THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR
AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
SEMINAR REPORT
VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, 21-23 MAY 2004. RAPPORTEURS: MARK CHINGONO AND GUY LAMB
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Cover Photograph  
Rwanda, Kigali, June 1994: Troops of the United Nations mission in Rwanda at their base during the genocide which saw about 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis, murdered by Hutu extremists.  
Photo © Eric Miller
Acknowledgements

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About The Rapporteurs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pursuant to its vision and mission objectives of promoting peaceful conflict resolution in Africa, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Cape Town, South Africa, in collaboration with the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) offices in South Africa and Mozambique, and the United Nations Foundation (UNF) office in New York, organised a three-day policy seminar from 21 - 23 May 2004 in Cape Town. The meeting focused specifically on the interrelated and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security. Participants deliberated the merits of institutional reform of the United Nations (UN) – a pivotal actor in Africa’s security architecture – and considered a possible restructuring of its relationship with the African Union (AU) and Africa’s subregional organisations, specifically the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Seeking practical solutions and policy recommendations to these problems, participants discussed these issues based on a solid historical foundation and concrete case studies.

From the deliberations during the Cape Town seminar, it became clear that African conflicts have many causes which have roots in economic, political and religious processes, as well as ethnic divisions. The lack of social development and poverty are indeed the major causes of conflict on the continent, and in order to offset this, there is a pressing need for large-scale investment in human resources. At a political level, the “winner – takes – all” election system in many parts of Africa and the lack of democratic accountability also contribute to tensions and conflict. A long-term solution to African conflicts and the building of durable peace requires that the root causes of these conflicts be urgently addressed.

A wide range of policy recommendations was proffered by participants at the Cape Town seminar for consideration by the UN High-Level Panel set up in November 2003 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to assess present and future security threats and to deal collectively with these threats. Contained herein is a summary of these recommendations – the Cape Town Declaration of the New Partnership for Africa’s Security (NEPAS) – their rationale and possible ramifications. In contrast to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was devised by Africa’s heads of state, NEPAS is a civil society-driven process that seeks to define a new division of labour in Africa’s security and governance architecture and to complement NEPAD’s efforts in the development field.

1. Africa and the United Nations

In addition to discussions on the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, participants at the Cape Town meeting expressed concern over the new American doctrine of the unilateral, pre-emptive use of force. They deliberated on related threats to present and future security that are posed by weapons of mass destruction (it was noted that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France – now possess the largest stockpiles of these weapons), international terrorism, and international organised crime. The institutional reform of the UN Security Council, as well as the relationship between the UN, the African Union, and Africa’s subregional organisations was a recurrent theme of the seminar. It was felt that Africa needs stronger and more permanent representation on the 15-member UN Security Council, on which the continent currently has three seats which rotate among African states. Effecting change in the UN General Assembly and the Security
Council is, however, an extremely complex and difficult process that requires the consent of the most powerful members on the Council. Reform of the Council has remained stalled for the last decade.

The legitimacy of institutions is one of the key issues of the 21st century with which the UN High – Level Panel will have to grapple. This was reflected in the calls for institutional reform of the UN Security Council and of the relationship between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations. It was felt that there is a disturbing pattern towards centralisation of power in the hands of the Great Powers that effectively control the Council, rather than in the broader UN. If not arrested, this process could see the UN suffer the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which died in the late 1930s due to its ineffectiveness in responding to security threats posed by the ‘revisionist’ Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. In order to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, the UN Security Council must be urgently reconfigured to allow it to respond collectively to future security threats. Although there are more UN peacekeeping missions in Africa than anywhere else in the world (nearly half of the UN’s 45 post – Cold War interventions have been in Africa), expenditure per head on human security in Africa is far less than on other continents. However, as the deployment of British forces in Sierra Leone in 2000 suggests, forces from Western countries can make an important and constructive contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa. In order to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, the UN Security Council must be urgently reconfigured to allow it to respond collectively to future security threats. Although there are more UN peacekeeping missions in Africa than anywhere else in the world (nearly half of the UN’s 45 post – Cold War interventions have been in Africa), expenditure per head on human security in Africa is far less than on other continents. However, as the deployment of British forces in Sierra Leone in 2000 suggests, forces from Western countries can make an important and constructive contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Related to the under – funding of African peace missions are questions of who has the authority to mandate an intervention, and when intervention is justified. Are Africa’s regional organisations or the UN Security Council responsible? At a regional level, Africans have developed four criteria, through the African Union’s 15 – member Peace and Security Council, to underpin the duty to intervene – itself a significant departure from the OAU’s paralysing obsession with non – interference in the internal affairs of member states. Regional instability, genocide, gross violation of human rights, and the overthrow of constitutional governments will all justify intervention by an envisioned AU stand – by force to be established by 2010.

### 2. Human Rights and Civil Society

An effective strategic plan and vision for global peace and security requires that the UN adapt a new conception of international peace and security which promotes human security and “second generation” human rights. This broadened definition of human rights as “social justice” should complement the core principles of the international collective security system. The need to go beyond simply responding to conflicts and to engage effectively in conflict prevention and peacebuilding means that any strategic analysis of international peace and security must necessarily be multi – dimensional. In order to optimise opportunities for peace and development, key issues should be clearly defined and identified, and more public debate and interaction should be promoted. In particular, the debate on the relationship between “democratic governance” and “good governance” needs to be given greater attention. Civil society has an important role to play both in preventive early warning and in post – conflict reconstruction, and therefore its members should be recognised and strengthened. This could be achieved partly through peace education which inculcates values celebrating difference and diversity in education curricula. However, strengthening civil society should not undermine the centrality of state institutions which must also be supported.
3. Democratic Governance and Fair Trade

Democratic governance, and not merely “good”, efficient, or economic reform-minded governance, is an essential cornerstone of social justice, peace, and security in Africa. In order to achieve these goals, Africa’s regional organisations and the UN need to adapt a new model of development policy and action plan to promote respect for human rights and democratic empowerment. Similarly, future peacekeeping missions need to be sensitive to local cultures and traditions, and the start-up costs for economic, political, and social reconstruction need to be included in the mission’s estimated budget along with the costs of security forces. The inequitable distribution of resources, both locally and globally, is a major source of political instability and conflict. It is, therefore, important to put in place measures to ensure the equitable distribution of resources and to promote more equitable North-South trade. This could be facilitated through creating a conducive environment for domestic and international investment, equal access to international markets, cancelling Africa’s external debt, and directing efforts at incorporating the findings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in international economic policy, as well as revitalising stalled talks at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to reduce deleterious agricultural subsidies by the West which are harmful to Africa’s chief exports. Development is indeed an important condition for peace.

From left to right: Brig. Gordon Hughes, Mr. Bereng Mtinkulu, Dr. Roger Kibasomba and Prof. Rifaat Hussain.
4. Resources and Capacities

There is a pressing need to establish a proper division of labour between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organisations which need to be greatly strengthened. The UN had to take over peacekeeping duties from the AU and ECOWAS in Rwanda, DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, clearly underlining the financial and logistical weaknesses of Africa’s regional organisations. The UN Security Council has not done much to strengthen the capacity of regional peacekeepers and to collaborate effectively with them in the field. The Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping of August 2000 was curiously and disappointingly short of details on the subject of establishing an effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. An innovative approach to UN peacekeeping in Africa could centre on regional pillars supported by local ‘hegemons’ like Nigeria and South Africa whose political dominance of such missions is diluted by multinational peacekeepers from outside their regions. The willingness of Western peacekeepers, who have both the equipment and resources, to continue to contribute to UN missions in Africa remains important in this regard.

Institutional incapacity and inadequate resources have been major constraints to effective peacemaking and peacebuilding in post-conflict Africa. Therefore, institution building which should include adequate military and other forms of training of soldiers and civilians involved in peace operations, must also become an urgent priority in post-conflict reconstruction and development. One way of dealing with the problem of capacity and the resource gap might be to create space for the African Diaspora to contribute to peacebuilding and development in Africa, as the African Union is currently trying to do.

5. Present and Future Security Threats

Since 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, terrorism has become defined as the major threat to international peace and security and efforts to combat this phenomenon need to be strengthened. However, terrorism should not be unilaterally defined, and in particular, any opportunistic and self-centred definition of terrorism should be rejected in favour of a structural and more refined one. The route to ending terrorism entails halting the double standards which polarises international relations, for example, the issue of weapons of mass destruction, the largest stockpiles of which are in the hands of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Another related major threat to international peace and security is the continued existence of shattered societies in which the absence of law and order render collapsed states a possible haven for international criminals, gangsters, and terrorists. Thus, greater efforts should be directed towards rapid post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding of shattered societies.

In assessing threats to present and future security, the Cape Town policy seminar recommended the adoption of a broader view of international security that transcends the traditional state-centred view, and that encompasses human security, environmental degradation, and HIV/AIDS, among other issues. This new conception of security and its action plan should also promote human rights, civil society, gender equality, and democratic governance.
1. The UN and Africa’s Security Architecture

Pursuant to its vision and mission objectives of promoting peaceful conflict resolution in Africa, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Cape Town, South Africa, in collaboration with the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) offices in South Africa and Mozambique and the United Nations Foundation (UNF) office in New York, organised a three-day policy seminar from 21 – 23 May 2004 in Cape Town. The meeting focused specifically on the interrelated issues of political instability in Africa and international security. Participants deliberated the merits of institutional reform of the United Nations (UN) – a pivotal actor in Africa’s security architecture – and considered a possible restructuring of its relationship with the African Union (AU) and Africa’s subregional organisations, specifically the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Seeking practical solutions and policy recommendations to these problems, participants discussed these issues based on a solid historical foundation and concrete case studies.

African civil society activists, policymakers and military officers proffered a wide range of policy recommendations for consideration by the UN High-Level Panel set up in November 2003 by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to assess present and future security threats and to deal collectively with these threats. Contained herein is a summary of these recommendations – the Cape Town Declaration of the New Partnership for Africa’s Security (NEPAS) – their rationale and possible ramifications. In contrast to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was devised by Africa’s heads of state, NEPAS is a civil society-driven process that seeks to define a new division of labour in Africa’s security and governance architecture which will complement NEPAD’s efforts in the development field.

Africa’s security architecture is filled with potholes and landmines. Careful navigation is, therefore, essential for survival and success. This truism was vividly revealed in the many presentations that attempted to highlight different aspects of Africa’s security architecture during the Cape Town seminar. In response to concerns by several member states of the UN, the terms of reference of the UN High-Level Panel has been expanded, and the panel now takes a broader view of threats to collective security which includes human security. However, reconciling human security and state security, and the different strategic approaches to security, is a daunting task. Specifically, the panel is examining six broad baskets of issues:

1) Civil wars and large-scale violence
2) Inter-state threats and the use of force
3) Socio-economic issues, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS
4) Weapons of Mass Destruction
5) International terrorism and
6) International Crime

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1 Members include Robert Badinter, Joao Soares, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Mary Chinery-Hesse, Gareth Evans, David Hannay, Enrique Iglesias, Amr Moussa, Satish Nambiar, Sadako Ogata, Yeoryy Primakov, Qian Qichen, Naqs Sadik, Salim Ahmed Salim, and Brent Scowcroft. See UN Press Release, SG/A/857.
From the outset, it is important to note that the Cape Town policy seminar’s deliberations built on five initial recommendations that had earlier been made to the UN High - Level Panel. These were:

- Sovereignty involves the responsibility to protect citizens and entails obligations to the international community;
- Preventive and pre-emptive unilateral use of force by states has no basis in international law;
- Increased threats from terrorism can be combated effectively through collective security;
- Social and economic justice should be considered central to international stability and security; and
- International trade rules, which favour the United States and European countries, are destructive to Africa and intensify poverty which, in turn, has the potential to lead to violence and political instability.

Objectives of the Cape Town Meeting

The Cape Town Meeting was held in order to add African voices and perspectives to this deliberative process. The specific aims and objectives of the policy seminar were to make realistic policy recommendations that can feed into the work of the UN High - Level Panel. The broad terms of reference of the meeting were to:

1. assess threats to present and future international security;
2. suggest ways in which the UN can contribute to the peacemaking efforts of the AU and Africa’s regional organisations;
3. advise the UN on how it can best restructure its relations with these organisations;
4. provide African perspectives on restructuring the continent’s relations with the UN; and
5. develop a vision of partnership on international security.

From left to right: Prof. Mwesiga Baregu, Dr Cheryl Hendricks and Ms. Razaan Bailey.
Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture

Central to the non-viability of Africa’s security architecture is the discrepancy between the elaborate principles of its institutions and the harsh realities on the ground. For instance, since the Abuja agreement of 1991, Africa’s subregional organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), have been seen as the pillars of development, yet real development and stability remain elusive. Similarly, the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development have clear principles that emphasise peaceful conflict resolution, good neighbourliness, greater African solidarity, good governance, human rights, accountability, and linkages with civil society. Yet, violent conflict and insecurity still remain the defining feature of the politics in many parts of the continent. The same applies to the idea that a division of labour needs to be established between the United Nations and Africa’s regional organisations, while on the ground, there often is no co-operation among these organisations.

The UN’s peacekeeping experience in Africa and its interaction with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – now the African Union – and Africa’s subregional organisations is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the first four decades and a half of the UN’s existence, there was only one UN peacekeeping operation in Africa, namely the controversial Congo operation (1960 – 64). The UN only returned to Africa some 25 years later in 1989 when it oversaw South Africa’s military withdrawal from Namibia and supervised that country’s first democratic election. Over the next decade, a further 17 peacekeeping operations were undertaken by the UN in Africa. There were relative successes, such as Namibia (UNTAG) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ), but there were also spectacular failures such as Somalia (UNOSOM) and Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The African Union is looking to develop its own peacekeeping capacity by creating an African stand-by force by 2010 based on five subregional pillars. There have been limited examples of regional peacekeeping in the 1990s such as the involvement of SADC (represented by the armed forces of South Africa and Botswana) in the Lesotho crisis of 1998. ECOWAS has also intervened militarily in armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea – Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire in the decade of the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. Since the UN’s peacekeeping successes and failures are often contingent on the domestic, regional, and external dynamics of conflict situations, it is important to focus particularly on these factors in each case. One must pay particular attention to the politics of peacekeeping, and focus less on its technical and logistical constraints. While these technical and logistical deficiencies are often important, the existence of political consensus among key domestic, regional and external (particularly the powerful members of the Security Council) actors is often more significant in determining the success of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Challenges and Problems

African countries face multiple security threats, and yet do not possess sufficient capacities to deal with these threats. Institutional incapacity is the major constraint to designing a viable security architecture in Africa. Hence the desirability of regional integration, based on the interaction between subregional organisations and the African

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Union in which subregional organisations deal with security challenges in the first instance. In such a system, the AU will only intervene if the subregional organisations are unable to resolve conflicts in their subregions.

Another serious problem arises from the policy incoherence between the African Union and subregional organisations and among these organisations, an incoherence which often results in duplication of roles and waste of resources. In principle, the AU is the mandating authority for subregional organisations, but in practice, these organisations often take the initiative themselves, as did different missions of SADC states in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These problems further complicate the role of civil society groups which attempt to complement the efforts of these organisations.

Even when interventions have been launched, peacekeeping operations encounter a series of problems which include, for instance, having to change rules of engagement on the basis of cultural awareness and variation. The lack of early warning systems and the poor support rendered to African peacekeeping missions by the UN often contributes to the escalation of conflicts. Further, new doctrines of “regime change” and “good governance” can be manipulated to legitimise violent uprisings and armed rebellions. The unease generated by these doctrines is compounded by a disturbing pattern towards centralisation of power in the most powerful members of the UN Security Council. This process, if not arrested, could see the UN suffer the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which died in the late 1930s due to its ineffectiveness in responding to threats posed by the “revisionist” Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan.

A long-term strategy needs to be developed to address the root causes of conflict which involve economic injustice, poor governance, and lack of accountability. This strategy should focus on strengthening civil society activists who have contributed tremendously to peacemaking and democratisation efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Mali and Zambia. In short, there is need for more policy coherence, more equitable allocation of resources, and a more effective regional approach to conflict resolution efforts in Africa.

The Politics of Peacekeeping in Africa

There is a pressing need to establish a proper division of labour between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organisations, which need to be greatly strengthened. Rwanda’s Arusha agreement, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Lusaka accord, and the Algiers accords that ended the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, all clearly revealed the military weakness of the OAU/AU, whose members lacked the resources to implement agreements they had negotiated without UN peacekeepers. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the UN also had to take over peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS and from the AU mission in Burundi. The UN Security Council has not done much to strengthen the capacity of regional peacekeepers and to collaborate effectively with them in the field. The Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping of August 2000 was curiously and disappointing short of details on the subject of establishing an effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. The willingness of western peacekeepers, who have both the equipment and resources, to continue to contribute to UN missions in Africa remains important.

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3 This section is taken from Adekeye Adebajo, “Brothers In Arms? UN / ECOWAS Cooperation in Liberia and Sierra Leone”, paper presented at the Cape Town Seminar, May 2004.
The Ethiopia/Eritrea case in 2000 also provides an example of the potential of co-operation between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations. The UN and the OAU eventually co-operated in the deployment of peacekeepers to the Horn of Africa after the OAU had mediated an accord that the UN was asked to implement. After difficult experiences with ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group) in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990s, there remains great unease within the UN Security Council about working alongside regional peacekeepers. The UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Ethiopia/Eritrea and the crucial support of western governments for the UN operations in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Liberia, however, demonstrate the importance of external actors to peace processes in Africa.

The UN missions in Sierra Leone and Congo could signify an innovative approach to UN peacekeeping in Africa based on regional pillars supported by local ‘hegemons’ like Nigeria and South Africa whose political dominance of such missions is diluted by multinational peacekeepers from outside their regions. By placing regional forces under the UN flag, the hope is that the peacekeepers will enjoy the legitimacy and impartiality that the UN’s universal membership often provides, while some of the financial and logistical problems of regional peacekeepers can be alleviated through greater burden-sharing. These missions should also be more accountable, since the peacekeepers will have to report regularly to the UN Security Council. This might also force the Council to focus more attention on African conflicts.

The commitment of important members of the Security Council to UN peacekeeping in Africa and the politics surrounding their interactions within the Council are often vital to the outcome of these missions. The US role in Somalia and Britain’s role in Sierra Leone were crucial to the establishment of UN missions in these countries. Washington played a critical role in preventing UN action during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The decision to send a UN peacekeeping force to Rwanda in 1993 was pushed strongly in the Security Council by France which hoped to use the peacekeepers for its own parochial national interests.

The AU, the UN and Africa

In order to influence the UN’s most powerful decision-making body, African governments have pushed for at least one permanent seat (the continent currently has three rotating seats on the Council) on a reformed Security Council, which could have 20 members or more. Disputes, however, remain as to which country would fill a permanent African seat (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa have all expressed a keen interest) or whether a system of rotation between three or more influential African states could be developed. In any case, efforts to reform the Council are currently stalled.

Given the paucity of resources available to the AU, closer co-operation between the AU and the UN is necessary. Certain functions could be devolved to the AU, which should proceed with plans to create a 15,000 strong African stand – by force by 2010 that it can activate in cases in which the UN is unwilling to act. As the experience of the British mission in Sierra Leone in 2000 suggests, and French troops in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002, troops from western countries can make an important contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa, but their involvement should be integrated into a unified UN command. Soldiers from western countries are generally better equipped, trained, and resourced to sustain prolonged missions. The dilemma, however, is that Africa cannot expect outsiders to contribute without at the same time retaining some control of their troops and of peace processes.
Although there are more UN peacekeeping missions in Africa than anywhere else in the world (20 of the UN’s 45 peacekeeping troops deployed in the post-Cold War era have been deployed in Africa), expenditure per head on human security is far less in Africa than on other continents. For example, while between 1995 and 2000, the UN spent $5000 per Bosnian, it spent $17 per Angolan, and $4 per Rwandan. This is partly because of poor African representation on the UN Security Council. How can Africa be better represented on a reformed UN Security Council? Given its huge size, Africa perhaps deserves three permanent seats on this vital organ responsible for international peace and security. The three representatives could be chosen according to subregions, or alternatively regional hegemons such as South Africa, Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and Nigeria could be elected to represent the continent.

Founded in 1945 with the five permanent members which were the victors in the Second World War as its core, the composition of the UN Security Council has today become anachronistic. Diversity within the Security Council and its expansion should not be seen as a threat, but instead as a source of strength. Although desirable, it is a complex process to effect change in the UN General Assembly, let alone in the Security Council. Related to the under-funding of African peace missions are questions of who has the mandate to intervene, and when is intervention justified. Is the AU or the UN Security Council responsible for maintaining peace and security in Africa? The UN Charter clearly gives the organisation primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and security, but with the tragedies of Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s, Africa has learned that it cannot always rely on the UN to fulfill its responsibilities on the continent.
2. The UN, ECOWAS and the African Union

The UN and ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone

The Economic Community of West African States was established in 1975 with primarily an economic focus. However, from the late 1980s, ECOWAS began to play a more diplomatic and military role in West Africa and initiated a number of peacekeeping missions. In 1990, ECOWAS established ECOMOG, a military intervention force to respond to the Liberian civil war at the time. ECOMOG has subsequently become the military component of ECOWAS and has been deployed in response to violent conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea - Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire.

In 1989, a civil war erupted in Liberia involving the government and seven rebel factions. The Liberian government requested diplomatic and military assistance from neighbouring states in 1990. Consequently, ECOMOG was established, and peacekeeping troops were deployed to Liberia in August 1990, initially to alleviate the deleterious humanitarian situation and allow implementation of a peace agreement. But with no peace to keep, ECOWAS soon began to play a peace - enforcement role.

Initially, the UN remained aloof from the ECOMOG deployment, but after the signing of the Cotonou peace agreement on 25 July 1993, the UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in September of that year with a staff of approximately 300 observers (which was reduced to 160 in November 1995). In July 1997, legislative and presidential elections were held in Liberia, the result of the facilitation and implementation of a ceasefire agreement by ECOMOG.

The Liberian civil war spilled over into Sierra Leone, as it ignited a civil war in this country in March 1991. A rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, engaged in hostile action against the government of Sierra Leone. Indeed the RUF had received significant backing from Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Following six years and three military coups, the RUF was able to seize control of the government of Sierra Leone in 1997 (in an alliance with a military junta). In February 1998, ECOMOG ousted the RUF and military junta from power.

In July 1998, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMOSIL) was established and staffed by 50 personnel (the force was increased to 210 in August 1999). In October 1999, a UN peacekeeping force of 6,000 soldiers was deployed to Sierra Leone. This force was eventually expanded to 20,000 by the end of 2000. Relative peace was eventually restored to Sierra Leone after a failed RUF seizure of power in May 2000.

5 The members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea -- Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
The Nature of UN/ECOWAS Co-operation

The principle of co-operation between the UN and ECOWAS in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone was a positive development in terms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. However, in both cases, there was tension between ECOMOG and UN personnel over strategy, division of labour, the sharing of scarce resources, conditions of service and remuneration. In addition, there was often poor communication and a lack of trust between both organisations.

On the issue of the ECOWAS security mechanism agreed in 1999, West African leaders have made more progress than any other African subregion in establishing a security mechanism which consists of the following organs: A Mediation and Security Council; a Defence and Security Commission; a Council of Elders; and an early warning system with local bureaux that gather information for use in preventing conflicts. There are also plans to establish an ECOMOG stand-by force.

Lessons for Future Peacekeeping Operations

Four lessons can be derived from the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases for future peacekeeping operations in Africa.

First, the UN should play an active role in subregional peacekeeping efforts. Second, the military and financial capacity of local hegemons like Nigeria must be mobilised into multilateral efforts, preferably under a UN umbrella. Third, external actors (major international powers) should be encouraged to contribute positively and substantially to peacemaking efforts in Africa. Fourth, civil society organisations can play a critical role in the process of peacemaking, but in the case of civil wars, this role is often limited by the control of the countryside by warlords. Fourth, effective strategies, including the use of sanctions, should be developed to deal with subregional “spoilers” such as Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh.

During discussions, many of the participants strongly supported closer co-operation between the UN, the AU, and subregional organisations in future peace missions in Africa. The importance of a unified chain-of-command, a clearly defined division of labour between these organisations, and unambiguous principles of co-operation between the military and civilian components of peace missions, were stressed in order to facilitate effective communication between these organisations and to enhance the accountability of these missions.

Concerns were also raised that insufficient resources had been provided by the UN and international donor organisations to African peacekeepers. For example, while $2 billion was pledged to the reconstruction of the Balkans in 2000, barely $150 million was pledged to Sierra Leone. This was particularly the case in terms of logistical support such as vehicles, communication equipment and air transport. It was also emphasised that, where possible, the UN should take the lead role in peace missions, given its international legitimacy and greater resource endowment.
At the time of the establishment of the OAU in 1963, its founding member states, with the experience of colonial exploitation still fresh in their minds, insisted that this organisation should, where possible, protect their independence and their newly-won sovereignty. Hence, sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs of African states became cornerstones of the OAU Charter. Consequently, the OAU did not actively intervene in conflicts on the African continent for the first 30 years of its existence. Where it did, as in the case of the deployment of OAU peacekeepers to Chad (1981–82), the involvement was largely ineffectual.

The creation of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 signalled a gradual departure from the OAU's stubborn commitment to sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. A handful of peace operations were launched, such as the observer missions in Burundi (1993–96) and Comoros (1997–99). In addition, the OAU started to become a more active mediator on the African continent from the late 1990s.

In May 1998, as a consequence of a border dispute, a violent conflict erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The OAU was able to initiate a mediation process and at the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999, the two parties signed the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement. This document was further updated and titled "Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities", which called for the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to determine the border demarcation between both countries. Following this incident, the OAU brokered the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which was signed by both factions on 18 June 2000. This conflict resulted in the loss of approximately 100,000 lives.

On 31 June 2000, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), consisting of 100 military observers and some civilian support staff. On 15 September 2000, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of approximately 4,300 peacekeeping troops to the Horn of Africa. Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea are yet to agree on the details of implementing the physical demarcation of their common border (which was decided by an international Boundary Commission on 13 April 2002), this case provides useful lessons for future UN and AU co-operation with respect to peace missions in Africa. Many participants agreed that the Eritrea/Ethiopia example was one of the most encouraging collaborative efforts that had taken place between the OAU/AU and the UN. The OAU, through its Algerian chair, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, used its conflict resolution experience to initiate and facilitate a peace process between both countries. This was followed by the UN taking the lead role in terms of peacekeeping, and thereby providing the necessary resources and international legitimacy to the intervention.

This section is partly based on the presentation by Festus Aboagye, "UN / AU Cooperation in Ethiopia / Eritrea", Cape Town Seminar, May 2004.
Lessons for Future AU/UN Co-operation

Five lessons for future UN/AU collaboration in African peace processes can be drawn from the Eritrea/Ethiopia case.

First, it is important that there is reciprocity of political and diplomatic roles and actions between the AU and the UN. If Africa’s subregional organisations take the political initiative to facilitate conflict resolution processes in situations of armed conflict, the UN Security Council should make every effort to endorse these initiatives and thereby provide them with increased legitimacy.

Second, collaboration between the AU and the UN at the strategic level is essential for collaborative success on the ground. The AU has often been an effective regional lead player in facilitation and mediation efforts, but this lead role is enhanced through close collaboration with subregional organisations, the UN, and the international community. It is critical that this collaboration is secured at the early stages of interventions.

Third, there should be operational complementarity between co-deployed AU and UN missions. Specifically, there needs to be formal mechanisms and institutions to operationalise the policy framework for collaboration.

Fourth, there should be harmonisation of concepts of operations at all levels between the AU and the UN in cases of cooperative missions, as well as mechanisms of effective communication.

From left to right: Prof. Mwesiga Baregu, Ms. Alice Mogwe and Dr. Mark Chingono
Fifth, UN assistance should address critical weaknesses of regional peacekeeping missions. There needs to be a recognition that Africa’s regional bodies lack important resources, namely financial, equipment and logistics for deployments and mission sustainability.

Participants at the Cape Town seminar agreed that, in future collaborative interventions, more effective planning and communication between the UN, the AU and subregional organisations needs to take place, with the UN actively assisting these organisations in building their conflict prevention, management and transformation capacity. In addition, participants noted the importance of the UN providing logistical, financial and training support to peace support interventions undertaken by the AU and subregional organisations.

A number of participants expressed concern that substantial institutional building and resource mobilisation still need to take place within Africa’s regional bodies in order for there to be more effective collaboration between these organisations and the UN. For example, one participant argued that not all of Africa’s regional stand – by peacekeeping brigades are at the same stage of development, with brigades in a number of regions being several years away from operational readiness.
3. Reconstructing Failed States In Africa

Many parts of Africa are characterised by weak states and, at times, these weak states have become failed states. This has resulted in a security crisis not only for people who live in the affected area, but a security crisis for neighbouring states. Consequently, the policy seminar focussed on the issue of state failure in Africa, and in particular: the reasons for state failure; the consequences of state failure for civil society organisations and the rest of society; and the various methods and approaches for dealing with state failure. Historically, examples of failed states in Africa have included Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Chad.

The Nature of the State and State Failure

A state is primarily an instrument for exercising power. It consists of a hierarchy of control and comprise political leadership; agencies for bureaucratic regulation and service delivery; tax – collectors; a judiciary; and security forces. It has a territory with defined boundaries and a population over which it claims control. However, historically, this instrument has been employed in both a constructive as well as a destructive fashion. In the constructive sense, the state plays a critical role in the effective management and equitable distribution of resources, and is the instrument that facilitates the pursuit by the population of public benefits such as peace, welfare, and the opportunity for individuals to pursue their own self-interest, and in the process, the majority of the citizenry are exploited and oppressed.

State collapse is a phenomenon that represents an extreme case of bad governance in which the structure and authority of government, the legal system, and political order have broken down to the point that they cease to function. Laws are not respected, order is not maintained, and social cohesion is absent. This is also a situation in which the state has forfeited the power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their identity. In such cases, as a territory, the state no longer ensures security through a central sovereign organisation. As an authoritative political organisation, a collapsed state loses its legitimacy. In addition, the formal economy disintegrates; the official education and health systems cease to function; physical infrastructure starts to decay; and crime and violence are widespread. In cases such as Liberia and Somalia where government elites favour certain groups over others in terms of access to resources, state failure may result in civil war.

It is generally understood that states fail due to the ineffective and/or unequal distribution of resources within the state’s area of control and responsibility, which is the result of four main factors. First, a lack of political will among the ruling elites (largely inspired by greed) to establish or promote institutions that facilitate the equitable distribution of resources in their respective countries. Second, politicised ethnicity and politicised religious differences that often relate to resource management and distribution. Third, Africa’s impoverished nature and lack of access to resources and international markets. Fourth, international systemic changes that have a dramatic impact on how states relate to each other. For example, following the end of the Cold War, a number of vulnerable states in Africa such as Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire collapsed as a result of the Soviet Union, France and/or the US withdrawing their financial and material support from their autocratic rulers.

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7 This section draws on the presentation by Rok Ajulu “When States Fail: Do organisations follow?”, UN Conference, May 2004.
There have often been clear indications of impending state failure in Africa, but either no action has been taken by regional states and the international community, or inappropriate action (that deals predominantly with symptoms rather than causes) has ensued. The current array of conflict and state failure early warning models in Africa appear to lack the adequate sophistication accurately to predict impending state failure. Many weak states have survived for decades, but it is usually an unexpected trigger event (or combination of events) such as a rigged election, the outbreak of violence (such as a military coup d'état), an economic crisis, or an environmental crisis, that results in state failure. The failure of a state in a particular region may result in a domino effect, namely the failure of surrounding weak states. This appears to be the case in Central and West Africa with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia being the epicentres of conflicts in both subregions.

**Restructuring Failing and Failed States**

State reconstruction essentially entails the revitalisation of those key institutional mechanisms and processes that formally provided coherence to state action, legitimised state power and action, established social trust between state and society, and returned the state to the centre of social life. The process is complex, multifaceted and requires long-term planning.

There are generally no ‘quick fix’ solutions as, in most cases, state institutions have been mismanaged and exploited to the point of virtual collapse. Several intellectuals and policymakers have callously declared that prior to effective reconstruction of the failed state, the process needs to run its full course (i.e. complete collapse) before a new structure of legitimate authority can be reconstituted. However, allowing the state to collapse entirely and then rebuilding it anew, appears to be a disastrous strategy as the cost to human life and property of such an approach would be immense. Furthermore, post-collapse, the requisite capacity and resources may not exist to reassemble the state structure to full operation.

The most critical aspect of reconstruction, and also the most noticeable, is that of rebuilding, repairing and adequately maintaining physical infrastructure such as serviceable roads, railways, airports, electricity, sewage systems, means of communication and hospitals. This is the case because all the other aspects of state capacity-building are highly dependent on infrastructure for their effectiveness. A basic infrastructure must be in place, not only to facilitate the equitable distribution and appropriation of resources, but also to attract foreign investment. Democratic government cannot function effectively without adequate infrastructure. Civil society cannot flourish unless functional communication systems are in place.

One of the challenges that actors seeking to rebuild a failed state will encounter is a climate of diminished faith by the population in the capacity of the state to provide security. Often in failed states, citizens have pursued personal and group security through traditional structures and processes which are usually ethnic in orientation. Consequently, it is of critical importance that state security forces, such as the police and the military, are established or reformed in such a way that they are able to provide more effective security for citizens than traditional structures.

Of no less importance in the overall restructuring of state structures is the revitalisation of both the formal and informal economy. Typically, when the state fails, the currency, banking system and structure of formal investments and savings collapse. To rebuild the state, the assistance of outside actors and neighbouring states is often required.
Two basic strategies have been employed to deal with state collapse in Africa. First, the establishment of a "benevolent" authoritarian regime. This is the 'strongman' solution that contributed to the reconstruction of the Chadian state. Second, the problem has been tackled by the development of democratic leadership. The authoritarian solution may appear more promising in the short run, but in the long run it is very likely to lead to a new cycle of collapse. The democratic solution is clearly the most desirable and probably the only viable option in the long run, but unfortunately, it is the most difficult to implement in the short run.

State legitimacy can be restored through constructive participation and freely expressed support from civil society. It is necessary to provide a large, informally representative forum, and if the contenders for power do not do so, an external force may be required to guarantee security and free expression during the legitimisation process. A large, pluralistic national convention composed of many political and professional figures and organisations, needs to establish transitional institutions and to prepare a constitution. A national covenant to set up new rules of the game and engage new players to respect each other, should be an early step towards institutionalisation and should be a precondition for any election. Ultimately, in order to facilitate legitimate state reconstruction, a new political system is needed, often requiring new leaders who are not tainted by the old order. Free and fair democratic elections should be held.

A state cannot be reconstructed in the absence of a serious effort to encourage the reawakening of the positive elements of civil society. In the case of many failed states in Africa, the ancien régime destroyed or undermined most of the civil society structures, networks and support bases. Consequently, civil society which includes bodies from traditional organisations to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and from trading networks to community ventures, needs to be strengthened in order for the state to function effectively. However, it is important that civil society remains free from government interference. In conclusion, dealing with state failure requires multilateral and holistic strategies that target the causes of failed and failing states rather than merely the symptoms, which has been the fundamental weakness of many early warning/early response models in Africa.
4. Democratic Governance and Free Markets: Underpinning or Undermining Security?  

The policy seminar also explored the relationship between democracy and development, peace and security, "hard threats" and "soft threats". Several participants noted that democracy and development contribute to peace and security, while human security often leads to threats to peace. Indeed, the AU vision and the African Renaissance agenda articulated by South African president Thabo Mbeki is based on the assumption that there will be "no peace without development". In order to address "soft threats" to peace, structural changes are needed at the local and global levels, and power, at home and abroad, needs to be democratised. At present, the UN enjoys legitimacy but has no power, while the US has power, but no legitimacy, as evidenced by the war in Iraq in 2003.

Good Governance, Democratisation and Human Rights

As a technocratic approach to essentially political and social processes, good governance entails harnessing the forces of civil society, effectively managing institutions and skillfully relating them to society. Lack of accountability often leads to ineffective governance which, in turn, creates and triggers conflict in society. Democratic governance – and not merely "good" governance – and social and economic justice should be the goals guiding peace processes in Africa. Given Africa's history of slavery and colonialism, social and economic justice assumes a particular significance. Yet the new doctrine of good governance, with its rather limited focus on managerial aspects of development and transformation, does not adequately address these concerns. Human rights awareness and promotion campaigns should be an integral part of peace processes in Africa. UN agencies such as the Human Rights Commission and the Economic and Social Council and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights should enforce their mandates and promote progress in post - conflict societies: respect for the rights of women and minorities; as well as respect for the rule of law and democratic practices.

Civil Society

The notion of civil society was a recurrent subject throughout the deliberations. Civil society, classically defined as social networks, was both romanticised as an important countervailing force for an authoritarian state, and vilified for its supposed incestuous relationship with the state. In its romanticised version, civil society is seen to provide voice to the voiceless and the invisible. However, when controlled by the state, civil society can be used to...
demobilise and disorganise populations. This raised fundamental questions about the appropriation of governance and how power is distributed and exercised both locally and globally.

Several participants lamented the fact that civil society was weak because all avenues of free expression and social mobilisation were blocked by governments in Africa. Indeed, the weaknesses of civil society are often a reflection of the authoritarianism of the state. It was also noted that many NGOs are not linked to voiceless peoples, but instead busy themselves with producing ‘poverty reduction papers and strategies’ (PRPS).

NEPAD and Its Critics

Several participants noted that, in the dominant discourses within and outside the continent, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development is taken more seriously than the AU, the only legitimate Pan-African body on the continent. Though a progressive political regime, NEPAD, according to its critics, is based on a poor economic foundation and thinking. Not surprisingly, though a noble project, to date it has yet to prove its worth in promoting economic development in Africa. A long-term incremental view of NEPAD should see intra-African trade and economic co-operation increase. The idea of a peer review mechanism is revolutionary, and naturally it will face some resistance. The distribution of power within Africa means that peers are unequal, and hence the capacity of weaker peers to pressure powerful ones is limited. Is Africa prepared to come up with a ratings index of fairness and democratic practice? Questions about where the countervailing political pressure should come from – civil society or governments – need to be carefully addressed.

NEPAD has restated its commitment to economic fundamentals, but this seems a fallacy and a myth, according to critics, as its macro focus is on ‘circulation’ and not ‘production’. The latter is more important since it deals with the creation of jobs and wealth. Some participants argued that NEPAD needs to get its micro and macro fundamentals right, and needs to include more legitimate social actors in its debates. Other participants felt that there was a need to engage with NEPAD and to refine the plan in the interests of Africa’s masses.

The neo-liberal economic orthodoxy which informs the “Washington Consensus” urges rolling back the state to allow market forces to determine the pace of economic development. Yet historically, no society has developed without a strong state nor without economic growth. Africa needs strong states capable of implementing policies of economic growth promoting wealth and job creation. In Botswana, for example, although the economy is experiencing rapid economic growth, this growth is privately driven and has a narrow base. Consequently, this has led to greater inequality within social groups in the country. Similarly, in South Africa, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening as the country’s developmental goals remain unmet. In short, macroeconomic policies such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) should be inclusive, and not exclusionary. People-centred development must be promoted with the government at the centre of these efforts.

Africa’s International Economic Relations

International economic policy and the anarchic global economic system contribute to conflict in Africa. Due to a vibrant international arms black market, the new “black diamonds” continue to flow into African conflict zones.
Indeed, a flourishing, illicit world-wide arms bazaar has fuelled many civil wars in Africa’s diamond-rich countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola. Africa is now awash with small arms and light weapons (SALWs), yet with the exception of South Africa, it does not produce these arms. The impact of free trade on conflict remains understudied and there is no arms control mechanism in many African war zones.

According to several participants, the multilateral trading system has failed Africa in particular and the Third World in general through unfair and inequitable trade. Important reforms are needed in relations between North and the South to end the “dialogue of the deaf” between the two camps. There is a pressing need for trade-offs between developing and developed countries, particularly with regard to the huge subsides of agriculture in Europe and North America. Many participants felt that the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) rules and approaches are biased and contribute to global conflicts. For instance, organised economic pressure on weak states.

According to one participant, the tirade against the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by rich countries reflects their narrow economic interests of maintaining an unfair international economic system that disproportionately benefits them. UNCTAD, in so far as it articulates the interests of weak states that cannot defend their interests outside international institutions, is an important actor whose ideals should be supported. Perhaps a formal relationship between the UN and the WTO could help strengthen and revitalise UNCTAD. Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is still relevant, as it gives weak nations leverage over powerful ones. The Group of 20 (G20), of which South Africa is a member along with states such as Brazil and India, should increase the voices of the “wretched of the earth”.

The unequal trade relations between developed and developing countries is also reflected at a regional level in Southern Africa. South Africa, the dominant regional economy, trades with its neighbours in the way that the West trades with rest of the Third World, with trade being skewed in Pretoria’s favour by a ratio of nine to one. Africa’s marginalisation in the world economy presents a great threat to world peace. Encouragingly, Sweden has taken the lead in addressing this economic imbalance by adopting, in 2003, a New Development Co-operation Bill of Shared Responsibility to combat poverty in the Third World with responsibility being shared by actors in both North and South. More rich nations should emulate this example.

Economic reforms and structural adjustment conditionalities have wreaked havoc on African economies and eroded any semblance of social welfare that might have existed. Consequently, as poverty levels rise, street kids and orphans are increasing, in turn leading to crime, violence, and insecurity. Instead of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-imposed structural adjustment programmes, Africa needs its own home-grown transformation programmes.

Africa’s marginalisation in the global economy has increased over the years and has been primarily centred on dwindling foreign direct investment. For example, in 2002, the rest of Africa outside of South Africa received $13 billion in foreign direct investment, compared to $13 billion each received by Taiwan and South Korea, $16 billion by Brazil, $800 million by South Africa and $1.2 billion by Angola.
5. Rebuilding Peace in Shattered Societies: A Capacities Gap?  

After decades of concerted attempts by the World Bank and the IMF to ‘rollback’ the state in Africa, the ‘rolled back’ state is now referred to as a failed state. A puzzling part of this irony is that highly centralised American and European governments, with huge intelligence organisations that work hard to cement people to their governments, are advocating for less government in the Third World.

Implicit in the notions of “failed states” and “underdeveloped countries” is the presumption that Africa is a problem rather than a partner in conflict resolution. This is a dangerous misconception since Africa must be an active partner in the attempt to revitalise the UN and its agencies. According to one participant, often the notion of failed states is used as a licence by powerful countries to intervene in regimes they do not like. When Mobutu Sese Seko misruled Zaire for 30 years, few in the West said it was a failed state. Easy access to vital minerals, including diamonds, copper and cobalt, were more pressing priorities. Authoritarianism is not just the hallmark of the Third World. Indeed, the fascist Portuguese state of 1927 – 1974 was arguably the first failed state, especially in relation to its African colonies. In short, the definition of a failed state must be based on a tempered argument.

The notion of ‘shattered societies’, strictly speaking, refers to ‘shattered political societies’ and political systems. This is because many societies are resilient and do survive violence. Some entities such as Uganda and Somaliland even recreate themselves without external assistance. In much of Africa, the notion of “reconstruction” is similarly misleading. Since there was nothing there in the first place, there may be nothing to re-construct. It is instead new construction, starting from scratch. For example, in the DRC, where three decades of Mobutu’s rule saw the country’s infrastructure collapse and where about 90 percent of economic activity is conducted in the informal sector, peacebuilding entails laying the developmental infrastructure afresh.

Central to this discussion were the following questions: Why has post – conflict peacebuilding been so difficult and even elusive, in many war – torn African societies? At what point of the conflict cycle should resources be put into war – torn societies? These questions generated interesting discussions. Several participants stressed that shattered societies should not necessarily be seen as an impossible problem, but as a peacebuilding challenge. Indeed.

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9 This section is partly based on the presentation by Mwesiga Baregu, ‘Africa, the UN, and International Terrorism’, UN Conference May 2004.
Africa is not unique in experiencing the painful but transitional pains of shatteredness. Europe went through the same experience during the First and Second World Wars, and was successfully reconstructed after 1945 through the Marshall Plan. Several participants wondered why there was no African Marshall Plan.

It was also noted that the international community is tired of Africa’s seemingly endless wars. Western countries that intervene in African countries are concerned about more entry points and exit strategies, and often want to stay for as short a time as possible.

In African wars, the vast majority of fatalities tend to be civilians rather than soldiers. The destruction of infrastructure, roads, schools and hospitals and the dislocation of populations have been hallmarks of African civil wars. This has made post–war peacebuilding, reconstruction, and revitalisation of the social fabric of society a mammoth task. Post–conflict peacebuilding is also viewed differently by different political actors who benefit or lose from these conflicts, and often the non–beneficiaries of peace processes become or support “spoilers”.

**Keeping and Building Peace**

For a peace mission to succeed, local populations need to understand the mission and the mission should also understand the local situation. Local people should in fact participate in the process, as they did in Mozambique. Mozambique is an exception in achieving the greatest level of post–civil war peace in Africa. What were the ingredients of success in Mozambique? Did the will to peace come from inside or was it imposed from outside? It
is easy to argue that peace cannot be imposed from outside. Yet in Mozambique, without the huge investment in
the rule of law by the UN between 1992 and 1994, would the peace have held? Given the initial squabbling
between the warring factions over control of territory this seems unlikely.

In spite of the dollarisation and the devaluation of Mozambique’s local currency, the economy is still weak. The
money poured into the country by Western donors made it easier to ‘sweet talk everyone into line’. But,
Mozambique’s success should not be overstated, as it has quite significant limitations. As stipulated in the Rome
Peace Agreement of October 1992, disarmament and demobilisation were achieved, though not without some
difficulty. Indeed, stability has been restored to the country, but more needs to be done to ensure economic justice
– which is lacking – and equitable development. Worse still, the cancerous political disease of corruption is
consuming the country. This has been exacerbated by the ‘dollarisation’ of the economy, especially by foreign
NGOs who pay their employees in US dollars. Foreign NGOs have the money but often not the ideas nor plans
on how to use these funds effectively to promote post – conflict peacebuilding and development.

**Challenges: Landmines, Demobilisation and De-weaponisation**

Landmines – a brutal legacy of war – pose a serious problem to post – war reconstruction and development. The
UN has never made enough provisions for mine clearance, and this has hampered post – conflict development,
especially agriculture. Lack of, or uneven, development often leads to conflict, as happened in Mozambique where
a large part of the population in the relatively underdeveloped north supported Renamo (Mozambique National
Resistance) rebels. Thus, in order to optimise the potential for development, de – mining needs to be integrated
into post – conflict peacebuilding. Perhaps landmine producers should pay part of the costs of demining.

A related problem is the demobilisation and integration into society of former combatants, most of whom possess
no other useful skill than handling guns. Because of its potential to wreak havoc and derail peace processes, this
social category needs special attention. Are former rebel soldiers villains, victims, or merely the cannon fodder of
Africa’s wars? However they are perceived, their re – skilling and re – training programmes, as well as financial
assistance for them, should be paramount. De-weaponisation should also be carried out alongside demobilisation,
and experience suggests that there should be an incentive and/or reward system for surrendering guns. In this
context, it is important to note that many other implements, such as machetes and axes, have been used in the
massacre of people, especially in the Great Lakes region and West Africa.

How a peace settlement is arrived at has implications for the resolution of these problems and the sustenance of
peace. Thus, one of the important challenges of peacebuilding revolves around the question of how to internalise
and indigenise peace settlements. This should involve mainstreaming local and traditional conflict resolution
mechanisms into contemporary political structures. Inclusion of formally marginalised social groups, such as
women and child soldiers, in peace processes is vital. Involving women in these processes not only promotes
gender equality, but their femininity may also counter the macho and masculine approach to politics that often
leads to violence. Traumatised child soldiers should be demobilised, rehabilitated and offered opportunities to go
back to school or to acquire new skills.
Developmental Post - Conflict Strategy

Development, as a process of empowerment, of necessity involves intervention and the responsibility to report. Thus a developmental post – conflict strategy, which takes into account the needs of various stakeholders needs to be designed according to each country’s particular situation. The strategy should be based on an assessment of urgency, and the priority list should reflect the situation on the ground. Sequencing and timing of the actors and activities is vital. De – mining or poverty reduction, political, economic or social stabilisation, are all important, but given limited resources, decisions must be made about what must be done first, simultaneously, and last. This partly involves revision of peace mandates, for instance, to enable the military, who have the expertise and equipment, to contribute to development and economic reconstruction.

A ‘market plus’ development strategy, in which the market is complemented and supported by a strong state, is needed to facilitate rapid post – conflict economic growth, recovery, and development. This strategy should transcend the parochialism of the ‘Washington Consensus’, since, as earlier noted, no society in the world has developed without a viable state. Such a post – conflict development strategic plan should also be geared towards eliminating inequality and promoting social justice. For its effective implementation, this strategy should be coordinated with, and linked to, available policy instruments.

The Ambiguous Legacy of Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations have left a trail of problems in the zones in which they have operated. First, are the children of war born out of the marriages of convenience between well – paid soldiers and local women. ECOMOG missions in West Africa are estimated to have produced about 30,000 babies, while the South African mission in Burundi has reportedly registered 19 marriages. Second, these missions have been a conduit for the spread of Human Immuno – Deficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immuno – Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and sex, rather than being a means for procreation and recreation, has sometimes become a weapon of mass destruction in Africa. Many former peacekeeping soldiers have contracted AIDS in areas in which they were deployed, and the social impact and cost of this is immense. The final outcome of this situation is the ever increasing number of orphans who, if not well looked after, will be forced into crime and violence in order to survive, leading to a vicious circle of violence.

In the long term, post – conflict state institutions must be consolidated and synergistically adapted to benefit from interaction with civil society and the market. Successful conflict resolution and peacebuilding is a challenging undertaking. It requires the full commitment of the requisite resources and energies of societies. Given the seeming inability productively to absorb and mobilise resources in many post – conflict societies, there is a need for realistic time – frames of about 10 years to assess the impact and effectiveness of peace processes.

The capacities and resource gap as well as the lack of commitment by powerful nations to risk their troops in peace missions raises the question of the use of private security companies and mercenaries. Indeed, private security companies have been subcontracted by the UN for guard and sentry duties a few times in peace missions. However, in spite of the fact that African armies are often ill – equipped and trained to deal with peace missions, most participants condemned the use of mercenaries as ill-advised and improper. Given Africa’s experience with
mercenaries, which has recently been highlighted by the arrest of foreign mercenaries allegedly plotting to oust the leader of Equatorial Guinea, this aversion is understandable. Mercenaries have been used by powerful foreign interests to forestall change, for instance, by fighting against freedom fighters during Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence or to effect undemocratic and illegal “regime change” in order to access vital resources, oil (in the case of Equatorial Guinea) and diamonds (in the case of Sierra Leone). Thus, although mercenaries may be technically better equipped than regular armies, they lack legitimacy; they are not accountable to any government nor to the UN, and are not recognised legally by any government.
6. Africa, the UN and International Terrorism

The problems of international terrorism and increasing poverty in the Third World are two major security threats in the 21st century. These problems are interrelated and feed on each other. International terrorism is a global problem and can only be resolved through a global approach, and not through unilateral actions. It is indeed more of an intellectual and moral challenge than a military one. All countries need to be committed to contributing to tackling this problem through dialogue and not confrontation.

Schools of Thought on Terrorism

There are two broad schools of thought on the causes of terrorism: the structuralist and behaviouralist. From a structuralist standpoint, terrorists are an inevitable product of the inequities of the global economy. The behaviouralists, on the other hand, focus on the individual. These perspectives lead to different solutions to the problems of terrorism. The structuralist stresses structural changes and transformation of the global economy to eliminate poverty, while behaviouralism, which has informed US policy, is concerned with individuals and groups.

In order to avert criticism from the behaviouralists, it is important to indicate how to operationalise the structuralist approach. It is also important not to overstate the difference between structuralist and behaviouralist perspectives, since structures influence behaviour and vice versa. A critical synthesis of the two schools can perhaps better inform understanding and policy.

But dealing with the symptoms of a deeply entrenched process does not help much for, with nothing to lose except their misery and humiliation, youths will volunteer to become suicide - bombers. Beneficial inclusion into the global economy is the only sure way of overcoming the frustration of youths, which often renders them easy prey for terrorist recruitment by terrorist groups. Poverty has swelled the ranks of rebel groups in Africa and terrorists world - wide.

According to several participants, the American reaction to terrorism has led to the suppression of civil liberties domestically. Adopting the behaviouralist perspective is short - sighted, since it does not address the root causes of terrorism. In denial of the need for social transformation globally, “imperial” America is chasing its own shadow.

Definition of a Terrorist

In Africa, a region where most of the contemporary leaders were once referred to as “terrorists” during their struggle for independence, the definition of a terrorist is understandably a sensitive issue. Freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were often defined as terrorists by colonial and apartheid regimes.

According to several participants, there seems to be a double standard in the definition of terrorists, for example, with regard to the Israeli – Palestine conflict, where Palestinian freedom fighters are often referred to as terrorists.
Can Iraq’s insurgents, now fighting foreign occupation be referred to as “terrorists”? From some perspectives, the Iraq war has now become a liberation struggle.

Terrorism takes many forms, ranging from guerrilla tactics to suicide bombing, and this further complicates the definitional problems of who a terrorist is. In Africa, the major sources of terror are the state and armed rebels. The point is, everyone has his or her own definition of what constitutes a ‘terrorist’. and some countries are willing to eschew justice in the fight against terrorism. Nonetheless, it was noted that the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism cannot be an excuse for not standing up against it.

Unilateralism and its Unlimited Problems

According to several participants, powerful nations like the US are exhibiting a disturbing propensity for manipulating multilateral organisations like the UN for their own selfish ends. American unilateralism and military and psychological violence, as well as a condescending marginalisation of the UN, point to dangerous precedents for global security. These developments place a burden on Africans to graduate from being passive objects of history to being active agents shaping its course.

Many participants asked: To what extent is the US justified in assuming the self-appointed role of international policeman? And why should one state’s problem, the US in this case, be everyone else’s? This situation runs the risk of forcing African states to accept America’s definition of terrorism in return for receiving economic aid and access to the US market. America’s capacity not to listen to others is a malaise. In order to build bridges of understanding and create the conditions for peaceful co-existence in difference and diversity, future American political leaders need to be trained in the legal, social and political values of other nations.

Routes to Ending Terrorism

Several participants asked how Africa can respond effectively to international terrorism and American pressures to cooperate in its ill-defined ‘war on terrorism’. There are a number of ways for dealing with terrorism. First is the 19th century approach of a condominium, in which terrorists are eliminated through a combination of force and deceit. Second, weaker states, in this case African, can be organised in such a way that promotes the interests of powerful states. In fact, America is exerting direct control in some African defence forces, and has spent about $100 million in East Africa alone, establishing a military base in Djibouti with future plans for a base in Eritrea. The clear message is: Africa must cooperate with the US in order to fight terrorism effectively or else it will lose valuable aid. Indeed, African leaders have signed up to this war on terrorism, but are they speaking for most of their populations?

Many participants noted that the best route to peace for Africa is to point out to America that it should not deal with symptoms, but with the root causes of international terrorism. Africa must convince America to change its foreign policies, especially those that generate resentment against it. The US must be persuaded to build bridges and to recognise that ‘the American way of life’ can not be imposed through the barrel of a gun on the rest of the world, nor is it superior to other peoples’ way of life. Fair trade to facilitate development is necessary, since terrorists find safe havens in failed states.
Deep antagonisms between the “haves” and the “have nots” lie at the heart of political instability in Africa. According to one view, Al-Qaeda’s challenge has little to do with poverty, but more to do with identity and rejection of domination by western “infidels”. Is this the Third World War and “clash of civilisations” between Christians and Muslims that prophets of doom like Samuel Huntington often talk about?

There are three different wars going on simultaneously: the wars on terrorism, poverty and crime. America also needs to be aware that some African governments can use the fight against terrorism to suppress domestic democratic movements. It is self-defeating to fight terrorism by creating more terrorists: the more innocent victims killed, the more potential terrorists are created from angry and vengeful relatives, friends, and compatriots.

From left to right: Ambassador Torben Brylle and Colonel Festus Aboagye
7. Conclusion

From the deliberations during the Cape Town seminar, it became clear that African conflicts have many causes which have roots in economic, political and religious processes, as well as ethnic divisions. The lack of social development and poverty are indeed the major causes of conflict on the continent, and in order to offset this, there is a pressing need for large-scale investment in human resources. At a political level, the “winner-takes-all” election system in many parts of Africa, and the lack of democratic accountability also contribute to tensions and conflict. A long-term solution to African conflicts and the building of durable peace require that the root causes of these conflicts be urgently addressed. A wide range of policy recommendations was proffered by participants at the Cape Town seminar for consideration by the UN High-Level Panel set up in November 2003 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to assess present and future security threats and to deal collectively with these threats.

a) Africa and the United Nations

In addition to discussions on the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, participants at the Cape Town meeting expressed concern over the new American doctrine of the unilateral, pre-emptive use of force. They deliberated on related threats to present and future security that are posed by weapons of mass destruction (it was noted that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France – now possess the largest stockpiles of these weapons), international terrorism, and international organised crime. The institutional reform of the UN Security Council, as well as the relationship between the UN, the African Union, and Africa’s subregional organisations was a recurrent theme of the seminar. It was felt that Africa needs stronger and more permanent representation on the 15-member UN Security Council, on which the continent currently has three seats which rotate among African states. Effecting change in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council is, however, an extremely complex and difficult process that requires the consent of the most powerful members on the Council. Reform of the Council has remained stalled for the last decade.

The legitimacy of institutions is one of the key issues of the twenty-first century with which the UN High-Level Panel will have to grapple. This was reflected in the calls for institutional reform of the UN Security Council and of the relationship between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations. It was felt that there is a disturbing pattern towards centralisation of power in the hands of the Great Powers that effectively control the Council, rather than in the broader UN. If not arrested, this process could see the UN suffer the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which died in the late 1930s due to its ineffectiveness in responding to security threats posed by the “revisionist” Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. In order to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, the UN Security Council must be urgently reconfigured to allow it to respond collectively to future security threats.

Although there are more UN peacekeeping missions in Africa than anywhere else in the world (nearly half of the UN’s 45 post-Cold War interventions have been in Africa), expenditure per head on human security in Africa is far less than on other continents. However, as the deployment of British forces in Sierra Leone in 2000 suggests, forces from Western countries can make an important and constructive contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa, but their soldiers should be integrated into a unified UN command. An effective division of labour must also
be established between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, building on experiences in the 1990s with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Related to the under-funding of African peace missions are questions of who has the authority to mandate an intervention, and when intervention is justified. Are Africa’s regional organisations or the UN Security Council responsible? At a regional level, Africans have developed four criteria, through the African Union’s 15-member Peace and Security Council, to underpin the duty to intervene – itself a significant departure from the OAU’s paralysing obsession with non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Regional instability, genocide, gross violation of human rights, and the overthrow of constitutional governments will all justify intervention by an envisioned AU stand-by force to be established by 2010.

b) Human Rights and Civil Society

An effective strategic plan and vision for global peace and security requires that the UN adapt a new conception of international peace and security which promotes human security and “second generation” human rights. This broadened definition of human rights as “social justice” should complement the core principles of the international collective security system. The need to go beyond simply responding to conflicts and to engage effectively in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, means that any strategic analysis of international peace and security must necessarily be multi-dimensional. In order to optimise opportunities for peace and development, key issues should be clearly defined and identified, and more public debate and interaction should be promoted. In particular, the debate on the relationship between “democratic governance” and “good governance” needs to be given greater attention.

Civil society has an important role to play both in preventive early warning and in post-conflict reconstruction, and therefore its members should be recognised and strengthened. This could be achieved partly through peace education which inculcates values celebrating difference and diversity in education curricula. However, strengthening civil society should not undermine the centrality of state institutions which must also be supported.

c) Democratic Governance and Fair Trade

Democratic governance, and not merely “good”, efficient, or economic reform-minded governance, is an essential cornerstone of social justice, peace, and security in Africa. In order to achieve these goals, Africa’s regional organisations and the UN need to adapt a new model of development policy and action plan to promote respect for human rights and democratic empowerment. Similarly, future peacekeeping missions need to be sensitive to local cultures and traditions, and the start-up costs for economic, political, and social reconstruction need to be included in the mission’s estimated budget along with the costs of security forces.

The inequitable distribution of resources, both locally and globally, is a major source of political instability and conflict. It is, therefore, important to put in place measures to ensure the equitable distribution of resources and to promote more equitable North-South trade. This could be facilitated through creating a conducive environment for domestic and international investment, equal access to international markets, cancelling Africa’s external debt, and directing efforts at incorporating the findings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in international economic policy, as well as revitalising stalled talks at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to
reduce deleterious agricultural subsidies by the West which are harmful to Africa’s chief exports. Development is indeed an important condition for peace.

d) Resources and Capacities

There is a pressing need to establish a proper division of labour between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organisations which need to be greatly strengthened. The UN had to take over peacekeeping duties from the AU and ECOWAS in Rwanda, DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, clearly underlining the financial and logistical weaknesses of Africa’s regional organisations. The UN Security Council has not done much to strengthen the capacity of regional peacekeepers and to collaborate effectively with them in the field. The Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping of August 2000 was curiously and disappointingly short of details on the subject of establishing an effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. An innovative approach to UN peacekeeping in Africa could centre on regional pillars supported by local ‘hegemons’ like Nigeria and South Africa whose political dominance of such missions is diluted by multinational peacekeepers from outside their regions. The willingness of Western peacekeepers, who have both the equipment and resources, to continue to contribute to UN missions in Africa remains important in this regard.

Institutional incapacity and inadequate resources have been major constraints to effective peacemaking and peacebuilding in post – conflict Africa. Therefore, institution building which should include adequate military and other forms of training of soldiers and civilians involved in peace operations, must also become an urgent priority in post – conflict reconstruction and development. One way of dealing with the problem of capacity and the resource gap might be to create space for the African Diaspora to contribute to peacebuilding and development in Africa, as the African Union is currently trying to do.

e) Present and Future Security Threats

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, terrorism has become defined as the major threat to international peace and security, and efforts to combat this phenomenon need to be strengthened. However, terrorism should not be unilaterally defined, and in particular, any opportunistic and self – centred definition of terrorism should be rejected in favour of a structural and more refined one. The route to ending terrorism entails halting the double standards which polarises international relations, for example, the issue of weapons of mass destruction, the largest stockpiles of which are in the hands of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Another related major threat to international peace and security is the continued existence of shattered societies in which the absence of law and order render collapsed states a possible haven for international criminals, gangsters, and terrorists. Thus, greater efforts should be directed towards rapid post – conflict reconstruction and rebuilding of shattered societies.

In assessing threats to present and future security, the Cape Town policy seminar recommended the adoption of a broader view of international security that transcends the traditional state – centred view, and that encompasses human security, environmental degradation, and HIV/AIDS, among other issues. This new conception of security and its action plan should also promote human rights, civil society, gender equality, and democratic governance.
ANNEX I

“South Africa, the United Nations and Human Rights”

Address by Professor Kader Asmal, MP, Chairperson of South Africa’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence.

The programme of your conference focuses on Africa. However, most of the programme deals with problems covering regional conflicts and continent-wide crises. You focus on specific regional conflicts – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Great Lakes, and on broader crises, such as the so-called failed states and shattered societies, disorganised governance and underdeveloped economies. On balance, therefore, the agenda for your meeting seems to suggest – as a kind of implicit sub-text – that Africa is a problem rather than a partner in the work of peace-building.

For those of us participating in this conference, I am certain that this premise: Africa as problem rather than as partner cannot be your point of departure. Instead, we are seeking to explore African resources and strategies for...
revitalising multilateral institutions that have recently been threatened and undermined from other quarters. In revitalising the United Nations and reaffirming its mandate, we must look to Africa not as the problem but as a crucial partner in the work at hand.

On 10 May 2004, we witnessed an extraordinary event in South Africa. On the tenth anniversary of his inauguration as the first president of a democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela addressed a joint sitting of Parliament. Although he described himself as a “pensioner”, retired from political life, Mandela was clearly still working, and clearly still engaged with the urgent problems of our politics, both locally and globally. Nelson Mandela’s pointed observations about recent international events were highlighted in media accounts of his speech. As you will recall, Madiba said: “We watch as two of the leading democracies, two leading nations of the free world, get involved in a war that the United Nations did not sanction: we look on with horror as reports surface of terrible abuses against the dignity of human beings held captive by invading forces in their own country.”

The violence unleashed in 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the devastating effects of the exercise of unilateral power. According to Nelson Mandela, this defiance of the United Nations and abuse of human dignity was not an anomaly. He saw a larger pattern in global politics. In these recent events, Madiba declared: “We see how the powerful countries, all of them so-called democracies, manipulate multilateral bodies to the great disadvantage and suffering of the poorer developing nations.”

Although the media expressed surprise at these critical comments, finding these remarks particularly “newsworthy”, Mandela was undertaking a strategic analysis that he has consistently advanced. On an earlier occasion, he observed: “Mankind as a whole is today standing on the threshold of great events, events that at times seem to threaten its very existence.” Mandela spoke those words in 1951 in an address to a meeting of the African National Congress in which he took up the major themes of war and peace, conflict and its resolution, in the global arena. In his global threat analysis in 1951, Mandela identified military forces, headed by “the ruling circles in America,” that were “prepared to go to war in defence of colonialism, imperialism and their profits,” but he also identified the psychological dynamics in which global forces were “determined to perpetuate a permanent atmosphere of crisis and fear in the world.” Assuming that frightened people cannot think clearly, those forces were attempting, as Mandela observed, “to create conditions under which common men [and women] might be inveigled into supporting the building of more and more atomic bombs, bacteriological weapons, and other instruments of mass destruction.”

Although ordinary people had become targets of this military and psychological violence, they also had the resources, as Mandela recognised, to build peace by “rising from being the object of history to becoming the subject of history,” the “conscious creators of their own history.” Over five decades later, we must follow the same strategic analysis.

First, the strategic analysis of conflict must be multidimensional. The dimensions of conflict include psychological, social, and economic dynamics. All of these factors feature in the ‘structural causes’ of conflict, crisis and violence. We have sought to develop a multidimensional analysis of military force, a strategic analysis driven by a commitment to human rights, not only as a matter of theory, but also as a means of practical intervention. In South Africa at the level of strategy, all of this has contributed to demilitarising our country and humanising our country’s military.
Second, although we know that people can be disempowered by conflict, they can also find in situations of conflict the resources for becoming conscious agents in creating their own destiny. Within our country, we have seen pioneering efforts in designing and implementing programmes in peace education and conflict resolution for children, youth, teachers and parents. These projects have made important contributions to both peace and education by providing learners with resources for conflict mediation and providing our schools with a model for educational transformation. We have also put in place structures in government to monitor South Africa’s involvement in international conflicts to ensure that basic human rights standards are observed.

South Africa, of course, is also part of a globalising world. The unilateral actions by global superpowers, which Mandela highlighted, have created a crisis in the international order, undermining the efficacy of international institutions. Over ten years ago, the philosopher Jurgen Habermas anticipated the defining geopolitical opposition of our times, the opposition between states committed to multilateral co-operation and states embarking upon unilateral agendas. According to Habermas, the politically decisive distinction exists between those who take the UN’s jurisdiction seriously and, therefore, want to permit participation only in operations under UN command, as opposed to those who want to procure a broader political and military room for action for individual nations or union of nations.

In South Africa, we do not need to be convinced of the value of these legitimate international instruments and institutions. For those of us working in the liberation movement in the struggle against apartheid, we were already accustomed to operating from a global perspective. By stark contrast to the unilateral, isolationist posture adopted by the apartheid regime. We relied upon the international support of a global anti-apartheid movement that drew together the United Nations, human rights organisations and a host of other transnational agencies in mobilising opposition to oppression and for self-determination. We also are committed to ‘working ever more closely with the UN’ in addressing the current challenges of Africa and the world. Our work in revitalising multilateral institutions will require rethinking what we mean by ‘sovereignty’ in international relations and international institutions.

The system of states, inherited from Westphalia, implicitly operates with a definition of state sovereignty in the classic formulation by the sociologist Max Weber, as the ‘organised exercise of legitimate violence over a territory.’ These three features of the modern state: demarcated territory, monopoly on the use of force, and political legitimacy, no longer seem adequate to protect the ‘sovereignty’ of smaller states in the global order. Globalisation has subtly, but substantially, eroded state sovereignty in areas such as currency regulation, trade relations and migration, for better or worse.

In this globalising world, is it possible to redefine state sovereignty, not as the organised exercise of legitimate force, but as the ‘organised exercise of the public good’? Here I invoke the phrase ‘public good’ to refer to a value that can be enjoyed by everyone and cannot be denied to anyone. These defining features of a public good, which economists identify in technical terms as non-rivalrous and non-excludable value, should be central to our understanding of state sovereignty. In this rendering, ‘sovereignty’ is the state’s capacity to protect and extend the shared, inclusive values inherent in public goods.

Idealistic perhaps, but not realistic. As Habermas observed, in the reality of politics, including the reality of international politics, “ideas will prostrate themselves before interests every time.” Nevertheless, this is a
reformulation of sovereignty, in keeping with the idea of 'sovereignty as responsibility' that will be crucial for revitalising multilateral institutions. The public good, even in a globalising world, is in everyone's interests. As far as interests are concerned, Lord Palmerston, England's gunboat foreign secretary, reminded everyone in the 19th Century that England did not have permanent allies nor permanent enemies but permanent interests.

In one of his most perceptive insights, President Thabo Mbeki recently identified the fact that states in the South could not exercise their interests individually because of the lack of power. Larger states could do so. Therefore, it was necessary that African countries should act in concert so that collective self-interest would be able to generate pressure to achieve common objectives. This was borne out, I say, in relation to the Doha trade round.

Today, for many people, globalisation is a source of despair, not because the global movement of money, technology and people has made the world a 'global village', but because these forces have widened the gap between rich and poor in an increasingly polarised world. How could this source of despair become a repository of hope?

If the notion of human rights has a future, it must be in harnessing global forces to a politics of hope. Advancing a powerful critique, while never giving up hope. Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, has argued that we must "ask questions not only about the economics and politics of globalisation, but also about the values and ethics that shape our conception of the global world."

When I chaired the World Commission on Dams, we worked out an approach to decision-making in development projects that I called 'globalisation from below'. This approach considered the rights and risks of global investors but it insisted on highlighting the human rights, as well as the considerable risks, of people who were most directly affected by the project. As we brought peasants, workers, women's groups and representatives of indigenous people into the negotiations, we saw the tremendous potential of grassroots globalisation for advancing human rights in transnational negotiations. In many other areas, I believe the future of human rights will also depend upon this new 'globalisation from below'. We might want to say that a public good is just another language for human rights. But it is a language that directly engages the global economy as an alternative to the commodification of all values. As such, our commitment to the public good goes to the heart of Amartya Sen's call to clarify "the values and ethics that shape our conception of the global world."

In the future of human rights as part of the right to development, revitalising our conception of the public good as a basis for national sovereignty, democratic governance, and economic development holds the promise of transforming our despair into hope in a globalising world. We will find the future of the right to development in the midst of the hardest cases. As a transformative agent, human rights - individual and collective - must be deployed at their best every time we engage the sources of our despair as avenues for revitalising hope. All of this, of course, requires great courage and imagination. We can only seek to seize this moment for the public good.

As this meeting is formulating recommendations for changes in existing multilateral arrangements that might make them more effective in dealing with threats to peace, let me invoke the prerogative of a keynote speaker to say some obvious things in conclusion.

First, the composition of the UN Security Council needs to be changed. This process has been stalled and needs to be revived. Permanent membership for an African state would go a long way towards enhancing co-operation
between the UN, the African Union, and the relevant regional economic communities in taking effective measures to prevent or remove threats to peace and security. The power differential which determined the identity of the five permanent members has totally changed. The reform of the Dumbarton Oaks institutions – the World Bank, the IMF, etc. cannot be postponed indefinitely.

Second, the African Union has formulated a Common African Defence Policy that is remarkably thorough. Its goals and objectives extend from defence co-operation to mutual trust, from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, from humanitarian assistance to environmental protections. This policy is a comprehensive plan for peace. The obvious problem with this plan is the high cost of implementation. When I was Minister of Education of South Africa, I adopted the slogan, “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.” In this case, we might say: “If you think peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building are expensive, try to measure the costs of conflict.” Nevertheless, these African initiatives will need to be funded, and will need to be thoroughly integrated into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and they will need to be a priority for the United Nations.

Third, while recognising the need for international support, we must continue to focus on formulating African solutions to African problems. Regional economic communities, with their history of conflict, also have a history of dealing with conflict in the various regions of the continent. This meeting is providing an extremely valuable opportunity to reflect on what might be learned from this wealth of experience.

Fourth, in a world divided between public institutions and the private sector, many commentators look to “civil society” as an antidote to allegedly corrupt public institutions and inevitably competitive private interests. Often we are told that “civil society” is weak, or ineffective, or even absent in Africa. Such denials of African civil society fail to understand the vitality of social networks, informed by trust, which enable people to work together to achieve common goals. Such networks enable people to survive conflict, and even recover from conflict. In the work of preventing and removing threats to peace, we have much to learn from the vitality of African social networks.

Recently, it has become fashionable to refer to such networks as “social capital” – the resources available to people who are included in social networks that are based on trust. In Africa, we might be poor, but we are rich in the “social capital” of mutual regard, mutual recognition, and mutual support under difficult and often impossible conditions of deprivation. Otherwise, to put it bluntly, we would not survive.

Our social networks might not fit a classic Western, liberal definition of “civil society”. That does not mean that “civil society” is absent in Africa. It means that we need to change our understanding of “civil society”. The question for this meeting, of course, is: How do we enable and energise existing social networks, based on trust, in which people might work together to prevent conflict, resolve conflict and recover from conflict?

Fifth, and finally, what many political analysts call “soft power”, the fine arts of diplomacy, negotiation and building trust, has become increasingly harder in our world. In our current geopolitical terrain, we are confronted with the brutal coercion of unilateral force and the subtle coercion of globalising co-optation. In these exchanges, “soft power” only seems weak. Our experience in South Africa, however, taught us that the “soft power” of recognising our diversity, negotiating through our differences and imagining a common ground was the source of our strength. I have no intention of being prescriptive. I have no illusion that our resolution in South Africa provides a model for the region, for Africa, or for the world. Nevertheless, if we are looking for lessons, grounded in experience, we should
not forget that in our lifetimes we witnessed the transformation of one of the most intractable conflicts in the world in South Africa.

Recalling the words of Nelson Mandela, a master of “soft power”, we must affirm the “solidarity of peace – loving nations”. This meeting, as I understand our objective, is dedicated to redefining “solidarity” so that it means establishing vital links – real networks – among the United Nations, the African Union, regional economic communities, African states, civil society, and other social agents. It is not enough merely to love peace. We must keep peace, make peace and build peace through new initiatives in African solidarity and African networks for peace. This meeting, I hope, will contribute to creating – not merely another map for peace – but a road for peace that we can all walk in Africa.

I thank you all.
ANNEX II

“Remembering Rwanda”

Address by General Henry Anyidoho, Former Deputy Commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda.

The April 1994 horrors in Rwanda stunned the world. Books have been written, countless interviews have been conducted and journalists have expounded their views with very revealing and horrifying pictures. The Best Practice Unit of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations has carried out a post-mortem. The United Nations and the OAU instituted separate investigations, and institutions of higher learning have carried out in-depth research. Still the question lingers: What went wrong? The answer in brief is that the world could not protect the Rwandese, let alone prevent genocide.

The atrocities which started soon after the crash of President Habyarimana's aircraft on 6 April 1994 resulted in Major-General Paul Kagame sending me a message at the headquarters of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Kigali on 8 April 1994 at about 16h00 that he was dispatching a battalion to Kigali to assist government forces in preventing further bloodbaths by renegade forces. On 12 April 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) entered Kigali. The next day, at about 05h00, the guns began to bark over Kigali. Sustained small arms, heavy machine gun, multiple rocket and artillery fire bellowed over the city. A well-ordinated attack started in earnest. The sadness that dominated my mind at the time gave the title to my book Guns Over Kigali. The aim of this brief presentation is to express my views ten years after Guns over Kigali.

Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993 provided UNAMIR with a strength of 2,548 personnel, even though a joint Rwandan Government/RPF delegation at a meeting on 15 September 1993 requested a force level of 4,260. Only a week after signing the Arusha Peace Agreement (the Accord between the Rwandan Government and RPF), the UN published a report which provided a worrying picture of the human rights situation in Rwanda. Why then did the Security Council establish such a small force, allowing for only three lightly equipped infantry battalions and under Chapter VI of the UN Charter? There seemed to be no political will on the part of UN member states, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to seriously intervene in Rwanda.

Security Council Resolutions are worded in such a way that the commander in the field can make his own interpretation. The 800 Ghanaians deployed in the DMZ (demilitarised zone) were too small a force to provide effective security for this area of several kilometres, and similarly, the 500 - member Belgian and Bangladeshi battalions could not maintain security in Kigali, which was designated by the UN as a “Weapons Secured Area”. Simply put, there was insufficient manpower and equipment to match the tasks that were assigned. Failure started from the onset because of a wrong assessment of the situation and improper synchronisation of troops and equipment to task - especially when signs of danger were looming.
Those of us on the ground in Rwanda were all aware of the inadequacies in the composition of UNAMIR. There was a lack of vehicles and radio equipment (we had to wait for them to come from other UN missions that were closing down). Meanwhile, co-operation between the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, and the UN Force Commander, Romeo Dallaire, was conflictual. The Rwandese, especially the government of President Habyarimana paid lip service to the Arusha Peace Accord. On 28 December 1993, UNAMIR accompanied 600 RPF troops to Kigali and installed some at the Parliament House. This was to be followed by the installation of a broad-based transitional government paving the way for democratic elections. I arrived in Kigali on 16 January 1994 and soon after, began to participate in the lengthy negotiations, but the transitional government was not established. UNAMIR soldiers were harassed by both government forces and the RPF. While the intransigence continued, there were reports of killings and massacres, which were duly reported to UN headquarters in New York. Much has been publicised about the cable of 11 January 1994 in which UNAMIR communicated a looming danger in Rwanda. Take a look at the following additional events:

- On 21 February 1994 Mr. Felicien Gatabazi, Minister of Public Works and a moderate Hutu Liberal Party (PL) leader, was shot and killed.

- On 22 February 1994, as a reprisal for Gatabazi’s death, the President of the Christian Democratic Party, Mr. Martin Buchana, was also ambushed near Butare and killed.

- On 3 March 1994, a grenade exploded in the house of a member of the Revolutionary National Movement for Development (MRND); his family and five other people were seriously injured. On the same day, at a meeting between the Vice Chairman of the RPF, Mr. Patrick Mazhimaka, and the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwiligiyimana, a Rwandese government force soldier on guard fired two rounds from his rifle and referred to it as accidental discharge.

- On 15 March 1994, an ambush was executed by an unknown group near Kinihira tea plantation and factory: killing the manager of the factory, his wife, the cashier and two other employees.

The conclusion from our assessment indicated that all the above incidents were politically motivated and our views were duly communicated to New York. As a security measure, UNAMIR, on 28 February, withdrew an expanded company of the Ghanaian battalion from the DMZ to strengthen security in Kigali. The RPF began to deploy some of its elements in the DMZ. Protests from UNAMIR led to greater restrictions on the patrol activities of our military observers. The RPF was building up forces northwest of Kabale in Uganda, an indication that preparations for a possible war were underway. The work of UNAMIR was becoming increasingly difficult and frustrating. One could smell danger everywhere in Kigali and beyond. Hell was certain to break loose!

News of the crash of the presidential jet spread like wildfire. I received orders from the Force Commander, General Dallaire, to proceed to our headquarters immediately and to take charge of affairs while he tried to link up with the authorities in Kigali. On my tortuous route to the headquarters complex, I had to negotiate my way through many roadblocks, which were being fortified and manned by government soldiers and notorious Interahamwe militia. They also undertook violent actions throughout Kigali. They headed for the homes of political opponents and started mass killings. The RPF could not stand by – military confrontation began.
Within a couple of days of the presidential plane crash, evacuation operations were carried out by France, Belgium and Italy. During that period, the warring factions observed a cease – fire – even though the roadblocks were still aggressively manned. UNAMIR requested reinforcements, but instead, the international community, due to pressure from Belgium, contemplated the total withdrawal of UNAMIR. The Foreign Minister of Belgium at the time, Willy Claes, on 12 April 1994, told the UN Secretary – General, Boutros Boutros – Ghali, that the Ghanaian contingent had fled Rwanda, which was false (it was, in fact, the only contingent that stayed behind), an attempt to have UNAMIR withdrawn from Rwanda.

The Belgian and Bangladeshi contingents were already prepared to abandon the Mission when the Security Council passed Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994 for a reduction of UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 personnel, and ordered a change of the mission’s mandate. A ship that was in distress had sent out an SOS message and the reply was to abandon it in mid – ocean. Only the contingent from Ghana was left, and we had to build our residual force from soldiers from Ghana. We actually kept a force level of 450, and hence violated the Security Council resolution. Everyday that Ghanaian soldiers stayed in Rwanda, I held myself accountable for every officer and man. I was worried about their families back home, especially after one of my soldiers was killed.

We felt forsaken with the passing of Resolution 912, as we no longer had the capacity to stop the massacres and negotiate with the warring factions. However, it was a daring effort on our part to save those few found hiding out or those that ran to our locations within Kigali. To add insult to injury, the Security Council passed Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, which authorised the multinational ‘Operation Turquoise’ with a chapter VII mandate to be led by France to the South Western Sector of Rwanda. This force was stronger, better equipped and deployed than UNAMIR and the resolution was being passed at a time when our mission could still not be supported.

Commanders require intelligence upon which to operate. The UN resisted using phrase intelligence, but rather opted for spying as the main means of intelligence – gathering. We had to rely on foreign envoys and unreliable volunteers as our sources of information, but even then, we were not allowed to fully use this information.

One of the most nagging difficulties faced by UNAMIR was poor logistics support. The UNAMIR administrative support system could not regularly provide food and water. Individual members of the force supplied us with biscuits and gari, a typical West African food made out of cassava, but these rations lasted only six days. We had to share with each other and with some of the internally displaced people. In addition, we did not have a blood bank. The best we could do was to identify individual donors. Power supply and telecommunications were disrupted in Kigali with the outbreak of violence. UNAMIR had very few generators and radio equipment as we were waiting for supplies from the Somalia and Cambodia UN missions.

Despite my complaints and accusations against the media, without the news reporters, we would have perished in Rwanda, a landlocked country in which the airport was closed and roads were blocked. It was the media that reported our plight through satellite communication to the world. However, Radio – Télévision Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM) in Rwanda incited the population to kill, reflecting the ugly side of the media’s power.

The OAU took the lead in establishing an Observer Mission in Rwanda in 1993 before the establishment of UNAMIR. As the international community was clearly failing in the face of genocide in Rwanda, what did the OAU do? I enjoyed the support of the contingent from Ghana and that of African officers from the Observer Mission. However, I felt and still feel that the OAU could have done more than just calling on its member states to provide troops. Certainly, some members responded by providing troops, but at a very slow pace. We did not have a visit
from the OAU headquarters during the crisis. No African religious leader visited Rwanda until much later. Similarly, there were no journalists that represented the media in Africa. Talk of an African Stand – by Force began with the OAU soon after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. We are still talking about it ten years later. When will these debates yield concrete action?

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Children's Fund were two UN agencies that stood by us in Rwanda. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs such as Adventist Development Relief Agency and Médecines sans Frontières, stayed with us throughout the genocide and beyond, delivering humanitarian aid. These agencies and NGOs are useful so long as they co-operate and support the interests of the population in distress. The military must also learn to understand and co-operate with UN agencies and NGOs.

In Rwanda, we did not have access to resources for humanitarian aid. Rwanda was a “failed state” at the time of, and immediately after, the genocide. Of what use were a bunch of soldiers with blue helmets to a community that was badly in need of food, medicine, shelter, clothing, hospitals and schools for their children? The government that was established immediately after the civil war had no resources for the administration of the country. All offices and ministries had been looted. Banks did not exist. The presence of troops under these circumstances gave the population a sense of security, but when they saw no concrete efforts in repairing the ruins of war, the Rwandese began to question the usefulness of the peacekeepers. The communities that were appreciative were those in which UNAMIR gave assistance by way of daily medical care and establishment of day – care centres for orphans. When the international community urges a failed state or a country that has passed through a bitter civil war to respect human rights, and for the internal factions to reconcile, it is incumbent on the same international community to quickly help with concrete measures in reconstructing that country.
Recommendations

• Concrete steps should be taken by governments to refrain from using ethnicity as the basis for governing people.
• Set up a quick intervention force in conflict zones, particularly when factors point to an emerging catastrophe.
• A successful peacekeeping operation requires a clear, unambiguous, and practical mandate.
• Political will on the part of all members of the UN is paramount. Members of the UN, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, must support the UN morally and financially and extend the same to regional and sub-regional organisations.
• There should always be a lead nation role in complex emergencies. A coalition of the willing and the capable under a UN or AU mandate.
• Coherent planning as a result of available useful intelligence and thorough reconnaissance will ensure a successful mission. Ad hoc, half-hearted approaches will always result in failure.
• The operational control of field units must be clearly defined.
• Contingents, once assigned to a UN, regional, or sub-regional mission, should remain loyal to their Force Commander. Certainly, consultation with home governments will continue, but battalion commanders “chickening out” of crucial operations because of fear should be relieved of their commands.
• The need for a strong logistics support unit remains a crucial issue and must be addressed.
• The establishment of Africa’s regional stand-by force should not be delayed.
• The role of the media is crucial but it must play a positive role.
• The AU’s Peace and Security Council is a laudable idea and must be given a practical definition. In a similar manner, sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC need the support of the international community to give practical meaning to their goals.
• Arms control is weak in developing countries, and, worst of all, in Africa. Stronger measures at the UN and at the level of regional organisations need to be instituted against member states that continue to ship arms to conflict zones.
• Conflict resolution institutions around the globe should be supported.
ANNEX III

AGENDA

Thursday 20 May 2004

19h00: Cocktail Reception
19h45: Dinner

Friday 21 May 2004

9h00 – 9h30: Welcoming Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo (CCR), Dr. Jeff Laurenti (UNF), Dr Werner Rechmann (FES), and Dr Stephen Stedman (UN High – Level Panel)

Session 1
9h30 – 11h15: The UN and Africa’s Security Architecture

Presenter: Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, UN Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Chair: Mr. Alan Thiam, African Union, Ethiopia

11h15 – 11h30: Coffee Break

Session 2
11h30 – 13h15: The UN and ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone

Presenter: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa
Chair: General Henry Anyidoho, former Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)

13h15 – 14h30: Lunch

Session 3
14h30 – 16h15: UN/AU Co-operation in Ethiopia/Eritrea

Presenter: Colonel Festus Aboagye, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa
Chair: His Excellency. Torben Brylle, Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa
19h00: Dinner

20h00: Keynote address: “South African, the United Nations and Human Rights”
Speaker: Prof. Kader Asmal. Chair, Portfolio Committee on Defence, Parliament of South Africa
Chair: Mr. Tor Sellstrom, Embassy of Sweden, South Africa

Saturday 22 May 2004

Session 4
09h00 – 10h30: When States Fail: Do organisations follow?
Presenter: Professor Rok Ajulu, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Chair: Dr. Mark Chingono, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa

10h30 – 10h45: Coffee Break

Session 5
10h45 – 12h30: Democratic Governance and Free Markets: Underpinning or Undermining Security?
Presenter: Dr. Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa
Chair: Dr. Ulrich Golaszinski, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Mozambique

12h30 – 13h45: Lunch

Session 6
13h45 – 15h30: Re – Building Peace in Shattered Societies: A Capacities Gap?
Presenter: Ambassador Felix E. N. Mosha, Africa Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues, Arusha, Tanzania
Chair: Ms. Alice Mogwe, Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Botswana

15h30 – 15h45: Coffee Break
Session 7
15h45 – 17h30: Africa, the UN and International Terrorism

Presenter: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar – es – Salaam, Tanzania
Chair: Dr. Irae Baptista Lundin, Instituto Superior Mocambicano de Relações Internacionais (ISRI), Mozambique

19h00: Dinner

20h00: Remembering Rwanda

General Henry Anyidoho, former Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of the UN Mission in Rwanda
Chair: Mr. Ben Amathila, Namibian National Assembly, Windhoek

Sunday 23 May 2004

Session 8
10h00 – 12h00: Panel Prospects and Future Action: Building Momentum

Chair: Dr. Jeff Laurenti, United Nations Foundation, New York, USA

12h30 – 14h00: Lunch
ANNEX IV

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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14. Dr. Cheryl Hendricks  
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15. Brig. Gordon Hughes  
    British High Commission.  
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16. Prof. Rifaat Hussain  
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17. Dr. Roger Kibasomba  
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18. Mr. Mathew D. Kitundu  
    National Parliament.  
    Dar – es – Salaam, Tanzania
19. Ms. Anicia Lala  
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22. Dr. Jeffrey Laurenti  
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24. Dr. Irae Baptista Lundin  
   Centre for Strategic and International Studies.  
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27. Mr. Kholisile Mazaza  
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   Cape Town, South Africa
28. Mr. Wilfred Mhanda  
   Zimbabwe Liberators Platform  
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29. Mr. Amade Miquidade  
   National Council for Defence and Security  
   Maputo, Mozambique

30. Mr. Kwezi Mngqibisa  
   African Centre for the  
   Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).  
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31. Ms. Alice Mogwe  
   Botswana Centre for Human Rights.  
   Gaborone, Botswana

32. Prof. M.G. Molomo  
   University of Botswana.  
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33. Ambassador Felix Mosha  
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34. Mr. Bereng Mtimkulu  
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