PUBLIC EXPENDITURE GOVERNANCE IN UGANDA’S AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SYSTEM

Annette Kuteesa | Emmanuel Keith Kisaame | Julian Barungi | Ramathan Ggoobi

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IN UGANDA’S AGRICULTURAL
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of tables</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of figures</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1.0 Introduction

1.1 Reforms, Structure and Public Expenditure in Uganda’s Agricultural Extension

1.1.1 Reforms in agricultural extension in Uganda and implications for governance

1.1.2 Institutional framework of agricultural extension in Uganda

1.1.3 Agricultural sector funding to Extension Services

## 2.0 Narrative of the conceptual frame work

2.1 The public Expenditure Governance model

2.2 Principles, Definitions and Indicators

## 3.0 Methodology

3.1 Study Scope and District Selection Criteria

3.2 Data Collection Process

3.3 Quality Assurance

3.4 Data Management and Analysis

3.5 Limitations of the Assessment

## 4.0 Findings

4.1 Strategic Vision

4.2 Participation

4.3 Coordination

4.4 Transparency

4.5 Control of Corruption

4.6 Accountability

4.7 Effectiveness and Efficiency

4.8 Responsiveness

4.9 Equity

## 5.0 Conclusion

5.1 Recommendations

Bibliography

ACODE Policy Research Papers

ANNEX
List of Tables

Table 1: Central Government Grants to Local governments for Agriculture (Billion UGX) 13
Table 2: Summary of the Corresponding Characteristics of the study districts and their 19
Table 3: Evidence of Strategic Vision in Agricultural Extension 24
Table 4: Participation in Agricultural Extension at District Level 28
Table 5: Evidence of Agricultural Extension Coordination Practices at District Level 34
Table 6: Evidence of transparency practices in agricultural extension at district level 39
Table 7: Evidence of Control of Corruption 45
Table 8: Evidence of Accountability at District Level in Agricultural Extension 49
Table 9: Evidence of Effectiveness and Efficiency in Agricultural Extension 53
Table 10: Evidence of responsiveness at district offices 60
Table 11: Evidence of equity practices at district local government 63

List of Figures

Figure 1: Organogram of the National Agricultural Extension System in Uganda 6
Figure 2: Trends in the Agricultural sector Budget (UGX Billions) ** 11
Figure 3: Distribution of the Agricultural sector Budget by Function (UGX Billions) 12
Figure 4: Distribution of the Agricultural sector budget across the Sector’s MDAs 12
Figure 5: Public Expenditure Governance in Agriculture Extension Model 14
Figure 6: Utilisation Levels of the Production and Marketing Grant for selected study districts 54
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural extension services</strong></td>
<td>Interventions or activities that facilitate access to agricultural inputs, advisory services and technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural extension system</strong></td>
<td>Set of organisations and institutions (public, private, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations) that are involved in providing agricultural extension services.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural inputs</strong></td>
<td>Resources that are used in farm production e.g. seeds and other planting materials; fertilizers, pesticides, farm equipment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural advisory services</strong></td>
<td>Provision of guidance to farmers with regard to the operation and management of their farming enterprises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural technologies</strong></td>
<td>Agricultural inputs or processes produced as a result of scientific techniques, methods, skills and processes e.g. improved crop varieties, irrigation technology and biotechnology.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Farmers forum</strong></td>
<td>Farmers’ organisation comprising registered farmer groups at Sub-county, district or national level.</td>
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<td><strong>Beneficiary</strong></td>
<td>An Individual directly reached and benefiting from agricultural extension services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extension worker</strong></td>
<td>Personnel employed and deployed by agricultural extension service provider organisation e.g. Government to work directly with beneficiaries.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACODE</td>
<td>Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSP</td>
<td>Agricultural sector Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBEG</td>
<td>Centre for Budget and Economic Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Cotton Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society organisations</td>
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<td>DAES</td>
<td>Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Dairy Development Authority</td>
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<td>DDP</td>
<td>District Development Plans</td>
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<td>DPO</td>
<td>District Production officer</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFMS</td>
<td>Integrated Financial Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPFs</td>
<td>Indicative Planning Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGCSCI</td>
<td>Local Government Councils’ Score Card Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAIF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Animal, Industry and Fisheries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFPED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Microfinance Support Centre</td>
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<td>NAADS</td>
<td>National Agricultural Advisory Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAGRC-BD</td>
<td>National Animal Genetic Resources Centre and Data Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARO</td>
<td>National Agricultural Research Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Enterprise Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Planning Authority</td>
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<td>NSCS</td>
<td>National Seed Certification Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWC</td>
<td>Operation Wealth Creation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEG</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWDs</td>
<td>People With Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Resident District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACCO</td>
<td>Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Senior Assistant Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Message Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standing Orders of Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPC</td>
<td>Technical Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBoS</td>
<td>Uganda Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDA</td>
<td>Uganda Coffee Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Uganda Development Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>UES</td>
<td>Unified Agricultural Extension Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda Police Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VODP</td>
<td>Vegetable Oil Development Project</td>
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</tbody>
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Executive Summary

In its quest to become a middle-income economy, Uganda has placed emphasis on improving and commercialising agriculture as one of its growth strategies in the National Development Plan (NDP II 2015/16 – 2019/20). Funding to the agricultural sector has more than doubled – rising from UGX 422 Bn in FY 2013/14 to UGX 901.68 Bn in FY 2017/18. About three-quarters of this funding has been directed towards agricultural extension, particularly, the provision of agricultural inputs to farmers. In addition, the sector has had several reforms in the provision of agricultural extension services. The most recent these reforms were the creation of the National Agricultural Advisory Services in 2001 and the switch to a single-spine agricultural extension system, which culminated into the adoption of the National Agricultural Extension Policy in October 2016.

Despite the reforms and the increase in funding, the agricultural sector’s growth has stagnated and in some instances regressed over the NDP II planning period. Macroeconomic statistics from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) indicate that in fiscal year 2015/16, the agricultural sector’s share of Uganda Gross Domestic Product (at market prices) was 23.6%. This marked a 0.2% decline from the fiscal year 2014/15 share of 23.8%. As of June 2017, the agricultural sector had experienced four consecutive quarters of negative growth.

We posit that the weak governance of agricultural extension and its public expenditure is the missing link. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2008) argues that unless effective governance systems are put in place, interventions in agriculture will remain ineffective in their impact on achieving food security and poverty reduction.

This study therefore assesses the governance of public expenditure in Uganda’s agricultural extension system. The study aims at examining the nature in which decisions pertaining to public expenditure prioritisation and implementation are made. Most specifically the work aims to;

1. Ascertain public expenditure governance practices in Uganda’s agricultural extension system
2. Document the perceptions of actors at the district level on public expenditure governance of agricultural extension.
3. Discuss the implications of specific public expenditure governance practices to sector outcomes.

In pursuing this research, the public expenditure governance assessment framework developed by Bogere and Makaaru (2014) which is rooted in the work of Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011) was adopted. In the framework, public expenditure governance is defined as “the manner in which decisions over public expenditure are made and implemented including the interaction among actors”. The assessment is conducted along the nine principles of the framework including strategic vision, participation, coordination, transparency, control of corruption, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness and equity.

The study scope was restricted to crop production and in doing so, the assessment was restricted to a two year reference period between financial years 2015/16 and 2016/17. The local government level was the major unit of analysis and to this end, the
study was undertaken in ten districts namely; Gulu, Hoima, Kabalore, Kamuli, Luwero, Mbarara, Mukono, Nebbi, Soroti, and Tororo. These were chosen on the basis of a number of factors including the type of priority crops produced in the given district, geographical representation of the country, and the agro-ecological/production zone representation.

Overall, the performance of the study districts was found to be mixed across all the nine governance principles. While the recent reforms of the agricultural extension system have had some immediate gains, major challenges remain, especially, in coordination of the several actors in the provision of extension services. Some of the major conclusions are summarized below.

The effectiveness and efficiency of governing agricultural extension expenditure is greatly constrained by the top-down nature of priority setting and decision making. Without involving the farmers who are the primary beneficiaries of the service, the system remains ineffective. Additionally, the sector allocates limited funding to functions of quality assurance. This has resulted into the proliferation of low quality seed on the market which greatly contributes to the low levels of production the sector has experienced. The resultant proliferation of poor quality inputs onto the market is cascaded to the local government level which has limited capacity to test the quality of the inputs. This greatly explains why the sector continues to register negative levels of growth despite the increased agricultural sector budget.

Against such a background, the study recommends the following:

- MAAIF should ensure that agricultural inputs distributed to farmers are in line with their respective agro-ecological zones.
- MAAIF needs to consider decentralising the procurement of agricultural inputs and adopting a voucher system for the distribution of the inputs.
- MAAIF should strengthen quality assurance and regulation of agricultural inputs.
- MAAIF and MoFPED should improve prioritisation of resources in the agricultural sector to target extension challenges.
- Government should restore the functionality of farmer forums as a major avenue for farmer participation and decision making related to agricultural extension services.
- MAAIF should ensure more predictability in agricultural inputs delivery timelines.
- OWC activities should be integrated into the district department to improve coordination.
- The Office of the Prime Minister should operationalize the Uganda Development Forum by ensuring compliance of all the actors.
- MAAIF in collaboration with parliament should fast track the enactment of the National Agricultural Extension Bill 2017 into law.
- The CAO should intensively communicate to other district leaders on public display of funding information relating to agricultural extension.
- The CAOs should ensure the allocation of some local revenue to facilitate agricultural extension at sub-county level.
1.0 **Introduction**

Uganda’s quest to become a middle income country as emphasized by the National Development Plan (NDP) is pegged on improving agricultural sector performance. Agriculture is a key foreign exchange earner and a source of employment for 66% of Uganda’s population (UBoS 2017). Agriculture is therefore an instrument that can potentially boost rural incomes and reduce poverty in Uganda. While the agricultural sector remains a major contributor to economic growth, its performance has relatively stagnated over the last five years. In fiscal year 2015/16, the agricultural sector’s share of GDP (at current prices) was 23.6%, which marked a slight decline from the fiscal year 2014/15 share of 23.8%. According to the National Agricultural Extension Policy (2016), the agricultural sector is challenged by a weak extension system that is characterized by poor linkages of farmers and other actors to markets, processors and financial services, high cost of service delivery, institutionally weak farmer organizations, uncoordinated inputs delivery approaches and low technological uptake. The Policy also indicates that the situation is worsened by limited financial resources and poor accountability as well as limited ownership from the beneficiaries of agricultural extension.

Faced with such constraints, the agricultural extension system in Uganda has continued to evolve so as to provide a more effective service. In 2013, an intervention code-named ‘Operation Wealth Creation (OWC)’ was launched in order to improve household income through commercialized agriculture. The OWC intervention is implemented by the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). Other than distributing planting and breeding inputs, the intervention is meant to facilitate value-chains through distribution of post-harvest bulking and processing equipment to farmers. Faced with coordination challenges, agriculture extension was restructured in 2014 to a single-spine system. This brought about the creation of the Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) within the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal, Industry and Fisheries to oversee the provision of agricultural extension and advisory services in Uganda. In December 2016, a new Agriculture Extension Policy was launched to guide the DAES in the execution of its mandate.

In addition, the sector’s budget has more than doubled between financial years 2014/15 and 2017/18 (see sub-section 1.13 for details). However, in spite of the funding increment, the sector continues to produce poor outcomes. As of June 2017, the agricultural sector produced four consecutive quarters of negative growth in production¹ leading to debates over the nature of prioritisation and overall governance of expenditure within the sector.

The interventions instituted by government have a limited effect as evidenced by the poor sector outcomes which lends credence to the calls for improved governance. The pursuit of good governance within the extension services is a critical condition for the delivery of quality results. The UNEP (2008) argues that unless effective governance systems are put in place, interventions in agriculture and their impact on achieving food security and poverty reduction will remain ineffective.

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¹ UBoS Quarterly GDP Figures
The widely documented cases of corruption in the previous NAADS program by scholars, the media and civil society organizations (CSOs) is evidence on how failures in governance can result in ineffective performance of the public service delivery. Research in the sector has extensively documented massive misappropriation of program funds, poor financial accountability and bribery by NAADS and District officials; and failures in the delivery of inputs (Wadiri, 2014; Okoboi et al, 2013; Maseruka, 2014).

Bitzer, Wennink and Piters (2016) argue that the pursuit of governance in extension can be difficult. At the centre of governance lie complex questions of how extension services are steered, the level at which decisions for budget are made, the level at which design and implementation of extension services are made, and how authority is exercised. Governance may refer to the institutional design of extension services, such as the level of decentralisation or privatisation of extension services, as well as monitoring and accountability mechanisms. It may also take into account the roles and responsibilities of the public, private and civil society sectors in providing and financing extension services as well as the linkages and coordination across these different actors. Establishing good governance will make agricultural extension more accountable and promote a system that responds to local and national needs as well as the changing nature of regional and global agriculture to deliver improved sector performance.

It is against this background that this study assessed the governance of public expenditure in Uganda’s agriculture extension system. The study aimed to examine the nature in which decisions pertaining public expenditure prioritisation and implementation were made. Most specifically this study;

1. Ascertains public expenditure governance practices in Uganda’s agricultural extension system
2. Documents the perceptions of actors at the district levels on public expenditure governance of agricultural extension.
3. Discusses the implications of specific public expenditure governance practices to agricultural sector outcomes.

In pursuing this investigation, this research adopted the public expenditure governance (PEG) assessment framework developed by Bogere and Makaaru (2014) which is rooted in the work of Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011). In the framework, public expenditure governance is defined as “the manner in which decisions over public expenditure are made and implemented including the interaction among actors.”

The assessment is conducted along the nine principles of the framework namely, strategic vision, participation, coordination, transparency, control of corruption, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness and equity. Focus is placed on extension in crop production in the agricultural sector. Section two of this research presents the structure, reforms and expenditures in agriculture extension in Uganda. Section three discusses the conceptual framework and methods applied. Section four presents the findings while section five gives conclusions and recommendations.
1.1 Reforms, Structure and Public Expenditure in Uganda’s Agricultural Extension

1.1.1 Reforms in agricultural extension in Uganda and implications for governance

Public policies often have long term effects on practices of institutions and lives. It is possible that the current pattern of practices in the agricultural extension system in Uganda is a product of spill overs of policies or reforms that have been enacted overtime. Like in many African countries, the policy landscape of agriculture extension service delivery in Uganda has evolved over the past five decades. Whereas changes were directed to improve production and productivity of farmers, they have also meant alterations in nature of governance in the service delivery systems. This sub-section presents some of these extension service delivery systems and further discusses their implications to underlying key principles of governance, namely: participation, transparency, and accountability.

The earliest signs of extension administration in Uganda date back to the period between the 1920s and the 1950s. Perhaps Semana (2008) offers most of the insights than any other documentation encountered. His discussions reveal a linear technology transfer extension system in which farmers participated solely as receivers of new technologies of major cash crops such as coffee, cotton, rubber and tobacco; generated by the government. Under this system: cultural chiefs, expert field officers and African instructors were tasked with educating the farmer about good husbandry practices, proper land use and ensuring household food security. Whereas the discussion was silent on resource allocation, it is clear that the nature of service delivery system was extremely weak on transparency and accountability. The lack of feedback channels meant that citizens had very little access and input into public information directed to improve their lives. The absence of mechanisms to report back to the public on the provision of extension became a precursor for failing interventions.

Without addressing these deficiencies, changes in the system only brought more challenges in farming. The linear model was later altered to accommodate the support of selected progressive farmers by providing them with credit inputs and technical advice. This new model of extension service delivery also limited farmer participation and had little impact on the adoption of technologies and innovations. Without transparency and accountability, many of the selected farmers abused the special support given to them in form of credit and inputs. Some farmers were not cooperative and willing to serve as contact farmers for educating others. Other farmers looked at progressive farmers as a privileged group rather than good examples to emulate (Semana, 1999).

Shifts in extension service delivery were also observed in the post-independence era of the mid1960s. The collaboration between the United States Agency for International Development and the Ministry of Agriculture brought to light the idea that farmers were active users of information developed based on their interests and experiences. This ideology resulted in increased public and farmer participation. Transparency was also encouraged through core activities of field days, study tours,
radios and television programs. Youth platforms facilitated the communication and exchange of ideas and needs with government. The political turmoil of early 1970s to 80s undermined these achievements since the country was characterized by poor governance and a collapsed agricultural sector.

The restoration of extension services began in the mid 1980s in the post conflict era. Several government agencies and non-government agencies were actively involved in administering parallel extension services characterised by poor coordination and communication. Efforts to restore extension services in the country also marked the beginning of a new extension policy that emphasized a participatory approach allowing for technology development and dissemination based on farmer’s indigenous knowledge and research group knowledge. Management of extension was consolidated under MAAIF which created a Unified Agricultural Extension Service and the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO). District extension coordinators and county extension coordinators were instituted to coordinate extension activities within districts (Semana, 2008 and Mangheni, 2007).

The implementation and impact of this reform was affected by other on-going reforms including: decentralization, privatization, restructuring, and retrenchment all of which had a direct effect on the delivery of extension services in the country. First, decentralization transferred the delivery of agricultural extension services to Local Governments, as per the Local Governments Act of 1997. MAAIF was left with the role of: planning and policy formulation, regulatory functions, technical backstopping, training, setting standards for monitoring performance of the agricultural sector, and managing funds of selected projects (Friis-Hansen and Kisauzi 2004; Mangheni 1999). In 1998, the MAAIF’s directorate of extension was abolished, central staffing was reduced by about eighty percent, and the major responsibility of supporting field-level extension was transferred to the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO). In the same year, in a move contrary to downsizing, restructuring, and contracting out or privatization; the Central Government introduced a plan to employ up to three graduate specialists per sub-county. The salaries of graduate specialists were paid by the Central Government as conditional grants while the districts and sub-counties were expected to cover operational expenses (Crowder and Anderson 2002).

The contributions from districts and sub-counties were not forthcoming due to budgetary limitations. The quality of extension service delivery was further constrained by the absence of operational funding. Extension work only existed in situations where supplementary support from donors or NGO funding was available (Crowder and Anderson 2002). While decentralization enhanced participation of local communities in planning and implementing programs and continued to ensure closer staff supervision (Kibwika and Semana 1998), it also had several governance failures. Some of these failures include; the poor accountability leading to misappropriation of funds by local authorities, isolation from headquarters and resentment from being supervised by local councils that never had the technical expertise in the field, perceived unrealistic expectations from political supervisors, and reduced staff satisfaction stemming from lack of promotions on the job.
In 2001, Uganda embarked on a process of transforming its public extension system to conform to the rest of its economic transformations in the country. Under the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Act of 2001, the public extension system was gradually phased out and replaced by a contract privatized system implemented by NAADS (Mangheni 2007). District and sub-county local governments were provided matching facility grants to contract private firms, farmers’ associations, and NGOs to provide extension services. The major features of the NAADS program included private delivery of publicly funded services, a demand-driven and farmer owned, decentralized service delivery approach, and poverty and gender targeting. Private extension service providers who operate as either individuals or firms were contracted by sub-county farmers’ forums to deliver enterprise-specific services to particular groups of farmers over a period of three to six months. In order to foster farmer articulation of needs, ownership, and control over the program, NAADS used the farmer institution development process to facilitate the establishment of farmers’ forums from parish to district level.

The performance rating of the NAADS program has received mixed reviews. Benin et al. (2008) found that farmers participating in the NAADS program had better access to extension and other rural public services, were more organized in groups, had better capacity to demand for improved technologies, and had experienced welfare gains. However, certain key anticipated benefits of such an extension system—such as more operational efficiency and cost effectiveness, greater accountability of extension services to farmers, and diversity or plurality of service providers were not fully realized. Some of the documented deficiencies include: a prescriptive farmer demand articulation process which is too complicated for farmers especially the poor and illiterate (Obaa, Mutimba, and Semana 2005; Draa, Semana, and Adolph 2004); failure to actively engage the farmer group members in monitoring service providers and quality assurance; weak private service provision capacity; unfavorable conditions for private service providers; and unsustainable funding arrangements (Mubangizi 2006).

Uganda has been lauded for what is considered to be an innovative reform of the extension service despite of the challenges faced. The attainment of the potential benefits however appear to have been hampered by the absence of critical prerequisites for success of this kind of extension approach—namely, a conducive policy environment, sufficient farmer capacity to articulate their demands, sufficient capacity of private extension service providers, efficient and effective service quality assurance mechanisms, adequate and sustainable funding, and effective coordination of the multi-actor processes that are part of this complex approach (Mangheni 2007).

It is against this background of weak coordination and other challenges faced by the NAADS programme that Uganda has once again embarked on further reforms. According to the 2016 Uganda National Agricultural extension Policy, the ‘Single-Spine Extension System’ reforms begun in June 2014. As per the policy, the reforms have mainly been characterised by the “transfer of the extension function from the NAADS to the mainstream MAAIF and the creation of a Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES); integration of the NAADS program into the local government production departments, and eliminating the parallel institutional arrangements as well as separation of agricultural input supply from the extension service delivery
system”. While the system is still in its nascent stages, the governance challenges especially in coordination, effectiveness and efficiency have continued to prevail. This study therefore seeks to contribute to evidence to policy makers that can used to improve the performance of the agricultural extension system by studying the governance of public expenditure in Uganda’s agricultural extension.

1.1.2 Institutional framework of agricultural extension in Uganda

The purpose of this sub-section is to provide a general overview on the institutional arrangement for agricultural extension that currently prevails in Uganda. It does not engage in an in-depth analysis of the evolution of institutional setting of agricultural extension. The institutional framework for agricultural extension comprises institutions at the national and local government levels as summarised in Figure 1.

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Figure 1: Organogram of the National Agricultural Extension System in Uganda

Source: MAAIF, 2015

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2 For detailed information on evolution of institutional setting of agricultural extension in Uganda, see Buyinja et al (2015) and Kjaer & Semana, A.R (1999). Also refer to the preceding section on the reforms in agricultural extension.
National Level

The major institutions engaged in public agricultural extension in Uganda include: MAAIF, NAADS, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (through OWC), NARO, and the private sector. These institutions are mainly involved in planning, procurement, supply, quality assurance and distribution processes.

Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF)

Provision of agricultural extension services is a decentralised function under MAAIF which is mandated to provide overall coordination and policy formulation. In order to ensure that synergies needed for effective agricultural extension delivery are achieved, several government ministries, departments and agencies are brought on board to support agricultural extension (see Organogram in figure 1). The institutional arrangements for implementing the agricultural extension services in Uganda is summarised by MAAIF (2017 and 2016). At the national level, the technical functions of agricultural extension are a shared responsibility of the technical Directorates under MAAIF namely: the Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES), Animal Resources, Crop Resources and Fisheries Resources, as well as the three ‘Commodity Agencies’3 and other semi-autonomous agencies4 under MAAIF.

Among the MAAIF directorates, it is the DAES that is principally mandated to coordinate the public and private agricultural extension service delivery systems at national, local government and other non-state levels. Formulation of policy, regulations, standards, strategy and work plans for Uganda’s agricultural extension system and capacity building for agricultural extension workers rests with the MAAIF under the DAES. MAAIF is also responsible for assuring the quality of the agricultural inputs procured by the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS).

National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)

The NAADS is a semi-autonomous public agency that is under MAAIF—originally mandated to undertake agricultural extension service —and is now more involved in procurement of agricultural inputs for farmers5. Procurement of agricultural inputs is done centrally at the national level. NAADS works closely with the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) to ensure appropriateness of requested agricultural inputs by local governments. NAADS is in charge of selecting the suppliers for agricultural inputs. It also issues orders to the pre-qualified input suppliers prior (about a month) to the rainy season to supply the required inputs. The prioritisation of agricultural inputs procured by NAADS is conducted at the national level. Priority is often given to commercial crops that are in line with Uganda’s efforts to commercialise agriculture and increase production and productivity along value chains (MAAIF, 2015).

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3 Commodity agencies under MAAIF are three – Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA), Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), and Dairy Development Authority (DDA).
4 Semi-autonomous agencies under MAAIF such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO).
5 The change of mandate was effected following the nationwide launch of Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) in 2014 and the adoption of the National Agricultural Extension Policy in 2016. However, the NAADS Act (2001) is yet to be amended to reflect this change mandates.
**Operation Wealth Creation (OWC)**

The Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) is an initiative charged with distributing the procured agricultural inputs to the respective local governments (MAAIF, 2015). The OWC was officially launched in June 2014\(^6\), as an intervention coordinated by Officers of the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) aimed at facilitating effective service delivery and national socio-economic transformation. The military was deployed in the agricultural sector to accomplish defined tasks, primary of which was the distribution of publically procured agricultural inputs to farmers. The OWC target population is the 68 percent of the households engaged in subsistence production\(^7\).

The overall objective of the pilot OWC was to leverage the military institutional strengths to mobilise and facilitate peasants to transform from subsistence level of production to commercial agriculture. The involvement of the military was justified by the President as a response to slow implementation and limited effectiveness of government programmes. The military officers were supposed to monitor and ensure that there is impact on the ground. According to the OPM (2016) argues that the success of the OWC in selected pilot areas in the Luwero-Rwenzori Triangle triggered the nation-wide intervention.

The OWC is being implemented with funding under the NAADS Secretariat and its operation is in line with the new mandate of providing agricultural inputs to farmers. Typical of operations involving the military, the OWC relies on Standing Orders of Procedure (SOPs)\(^8\) which define stakeholders' roles as well as the implementation arrangements. The intervention is mainly dependent upon directives from the President, through the Senior Coordination Team and/or sector political and technical leadership. One of such directives, issued in May 2016, was that the OWC concentrates on distributing “strategic crops” that include: coffee/cocoa, Tea, banana, and Fruits (Mangoes, Oranges, Pineapples, and Apples)\(^9\). This directive resulted in the scaling down of distribution of food crop seeds, livestock and other inputs.

The OWC intervention, however, has faced challenges ranging from poor coordination among stakeholders across the agricultural sector, low quantity and quality of inputs, huge losses due to limited extension services, inadequate information with regard to farmer, soil and water profiles, and elite capture of the program, among others.

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\(^6\) The first (pilot) phase was carried out in FY 2013/14 among veterans in the Operational Zones in the Luwero-Rwenzori Triangle which supported the military/political liberation struggles of NRM in the 1970s up to mid-1980s.

\(^7\) The official position of the OWC strategy was based on the 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census which put the proportion of Ugandans under subsistence production to 68 percent. The Population and Housing Census of 2014, however, reported that the proportion of Ugandans depending on subsistence farming as their source of livelihood had increased to 69 percent.


\(^9\) See “OWC Deliveries, Linkages, Challenges and Mitigation: Strategies for Better Service Delivery,” A Presentation by the OWC Secretariat to the Presidential Advisory Committee on the Budget (PACOB), October 2016.
Private Sector

The private sector is in charge of supplying the required agricultural inputs to NAADS. The private sector engaged in supply of agricultural inputs comprises of seed companies that are pre-qualified by NAADS. The pre-qualified seed companies receive a supply notice from NAADS prior to the rainy season and they begin by indicating to NAADS whether they have the required agricultural inputs, after which they supply.

Other Extension Institutions

Other institutions that play a key role in agricultural extension at the national level include: Uganda National Farmers' Federation which advocates for favourable policies for farmers and empowers farmers through knowledge on recommended farming practices and inputs; the parliament of Uganda which provides oversight and budget support; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives which provides market information; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development which provides financial resources for agricultural extension services; Ministry of Water and Environment which provides meteorological information; Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development which mobilises communities for uptake of extension services. The universities, colleges, and training institutions offer training and development of agricultural extension workers and research institutions such as the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) that provide technical support and promote adaptation and use of appropriate technologies.

Local Government Level

The major institutions engaged in public agricultural extension at local government level include: the production and marketing department, Office of the District Chairperson, Office of the District Chief Administrative Officer, the OWC Office, and the Senior Assistant Secretary Offices. These institutions are mainly involved in actual delivery of agricultural extension services.

District Level

The Department of Production and Marketing is responsible for coordinating delivery of agricultural extension services within the district, supervising agricultural extension workers at sub-county level, and delivery of agricultural extension services up to farm level as well as planning and budgeting for agricultural extension within the district. The head of the Department of Production and Marketing, the District Production and Marketing Officer, reports directly to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The technical team from the Department of Production and Marketing together with the District Operation Wealth Creation Officer and other key stakeholders such as the District LCV Chairperson verify the quantity and quality of agricultural inputs delivered at the district against the quantity and quality of agricultural inputs procured and dispatched by NAADS.

The team is also responsible for clearing the inputs before they proceed for distribution at Sub-county and ultimately parish levels or even village level in case of specific
crops like coffee seedlings. The District OWC Officer is responsible for overseeing distribution of agricultural inputs within the district as well as participating in planning, developing district priorities; selection of enterprises verification and mobilisation of beneficiaries of agricultural inputs as well as assessing community utilisation of distributed agricultural inputs. The District OWC Officer reports to the Regional OWC Officer who then reports to the OWC Secretariat at national level. The District OWC Officer shares copies of the reports with the District Production and Marketing Officer.

**Sub-county Level**

Delivery of extension services mainly occurs at the sub-county level. Each sub-county has at least an agricultural extension worker in charge of crops and another in charge livestock. Some sub-counties have agricultural extension workers in charge of fisheries and entomology especially if fishing and apiculture are some of the major economic activities in those areas. The agricultural extension workers are charged with providing agricultural extension services to farmers within their respective sub-counties. They are also charged with working with farmers to plan and prioritise agricultural enterprises and technologies and also verifying agricultural inputs delivered at sub-county level.

In addition to providing public extension services, the technical staff also supervise and quality-assures private service providers, community based facilitators, NGOs and other non-state actors involved in agricultural extension service delivery. The agricultural extension workers report directly to the District Production and Marketing Officer through submission of reports twice a year and share copies with the Senior Assistant Secretary at the sub-county.

**Challenges of the current institutional Framework**

There are quite a number institutions involved in the agricultural extension system of Uganda. MAAIF provides for joint stakeholder planning, review and priority setting meetings that are conducted both at national and zonal levels to strengthen linkages between research, extension and farmer institutions (MAAIF, 2016). Despite such efforts by government to coordinate various institutions engaged in agricultural extension, several challenges still exist and continue to affect the quality of agricultural extension service delivery.

According to Byarugaba (2017), institutions engaged in agricultural extension face several challenges including weak mechanisms for coordination and collaboration; lack of standards for extension service providers, weak research-extension-farmer linkages, weak farmer institutions, inadequate extension staffing and limited facilitation for extension staff. Shortage of quality agricultural inputs is also another major challenge. There are cases where the NAADS Secretariat has funds but is unable to procure seed of specific crops such as beans, simply because the seed companies do not have the seed.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) Including universities, agricultural colleges and other tertiary institutions as well as NGOs, private service providers, community based facilitators, and civil society organizations.

\(^{11}\) Interview with the Executive Director, NAADS. Interview conducted in May, 2017.
1.1.3 Agricultural sector funding to Extension Services

Overall funding to the agriculture sector has been increasing over the last five years. An attempt on disaggregating agricultural sector funding is made to highlight what is directed to agricultural extension. It is important to note that this report considers agricultural extension to comprise provision of inputs, advisory services and technologies. The agricultural sector funding considered under this section excludes the provision of new technologies.

Overall Trends in the Agricultural sector Budgets

After two decades of limited funding, Uganda’s Agricultural sector is currently experiencing an increase in the financing. Over the last five years, the sector’s budget has more than doubled – rising from UGX 422 Bn. in FY 2013/14 to UGX 901.68 Bn. in FY 2017/18.

**Figure 2: Trends in the Agricultural sector Budget (UGX Billions)**

The largest increase (of 67%) over this period in the sector’s budget was observed between financial years 2015/16 and 2016/17. This major increment was mostly attributed to the significant rises in the budgets for crop production and agricultural extension (see, figure 2). These areas received budget increments of 189% and 92% respectively. The increase in the funding to agricultural extension has therefore played a major part in the changes to the size of the Agricultural sector’s Budget.

The financial year of 2015/16 marked the commencement of the single spine system in agricultural extension. The institutional arrangements of the single spine system begun to have major effects on the budget in FY 2016/17, which partly explains the significant rise in the sector’s budget directed towards agricultural extension.

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12 See Lukwago, 2010 and the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks over the past two decades
With an increased emphasis on the distribution of agricultural inputs, most of the funding still goes to the NAADS secretariat, (see figure 4) whose primary mandate has now been amended to strictly providing agricultural inputs. Thus the funding of extension service delivery has been mainly made up of the allocation to the NAADS secretariat and grants to local governments for the purpose of production services.

In financial year 2017/18, the agricultural sector budget has risen further by 6% from the funding levels in the preceding financial year. The increments are partly explained by the inception of the DAES to coordinate agricultural extension service delivery in the country under the auspices of in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries. A total of UGX 29.55 Billion has been allocated to the DAES in FY 2017/18.
Composition of Agricultural Extension funding at Local Government Level

Agricultural extension service delivery is a decentralised service, as provided for in the Local Government Act (1997 as amended) and also emphasised by the 2016 National Agricultural Extension Policy. Like other decentralised services in Uganda, the central government transfers funds in form of grants to local governments to undertake agricultural extension service delivery. This transfer of funds is mainly attributed to local government departments being agents of their line ministries at central government level and also the fact that there are funding shortfalls at the local government level.

The reforms in the agricultural extension service delivery in Uganda have also created changes in the grants received at local government to provide extension services. Local governments received a National Agricultural Advisory Services Grant from FY 2001/02 till the end of FY 2014/15. Agricultural extension services at local government level are therefore facilitated by the Production and Marketing grant. Since FY 2016/17, the grant also includes the salaries which were formerly transferred to local governments as a separate grant (see, Table 1 for details).

**Table 1: Central Government Grants to Local governments for Agriculture (Billion UGX)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANTS</th>
<th>FY 2013/14</th>
<th>FY 2014/15</th>
<th>FY 2015/16</th>
<th>FY 2016/17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Ext - Salary</td>
<td>5,088,622</td>
<td>4,500,271</td>
<td>16,282,017</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and Marketing Grant</td>
<td>14,249,675</td>
<td>14,249,675</td>
<td>14,249,675</td>
<td>51,076,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAADS Wage</td>
<td>26,904,735</td>
<td>62,374,635</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAADS Development</td>
<td>104,342,403</td>
<td>68,872,503</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,585,435</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,997,084</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,531,692</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,076,637</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Approved Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the respective years*

The production and marketing grant has largely been for wages which has left agricultural extension services with a limited amount of non-wage facilitation (see findings on effectiveness and efficiency for further details).

The restructuring of agricultural extension has resulted into a reduction in the amount of funding transferred to local governments. As indicated in table 1, the level of funding for the local governments has reduced by approximately 66% since the disbandment of the NAADS structures at local government level. While the sector funding has increased owing to increments in extension related funding, these increments have only been experienced at the central government level. The funding outlay is projected to remain the same in FY 2017/18 based on the specifications in the FY 2017/18 Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) as well as the draft budgets.
2.0 Narrative of the conceptual framework

The study adopts the Public Expenditure Governance (PEG) assessment framework. The framework is grounded on nine principles grouped into inputs, processes, and outcomes as elaborated by Bogere and Maakaru (2014). The Model builds on the work of Baez-Camargo & Jacobs (2011), especially in the principles of governance adopted.

2.1 The public Expenditure Governance model

As illustrated in Figure 5, PEG is an interactive process between laws, policies, guidelines, plans, goals, strategies, budgets and priorities that govern actions and decision making. The assessment of this interaction is predicated on nine governance principles. The principles associated with the Input side of PEG are strategic vision, participation and coordination. These interact with the Processes which are attributes of delivering agriculture extension services in accordance with the plans, budgets and strategies stipulated in National Agriculture Extension Policy 2016. The assessment principles associated with the process are accountability, transparency, and control of corruption. The thread that runs across these is the aim to ensure the attainment of the intended Outcomes of public expenditure. In this case, the aim would be the attainment of the goals of Agricultural extension services in an equitable, effective and efficient manner. These form the basis for the principles associated with the outcomes which are, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, and equity.

Figure 5: Public Expenditure Governance in Agriculture Extension Model

Source: Bogere and Makaaru (2014)
The governance principles under the PEG framework are intertwined in ensuring the effective delivery of agricultural extension services. Controlling corruption in agricultural extension service delivery depends on the underlying level of transparency and accountability. These are heavily interrelated with the participation of the farmers (intended beneficiaries) in both the decision-making and monitoring processes of agricultural extension services. More so, without clear set goals, objectives, clear vision and mission statements that are easy to understand, achieving effectiveness and efficiency in extension service delivery is impossible. Consequently, the assessment is not complete without examining all the nine governance principles – a consideration taken into account in this assessment.

2.2 Principles, Definitions and Indicators
The principle definitions of the nine governance principles utilized in the assessment are laid out in Rhoads et al (2015) which uses the same assessment framework. This subsection provides their adaptation to agriculture extension and the respective indicators used in the assessment.

**Strategic Vision:** Strategic vision relates to the overall direction in policy and resource allocation across all levels of government. The strategic vision guides the priority setting, planning, budgeting, and decision making processes in agricultural extension. In assessing PEG, all documents guiding the priority setting in agricultural extension ought to reflect the priorities in the NDP II, the Agricultural sector Strategic Plan and the National Agricultural Extension Policy. Thus, the development plans and work plans of local government and lower local government levels must be consistent with the national strategic goals and objectives, including such as the priority crops and commodities of interest. In this study, focus is primarily on the governance of public expenditure in Agriculture extension at the district level. District Development Plans (DDPs) were examined for evidence of progressive improvements in district targets for providing extension services. While reviewing the plans, evidence of strategies to achieve district targets on provision of improved agricultural inputs, and transfer of technologies in agriculture was sought.

**Participation:** Participation is the involvement of non-state actors especially communities, farmers, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of agriculture extension services. The contribution made by farmers, community leaders, and NGOs in decision-making and resource allocation, utilization, and monitoring is critical for good governance. The indicators for assessing the governance of public expenditures in Agriculture extension at the district level are focused on: (i) examining for evidence of district meetings held at least once a year to solicit views of non-government actors (e.g. Farmers’ Fora/NGOs, private extension workers etc.) on the planning and evaluation of agricultural extension in the district; (ii) evidence of discussions of views from citizens (including farmer groups) on agriculture discussed in the district meetings; (iii) allocation of resources in the annual district budget for holding meetings with farmers’ forums/groups, citizens, CSOs and other non-government stakeholders to discuss Agricultural Extension issues, and; (iv) evidence of expenditure on meetings with farmers’ forums/groups, citizens, CSOs and other non-government stakeholders to discuss agricultural issues.
Coordination: Coordination in a pluralistic agricultural extension system implies effective communication and coherent action between the key actors involved in the funding, planning, delivery, monitoring, and evaluation of the agricultural extension delivery. The delivery of Agricultural extension program involves a broad range of ministries, departments and agencies of government as well as private sector and non-government actors. The goals, plans, and strategies of all these actors should be coherent to avoid duplications and resource wastage. The assessment of coordination involves examining evidence of collaboration between district production offices and other actors (state and non-state) involved in providing agricultural extension. Coordination examines collaboration between crop specific extension service delivery with mainstream extension service delivery from the local governments. It also involves examining evidence of collaboration between the different levels of government in the delivery of agricultural extension services.

Transparency: Transparency mostly focuses on access to information on agriculture extension funds, agricultural inputs and technologies in a format that is easily and readily usable by the citizens and other non-state actors. It also relates to the presence of a closed feedback loop between the decision-makers and the farmers. Advisory services which characterize extension service delivery are typically information delivery of public goods in nature. In situations where there are limited levels of transparency, citizens would not know for sure what they need to know to improve their production and productivity. In addition, they would not know what they are entitled to when it comes to the supply of agricultural inputs by government. Consequently citizens would not be in position to hold officer bearers accountable. The indicators for this principle focus on whether or not: conversant information on the production and marketing grant is displayed, evidence of clear criteria for selecting beneficiaries for extension services as well as adherence to it, existence of clear procedures for requesting information on agricultural extension services by citizens, and evidence of communication from the CAO or the Production office to the SAS or the Extension Workers and OWC Officers on guidelines for public display of information on funds and agricultural extension services.

Control of Corruption: Similar to other public goods, controlling corruption in agricultural extension involves having in place bureaucratic and administrative systems and practices that prohibit office bearers from abusing their offices. Thus in the context of agricultural extension, controlling corruption is done through internal audits at the district level and audits by the Auditor General at the national level. Indicators for this principle focus on evidence of the production and marketing grant being captured in quarterly internal auditing exercises by district, evidence of the district PAC discussing issues related to Agricultural extension from either the Internal Audit or Auditor General’s report, evidence of a DEC or Council meeting discussing a PAC report raising issues related to Agricultural Extension and evidence of administrative actions taken (e.g. introduction of new rules, procedures to control corruption) in response to queries raised by the Office of the Auditor General or that of the district PAC.

Accountability: Accountability in Agricultural extension implies holding governmental and non-governmental (such as the suppliers of inputs) actors responsible for the results in agricultural extension. This principle has three primary dimensions of accountability namely: bureaucratic, consequential, and financial. Bureaucratic
accountability involves adherence to regulations, sanctions, and rewards. The National Agriculture Policy (2015) defines the roles and responsibilities of the actors and other stakeholders at each level, from the Ministry to the service delivery unit. The Policy also defines the reporting channels and the mode of reporting. Fully functional bureaucratic accountability means that the mandates are clearly defined and funded, and there is an absence of overlaps between actors’ roles and institutional responsibilities. Consequential accountability emphasizes accountability to the general public. Indicators for accountability in Agriculture focus on evidence of district reporting on performance in provision of Agricultural Extension services in a public forum e.g. Barazas, District Budget Conference, Community meetings/dialogues; evidence of at least one quarterly monitoring and supervision visit by the DPO; evidence of submission of quarterly monitoring and supervision report to MAAIF and MoFPED; evidence of sanctions enforced against any office bearer for non-compliance with accountability guidelines for providing agricultural extension; and evidence of stakeholders witnessing delivery of agricultural inputs.

**Effectiveness and Efficiency:** Effectiveness is about the ability to achieve stated agricultural extension goals, while efficiency is about obtaining the maximum possible outcome with the resources available (value for money). Within Agriculture extension, effectiveness and efficiency rest in ensuring that agricultural inputs reach intended beneficiaries; that agricultural targets are monitored and met as well as ensuring that good quality agricultural inputs are supplied. Effectiveness and Efficiency, also relate to the utilization of all funds allocated from the central government and all funds raised through local revenue in a judicious manner. Indicators for this principle therefore point to evidence of district review of agricultural production, evidence of at least two council meetings discussing agricultural production and level of utilisation of the production and marketing grant transferred to the district.

**Responsiveness:** Responsiveness refers to government response to agricultural extension issues and concerns raised by citizens. It includes having mechanisms in place for providing information on extension services budget and performance, receiving feedback on extension-related policies and practices, and taking action that resolves the issues raised. Thus, the indicators for responsiveness include: evidence of resolutions taken by council on issues raised by citizens on agricultural extension (through petitions, letters, complaints etc.), evidence of the implementation of resolutions passed by Council on agricultural extension issues raised by citizens, evidence of the DPO’s office receiving complaints from citizens on agricultural extension, evidence of DPO’s office responding to the complaints received from citizens on agricultural extension and existence of clear procedures or guidelines for citizens to request for information on agricultural extension services.

**Equity:** Equity is about ensuring that agricultural extension is structured to ensure that every farmer, irrespective of their personal, social and economic circumstances can achieve their agricultural potential. Vulnerable populations such as the elderly, youth, widows, and people with special needs are especially targeted when ensuring equity. Indicators for this PEG principle include evidence of disaggregation of extension beneficiaries by gender, evidence of disaggregation of extension beneficiaries by age category (youth/elderly), evidence of strategies and plans to improve equity in provision of extension services; and evidence of implementation of strategies and plans to improve equity in agricultural extension.
3.0 Methodology

The study adopted use of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. At data analysis stage, we used content analysis of government documents to assess the governance of agricultural extension in selected districts. Qualitative data was collected using Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The content analysis, KIIs and FGDs were premised upon the nine principles of governance suggested by Bogere and Makaaru (2014) as elaborated in the conceptual framework. The KII and FGD data was managed and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data management and analysis computer software.

Consistent with research done under the Center for Budget and Economic Governance at ACODE, the study was conceived and implemented from an action research perspective. At the center of the PEG framework was an assessment tool designed to evaluate the performance of the selected local governments against a given set of indicators elaborated in the governance principle definitions contained in the preceding sections.

3.1 Study Scope and District Selection Criteria

The scope of this PEGs in agricultural extension is restricted to crop production. The analysis of documents under this assessment only covered a period of two years as reference period; that is from FY2015/16 to FY 2016/17. The performance assessment is based on the reviews undertaken starting with FY 2015/16, a financial year that marked institutional restructuring into a single spine agricultural extension system. The district source documents from a financial year 2016/17 and quarter four district performance reports of financial year 2015/16 were reviewed to score key indicators of the assessment.

The study utilized local governments (districts) as the main unit of analysis. Evidence from the district level analysis was also triangulated with the information on the practices and decision making processes at central government level. It is important to note that the current institutional arrangement of the agricultural extension allows the central government level to undertake most of the decision making and priority setting. To this end, data collection for this research was carried out in ten districts namely; Gulu, Hoima, Kabalore, Kamuli, Luwero, Mbarara, Mukono, Nebbi Soroti, Tororo. These districts were purposively chosen on the basis of a number of factors including the: nature of priority crops produced in the given district, geographical representation of the country, agricultural production zones representation, ACODE districts of operation, resources and time constraints. In addition, two sub-counties per district were selected in consultation with the District Production Offices. The sub counties were purposely selected based on proximity to the District Local Government headquarters (one rural sub-county and one urban sub-county). The Community level FGDs were conducted at sub-county level with the farmers.
Selecting 10 districts from among the 35 districts where ACODE operates allowed the study team to work in districts where ACODE had an existing working relationship with the local government leaders through its Local Government Councils Score Card Initiative (LGCSOCI). This made it easier for the researchers to interface with the communities, political leaders and the technocrats in those districts. In addition, it eased the study team’s access to the relevant source documents and information for the assessment.

Districts were further chosen after the review of their crop production data from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Agricultural Census of 2008/09. The districts were therefore chosen based on the high production levels of major crops, namely: coffee, tea, beans, maize and bananas.

The chosen districts provide geographical representation of the country. Most importantly, the selected districts provide also provided a representation of most agricultural ecological zones or production zones in Uganda as per the Agricultural Sector Strategic Plan, 2016. Table 2 summarizes the districts with their respective geographical regions, production zones, and priority crops grown (see Annex 1 and 2 for further details of the production zones and the respective priority crops).

Table 2: Summary of the Corresponding Characteristics of the study districts and their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
<th>Study District</th>
<th>Sub-County</th>
<th>Production Zones</th>
<th>Production Zone Crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Kamuli</td>
<td>Butansi</td>
<td>Kyoga Plains (V)</td>
<td>Sweet Potatoes, Citrus, pineapples, vegetables, sorghum, oil palm and oil seeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Namwendwa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soroti</td>
<td>Acetgwen</td>
<td>Gweri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tororo</td>
<td>Mella</td>
<td>Rubongi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Mokono</td>
<td>Nakisunga</td>
<td>Lake Victoria Crescent(VI)</td>
<td>Coffee, vegetables and oil palm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwero</td>
<td>Katikamu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Savana grassland(VII)</td>
<td>Coffee, sweet potatoes, mango, pineapple, vegetables, sorghum, tea and oil seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kikyusa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Geographical Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
<th>Study District</th>
<th>Sub-County</th>
<th>Production Zones</th>
<th>Production Zone Crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Mbarara</td>
<td>Bubaare</td>
<td>South Western farm lands(IX)</td>
<td>Banana, Coffee, Irish potatoes, Vegetables, Sorghum and Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rugando</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabarole</td>
<td>Buhanika</td>
<td>Western Savana grassland(VII)</td>
<td>Coffee, Irish Potatoes, Pineapple, Vegetable, Maize, Tea and Oil Seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bukuuku</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holma</td>
<td>Buhanika</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buhimba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
<td>Bungatira</td>
<td>North Western Savanna Grassland (III)</td>
<td>Beans, Coffee, Sweet potatoes, and oil seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unyama</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nebbi</td>
<td>Nyaravur</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kucwiny</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 Data Collection Process

Primary data was collected using Key Informant Interviews both at the Central and Local Government Levels. These were complemented by Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and analysis of government documents.

**Key Informant Interviews (KIIIs)**

At the national level, a number of stakeholders were interviewed who include the Director, of the DAES under MAAIF, Executive Director NAADS, and the Coordinator OWC. At the district level, key political leaders, such as, the Chairperson of the District Local Council (LCV), Secretaries for Production in the District Council and Resident District Commissioner (RDC) were interviewed. Owing to scheduling challenges, only five (5) RDCs were interviewed for the study. Additionally, in Soroti, the District Chairperson also doubled as the Secretary for Production in the District Council. From the technical arm of the local governments, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), District Production Officer (DPO), and the Operation wealth Creation Officers (OWC) were interviewed.

**Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

Six FGDs were conducted in each district with an average of 10 participants per FGD. Of the six FGDs, two were for women, two for men, one for the senior assistant secretaries (SAS) in the district, and another for Extension Workers in the district. The FGDs were undertaken at both the community and district levels. Community level FGDs were separated along gender lines in order to take care of cultural biases in the views of the women. Each of the community level FGDs included farmers, community leaders, youth and other interested citizens. The aim of collecting information using
FDGs was to gather perceptions and practices from key local government and non-government stakeholders about the underlying mechanisms and practices associated with the governance of extension services.

**Content Analysis of Government Documents Content**

Analysis of government documents included: the five year District Development plan, District Council Minutes, Annual Work Plans, Agricultural sector report, Budget Conference reports and Technical Planning Committee reports. The observation of public notice boards for displayed information was important for this assessment. An assessment tool was developed with measurable indicators based on the nine principles of assessing the public expenditure governance of agricultural extension service delivery. The tool helps to specifically appraise the performance of each district in the governance of agriculture extension services. ACODE Research Assistants were required to score each district on each indicator using authentic official documents accessed legally from the district. The assessment tool uses symbols to indicate the availability or not, of the relevant evidence of the practice for the indicator within the documents. A tick (✔) was used to indicate availability of evidence on the indicator being measured while a cross (×) was used to signify absence of evidence. The empty boxes indicate instances where the documents were either not available or not accessed.

**3.3 Quality Assurance**

A number of measures were put in place to ensure consistence and validity of the research. The process included consultations of key stakeholders to validate findings; the review of a number of relevant district documents and; training of field researchers to adhere to key quality standards of the data collected.

To ensure the validity, credibility, and the reliability of the data collected from the field, the KIIs and FGDs were conducted by ACODE district based researchers who are well versed with the regions in which they operate. These researchers have participated in various assignments for ACODE in these districts, key among which is the Public Expenditure Governance assessment of the Universal Primary Education (Kavuma et al, 2017). The field researchers were not only familiar with PEG assessment framework but were also re-trained (re-tooled) to ensure consistency in data collection.

In addition to the training in the PEG assessment framework, the researchers received training in research ethics and qualitative research approaches including the methods of conducting highly organized KIIs and FGDs. Finally, the study team at ACODE verified every transcript to ensure quality and consistence. The transcripts that did not meet the standard were sent back to the researchers with comments for improvement. Recordings from the Interviews and FGDs were also obtained from researchers along with photocopies of district Documents that were used to verify the credibility of scoring all the indicators of interest.
3.4 Data Management and Analysis

All the FGDs and KIIs undertaken in the ten districts were tape-recorded and later transcribed into detailed notes presented as Microsoft Word documents. After several rounds of verification and other quality assurance checks, total of 111 primary documents (49 KIIs transcripts and 62 FGD transcripts) formed the dataset for analysis in the report. The qualitative data obtained from these KII and FGDs was then coded basing on how it speaks to the nine principles of governance. These codes were then captured in Atals-ti which is qualitative data analysis software and the notes uploaded in the same software to enable the synchronization and the analysis process.

The analysis of data involved use of Atlas.ti to run query reports that bring out segments of information coded with the same code and analyzing the retrieved data to find patterns. In addition, Atlas.ti groupings (‘families’) of documents such as FGDs from farmers and KIIs from stakeholders were created and query reports on services provided or needed were run on both families to compare perceptions from both the supply and demand sides.

3.5 Limitations of the Assessment

The assessment of the performance of districts on the governance of agriculture extension program met a number of limitations. First, access of source documents was a big problem in most of the districts due to weak record keeping systems. In some instances, the records were not organized and as a result, the officers in charge were reluctant to avail them. Secondly, the timing of the study coincided with the beginning of the planting season, which made it difficult for the researchers to access most of the key informants such as production officers, OWC coordinators and the extension workers. These KIs were in the field most of the time distributing agricultural inputs.

Finally, the study also experienced challenges in securing interviews with resource persons. For instance the LCV Chairperson of Kabarole District had a running court case related to Agriculture in the production department and this prompted none response to some of the questions. The PEG assessment framework had inherent limitations on the scoring of the indicators which is restrictive. The scoring method is binary and therefore gives the assessor less flexibility to evaluate the magnitude of the district’s performance on each indicator. In absence of documented evidence, some districts scored poorly despite having undertaken some of the good governance practices being assessed.

For instance, in assessing responsiveness, transparency and accountability, it was observed that many district production offices reported using radios as avenues for providing farmers with information as well as responding to farmers’ concerns. However, unlike meetings which have minutes, what was discussed during radio appearances was difficult to capture and document. While radio stations often have recordings of the shows, these recordings were difficult to obtain.
This section presents the research findings of the study based on each of the nine governance principles namely strategic vision, participation, coordination, transparency, control of corruption, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, and equity. For each governance principle, we begin with the presentation of results obtained from the analysis of district documents, followed by issues that emerged from the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

4.1 Strategic Vision

**[Desired Outcome: Consistency of district agricultural extension plans with both the national agricultural extension plans and extension needs of the farmers]**

Assessing strategic vision in agricultural extension mainly considers two main issues. First, the assessment seeks to establish alignment of district agricultural extension plans and budgets with the national priorities and objectives. In relation to this, this section highlights how the sector is adapting to the recently launched National Agricultural Extension Policy (MAAIF, 2016). Secondly, the assessment seeks to examine the consistency between priorities at national and local government level.

**Strategic Direction in Agricultural Extension**

The main sources of strategic direction for agricultural extension in Uganda are the National Development Plan (NDP II, 2015/16 – 2019/20) and the National Agricultural Extension Policy (2016). The NDP II places emphasis on enhancing access to extension services and improved agricultural inputs among the strategies for improving agricultural production in the planned period. Ideally, at local government level, these two documents form the basis for the District Work/Activity Plans and the budgets.

The NDP II sets out the priority crops for its planning period to include Cotton, Coffee, Tea, Maize, Rice, Cassava, Beans, Citrus and Bananas. The prioritisation of these commodities across the study districts formed one of the assessment indicators of this study. As table 1 indicates, all the study districts except Mukono demonstrated evidence of prioritising the NDP II crops in their District Development Plans (DDPs) as well as their Agriculture Departmental Plans. It was also reported by some of the District Production Officers, that the annual assessment of budget compliance to the NDP II, undertaken by the National Planning Authority (NPA) has played a major role in encouraging alignment of district plans and budgets to the NDP II.

In addition to the priority crops, the NDP II also places emphasis on the improved provision of advisory services, agricultural inputs as well as improved transfer of technologies. Local governments are therefore expected to develop strategies along with the National Agricultural Extension Policy that are designed to attain these targets. Evidence of these strategies and targets was assessed across the study districts. Table 3 presents a summary of the assessment results.
From Table 3, it is notable that most of the study districts had performed well in the one strategic vision indicator (alignment of plans to the NDP II) that is required of them in order to receive funding from central government. The remaining indicators that assess targets and the associated strategies for their attainment are not mandatory and this possibly explains the absence of evidence on these in Mukono, Soroti, Nebbi and Gulu. The regional distribution of these districts (the Eastern, Northern and West Nile parts of the country) suggests that the strategic governance challenges vary across the regions. This is especially important for informing targeted governance interventions.

These results are consistent with the findings of the NPA's Certificate of Compliance assessment for financial year 2016/17. The Certificate of Compliance assessment indicates that local governments have prioritised the NDP II's twelve priority crops with gaps remaining in attainment of some of the other targets in agriculture especially the transfer of technologies. The certificate of compliance also indicates that the study districts of Soroti, Nebbi and Gulu had dismal performances in the alignment of their Development Plans, work plans and budgets to the NDP II.

Overall, majority of the districts had strategies to achieve improvements in access to improved agricultural inputs and transfer of technologies. For instance Nebbi district planned to train 150 farmers in all the lower local governments on soil and water conservation as well as on simple irrigation practices. In addition, the district planned to supply “200 banana tissue culture, resistant to banana fusarium wilt” in order to promote use of improved seed.

**Priority Setting Processes**

Overall, local governments are guided in their annual planning and budgeting processes by the budget call circulars which also contain the indicative planning figures (IPFs) from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. The conditionality of the grants received for the purpose of providing agricultural extension
services implies that the local governments have a limited amount of discretion to allow them divert from the national priorities.

However, this nature of priority setting is at times not consistent with the needs of the local governments – an issue that was well articulated by many of the respondents in the assessment.

*We don’t prioritize outside the national sector goals; finance sends standard outputs e.g training of farmers so we can’t divert much. We are guided by the Output Budgeting Tool but there are few activities that can fall out of the Output Budgeting Tool. Every year standards are set but not all that the district desires is captured e.g we wanted a permanent laboratory but the ministry needs a temporary one at district level.* --- DPO Respondent.

Mismatches between the priorities at the center and the needs at local government were also reported within the distribution of agricultural inputs. The procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs was in some instances reported to mainly focus on commercial crops that are not necessarily needed by the farmers in some parts of the country. In some instances, the agricultural inputs distributed are inconsistent with the type of soils in the beneficiary area.

*Recently, they delivered ginger at the sub-county and the extension worker refused them after finding out that no one in Kikyusa has ever grown them.* --- Male Farmer – Luwero District.

The issues of mismatch between the delivered inputs and the farmers’ needs are also consistent with the issues raised in the Report of the Parliamentary Sectoral Committee on Agriculture, Animal and Fisheries concerning the implementation of the OWC programme in Uganda (Parliament of Uganda, 2017). The report provides an illustration of the challenges faced by highlighting the citrus and mango seedlings that were supplied to Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts which were rejected by the farmers.

The parliamentary Committee report alluded to above further captures the issues of imbalance in the supply of planting materials for cash crop and food crop needs of the beneficiary districts. The report indicates that input delivery/supply focuses on tea, coffee, citrus and mango seedlings. These are, however, perennial in nature and do not address the immediate food needs of some regions in country such as the Tooro sub-region.

The current nature of prioritization in inputs supply/distribution is inconsistent with the provisions of both the National Agriculture Policy (2013) and the Agricultural sector Strategic Plan (MAAIF, 2016a) that emphasise specialization of crop production based on agro-ecological zones. Going against these production zones has caused distortions and confusion among farmers in some of the districts, as indicated by some of the respondents in Kabarole District.

*Kabarole District follows the zoning approach where specific sub counties are tagged to different crops that have soils which support the growth of*
these crops. The coming of OWC has made our famers cry since they were used to particular crops yet OWC is distributing different crops. --- SAS Respondent – Kabalore District.

The zoning approach is a sure way to improve the priority setting process of agricultural inputs. As the ASSP (2016) points out, the agro-ecological zones are essential in attaining the “requisite production volumes and values for each of the priority and strategic commodities” set out in the NDP II. The value of the agro-ecological zones is still appreciated in the districts implying that reverting back to this system as the basis for input prioritization could prove very beneficial.

Zoning is one of the key strategies the district is using. For instance, they have on several occasions planned for mountainous areas for coffee and the low lands of Kijura, Kiko and Kabende are zoned for tea. If this zoning takes root in Kabarole you will see changes because the problem is nologer the quantity but the right crops in the right season to the right people. --- RDC Respondent

Although agricultural extension is a decentralized service, in practice, the local governments have a limited amount of discretion in the decision making. While districts make requisition for the inputs they need, there are still rampant cases of mismatch between the inputs delivered and those requested or needed.

Efforts to improve the consistency between the prioritization process and the actual inputs supplied by the OWC leadership are calling for the adoption of a voucher system of accessing agricultural inputs. The voucher system was also suggested by some of the respondents as a way of ensuring the actual farmer needs are met as well as addressing the delays associated with inputs delivery.

Let us get seed suppliers and the government puts money in the seeds then the farmers deal directly with the supplier. Government can pay the seed supplier and maybe a farmer goes with a voucher and gets seeds or seedlings from the supplier. To me the government should divest its self from spoon feeding the farmers; let them (government) subsidize through private sector. ---CAO Respondent

The pre-paid voucher system has been seen to work in some countries such as Ethiopia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Experiences from these countries could inform the adoption of the pre-paid voucher system should Uganda consider it.

Adoption of the National Agricultural Extension Policy (2016)

In October 2016, Uganda adopted a new agricultural extension policy which marked a continued trend of agricultural sector reforms in the country. While it is still early to assess the effectiveness of the policy, it has already had some immediate effects on the delivery of agricultural extension both at national and sub-national level.

The National Agricultural Extension policy has institutionalized the single-spine agricultural extension system reforms, with some of the immediate policy changes including the creation of a Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) within MAAIF to spear head extension service delivery across the country. Consequently,
Public Expenditure Governance In Uganda’s Agricultural Extension System

the policy changes have resulted into a separation of agricultural input supply (the OWC intervention) from the advisory service delivery system and the lifting of the recruitment cap on extension workers. It has also resulted into the disbandment of the NAADS program structures at local government level thereby reinstating the agricultural extension mandate as the preserve of the district production departments (MAAIF, 2016)\(^\text{13}\).

However, the above reforms have been undertaken without a supportive legal framework. Given that the mandate of NAADS is established by law, the above changes have preceded the amendment of the NAADS Act (2001) and the passing of the National Agricultural Extension Bill (2017) into law— a process that is already underway\(^\text{14}\). While it is commendable that the much needed agricultural extension reforms have not been delayed by the legal framework, it is important that the amendment and subsequent enactment of the necessary legal framework to support the new reforms is fast tracked. Ideally, the legal framework should have been in place prior to the approval and adoption of the National Agricultural Extension policy (2016).

The National Agricultural Extension Policy (2016) has been adopted and appreciated by the technical arms of the local governments visited in the study. However, as the policy guides extension service delivery in the country, awareness of the policy among the politicians at local government was found to be low in some of the districts.

*I have heard about the policy but I haven’t got a copy yet, I need to take time and look for a copy at the production department. I guess they have it there. --- LCV Chairperson Respondent.*

*I have not yet seen or heard about the policy but I believe when it comes here, we shall get it and be able to implement it.--- Secretary for Production Respondent.*

Summary:

Overall, the sector priorities at local government level were found to be consistent with the national plans and guidelines on agriculture. The absence of evidence of targets and strategies to attain improvement in sector priorities in the districts of Gulu, Nebbi and Soroti presents an area for improvement. The prioritization and supply of agricultural inputs should be aligned to the needs and ecology of the local governments.

In the words of one the extension worker respondents, it is important that we supply the *“right crops in the right season to the right people.”*

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\(^{13}\) Republic of Uganda (2016). The National Agricultural Extension Policy

\(^{14}\) According to the Director of the DAES the Principles for the National Agricultural Extension Bill 2017 were approved in June 2017.
4.2 Participation

**[Desired Outcome: Opportunities for non-state actors to participate in planning, monitoring and evaluation of district agricultural extension services exist and their views are taken into account in decision making]**

The principle of participation in agricultural extension focuses on engagement of non-government stakeholders such as farmers and non-governmental organisations in the planning, decision making and monitoring and evaluation processes relating to agricultural extension. This section presents and discusses findings from analysis of interviews, focus group discussions and government documents on the governance practices and perceptions of key stakeholders on participation at district and sub-county levels. The review of government documents sought evidence of governance practices on the involvement of non-state actors in decision making, planning and budgeting for agricultural extension services at the district level. The documents reviewed were minutes of budget conferences, barazas and public hearings; council minutes; district budget and work plans; and performance reports.

**District Level**

The table below summarises the findings of the document review on participation at the district level.

**Table 4: Participation in Agricultural Extension at District Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Tororo</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of district meetings held at least once a year to solicit views of non-government actors on the planning and evaluation of agricultural extension in the district.</td>
<td>☐ ☒ ☒ ☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of discussions of views from citizens (including farmer groups) on agriculture discussed in the district meetings.</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of resources in the annual district budget for holding meetings with farmers’ forums/groups, citizens, CSOs and other non-government stakeholders to discuss Agricultural Extension issues.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of expenditure on meetings with farmers’ forums/groups, citizens, CSOs and other non-government stakeholders to discuss agricultural issues.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** ☒ evidence seen ☒ No evidence seen ☐ Documents not accessed

Results in Table 4 show that five districts (Tororo, Mbarara, Hoima, Kabalore, and Luwero) produced relevant evidence. This evidence is in the form of minutes and reports of budget conferences and other meetings held to solicit views of non-government actors on the planning and evaluation of agricultural extension in the district. With the exception of Kamuli, Kabalore and Gulu, all the other districts did not provide evidence, in form of council minutes, of discussion of views of farmers and other citizens on agriculture in the district meetings. Lack of evidence of discussion...
of farmers and citizens’ views on agriculture in council minutes could mean that the discussions were held and they were not recorded. It could also mean that the discussions were not held at all. This makes it difficult to allocate resources to and implement some key agricultural extension issues since the District Council – the highest decision making body within the district has not resolved on the issues.

While majority (70 per cent) of the districts studies demonstrated evidence of funds being allocated for the purpose of holding meetings to discuss agricultural extension issues with non-government actors, most of the districts, with the exception of Mbarara and Kabarole, did not provide any evidence of actual expenditure on meetings with non-government actors such as farmers, private sector and NGOs (See, Table 4).

Failure to organise meetings specifically to meet non-government actors and discuss agricultural extension services undermines participation of non-government actors in planning, evaluating, and contributing to the making of agricultural extension decisions. Such actors may not have access to another forum where they can effectively participate.

**Participation in planning for agricultural extension**

The budget conferences are the major forum for non-government actors to participate in planning for agricultural extension within a district. The district planning process begins at the village level based on indicative planning figures received. The parish development committee facilitates meetings for identifying priorities in agricultural extension within the villages in each parish. The parish development committee then prioritizes the funding priorities and concerns from the various villages and comes up with priorities at the parish level which are forwarded to the sub-county council. The sub-county council discusses priorities from the parishes and integrates them into the sub-county budget which is debated at the sub-county budget conference. The sub-county budget conference is chaired by the Senior Assistant Secretary. The revised sub-county budget is submitted to the district technical planning committee for integration into the district budget and plan. The Office of the District Planner then organizes the district budget conference which is chaired by the CAO.

The sub-county and district budget conferences are both organised as one-day events where all the departments within the district present their activities, achievements and failures in the financial year as well as plans for the next financial year. Stakeholders then share their views on the performance and the plans. While budget conferences would be a good forum for non-government stakeholders to participate in, organising them as a one-day event with an agenda heavy on presentations by technical officers from all service delivery sectors, leaves little room for the non-government actors to effectively participate in the planning process for agricultural extension. This is worsened by the low turn up of stakeholders.

*We invite farmers for budget conferences from which they are asked to make their contribution. However, the turn up is very low, the reason they do not come is the lack of transport refund and meals at the budget conference. --- SAS Respondent.*
Participation in decision making on agricultural extension

Major decisions relating to agricultural extension are made at the national level and then communicated to the district level through the CAO and the DPO. For example, the crop priorities are determined at national level and communicated to the district through the CAO and DPO. The CAO and the DPO then pass on information on these priority enterprises to the SAS and Sub-county extension workers respectively. While agricultural extension is a decentralised service, at least in policy, the practice seems to point to agricultural extension being a centralised service, hence a mismatch in policy and practice. This prevents non-government actors from effectively participating in agricultural extension decision making processes that could have significant effects on their livelihoods.

Sub-County Level

Farmer participation in decision making on agricultural extension

Some farmers felt that currently, they are not given an opportunity to participate in the decision making processes relating to agricultural extension unlike in the past where this was done under the NAADS programme.

At the moment we are not involved. This used to happen during the time of NAADS, where farmers were organized in farmer forums which were direct representatives of the farmers from the parish to the Sub-county.
--- Female farmer – Mukono District

This could be explained by the fact that selection of priority agricultural enterprises is determined at national level.

Farmer participation in monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension

Farmers play a major role in the monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension services. This is mainly done through provision of feedback on the performance of extension services. Analysis of data from interviews and FGDs reveal that farmers’ feedback on agricultural extension services ranges from: outbreak of pests and diseases such as the army worm, use of fake seeds, fake pesticides, absence of extension workers and supply of inadequate quantities of agricultural inputs. Farmers use the following avenues to provide such feedback to their leaders – both technical and political: radio talk shows, telephone calls, trainings, village meetings, budget conferences, monitoring visits by district officials, barazas, SMS, farmer field schools, and letters. Radio talk shows were a popular forum used by farmers in different regions to share their views on the performance of agricultural extension services.

For us, if we have any issues, we call the radio. There is a programme on Radio Mega every morning. They always ask the listeners to share what they feel is the issue affecting them. --- Female farmer – Gulu District.

Radio is the commonest media here since many of us can afford and access radio programs. --- Male farmer – Mbarara District.
The popularity of radio talk shows among farmers could be explained by the instant sharing of views and instant responses that occur during a live radio talk show and also by the many radio talk shows where district leaders participate in as discussants. However, the extent to which discussions and feedback during radio talk shows translate into policy decisions that are implemented is not yet known. Radio talk shows where agricultural extension issues are discussed are organised by the Production and Marketing Department, Office of the District Information Officer and local radio stations. The RDC also has free air time on local radio stations which are used by the technical officials to communicate development and service delivery issues to which farmers and other non-government stakeholders respond.

_We have a radio program which is coordinated by the office of District Information Officer. He has drawn a schedule for the whole year and every department knows which month its airtime is booked and at least in a quarter it may appear once because there are many departments. Once in a while you get some free airtime at local radio stations. They have a radio program over the weekend to help communicate developmental issues to the community and they have always invited us to go there._ — **DPO Respondent.**

While some farmers reported to have participated in the monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension services, most of the respondents reported not to have participated due to lack of an avenue to air out their views and concerns.

_We would want to give feedback to the extension workers but we are not in touch, and it seems they work in specific areas and abandon some, our extension worker never shows up. We do not have proper means to give feedback. The problem is that we hardly have community meetings where we would raise our concerns and also get feedback._ — **Female Farmer** — Luwero District.

Farmers also reported that they did not play a major role in the monitoring of beneficiaries of agricultural inputs. This could prevent farmers from benefiting from peer to peer learning that occurs during their participation in monitoring the management of agricultural inputs by fellow farmers.

_Monitoring and supervision of the beneficiaries of agricultural inputs is greatly lacking and this is made worse by the low morale exhibited in the farmer groups that has worsened after the demise of the NAADS program._

--- **Female Farmer** — Tororo District.

Farmer participation in the monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension services is useful in identifying extension challenges and weaknesses and generating alternative views on how extension services can be improved and made more effective. It is important that leaders respond to and take action on the issues and views raised by farmers on agricultural extension services if their participation is to become meaningful and make a contribution towards the achievement of effective agricultural extension service delivery.
Farmer perceptions on participation in agricultural extension

The major perception of farmers on participation in agricultural extension was that they are largely not involved in key decision making processes e.g. determining which agricultural inputs they receive and prioritization of their extension needs. Farmers think that government thinks for them on what agricultural inputs they should receive and as a result, they receive inputs which they do not need and which do not meet their current needs and food needs.

*The non-involvement of the farmers in the setting of priorities that work for them has always left the government supplying inputs that do not address the urgent needs of the farmers. They just inform us about which inputs they will bring. There are no community meetings conducted to solicit the needs of the farmers. --- Female Farmer – Tororo District.*

Farmers perception about not being involved in agricultural extension decision making processes are also echoed by district leaders who agree that indeed, farmers are not involved.

*Farmers are not actively involved in agricultural extension decision making. The only thing we do is to inform them what we are going to do. --- DPO Respondent.*

*The technical staff take it that they know what is good for this district and they do not involve farmers. --- District OWC Officer.*

Some farmers believe that free things should not be rejected regardless of whether one needs them or not. As a result farmers receive whatever inputs are available even when their soils and climate do not support their survival. Sometimes the farmers fail to understand why they have grown particular crops and end up changing their minds.

*In most cases, free things are very complicated and it is difficult to reject them. I am worried because I am also growing some of these inputs like oranges that do not have an established market. I wonder as to why I should grow such an input. Initially, I wanted to plant like 2acres of oranges but when I saw that the market is not readily available, I changed my mind but the government simply distributes. --- Male Farmer – Luwero District.*

Some farmers believe that the agricultural extension system favours some farmers and discriminates against other farmers. The farmers complain that they have never interacted with extension workers and therefore have not had an avenue to share their feedback on agricultural extension services.

*Personally, I have not interacted with extension workers and my colleague can bear witness. This means that we have not provided any useful feedback to them. We have been complaining, amongst ourselves, about discrimination in agricultural extension services. --- Female Farmer – Nebbi District.*
These people have their people whom they keep giving these inputs, they say that those are the people who can manage them well after all they have enough land. --- Male Farmer – Mbarara District.

Challenges to participation

Some farmers had given up on participating in planning, monitoring and decision making processes on agricultural extension services because government had either not responded to their previous issues raised or government had always claimed to be working on the issues.

Sometimes we complain of crop diseases but nothing is done so we keep silent ultimately. We have lost hope in these people, so we have chosen to sit with our problems. --- Female farmer – Soroti District.

Even if one reported an issue, the response would be, “we are working on it to find a solution”. I don’t see why we should make demands or complaints about our problems. I went to the sub-county and informed the Agriculture Officer about the army worm infestation. He responded that the worm had also attacked other parts of the district and they were working hard to find out which pesticide would kill the worm. I later heard that the MAAIF had delivered some few litres of pesticides for trials in every district but I have not seen any trials here in my parish. --- Male farmer – Mukono District.

Efforts to improve participation

Some farmers also believe that local councillors would be the best channel for them to share their feedback on agricultural extension services since they elected them and they are free with them compared to the technical officers. Other farmers share their feedback with the local council leaders because they believe that the local council leaders will pass on the feedback to higher levels such as the sub-county.

I report issues to the chairperson LCI because I know he is capable of reaching the sub-county to inform them. --- Female farmer – Tororo District.

Farmers believed that their participation in agricultural extension could be greatly enhanced if they were actively engaged in determining which agricultural inputs they received. Many of the farmers believed in the agricultural inputs being aligned to the agro-ecological zones.

Farmer groups are believed to improve access to extension services among farmers, encourage farmers to share their views and feedback and also improve response to issues raised by farmers.

With a farmer group it’s easy to access extension services since farmers are able to provide collective voice to the extension officers and creating group demand. Responding to farmers in a group is also easier than when an individual makes his/her demand. --- Male farmer – Mbarara District.
Summary

Most of the districts did not have evidence of discussion of farmers and citizens’ views on agricultural extension in district meetings. There are several mechanisms available for non-government actors to participate in the planning and monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension services. Participation in decision making processes seemed closed for non-state actors including farmers. Farmers rely more on participation mechanisms that are trusted on aspects of triggering timely responses to the issues raised. Farmers participate in monitoring and evaluation of agricultural extension services through provision of feedback and sharing their views on the performance of extension services. However, some farmers expressed their disappointment with the agricultural extension system that did not involve them in decision making and did not at times respond to their issues. Some farmers accused the agricultural extension system as being discriminatory and supporting some farmers at the expense of others.

4.3 Coordination

[Desired Outcome: Coherence between plans and activities of various actors involved in agricultural extension]

This section presents the findings obtained from the content analysis of government documents, interviews and focus group discussions on coordination practices and perceptions. The coordination principle looks at effective communication and coordinated actions between the key stakeholders involved in funding, planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation of the agricultural extension services. The review and analysis of relevant documents focused on identifying evidence of at least one quarterly Technical Planning Committee (TPC) meeting, where agricultural issues were discussed. It seeks evidence of meetings between district commercial officers, district production officer, OWC officer and CAO to discuss agricultural issues; and evidence of an annual Joint Sector Review (JSR) meeting between district officials and other stakeholders on agricultural extension services. Table 5 is a summary of the findings of the review.

Table 5: Evidence of Agricultural Extension Coordination Practices at District Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Toro</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of at least one TPC meeting where agricultural issues are discussed every quarter.</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of meetings between district commercial officers, district production officer, OWC Officer and CAO to discuss agricultural issues.</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of an annual joint sector review meeting (between district officials and other stakeholders) on agricultural extension.</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❏</td>
<td>❏</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: ✔ evidence seen ❌ No evidence seen. Documents not accessed
Evidence in Table 5 reveals that only two districts (Tororo and Mbarara) had evidence of the three best practices of coordination. Three of the districts studied (Kamuli, Soroti, and Luwero) presented no evidence whatsoever, while the rest of the districts had evidence of only one of the three practices of coordination.

**Intra and inter-sectoral coordination**

Given the multi-sectoral nature of agriculture, the significance of intra- and inter-sectoral coordination cannot be overstated. The DAES in MAAIF is mandated to coordinate the extension service providers at national, local government, and other non-state levels (MAAIF, 2016). Evidence from interviews and FGDs conducted among government and non-government actors, shows that there is limited coordination among different actors in provision of agriculture extension services. It is evident from the data collected that despite the appreciation at policy level of the need to coordinate activities for effective implementation of agricultural extension services, many actors in charge of implementation either do not appreciate it at all or stop at simply stating its significance without any evidence of practicing it. When asked about the significance and applicability of coordination, a group of extension workers from Central Uganda had this to say:

> It is not applicable to coordinate extension services provided by different providers with the publicly provided services. --- Extension Worker – Luwero District.

Evidence shows there is even competition between government and non-government agricultural extension service providers. This is a response from a group of extension workers in Eastern Uganda

> We are supposed to check on [non-government] service providers. Because they just pick people and they take them for training, you can find that there is a problem. Recently I went for demonstration on use of stryker [pest control drug] and found one of [the non-government] staff at parish level. He was struggling for audience and caused a lot of embarrassment. They need some backstopping. Some organisations like Plan International (PI) have got more money than us, so they give farmers drinks and lunch, and if there are two meetings, one for government and one for PI, ours is poorly attended and theirs works out because there is some kind of motivation for the farmers. --- Extension Worker – Kamuli District.

Similar observations were revealed by different groups of extension workers from Western and Northern Uganda. Operationally, duplication, poor information sharing, communication gaps, and absence of reporting channels were widely reported. Respondents attributed this to the liberalised policy that allows free operations among the actors.

> They have independent operations making coordination difficult. You may not know what they are doing and hence difficulty to collaborate in provision of extension services to the farmers. --- Extension Worker – Soroti District.
NGO programs on agricultural extension are short lived. They would create a bigger impact if they worked for about five years or more. Some do not inform us when they start working in our sub counties.
--- Extension Worker - Mukono District.

Since agricultural extension is a decentralised function, actors work more with the local governments than MAAIF. Although actors at all levels considered MAAIF as “our parent ministry,” and the latter held coordination meetings to provide technical support and policy advice to actors, the findings demonstrated that key actors held the view that MAAIF had less capacity to coordinate agricultural extension services.

A Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and a District Production Officer (DPO) had this to say:

\textit{Every ministry acts as a back yard for all sector players, but I must say agriculture was losing it. May be the new agriculture extension policy will save the situation. Since the time they suspended NAADS, MAAIF disappeared and lost relevance on the ground.} --- CAO Respondent.

\textit{We relate quiet well with our parent ministry [MAAIF]. However, there is need it to improve on their support supervision to the districts.} --- DPO Respondent.

Evidence shows that the coordination challenge in agricultural extension is not exclusively of intra-sectoral nature. Inter-sectoral coordination is equally ineffective, if not worse, given the multiplicity of institutions and actors.

\textbf{Coordination under OWC}

When the OWC initiative was scaled up, beginning in FY 2014/15, an effort was started by the OWC leadership to coordinate the agencies and other players in the agricultural value chain. A loose platform, named Uganda Development Forum (UDF), was formed to bring together NAADs, NARO, UCDA, DDA, CDO, UIRI, REA, NEC, VODP, MSC, NAGRC-BD, and UEPB under the leadership of the UDB. However, the effort seemed unpopular among the top leadership in these agencies. Evidence shows the top executives in the agencies snubbed two different coordination meetings convened in March and April 2016 by the Office of the Prime Minister.

The findings revealed that at local government level, the relationship between OWC officers and local government leaders, especially the political leaders was often problematic. This made coordination of agricultural extension work difficult. Asked to describe their relationship with the local government leaders in their areas of operation, the OWC officers had this to say:

\textit{Our relationship with local government leaders is not good because they were directly benefiting from the previous NAADS programme. Political leaders are greedy and they tend to allocate inputs within these parishes to themselves. If they are stopped, they start talking ill about the programme. They also wanted to use inputs as a way of rewarding those who voted them in office. They collaborate with
the sub-county chiefs to make the work of OWC officers difficult. --- District OWC Officer.

Because of their bad habits in the past, the district leaders think OWC has come to investigate them or take away their jobs. This is the misconception that some leaders have about OWC, making them hostile to the OWC officers. --- District OWC Officer.

Interviews with district technical staff further disclosed the divide among key stakeholders in the delivery of agricultural extension services at local government level.

The wealth creation strategy is good but it is being handled by an inexperienced army. Although the army’s main task is to ensure that supplies are given to the famers, even if this was done, they need a technical person to help the farmers. If technical people are not involved right away and the people think that the items are for OWC (associated with the army) and not for government, there is a misconception there. --- CAO Respondent.

The problem with OWC Officers is that they handle things in the military way. They want to order, and we act. They can even call you at night or weekend that come and receive the inputs and you must be there. For them they are well facilitated but for us we are on foot. They attend planning meetings but they come and instruct us otherwise. They are too fast, and for us civilians, we are slow. --- Extension Worker.

There is a conflict between us [local government staff] and the OWC officers. They want to take the responsibility of extension workers. They don’t have the mandate but they insist. --- CAO Respondent.

However, in some districts the relationship between the district local government staff, particularly the politicians, was reported as quite good.

I personally brought the OWC commander to sit with him on the District Executive Committee meeting every Monday. I brought him on board, he appreciated it and we work together to generate the list of beneficiaries. --- LCV Chairperson.

The OWC officers are very cooperative; they are my colleagues and brothers and the fact that am sitting in this chair on President’s behalf they come here and salute. So there is no problem; we all work very well both day and night. --- RDC Respondent.

The OWC officers have been co-opted as part of the extension staff in the department of production and so they work under my supervision. Secondly, there is a committee of operation wealth creation at the district and that is where we interact. --- CAO Respondent.

The interviews and focus group discussions disclosed that contrary to the policy and suggestions at national level, MAAIF was detached from planning, day to day
operations, and monitoring of sector activities at local government level. The districts work more closely with OWC officers without MAAIF’s supervision of the districts. Indeed in the organogram for agricultural extension (Figure 1), shows that MAAIF is communicating only with MoFPED. The local government implementers of agriculture extension services stated that there was a communication gap between them and MAAIF. Interviews and focus group discussions revealed that many local government staff could not remember MAAIF organising any regional workshop to communicate its policy direction. The local governments reported that they interacted more with the NAADs secretariat. However, in some easy to reach districts such as Mukono and Luwero they reported presence of MAAIF workshops. The reason for the perceived and observable coordination and communication gap in the sector may be attributed to the decentralised nature of agricultural extension. Communication and coordination beyond the district, to the lower local governments is normally done by CAO, at times without the knowledge and input of other district local government staff.

Summary

Proper coordination requires effective communication and coordinated actions between the key stakeholders involved in funding, planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation of the agricultural extension services. Evidence from government documents, both central and local governments, suggests that the agricultural sector, particularly extension, has for many years been a beehive of programs and interventions operating in silos. The best practices of coordination are not being practiced by most of the local governments in the delivery agricultural extension services. The interview and FGD data suggest that many actors do not appreciate the significance and applicability of coordination and therefore engage in unnecessary competition, duplication, poor information sharing, and problematic relationships.

4.4 Transparency

[Desired Outcome: Farmers have access to information on funds disbursed for agricultural extension, criteria for selecting beneficiaries of extension services and any other public information relating to agricultural extension]

Transparency is a principle connected to other governance principles including participation and accountability. For example, non-government actors cannot participate effectively if they cannot access information necessary for them to participate in agricultural extension processes. Neither can they hold their leaders accountable if they cannot access the information needed for them to do this. Transparency in agricultural extension is enhanced when citizens have access to all information relating to agricultural extension services.

District Level

As indicated in Table 6, the review of evidence of transparency practices at district level reveals that more than half of the districts did not display up to date information on agricultural extension funds received by the district from central government. Similarly, all the districts, except Soroti, Hoima and Kabarole, did not have evidence
of communication from the key district leaders such as CAO or DPO to the sub-county officials namely – SAS and extension workers on guidelines for public display of information on funds and agricultural extension services.

Lack of evidence on public display of extension information could mean that the districts did not receive instructions to display the information. It could also mean that the instructions were received but not adhered to and as a result the information was not displayed. Absence of publicly displayed information on extension services makes it difficult for non-government actors such as farmers, citizens and non-government organisations to access up to date information on funding. Farmers and citizens’ capacity to hold their leaders accountable on funds received for agricultural extension is therefore undermined. Similarly, more than half of the districts did not show evidence of having clear criteria for selecting beneficiaries for extension services. The decision making in agricultural extension appears centralised, at least in practice. To the extent that centralised decision making is happening, it could mean that districts have not received clear guidance from central government, on how beneficiaries of extension services should be systematically selected. Lack of guidance on selection of beneficiaries could undermine efforts to make agricultural extension services more equitable.

With the exception of Kabarole, the remaining nine districts did not show evidence of having clear procedures for requesting information on agricultural extension services by citizens. This has implications on participation and accountability by citizens as it undermines access to information on agricultural extension services by citizens. Some citizens may not access key information because they do not know the procedure of requesting for such information.

**Table 6: Evidence of transparency practices in agricultural extension at district level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Tororo</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Display of up to date (Q1 – Q4 FY 2016/17) information on the production and marketing grant at district headquarters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of clear criteria for selecting beneficiaries for extension services (as well as adherence to it).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of clear procedures for requesting information on agricultural extension services by citizens.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of communication from the CAO/Production office to SAS/Extension Workers and OWC Officers on guidelines for public display of information on funds and agricultural extension services.</td>
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Key: ☑ evidence seen   ☒ No evidence seen.   ☐ Documents not accessed
Sub-county Level

Similar to the district level, sub-counties are also required to publicly display up to date information on agricultural extension including funding for agricultural extension. In cases, where information is publicly displayed, some farmers claimed that they read the information on the noticeboards while others indicated that they were illiterate and could not benefit much from such information.

When I visit the sub-county headquarters, I make sure I read the notice board. Sometimes information is pinned up there. --- Male farmer – Mukono District.

Although we are not able to read and write well, we have been seeing the sub-county notice boards with some information pinned. --- Female farmer – Nebbi District.

In some cases, information was not displayed in places where it could be publicly accessed for example display of information inside offices. This undermines access to information by citizens and hence their participation in key agricultural extension processes. When citizens do not access information on funding of agricultural extension services, it also becomes difficult for them to hold their leaders accountable on extension allocations and expenditures.

If you are to move to the sub-county offices, the information is pinned inside the offices. There is no such display externally to allow more people access this. --- Female farmer – Tororo District.

Access to information by key stakeholders

Farmers accessed information on agricultural extension mainly through radio talk shows, telephone calls, trainings, village meetings and budget conferences. Generally, farmers reported that they do not have prior information on when agricultural inputs will be delivered to them. This could undermine effectiveness of agricultural extension services as inputs may be delivered at a time when farmers have not prepared their gardens thus causing delays in planting and deterioration in the quality of inputs. This is especially true for vegetatively propagated crops. Prior to the delivery of inputs, LC1 Chairpersons for each village registered farmers who were interested in specific agricultural inputs. Farmers’ choice of inputs was informed by a pre-determined list of priority inputs from the central government.

Farmers indicated that when agricultural inputs were delivered at the sub-county, the OWC Officers, LCIII Chairpersons or SAS communicated to the LC1 Chairpersons of each village who in turn communicated to the farmers through different forums including radio announcements, announcements in places of worship, and written notices in different places within the village.

The only news we receive on when inputs are delivered is like when the LC1 Chairman writes on a banana plant telling us to go and collect coffee or tea. --- Female farmer– Mbarara District.
Some farmers, including those who had initially registered with the LC1 Chairpersons to receive the inputs, got to know that the inputs had been delivered through several means. Some of them received information from those who had already picked the inputs while others observed others moving back to their homes after receiving the inputs or received information from boda-boda (commercial motorcycle hire) riders or heard rumours from others who had seen people receiving the inputs.

*Information is hard to get, a lucky person is the one who hears from someone who reached the sub-county. Here we get information from boda-boda men who see something along the way and tell farmers that we are seeing this being done at the sub-county but information through the phone or letters sent by the sub-county chief is not there.* --- Male farmer – Tororo District.

The interviews and focus group discussions revealed that there was no mechanism of knowing all the beneficiaries of the agricultural inputs distributed within the district. Similarly, it was not easy to know all the people who had previously registered to receive the inputs but did not receive the inputs. People received the inputs at different times, depending on when they got information on delivery of inputs. Any interested person who accessed the information about delivery of inputs and also accessed the distribution places could receive available inputs and they would be required to write their names as an acknowledgement of receipt of inputs. This was the practice in all the study districts. In some places, presenting one’s identity card was a pre-requisite to receiving the inputs.

*When it is time for supplying inputs, whether you were registered or not, the recipient could be someone else.* --- Male farmer – Tororo District.

*The last time I got inputs was when I was just passing by the sub-county and I found the input delivery exercise going on and I also grabbed some inputs.* --- Female farmer – Mukono District.

*Sometimes you may see someone passing with coffee and when you stop to ask he or she will tell you that go with your Identity Card and pick coffee.* --- Female farmer – Mbarara District.

Distributing agricultural inputs with total disregard of the list where interested farmers initially registered undermines effectiveness of agricultural extension as inputs could end up being distributed to non-farmers, farmers who have not prepared their gardens or even farmers who are not interested in those particular inputs.

Some of the officials involved in distribution of inputs testify to not following the lists where farmers initially registered especially when distributing planting materials for crops.

*The only inputs that are distributed according to the initial list of request are the cows. For crops, we just monitor the lists of beneficiaries because whoever receives, has to sign.* --- District OWC Officer.
Some of these officials claim that at times, they are influenced by sub-county political leaders and other people to distribute inputs to people who had not initially registered for the inputs even when they are aware that they are supposed to distribute inputs to only those who had initially registered for them.

*In actual sense we are supposed to follow the list where farmers registered for inputs, but due to pressure from the people and politicians especially LCIII Councilors and Chairpersons, as a person who is distributing, you are forced to give even to the people whom you did not register due to pressure and demand.* --- **LCV Secretary for Production.**

**Farmers’ Perceptions on Transparency in Agricultural Extension**

Some farmers believe that when agricultural inputs are delivered at the sub-county, the LCIII Chairpersons, SAS or OWC Officers often ask the LCI Chairpersons to mobilise farmers to pick the inputs. However, LC1 Chairpersons tend to share the information with a few people, who are usually their friends or members of their families. Information on delivery of inputs does not therefore reach many farmers.

*When inputs are delivered at the sub-county, they call the LCI chairperson who also calls his/her friends only.* --- **Female farmer – Mbarara District.**

*The LCI chairmen do not mobilize the people, they only pass information to the people known to them. They will pass information first to family and friends and when they are satisfied that their families have benefited that is when they will circulate the information.* --- **Female farmer – Tororo District.**

Other farmers believe that it is the people who live closest to the sub-county offices who tend to consistently receive the delivered agricultural inputs.

*Only a few people around the sub-county are the ones who access this information and continue receiving these inputs all the time.* --- **Female farmer – Mbarara District.**

Some local leaders explained that they mobilise only a few people for the inputs because in most cases, the quantities delivered are much less than the quantities that were requested for at the time when farmers registered their seed needs. However, there were also cases where the inputs delivered at the sub counties were not picked by farmers and they ended up being dumped. Some farmers attributed this to poor mobilization of farmers to receive inputs.

*Sometimes they bring inputs at the sub-county without our knowledge and they call LCs to come and pick seedlings and even tell community members. There is a time when I found coffee seedlings just dumped under the tree at the sub-county and people didn’t pick it because they were not well mobilized.* --- **Male farmer – Mbarara District.**

**Challenges related to transparency**

Some district officials such as the CAOs reported that during the planning process, some non-government actors for example non-governmental organisations and
development partners did not disclose their resource envelop. This undermines transparency in planning for agricultural extension services, could lead to duplication of efforts, and inefficient utilisation of meagre resources available for agricultural extension services.

Farmers reported that they made telephone calls or walked into offices of district officials in case they needed information from the district relating to agricultural extension. However, some top leaders at the district did not think it was necessary for farmers to obtain information on agricultural extension from the district since they could easily obtain the information from the sub-county. Such a perception could undermine farmers’ access to key extension information that may not be available at the sub-county level.

*Farmers do not need to get information directly from the district because the farmer is nearer to the sub-county than the district so the farmer does not need to come to the district. They can look for information from the extension workers at the sub-county and that is the spirit of decentralization and where the extension officer does not have it then they look for the information and feed the farmer.* --- **CAO Respondent.**

Farmers complained about delays in communication regarding delivery dates for agricultural inputs which led to delayed preparation of gardens and deterioration in quality of inputs especially for vegetatively propagated crops. They added that this prevented them from optimally benefiting from government programmes.

*You receive a phone call being told to go to collect inputs from the sub-county. Before you prepare the garden, you hear that they are supplying cassava cuttings, by the time you prepare the garden, the cassava cuttings are drying. This is a way of destroying government projects for farmers.* --- **Male farmer– Tororo District.**

Some farmers complained about the inputs that they received being unable to grow after one season of planting, forcing them to resort to their traditional seeds.

*The seeds help us but we have one problem, when you grow them for one season, the next season they don’t grow. So we have resorted to go back to our original seeds.* --- **Female farmer – Mbarara District.**

Perhaps, farmers are not given the necessary extension information for the management of specific crops. This could be a case of hybrid seed being distributed and farmers are not informed that they need to use new seed every season and the reason why they should do this. Similar sentiments on lack of extension information were shared by other farmers.

*The major problem that we find is that we don’t know how long these packed improved seeds have been stored before they give them to us and they also give them to us without training on how to plant.* --- **Male farmer – Tororo District.**
Efforts to improve transparency

Some farmers think that putting in place community notice boards for farmers will go a long way in disseminating information for improving farming practices. Perhaps the community notice boards may be more effective when the notices are in the popular local languages.

There is need to accelerate information access by putting in place community notice boards for farmers to allow access to the required information to guide their farming approaches. --- Male farmer – Tororo District.

Farmers thought that if they received prior information on when the agricultural inputs would be delivered, they would be able to prepare their gardens in time. Prior communication to farmers on when inputs would be delivered actually minimised on-farm deterioration in quality of inputs before they were planted, allowed for timely planting and also minimized wastage of the inputs hence improved effectiveness and efficiency of agricultural extension services.

It would be good if they can inform us at least two weeks in advance before they deliver the agricultural inputs to allow us to prepare our gardens. --- Male farmer – Tororo District.

Summary

The public display of up-to-date information on funding of agricultural extension services is still lacking in most of the districts. There is limited access to information by farmers on when inputs will be delivered, when they are actually delivered, and to whom they have been delivered. Receiving agricultural inputs does not need prior registration and prior registration is not a guarantee to receiving the inputs.

4.5 Control of Corruption

[Desired Outcome: Bureaucratic and administrative systems and practices are in place that prohibit managers of district agricultural extension services from using their offices for private gain]

This section presents findings obtained from document review and responses from respondents on control of corruption practices. The document review focused on evidence of bureaucratic and administrative systems and practices that are in place to safeguard against corruption. Control of corruption is assessed by looking for evidence of resolutions taken by the council on issues raised by citizens on agricultural extension services. For example through petitions, letters, complaints and any other ways; evidence of the implementation of resolutions passed by council on agricultural extension issues raised by citizens; evidence of the DPO's office receiving complaints from citizens on agricultural extension services; evidence of DPO's office responding to the complaints received from citizens on agricultural extension services; and existence of clear procedures and guidelines for citizens to request for information on agricultural extension services.
The documents reviewed under the control of corruption majorly included minutes of council meetings as well as reports by council and DPO's office on actions taken in response to queries raised by the citizens on agricultural extension services both to council and DPO's office. Table 7 summarises the findings of the review.

Six out of the ten districts produced no evidence whatsoever on each of the five practices of control of corruption related to agricultural extension services. Only Hoima District provided evidence on three of the five practices, while Kamuli and Tororo districts provided evidence on only two and Gulu district on just one of the five practices of corruption control. Three districts; Kamuli, Hoima and Gulu, provided evidence of resolutions taken by the Council on issues raised by citizens on agricultural extension, out of which we found only Kamuli with evidence of implementing these Council resolutions. We found that only Tororo with evidence of DPO’s Office receiving complaints from Citizens on agricultural extension, and the DPO’s office responded to these complaints. In respect to existence of clear procedures and guidelines for citizens to request for information on agricultural extension, only Hoima provided evidence.

**Table 7: Evidence of Control of Corruption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of corruption</th>
<th>kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Tororo</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of the production and marketing grant being captured in quarterly internal auditing exercises by district.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of the district PAC discussing issues related to Agricultural Extension from either the Internal Audit or Auditor General’s report.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of a DEC or Council meeting discussing a PAC report raising issues related to Agricultural Extension.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of administrative actions taken (e.g. introduction of new rules, procedures to control corruption) in response to queries raised by the Office of the Auditor General/ district PAC.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key: ☒ evidence seen  ☐ No evidence seen.  ☐ Documents not accessed

Information obtained from key informant interviews and focus group discussions with government and non-government actors provided further evidence on the prevalence and control of corruption in relation to agricultural extension services in Uganda.

**Prevalence of Corruption in Agricultural Extension**

The main form of corruption prevalent in almost all the study districts in relation to agricultural extension is mismanagement of inputs distributed by government under the Operation Wealth Creation intervention. The inputs in the crop subsector that are being distributed include seedlings of the priority crops such as coffee, tea, banana, citrus, mangoes, pineapples, and cocoa as well as seeds for food crops like maize, beans, and cassava cuttings. The corruption tendencies include those related to procurement of the inputs, delivery of poor quality inputs, inflation of the price of inputs
and supply of ‘air’ (where suppliers fail to deliver inputs but claim the money). Others include some politicians giving inputs to their supporters and discriminating against non-supporters, beneficiaries conniving with suppliers and signing for technologies without receipt in exchange for money, inputs dumped by suppliers to farmers who do not need them, falsification of documents at various levels, and collusion among actors particularly between suppliers and public officials. Farmers thus reported that:

*Politicians give inputs to their supporters. The same people who get cows get coffee and keep on benefiting year in, year out. When we complained, the chairperson said, “I am the chairperson; I determine who gets and who does not get.” --- Men Farmer - Luwero District.*

*Last season I was supposed to receive maize seeds. I went to the sub-county only to find that the extension worker and sub-county councilors had taken what was meant to be my share. They said I had come late. Some officers at the sub-county toss us around during the distribution exercise to frustrate us, after which they share the inputs with the few who eventually turn up. --- Woman Farmer - Mukono District.*

Similarly, Senior Assistant Secretaries’ FGD participants in Kabarole queried the diligence of the procurement process and claimed that,

*With the OWC there is an ‘improved’ corruption tendency that may not easily be detected. The quality of technologies sometimes is very poor and you ask yourself if they were really procured. For instance they brought dry cassava stems and dry mangoes. --- Extension worker- Luwero District.*

Another widely reported form of corruption was related to extension workers soliciting money from farmers. This practice was reported by farmers in seven out of the ten study districts. The extension workers demand for money, apparently for transport, to visit farms or consider farmers for inputs. They demand for transport refund of up to UGX 100,000 depending on the distance. However, one of the District LCV Chairpersons had a different view:

*In other places they may call it corruption but for me that is not corruption. If an extension worker does not have a motorcycle and you call him to come and provide advisory services at your home and he asks for transport, I don’t think we should call that corruption. I encourage my farmers to do it. That’s not corruption. --- LCV Chairperson.*

Information from the DAES at MAAIF supports this view. Although government has increased recruitment of agricultural extension staff in all the 116 District Local Governments—raising the number from 1,261 in 2014 to 3,062 by end of June 2017—logistical support, particularly transport has been reported as inadequate. Inadequate facilitation should not be used as a conduit for farmer exploitation by agricultural extension staff. Several DPOs and CAOs, also noted that sometimes the extension workers do not reach out to farmers, even when they are facilitated. They divert the money given to them for personal gain. Some do not report to their duty station but claim they were in the field when actually they were not. This issue was raised in a number of districts including Gulu, Hoima, Mukono, Nebbi, and Tororo.
Another corrupt tendency reported is related to the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS), ironically developed to curb corruption by improved efficiency in budget preparation, execution and financial reporting. It was adopted in 2003 to facilitate expenditure control and discipline in budget management both at central and local government levels. The idea was that IFMS would result into improved oversight and enforcement of internal controls; a reduction in the time taken to process payments; improvement in account reconciliation; and more accurate and reliable financial reporting. That notwithstanding, some actors in local government attributed some corruption tendencies to the system.

Under IFMS we at local government level get money from the central government using one account. Sometimes the money comes late, past the quarter when it was supposed to be spent. The staff end up diverting the money and account for it. For example, we put in a requisition to teach farmers how to spray the armyworm [a pest that attacked maize and other cereals in many parts of Uganda] and it delayed. The money came when people were harvesting, of course the little that survived the army worm. So when money arrived it was used by the staff, since they could not fail to find a way of accounting for it. Therefore, sometimes it is the system that creates problems. --- LCV Secretary for Production.

Mechanisms for Dealing with Corruption

Interviews with senior technical staff, local government leaders, and OWC officers, as well as FGDs with extension workers and farmers revealed a number of mechanisms for dealing with corruption in agricultural extension. These range from reactive/curyative mechanisms such as interdiction to warning letters followed by suspension of suspected corrupt officials. Others include termination of contracts particularly for fraudulent suppliers, transfer of errant technical staff, and arrest and prosecution of corrupt beneficiaries of OWC inputs. One of the RDCs summarised it as:

We have an elaborate monitoring system. Monitoring government programmes is the core function of the office of the RDC. Should we find any incident of misuse of funds; not only agricultural funds, we involve other arms like the IGG, DISO and the GISOs to follow up cases of corruption. At the district, we have the OWC Committee whose sole purpose is ensuring that there is no attempt of corruption in the disbursement of the inputs. --- RDC Respondent

The preventive mechanisms that were reported by a cross-section of respondents included: use of National Identification Cards to identify the right beneficiaries, vigilance, sensitisation and communication on notice boards and other channels, peer appraisals among technical staff and by supervisors, monitoring and supervision, and blacklisting of corrupt suppliers and other service providers. The involvement of UPDF soldiers (with stringent Standing Orders of Procedure) has also been reported as a preventive measure since soldiers are respected and feared.

The use of soldiers is helping a bit. They often help us to arrest corrupt officials and farmers and hand them over to police. --- SAS Respondent-Kamuli District.
Similar sentiments were shared about military officers bringing in some practical interventions to control corruption in agricultural extension service delivery. One of the District OWC Officers had this to say:

*There is a supplier, a lady who was supposed to bring cocoa in 2015. The good thing is that I was there when the vehicle arrived. The lady claimed there were 30,000 cocoa seedlings on the track. I told her 'you want to cheat'. When she insisted, I demanded that they offload as we count one by one. In the end they were 2,900 seedlings only. I ordered her to pack her cocoa and go away. She did not like it.* – OWC Officer Respondent.

In a separate interview, one of the CAOs corroborated the report above saying

*Corruption is not very high because OWC officers are seriously on the ground.* – CAO Respondent.

**Challenges to controlling of corruption**

During interviews and FGDs, many respondents were hesitant to provide answers on how the corruption is being dealt with in their areas. They were more eager to cite the numerous corruption tendencies but very cautious at identifying control mechanisms in place. It was evident that the actors who are supposed to prevent the corruption do not have any control over it. For example, the SAS have no control over the procurement and distribution processes for the agricultural inputs. The farmers who are directly affected by the corruption tendencies were evidently resigned. They have given up. If corruption escapes the institutional mechanisms, the average farmer has nothing to do about it. Citizens have not been empowered to fight corruption.

Asked what they did about the numerous corruption tendencies and practices related to extension services, the numerous actors from different parts of the country had not done anything about the corruption and did not seem to know what they can do about it. They responded thus:

*There is completely nothing we can do about it, because we don’t have the capacity.* – Male Farmer – Gulu District.

*Where should we report them when the offenders are the authority?* – Woman Farmer – Mukono District.

*We got tired and resigned. We keep quiet.* – Male Farmer – Kabarole District.

*Much of the corruption is done at the center where big procurements take place. So, some of us have no control.* – SAS – Kabarole District.

*In some cases, corruption is in the blood.* – DPO Respondent.

*Corruption is part and parcel of society. Wherever you go, once there is democracy, there will always be corruption.* – CAO Respondent.
The measures are in place, but if you have not got somebody red-handed, it is difficult to prosecute them. This is because you must have some evidence you can use to charge and convict somebody. --- District OWC Officer.

Summary

The prevalence of corruption in agricultural extension services was widely reported across all districts. The main form of corruption is related to management of agricultural inputs distributed under the OWC intervention. Other forms of corruption are related to extension workers soliciting money from farmers and to the government system that is in place to improve efficiency in budget preparation, execution and financial reporting. What is more worrying is that there are a number of mechanisms for dealing with corruption in agriculture extension, however, we could not find any evidence that these mechanisms are implemented in nine out of the ten districts involved in this study. It is clear that citizens are not empowered to fight corruption, and as result many have given up on fighting the vice.

4.6 Accountability

[Desired Outcome: Mechanisms are in place to ensure that public agricultural extension duty bearers give account for their work and sanctions are applied where needed]

Agriculture is a largely private venture with government playing an enabling role through agricultural extension services. Thus the accountability relations have mostly involved the participatory roles of the farmers (beneficiaries) in resource utilisation as well as the reporting functions of the office bearers. To assess accountability in agricultural extension, the study sought to establish the existence of evidence on reporting between the different levels of government; evidence of accountability monitoring and supervision as well as adherence to established guidelines of accountability (enforcement of sanctions given the lack thereof).

Table 8: Evidence of Accountability at District Level in Agricultural Extension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Tororo</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of district reporting on performance in provision of Agricultural Extension services in a public forum e.g. Barazas, District Budget Conference, Community meetings/dialogues</td>
<td>☒ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of at least one quarterly monitoring and supervision visit by the DPO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of submission of quarterly monitoring and supervision report to MAAIF and MoFPED</td>
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</table>
### Accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Toro</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luweero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of sanctions enforced against any office bearer for non-compliance with accountability guidelines for providing Agricultural Extension</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of stakeholders witnessing delivery of agricultural inputs</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
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<td>✗</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: ✓ evidence seen  ✗ No evidence seen.  □ Documents not accessed

The study findings Table 8 show mixed performance on this particular assessment. While most of the study districts (eight out of ten) undertook accountability monitoring and supervision visits in the reference period, majority of them did not have evidence of stakeholders witnessing the delivery of agricultural inputs. While there was no evidence of sanctions being imposed for non-compliance with accountability guidelines in most districts, this can either be taken to mean an absence of corruption tendencies or absence of proper records on the actions taken. These results are further discussed in the subsequent sections.

### Accountability Mechanisms in Agricultural Extension

The mechanisms of accountability in agricultural extension are strongly interlinked with the platforms available for transparency (specifically those for access to information) as well as participation. The policy changes that resulted into the disbandment of the NAADS structures at local government level have limited the accountability interactions between the farmers and the district agricultural staff. Initiatives such as the farmers' forums used to organize farmers in groups and this would make it easy for the district to share information with the farmers.

In the absence of the farmers’ forums, there are limited platforms that farmers can use to voice out their concerns. The radio was reported by both the farmers and the district technical staff as one of the most reliable accountability channel. In FY 2015/16, Kabarole’s production department reported to have attended 13 radio talk shows to create awareness around agricultural extension issues. With dedicated airtime offered to the district staff, the District Production staff have utilized this as an opportunity to not only share information with farmers, but also receive some feedback from farmers. Farmers often call in and express their grievances which the District Production Office staff respond to. This has worked effectively, since it provides real time feedback to the farmers that call in. However, there is also a high likelihood of some farmers being excluded, if they cannot call in or they are not listening-in at a given time.

It was also reported that there are no clear grievance handling mechanisms for the extension workers. In Gulu for example, extension workers reported having a chance to voice their concerns during their annual appraisals. It was reported that the appraisal form included a column for one to indicate their challenges and concerns. Most Extension workers utilize production departmental meetings and council sittings (when called upon) as opportunities to voice their concerns. However, as one of the
extension workers pointed out, this only works for those that are brave enough to raise the concerns amidst their superiors.

*We do not have where to channel our concerns except in such forums. But call all of us in a departmental meeting, none of us can say anything because there is an agenda and we follow that agenda. In a meeting, people will shy away and fail to tell the DPO that they receive quarter one funds in quarter two and for that reason we need to be open because we are not in court. This is a chance for us to air our concerns.* — Extension Worker – Kamuli District.

At the sub-county level, the same situation prevailed with extension workers indicating that they utilize the sub-county technical planning meetings. Still at this level, the same limitations apply as elaborated above.

**Accountability Monitoring and Reporting**

The technical and political wings of the district leadership indicated that they had undertaken accountability monitoring and supervision. This is done on a quarterly basis where accountability issues are identified and dealt with. In some instances it was reported that these monitoring and supervision visits are used as opportunities to establish whether agricultural extension workers are reporting to their duty stations. To this effect, attendance registers have been instituted and are checked to monitor the extension workers.

*We also check in the attendance book at the sub-county to see whether our extension staff do the work or are ever on duty, you know we have been facing a challenge with our extension staff, people have been complaining that they are never in the field claiming they have no transport. So we always remind them that they agreed to work in those areas so they should do so.* — LCV Secretary for production.

In Mbarara and Gulu districts where evidence of sanctions was observed (see Table 8 above), this was in line with absconding from duty. Reports from these monitoring visits form the basis for some of the decisions taken by the district councils as well production departments in the delivery of extension services.

In addition, extension workers also reported they undertook monitoring visits of their own to support farmers as well as understand the challenges the farmers face. However, in some of the districts, these reports were not acted upon whenever they were submitted.

*I will say this but I don’t think they are given time but for purposes of answering, we write quarterly reports and we note the challenges encountered and we submit those reports and they’re compiled and filed somewhere.* — Extension Worker – Kamuli District.

The lack of evidence of the reports being discussed suggests that the process is ineffective. This however is not limited to the extension workers. There was no evidence of feedback from central government on the issues raised in the quarterly progress reports submitted. The absence of the feedback has left the reporting elements of accountability ineffective.
Accountability in the delivery of inputs

In the delivery of inputs, local governments are expected to follow standard criteria to ensure that the inputs reach the intended beneficiaries. However, throughout the consultations, the study team did not come across the criteria used to ensure that agricultural inputs reach the intended beneficiaries. Additionally, there was no redress mechanism for the intended beneficiaries that missed out on receiving the inputs. This has left many intended beneficiaries with unsettled grievances which is a major accountability gap.

Upon delivery, various stakeholders at the sub-counties are supposed to acknowledge receipt of the inputs. These stakeholders vary across the districts including SAS, extension workers, RDCs, and farmers. In some districts like Nebbi, a designated store keeper was also part of the delivery process and was answerable in case the inputs delivered were less than what was received from the supplier.

Acknowledging receipt includes signing a receipt voucher by those stakeholders present. However, extension workers in Kamuli expressed concerns that the voucher provides no room for them to provide any comments on the nature of inputs delivered.

When inputs are delivered at the sub-county, the form that they come with has nowhere I can comment. I can only count and verify the figures and sign my name. The form has questions like how many bags came of maize? They were 277. Did you count them and they were 277? Yes. Sign your name here and your title. --- Extension Worker - Kamuli District

It was also observed that there are limited accountability procedures that govern the interaction between the private suppliers of agricultural inputs and the districts. Where they exist, they are not standardized and as a result they are ineffective in some instances. There are reports of cases of poor quality inputs rejected by the farmers being left at the sub-counties and not taken back by the suppliers. It was unclear whether the respective suppliers were paid for those deliveries or not.

In line with that, the extension workers expressed concerns that they have sometimes acknowledged receipt of inputs of poor quality – suggesting that they should be allowed to review the quality of the inputs and send a report at a later date. This report would then form the basis for paying the suppliers. This was seen as an additional layer of accountability from the suppliers to the farmers and the districts.

These reports however have to be acted upon for the above suggested measure to be effective. A case of an ignored due diligence report was highlighted in one of the districts where the extension worker felt powerless to deal with a supplier of poor quality seedlings – as they were instructed to distribute the inputs regardless of the quality.

I happen to be the person who was assigned the duty by the District Agriculture Officer, to verify the nurseries. I wrote a report and submitted it. Despite agreeing with a given supplier on the quality of inputs, they supplied the worst they had in my sub-county. So I got a call and they said you give out that coffee and I said no problem, provided I can write
there is no problem. The person who would have checked on me is the one saying give out, I gave out. So, what am saying is that we don’t have powers; even those who certify do not have powers. --- Extension Worker
– Kamuli District

Such situations suggest existence of undue influence from some of the stakeholders in agricultural extension. The system thus needs to have in place measures and procedures that can proof it from such weaknesses in accountability.

Summary

Accountability remains weak in the delivery of agricultural extension services. Accountability relations between the farmers and the districts have been negatively affected by the absence of the farmers’ forums. There are limited platforms that farmers can utilize to hold the duty bearers accountable. The same accountability constraint existed between the district staff and the suppliers of agricultural inputs.

4.7 Effectiveness and Efficiency

[Desired Outcome: Agricultural extension resources such as funds are optimally utilized to meet set targets and agricultural resources such as inputs reach their intended beneficiaries]

In assessing effectiveness and efficiency, emphasis was mainly placed on analyzing access to extension services, value for money in service delivery as well the process of delivering agricultural inputs. In particular, the assessment of the input delivery process takes into account aspects of adequacy, quality, timeliness of the inputs delivered as well as their consistency with the requests or input needs expressed by the farmers.

As pointed out in the definition of the governance principles, effectiveness is about meeting targets, while efficiency is about the utilization of funds to attain the targets. Table 9, summarises the performance of the study districts across the indicators identified under effectiveness and efficiency in agricultural extension service delivery. The indicators focus on governance process in reviewing agricultural performance by both the technical and political arms of government.

Table 9: Evidence of Effectiveness and Efficiency in Agricultural Extension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness and Efficiency</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Toro</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Holma</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of district review of Agricultural production</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
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<td>☑</td>
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<td>☑</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence of at least two council meetings discussing Agricultural production</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of utilisation of the production and marketing grant transferred to the district</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: ☑ evidence seen ☒ No evidence seen. □ Documents not accessed.
From Table 9, it is noted that majority of the district councils reviewed performance of agricultural production (and agricultural extension)\textsuperscript{15}. Majority (6 out of 10) of the districts visited had no evidence of reviewing agricultural production in their areas of jurisdiction. This finding highlights gaps in the record keeping of the respective districts.

**Effectiveness and Efficiency in Funding**

The District Production and Marketing Grant is to facilitate agricultural extension service provision at local government level. Based on the evidence available, the levels of its utilization were only established in five of the ten study districts. This was mostly down to record keeping issues as well as limitations in the access to information at some of the local governments. These have critical implications for transparency in agricultural extension – a tenet discussed extensively under the transparency findings.

Where evidence on the utilization (absorption capacity) of the production and marketing grant was available, it indicated high levels of utilization. In addition, the impact of the absence of evidence on the utilization of the grant on the report findings was mitigated by examining the quarter two (2) progress reports for FY 2016/17 submitted to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.

**Figure 6: Utilisation Levels of the Production and Marketing Grant for selected study districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Utilization Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tororo</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwero</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoima</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebbi</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soroti</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Quarter 2 progress reports for the respective districts*

Whereas these were available, it was established that the grant had an average level of utilization of about 78% by the end of the second quarter of financial year 2016/17. With the exception of Soroti whose performance was below average, most of the districts had utilized more than three quarters of the cumulative amount of the production and marketing grant they received.

\textsuperscript{15} Agricultural extension issues are usually discussed during the review of agricultural production.
The high level of absorption capacity of the grant notwithstanding, the level of funding was reported to be very inadequate. It is notable that the production and marketing grant to all districts in Uganda in financial year 2016/17 increased by 67.3% from the funding in financial year 2015/16. However most of this increment was a wage provision (an additional 22.73 Billion UGX) for the recruitment of additional extension workers. The number of extension workers has risen from 1,261 in 2014 to 3,062 by end of June, 2017. Despite this major improvement in recruitment, the Extension worker: farmer ratio is still far from the desirable level. As of June 2017, the Extension Worker: farmer ratio stood at 1:1800 instead as opposed to the targeted 1:500 by MAAIF\textsuperscript{16} - a challenge emphasized by one of the study respondents:

\begin{quote}
One of the major challenges we face is not having extension services reach the farmers on time. At the sub-county we have an agricultural officer who is shared with another sub-county so at times when farmers need his services he may not be available. --- SAS Respondent –Tororo District.
\end{quote}

The available extension workers are poorly facilitated in undertaking their duties. In financial year 2016/17, the non-wage recurrent component of the production and marketing grant which among other things is meant for facilitating the extension workers to provide advisory services reduced by UGX 7.71 Billion from the FY 2015/16 funding levels. Going by the FY 2017/18 draft estimates of revenue and expenditure as well as the IPFs for the local governments, the production and marketing grant for non-wage funding levels have not increased from the 2016/17 levels.

Consultations with district production offices indicated that local governments are required to raise the resources to facilitate the extension workers from local revenue.

\begin{quote}
The challenge now is facilitation of district staff and sub-county staff because according to the standing procedures, districts must identify those resources and this is very hard. --- DPO Respondent.
\end{quote}

The meager nature of the local revenue which has many competing service delivery needs of the districts has resulted into many district production offices not receiving any facilitation for extension. It was observed that unlike under NAADS, sub-counties no longer receive any grants from central government for the purposes of facilitating agricultural extension. Thus, in the absence of local revenue facilitation, there is no facilitation for agricultural extension services at sub-county level.

Farmers therefore end up having to bear some (and in some cases, all) of the burden of facilitating the extension workers in order to obtain services – turning a service that is meant to be freely provided into a paid service. As one of the respondents highlights below, some of the costs borne by the farmers are along lines of transport as well as compensation for the extension workers’ time/service.

\begin{quote}
You pay for the fuel and allowance of the extension worker to provide extension service to you in your garden. --- Female Farmer - Hoima District.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Drawn from the presentation by the Director of DAES, MAAIF on strategies for effective agricultural extension delivery in district local governments at the OWC Workshop held on 6\textsuperscript{th} – 7\textsuperscript{th} July, 2017
The funding constraints were also reported to have limited the use of demonstration farms as well as the monitoring visits from the production office to support and supervise the extension workers. This has also further exacerbated the absence of extension workers from their duty stations and resulted into limited provision of advisory services.

The limitations of funding for extension services at local government have therefore largely contributed to the ineffectiveness observed in the process of providing advisory services. Many farmers reported to have received seeds without any guidance on how to get the best out of the improved seeds. In the absence of facilitation, it was indicated that many farmers go very long periods without receiving advisory services. This was highlighted as one of the reasons behind the low levels of germination of the inputs provided to farmers, thereby limiting the levels of efficiency (value for money) associated with inputs delivery.

**Effectiveness and Efficiency of Inputs Supply and Delivery**

It is important to point out that the inputs delivery process has had some gains especially in providing improved crop varieties/seeds to the farmers. The procurement, supply and delivery of agricultural inputs accounts for the largest share of the agricultural sector budget. The process (from procurement to delivery and receipt) has largely been characterized with ineffectiveness and efficiency. As pointed out in the strategic vision section, the process of identifying the improved crop varieties/seeds to be supplied has often not been consistent with the needs in the respective districts.

**Delivery and Distribution of inputs**

The Standing Orders of Procedure for OWC require the beneficiaries of agricultural inputs to have *adequate land*, *have a ready to plant garden (at correct spacing, planting holes with manure and weed-free)*, *be ready to take and plant the inputs allocated*, and *have interest and experience in managing the allocated inputs*. This criteria is however unclear. For instance, it does not specify the acreage that constitutes “adequate land”. In addition, it is difficult to measure a given farmer’s “readiness to take and plant” the inputs provided.

Concerning the inputs that are delivered, it was observed that there was no consistent use of a criterion for identifying beneficiaries of the agricultural inputs. While the OWC Officers reported the existence of a specific criteria that takes into account the acreage that a given farmer has, this was not consistently used by the sub-county officials in selecting the beneficiaries. In many instances, farmers were simply asked to register for particular crops and those that received the information are the ones that ended up on the list. Some farmers reported to be excluded on the basis of long distances between their homes and the sub-county headquarters where the registration was undertaken.

In the absence of the farmers’ fora, there was no specific mechanism for effectively identifying the farmers. There was also no standard mechanism for ensuring that the agricultural inputs reach the intended beneficiaries. Thus being registered as beneficiary was not a guarantee that one would receive the inputs. The distribution
was in some cases reported to have been on ‘first-come-first-serve’ basis. This was consistently expressed by both the farmers and the extension workers.

Right now farmers are waiting because when you wake up in the morning you will see a lorry and those near the sub-county would benefit. Whoever comes first will take everything. If there is a passion fruits lorry I will call the DISO and whoever comes first will take. So really farmers are not involved. --- Extension Worker - Mbarara District.

I got banana suckers by coincidence; I had gone to the sub-county and found people receiving suckers. I also received in the name of another person who was not present at the time. --- Female farmer - Kamuli District

The delivery of the agricultural inputs was reported to have been largely characterized by delays. This has often resulted into farmers receiving inputs after the planting seasons (rainy seasons) have passed. Many of the supplied inputs were reported to have dried up or failed to germinate. While there have been improvements in the timely delivery of the inputs in some areas, all the districts generally reported delays in the delivery of the inputs – the distance from the center notwithstanding.

The timeframe is another bigger challenge. Farmers complain of late delivery of the seedlings. For instance its’ currently raining but the OWC guys will begin distribution after three months when it’s heavily shining. This is the reason why in some places the technologies distributed to farmers have not been germinating. --- CAO Respondent

We told our husbands to accept and pick the cassava cuttings delivered late in December which is a total dry season here just because of the sacks that we will empty and use for our other purposes. --- Female farmer – Nebbi District.

These findings on the delivery and distribution of inputs are consistent with some of the findings in the report of the parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, Animal, Industry and Fisheries on the implementation of the OWC programme. The report highlighted the late delivery of inputs in the districts of Agago, Oyam and Nebbi.

Quality and Quantity of Agricultural Inputs

The supply of improved agricultural inputs to the farmers is one of Uganda’s main strategies for improving agricultural production. Consultations with the farmers revealed numerous complaints on the quantity and the quality of the seed delivered in the area. Despite the large proportion of the agricultural sector budget being allocated to the purchase and delivery of inputs, the inputs delivered have been inadequate.

Sometimes I do not have seedlings and the government brings very little, you can only manage having to get two kilograms of maize or beans which cannot be enough for your acreage of land that you have prepared. Recently only two sacks of cassava cuttings where brought to serve the entire sub-county and at the end only two people from each village managed to get. --- Female Farmer – Luwero District.
The discussion on the adequacy of the agricultural inputs leaves one important question; are the inputs meant for everyone? Consultations with the NAADS, MAAIF and OWC staff revealed that priority is meant to be given to low income household. However, it is important to note that seven out of every ten households in rural Uganda are considered as either poor or vulnerable to poverty. Most of the households in rural Uganda where agriculture is the main source of livelihood are classified as low income. This puts a lot of pressure on the limited resources available for the supply of inputs and further emphasizes the need to have a standard criteria for determining beneficiaries.

The quality of inputs supplied was also reported as a major challenge. This was noted among all the respondents ranging from the farmers to the technical staff at the districts.

"I recently planted certified maize seed but if you look at the outcome from the maize which is Longe 10 in the garden, each seed grew in its own way, it is like this is a collection for various seed varieties and yet they say it is Longe 10. So it is like the seeds they certify are not really good."

Male Farmer – Kabarole District.

In line with the quality of inputs, the quality assurance constraints have also filtered through to affect the quality of the agro-chemicals on the market – which was also reported to be very poor in all the study districts. Many farmers reported having bought counterfeit agro-chemicals which were not effective in dealing with the weeds as well as pests and diseases.

The poor quality of the supplied inputs points to significant gaps in the quality assurance procedures in the inputs purchase, supply and delivery processes. It was noted that quality assurance is undertaken at national level and verification done at local government level, while the inputs are being delivered. The quality assurance mandate in MAAIF is under the Department of Crop Inspection and Certification, specifically undertaken by the National Seed Certification Services (NSCS). The department faces significant resource (human and financial) constraints that perhaps explain the proliferation of poor quality seed on the market.

In addition to the funding inadequacies, it was noted that the department’s non-wage budget (meant for the facilitation of the department’s work) reduced from UGX 1.5 Billion in FY 2016/17 to UGX 1.02 Billion in FY 2017/18. The Wage budget remained constant across these two years at UGX 0.4 Billion, implying that no further additions will be made to the staff numbers. The wage budget is of particular concern because as Naluwairo and Barungi (2014) point out, the NSCS is operating with a 70 per cent staffing gap for seed inspectors. Furthermore, the national seed testing laboratory had one seed sampler who also doubled as the seed analyst. These resource constraints significantly contribute to the poor quality seed on the market as numerous seed fields planted for certification end up on the market without being inspected.

At local government level, the seed quality challenges that characterise the seed that is supplied are often not dealt with because the quality assurance at this level is only characterised by verification of quantities and physical inspection. Thus the only
inputs likely to be rejected are those that have compromised physical properties such as those that are withered or dry.

The District Agricultural Officer doesn’t go to verify things from the source and is forced to accept the quality in his office. So basically, we are looking at the appearance and say we are looking at phenotype at a later stage where things have already grown. You certify them before they are planted and only to find out the quality was bad after planting.

--- Extension Worker – Kamuli District.

Verifying crops such as citrus is very difficult to do at seedling stage. Extension workers pointed out that all the varieties bear similar physical properties which makes it hard to tell them apart when they are seedlings. It’s upon maturing that the farmers and the extension workers begin to tell the difference – which if it is different from what was expected represents years wasted.

You cannot identify citrus just at seedling stage, you have to know the mother garden where those seeds came from but even the people who brought these things will tell you anything because now, the expert to verify that this is a ‘hamuli’ variety or ‘Washington’ variety cannot do it, unless it matures, it fruits and then they say, ‘oh this is navel now’, when it is too late. --- Extension Worker - Kamuli District.

The need to know the mother/seed gardens or nurseries further lends credence to the argument that procurement of the inputs should be decentralized and sourcing done from gardens within the districts. In addition to easing quality assurance, it will also further ensure that farmers obtain seed that is good for their respective soils but also create opportunities for farmers to commercially supply the inputs.

**Mechanisms in place to improve Effectiveness and Efficiency**

In order to improve effectiveness and efficiency, the study districts reported putting in place some mechanisms. It was reported across all the study districts that the technical departments jointly undertake monitoring visits with their political counterparts from the District Council. These monitoring visits are constrained by resources, but on average they were reported to have been undertaken at least once every quarter. In the course of the monitoring visits, agricultural extension issues are identified and discussed both in the Council meetings as well as the Technical Planning Meetings. From table 9, it was noted that seven out of the ten study districts had evidence of at least two Council sittings to discuss agricultural issues.

Faced with the quality issues elaborated in the preceding sections, some of the District Councils had passed ordinances to deal with their agricultural challenges. For instance, some districts reported to have passed ordinances to deal with fake inputs.

We passed an ordinance against sell of fake farm implements. It is with the Attorney General now. It is a legislative measure which is part of our work as the Council. If a person is found with fake things being sold, we have outlined the penalties and once the Attorney General endorses it we shall have one of the best laws for fighting fake seeds, fake farm implements and the like. --- LCV Chairperson Respondent
Legislative measures represented minimum cost solutions to the challenges districts faced and could improve on the regulation of agricultural inputs. The only costs envisaged in this were the enforcement costs which are also envisaged to be minimal as they are within the remit of the mainstream law enforcement systems.

Summary

The effectiveness and efficiency of governing agricultural extension expenditure was greatly constrained by the limited funding that the sector allocated to functions of quality assurance. The resultant proliferation of poor quality inputs onto the market was cascaded to the local government level which had limited capacity to test the quality of the inputs. Without assuring the quality of the inputs, the value for money could not be guaranteed. This perhaps explains why despite the large volume of funds allocated towards the provision of inputs, the sector has registered limited improvement in production.

These quality challenges were further exacerbated by the high extension worker: farmer ratios which limit the availability of advisory services. However, some internal solutions, such as, the ordinances passed in some District Councils suggest cost-effective measures that are within reach of the districts.

4.8 Responsiveness

[Desired Outcome: Providers of district agricultural extension services solicit and respond to feedback from farmers]

Responsiveness is a process that entails the means, and the extent to which government officials react to the issues raised by citizens. According to the FGDs, and key informant interviews of technical and political leaders, farmers raise concerns about extension services by directly approaching the extension staff and LCI, calling in during radio programs, local meetings, writing letters and making phone calls directly to district officials. Districts utilize sub-county extension officers, and LCI as primary means of communicating information back to farmers. Feedback on issues is done at local meetings, field visits and social gatherings at churches and funerals. Other mechanisms of communicating information included radio programs and announcements, displaying of information on notice boards and public rallies.

Table 10: Evidence of responsiveness at district offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
<th>kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Toro</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of resolutions taken by Council on issues raised by citizens on Agricultural Extension (through petitions, letters, complaints etc.).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of the implementation of resolutions passed by Council on Agricultural Extension issues raised by citizens.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of the DPO’s Office receiving complaints from Citizens on Agricultural Extension.</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public Expenditure Governance In Uganda’s Agricultural Extension System

Responsiveness

Evidence of DPO’s Office responding to the complaints received from citizens on Agricultural Extension.

Existence of clear procedures/ guidelines for Citizens to request for information on agricultural extension services.

Key: ☑ evidence seen  ❌ No evidence seen.  □ Documents not accessed.

Table 10 above offers the evidence of how districts respond to issues on agricultural extension services. Generally districts respond poorly to issues on agricultural extension as evidenced by zeros scores on many of the practices that track responsiveness. Hoima performed best showing evidence on three practices out of five. Five districts including Gulu Nebbi in the north eastern and Mbarara, Kabalore in the west and Luweero in the central showed no indication of responding to citizen complaints. While Hoima, Gulu and Kamuli districts showed evidence of resolutions taken by Council on issues raised by citizens, none exhibited any implementations of these resolutions. Responsiveness of district staff was shown in Tororo and Hoima districts where evidence shows the DPO had addressed complaints from farmers.

While the poor performance was a concern, the FGDs indicated that the majority of the farmers interacted more closely and frequently with Community Development Officers and extension workers regarding issues that affected them; which could explain the above outcome. It is quite possible that in several of the districts, a lot of the issues were addressed by these technical officers before they got to the district and the DPO. Also the poor scores by districts could be attributed to the mechanism of communication. Again in several FGDs and interviews farmers in various districts appeared to raise complaints through the radio programs in which the DPOs and extension officers were participating and could respond to their issues.

No doubt, FGDs and interviews offered more insights into how district officers respond. For example, in some districts, the LCV chairpersons alluded to the fact that they used LCIIIIs, sub-county chiefs, parish chiefs, and extension staff to deliver and get concerns from farmers. That information reached the DPO’s office and was shared with different for a and committees.

The responsiveness of district officers is shown by discussing the issues, devising solutions and communicating back to the farmers. For instance, one of the DPOs notes that:

*When issues are raised by the citizens, they are normally brought forward by councillors, to the production department through the production committee where some councillors are members and discussed at length.*

In certain situations, decisions are made to include them in the work plans. Another DPO stated that:

*When we get such issues from the citizens, we try to incorporate them in the plans of the district. Citizens’ views are actually what inform our plans and strategies for response.*
In other cases, the responsiveness of district staff decisions was indicated via actions that addressed the farmer concern such as providing technologies and building infrastructure. An example is a Women’s group in Tororo District which was in need of cassava cuttings and wrote a letter to the district requesting for these inputs. The district responded by sending them the cassava cuttings as needed. There were other cases of responsiveness to farmers’ issues reported in other districts:

*The first coffee we received was not good. It was very young, so people complained and we submitted our complaints as well. The centre tried to listen and worked upon our complaints, now quality has been improving.*

--- **Secretary for Production Respondent.**

Aside from providing information and infrastructure, district officials may respond by creating regulation to deal with certain extension related challenges affecting the farmers. In some districts, ordinances have been developed to deal with the poor quality of agricultural inputs.

Other concerns that indicated responsiveness by district officers related to the need for pesticides.

*There was a serious outcry of emergence of the coffee trig borer, that is a pest which attacks coffee, and we sat as a team and we consolidated. We gave ourselves a task, each extension worker to go and register the most affected parishes and we provided this information to UCDA (Uganda Coffee Development Authority) which culminated into UCDA giving us a chemical, 70 litres of the chemical to control the trig borer pest in coffee.*

--- **DPO Respondent.**

The extent to which these issues are addressed to provide appropriate response however depends on the capacity of the district staff to come up with suitable strategies and further ensure that the issues reach the district meetings to be incorporated into planning activities.

*How to translate issues into strategies to address them is the challenge for us, we are there as technical persons to advise. But some views come when work plans are already drawn and as you know we can only use the budgets to address their concerns, and resources are always limited, however there is prioritization. We consider more pressing issues, where resources allow but of course majority are left out due to limited resources.*

--- **DPO Respondent.**

Perhaps this might explain delayed response or why some complaints were not dealt with causing many farmers to become frustrated and doubt the system and actions of government.

The lack of responsiveness may also be attributed to a poorly functioning system where the technical staff tend to neglect farmer concerns.

Some farmers reported cases of being provided with the wrong input agricultural inputs whose production was not compatible with the environment.
The truth is our leaders are supposed to get back to us and hear our concerns and share them in the council at the district. But when they got there, they forgot some of their roles. For example these seedlings which are not solicited for would not have been brought to us. Sincerely speaking, bringing oranges to us here in Kikyusa where the soil does not favour oranges would not have happened when those councillors are there and they very well know the area where they come from. And even when you look for orange farmers here, they are not there. --- Male Farmer – Luwero District.

4.9 Equity

[Mechanisms are in place to ensure that agricultural extension services reach special interest groups such as women, youth and Persons with Disabilities]

To encourage effective participation and full benefits of extension services to all farmers, current policy documents (i.e. NDP II and extension policy) place importance on identifying and addressing constraints, needs and opportunities in structured and equitable manner that is inclusive of all vulnerable groups. Among vulnerable groups were particularly women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs). Having in place data, plans and resources directed to needs facilitated their potential in contributing to increased production and livelihood. Thus in assessing for equity we sought out evidence of disaggregated data by gender, age, and the implementation of extension services and programs targeting these groups.

Table 11: Evidence of equity practices at district local government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Kamuli</th>
<th>Soroti</th>
<th>Toro</th>
<th>Mukono</th>
<th>Mbarara</th>
<th>Hoima</th>
<th>Kabalore</th>
<th>Luwero</th>
<th>Gulu</th>
<th>Nebbi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of disaggregation of extension beneficiaries by gender.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>✕</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>✕</td>
<td>✕</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of disaggregation of extension beneficiaries by age category (youth/elderly).</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>✕</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of strategies and plans to improve equity in provision of extension services.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of implementation of strategies and plans to improve equity in agricultural extension.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☒</td>
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Key: ✔ evidence seen   ✕ No evidence seen.   ☐ Documents not accessed.

As shown in Table 11, there is a general of lack data relating to vulnerable populations in most of the districts except in Hoima, Tororo and Kabarole districts. This deficiency creates challenges for districts to pursue equity-based extension services geared to the development of their regions. Without this information, it becomes difficult to identify and take decisions on relevant issues, mobilize resources, develop and implement appropriate strategies and track progress in meeting these needs. Indeed findings from several FGDs and interviews revealed that while the district staff were
aware of the type of the vulnerable groups, they lacked means of identifying numbers of those in need, to later on design the relevant outreach programs. Nonetheless, most of the districts appeared to have strategies or plans for ensuring equity. This is mainly attributed to programs such as the youth livelihood program and women empowerment program that were initiated by the central government and pushed down to the districts. This work was unable to establish whether these programs were customized to district needs. The extent to which women and youth participated in their conceptualization is not known. Data from FGDs and KII offered detailed perspective of extension issues affecting vulnerable populations. We present and discuss these issues for each of the groups to show an insight of the strategies utilized and the challenges faced.

**Women**

The inability of women to own land makes them vulnerable to take advantage of the benefits of the extension services in the various districts. While land ownership is cultural norm as stated by farmers in Kamuli, Gulu, Kabarole, Nebbi and Soroti districts (both male and female), it limits a woman’s ability to farm. In certain cases where the inputs were provided men who own the land could assume control over such inputs.

> Women are marginalized when it comes to the issue of land ownership… you may find that that woman may receive inputs for one acre then the man may over power her and he takes the inputs. --- **Extension worker**

--- Kamuli District

Aside from land women lack voice and control in decision making as they lack women leaders on the committees in their communities.

> Women are not among the leaders so when it comes to receiving, men who are at the forefront have an advantage. Women are used as stepping stones which they use for accountability purposes. --- **Female famer**

--- Kamuli District

In certain communities, women are considered to have limited knowledge on agriculture, have poor leadership, inadequate skills or training and limited access to social services compared to the men. At times it is just outright discrimination of women since they are usually not the heads of the households.

> Women are discriminated by these programmes. When LC leaders are registering names of beneficiaries, they are not included on the list and are denied access to services. Men will also tend to access services on behalf of the women; men want to dominate, here men get advisory services on behalf of the family including women. --- **Male farmer**

--- Nebbi District

The above issues imply that the extension interests of women in agriculture may not be fully identified and met by the districts.
Youth

Evidence from the FGDs and interviews reveals the vulnerability of youth due to a lack of resources which extend from land, skill and finances. For instance youth farmers in some districts stated that

*In most cases we have no money to buy inputs for example for spraying tomatoes. We have nowhere to get 500,000/- to buy inputs for our gardens. We do not have where to cultivate. You find you are a married man who has no land so you beg other people for land for cultivation.* --- Youth Respondent – Kabalore District

*Our parents refuse to give us the land until they die, so what happens, you cannot plant coffee, they even ask you ‘where are you going to plant coffee?’ I don’t know, we don’t capture age on our forms because I have some forms here but there is, it is rare to find someone between the age of 18 to 25, coming to get coffee.* --- Extension Worker – Kamuli District

These deficiencies can limit the access and utilization of extension services when received. For instance a youth without access to land will not have where to plant the seed when he or she gets the technologies. However there was also a general negative perception that rendered youth as a high risk group. Generally, most of the farmers, district staff and the political leaders, told of youth being negligent and not working in agriculture. Instead the youth resort to activities such as gambling that generate quick money.

Elderly and PWDs

Elderly people are considered a highly vulnerable group in agriculture extension because of the assumption that they do not need such interventions. They are often ignored in the planning process and interventions based on presumption that they are being assisted by relatives that are beneficiaries of government programs.

*When it comes to delivery of inputs, the elderly are not considered. In the planning, they are not catered for among the beneficiaries. Other groups like youth, women, child headed households, are often catered for but it is not the case with elderly persons.* --- LCV Chairperson Respondent.

FGD discussions from some districts further expose these vulnerabilities revealing that often the elderly have already disposed of their agricultural land and can no longer engage in farming. The vulnerability of the PWDs relates to their inability to readily move to the various points of access to extension services. The mobility of people with disabilities is limited. However where outreaches occur, PWDs are ignored just like the elders. Farmers in some districts revealed that inputs are not given to the old including needy, PWDs in their communities. The justification for this denial is that they cannot work and also lack finance to hire labour. Other farmers cite the lack of special tools to facilitate farming in their gardens.

Equity related interventions and challenges faced by districts

Attempts to address the above equity issues have made districts turn towards the special government fund initiatives that support these groups. Scheme like Disability grants, Community Driven Development, were cited in some districts, while women
empowerment funds, and youth livelihoods funds were cited in most of the districts. They have specific provisions on agricultural production and marketing which are flexible depending on how creative the individuals/groups are. Some funds are accessed through groups particularly the women and youth. The disability council, youth council and women council at districts are ensuring that, part of these resources handle the beneficiaries’ agricultural needs.

However it is unknown as to how much is allocated for extension to deliver impact. The district production and extension officers cited several challenges with implementing these programs, among which is the lack of adequate transport means.

*Being a disabled secretary for production on a wheel chair, I require modest transport means to traverse the district including farmers’ fields which the district cannot provide at the moment due to resource constraint.*

--- LCV Secretary for Production.

There is limited human resource capacity at the district to facilitate proper outreach. District officers argued that staff working with and for the farmers is small in number and are not able to effectively handle the diverse farming communities. Furthermore the funds allocated to run the entire program are seemingly small with “conditions attached” with no option for reallocation making it difficult to address pressing needs not featured in the district plan and budget.

*The youth livelihood program and women entrepreneurship program are such new programs targeting the vulnerable groups, but how many groups benefit? Only one per Parish and when will it reach all? In other words, funding for these programs are insufficient to cause meaningful impact.* --- Female farmer – Hoima District.

Access to some of these schemes can be challenging. Youth farmers in some districts cited the case of access to the youth development fund which requires secondment from an elderly person. Accessing the fund can be difficult where death of parents or guardians has occurred or misunderstandings exist between the youth and elderly. There are also problems of diversion from the intended use.

*Youth apply for the funds when they are in a group of around 8-10 youths. They apply for about 8-10 million shillings. However, the majority of youth got the money. But some of them wanted to eat the money and ended up being arrested and jailed.* --- LCV Secretary Production

Some districts are encouraging communities to form SACCOs or groups so as to access funding from the sub-counties. This can be used to develop their own projects in the in their respective villages. However, with this mechanism the groups are scattered making extension outreach difficult amidst limited resources for agriculture.

Men are also being sensitized through various meetings, social events such as churches. Some districts have witnessed change and have observed women become more active in marketing activities and trade in markets. Other districts have taken advantage of radio talk shows where non-discriminative issues such as gender empowerment are discussed.
The study has assessed the governance of public expenditure in agricultural extension in Uganda. The performance was noted to be mixed across all the nine governance principles. While the recent reforms in the systems have had some immediate gains, major challenges still remain. Some of the major conclusions are summarized below along key themes.

**On Priority Setting:** Despite the recent nature of the policy changes, the sector priorities at local government level are consistent with the national plans and guidelines on agriculture. However, the prioritization and supply of agricultural input is inconsistent with the needs and ecology of the local governments. This is inconsistent with both the Agricultural sector Strategic Plan (2016) and National Agriculture Policy. The priority setting remains top down, even in deciding the inputs that the farmers need – no wonder there have been severe cases of mis-match between the inputs delivered and the needs of the farmers.

**On Coordination:** Proper coordination requires effective communication and harmonised actions between the key stakeholders involved in funding, planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation of the agricultural extension services. Evidence from government documents, both central and local governments, as well as the consultations suggests that the agricultural sector, particularly extension, was for years a beehive of programs and interventions operating in silos. The best practices of coordination are not utilized by most of the local governments in the delivery agricultural extension services. This perhaps can be best explained by the fact that despite coffee being the most distributed agricultural input in most regions, the UCDA has no known role in the procurement, supply, and distribution of coffee seedlings around the country.

**On agricultural inputs:** The procurement, supply, and delivery of inputs have severe challenges. The agricultural inputs supplied are inadequate and are not reaching the intended beneficiaries. This could be explained by the fact that there is no evidence of either a criterion for selecting beneficiaries, or a mechanism for ensuring that the inputs reach the intended beneficiaries.

Additionally, there are also major concerns on the quality of inputs being supplied and subsequently delivered. The quality assurance is severely constrained by resource constraints which have resulted into discrepancies between the inspected seed varieties and the varieties that end up on the market. At local government level, there is no capacity to verify the quality of the inputs being supplied, except for an assessment of their physical attributes. The quality of inputs being delivered, coupled with low levels of access to advisory services are the major reasons behind the poor rates of return associated with the distribution of inputs.

**On Participation:** The restructuring of the agricultural extension is devoid of farmer involvement which has caused farmers to wish for the NAADS days. While the farmers are cognizant of the challenges NAADS had, they are quick to point out that they had a voice – especially through their farmer groups. Most of the districts do not have
evidence of discussion of farmers and citizens’ views on agricultural extension in district meetings.

**On Accountability:** Overall, accountability remains weak in the delivery of agricultural extension services. Accountability relations between the farmers and the districts have been negatively affected by the absence of the farmers’ forums. Thus there are limited platforms that farmers can utilize to hold the duty bearers accountable. The same accountability constraint exists between the district staff and the suppliers of agricultural inputs.

The effectiveness and efficiency of governing agricultural extension expenditure is greatly constrained by the nature of priority setting and decision making. Without involving the intended beneficiaries of the service (farmers), the system continues to be ineffective.

In line with priority setting, there is limited funding that the sector allocates to functions of quality assurance. The resultant proliferation of poor quality inputs onto the market is cascaded to the local government level which has limited capacity to test the quality of the inputs. This greatly explains why despite the large increases in the agricultural sector budget in recent years, the sector continues to register negative levels of growth.

### 5.1 Recommendations

The paper makes the following recommendations to the major actors in the governance of public agricultural extension services i.e. central government and local government. Given the top-down nature of decision making, most of the actors specified herein are at central government level. However, all the recommendations are geared towards improving the governance of agricultural extension services at the district level.

**Central Government**

MAAIF needs to ensure that agricultural inputs distributed to farmers are in line with their respective agro-ecological zones. Currently, agricultural inputs such as seeds of crops that are deemed to be of strategic importance at national level are distributed to farmers regardless of whether their soils or climate or previous farming experience support their proper growth. This undermines effectiveness of agricultural extension services since it leads to low levels of germination and crop failure. Additionally, MAAIF needs to ensure that a standard criterion is used in identifying beneficiaries of the agricultural inputs distributed. This will enhance effectiveness by ensuring that inputs reach their intended beneficiaries.

MAAIF needs to consider decentralising the procurement of agricultural inputs. Currently, procurement of agricultural inputs is done centrally by the NAADS Secretariat. Movement of the inputs from Kampala to different districts all over the country has in some cases led to late deliveries and associated deterioration in the quality of inputs especially for vegetatively propagated crops hence undermining the effectiveness of agricultural extension services.
Additionally, MAAIF should consider adopting a voucher system for the distribution of inputs. The system has worked well in other African countries and would limit cases of mismatches between the inputs distributed and the farmers’ needs.

MAAIF needs to consider strengthening the quality assurance of agricultural inputs and improving upon regulation of agro-chemicals (pesticides). Currently, there is high proliferation of poor quality inputs and agro-chemicals on the market and this undermines effectiveness of agricultural extension services since some of the inputs distributed to farmers are of poor quality. The quality of agricultural inputs on the market can be improved through decentralisation of quality assurance for agricultural inputs to competent local government officials such as the District Agricultural Officer and fast tracking the finalisation of the National Seed Policy to guide the development of the seed sector and Seeds and Plant Regulations to operationalize the Seeds and Plant (2006).

MAAIF and MoFPED need to consider improving upon the prioritisation in the Agricultural Sector’s resource allocation. While the sector’s budget has increased greatly in the last three financial years, vital elements of the sector such as quality assurance of seed varieties on the market and facilitation of extension workers remain with crippling resource (human and financial) constraints. Allocating close to half of the sector’s budget to purchasing and distributing inputs without addressing these challenges will continue to result into negative growth of the sector.

MAAIF needs to consider restoring the functionality of farmer forums as a major avenue for farmers’ participation in decision making related to agricultural extension services. Currently, decision making relating to agricultural extension services is centralised with farmers and farmer forums having almost no role. This undermines farmers’ participation in key decision making processes relating to agricultural extension services and creates challenges of ownership and uptake of extension technologies and inputs.

The Operation Wealth Creation Secretariat together with MAAIF and the NAADS Secretariat need to consider conducting mass sensitisation in local governments about their roles in delivering extension services. The sensitisation should be conducted at district, Sub-county, parish and village levels using different media and forums. This will contribute to improving transparency in agricultural extension services and clear some of the misunderstandings and negative perceptions that farmers and some local government leaders harbour regarding the key agricultural extension actors at the national level.

MAAIF should ensure more predictability in agricultural inputs delivery timelines. The DPO and the District OWC Officer should ensure that this information trickles down to the farmers to enable them prepare their gardens in time, plant on time when the inputs are delivered and minimise reduction in quality of inputs due to unnecessary delays. Timely communication on delivery dates of inputs will improve transparency and effectiveness of agricultural extension services.

In order to improve coordination, OWC activities need to be integrated into the district department. This will ensure effective harmonization, coordination, as well as effective monitoring and evaluation of agriculture extension service delivery.
In addition, at the central government level, the Office of the Prime Minister needs to consider operationalizing the Uganda Development Forum by ensuring compliance of all the actors. This will help to improve both intra- and inter-sectoral coordination of the stakeholders involved in agriculture extension at the national level.

MAAIF in collaboration with parliament needs to fast track the enactment of the National Agricultural Extension Bill 2017 into law in order to institutionalize the restructuring of the Single Spine Agricultural Extension System and legalise changes in the institutional mandates such as those of NAADS.

**Local Government**

The Local Government CAOs need to intensively communicate to other district leaders on importance of the public display of information relating to agricultural extension. Intensive dissemination of information on public display of extension funding information to key district leaders such as the DPO and the SAS will contribute to more districts publicly displaying information on funding and inputs hence improving transparency of agricultural extension services.

The Local Government Councils need to consider allocating some local revenue to facilitate agricultural extension at sub-county level. In the absence of central government grants to the sub-county levels, allocating a proportion of local revenue to agricultural extension will greatly improve service delivery.
Bibliography


Semana A.R. 1999, Communication as a key to operationalisation of integrated Approach to rural development, Uganda Journal of Agricultural Sciences 4:1:27


ANNEX

Annex 1: Map showing agricultural production zones of Uganda

Source: Agricultural sector Strategic Plan
### Annex 2: Priority Commodities in Uganda’s agricultural zones mapped above

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