has myriad insecurities, coalitions, actors, and competing regionalism projects. We have argued that Turkey’s increased presence in the region has unleashed a complex network of inter-regional relations and security challenges. Concurrently, the Horn is becoming militarized. The latter has serious consequences for sustainable peace and security in the region. A move toward militarization could surpass human security and NTS challenges which are central to much of the insecurity in the region. Meanwhile, emerging powers are the new centres of development and Africa’s leading trade and infrastructure development partner including China’s Belt and Road Initiative\(^34\) for the foreseeable future. We propose the following recommendations for constructive inter-regional relations and cooperative development partnerships.

1. Emerging power engagement with Africa should focus on trade, development, and humanitarian assistance. Especially for the Horn, military and political involvement have proved counterproductive for both human and state security. Initial focus on investment, trade, and development by Turkey in Somalia proved successful. Before Turkey switched to military cooperation, its humanitarian and development assistance to
Somalia greatly assisted rebuilding the war-torn country thereby contributing to peace and security in the region. Further, emerging powers like China and India are evidence that focus on trade, investment, and infrastructure development are more beneficial for the Horn and the continent than military engagements. Concentrating on these sectors will, in turn, serve to address root causes of NTS issues like migrations, human and drug trafficking, hunger, disease, and viruses, which contribute to both state and human insecurity in the region.

2. Turkish terrorism assistance (and cooperation) in Somalia and broader Horn of Africa region should not be military centred. Non-traditional transnational security threats like terrorism have proved challenging to address through military solutions because their causes are not necessarily military, but social, political and economic. Therefore, terrorism assistance could emphasize non-military/non-traditional security measures such as understanding what and how terrorist groups are sustained, the motivations which drive young people to join, who (diaspora, states, transnational networks?) and why they provide support - financial or otherwise - and dialogue or better inclusion of insurgent groups in political processes of their countries. Consequently, countering terrorism partnerships ought to be multifaceted to capture the complexity of the challenge and forge appropriate measures.

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End Notes

1 These include Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
6 Meester, The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa.
17 Ibid.
18 For information on the war in Yemen, see a BBC article here: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423
20 Kabandula, & Shaw, ‘Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa’ elucidate on this point further.
22 The map and article can be accessed at Stratfor website at https://worldview.stratfor.com/

25 PressTV. (2017, 28 December). ‘Sudan plotting with Turkey, Qatar against Egypt.’
26 Ibid.
The Somaliland Mission to the US press release gives a few more details on the agreement. See the link below to access it.

http://unpo.org/article/20682


More information about the initiative can be found in The Economist, (2017, 14 May) article here: https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/05/14/what-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative