Focus on the 31st AU summit:
- Scrutiny of its budget a first for the AU
- Who will oversee Africa’s new free trade area?
- The African Union reform: much still to be decided

PSC Interview: ‘The role of Cameroon’s friends could be decisive’

Decisions of the PSC from April to June 2018
Scrubiny of its budget a first for the AU

The 31st African Union (AU) summit in Nouakchott for the first time saw a vigorous interrogation of the organisation’s proposed budget. Issues of corruption and mismanagement were also brought to light as part of the process – seen as one of the spin-offs of the reforms led by Rwandan President Paul Kagame.

Positive steps were taken at the 31st AU summit in Nouakchott, from 25 June to 2 July, to make the 2019 AU budget more credible and transparent. Although this new process is not stipulated in the current institutional reform process, it is in line with one of its main priorities, namely to ‘manage the business of the AU efficiently and effectively at both the political and operational levels’.

The 2019 budget was also lower than that for 2018.

Member states’ finance ministers participated in the budgeting process alongside members of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) and officials, focusing on what they termed the ‘golden rules’ of budgeting, including sustainability and predictability.

The introduction of budget ceilings brought with it a level of scrutiny and rigour previously unknown in the AU budgeting process.

The 0.2% levy to finance the AU, adopted at the 27th AU summit in Kigali, was aimed at achieving such sustainability and predictability, especially for countries with smaller national budgets or weak fiscal capacity.

AU Commission Deputy Chairperson Kwesi Quartey at the opening session of the PRC meeting on June 25 said the golden rules were there so that ‘AU budgets are well-scrutinized to ensure the highest standards in accountability and judicious application of AU resources and that AU budgets are in line with the goals and objectives of the Union as agreed by the leadership’.

He said the introduction of ‘budget ceilings’ brought with it ‘a level of scrutiny and rigour previously unknown’ in the AU budgeting process.

Cuts to big money items

A high-ranking AU official involved in administrative issues told the PSC Report at the summit: ‘The budget process this year was tough. The committee even rejected the budget, which was good.’

It was revised with cuts to big money items such as the travel budget. ‘You have to stop it from the budgetary process,’ he said. ‘Missions can be addictive.’

He said AU policy restricted travel to 21 days per quarter and under, but some officials spent 150 days of the year travelling. ‘The cost is not just the cost of travel, but also the cost of absence,’ he said.
A tighter budgeting process also saw the budget committee eliminate duplication among AU organs for campaigns, increasing the savings.

Kagame, the current AU chairperson, at the opening plenary of the Assembly said that, ‘thanks to the outstanding work of the Committee of 15 Finance Ministers (F15), together with the Executive Council, the AU has applied the “golden rules” and adopted the most credible and transparent budget in our history’.

He praised states for their contributions to the Peace Fund, which, he said, were the highest ever and now stood at US$45.5 million. Ultimately the AU wanted a US$400 million endowment in place by 2021 to enable African countries to drive their own peace and security agenda.

Greater contribution by member states

The new budgeting process cut the 2019 budget by 12%, to a total of US$681 million, compared to US$790 million in 2018. The 2019 operational budget of US$158.5 million will be fully financed by member states, while 44% ($110.3 million) of the programme budget of US$249.8 million will be financed by member states, with the rest coming from partners, according to a statement by Quartey.

For the US$273.3 million peace support operations budget, 95% (US$261.9 million) will come from international partners. Ultimately the aim is to reduce donor funding and have member states fund 100% of the operational budget, 75% of the programme budget and 25% of the peace support operations budget.

More flexibility on 0.2% levy

Meanwhile, one year after the deadline for AU member states to implement the 0.2% levy on eligible goods, and with a low uptake, the continental body has resolved to allow more flexibility. Only 23 countries are reported to be ‘at various stages of’ implementing the levy, and there will be another extraordinary summit, in November, to discuss this sticking point in the AU reforms.

Kagame in a closed session on the progress of the reforms told the Assembly that ‘a good amount of the controversy surrounding the 0.2% levy, adopted at the Kigali 2016 summit, has dissipated, as member states have come to appreciate the flexibility with which it can be applied. And also that they will not necessarily be paying more, and certainly not more than their fair share.’

Kagame said options for a new scale of assessment for 2019–2021 for member state contributions have been prepared in line with budget caps.
The Assembly decided at the 28th summit in 2017 that ‘the current scale of contributions should be revised based on the principles of ability to pay, solidarity, and equitable burden-sharing, to avoid risk concentration’, and the sanctions regime for defaulters should be strengthened.

Kagame in his report said member states ‘have the ability to determine the appropriate form and the means they will use to implement the 0.2% decision in line with their national and international obligations’.

Member states belonging to the World Trade Organization could do so ‘without contravening their international trade obligations’, he added.

The Executive Council resolved to hold back the Pan-African Parliament’s budget for 2019

Officials are interpreting the flexibility around the 0.2% levy to mean that member states that are able to do so could pay their assessed shares from their treasuries. The Southern African Development Community, for one, has raised objections against the levy because it could clash with the trade obligations of its members.

Pan-African Parliament brought to book

There was also scrutiny of money already spent – a step that could bolster the confidence of member states that their contributions will not go to waste. The Executive Council resolved to hold back the Pan-African Parliament’s (PAP) US$18.5 million budget for 2019, pending an ‘urgent, independent audit of [the] PAP’, set to be completed by October 2018. The PAP is the second-most financed organ of the AU after the AU Commission.

The Executive Council also said PAP President Roger Nkodo Dang ‘shall refrain from adopting decisions with regard to staff disciplinary measures without prior approval from the Chairperson of the AU Commission until the audit is completed’. This follows media reports on questions by PAP staff about Dang’s official expenses for accommodation and transport, as well as alleged irregularities in appointments and recruitment in the PAP.

The funding overhaul has, however, not yet benefited all. The African Peer Review Mechanism’s (APRM) contributions are reported to be ‘at their lowest since 2007’, with only five countries paying their full contributions of US$200 000 and 31 countries in arrears totalling US$21 million.

Chief Executive Officer Eddy Maloka said this was because, as a result of the re-assessment of countries’ contributions in 2016, some of the APRM’s biggest funders, including Nigeria and South Africa, had to pay significantly more to the AU. ‘They were unable to cope with demands’ from the APRM, he said, and could not pay their usual additional contributions to prop up the budget.

‘We are now starting to feel the pain of countries not paying,’ he said. The APRM could be moved to the AU’s core budget as part of the institution’s reform process.
At a meeting in Dakar in June 2018, a bureau of AU ministers of trade, consisting of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania, South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire, was set up to lead the AfCFTA process for the next 12 months.

Meanwhile, at the 31st AU summit earlier this month, five more countries – Burundi, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone and South Africa – signed the agreement, joining the 44 that had signed in March during the extraordinary summit in Kigali, Rwanda. eSwatini and Chad were the latest to ratify the AfCFTA, bringing the total number of ratifications to six; still far short of the minimum of 22 needed for the free trade area to come into being.

Officials, however, believe this goal is in sight, with countries such as South Africa now making haste to get the ratification through their domestic legal processes and parliaments, so that they can be part of the free trade area when it comes into being.

Countries such as South Africa are now making haste to get the ratification through their domestic legal processes

Chief Director, Africa Economic Relations for South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry Wamkele Mene said being a state party to the free trade area meant ‘you are in a prime position to shape and influence the direction of the negotiations, and when the secretariat is established, you have a say in its structure and who is the head of the secretariat – and you benefit from the new market access agreed to.’

High stakes to host the secretariat

Despite this progress, no final decision on the secretariat of the AfCFTA has yet been taken. Speculation is also rife about the status of the secretariat, currently based at the AU Commission headquarters in Addis Ababa.

At the 31st summit, both eSwatini and Ghana raised their hands to host the secretariat.

For eSwatini the stakes are high. The tiny Southern African kingdom rushed to ratify the AfCFTA after it announced its intention to host the secretariat at the Southern African Customs Union summit in June, just before the AU summit.

The Swazi Observer reported that Minister of Commerce, Industry and Trade Jabulani Mabuza said the intention to host the secretariat was a way to ‘motivate parliamentarians to speedly ratify the AfCFTA protocol’, as it would place the country at an advantage. Hosting the secretariat would attract meetings to the country and turn it into a ‘hive of activity’. The other bidder, Ghana, had ratified the protocol in Kigali in March.

These bids come after the withdrawal of Nigeria, which was preparing a bid to host the secretariat ahead of the Kigali summit.

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These bids come after the withdrawal of Nigeria, which was preparing a bid to host the secretariat ahead of the Kigali summit. Those aspirations, however, remained at home with President Muhammadu Buhari, who at the last minute declined to attend the gathering owing to concerns expressed by local manufacturers, as well as internal politics. Nigeria has still not signed the agreement.

During a visit to Abuja by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa one week after the 31st AU summit, Buhari promised that Nigeria would sign the AfCFTA,
but officials say they do not see this happening before that country’s presidential elections early next year.

Nigeria would have been a logical host for the secretariat. It previously led plans to get the AfCFTA off the ground, with the creation of a free trade area first mooted in the Lagos Plan of Action following a summit there in 1980. The 1991 Abuja Treaty on establishing the African Economic Community set out the road map towards the free trade area.

**An historic achievement**

Establishing a free trade area in Africa is considered by some as one of the crucial outcomes of the AU’s institutional reform process currently underway, and includes components such as the Single African Air Transport Market and the Free Movement Protocol.

An African Union capable of delivering a functional free trade area is actually the end point of the reform

In his speech on the reforms at the 31st AU summit, AU Chairperson and Rwandan President Paul Kagame called the AfCFTA ‘among the most historic achievements of the African Union’.

Kagame said: ‘It is going to become a reality before much longer’, adding that ‘an African Union capable of delivering a functional free trade area is actually the end point of the reform’.

Even though there is still some distance to cover on this, Kagame said the AU was proving outside perceptions that it could not deliver a free trade area to be ‘increasingly … outdated’. He also said interests from outside the continent would be ‘recalculated’, and this made it crucial for Africa to speak with one voice on the free trade area.

At best, the AfCFTA is set to unite Africa’s 1.07 billion people with a combined continental gross domestic product of US$3.3 trillion in a single market. At the 31st AU summit, annexes on the establishment of the AfCFTA were adopted after these were discussed and finalised at a meeting of African ministers of trade in Dakar, Senegal in June 2018.

The annexes cover areas such as rules of origin, cooperation between customs agencies, transparency, dumping, transport regulations and dispute resolution.

Ministers of trade now have to submit schedules of tariff concessions and specific commitments on trade in services to the assembly at the 32nd AU summit in Addis Ababa next year. Negotiations around investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights and e-commerce are set to start next, with a January 2020 deadline.

**Consultations at member-state level**

AU Commissioner of Trade and Industry Ambassador Albert Muchanga emphasised the need for each country to set up consultative and coordinating mechanisms around the AfCFTA that allow stakeholders to participate.

This was made an Assembly decision at the 31st AU summit. Officials believe lack of local participation is one of the reasons why Nigeria’s intentions to sign were so abruptly halted.

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The Assembly also decided that the AU should ‘undertake broad-based national awareness campaigns so that all stakeholders such as ordinary citizens and business people across Africa embrace the AfCFTA’. It also called on the AU Commission to organise a civil society forum and a private sector forum ‘to enhance stakeholder engagement on the implementation of the AfCFTA’ at the AU’s next mid-year gathering, set to take place in Niger.

There is a general expectation in the AU that the required minimum of 22 ratifications is feasible and that the AfCFTA will come into being at this gathering. Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, the AU’s champion on the AfCFTA, is already reported to be planning to host a large gathering in celebration.
The African Union reform: much still to be decided

According to the decisions of the 31st AU summit in Nouakchott, an extraordinary AU summit will be held in November 2018 in Addis Ababa to decide on outstanding reform proposals. Rwandan President Paul Kagame intends to use this last opportunity during his tenure as AU chairperson to argue for binding decisions on the reforms. While some progress has been made, there are still divisions among African states over the substantive reforms required to make the AU more effective.

Following criticisms of inadequate consultation during the initial development of the reform proposals in 2016, Kagame and the Reform Implementation Unit have initiated wide-ranging consultations with key AU organs and regional economic communities (RECs).

The issues to be debated prior to the extraordinary summit in November 2018 include the selection process of the senior leadership of the AU Commission (AUC), ways of enhancing the performance of AU organs, the division of labour between the AU and RECs, and sanctions for members that fail to pay their dues on time.

Selection of senior AU officials

Reforming the current process of selecting senior AUC leaders is critical if the reforms are to address the inefficiencies within the AUC. The proposal calls for a shift from politically driven appointments to a merit-based appointment process. Ideally, according to the reform team, the AUC chairperson should be elected every four years through a merit-based process. The chairperson, serving as the chief executive officer, would then play a critical role in recruiting the deputy chairperson and commissioners.

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Based on the proposals seen by the PSC Report, two options are on the table:

- The deputy chairperson and commissioners are selected and nominated by the chairperson of the AUC and appointed by the AU Assembly. This proposal would mean these posts are advertised in the six months prior to the election of the new AUC chairperson in January. Two issues, however, remain unclear:
  - The proposal does not clarify whether the selection and nomination will be done by the outgoing chairperson or the new chairperson elected in January.
According to the proposal, the shortlisted candidates would be ‘presented to the chairperson of the commission in February and s/he would proceed to appoint commissioners and assign their portfolios in March’, but it does not spell out the exact role of the assembly.

The second option requires a competency-based assessment and shortlisting of candidates for election by the ‘Executive Council and appointment by the Assembly’ in January. The chairperson would then assign portfolios to the elected officials as either deputy chairperson or commissioner in March.

In both options, the candidates are expected to be accountable to the chairperson, who assigns portfolios to them and retains the right to redeploy them and terminate their employment.

Some critics of the reforms argue that this would require an amendment to the AU Constitutive Act. However, given that the AU Assembly reserves the power to delegate its rights to other organs, in line with Article 9(2) of the Constitutive Act (as it did recently by delegating the adoption of the AUC budget to the Executive Council), the Constitutive Act would not need to be amended. Only the Rules and Procedures and Statutes of the AUC would require amendment.

It is also necessary to develop an appraisal process for candidates seeking re-election, to ensure efficiency. In the previous selection processes, politics and regional considerations were the driving force behind the re-election of candidates, rather than performance.

**What is the added value of other AU-affiliated organs?**

As part of the initiative to foster integration and avoid duplication, the AU reform has initiated an audit of its organs. There is growing criticism of the perceived lack of efficiency of organs such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the PSC, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

During the Nouakchott Summit, the AU Assembly approved the gradual integration of NEPAD into the AU as the AU Developmental Agency. Hence, rather than duplicating some of the work done by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the APRM will instead support the DPA in tracking implementation and providing monitoring and evaluation in key governance areas.

Meanwhile, there are still significant misgivings about the PAP. It became functional in 2003 but has only yielded limited results in terms of providing advisory support and developing some model laws.

The AU Assembly approved the gradual integration of NEPAD into the AU as the AU Developmental Agency

Although the revised PAP Protocol of 2014 accords the body legislative powers, it has not come into force because only six countries have ratified it out of the 28 required. The PAP’s duties of providing oversight, checks and balances within the AU are, to a large extent, currently being undertaken by the AU Permanent Representatives Council of ambassadors in Addis Ababa.

To compound the situation, there is an ongoing investigation of corruption allegations against the PAP Secretariat. This emphasises the need to ensure the efficiency of the body, which is the second most financed organ of the AU – after the AUC – with a total budget of US$20 million in 2018.

On the other hand, the progress of organs such as the African Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been impacted by the reluctance of member states to accept judgements made by the court and the commission.

**Division of labour between the AU and RECs**

The AU currently recognises eight regional organisations, besides several other regional mechanisms and commissions. This has spurred discussions on reducing the number of RECs to five – in line with the five regions of Africa – to avoid duplication.

This presents enormous challenges, as some member states have overlapping memberships and different interests beyond a particular regional set-up. RECs also do not derive their legitimacy from the AU and there is often little coordination between the RECs and the AUC.
Ongoing discussions highlight the overall need for the AU to coordinate, harmonise and provide strategic direction, while RECs are responsible for the actual implementation and enforcement of decisions. This is the main idea behind the AUC’s call for it to lead negotiations with the European Union around the future of a post-Cotonou deal, rather than the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries representing the original Cotonou agreement. This will enable the AU to harmonise Africa’s integration agenda at all levels.

A clear division of labour between the AU and RECs is also crucial for the functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture, where the AU and RECs hold overlapping mandates for peace and security. The PSC is often reluctant to proactively address security threats, as it increasingly relies on RECs to take the lead. In South Sudan, for instance, some opposition parties and civil society organisations are calling on the AU to play a greater role in resolving the crisis, in the face of alleged bias on the part of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states. It is important to address this situation and provide appropriate checks and balances, especially when RECs become part of the problem in crisis areas.

The AU intends to develop a roadmap on the division of labour by August 2018, but it is uncertain whether member states will reach a decision during the Extraordinary Summit in November 2018.

During the November summit the AU will decide on the scale regulating members’ contributions and the sanctions for those that fail to pay their dues.

The annual AU/RECs coordination meeting that is expected to be held every mid-year from 2019 will play a crucial role in shaping the future of this relationship and the division of responsibilities between the AU and RECs.

**Financing the AU**

Thanks to the AU reforms, the budget was for the first time reviewed and adopted by the Executive Council and the Committee of Ministers of Finance (also known as the F15). This saw the reduction of the AU’s budget for 2019 by 12% compared to the 2018 budget. During the Nouakchott Summit five members were added to the F15, making it the F20.

The implementation of the 0.2% levy on imports to finance the AU continues to face obstructions. While 23 member states said they had begun implementing the 0.2% levy decision, only 13 member states have actually started collecting the funds. Despite the flexibility required for member states to implement the decision, some are unsure how to implement the decision, owing to national and international trade commitments.

During the November summit the AU will decide on the scale regulating members’ contributions and the sanctions for member states that fail to pay their dues on time.
The violence in the anglophone zones of Cameroon seems to be spinning out of control with increasing acts of kidnapping and violent confrontations with the security forces. What has been the impact of this climate of fear on ordinary citizens in this region?

It is true that there has been a steady increase in violence in the anglophone zones of Cameroon. In fact, in less than 30 months the situation has gone from serious, characterised mainly by sectorial and corporatist demands, to an overwhelming expression of unease and unhappiness; of social, economic and political dissatisfaction to a situation that today can truthfully be termed an armed conflict. This conflict is mainly between secessionist groups and the security forces that have the mandate not only to maintain law and order but also to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. It’s also important to note the presence of some elements who are taking advantage of the climate of insecurity to carry out criminal acts against ordinary citizens.

People living in these regions are gripped by fear and uncertainty about the future to such an extent that many of them have fled their region and even national boundaries to look for peace and security elsewhere.

How do you see the reaction of the Cameroonian security forces? Has it been excessive?

The role of the security forces – the most visible representatives of state authority – has been crucial. One has to emphasise the fact that currently the security forces are active on several fronts: in the northern part of the country because of Boko Haram, in the east to manage the fallout from the crisis in the Central African Republic, on the coast to fight piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing, and now in the anglophone regions to try and maintain law and order.

In this latter case, the security forces have been faced with acts of extreme cruelty and their professionalism has been tested by the incalculable violence meted out against them.

Some analysts have noted a disproportionate reaction on their part in certain cases. All of this takes time to verify – something that is very important to do to fight against impunity.

Has there been a radicalisation of the independence movement, both ideologically and in the means they are employing to get their way?

As I said earlier, there has been a clear escalation owing to, on the one hand, the progression from a demand for federalism to one of secession and, on the other hand, the recourse to acts of terror and violence against representatives of the state, particularly the security forces.

Do you think presidential elections can still take place in October under these circumstances?

Senatorial elections took place on 25 March 2018 and according to several observers they were generally satisfactory, with many people applauding the way the security situation was dealt with. Even if the climate
is still charged with individual acts of violence, we believe it will be possible to hold presidential elections in the next few months without any major problems that would lead to a total disruption of the electoral and post-electoral processes.

In this regard, our think tank, the CEIDES, recently organised a participatory dialogue about the elections in Cameroon. The electoral commission (ELECAM) cooperated throughout this process and seemed very confident about holding the elections.

Some say the Catholic Church is the only mediator that can possibly calm the situation. Do you agree?

The current situation that we are faced with in our country, particularly in the anglophone regions, necessitates the mobilisation of all good offices. I don’t at this point in time agree with those who opt for just one actor, be it the Catholic Church or any other, to manage the tensions and mediate in the crisis. I also believe that much still has to be done in terms of investigating and finding out exactly what gave rise to the current crisis, particularly the most recent developments. We need skilled experts in the domains of conflict management and analysis, and crisis mediation, and even experts on dealing with historical issues.

The electoral commission cooperated and seemed very confident about holding the elections

In this regard, I believe that the history of our reunification and the evolution of our society on the political, economic, social and cultural front these last 60 years should be re-appropriated as part of a dialogue aimed at finding common ground that will lead to social cohesion and peace.

The crisis in Cameroon is hardly ever on the agenda of the PSC. Yet it often discusses other crises, such as in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Why do you think that is?

I think that Cameroon is a country that matters a great deal in Africa. It plays a crucial role in the fight against terrorism and has never failed to fulfil its responsibilities towards the AU. The foundations of this crisis are contrary to the principles of the AU and the PSC, as well as the UN, the Commonwealth and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, all of which are very much aware of the current situation in the country.

The possibility of a violent rupture could have an incalculable impact on its immediate neighbours

I believe we still have considerable leeway to appease and even eventually to resolve the issue internally. It is up to national actors and notably the decision makers to put in place the conceptual and operational outlines of a roadmap that will be convincing in this regard. This roadmap should necessarily go beyond just the security aspects and also include the humanitarian, political, economic and cultural challenges that we are facing.

What would you advise the international community to do to help solve the crisis?

This year, 2018, is a crucial year for Cameroon, with many challenges, and in this context the role of its friends in the international community could be decisive. I believe that all the diplomatic forums should be used as an opportunity to place the fight against terrorism and violence on the agenda. All the judicial cooperation mechanisms should be mobilised to neutralise those outside of the country who want to create chaos in Cameroon.

Our country has the particularity of being a pivot, and the possibility of a violent rupture could have an incalculable impact on its immediate neighbours, which already face a volatile security situation.

It would also be helpful if Cameroon’s friends could share their experiences and best practices to help us to solve our problems, which, on the whole, are not confined to the south-west and north-west. We need to recreate good neighbourliness, re-conceptualise inclusivity, collectively re-appropriate our history in all its particularities in order to reinvent a trajectory for the future.
## Decisions of the PSC from April – June 2018

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• 7th April of each year the African Union (AU) Day of Commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda | • PSC  
• Rwanda  
• AU member states | As soon as possible | • Suggested laws may be used against opponents of the government |
| 762nd meeting 9 April 2018 | Addressing the impact of terrorism and armed conflicts on Africa’s social fabric | • AU Commission (AUC) should expedite the development of the African Humanitarian Agency  
• States parties to the Pelindaba Treaty to fulfil their financial obligations and implement decisions  
• AUC and African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to provide annual briefing to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the status of implementation | • AUC  
• African Humanitarian Agency  
• UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) | By January 2019 | • Limited funds available to operationalise the agency |
| 763rd meeting 10 April 2018 | Weapons of mass destruction | • AUC and the AU Advisory Board on Corruption to jointly develop a report that empirically addresses the relationship between corruption and conflict, and report to the PSC | • PSC  
• AFCONE  
• AUC  
• AU Advisory Board on Corruption | As soon as possible | • Lack of political will and capacity to end corruption |
| 764th meeting 12 April 2018 | Fight against corruption | • AUC and the AU Advisory Board on Corruption to jointly develop a report that empirically addresses the relationship between corruption and conflict, and report to the PSC | • PSC  
• AFCONE  
• AUC  
• AU Advisory Board on Corruption | As soon as possible | • Lack of political will and capacity to end corruption |
| 766th meeting 24 April 2018 | Africa’s peace and security landscape by the year 2023 | • Regular consultative meetings with the troop-contributing countries and peace and security organs in the different regional economic communities/mechanisms (RECs/RMs) | • PSC  
• Member states | Silencing the guns by 2020 | • Ongoing and emerging conflicts in Africa |
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| 772nd meeting 16 May 2018 | Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) | • Extend the mandate of the AU RCI-LRA for three months, until 22 August 2018 | • PSC  
• RCI-LRA | As soon as possible | • Lack of human and financial resources after the withdrawal of the United States and Uganda |
| 773rd meeting 18 May 2018 | Darfur, Sudan | • The UN should place Darfur on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) | • UNPBC  
• Sudan  
• UNAMID | • Ongoing clashes in Darfur |
| 774th meeting 21 May 2018 | Climate change | • The Continental Early Warning System to include potential adverse effects of climate change in its regular briefings  
• AUC to undertake a study on the nexus between climate change and peace and security  
• AUC chairperson to appoint an AU Special Envoy for climate change and security | • AU member states  
• PSC  
• AUC  
• Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change  
• RECs/RMs | As soon as possible | • Limited expertise on the impact of climate change |
| 776th meeting 24 May 2018 | Illicit financial flows | • Closer collaboration between and among regional police authorities and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA)  
• UC should provide necessary technical assistance to member states | • Member states  
• PSC  
• CISSA  
• AU Border Programme  
• AU Commission | As soon as possible | • Lack of political will and capacity to end illicit flows |
| 777th meeting 1 June 2018 | Borders | • AU to assist all member states to establish their own one-border posts | • AU Commission  
• PSC | 2022 AU deadline for delimitation, | • Limited capacity of member states |
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<td>777&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; meeting 1 June 2018</td>
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<td>• AU should harmonise existing approaches on border governance</td>
<td>AU Border Programme</td>
<td>demarcation and reaffirmation of all African borders</td>
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| 778<sup>th</sup> meeting 11 June 2018 | Darfur                        | • Government of Sudan should investigate reports of sexual violence and immediately bring the perpetrators to book  
• Extend the mandate of UNAMID for a further 12 months | Government of Sudan  
• UNAMID | As soon as possible | • Government’s commitment to prosecute its forces |
| 782<sup>nd</sup> meeting 27 June 2018 | Somalia                       | • AMISOM reconfiguration should include the expansion of its civilian component  
• AMISOM’s mandate renewed up to 27 May 2019 | PSC  
• AUC  
• AMISOM  
• Government of Somalia  
• UN  
• International partners | Within the next three months | • Limited funds |
| 782<sup>nd</sup> meeting 27 June 2018 | The situation in Mali and the Sahel | • AUC chairperson to undertake the necessary consultations to follow up on pledges  
• AUC to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Nouakchott Process  
• AUC to review the AU Strategy for the Sahel | G5 Sahel  
• AUC  
• PSC | | • Limited funds |
| 783<sup>rd</sup> meeting 30 June 2018 | South Sudan                   | • The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) and the JMEC should be vigorous and provide verifiable evidence in order for appropriate punitive measures to be taken | PSC  
• South Sudan  
• IGAD | As soon as possible | • Unwillingness to impose sanctions |
About the PSC Report
The Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). The monthly publication is the only one of its kind dedicated to providing current analysis of the PSC’s work. It is written by a team of ISS analysts in Addis Ababa.

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The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa’s future. Our goal is to enhance human security as a means to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity. Using its networks and influence, the ISS provides timely and credible analysis, practical training and technical assistance to governments and civil society.

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