



Burundi Conflict Insight

Situation analysis

Since gaining independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced several violent conflicts, including a civil war that took place between 1993 and 2005. The common denominator of these conflicts was the politicization of divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. The civil war was triggered by the assassination of the first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi elements in a failed attempt to overthrow the government. The civil war is estimated to have caused more than 300,000 deaths and over 1 million displacements. In order to bring the civil war to an end, three major agreements were signed with varying degrees of success, namely, the 1994 Convention of Government, the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement,¹ and the 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement.

¹ In an attempt to bring the civil war to an end, Julius Nyerere (former President of Tanzania) and Nelson Mandela (former President of South Africa), facilitated a lengthy negotiation between the Hutus and the Tutsis. In August 2000, the negotiation yielded the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (also known as the Arusha Accords), which brought peace temporary to the country.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to assist the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States and Development Partners in decision making and in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments.

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POPULATION	GDP PER CAPITA (PPP)	LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YEARS)	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)	NEIGHBOURS	RECS
11.2 million	\$693	57.1	Index: 0.404 Rank: 184/188	DRC Rwanda Tanzania	COMESA EAC ECCAS

Figure 1: Country profile and demographicsⁱⁱ

The 2004 agreement led to the adoption of a constitution that guaranteed a power sharing arrangement between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. The constitution also recognized a multiparty system where political parties were allowed to operate freely. In 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza became President of Burundi. According to Article 96 of the Constitution, the President may be elected for a mandate of five years, which can be renewed once through re-election.

In April 2015, amid disputes over constitutional interpretations, the president announced his intention to run for a third term, triggering violent conflict between the government and those who opposed his bid. Protesters, who took to the streets the day after he announced his intention to re-run and demanded the withdrawal of his candidacy, were met with extreme police repression and brutality.

Causes of the conflict

Poor economic performance

One of the structural causes of the current conflict is related to the country's long-term poor economic performance that has left close to 65% of the population living under the poverty line. The 2010 Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), taking into consideration deprivation in health, education and living standards, indicates that 81.3% of Burundians are poor while 48.2% live in severe poverty and deprivation. Despite palliative measures by the government such as free maternal health and primary education, the situation of the rural population, where poverty and limited economic opportunities are particularly acute, has created seething resentment towards the government.

Ethnic tension

Although in the minority, the Tutsi elites historically dominated the Burundian political scene during the pre-independence era, which was characterized by a monarchical system of government. By the time the 'divide and rule' policy of Belgian colonial rule was fully established, it had created new divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groupsⁱⁱⁱ that precipitated recurrent violence. It is estimated that up to the end of April 2017, two years after the outbreak of conflict in 2015, over 420,600 Burundian refugees had fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Tanzania. The deep ethnic divisions across the country have also crept into and influenced the armed forces. A report by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), for instance, detailed a split within the army; between those who supported the attempted coup in 2015 and those who backed President Nkurunziza. Although the government rejected this allegation, the report argued that the split became worse with the "purge and elimination" of soldiers who came from the former Tutsi-dominated army. Between November 2016 and March 2017, the United Nations (UN) recorded a rise in the number of people being targeted because of their ethnicity.

Absence of democratic constitutionalism and disregard for the rule of law

One of the key hallmarks of constitutionalism is that it serves to limit governmental power in order to counter arbitrariness and abuse. It is well established that respecting executive term limits as typically provided for in national constitutions is one of the basic elements of modern government. In the case of Burundi, the national constitution as well as the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement specifically imposes a two-term limit on the occupant of the highest office - the presidency. However, on 25 April 2015, the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party,

ⁱⁱ Source: Human Development Report, UNDP. 2016.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ethnic composition (%): Hutu (85%); Tutsi (14%); Twa (1%) <https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/bethnic.htm>

announced that Nkurunziza would be its candidate in that year's elections, a development that would violate the two-term limit enshrined in the constitution. This announcement immediately triggered widespread demonstrations across the capital, Bujumbura. Arguing that the constitution could be read as permitting an additional term, supporters of the president framed the issue in legal terms and put forward rule-of-law arguments, urging the constitutional court to interpret articles 96 and 302 of the constitution.

On 5 May 2015, the constitutional court approved the president's bid to run for a third term. Although the judiciary is meant to act independently and decisively, there were claims that the judges that heard the matter were subjected to political pressure and manipulation. One week later, while President Nkurunziza was attending an East African Community (EAC) summit in neighbouring Tanzania, Major General Godefroid Niyombare announced on the radio that the president had been removed from office. However, the coup attempt failed due to disagreement between those in opposition and those who were loyal to the government. Though nearly every opposition party boycotted the eventual polls, Nkurunziza was declared the winner on 24 July 2015, capturing 69% of the vote.

Actors

National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)

Founded one year after civil war broke out in 1994, Nkurunziza joined the CNDD-FDD as a soldier and quickly rose through the ranks to lead the rebel group in 1998. CNDD-FDD played an important role throughout the civil war, with CNDD acting as the political wing and FDD as the military wing. In April 2015, when violent protests erupted due to the president's intention to run again, the government responded with force, deploying police and security forces. CNDD-FDD fully supported the third term bid on the basis that the first presidential term (2005-2010) did not count since Nkurunziza was elected by a vote of parliament and not by popular franchise as stated in the constitution.

Imbonerakure

The youth wing of the CNDD-FDD party is known as the *Imbonerakure*, which is a Kirundi word for "those that see far". The group emerged in 2010, and has grown to an estimated 50,000 members across the country. They were reportedly trained by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a former Rwandan Hutu militia, with keen interests in retaining a Hutu president sympathetic to their own goals. When Nkurunziza decided to run for a third term, the *Imbonerakure* played a major role in achieving that goal by setting up roadblocks and check points in some provinces where they extorted money, harassed passers-by and, despite having no powers, arrested people they suspected of having links to the opposition.^{iv}

National Forces of Liberation (FNL)

This is the opposition party led by Agathon Rwasa. The FNL was founded in 1980 as the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People – National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU – FNL). The group was the last to sign the peace agreement with the government after the civil war ended in 2005. In 2014, the FNL, a mostly Hutu backed group, and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), mostly supported by the Tutsi, formed a coalition named Amizero y'Abarund to challenge the dominance of CNDD-FDD. The motivation for FNL's involvement in the political crisis was to fight against CNDD-FDD and the *Imbonerakure* in the Kirundo, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Gitega provinces. Although the group came under attack from the Congolese army and the UN peacekeeping mission in 2014 and 2015, it continues to actively recruit fighters.

Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB)

Formerly known as the Republican Forces of Burundi (FOREBU), the FPB is composed of those who oppose Nkurunziza's third term and former military and public officials led by Major General Jeremie Ntiranyibagira. Three generals that were involved in the 2015 coup plot were arrested, but Niyombare fled the country and has not been seen or heard, apart from a telephone interview he granted Jeune Afrique in May 2017. The group originally established itself in eastern DRC in December 2015 and also recruited Burundian refugees into its fold from the Lusenda refugee camp in South Kivu. A recent UN Group of Experts report published in August 2017 claimed that FOREBU had emerged as the most relevant Burundian armed group

^{iv} <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burundi>

operating in the DRC with 300-500 fighters who had probably been inherited by the new FPB. In early 2017, significant elements of FOREBU relocated from south Kivu to Uvira territory (closer to the Burundian border). Due largely to assistance from Rwanda, the FPB is in a position to stage frequent raids as well as attack positions inside Burundi's north-west and on the outskirts of Bujumbura.

National Council for the Restoration of the Arusha Accords and the Rule of Law (CNARED)


This group was formed in August 2015 with the intent of upholding the Arusha Peace Accord. It is an umbrella coalition of all opposition political parties, civil society organizations and those that opposed the third term bid of Nkurunziza. A major demand of the coalition is for the entire Nkurunziza government to step down and fresh elections conducted without him. CNARED was unable to participate in the on-going inter-Burundian dialogue in Arusha, Tanzania, because it was labelled a terrorist group by the government. On 15 November 2017,

CNARED announced that it would not participate in the new round of dialogue because of its longstanding distrust of the EAC-appointed facilitator of the process, former President of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa.

Forum for Strengthening Civil Society (FORSC)

The Forum opposes President Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term. When it was first created in June 2002, the main concern of the coalition of 143 Burundian civil society groups was to help Burundi's civil society coordinate their actions for the sake of public interest. FORSC suspended dialogue with the government on 25 May 2015 following attacks on protesting leaders.

This development led to street protests that successfully tapped into prevalent public anger over the third term election, heightened public frustrations due to long-standing political and economic marginalization, as well as alleged human rights violations. The protests were met with a harsh response from the state, including the deployment of force and restrictions on the media.



Key



Figure 2: Actors mapping

Dynamics of the conflict

President Nkurunziza's announcement to run for a third term in April 2015 was met with political opposition and public protests. While the country's constitution does not allow for a three-term presidency, Nkurunziza claimed his right to run for a third term because his first term was based on a vote in parliament and not through popular general elections as stipulated in the constitution. Shortly after, Burundi's Roman Catholic Church along with opposition parties like FPB and CNARED and elements within the ruling party openly opposed the third term bid and expressed concerns over the possibility of violence should Nkurunziza insist on having his way. Two of the leading figures that instigated the protests that quickly erupted were General Godefroid Niyombare (former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and former director of the National Intelligence Service) and Cyrille Ndayirukiye (the former Minister of Defence). They also led the unsuccessful coup in May 2015. Though the demonstrations and civil unrest lasted for several weeks, they did not succeed as the country's highest court approved the president's right to run for the third time. Following the civil unrest, many people were killed, injured, arrested or forced to flee the country.

After postponing the presidential election several times, it eventually took place on 21 July 2015. Though the electoral commission kept their names on the ballot paper, four of Nkurunziza's main rivals, including Agathon Rwaswa, boycotted the poll. Nonetheless, President Nkurunziza won a third term with 70% of the vote. In the months that followed, turmoil continued to affect the country's stability.

In March 2016, at the 17th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State Summit in Arusha, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa was appointed as the facilitator for peace talks in Burundi, with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni remaining the main mediator. CNDD-FDD is resisting externally mediated talks, claiming that the security conditions have been met and that questions around the constitution and 2020 elections have already been answered internally. Religious organizations, especially the Roman Catholic Church, have also tried to mediate the conflict.

The civilian unrest resulted in forced migration to several neighbouring countries. On 23 September 2016, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) announced that the number of refugees fleeing violence, threats, extrajudicial killings, abduction, torture and persecution in Burundi had passed the 300,000 mark with a likelihood of a spike upwards.^v By the end of October 2016, some 322,300 Burundians had fled the country; principally to the DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.^{vi}

Executions have been committed on a large scale by the security forces, often supported by the *Imbonerakure*. A majority of the victims were those perceived or actually opposed to the president's third mandate.^{vii} Government forces have targeted opponents with unprecedented brutality while armed opposition groups retaliated by carrying out attacks and killing members of the ruling party. For instance, on New Year's Day in 2017, the Water, Environment and Planning Minister was assassinated, marking the first assassination of a serving government minister since the outbreak of unrest in 2015. In 2016 and 2017, the political crisis became less explicit in the occurrence of violence although serious human rights violations including torture, arbitrary arrests and violence against women and girls continued.^{viii}

After receiving a report from public consultations indicating that a majority of the 26,000 respondents favoured scrapping the presidential term limit, Nkurunziza set up a commission on 12 May 2017 to propose, within 6 months, a revision of Burundi's constitution. Following this, the government approved a constitutional amendment on 27 October 2017 that enabled the president to run for another term. By orchestrating this move, President Nkurunziza seems to be paving the way to remain in power for another 14 years. According to the draft constitution, the president is to be elected for a seven-year term renewable once.

The international community and Burundi's political opposition, including figures such as Agathon Rwaswa, Deputy President of the Parliament; former President Benjamin Mkapa, facilitator of the Inter-Burundi Dialogue (IBD); and even the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, viewed the proposition to amend the constitution as clear evidence of President Nkurunziza's intention to perpetuate himself in power.

^vhttp://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-11/burundi_7.php?print=true

^{vi}<http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2017%20Burundi%20Regional%20Refugee%20Response%20Plan%20-%20Jan-Dec%202017%20%28December%202016%29.pdf>

^{vii}<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20534&LangID=E>

^{viii}<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/burundi/report-burundi/>

The current political and security situation in Burundi indicates that the country continues to be on the brink of a superficial and fragile peace. Nevertheless, serious human rights abuses and acts of impunity inflicted on the civilian population by the government and *Imbonerakure* have become a daily occurrence, forcing many to flee the country for fear of persecution.

Scenarios

Best case scenario

The series of initiatives towards peace, especially within the framework of the Inter-Burundi Dialogue (IBD) supervised by the EAC, might yield fruitful outcomes in the short and long run. Groups like CNARED, which have not been participating in the dialogue, might get a chance to take part and reach a mutually rewarding understanding with the government such that the peace process might run smoothly. This will pave the way for the ruling party to step down in 2020 and allow free and fair elections to take place.

Worst case scenario

In the lead up to the 2020 election, the conflict may intermittently escalate and eventually result in another civil war. Using the grievances surrounding the third term bid of the president as a benchmark, the opposition could draw on already fractured ethnic and religious fault-lines in the country to promote fighting along ethnic lines. This could further ethnicize poverty and deepen human rights violations across the country. Already deeply divided, armed groups could polarize the public along ethnic lines and pursue their opposition to the government through armed struggle.

Most likely scenario

The country will continue to face a dire public safety and humanitarian crisis, as well as instability and forced migration in the build-up to the 2020 election if another episode of violent political unrest is to be averted. It is already evident that the president is determined to complete his third term, and possibly stay in power if the constitutional amendment he is currently orchestrating is approved. Human rights abuses by government security forces and CNDD-FDD's youth wing may continue in response to public protests.

Current response assessment

Continental response

In March 2015, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) held its first meeting on Burundi.^{ix} There was division among members of the council on what actions the continental body should take since Burundi was a member of the PSC at that time and was able to refuse its matters to be placed on the agenda. Ultimately, the PSC fell short on imposing stiff sanctions, except for actions that perpetuated violence and obstructed the search for a solution.

On 14 May 2015, the AU urged the government of Burundi to postpone the July 2015 election until the prevailing political crisis was resolved. When the government ignored this request, the AU deployed around 20 military and human rights observers, but only after the polls had closed. The AU took this action based on the conviction that the parliamentary election would be neither free nor fair. In December 2015, the PSC announced a precedent-setting invocation of the AU's Article 4(h) authorizing the deployment of a military mission to Burundi to quell violence related to the dispute over the third term bid of President Nkurunziza.

The AU Summit the following year, in January 2016, discussed whether to authorize the deployment of an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU). This was promptly rejected by the Heads of State, who instead authorized the AU to send a high-level delegation to engage in consultations with the Burundi government and other actors, and to encourage the government to welcome the deployment of the AU mission. Nkurunziza responded by stating "everyone has to respect Burundi's borders", effectively making it difficult for the AU to deploy the proposed forces. An investigation was also launched by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) into the violation of human rights in Burundi.

The PSC's inability to follow through on its resolution, and the decision of the Summit to backtrack, turned out to be a huge setback for the AU. Moreover, it was unclear whether the AU even had the authority to deploy the envisaged forces under Article 4(h)^x of the Constitutive Act. Another issue the AU faced in implementing its decisions on Burundi is the fact that it had to depend on Member States that were not well disposed to Burundi

^{ix} <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/car9-1.pdf>

^x This article stipulates that the rights of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

to contribute troops. Tanzania, for instance, was against the deployment of the AU forces and instead pushed for talks to end the violence.

Regional response

The Inter-Burundi Dialogue (IBD) is an EAC-led mediation process mediated by President Museveni and facilitated by former President Mkapa. The IBD attracted the participation of top government officials, former Heads of State, the National Commission for Inter-Burundi Dialogue (CNDI), all political parties registered in Burundi, civil society organizations, faith-based groups, prominent political actors inside and outside Burundi, as well as women and youth groups. Although it was designed to mediate talks between the government and the opposition, Nkurunziza refused to take part in the dialogue after the first meeting in December 2016. Largely due to the bickering among key actors, the pace of the dialogue has slowed, or even stalled. The most recent IBD, the fourth session, took place in Arusha, Tanzania, from 27 November to 8 December 2017. Nevertheless, there is an absence of progress and commitment from the government and the opposition to compromise.

International response

The international community led by the UN, AU and the EAC responded to the 2015 Burundi violence by providing space for dialogue and negotiations between the government and the opposition. The international community also promptly issued statements expressing concern that the elections risked being manipulated but did not elicit any form of rebuttal or response from the government in Bujumbura.

In December 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, opened an emergency session of the UN Human Rights Council on the escalating violence in Burundi. The Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry on 30 September 2016 to conduct a thorough investigation into human rights violations and abuses committed in Burundi since April 2015, to find out if any of them may constitute international crimes and to ascertain their alleged perpetrators. The Council of Inquiry concluded in its report that it has "reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in Burundi since April 2015". Burundi rejected the conclusions made by the commission labelling it as unjustified.^{xi} On 4 October 2017, the Council extended the commission's mandate by an additional year.

In April 2016, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented the Security Council with three options: i) a light footprint of 20 to 50 police personnel to assess the Burundi police, ii) a monitoring presence of 228 police, or iii) a protection and monitoring deployment of some 3,000 police. In July 2016, the UN Security Council authorized the second option; a deployment of 228 police personnel, hoping to prevent human rights violations and to create the necessary conditions for the IBD. Nonetheless, it was never deployed as Burundi ignored the resolution and refused to allow the component to be established.

The US, Belgium and the Netherlands have suspended bilateral aid while the International Criminal Court (ICC) has made moves to investigate crimes during and since the crisis. The government quickly responded to the latter by withdrawing from the ICC and rebuffing international efforts. While it continues in power, the government has remained recalcitrant to international pressure to resist the temptation of staying in power beyond 2020.

Strategic options

To the African Union

- ❖ The AU and the EAC should cooperate more effectively to address the instability and insecurity in Burundi in order to be well positioned in the event that large-scale violence erupts in the near future. For this purpose, the AU should co-operate and work closely with the UN Security Council, including drawing from the vast resources and expertise of the Council, as stated in Article 17 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol).
- ❖ Since Article 7(j) of the PSC Protocol calls for the promotion of close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the AU in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The AU should pledge full support to the ongoing IBD sponsored and led by the EAC as the best route to lasting peace and stability.

^{xi} http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_779.pdf

To the national government

- ❖ The national government should demonstrate greater commitment to - and support for - the work of the IBD rather than repudiating it. The government should be fully involved in the dialogue

without setting any preconditions for its own participation or that of other stakeholders.

- ❖ The government should collaborate with neighbouring countries, the AU and the EAC to quickly repatriate and resettle IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries fleeing for fear of persecution.

Burundi Conflict Timeline: 1962-2017

1962 July	The country gains independence from Belgium.
1966 November	General Michel Micombero (a Tutsi) becomes the first President.
1972	More than 120,000 Hutus are killed by the Tutsi-led government.
1976	Jean-Baptiste Bagaza stages a military coup and overthrows President Micombero.
1987	Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, overthrows President Bagaza, a Hilma Tutsi.
1993 June	The leader of the democratic party of Burundi (FRODEBU) Melchior Ndadaye becomes the first elected president in Burundi.
1993 October	After only 4 months in power, Melchior Ndadaye is assassinated, creating one of the triggering factors of the civil war where 300,000 lives are lost in the ethnic conflict.
1993 July	Sylvie Kinigi becomes the first and only female Prime Minister and Acting President of Burundi.
1994 February	Cyprian Niyamira becomes president.
1994 April 6	A mysterious plane crashes while carrying the presidents of Rwanda (Juvénal Habyarimana) and Burundi (Cyprian Niyamira).
1994 April 6	Sylvestre Ntibantunganya takes over the presidency and stays in power until Pierre Buyoya's military coup in July 1996.
1996 August	Former President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere leads East African heads of state to force Buyoya to restore democratic rule and to impose sanctions on Burundi.
1998	The democratically elected parliament swears in Pierre Buyoya as president after agreeing on a transitional constitution.
1999 December	Nelson Mandela is appointed by leaders as the new mediator for talks in Burundi to end the civil war.
2000 January	Peace talks are held in Arusha, Tanzania where Nelson Mandela censures leaders of Burundi for having failed their people.
2000 August	The Arusha Agreement is signed, ending the over decade-long civil war in Burundi (1993-2006).
2001 July	Having survived an attempted coup by Tutsi soldiers, President Buyoya concludes a power sharing agreement which allows him to remain President for 18 months.
2002 December	CNDD-FDD signs a cease-fire agreement with the then government and registers as a political party in January 2005.
2002 January	The leader of Hutu Party FRODEBU, Jean Minani, is elected as president of the transitional national assembly.
2003 April	Domitien Ndayizeye succeeds Buyoya as per the 18-month power sharing transitional government.
2003 November	Ndayizeye and Pierre Nkurunziza, the leader of the Hutu rebel group Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD); sign an agreement to end the civil war.
2005 August	Nkurunziza is elected as president by the two houses of parliament.
2008 October	The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi is signed.
2008 December	The National Forces of Liberation (FNL) sign a cease-fire implementation agreement and become a political party in 2009.
2015	A commission is formed to consult the people on ideas for political reform.

2015	President Nkurunziza decides to run for a third term.
2015 January	The “Citizens Campaign against the third term” is launched by 304 Burundian civil society associations.
2015 March	A petition against the third term of President Nkurunziza is signed.
2015 April-Feb 2016	800-900 people are reported to have been killed.
2015 April 29	The Attorney General establishes a commission of inquiry on the anti-third term protest movement in order to bring the perpetrators before the law.
2015 May	Military officers, led by General Nyombare, attempt to overthrow the incumbent President Nkurunziza.
2015 May 23	Zedi Feruz, head of the UPD party, is assassinated.
2015 June 13	AU decides to send observers to Burundi’s much disputed election.
2015 July 6	President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni is appointed a crisis mediator at the EAC Dar es Salam Summit.
2015 July 21	President Nkurunziza is re-elected with a 69% vote that is boycotted by the opposition.
2015 August 1	National Council for the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the Rule of Law in Burundi (CNARED), composed of former CNDD-FDD members, former Heads of State and prominent members of civil society is created.
2015 August 2	Chief of presidential security and Nkurunziza’s right hand, Lieutenant General Adolphe Nshirimana, is assassinated in a rocket attack.
2016 August 20	The president threatens civil society groups not to interfere in political affairs.
2015 September 7	Patrice Gahungu, spokesman of the Union for Peace and Democracy (UPD), is assassinated.
2015 August	Former army chief Jean Bikomagu is assassinated outside his home.
2015 December	The first Inter-Burundian Dialogue is held, composed of 15 members including 3 religious leaders, 3 political actors and 2 civil society representatives.
In December 2015	The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, opens an emergency session of the UN Human Rights Council on the escalating violence in Burundi.
2015 December 18	The AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) decides to deploy an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) consisting of 5,000 peacekeepers.
2016 January	President Nkurunziza threatens to counter deployment of AU peacekeepers.
2016 February	An AU High Level Panel is created to resolve the Burundi crisis and is led by South African President Jacob Zuma.
2016 March	EU announces decision to suspend direct financial aid to the government.
2016 May	The UN accuses the government of Rwanda of supporting Burundian rebels.
2016 July 29	The UN Secretary Council authorizes a 228-member international police force to deploy to Burundi.
2016 August	Burundi rejects the deployment of the UN police saying the plan violates its sovereignty.
2016 August 24	The Inter-Burundi Dialogue commission chairman announces findings in favour of removing the presidential term limits.
30 September 2016	The Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry to conduct a thorough investigation into human rights violations and abuses committed in Burundi.

- 2016 October** President Nkurunziza signs into law a bill to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- 2016 December** Nkurunziza threatens to pull out almost 5,500 troops from the African Union Forces in Somalia (AMISOM) over unpaid allowances.
- 2017 May** President Nkurunziza sets up a commission to propose a revision of the constitution within 6 months.
- 2017 July** Nkurunziza urges 240,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania to return.
- 2017 October 24** The government of Burundi approves constitutional change that could pave the way to a 14-year extension of the incumbent president.
- 2017 October 27** Burundi becomes the first country to leave the ICC.

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