Introduction

Good governance, conceived here as a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development-oriented (Jeffries 1993:27), has remained illusive in Africa. Legitimacy has been determined not by democratic processes but largely by ascriptive and patron-client relations (Herbst 1990, Chabal 2002), while corruption has been pervasive (Mbaku 2000). This has left damaging consequences for development. In the early 1980s, the World Bank (1981) attributed sub-Saharan Africa’s lack of development to the absence of good governance. This led to a combined search by Africans and the dominant International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for solutions to Africa’s persistent crisis of governance, a search that culminated in the adoption of the ubiquitous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). SAPs, however, failed to spawn good governance, allowing mis-governance and human right violations to continue unabated. To be sure, rather than ameliorating, SAPs exacerbated the prospects for authoritarian tendencies evidenced, for example, in Jerry Rawlings Ghana (Amnesty International 1989, Haynes 1991) and Yuweri Museveni’s Uganda (Ayittey 1992: 148) once credited as success cases of SAPs. More generally,

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1 Good governance has become an evocative term yet its precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous. However, the use of the phrase by the World Bank and other credit-giving agencies suggest that good governance transcends the political realm to include not just a democratic setup, frequent elections and the respect for human rights, but also the judicious use of resources and the promotion of the private sphere (see, for example, World Bank 1981, 1992, Moore 1993: 41).
undemocratic practices have persisted in Africa notwithstanding the preponderance of multiparty elections, democratic constitutions and the presence of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

The OAU was established to among other things accelerate the decolonisation process of the continent, and promote development and cooperation among African states (OAU 1992:4). However, until its demise in 2002, the organisation left arguably a pathetically chequered record in the promotion of good governance. Against this background high expectations are placed on the African Union (AU), the successor of the OAU. The AU and its accompanying development paradigm, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), are premised among other things on good governance now recognised as an essential precondition for development. The dual initiatives of NEPAD and the AU have incorporated a peer review mechanism, popularly referred to as the African Peer Review (APR), by which African heads of state exercise some form of surveillance over their colleagues in a bid to ensure good governance. In what follows, I analyse the prospects for good governance under the AU, NEPAD and the APR. I contend that although the AU, NEPAD and the APR theoretically have a potential to promote good governance, too much expectation on these projects is misplaced. Rather, caution is recommended not only because these initiatives are new, but also because of the formidable institutional and operational challenges that confront them. To understand the formation of the AU and how it may impact on governance, however, some insights into the failures and subsequent demise of the OAU are germane.

The OAU and Good Governance

The OAU was formed in 1963 at a time when a good number of African states were emerging from the shackles of colonial rule. Although its objectives included “the promotion of international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (OAU 1992: 4), its primary objectives were the speedy decolonisation of Africa, the unity of the continent and the defence of the territorial integrity of states (OAU 1992). This was thought to be the tonic for the imperialist threats facing the continent. Thus the OAU was not designed as a human rights prevention or good governance promotion institution. The 1960s witnessed the emergence of an “ideology of development” which was associated with the thinking that economic development – the provision of social amenities and the building of infrastructure – should be the highest goal of government (Callaghy 1986: 47). This ideology gave prominence to collective welfare rather than human rights. Implicitly preferred by the OAU, the development ideology led to the proliferation of one-party systems, quasi- and full-scale dictatorships across Africa under which corruption, mismanagement and human rights violations flourished (Nyong’o 1992). Thus as the OAU focused primarily on the security and territorial integrity of states, it paid little or no attention to practices of bad governance. Nor was the OAU entirely successful in mitigating conflicts, which eventually came to dominate its agenda. To be sure, the increase in the number, scope and intensity of intra- and inter-state conflicts in Africa has been phenomenal.
since 1980 (Brown 1995: 101), with devastating consequences. One study found that there were 16 conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 1997. Of these 14 were intrastate and only two interstate conflicts - namely Chad/Libya and Rwanda/Uganda. Together, these conflicts induced more than eight million refugees and internally displaced persons, aside of the thousands killed (Laremont 2002:3). Yet, in none of these conflicts was the OAU successful in bringing termination. Indeed, since the ill-fated, Nigerian-led OAU intervention in the Chadian civil war in 1982, the organisation has shown an increasing weakness to confront the incidence of conflicts. Evidence of this was amply demonstrated in June 1998, when full-scale wars raged between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and between rebels and the government of Guinea Bissau while the Summit of the OAU Head of States and Governments was taking place in near by Burkina Faso (Akokpari 1999). It is fair to assert that the OAU’s conflict resolution measures hardly extended beyond the verbal condemnation of aggressors. The demise of the OAU and its replacement by the AU clearly showed that the former had failed to meet the continent’s post-cold war aspirations.

Equally sad, the OAU imparted deep contradictions in matters of good governance. Although the organisation theoretically professed the respect of human rights, some governments remained unremittingly brutal in the suppression of human rights. The regimes of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Arap Moi of Kenya, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, just to name a few, were classic examples in this regard. Among other things, these clumped down on opposition elements, inhibited press freedom and detained dissenting citizens without due process. Similarly, in addition to repression, some leaders, including Mobutu Seseko in Zaire, Moussa Traore in Mali and Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast, to name but a few, remained corrupt, accumulating personal fortunes, huge enough to pay off the entire external debts of their countries (Ayittey 1992: 233-264; Sandbrook 1985: 96). Surrounded by sycophants and opportunists “like pilot fish swimming around a shark”, Nyong’o (1992:93), these transformed into personal rulers and ran their countries as their private estates. The OAU did absolutely nothing about these regimes. It was as though the Summits of the OAU Heads of State and Governments had become more or less a forum for sharing experiences on how they survived or foiled coup attempts, or how they clumped down on opposition elements in their respective countries. Such summits neither creatively discussed the promotion of good governance nor the protection of human rights. The closest the summits came to doing this was to condemn military coups, which were instigated in most cases by their own misrule and ineptitude. The failure of the OAU to promote good governance or prevent conflicts has raised popular expectations on the AU. The question is: are these expectations well founded? Can the AU break new grounds and succeed where the OAU failed? Can the AU make a fundamental difference in the lives of Africans as far as the promotion of good governance is concerned? In the next section, we address these questions more closely by analysing the prospects and challenges of the AU in promoting good governance.
The AU, NEPAD and Good Governance

There are ample grounds for both optimism and pessimism about the capacity of the AU and NEPAD to promote good governance. The AU succeeded the OAU as the main continental organisation in Africa. Its birth was rooted in the conviction among African leaders that the OAU had demonstrated an inability to promote peace and development on the continent. This fundamental weakness was reflected among other things, in the organisation’s failure to salvage Africa from its socio-economic doldrums or become a catalyst for good governance. The incapacity of the OAU to meet the new challenges facing Africa was not accidental; it was formed at a time when the Cold War was gearing up. Four decades after, new issues have emerged for which the OAU institutions were unprepared. The abatement of the Cold War; the forces of globalisation; the dominance of neo-liberalism; the related phenomena of rebel movements and collapsed states; the threats of national and international terrorism; and the deepening of Africa’s economic crisis, along with its marginalisation in the international economy are among the novel issues, which the largely anachronistic institutions of the OAU could not adequately address. The AU was modelled after the European Union (EU) and seeks to promote African unity; contain, terminate and prevent conflicts; create a larger African market; and to find innovative ways of addressing the continent’s galaxy of intractable challenges, including debt, corruption, the scourge of HIV/AIDS, environmental decay, and good governance (Salim 2001). The AU expects to achieve these objectives through NEPAD.

NEPAD is a partnership programme established between Africa and the G8 countries. It emphasises three dimensions of governance; namely economic and corporate governance; political governance; and peace and security, among other things. NEPAD represents a form of moral contract between which African countries and the G8. While the former strive to improve governance and promote democracy by undertaking political reforms and market-friendly economic policies, the latter undertakes to assist those African countries committed to good governance, the promotion of human rights, poverty eradication, and economic growth. Such assistance is to be given through a programme of “enhanced partnership” established by the G8 at the Kananaski (Canada) Summit in June 2002. This is a programme through which African countries meeting the criteria of good governance and market reforms are rewarded with aid. The G8 assistance takes the form of development aid; i.e., assistance in building institutions, improving education, health care and combating HIV/AIDS as well as granting access to western markets. The NEPAD arrangement is expected to fetch Africa $64 billion in aid annually if the G8 meets its obligation (The Economist 22 June 2002: 44). Implicitly, then, the G8 aid to African countries under the partnership is neither guaranteed nor automatic. Rather, this is contingent on the latter meeting stated conditions, reminiscent of the panoply of conditionalities under SAPs.

Yet, a great deal of controversy still surrounds the origin of NEPAD. African leaders herald NEPAD as a homegrown programme designed to propel the continent out of its quagmires. This
claim is premised on the reality that NEPAD was an amalgam of three separate development programmes initiated between 2000 and 2001. The first was the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP), developed by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and whose main objective was to address Africa’s debt. MAP enjoyed the support of Presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The OMEGA Plan developed by the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, was the second. Enjoying the broad support of French African countries, OMEGA was concerned with building regional infrastructure and educational projects. The third was the Global Compact for Africa Recovery, which incorporated the idea of peer review and initiated by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, through a mandate given by African Ministers of Finance in 2000. The merger of these programmes in July 2001 at the AU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, culminated in the New African Initiative (NAI). However, NAI was renamed NEPAD in October 2001. At the Lusaka summit, a 15-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), representing all the regions of Africa and chaired by Nigeria, was appointed, and this had it first meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001.  

Critics, however, maintain that far from being an African-constructed programme, NEPAD was a project of a dominant capitalist agglomeration, which is also its real controller. As Bond (2003:12) contends:

NEPAD surfaced only after extensive consultations with the World Bank president and IMF managing director (November 2000 and February 2001); major transnational corporate executives and associated government leaders (at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2001); G8 rulers (at Tokyo in July 2000 and Genoa in July 2001); and the European Union president and individual Northern heads of state (2000-2001).

Indeed, for some NEPAD is simply a reformulated version of the discredited SAPs, developed by Western creditors as a weapon to control Africa (Adesina 2002; Matlosa 2002; Obi 2002). In outlining some of the lapses of NEPAD, Aredo (2003:30) argues that

Today, one major obsession of the west is to find ways to prevent African leaders from reversing the donor-imposed policies of economic liberalisation. No doubt, NEPAD is conceived to “lock in” policy reforms and to further contain any sorts of non-compliance with structural adjustment policies.

These counter claims are underscored not only by the web of conditionalties (similar to those under SAPs), to be met by African countries, but also by the absence of linkages between NEPAD and previously indigenous African development programmes such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Alternative to Structural Adjustment (AAF-SAP) developed by the ECA.

This controversy notwithstanding, NEPAD aims at tackling the continent’s multi-faceted crisis, reflected in poor economic performance, bad governance,
corruption and mismanagement, conflict and insecurity. More specifically NEPAD seeks to arrest and eradicate the deepening poverty on the continent; promote growth and sustainable development; halt and reverse the trend of the continent’s marginalisation; and restore peace, security and stability. In furtherance of these objectives, NEPAD focuses on certain priority areas, such as peace and security, economic and corporate governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and access to international markets. In contrast to SAP, NEPAD is projected as a partnership between Africa and the international creditor community. In this partnership, NEPAD hopes to accelerate the integration of the increasingly marginalised African continent into the global economy (Ubomba-Jaswa 2002). Yet, although it theoretically emphasises mutual partnership NEPAD is, as one observer puts it, “a partnership of unequal partners” (Asante 2003:14).

However, the extent to which Africans can be optimistic about the effectiveness of the AU and NEPAD in promoting good governance is the critical question. It is clear that the attenuation of the cold war in the late 1980s and the consequent rise to dominance of neo-liberalism has unleashed forces that underscore a culture of good governance and human rights protection. A country shunning these virtues risks isolation, western aid and investments. The G8, international financial institutions (IFIs) and nearly all bilateral donors have all joined the chorus of making good governance and human rights protection cardinal aid conditionalities. Thus accepting NEPAD as crucial to Africa’s recovery (evidenced by the lack of opposition to it at least thus far) and with the programme drawing heavily on western aid, African governments may be morally compelled to accept its dictates and thus facilitate good governance.

Moreover, dubbed as a home-grown project by African leaders (in contrast to SAPs, which were initially seen as externally imposed and therefore elicited opposition), NEPAD seems acceptable to African leaders, which in itself is a source of hope. Under NEPAD African leaders are for the first time willingly committing themselves to the defence of certain core universal principles, including good governance and human rights protection. The voluntary commitment by African states to NEPAD and its trappings excites confidence for the dawning of a new era, a radical departure from the old and familiar traditions of rent-seeking, and what Okoth-Ogendo (1991) referred to over a decade ago as “constitutions without constitutionalism” to cultures of accountability, transparency and responsibility. This optimism is reinforced by the truism that people are generally more inclined to accept self-imposed challenges and responsibilities, no matter how distasteful and burdensome than if these were externally imposed. Thus, seen as an Africangenenerated project, NEPAD may have higher chances of success in promoting good governance and inducing economic renewal than did SAPs.

But, if the affability of African leaders with NEPAD is a basis for optimism for good governance, the latter’s chances are even further enhanced by the new global disdain for undemocratic governance. Spreading in tandem with the collapse of communism, the culture of good governance and human rights respect has been supported by the dominant multilateral and bilateral agencies. This

http://www.nepadsn.org/nepad_presentation.html
has emboldened African civil society, which had hitherto retreated into slumber on account of its “Lilliputian” stature vis-à-vis the veritable “Kilimanjaro” states (Bratton 1989: 410-11). Since the ideological discreditation and retreat of communism, however, civil society has, in various parts of Africa, emerged out of its doldrums as counterweight to the state. Advocacy groups across much of sub-Saharan Africa have, with varying degrees of successes, acquired space from which to confront the state, keep it on its toes and prevent governmental abuses. It is this new lease of space and newly found freedom that has, for example, emboldened the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to press for the rolling out of anti-retroviral drugs to persons living with AIDS in South Africa; women groups to demand representation in many African countries (Tripp 2001); opposition elements to demand the freedom to form political parties in Swaziland (Mzizi 2002); and the general demand for accountability and transparency in governments across Africa. For these reasons, Africa can cling on to rays of hope for the promotion of good governance.

Nevertheless, there are limits to which this hope can be sustained. It is a truism that NEPAD in particular was hardly informed by discussions, debates or consultations. As De Waal (2002: 474) correctly noted

NEPAD has been designed by experts and adopted by governments with little public consultation. There is some popular discontent over this, and the weakness of consultation means that opportunities are being missed for strengthening popular ownership and ensuring that NEPAD promoted democracy.

In no African country, including Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, the founding members and leading advocates (and which can be referred to as the “big five”) of NEPAD, was anything close to a referendum contemplated, let alone held, to determine its public acceptance, depriving it of the necessary legitimacy. Moreover, the lack of consultation did not only expose a major contradiction in NEPAD’s stance on good governance, but also rendered the programme’s commitment to democracy highly suspicious. Lack of consultation has, in addition, left NEPAD vulnerable to the accusation that it is the brainchild of the leadership of only four African countries – Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa – who are setting an agenda for the continent. Yet even more importantly, the absence of public discussion on NEPAD considerably limited knowledge about it not only among the general public but also among some political elites. In October 2002, Ms Ama Benyiwa-Doe, a member of Ghana’s Parliament, candidly admitted that she and many of her colleagues in the law-making body knew nothing about NEPAD. Similarly, although Nigeria is one of the architects of NEPAD, the vast population in the country remain ignorant about the programme (Harsch 2003:7).

A further source of doubt about NEPAD’s ability to deliver good governance is linked to the suspicion of its externally-driven character and the consequent cynicism associated with it. Although African leaders are currently its leading advocates, NEPAD is widely suspected to be a project inspired by western creditors and specifically by the “Washington Consensus” (Adesina 2002). As Matlosa (2002) argues, a great deal of suspicion hangs around the
sudden and apparently inexplicable change of the name from NAI to NEPAD. This suspicion is bolstered by the evidently stronger partnership of NEPAD with international creditors than with the African people. As Bond (2003: 12) warily puts it, NEPAD has “too much legitimacy in Washington, London and Geneva; and too little at home.” African leaders at the forefront in the campaign to project NEPAD are seen as proxies of the creditor community whose other task is to promote the legitimacy of the programme. Such suspicions are likely to undercut popular faith in the project and thereby diminish its ineffectiveness. It will be recalled that one of the reasons for the poor performance of SAP in many African countries was its depiction as an alien programme. This perception crystallised popular opposition to SAPs, which in most cases deprived the programmes of the crucial support and legitimacy needed for success. A similar fate may befall NEPAD if it is perceived as another creditor community imposition.

The confusing relation between NEPAD and the AU has also exacerbated misgivings about the former. In underscoring the “Africaness” of NEPAD, President Mbeki emphasises that “African Union is the mother [and] NEPAD is her baby” (Mbeki 2003:44), suggesting two implicit and interrelated assumptions: that (1) the AU is the womb that bore NEPAD, and therefore (2) the AU has ownership and control over NEPAD. However, a closer examination of NEPAD’s implementation structures reveals serious disjuncture between the two initiatives. First, NEPAD is controlled by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), which meets once in every four months. Although the HSGIC reports to the AU Summit of heads of state and governments, it has total discretion over NEPAD issues. Besides, it directs a steering committee made up of the “big five” of NEPAD, which meets once a month. Further down is a permanent secretariat in the South African administrative capital of Pretoria, made up of five people under Mr. Wiseman Nkuhlu, a South African, to oversee the day-to-day running of the plans. A large assembly held once a year, the AU summit is practically ill-placed to effectively inform NEPAD issues, leaving critical decisions to the HSGIC. Consequently, the AU summit has come to exercise virtually little or no control over NEPAD – a classical African paradox of a mother without control over her baby. And even more contradictory, NEPAD, technically speaking, predated the AU. While NEPAD was launched in October 2001, the AU was inaugurated in July 2002 – another perplexing paradox; the mother is younger than her baby.

Second, as noted, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has been instrumental in shaping the current NEPAD document. The peer review mechanism, a crucial process considered as “the major selling point of NEPAD” (Taylor 2003: 284), was an innovation adopted from the ECA’s compact document. Given the ECA’s involvement in formulating past development programmes in Africa and its location in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the AU is also headquartered, one would have thought the location of the NEPAD secretariat in the Ethiopian capital would be a mathematical certainty. But, alas, that was not the case. Its location instead in Pretoria is a further sign that NEPAD is far from being entirely owned by the AU. Thirdly, while the AU has no criteria for
membership, beneficiaries of the “enhanced partnership” must satisfy conditions of good governance and economic liberalisation. Thus, the determination of which African countries would benefit from NEPAD or the G8’s “enhanced partnership” is beyond the domain of the AU, suggesting again that NEPAD is not necessarily the child of the AU.

The dominance in African politics of neo-patrimonialism and its potential to subvert well-meaning development programmes is a further source of pessimism on NEPAD’s ability to instigate good governance. Described as a system in which “government rests on well-understood, if unequal, forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their clients along vertical social lines” (Chabal 2002:450), neo-patrimonialism has been endemic in African politics and represents one of the major factors stalling development. So inseparable is the practice from politics in Africa that neither SAPs nor the multiparty elections imposed on Africa as conditions for aid and designed to promote good governance was effective in abating. On the contrary, SAP and democratisation offered new opportunities for Africa’s ruling elites to strengthen patron-client relations. For example, while SAPs brought in the much-needed resources to lubricate the wheels of clientelism, the pressure to democratise created auspicious conditions for “managed elections” by which old ruling elites regained long-lost legitimacy (Chabal 2002). Embodying the latest set of conditions for western aid, NEPAD may be unlikely to counter this deeply-entrenched practice of neo-patrimonialism in Africa and thus spawn good governance. Like SAPs and multipartyism, NEPAD may become the latest manifestations of the usual “yes, I do” pledges of African leaders to attract overseas development aid (ODA).

NEPAD faces yet another challenge linked to the commitment of the G8 and other bilateral creditors in meeting aid obligations. The global war on terrorism declared by the US President, George W. Bush Jnr., after the 11 September 2001, may take Africa off the priority list of the West, to accelerate a trend that was already unfolding. Since the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, ODA and foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries and particularly to sub-Saharan Africa had on the aggregate been dwindling. For example, although total ODA to Africa stood at US$23.5 billion in 1994, this plummeted to US$18.7 billion in 1997 (UN Information Department 1999: 6). Similarly, total FDI to sub-Saharan Africa fell from $8.6 billion in 1997 to $6.5 billion in 2000 (UN Information Department 2001: 28). This has been caused in part by the discovery of new investment opportunities following the liberation of East European economies, and partly by the inauspicious investment climate in Africa caused by corruption, bad governance and warlordism. The campaign against international terrorists – invisible and borderless enemies – requires huge amount of resources to prosecute and is certain to decrease the proportion of aid to Africa. The recurring threat posed by the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Ba’ath establishment in Iraq and the vast number of fanatic and anti-western organisations in the Middle East and South Asia would combine to refocus western and especially US attention away from Africa on to combating these threats. Real and eminent, this fear is shared by the leading exponents of NEPAD. The director-general of
President Mbeki’s office, Dr. Frank Chikane, expressed concern that the war on terrorism would overshadow Africa’s priorities such as NEPAD (UN Information Department 2003: 10). This is compounded by the attempts of the US and its western allies to resolve the complex and seemingly intractable Israel-Palestinian problem. These related western concerns might impact negatively on NEPAD.4

Even granting that NEPAD becomes a reality, the vast differences in the economic fortunes and capabilities of African states are certain to accentuate a disproportionate distribution of its gains and pains among the regions in the continent. With the ending of the Angolan war, Southern Africa has become a much more stable and perhaps economically more prosperous region (notwithstanding the marring of its stability credentials by the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe) than western or central Africa. Consequently, it would be a much more attractive as a region for investment than other regions in Africa. Yet, for various reasons an unequal distribution of the rewards of NEPAD among SADC countries is inevitable. South Africa is certain to receive a lion’s share of investment. Already, with better infrastructure and investment climate, South Africa was by 1997 receiving a net FDI of $1,705 million, equivalent to 54 percent of all FDI to the Eastern and Southern African region (UNDP 1999:45) and generating over 70 percent of the total GNP of the Southern African Development Community – SADC (Lee 2000). Having attained the enviable and unassailable status as the economic powerhouse of Africa, South Africa is sure to attract more than its fair share of total FDI to Africa. In the final analysis, South Africa stands to be a major beneficiary of a successful NEPAD. This probably explains the active role of the South African president in NEPAD issues.

Also, although the continental organisation has a new name, the AU may simply be the same old wine in new bottles. The AU is composed of the very countries that constituted the OAU and the very heads of states that perpetuated bad governance and brutally suppressed human rights. This makes it difficult to see just how different the AU is from the OAU. Besides, the AU appears too ambitious in achieving continental unity in a short time. The EU, whose success it attempts to replicate took four decades to materialise. It began in 1951 with the integration of the steel industries of six countries5, to the Treaties of Rome in 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC). Full integration of defence policies, justice and home affairs was achieved only under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992

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4 In July 2003, President Bush visited Africa to possibly repair the damage done to Afro-American relations following Washington’s unilateral invasion of Iraq, to drum up African support for his war on terrorism and to allay fears that Africa would be out of the spotlight of American aid. As part of this courting campaign, Bush announced a $15 billion aid package to developing countries, including Africa to fight HIV/AIDS. However, this is grossly inadequate compared to the vast amount of money committed to Iraq. In October Congress granted President Bush an additional $87 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq Mail and Guardian 31 October 2003). Similarly, at the Madrid international donor conference in October 2003, the EU pledged a total of €200 million for rebuilding Iraq Mail and Guardian 3 October 2003). No such huge financial commitments are made to Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Somalia which are clearly struggling either to reconstruct their collapsed states or to feed their populations.

5 These countries were Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands.
(Dedman 1996), while monetary union was accomplished as recently as January 2002.\textsuperscript{6} With the admission of 10 more countries, the total membership of the EU will grow to 25 by May 2004. The origin of the EU in 1951 to its consolidation in 2002 was thus gradual and functional, involving a slow process of expansion in membership and in the deepening of sectoral integration. This slow pace of expansion enabled the nascent institutions of the organisation to grow and to educe the confidence of both member governments and citizens. Besides, although an organisation in continental Europe, membership in the EU was not automatic for countries. Rather, membership was contingent on meeting certain conditions, including the implementation of market and democratic reforms as well as meeting specified inflation and other economic targets (\textit{Mail and Guardian}, 11 October 2002).

By contrast, the AU adopted a rapid and a more or less robust approach under which there is an illusory dream of achieving political union, a United States of Africa, within months. No time was allowed for the hastily created institutions and organs of the organisation to develop. Unlike the EU, there were no credible existing sectorial integrations or regional formations, providing the basis for enlargement and eventual progression into a continental union. The gathering of Africa’s Heads of States in Durban in July 2002 simply legislated the AU into existence without a history of natural development. And this is in a continent characterised by conflicts, mutual suspicion, weak economies and heavy dependence on the North (Makgotho 2002: 1). Besides, unlike the EU, membership in the AU is a matter of course; no criteria for joining exist except the signature of the head of state or government, thus creating a union of countries with wide divergence in economic, social and political positions.

Such vast disparities, especially in economic terms, have a natural tendency to trigger auxiliary and, indeed, inimical developments such as uncontrollable migration from poor to the more affluent countries in the union. Moreover, in the midst of troubling economies marked by escalating external debts, it is unclear how the financial obligations of member states to the AU would be met. Already, the AU is estimated to require an annual budget of $64 million up from the current $51 million. At the same time some member countries are in arrear to the tune of $39 million (Yedder 2003:14). Majority of these defaulting countries are those either presently at war or who have experienced some sort of upheavals in the recent past and are therefore unlikely to speedily settle their arrears.\textsuperscript{7} Similar questions relate to the AU’s ability to successfully prevent conflicts and promote peace and stability. This is a legitimate concern given that even with the formation of the AU it took the intervention of French troops in 2002 and US marines in 2003 to restore some semblance of order in war-torn Ivory Coast and Liberia respectively. These are compelling questions that may be sources of doubt about the ability of the AU to chart a completely new direction from the OAU. One remarkable point of departure of the AU from the OAU, however, is its emphasis on interference, albeit minimal, in the internal affairs of states through the APR in sharp contrast to the

\textsuperscript{6} http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm

\textsuperscript{7} These countries include DR Congo, Central African Republic, Comoros Islands, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Somalia.
old and discredited dictator-loved principle of non-interference advocated by the OAU (OAU 1992: 5). The APR is an unprecedented process built into the AU and NEPAD to promote good governance. As a distinct innovation, the APR deserves some separate analysis from the AU.

**The African Peer Review (APR)**

The Peer Review Mechanism (PRM), commonly referred to as the African Peer Review (APR), is a remarkable component in the AU framework. It is a process by which African states with the assistance designated institutions periodically review the progress of states in matters of governance. This is achieved by assessing the adherents of states to certain principles of governance set out by both NEPAD and the AU. This review process is to be done under the auspices of the AU. The key purposes are to ensure the compliance of African states with certain standard practices of governance agreed upon by the AU summit in July 2002; as well as to assist states to review and improve their policies and policy-making and thereby maximising the attainment of their commitment to acceptable codes of conduct. Designed to improve especially economic and corporate governance, these practices essentially include those conventionally known to foster good governance such as democracy, the respect for human rights and the adoption of sound economic policies.

The APR is a new initiative in Africa, although it has been practised among the OECD countries. For Africa, it presents fresh opportunities for empowering and strengthening institutions of democracy to ensure that the basis of governance transcends the narrow confines of personal rule, patron-client relations or ethno-religious politics. The agreement on the APR provides for the establishment of an Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) to be responsible for the review and assessment process. For representivity and balance, the IPEP is to consist of between five and seven members with at least one member from the AU’s major sub-regions – Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and western Africa. In May 2003, six of the seven members were appointed, representing all sub-regions, but North Africa. They include Ms Graca Machel, a Mozambican and wife of former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela; Professor Adebayo Adedeji, a Nigerian; Ms Marie-Angelique Savane from Senegal; Mr. Bethuel Kiplagat, Kenyan; Ms. Dorothy Njeuma, a Cameroonian and Mr. Chris Stahls from South Africa (*Africa Recovery*, 17(2) July 2003: 4). All members of the IPEP, including the chairperson and vice-chairperson are appointed by the fifteen-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee – HSGIC (UNECA 2002: 9-10). But the central question is: can the APR spawn a fundamental difference in the style of governance in Africa?

**Prospects for the APR**

There are good reasons why Africans can be positive about the APR injecting some sanity into governance practices characterised by corruption and informal relations. A project in which states can voluntarily opt in or out without losing their AU membership, the APR is premised on the belief that African leaders will be more willing to accept and implement recommendations from their peers than from international creditors, whose disfavour with discredited governance practices often translate into aid suspension. Implicit in
the APR, moreover, is the assumption that criticism from fellow African leaders will serve as a form of pressure on countries that have been reviewed and who have been adjudged to have fallen short of meeting the criteria of good governance, to reform (UNECA 2002: 7).

Furthermore, the APR can serve as a disincentive for potential dictators for two interrelated reasons. In the first place, the assumption that the report of the IPEP would be publicised could alert regimes to the need for good governance. The fear that a regime’s appalling human rights, corruption or mismanagement record would be publicised could encourage countries to be more responsible and make efforts to avoid being “blacklisted”. Since as a rule countries strive to maintain good international standing, this could be a powerful incentive to remain “clean”, or to backtrack from unacceptable governance practices. Secondly, as the dominant objective of African post-cold war and indeed post-independence foreign policies has largely been to secure foreign aid (Agyemang-Duah and Daddéh 1994; Akokpari 2004), some moral pressure has come to bear on African leaders to pass the APR test in order to ingratiate their states to the international creditor community as a prerequisite for securing external aid and investments.

Moreover, where voluntary compliance fails to work, a form of “backdoor” or “quite diplomacy” may be used by peers to persuade a wayward state into compliance, something similar to what South Africa is currently doing, albeit unsuccessfully, to restore calm to Zimbabwe. In the light of these measures, it seems fairly reasonable to assume that under the APR regime the prospects for good governance are greater now in Africa than have ever been. However, one of the greatest dilemmas facing Africa is the dichotomy between theory and practice; the gap between rhetoric and reality. As a result of this gap optimism about the prospects for good governance predicated on the APR needs to be tempered with caution. Africa has been known to be a continent of “disappointed hopes”, where elaborate and innovative proposals have either survived only on paper, have been implemented on an adhoc basis, or simply have been ephemeral in life span. Export-led development strategies, which promised hope for Africa in the 1960s soon turned to be disappointments as were the widely adopted SAPs whose initial promises of hope soon turned to despair.

Besides, Africa has in the past suffered numerous disappointments in aid deals with creditor nations. In 1986, for example, the UN developed a four-year recovery programme, the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PARRED) 1986-1990. This programme embodied pledges by the international creditor community to provide assistance to Africa. However, the tepid response from the international community condemned UN-PARRED to a premature demise. Again, in 1991, the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) was adopted under which the creditor community was to, among other things, commit 0.7 percent of its GNP as ODA to Africa. On their part, African countries committed themselves to economic and democratic reforms.

8 It is clear though that the policy of quite diplomacy has not worked in the light of the escalating human right abuses and deepening economic situation in Zimbabwe.
However, by the close of the decade, only the Netherlands, together with the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden provided 0.7% or higher of their GNP as ODA to Africa. To be sure, aggregate ODA to Africa actually plummeted from $28.6 billion in 1990 to $16.4 billion in 2000 (Bentsi-Enchill 1997; Asante 2003:16). Here, too, the pledge from the donor community went unfulfilled.

Also, in 1996 the industrialised countries instituted the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives under which the former earmarked 41 countries, 33 of which were in Africa, to benefit from debt relief. Debt relief was contingent on meeting certain conditionalities, including a 3-6 year track record of successful structural adjustment reforms. With the exception of Uganda, which had a 20 percent debt cancellation for all its impressive SAP record, very few African countries saw tangible result in debt reduction and the talks on HIPC seem either to have completely gone awry or have been overshadowed by the NEPAD rhetoric (Akokpari 2001:157-160). Accordingly, undue expectation on the APR and on NEPAD on which it is based may be highly misplaced. And there are legitimate grounds for this.

Obstacles for the APR

As indicated earlier, membership in the APR project is purely voluntary. States can either sign up or stay out. Even those who initially joined the project can withdraw without any serious diplomatic consequences. The challenge, therefore, is how a country persisting in human rights violations can be made to reform if it withdraws from the APR or simply refuses to sign up. Related to this, the APR lacks any definite elements of compulsion. The IPEP has no clearly defined ways of obligating deviant states to reform. It does not, for example, spell out any process of subjecting states to diplomatic, economic or any form of punitive sanctions in the event of poor or non-compliance with the established principles. This rather loose setup with seemingly no compelling strings and no internal coercive mechanisms has failed to attract African countries to the project. It is little wonder, therefore, that by end of 2003 only 15 of the AU’s 53 member countries have signed up for the APR (South African Department of Foreign Affairs 2003).

The lack of compulsion is certain to keep countries such as Libya, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, the current epicentres of human rights abuses in Africa, and those with dubious human rights records out of the APR project for fear that it could be used by the AU as a tool for meddling in their internal affairs.

And the confusing, often contradictory, interpretations of the purpose of the APR by African leaders, the very proponents of NEPAD, are not helping the former’s credibility either. Given Africa’s appalling track record on human rights and governance in general, the dominant assumption was that the APR would serve as a measure to assure international creditors of the continent’s resolve to change. The G8 and many Africans enthusiastically welcomed the APR idea on the belief that it would assuage the chronic practice of misgovernments by chastising culprits. However, recent statements by some African presidents tend to suggest the contrary. President Thabo Mbeki, for example, was reported to have claimed that “there was never ever any suggestion that we have a NEPAD peer

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9 These include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda.
review process that would conduct the work of the commission on human rights” (Taylor 2003: 283). Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambican leader and current chair of the AU, was reported to have warned against talking about peer pressure even in countries with blatant human rights violations; and the Zambian leader, Levy Mwanawasa, who emerged from the country’s 2002 controversial elections, argues that “peer review must not be about isolation” (The Economist 22 June 2002: 44). Such statements are unremittingly disturbing and are not only setting the stage for the manipulation of the APR for self-serving objectives, but also validating the suspicion that it was included in the AU agenda purposely to placate international creditors. Moreover, they give credence to the Afro-pessimists who believe that NEPAD and the APR are nothing more than a tattered veil for corruption and misrule.

Also, likely to hinder the implementation of the APR, as noted already, is the huge dearth of knowledge about NEPAD, on which it is based. The lack of knowledge on NEPAD will surely translate to lack of knowledge on the APR, which will in turn vitiate the latter’s legitimacy. The poor response so far from members to the AU’s call for members to sign up for the APR is a testimony perhaps of the inadequate knowledge of the process, which in turn resulted from the non-involvement of social groups in the design and implementation of NEPAD. Although this cannot be a plausible reason for the paltry response since African governments appended their signatures to the AU Charter and claimed ownership of NEPAD, it suggests the general lack of interest in the process caused in the first instance by the inadequate knowledge about NEPAD and what it entails. Moreover, how IPEP would gather information about countries is far from lucid. Whether this will be the responsibility of citizens and social groups still remains muted. It is clear however, that the dearth of knowledge about NEPAD and the APR will potentially limit the ability of civil society to be of assistance to the IPEP.

In addition, the APR could be shrouded in deep suspicion as to undermine its credibility and effectiveness. This will especially be the case if it is suspected that the process is controlled or hijacked by states to be used as an instrument of foreign policy. Consequent on the financial implications, countries like South Africa and Nigeria, who are among the key driving forces behind the project, and who are certain to bear the greatest financial burden of the AU and NEPAD initiatives, presumably had disproportionately stronger voices in the appointment of the IPEP and other AU and NEPAD officials. Such leverage in appointment could enhance the ability of these countries to exercise some measure of “behind the scene” control over these officials and can potentially compromise the autonomy, neutrality and objectivity that should ideally characterise their work. Many observers believed that the appointment of Alpha Oumar Konare, the former Malian president, as Chairman of the AU Commission, above Amara Essy, the Ivorian and then serving Executive Secretary of the OAU, had involved considerable arm-twisting by Mbeki and Obasanjo. A related and,

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10 Amara Essy, who towards the end of his term saw clear signs that Thabo Mbeki was showing preference for the former Malian president, Oumar Konare, as the new Chairperson of the AU Commission decided not to run. However, the Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo, prevailed upon him to run, promising all the necessary support for his candidature. Suddenly, however, Laurent Gbagbo withdrew support for Essy, a candidate he persuaded to run in the first
indeed, disconcerting dimension to the appointment of Oumar Konare is the looming possibility of turning the post of the Chair of the AU Commission into an exclusive preserve of retired heads of states rather than technocrats. This precedent will spawn little surprise if one of the current leaders in the “big five” becomes Konare’s successor. Moreover, the composition of the six appointed members of the IPEP so far suggests that less influential countries in the AU may have muted voices in the NEPAD structures. More generally, the dominance of certain states in the AU/NEPAD setup might give them monopoly over the definition of good governance.

A further source of concern is the possibility of African leaders shying away from condemning their peers even in cases where the IPEP produces damning reports. The continental silence on human right violations in Rawlings Ghana in the 1980s, Abacha’s Nigeria in the 1990s, the range of bizarre human right abuses in the Sudan, Cameroon, and the absence of direct condemnation of the grotesque and systematic human rights abuses under President Mugabe whose policies are becoming an unmitigated disaster for Zimbabwe, have amply demonstrated African leaders’ lack of moral courage to reprove fellow peers. The call by the democrat and former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, to subject Zimbabwe to the APR (Hlophe 2003: 3) is highly unlikely to be heeded by the AU. Already, Pretoria rejects demands by human rights groups and its own opposition parties for a tough stance on Harare. In February 2003 the Foreign Minister, Dr. Nkosana Dlamini Zuma, stated unequivocally that “we [South Africa] will never criticise Zimbabwe” (Bond 2003: 15).

African leaders seem to share membership in a cryptic club, what Sandbrook (1984) has humorously yet aptly characterised as a “presidential brotherhood”, in which there is little inclination to castigate but greater tendency to empathise with members. The affirmation of the brotherhood bond, as in the past, was demonstrated at the launch of the AU. At this gathering, the AU heads of states refused to recognise Marc Ravalomanana as the winner of the December 2001 elections and thus as the legitimate leader of Madagascar and instead threw support for the old and long-time leader, Didier Ratsiraka, whose controversial victory was annulled by the country’s highest constitutional court in April 2002. In another glaring display of solidarity, African leaders wasted no time in congratulating President Obasanjo after both local and international observers dubbed the April 2003 Nigerian elections that returned him to the presidency as characterised by “serious irregularities” (Mail and Guardian 26 April 2003). The natural proclivity of African leaders for condoning bad governmental practices of their peers, as a way of lending themselves to less future criticisms, is a cautionary signal about the extreme dangers of placing undue expectation on the APR as a catalyst for good governance (Mangongera 2002).

Equally worrisome is the inability of African states to effect internal policy changes in countries about which unfavourable reports would be written. Historically, what has spawned reversals in domestic and foreign policies of
African states has been the pressure from the international creditor community which use the threat of aid suspension, or international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) which use the influence of their home governments. For example, in the mid-1990s, domestic pressure to force President Arap Moi to improve his regime’s human rights records yielded no results until the Green Belt Association of Kenya advised the Paris Club to suspend aid to the country. This eventually compelled the Kenyan leadership to improve upon the country’s atrocious human right records (Wangari 1995). Similarly, it was the threat of loosing international aid that forced hesitant Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana to accede to multi-party elections in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Since African countries are generally not a source of aid to fellow African states, verbal condemnation may have little, if any, impact on actual policy reversals in the offending country. In other words, the APR may have minimal impact if its administration is left entirely on African leaders who lack credible instruments of sanctions. Some threats of diplomatic isolation, suspension of aid, denied membership in the AU’s structures, e.g. the AU Parliament, the AU Summit, etc, are necessary to make the APR an effective tool for good governance.

Also, of concern is the APR’s silence on environmental crimes. The project is neither loud nor explicit on the redressing of grievances related to environmental pollution held by various communities in Africa. Degrading the environment and thus denying its use to communities whose livelihood depends on it amounts to blatant violations of communities’ rights. Such is the plight of many communities in Africa, including the much-publicised Ogoni community in the Niger delta of Southern Nigeria (Obi 1997) and communities in the gold mining areas of Ghana (Akokpari 2001: 203). The AU need to come to the quickest realisation that the pressure to repay debt and or make countries competitive under globalisation is forcing many African states to compromise environmental standards. Moreover, the AU needs to realise that an effective affront on poverty cannot be achieved in isolation from environmental protection. In the meantime the AU and NEPAD’s silence on environmental issues, which are globally assuming new levels of importance, along with the fact that reviews and reprimand are periodic, allowing human right violations to persist in the intervals between reviews, should serve to limit expectations on the efficacy of the APR to promote good governance.

**Conclusion**

The failure of the OAU and previous development programmes to improve the standard of governance in Africa has placed high expectations on the AU and NEPAD. Although the relation between the two agendas remains somewhat confusing, African leaders generally believe that NEPAD is homegrown and owned by the AU. The AU, which succeeded the OAU seeks among other things to address the growing challenges facing post-Cold War Africa, including marginalisation and governance through charting new directions in the continent’s domestic politics and international relations. As noted, NEPAD represents a “new” development agenda based on partnership with creditor countries. It embodies conditions of good governance and sound macro-economic policies to be met by Africa as prerequisites for benefiting from the “enhanced
partnership” established by the leading creditor countries. As noted, NEPAD seeks to reverse Africa’s developmental malaise through the institution of good governance practices and aid from the north. A key instrument for the promotion of good governance is the APR, which provides a framework for exposing and reprimanding governments persisting in practices inimical to good governance and development.

The paper argued that there are ample grounds for optimism on the ability of NEPAD and the APR to promote good governance. NEPAD is dubbed as a home-initiated project, which gives it some degree of support and legitimacy in Africa. Besides, the growing international aversion for undemocratic regimes and practices enhances the prospects for good governance under the NEPAD. These conditions are further strengthened by the willingness of African leaders, in principle, to sign up for the APR, although, as indicated already only about a quarter of them have so far signed up. The willingness of African leaders to have the APR in the AU document is itself an encouraging sign. Moreover, the fear of being excluded from the G8 “enhanced partnership” scheme may compel African government to remain “clean” in order to qualify for ODA and FDI. For these reasons, the APR is a potentially effective weapon for catalysing good government in Africa.

However, the paper has also noted the daunting hurdles facing NEPAD and the APR in promoting good governance, hurdles that underscore the need for caution in celebrating the birth of NEPAD and the APR as instruments of good governance. NEPAD in particular remains a suspicious and controversial project, especially because it was not informed by debates and consultations. Because it excluded African social groups, even some governments, in its formulation, it is suspected of being externally-driven or a new version of SAP. This suspicion robs NEPAD of the necessary support for implementation. Furthermore, the prevalence of informal relations underlying African politics may emasculate the potency of NEPAD. The AU, the political framework for NEPAD, may itself be ineffective since in many ways it is hardly different from the OAU. Besides, the AU seems to bite more than it can chew. The ambition to achieve continental integration within a short time, something the EU achieved in 40 years, may weigh down adversely on the nascent organisation.

Similarly, the APR is certain to face nearly insurmountable obstacles. As indicated already, membership in the project is voluntary, which does not serve as an incentive for countries making headlines in human right violations and in corruption. Even so, the little force left for the APR is being systematically toned down by African leaders through statements designed to lessen expectations from the project. The ever-present inclination of African leaders to support and protect each other from international criticism, along with the suspicion that it was invented as a tool for attracting aid, increase cynicism about the APR. Such perceptions only compound the already daunting challenges facing the implementation of the APR system - herein lies the need for caution in celebrating NEPAD, the AU and the APR as catalysts for precipitating or consolidating good governance.
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