

SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE



**CENTRE FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION**



SEMINAR REPORT

STELLENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA 29 JULY - 1 AUGUST 2004. RAPPORTEURS: CHERYL HENDRICKS AND KAYE WHITEMAN
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Centre for Policy Studies



African Centre for
Development and
Strategic Studies

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About The Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is affiliated with the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. The organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa, and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa's regional organisations, as well as on policy research on South Africa's role in Africa; the UN's role in Africa; AU/NEPAD relations; and HIV/AIDS and Security.

The Centre for Policy Studies

The Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, South Africa, is an independent policy research institution, which seeks to influence policy debate and dialogue through original policy research in the areas of governance, democratization and development. CPS also serves as a forum for debate among policymakers, scholars, analysts and other stakeholders in the policy community.

The African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies

The African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) in Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria, is both a strategic think-tank for African development and an advocacy institution. ACDESS is multi-disciplinary in its research approach and provides a unique link between research and policymaking communities in Africa.

About The Rapporteurs

Dr. Cheryl Hendricks is the Academic Programme Manager at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa.

Mr. Kaye Whiteman is the Editorial Adviser to *Business Day*, Nigeria, and former editor of *West Africa*.

The organisers would also like to acknowledge the editorial input of Mr. Yazeed Fakier in completing the report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2004, South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy. Among many stock-taking exercises, it seemed opportune to reflect on the role that the country has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation. Thus, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, and the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) in Nigeria, held a three-day policy seminar on "South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Decade". The meeting took place in Stellenbosch, South Africa, between 29 July and 1 August 2004. About 70 African participants drawn from policymakers, academia, business, civil society and the media attended the seminar. Members of the donor community and a few European scholars were also present.

Nelson Mandela noted in 1993 that the new democratic South Africa could not "escape its African destiny". The convergence of this destiny with the country's strength relative to other African countries, deriving from its greater resource base as the wealthiest and most industrialised state on the continent, reinforces South Africa's responsibility to play a leadership role in the promotion of peaceful political transitions, good governance and human rights. Africa's prosperity and stability are plainly in South Africa's own national interest.

The Stellenbosch seminar placed special emphasis on the interface between South Africa's domestic political, economic and social contexts, and its foreign policy, especially its geo-strategic location in Africa. South Africa's political transition had been a negotiated settlement with its inherent compromises that left the national question unresolved. The duality of the apartheid system continued, albeit in modified form. This duality, combined with the slow progress in de-racialising the "commanding heights" of the economy, have diminished South Africa's moral credibility in the eyes of many African critics. The xenophobic aspects of South Africa's immigration policies, arising historically from the "Africa of labour reserves", underscore both the country's inadequate knowledge base on Africa and the lack of a large and influential domestic constituency in support of the government's Africa policy. South Africa's economic weight on the continent, especially in the light of persistent underdevelopment in many parts of Africa, was also the subject of much discussion, particularly in the context of the country's current continental expansion in trade and investment, and the serious trade imbalances between South Africa and the rest of Africa.



Participants at the seminar on "South Africa in Africa", held in Stellenbosch.

The African Context: Multilateralism and Renaissance

Southern Africa's Frontline states, faced with the need to reduce their dependence on the apartheid regime, established the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 as an economic grouping which was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. SADC has made little progress in regional integration and trade, and its 14 member states still face challenges of external dependency, lack of diversification of production, and national rivalries. Stripped of a common enemy – apartheid South Africa – regional relations have become competitive, and SADC has become the theatre of rivalries, as evidenced in 1998 by controversial interventions in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.

The struggle over the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC), formerly chaired by Zimbabwe, and now by South Africa, illustrated the practical difficulties Pretoria has experienced in its regional policy. The contrast in South Africa's relations with Mozambique and Angola are instructive. Where relations with Mozambique - South Africa's largest trading partner in the region and recipient of major investments - have been close and cordial, those with Angola have long been tense and competitive. There was much evidence to show that in ten years of transition from pariah to legitimate player, South Africa has taken substantial steps to assert its presence on the continent, especially through corporate and parastatal investments, which, in turn, generate trade. Some participants argued that Pretoria may have acted like a partner in Africa, but behaved more like a hegemon. It was also noted that the South African market is too small for its products, and that its own enlightened national interest has underpinned its aggressive economic drive into the rest of Africa.

The seminar appraised specific case studies of South Africa's involvement in the region which met with mixed results in the DRC, Lesotho, Comoros and Burundi. Other regions, such as East Africa, francophone Africa, and North Africa, were also discussed. In West Africa, the focus was mainly on Nigeria, with which South Africa has formed what was described as an "axis of virtue": an alliance not just of mutual self-interest, but of benefit to all of Africa in the context of the "African Renaissance" and Africa's position in the world.



Commissioner Leon Levy, Chairman of the Board of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Ms Limakatso Mokhothu, of Lesotho's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).



Ms Shauna Mottiar, of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg.

South Africa's Africa policy has increasingly moved towards multilateral positions. Pretoria now seems poised to play an increasing continental role through SADC, the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the latter institutions which, at the beginning of the new millennium, South Africa played a crucial part in creating. Pretoria has deployed peacekeepers to the DRC and Burundi, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union. South Africa has recently chaired the AU and its newly-established Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the country hosts and largely funds the AU's new Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Alongside the importance attached to the AU, the NEPAD initiative, although not without its critics, appears central to the way that Pretoria tackles its African economic and financial responsibilities and destiny, in conjunction with other partners.

The following key policy recommendations emerged from the seminar:

1. Human Security

Ten years after South Africa's first democratic election, socio-economic inequality and poverty in the country remain at unacceptably high levels. Unless urgently addressed, this will limit South Africa's ability to play a leadership role in the development of the rest of Africa. South Africa must continue its efforts to reduce its domestic inequities and contradictions. In particular, the government should resolve the national question through the equitable redistribution of resources. Land redistribution is key in this regard. In undertaking important political and economic transformation measures, the government must work in a consultative, participatory manner with civil society organisations.



Mr Francis Antonie, of Standard Bank, Johannesburg, and Ms Mercia Andrews, of the Trust for Community Outreach and Education, Cape Town.

HIV/AIDS threatens to destabilise developmental and security initiatives on the continent. A more concerted, holistic approach should be adopted to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa and Southern Africa. The pandemic flourishes in conditions of poverty, inequality and conflict. HIV/AIDS, in turn, exacerbates the conditions that give rise to conflict. It was recommended that a subregional, co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to combatting HIV/AIDS be developed, focusing on both prevention and treatment strategies; that there should be increased political will to deal with the issue; and that civil society needs to be included more in fighting the pandemic.

2. South Africa in Africa

During the apartheid years, South Africa remained isolated from the rest of Africa, and a negative perception of the continent was instilled in its population. Many South Africans were still largely ignorant about other African countries and this has fuelled the current xenophobia in the country. Africans also encountered more difficulties than Europeans gaining entry into South Africa. It was, therefore, suggested that South Africa should strengthen its knowledge base of the rest of Africa through its educational and research institutions, many of which themselves urgently need to be transformed. This is essential if South Africa is to assume a leadership role on the continent. South Africa should also urgently review its immigration policy to facilitate easier access by legally qualified Africans who wish to visit the country. As a proponent of Pan-Africanism, South Africa should provide the same access to African citizens offered to South African corporations and individuals by other African countries.

South Africa has the strongest economy in Africa. South African capital has invested throughout the continent. This investment is deemed positive in light of Africa's pressing investment needs. However, concerns were raised about unequal exchange and terms of trade that are disproportionately in favour of South Africa. South African corporations were also perceived by some critics to be "exporting" apartheid abroad, and they were said to be increasingly dominating African markets to the detriment of local industries. It was, therefore, recommended that the government develop a regulatory framework for corporate investment to ensure positive rather than exploitative outcomes.

3. South Africa: Hegemony or Partnership?

South Africa's regional relations have been characterised by the establishment of partnerships. The Stellenbosch seminar felt strongly that this strategy, rather than the pursuit of domineering hegemony, was more appropriate for post-apartheid South Africa. It was recommended that Pretoria adopt a cultural policy for its engagement in Africa that would require South Africans to learn other languages, such as Swahili, French and Portuguese. South Africa's peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions on the continent were widely praised and welcomed. However, a cautionary note was sounded that Pretoria should not merely be exporting its own models of conflict resolution abroad. Rather, a more context-specific approach should guide these interventions. South Africa will, for the foreseeable future, remain a dominant player in Southern Africa and the wider continent. While safeguarding its own interests, South Africa should, however, take into account its neighbours' perceptions and refrain from assuming an aggressive, unilateral role in Africa.

4. The New Continentalism

Finally, South Africa's role as norm-setter and institution-builder within NEPAD and the AU was widely welcomed and encouraged. President Thabo Mbeki, in conjunction with his peers, has been at the forefront of those campaigning for the AU to be more interventionist; for the creation of an AU stand-by force; and for the institutionalisation of an African Peer Review Mechanism. This should continue. The Stellenbosch seminar also felt that, despite the inherent weaknesses in the NEPAD framework, there was a need for critics to engage with it and for NEPAD's leaders to consult more closely with civil society actors in implementing the programme.



Prof Adebayo Adedeji, left, of the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Nigeria, Prof Holger Bernt Hansen, of the Copenhagen Centre of African Studies, and Prof Ben Turok, Member of the South African Parliament.

South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Decade

Introduction

In 2004, South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy. Among many stock-taking exercises, it seemed opportune to reflect on the role that the country has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation. Thus, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, and the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) in Ijebu Ode, Nigeria, held a three-day policy seminar on "South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Decade". The meeting took place in Stellenbosch, South Africa, between 29 July and 1 August 2004. About 70 African participants drawn from policymakers, academia, business, civil society and the media attended the seminar. Members of the donor community and a few European scholars were also present.

The Stellenbosch meeting was a follow-up to a workshop on "South Africa in Africa: Within or Apart?", organised by ACDESS and held in Windhoek, Namibia, in January 1994. The Windhoek workshop's core task was "to assess, review and evaluate the present level and magnitude of interactions between South Africa and Africa". The meeting concluded that South Africa should "define its place in Africa positively and affirmatively", that it should play a leadership role, and that it could only fulfill such a role if its domestic political order and socio-economic relations were sound.

The Stellenbosch seminar adopted the Windhoek conclusions as its starting-point and defined its primary objectives as follows:

- To analyse South Africa's political and socio-economic challenges a decade after its first democratic election and to identify the key domestic factors needed to achieve positive foreign policy results;
- To assess the integration of South Africa into the rest of Africa after decades of isolation; and,
- To assess critically non-South African views of South Africa's involvement in conflict management, democratisation and economic development and co-operation in the rest of Africa.



Prof Adam Habib, of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Pretoria.

Where Windhoek's focus had been more on South Africa's relations with its neighbours in Southern Africa, Stellenbosch noted that a principal lesson of the past decade is a need to treat the continent holistically: for South Africa to have an Africa policy that applies to the entire continent. Thus, bilateral relations, although an important expression of a country's national interest, have to be placed within the context of regional relations, and these, in turn, need to be viewed within a continental context. Likewise, business and security relations must be situated in an overall policy framework, especially as they relate to South Africa's capacity to negotiate a new partnership paradigm and to help end Africa's marginalisation in the global community.

1. Domestic Reconstruction

The Stellenbosch meeting considered it imperative that South Africans deconstruct and reconstruct their society. The "new" South Africa that emerged in 1994 was a compromise based on "sufficient consensus" rather than a fundamental socio-economic transformation. In some respects, this preserving domestic consensus and consequent economic strength has been seen as a success. In other respects, transformation in South Africa is akin to what Kenyan political scientist Ali Mazrui described as "blacks receiving the crown, and whites retaining the jewels".¹ In 1994, the new government of Nelson Mandela faced the challenges of integrating the former apartheid homeland administrations – *bantustans* – into a new political system. There were massive challenges in education, housing and health and the inherited and increasing joblessness and lack of investment that had been part of apartheid's legacy. The new government also inherited a country in which a myriad of challenges presented themselves simultaneously, all vying for the attention of a regime with limited resources, a flagging economy, and increasing rates of joblessness. Apartheid had caused deep and embedded structural violence in society, leaving South Africa as one of the most violent countries in the world.²



Prof Sam Moyo, of the Africa Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS), Zimbabwe, and Ms Ruth Hall, of the University of the Western Cape's Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies.

¹ Ali Mazrui made this point during a seminar at Stanford University on 18 January 2000, Paulo Alto, California.

² On the legacy of apartheid, see South African Human Rights Commission, *Human Rights Review: First Decade of Democratic Governance*, Conference, 10-11 June 2004, discussion documents.

It is important, at the outset, to highlight some of the South African government's achievements in the last decade. Admirable progress has been made in many areas since 1994. Some "delivery" has occurred within the context of a tight budget. About 3 million people have benefited from the government's water supply programme. One million houses have been built. The black middle-class is now larger than the white middle-class. In 1994, fewer than 40 percent of South Africa's households had access to electricity; today some 63 percent of households are connected to an electricity grid. In 1994, about a quarter of homes had telephones. Today, 35 percent of homes are linked to telephone systems. The Primary School Nutrition Programme has reached five million children, and about 10 000 classrooms have been built or repaired. Pregnant women and children under six years old now have access to free medical care.³

South Africa's government first attempted to use the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) in 1994 as a means to redress these imbalances of the past. The programme provided the state with a central developmental role that was to be supplemented by a partnership with labour and private enterprise. Its life-span was short, a mere two years, before it was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan: a macroeconomic framework which sought to increase fiscal austerity, increase annual growth rates and employment, boost exports and create a more flexible labour market. The adoption of GEAR in 1996 was seen as a contributing factor in the lack of human development as far as the mass of poor people in South Africa are concerned. GEAR was likened to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS), which other African countries have been pressured to implement since the 1980s. The implementation of GEAR has also undermined the alliance between the government and the trade union movement. There has been a lack of consultation by government on its economic policy. GEAR also had profound foreign policy implications in that it was seen as accepting globalisation as the "source and saviour of the African continent".

The 2003 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report on South Africa argues that poverty and inequality in South Africa are increasing. South Africa has a high unemployment rate of approximately 40 percent.⁴ The vast majority of those who fall in the categories of unemployed and poor are black. The South African economy is still marked by apartheid patterns in which whites dominate the formal sector and the entrepreneurial skills of blacks remain confined to the informal sector. Current trends in globalisation, underpinned by a neo-liberal paradigm, and South Africa's aspirations to assert itself within the world economy, explain the rapid reversal of the social welfare policies contained in the RDP. The country's economic growth rate has increased, but this increase has not been accompanied by desirable redistributive policies. It was, however, noted that over the past year, there has been a government rethink on GEAR and a recognition that the state needs to be more interventionist and pro-active in creating jobs.⁵

Pretoria's moral legitimacy on the continent also remains questionable when Africans in South Africa continue to exist within apartheid-conceived spaces and when the dire poverty of black South Africans in townships often exceeds that of other African countries. If this situation is not urgently addressed, South Africa may well suffer from the same ills that have beset other post-colonial African states. Since 1994, South Africa saw national reconciliation as being central to the national question, with the issue of race relations at its core. According to several participants, the concession of amnesty, even though apartheid had been a crime against humanity, became a "pact with the devil". The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – although it uncovered past lies and produced public shaming – essentially let the

3 For a ten-year assessment of the South African economy, see Stephen Gelb, "An overview of the South African economy", in John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds.), *State of the Nation, South Africa 2004-2005*, HSRC Press and Michigan State University Press, 2004, pp. 367-400.

4 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *South African Human Development Report 2003*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and Cape Town, 2004; also see Steven Friedman and Ivor Chipkin, "A Poor voice? The Politics of Inequality in South Africa," Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report number 87, August 2001.

5 See Stephen Gelb, "An overview of the South African economy", op. cit.

"beneficiaries of apartheid" off the hook. Although the TRC had at first been perceived by some as a "call to action", it failed to demonstrate that, while apartheid as a structural system built the wealth of white South Africa, it destroyed the social and economic fabric of non-white South Africans, particularly the majority black population.⁶

The national project of rebuilding a nation that started in 1994 required a social, economic and political transformation of South Africa, which would lead to a change in attitudes, based on reconciliation, reconstruction and development. The establishment of a TRC was seen as the moral mechanism necessary to build a new South Africa, even if it was built on an immoral deal. Ten years on, the TRC has become one of the major legacies that South Africa can bequeath to the world. There have been more than fifteen other truth commissions in other countries (including, in Africa, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria), but none on the scale and magnitude of the South African one.

In the last decade, debate on the role of the TRC, especially between retributive justice and restorative justice, has been intense, particularly over the amnesty provisions, as confirmed by South Africa's Constitutional Court. Amnesty was necessary for rebuilding the nation and reconciling the people. However, by not examining the effect of the policies of apartheid, only the trigger-pullers bore the collective shame. While the TRC was engaged with the national reconciliation project, the politics of redress became compromised. According to this view, at least those who had not applied for amnesty should have been prosecuted.

The sub-text of this debate is that if South Africa is to play a meaningful role in Africa, it should first put its own house in order. Race is an intrinsic factor in the debate on reconciliation and it has become necessary for South Africa to present the face of a reconciled nation to the international community. The world has been amazed at the restraint shown by blacks, led by Nelson Mandela, towards their former oppressors. Yet reconciliation became necessary in the political circumstances of the day, even if what was accorded was more than the beneficiaries had expected. Much of South Africa's business elite, many of whom benefited from their close ties to the apartheid government, still refuse to talk about the past, while the gap between rich and poor is still growing wider. The post-1994 South African government passed affirmative action laws and drew up Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) charters in fields like mining, tourism, information technology, and others, in an effort to achieve redress, since many of the "beneficiaries of apartheid" had failed to come to the table.⁷

The inherited structures of the past constrain the translation of laws into practical realities. This process is further complicated by the nature of the negotiated settlement, which, it was argued, left the national question unresolved since structures of wealth, income and land distribution remained intact and protected by a liberal constitution and market principles. The "skyscraper" political economic system has persisted, with a white minority continuing to occupy the "commanding heights" of the economy. Furthermore, it was noted that the discourse and language of rights often serves to protect this privilege. South Africa's seeming inability to resolve the tensions caused by race-based inequities has wider implications for its legitimacy and credibility in the region. If South Africa is to be at the forefront of an "African Renaissance" that seeks to create equity through the reduction of poverty, then the government needs to address the socio-economic crisis it faces at home, especially on the issue of land redistribution. This has been an enduring problem in Africa, as the nationalist struggle had the twin objective of democratisation and regaining access to control over land. South Africa should learn lessons from post-independence Africa.

6 For two critical perspectives of the TRC, see Wole Soyinka, *The Burden of Memory, The Muse of Forgiveness*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1999, and Mahmood Mamdani, "From Justice to Reconciliation: Making sense of the African experience", paper presented at Uppsala University, Sweden, 22 April 1997.

7 For two perspectives on BEE, see Reg Rumney, "Who owns South Africa? An analysis of State and Private Ownership Patterns", in John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds.), *State of the Nation*, op. cit., pp. 401-422; also see Roger Southall, "Black Empowerment and Corporate Capital", *ibid.* pp. 455 - 478.



Dr Iqbal Jhazbhay, right, of the University of South Africa, Professor Achille Mbembe, of the Wits Institute of Social and Economic Research (WISER), Johannesburg, left, and Ms Yasmin Sooka, of the Foundation for Human Rights in Pretoria.

In many African countries, development policies have directed the use of land in ways which have not been beneficial for national development and which have favoured distorted accumulation by a small elite and foreign capital. The consequences of such policies have been land alienation, the loss of local livelihoods and increased conflicts over land. Settler societies like South Africa, whose liberation was achieved through negotiated settlements remain structured by racialised patterns of land-ownership and land-usage.⁸ There is, therefore, a direct overlap of the race question and the land question in these societies. Market-based land reform strategies have been used to correct imbalances in land-ownership. This approach, however, is problematic because of a lack of funding needed to buy back land at market prices. South Africa is experiencing problems such as identifying suitable land, budgeting blockages, weak state institutions dealing with land reform claims, conflictual agricultural reforms, and a lack of state support for this sector.

Race and land issues overlap in South Africa. A black-led South African government must pursue a more pro-active role in land distribution, drawing lessons from Zimbabwe's experience. South Africa is already experiencing the rise of spontaneous rural movements, emerging from deepening rural poverty and the slow pace of land reform. The country faces stark domestic challenges, but to provide credibility in its leadership position in Africa, South Africa needs a domestic renaissance. The period of dispossession of black people of their land in South Africa continued far longer than did colonialism in other parts of the continent, and left a legacy of large-scale land alienation, skewed economies, racial conflict and warfare in many countries.

The South African state has fared particularly poorly in relation to land redistribution. Only 3 percent of the targeted 30 percent of land restitution has been accomplished today. It was noted that land reform is an inherently conflictual process, since it challenges established economic and political structures and dominant cultural identities and calls for the restructuring of property relations and a change in power relations. Land reform can deepen the democratisation of the development process and assist in stemming the tide of rapid migration to urban areas that brings with it a new set of infrastructural challenges and social problems. Land reform must, however, be accompanied by "progressive" land tenure reforms which can defend the poor against potential land losses as well as accommodate excluded groups such as women, minorities and settlers. More attention needs to be given to land redistribution in urban areas, while the poor must be given a greater voice in land debates.

⁸ See Margaret C Lee and Karen Colvard (eds), *Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa*, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 2003.

There was also apprehension that South Africa's domestic contradictions have inhibited the effective pursuit by the country of even "constructive hegemony": a positive and acknowledged leadership role. The "two South Africas"⁹ have too often led to a duality in foreign policy. For some, this has meant too easy an acceptance of neo-liberal economic policies, and putting a brake on the deconstruction of the apartheid polity and its institutions. The international context of the end of the Cold War, with its emphasis on international neo-liberal solutions, notably in Africa, in which corporate South Africa has the opportunity to play a dominant role, has helped Pretoria to consolidate its position on the continent.

This debate extended to how far the military, one of the bulwarks of the apartheid state, had been transformed, and its culture and value systems changed. It was noted that there has been a "dramatic transformation" in South Africa's military in the past ten years, compared to the apartheid military apparatus. Others echoed similar criticisms about the slow pace of transformation of the military that has often been voiced by South Africa's Parliamentary Defence Committee. There have also been tensions between the theory and practice of civil supremacy over the military, including between the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).¹⁰

Under-resourced, the Military Ombudsman is grossly ineffective. There have also been continued incidents of racial discrimination by white soldiers against their black counterparts. There were, moreover, problems of an aging military (only 7 percent of the SANDF were between 18 and 24 by the end of 2002), the unsuccessful reintegration into civilian life of ex-combatants, and a steady attrition of valuable, technical expertise for which the Department of Defence (DOD) has introduced the Human Resources Strategy 2010, which, it hopes, will also have a favourable impact on the age range of the military.

The figures of racial representation at least show that some of the Department of Defence's targets have been met – between 1994 and 2004, the number of black personnel in the SANDF increased from 31,053 (or 37.5 percent) to 47,003 (or 62.1 percent) at a time of diminishing overall numbers. However, in middle-management in June 2004, nearly three-quarters of the rank of colonel and lieutenant-colonel were still white. Sixty percent of senior military officers are also white. Figures for improving gender equality remain disappointing.

Some participants argued that the transformation of South Africa's military remains superficial, and that even though progress has been made in de-racialising the military, this institution still remains stubbornly untransformed. According to some participants, the South African Defence Force's (SADF) apartheid-era culture and value systems have survived intact into the new era. Continuing apartheid-era military ties with Israel were also said to be out of sync with South Africa's foreign policy.

Several participants noted that the military was only one of the institutions in which transformation has been slow in the last decade – the judiciary and universities were cited as other notable examples of sectors in which the top echelons remain overwhelmingly white. Though race is beginning to be subsumed into class as the fundamental societal divide in South Africa, there remains a need for the country to avoid becoming a nation of policymakers which lacks any implementation plan. According to this view, a five-year implementation plan is needed for urgent institutional change. If the race issue is not rapidly addressed in South Africa, the basis will be laid for future conflict.

9 For an articulation of the notion of South Africa's "two nations" and "two economies", see President Thabo Mbeki, "State of the Nation," speech delivered at the Opening of Parliament, National Assembly, Cape Town, 14 February 2002.

10 For an official and an unofficial perspective of the transformation in the defence force, see South African Ministry of Defence, *An Analysis of Transformation in the Defence Force*, Ministerial Commission of Inquiry, Bloemfontein, 2001; and A. Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, London, I. B. Tauris, 1996.

2. Constituting a New Democratic Order

In many African countries after independence in the 1960s, transformation often amounted to a changing of the guard rather than to a fundamental shift in the practices and performance of power and developmental policies based on the emergence of a new participatory democratic order which incorporated the democratisation of the development process. In the 1980s and 1990s, the democratisation process promoted by the West was anchored on the ideology of economic liberalism of marketisation and privatisation. At its own liberation in 1994, South Africa embarked on a process of transformation from a state marked by the institutionalisation of racial discrimination to one based on the principles of democracy, non-racialism and non-sexism. South Africa has since developed a legal framework – a constitution, a bill of rights, and laws – that creates the foundation for a democratic society¹¹.

After 1994, an enabling environment was created for civil society organisations. Several participants stressed the pluralistic nature of South Africa's vibrant civil society while noting that a homogenous set of relations does not exist between civil society and the state.¹² Some organisations are adversarial, while others are collaborative. The state has also sought to establish a collaborative relationship with formal Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), enlisting them in service-delivery projects. Three distinct types of civil society organisations were identified: (1) Formal NGOs (2) Survivalist community-based organisations and (3) Social movements. The relationship between the state and social movements is somewhere between adversarialism and engagement. This plurality, it was argued, is good for democracy since it creates “uncertainty”, which, in turn, provides the necessary checks and balances for the institutionalisation of democratic practices.



Ambassador of South Africa to Brazil Ms Lindiwe Zulu.

¹¹ See *South African Interim Constitution 1993*, Act 200 of 1993, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa; and also see the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, adopted in 1996.

¹² For a perspective and debate on Civil Society-State relations in South Africa, see Adam Habib, “State-Civil Society Relations in post-Apartheid South Africa”, in *SA Labour Bulletin*, vol. 27, number 6, December 2003.

The role of South Africa's trade unions was particularly highlighted because of their ability to consult with participatory institutions. It was suggested that the South African government should learn to consult more with its trade union allies on key issues such as macroeconomic policy. There was wide recognition that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has to be a more independent voice for labour holding the government accountable. The trade union movement in South Africa, contrary to popular belief, has not been weakened in terms of membership, but could be less effective due to its close alliance with the government. One positive aspect after 1994, is the fact that South Africa's government has created participatory institutions and extended basic services to black communities. However, it was noted that the government does not consult sufficiently with the trade union movement, as was most evident in its shift in 1996 from the RDP to GEAR, without consulting its trade union allies. Critics noted that the government's macroeconomic policy encourages heavy industry that does not create sufficient employment, and that although there has been a slowdown in privatisation, there has been no fundamental policy change.

The value of COSATU and other civil society actors was evident in the discussion on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which sparked a debate on the significance of, and need for, a black middle-class. The seminar heard that BEE is important since it facilitates the emergence of this class, usually deemed necessary for democratisation. However, several participants argued that this middle-class needs to be more clearly-defined, and that a direct correlation should not necessarily be assumed between democracy and the emergence of a middle-class. Other participants cautioned that Africa's middle-classes have often been unproductive and parasitic, frequently failing to act as a "patriotic bourgeoisie". This debate, led by civil society, can only benefit policy processes in South Africa, and help to deepen democracy.



Prof Adebayo Adedeji, of the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), right, with seminar rapporteurs Mr Kaye Whiteman, of *Business Day*, Nigeria, left, and Dr Cheryl Hendricks, of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

3. Human Security

Zimbabwe was a constant reminder of the many insoluble issues still confronting Southern Africa. The need to adopt a human security approach to problems (the land issue, which overlaps with the race issue, being the most pertinent) was highlighted. Participants noted that land reform within former settler societies is a prerequisite to the constitution of a new democratic order, and the slow progress in land redistribution and social justice was described as a major cause for concern. South Africa's National Land Committee noted in 2000 that less than 1 percent of farmland in South Africa has been redistributed to poor, black households. By 2003, only some 3 percent of land had been transferred, way below the target of 30 percent set in 1994. Some participants cautioned that democracy without economic empowerment would only lead to future conflict and political instability.

The Stellenbosch seminar also reflected on HIV/AIDS as a new security threat for South Africa and the region.¹³ Statistics presented to the seminar indicated that Southern Africa has 51 percent of all infections in Africa and nearly 37 percent of global infections, while an estimated 5.3 million South Africans were infected with the virus in 2002. This epidemic, it was argued, flourishes in conditions of poverty, inequality and conflict. War contributes to the spread of the disease since it disrupts communities, creating large refugee populations where rape and commercialised sex are common. Armed combatants also carry the virus from country to country. Illegitimate governments do not command the trust required to facilitate collaborative interventions, while failing economies are unable to sustain the basic social services critical to prevention and treatment programmes. HIV/AIDS, in turn, exacerbates the conditions that give rise to conflict: inequality and poverty. It was further noted that many African militaries have higher rates of infection than civilian populations and that this could affect the capacity of states to protect their citizens at home as well as the capacity of armies to deploy peacekeepers abroad.




Prof Maxi Schoeman, right, of the University of Pretoria, and South African parliamentarian Prof Ben Turok.

¹³ For a perspective on the debate around HIV/AIDS, see Tim Quinlin and Sarah Willan, "HIV/AIDS: Finding Ways to contain the Pandemic", in John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds.), *State of the Nation*, op. cit., pp. 227-251.

4. The New Pan-Africanism

After 1994, South Africa found itself in the position of being a major new force in a post-Cold War Africa in which democratisation was at the top of the development agenda. The idea of an “African Renaissance” was placed on the policy agenda during the administration of Nelson Mandela between 1994 and 1999. But it was under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki after May 1999, that the concept was fleshed out. South Africa prioritised the restructuring of SADC and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) - with its new doctrine of interventionism. South Africa played a leading role both in the birth of the African Union in Durban in 2002, and in the parallel development of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. The African Peer Review Mechanism – a voluntary self-monitored system of democratic governance and economic accountability – can also be seen as part of “the new interventionism” in Africa, strongly backed by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, Mozambique, and others.

South Africa has diverse bilateral relations with different African countries, as clearly evidenced by a number of case histories presented at the seminar. Participants wondered whether South Africa was a behemoth, hegemon, partner, or simply a new kid on the block. In short, is Pretoria, a would-be partner, too often perceived as a hegemon? Is hegemon too emotive a word to use to describe its evolving leadership role? There was a recognition that partnership seems to be the only option for South Africa, which must remain conscious of the dangers of playing a “big brother” role in Africa due to its past ignominious military and economic role on the continent.



Dr Khabele Matlosa, of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), Johannesburg.

Since 1999,¹⁴ the government of Thabo Mbeki has laid greater emphasis on the importance of Africa as a whole, as opposed to the earlier focus on the Southern African region under the presidency of Nelson Mandela. This policy was placed in the context of the history of the OAU and its transformation into the AU. The OAU, from 1963, was dedicated to both liberation and unity, but the organisation was weighed down by the concerns of its 53 member states, above all, and for the most part, with preserving their own sovereignty. Mbeki, in conjunction with his close allies, has been at the forefront of the campaign for the AU to become more interventionist, for the creation of an AU stand-by force and for the institutionalisation of a Peer Review Mechanism.¹⁵

NEPAD represents an international parallel to South Africa's domestic compromise, dictated by the advance of globalisation. If Africa is to end its marginalisation, the continent must become an integral part of the global economy. Involving rich, industrialised countries in Africa's development through NEPAD was considered pragmatic by several participants.¹⁶ The age of the "war on terror" which followed the attacks on the United States of September 2001, has, however, complicated NEPAD's progress and diverted attention from Africa's development needs.

The close relationship between Africa's political and economic destinies, which NEPAD has sought to tackle, was thoroughly discussed during the seminar, particularly the continuing challenges of development in the first thirty years of Africa's independence, culminating in the "lost decade" of the 1980s when sectors like health and education began to regress. Hopes were attached to the negotiating muscle that South Africa might be able to provide in international fora such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the current Doha round of trade talks which aims to reduce pernicious Western agricultural subsidies. These hopes have, however, so far not been realised. The "African Renaissance", a dream rather than a project, is bound to take time to materialise.

It was felt that the description of South Africa as a "behemoth" could only apply in terms of the country's economic might, inflexibly and selfishly used, in the way, according to several participants, that the US often unilaterally uses its superpower status. This debate also asked whether foreign policy could ever be anything more than the legitimate pursuit of national self-interest, and strong feelings were expressed about the "inevitability" of South Africa's leadership position within Africa. A progressive Africa policy is deemed very much in South Africa's national self-interest, but is the converse also automatically true? Some participants felt that "hegemon" was too emotive a word and that it should be avoided because of the damage it could cause in promoting debate and creating negative perceptions about South Africa's role in Africa. However, others argued that while "partnership" may be the official policy, in power terms, "hegemon" may be closer to reality.

4.1. Regional Economic Relations


Southern Africa's encounter with colonialism left lasting scars on the socio-economic landscape of the region. Here, the form of colonial rule was that of settler colonialism and its duration was far longer than in other parts of the continent. The consequence of this history has been large-scale land alienation, skewed economies, racial conflict, and prolonged armed warfare in many countries. In 1980, after Zimbabwe attained its independence, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed with the primarily political aim of opposing the apartheid South African government. By 1992, the organisation shifted to a more economic rationale of development through regional integration and, accordingly, changed its name to the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

¹⁴ See, for example, Thabo Mbeki, *Africa: The Time has Come*, Selected speeches, Mafube/Tafelberg, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 1998, pp. 29-33.

¹⁵ For an outline of the African Peer Review Mechanism, see NEPAD Secretariat, *NEPAD at Work, Summary of NEPAD Action Plans*, Midrand, South Africa, July 2002, pp. 8-12.

¹⁶ On NEPAD, see John G. Nyuot Yoh, "NEPAD and AU: Problems and Prospects", *Global Dialogue*, July 2002.

SADC has experienced slow progress in regional integration and trade, and the 14-member grouping still faces challenges of external dependency, lack of diversification of production, and nationalist rivalries. South Africa's economic role on the continent is, however, contentious. Some participants noted the huge expansion of both trade and investment by largely white South African entrepreneurs on the continent.¹⁷ South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa saw a 328 percent increase between 1993 and 2003, while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from South Africa into the rest of Africa rose from 8 billion Rand in 1996 to 26 billion Rand in 2000. South Africa had become the largest investor in the rest of Africa by 2001. Retail trade, banking, telecommunications, hotel, tourism, mining and other infrastructure industries and sectors are areas of focus by South African investors in other African countries. But, trade relations with the rest of Africa remain unbalanced, with South Africa exporting more than it imports from the rest of the continent, and its companies dotting the economic landscape from the Cape to Cairo, invoking, in some African quarters, fearful images of Cecil John Rhodes's imperialist designs.



Prof Mwesiga Baregu, of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

In 2003, South Africa's total trade with the rest of Africa amounted to 8 billion Rand in imports and 38 billion Rand in exports. This activity is also not the monopoly of the private sector. Trade is also actively government-promoted, and South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) provides funding (and risk-sharing) by investing in 60 projects in 21 African countries. The need for a regulatory framework for South African capital entering the rest of the continent was a key policy recommendation emanating from the Stellenbosch seminar. Furthermore, the discussion on the South African corporate sector reinforced the need for an appreciation of the complexity of the issue. There are many actors in South Africa who have established relations on the continent. However, the intent, extent, and character of those relations differ, as evidenced by the recent incident of mercenaries allegedly plotting a coup against the government of Equatorial Guinea. South African capitalists and mercenaries should, therefore, not be seen as an extension of Pretoria's policies.

South Africa's relations with its neighbours formed a key part of the debate during the seminar. It is important here to highlight how successive apartheid governments used the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) – comprising Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, and, more recently, Namibia – to perpetuate relations of dominance that were advantageous to Pretoria. Another issue that was raised was South Africa's obligations to its neighbours which were severely destabilised during apartheid. Over 500,000 people died as a result of these destructive policies, and damages totalling \$60 billion were wrought on Southern Africa by the apartheid military between 1980 and 1988 alone. Should there be compensation for the costs of destabilisation and the costs of liberation? South Africa has a close relationship, both politically and economically, with Mozambique, which is now South Africa's largest trading partner in Africa. South Africa initiated the Maputo trade corridor, which is expected to boost Mozambique's exports

¹⁷ For an assessment of South Africa's economic expansion, see J. Daniel, V. Naidoo and S. Naidu, "South African expansion into Africa? Can the leopard change its spots?", SA Labour Bulletin, vol. 27, 2003, pp. 14-16.

tremendously. Between 1997 and 2001, South African companies invested 9 billion Rand in Mozambique and created 43,000 jobs. However, it was noted that the expansion by South Africa into Southern Africa has led to new relations of dependency, and this may ultimately create political tensions.

Despite attempts to transcend the “politics of the economy”, the seminar tackled the subject with a vengeance, when the question was strongly posed: What have private investments to do with an “African Renaissance”¹⁸ and is South African capital playing a “rampant” sub-imperialist role in Africa, or is it a “motor for revival”? There was much evidence to demonstrate that in ten years of transition from pariah to legitimate player, South Africa has taken substantial steps to assert its presence on the continent, especially through corporate and parastatal investments, which have the potential to generate trade. It was also noted that the South African market is too small for its products, and that its own enlightened national interest has underpinned its aggressive economic drive into the rest of Africa.

Since the end of apartheid, South African firms have significantly expanded their mining operations into Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia, as well as in light industry such as breweries and bottling plants. South African companies continue to dominate the food service industry in the SADC region, as well as the banking and finance sectors. Most recently, South African interests have bought a majority shareholding in Tanzania’s Central Bank, provoking widespread debates in that country over financial sovereignty. Above all, shops throughout Southern Africa are full of South African produce. South African retailers, such as Shoprite and Checkers, now dominate the SADC region.

Two sets of issues emerged from this discussion. First, the need for a regulatory framework for South African corporate capital expansion into the region. Second, a political economy analysis clearly highlights that there are a variety of actors in South Africa - whose interests may be in conflict with Pretoria - who have established relations in other African countries. The South African government has invested in the region through the Independent Development Corporation, but Pretoria has limited control over private investors. The seminar appreciated that any analysis of South Africa’s economic role should take account of this complexity and noted that more research is needed in this area since much of the discussion remains anecdotal, and systematic data has not been collected and analysed. Many participants, however, stressed the fact that South Africa must take cognisance of its neighbours’ perceptions of its role and the impact of its economic expansion and political engagement in the region. Pretoria must take active steps to mitigate the tensions that have emerged from these interactions in order to fulfill its leadership aspirations.

4.2. Regional Political and Military Relations

The Stellenbosch seminar appraised specific political and security case histories in the region, in which South Africa’s experience has been varied:¹⁹ the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Comoros and Burundi. Other regions, such as East Africa, West Africa, francophone Africa, and North Africa, were also discussed.

Stripped of a common enemy – apartheid South Africa – regional political and military relations are now both constructive and competitive. SADC became the theatre of both collaboration and rivalries. Rivalries revealed themselves especially in the disputes over the 1998 interventions in both the DRC and Lesotho. The struggle over the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC), formerly chaired by Zimbabwe, and now by South Africa, is a classic illustration of the practical difficulties Pretoria has experienced in regional politics.

¹⁸ For an articulation of the African Renaissance, see Thabo Mbeki, *The African Renaissance Statement*, South African Broadcasting Corporation, Gallagher Estate, Johannesburg, 13 August 1998.

¹⁹ See Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Foreign Affairs budget vote speech, National Assembly, Cape Town, 14 March 2000.



Chair of the parliamentary portfolio committee on defence, Prof Kader Asmal, delivers his keynote address.

South Africa's immigration policy, especially towards Africans from other countries, was criticised as a continued expression of the xenophobia that permeates large sections of the country. South Africa needs "to see [its] proper face in the hard vulnerability of the stranger". This xenophobia is a sign of both an inadequate knowledge of the rest of Africa, and a lack of a large, domestic constituency for the South African government's Africa policy. There remains a gap between the knowledge base of policymakers and the population at large. This situation needs to be urgently redressed through investment in the education of South Africa's public about the continent. Even within South African government circles, there is a need for a better understanding of the nature of politics and the culture of countries north of the Limpopo, including a need for South African diplomats to learn other languages, such as Swahili, French, and Portuguese.

The contrast in Pretoria's relations with Mozambique and Angola offered instructive bilateral case histories. Where relations with Mozambique - South Africa's largest trading partner in the region, and recipient of major investments - have been close and cordial, those with Angola have long been tense and competitive. The legitimacy of South Africa's interventions in the region has been questioned by its neighbours. In an account of South Africa's relations with Angola, it was argued that there are continuing tensions between the two countries, which stem from the apartheid government's support of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

South Africa's role in Lesotho, and the conflict with Zimbabwe over the SADC security organ, were examined in detail, as well as Pretoria's increased regional engagement following the transition from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki in 1999. The 2004 election in South Africa enhanced the legitimacy of the African National Congress (ANC) government regionally and internationally. The country will remain the dominant regional power in the next decade, but this is a role that will have to be approached with great political sensitivity due to South Africa's history of military destabilisation. There has been a sea-change in Southern Africa in the past decade, as negotiated settlements replaced military solutions in many countries such as Mozambique, Angola, and Lesotho. South Africa's regional role is also complicated by the fact that many Western countries are looking to it to play a leadership role through a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy.

It is in this context that Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" policy towards Zimbabwe should be understood. Due note should be taken, if only for the choice of countries mentioned, of the ANC's election manifesto of 2003 setting out policy as "economic integration in Southern Africa and strengthening democracy, peace and stability as well as economic growth and development; and, in particular, devoting time and resources to assist in social and economic reconstruction in Zimbabwe, DRC, Angola and Swaziland". But it is these regional and continental tasks that have placed South Africa and Nigeria – Pretoria's key ally - in the "driver's seat" of both the AU and NEPAD, as well as in regional security frameworks.

In the Comoros, South Africa played an active role in the resolution of the crisis which broke out in 1997 and involved two attempted secessions and several coups before the situation was finally calmed in 2001. Pretoria served as chair of the *ad hoc* group of "countries of the region", partly because many believed that South Africa was the only country in the Indian Ocean that was both neutral and capable of dealing with France on an equal footing. Pretoria's position was unbending, consistently advocating the national unity and territorial integrity of the archipelago, the return to constitutional rule and national reconciliation, in line with OAU/AU pronouncements, despite divisions on the issue among several African heads of state. South Africa did not take part, however, in the negotiations that led to the framework agreement for Comoros' reconciliation in February 2001. Pretoria's diplomacy was sometimes seen as "clumsy and confused" in its handling of the crisis. But South Africa's support for the OAU/AU and sending of military observers with other African countries, as well as its financial assistance in the health sector, were said to have been decisive in the final resolution of the crisis. Yet, this case demonstrated that there was still a perceivable knowledge gap in South Africa about the rest of Africa.

South Africa's involvement in Madagascar was limited to the period during which Pretoria held the AU chair between 2002 and 2003, when African states were divided on the issue. South Africa became involved in the Burundi crisis partly because Mandela wished to pay tribute to the late Mwalimu Nyerere, who had been facilitating the Burundi peace process before his death in 1999. The fact that such an intractable situation could lend itself to the laboratory approach of examples from South Africa's own transition negotiations, even if durable peace has remained elusive in Burundi, was a clear measure of the prestige enjoyed by both Mandela and South Africa. South Africa currently has about 1,400 peacekeepers in Burundi as part of a UN peacekeeping force.



Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, New York, and Dr Eddy Maloka, of the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Pretoria.



Ms Fiona Lunda, of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, left, and Dr Chris Landsberg, of the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg.

The Stellenbosch seminar produced a diversity of views on South Africa's recent peacemaking engagements in Lesotho, DRC, Madagascar, Comoros, Zimbabwe and Burundi. It was noted that the early experience of the Comoros gave South Africa the confidence and credibility to take on the more difficult cases of DRC and Burundi, though doubts were expressed about Pretoria's capacity to sustain these efforts.

Beyond Southern Africa, four African subregions were said to define South Africa's aspirations to use its political and economic power in pursuit of an effective Africa policy. The seminar considered these four different spheres through contrasting prisms. In the case of North Africa, through specific and often competitive bilateral relationships; in the case of francophone Africa, in the cultural dimension of African unity; in the case of Nigeria, through what was perceived to be an "axis of virtue"; and, in the case of East Africa, within the context of South Africa's corporate expansionism.

In West Africa, the focus was mainly on Nigeria, with which South Africa has formed an alliance not just of mutual self-interest, but of benefit to all of Africa in the context of the "African Renaissance" and Africa's position in the world. Relations between South Africa and Nigeria in the ten years of democratic rule has moved from a wretchedly low point in the difficult years of the mid-1990s under the autocratic rule of General Sani Abacha, to the five years of close and rewarding co-operation and alliance since the months of May and June 1999, when both Mbeki and the newly-elected

civilian Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, came to power at about the same time. It was the unfortunate coincidence of the presence in power of Mandela and General Abacha that led to a nadir in relations, after Abacha's execution of the human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists in November 1995, and the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth. Mandela was influential in this suspension. Despite South Africa's new democratic credentials, Mandela learnt African diplomacy the hard way, finding disappointingly little backing for imposing sanctions against Abacha's regime, and, accordingly, back-tracking on a hard-line approach towards the Nigerian dictatorship. Even at this stage, Mbeki, then deputy president, had been the foremost advocate of "quiet diplomacy", and his experiences with Nigeria, as head of the ANC office in Lagos between 1976 and 1978, were formative in this policy, as well as in his own later handling of Zimbabwe.

The arrival in power of Obasanjo ushered in a new era of friendship between Pretoria and Abuja, informed by both leaders' shared belief in an "African Renaissance". However, concerns have been raised that the relationship is too dependent on the close personal ties of both leaders. Still, both countries have formed a durable partnership, as evidenced by their diplomatic harmony in establishing and consolidating the AU and NEPAD (seen effectively at work at the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004), and the setting up of a bilateral commission in 1999 which has been accompanied by a remarkable expansion in trade between both countries.²⁰ Yet this relationship has known its own internal frictions, especially over perceptions and realities of the illicit activities of Nigerian citizens in South Africa. The leadership aspirations of both countries is also far from being universally accepted elsewhere in Africa.



Ms Annamarie Minder, of the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC), Pretoria.

²⁰ See African Union, *Vision and mission of the African Union*, Draft, Addis Ababa, March 2004.

For South Africa, the three countries of Algeria, Libya and Egypt were identified as its key partners in North Africa. Relations with Algeria had developed under Mbeki into a “strategic partnership”, especially with regard to NEPAD. Algeria is the only African country with which South Africa has a binational commission at the level of heads of state. Previously, Mandela had shown some naivety and diplomatic insensitivity in his early dealings with the Algerian regime, coinciding, it was true, with the height of Islamic dissidence within the country in the mid-1990s. With Libya, relations have been handled with greater understanding, deriving in part from Mandela’s loyalty to old friends, and indifference to American protests. This approach paid off handsomely when Mandela secured Libya’s agreement to a trial of those allegedly responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, which marked the end of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s diplomatic isolation. South Africa has shown courage, forbearance and tact with Qaddafi, although Mbeki’s strategies have been more open and candid than those of Mandela. Pretoria collaborated in actualising Tripoli’s initiative in the transformation of the OAU into the AU, a battle which presented two visions of African unity in which South Africa’s more gradualist approach won more support than Libya’s more federalist one.

Relations have been more complex and competitive with Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. The Egyptian leader insisted on being a part of the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC), and then did not attend its meetings. Although Egypt’s former anti-apartheid credentials were solid, Cairo’s current lacklustre approach to NEPAD was seen as an obstacle to a leadership role in Africa. Relations between Egypt and Morocco have often been strained, in part because of the latter’s relations with the apartheid regime, and because of the kingdom’s dominant pre-occupation with the Western Sahara, whose Polisario Liberation movement’s government-in-exile South Africa has been ready to recognise more than once in the past decade. Ties with Tunisia have been correct, though of a lower profile with the other three states. In general, the North Africans have appreciated South Africa’s willingness to reject Western governments’ divisions of the continent into North (and Arab) Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Francophone Africa is only part of Africa’s linguistic diversity, but it was argued that there should be a resistance to the linguistic balkanization of the continent. French has become an African language, and the question should be asked of South Africa whether it has a “politics of culture” or just a “politics of the economy”. According to this view, South Africa’s lack of cultural policy can render the pursuit of constructive hegemony sterile and lead to such diversions as misguided immigration policies that weaken its leadership ambitions.

East Africa was described as a region of “quiet instability”, focused particularly on the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. South Africa has maintained good relations with all the main players in the region, especially Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda, Joseph Kabila’s DRC and Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, but has been careful not to impose itself on its partners. But corporate South Africa’s efforts at the economic penetration of the region have been more aggressive. They culminated in the “beer wars”, in which South African Breweries eventually lost out to Kenya Breweries. As one critic wondered: How do these South African entrepreneurs differ from “the buccaneers of the 19th Century who opened Africa to colonial trade”? Part of the answer may lie with the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which have begun to pursue a strategy more in line with the principles embodied in NEPAD, with emphasis placed on partnerships for infrastructural development as a basis for fostering productive forces and laying the basis for the industrialisation of the region. But the question still remains: Which ruling elites within South Africa will drive such a developmentalist agenda?

4.3. The New African Multilateralism

During the past decade, South Africa's Africa policy has increasingly moved towards multilateral positions. South Africa now seems poised to play an increasing continental role through the AU and NEPAD, institutions which, at the beginning of the new millennium, it had played a crucial part in creating. Pretoria has deployed peacekeepers to the DRC and Burundi, under the auspices of the UN and the AU. South Africa has recently chaired the AU's newly-established Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the country hosts and largely funds the AU's new Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Pretoria also currently chairs the SADC security organ. Alongside the importance attached to the AU, the NEPAD initiative, although not without its critics, appears central to the way that Pretoria tackles its African responsibilities and destiny, in conjunction with its chosen partners, particularly Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique and Senegal. But both development and security imperatives are seen in the need for a holistic, continent-wide approach. NEPAD was, however, also, in the view of some critics, too reminiscent of a neo-classical Western agenda.

South Africa's roles as norm-setter and institution-builder within NEPAD and the AU were widely welcomed and applauded. President Mbeki, in conjunction with his close partners, has been at the forefront in campaigning for the AU to be more interventionist, for the creation of a stand-by force, and for the institutionalisation of the African Peer Review Mechanism. The Stellenbosch seminar felt that, despite the inherent weaknesses in the NEPAD framework, there was a need for critics to engage with it and for NEPAD's leaders to consult more closely with civil society actors in implementing the programme.

Finally, the new interventionist AU and NEPAD may hold the key to unlocking Africa's future and should be central to South Africa's policy agenda. Participatory democracy was seen as a cornerstone for Africa's development, and, in this regard, the new Pan African Parliament, as well as the African Peer Review Mechanism are good starting points. An enabling environment must be created for civil society in Africa and they should become part of the consultative processes engaged in by institutions tasked with implementing Africa's development and democratisation agenda.



Dr Adekeye Adebajo, of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

ANNEX I

AGENDA

DAY 1

Thursday 29 July 2004

19h00: Cocktail Reception

20h00: Dinner

Friday 30 July 2004

09h00 – 09h15: Welcome and Introductions

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Nigeria

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

Keynote Address

Chair: His Excellency, Dr Tunji Olagunju, Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa

09h15 – 10h30

Professor Kader Asmal, Chair, South African Parliamentary Defence Portfolio Committee

“From Addis Ababa to Durban: South Africa and Africa”

10h30 – 11h00: Coffee Break

Session 1: South Africa in Africa: Setting the Scene

Chair: Professor Kader Asmal, Chair, South African Parliamentary Defence Portfolio Committee

11h00 – 11h30

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, ACDESS, Nigeria

“The African Political Economy Landscape: 1994-2004 and Beyond”

11h30 – 11h45

Professor Ben Turok, Member of South Africa's Parliament
"CODESA: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement"

11h45 – 12h00

Professor Maxi Schoeman, University of Pretoria, Pretoria
"South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner, or Just another Kid on the Block?"

12h00 – 13h00

Plenary Discussion

13h00 – 14h00: Lunch

Session 2: The Political Economy of South Africa in Southern Africa

Chair: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

14h00 – 14h15

Dr. Tandeka Nkiwane, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
"The Political Economy of South Africa"

14h15 – 14h30

Ms. Augusta Conchiglia, Freelance Journalist
"The Political and Economic Role of South Africa in Angola and Mozambique"

14h30 – 15h00

Ms. Ruth Hall, University of Western Cape, South Africa, and Professor Sam Moyo, African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS), Zimbabwe
"Conflict and Land Reform in Southern Africa"

15h00 – 16h00

Plenary Discussion

16h00 – 16h15: Coffee Break

Session 3: Transforming the State and Reconciling the People

Chair: Dr Cheryl Hendricks, Programme Manager, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

16h15 – 16h30

Ms. Yasmin Sooka, Foundation for Human Rights, Pretoria
"Race and Reconciliation in South Africa"

16h30 – 16h45

Mr. Guy Lamb, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"New Model Army? The Transformation of the South African National Defence Force, 1994 – 2004"

16h45 – 17h45

Plenary Discussion

DAY TWO

Saturday 31 July 2004

Session 4: Regional Communities: Prospects and Challenges

Chair: Ms Lindiwe Zulu, Ambassador of South Africa to Brazil

09h00 – 09h15

Dr. Mark Chingono and Mr. Steven Nakana, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
[paper presented by Dr Mark Chingono]
"The Travails of Regional Integration in Southern Africa"

09h15 – 09h30

Dr. Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg
"Mbeki's African Agenda: South Africa and the making of the African Union and NEPAD"

09h30 – 10h00

Ms. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba; African Union, Ethiopia;
and Ms. Shauna Mattier, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg
"AIDS as a Security Threat in Southern Africa"

10h00 – 11h00

Plenary Discussion

11h00- 11h15: Coffee Break

Session 5: South Africa's Peace and Security Role in Africa

Chair: Dr. Eddy Maloka, Executive Director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria

11h15 – 11h30

Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg
"Regional Security in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role"

11h30 – 11h45

Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, United Nations, New York
"South Africa's Role in Comoros and Madagascar"

11h45 – 12h00

Professor Bidadanure Nestor, University of Paris,
"The Peace Process in Burundi: Progress, Risks and Prospects"

12h00 – 13h00

Plenary Discussion

13h00 – 14h00: Lunch Break

Session 6: South Africa's Regional Relations

Chair: Ms. Yasmin Sooka, Director; Foundation for Human Rights, Pretoria

14h00 – 14h15

Professor Achille Mbembe, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
"South Africa and Francophone Africa"

14h15 – 14h30

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"An Axis of Virtue? South Africa and Nigeria in Africa"

14h30 – 14h45

Professor Rok Ajulu, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
"South Africa and Eastern Africa"

14h45 – 15h00

Dr. Iqbal Jhazbhay, University of South Africa, Pretoria
"South Africa - North Africa Relations: Promoting Renewal by Bridging a Continent"

15h00 – 16h00

Plenary Discussion

16h00 – 16h15: Coffee Break

Session 7: Civil Society and the Private Sector

Chair: Mr Francis Antonie, Standard Bank, Johannesburg

16h15 – 16h30

Professor Adam Habib, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria
"State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa"

16h30 – 16h45

Mr. Khehla Shubani, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg
"Black Economic Empowerment: Myth or Reality?"

16h45 – 17h00

Dr. Neva Makgetla, Congress of South African Trade Unions, South Africa
"The Trade Union Movement in the 'New' South Africa"

17h00 – 18h00

Plenary Discussion

Dinner: 19h00

DAY THREE

Sunday 1 August 2004

Session 8: Summary of the Rapporteurs' Report

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Nigeria

09h30 – 10h30

Dr. Cheryl Hendricks, Programme Manager; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and
Mr. Kaye Whiteman, Editorial Adviser; *Business Day*, Nigeria

10h30 – 10h45: Coffee Break

10h45 – 12h00

Session 9: Producing A Policy-Relevant Volume

Chair: Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, ACDESS, Nigeria
Dr. Mark Chingono, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and
Dr. Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

ANNEX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Dr. Adekeye Adebajo
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
2. Professor Adebayo Adedeji
African Centre for Development
and Strategic Studies
Awolowo Way
P.O. Box 203
Molipa
Ijebu-Ode
Nigeria
3. Professor Rok Ajulu
Department of International Relations
Wits University
Private Bag Wits
Johannesburg
2050
South Africa
4. Ms. Mercia Andrews
Trust for Community Outreach and Education
P O Box 323
Athlone
7760
South Africa
5. Mr. Francis Antonie
Standard Bank
P O Box 3862
Johannesburg
2000
South Africa
6. Professor Kader Asmal
South African Parliamentary
Defence Portfolio Committee
P O Box 15
Cape Town
8000
South Africa

7. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
Department of Political Science
University of Dar es Salaam
P O Box 35042
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania
8. Dr. Andrew Charman
Independent Consultant
P O Box 259
Muizenberg
7950
South Africa
9. Dr. Mark Chingono
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
10. Professor Joao Paulo Coelho
Department of History
Eduardo Mondlane University
University Campus
P O Box 1993
Maputo
Mozambique
11. Mr. Nicholas Coghlan
Canadian High Commission
South African Reserve Bank Building
19th Floor
St George's Mall
Cape Town
8001
South Africa
12. Ms. Augusta Conchiglia
26 Bis Avenue
Daumensnil
7502
Paris
France
13. Colonel Manuel Correia De Barros
Angola Centre for Strategic Studies
Bairro Alvalade
Rua Fernão Mendes Pinto
12 / 14
Luanda
14. Professor André du Pisani
Department of Political and Administrative Studies
University of Namibia
Private Bag 13301
Windhoek
Namibia

15. Ms. Rose Francis
Chief Executive Officer
Rose Francis Communications
P O Box 95342
Grant Park
2051
South Africa
16. Minister Marianne Gramm
Embassy of Switzerland,
225 Veale Street
Parc Nouveau
New Muckleneuk
Pretoria
0181
South Africa
17. Professor Adam Habib
Human Sciences Research Council
Private Bag X41
Pretoria
0001
South Africa
18. Ms. Ruth Hall
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
University of the Western Cape
Bellville
7530
South Africa
19. Professor Holger Bernt Hansen
University of Copenhagen
Centre of African Studies
Koebmagergade 46
DK - 1150
Copenhagen
Denmark
20. Dr. Cheryl Hendricks
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
21. Mr. Stan Henkeman
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
22. Mr. Pereric Högberg
Charge d'affaires
Embassy of Sweden
P O Box 13477
Hatfield
0028
South Africa

23. Dr. Iqbal Jhazbhay
University of South Africa
P O Box 392
Pretoria
0003
South Africa
24. Ambassador Michael Lake
The Office of the European Union
P O Box 945
Groenkloof
0027
Pretoria
South Africa
25. Mr. Guy Lamb
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
26. Dr. Abdul Lamin
Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
PO WITS
Johannesburg
2053
South Africa
27. Dr. Chris Landsberg
Centre for Policy Studies
P O Box 16488
Doornfontein
2028
South Africa
28. Commissioner Leon Levy
CCMA
78 Darling Street
Cape Town
8000
South Africa
29. Councillor Jürgen Lovazs
The Office of the European Union
P O Box 945
Groenkloof
0027
Pretoria
South Africa
30. Dr. Dickson Lyonga Eyoh
Department of Political Science
New College
University of Toronto
M5S 1C7
Toronto
Ontario
Canada

31. Mr. Shaun Mackay
Centre for Policy Studies
P O Box 16488
Doornfontien
2028
South Africa
32. Dr. Neva Makgetla
Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU)
Leyds Street,
Braamfontein
P.O. Box 1019
Johannesburg
2000
South Africa
33. Dr. Eddy Maloka
Africa Institute of South Africa
P O Box 630
Pretoria
0001
South Africa
34. Dr. Khabele Matlosa
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)
2nd floor
the Atrium
Auckland Park
P.O. Box 740
Johannesburg
South Africa
35. Mr. Kholisile Mazaza
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
36. Professor Achille Mbembe
Wits Institute of Social and Economic Research
(WISER)
6th Floor
Richard Ward Building
East Campus
Wits University
Private Bag 3
P O Wits
2050
South Africa
37. Mr. Sifiso Mbuyisa
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
38. Dr. Henning Melber
Research Director
Nordic Africa Institute
P O Box 1703
SE - 751 47
Uppsala
Sweden

39. Ms. Annamarie Minder
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation
Private Bag X37
Hatfield
Pretoria
0028
South Africa
40. Mr. Craig Moffat
Department of Foreign Affairs
P O Box 27332
Sunnyside 0132
975 Schoeman Street
Arcadia
Pretoria
0001
South Africa
41. Commissioner Limakatso Mokhothu
Independent Electoral Commission
P O Box 4196
Sebaboleng - 104
Maseru
Lesotho
100
42. Mr. David Monyae
Department of International Relations
University of Witwatersrand
Private Bag 3
Wits
Johannesburg
2050
South Africa
43. Ms. Shauna Mottiar
No. 2 Dartnell Road
Mountain Rise
Pietermaritzburg
3201
South Africa
44. Mr. Tsepe Motumi
Department of Defence
Private Bag X910
Pretoria
0001
South Africa
45. Professor Sam Moyo
Africa Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS)
19 Bodle Avenue Eastlea
P.O. Box CY3396
Causeway
Harare
Zimbabwe
46. Ms. Caroline Sande Mukulira
Action Aid Southern Africa
Postnet Suite 418
Private Bag X15
Menlow Park
Pretoria
0102
South Africa

47. Ms. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba
African Union Commission
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia

51. Professor Bidanure Nestor
Research in Post-War Education
University of Paris VII
6, Impasse Chateaudun
93200
Saint Denis
Paris
France

48. Dr Musifiky Mwanasali
Department of Political Affairs
New York
USA

52. Ms. Bulelwa Ngwena
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa

49. Dr. Oscar Mwangi
National University of Lesotho
Department of Political and Administrative Studies
Lesotho
100

53. Dr. Tandeka Nkiwane
University of Witwatersrand
Private Bag 3
Wits
Johannesburg
2050
South Africa

50. Mr. Steve Nakana
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa

54. Dr Tunji Olagunju
Nigeria High Commission
P O Box 27332
Sunnyside 0132
975 Schoeman Street
Arcadia
Pretoria
0001
South Africa

55. Dr Werner Rechman
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung S.A.
P O Box 412664
Craighall Park
2024
Johannesburg
South Africa
56. Dr. Sehoai Santho
WK. Kellogg Foundation,
Lesotho Programme
Institute of Development Management
P O box 1318
Maseru
Lesotho
100
57. Professor Maxi Schoeman
Department of Political Sciences
University of Pretoria
Pretoria
0002
South Africa
58. Mr. Khehla Shubani
Centre for Policy Studies
P O Box 16488
Doornfontein
2028
South Africa
59. Dr. Owen Sichone
Department of Social Anthropology
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa
60. Ms. Yasmin Sooka
Foundation of Human Rights
Private Bag 14
Arcadia
0007
South Africa
61. Ms. Basetsana Thokoane
Department of Defence
Private Bag X910
Pretoria
0001
South Africa
62. Mr. Elling Tjonneland
Chr. Michelsen Institute
P O Box 6033
Postterminalen
5832
Bergen
Norway
63. Professor Ben Turok
South African Parliament
National Assembly
P O Box 15
Cape Town
8000
South Africa
64. Mr. Kaye Whiteman
Editorial Adviser
Business Day
Amuwo Odofin
Lagos
Nigeria

65. Mr. Brian Williams
Institute of Strategic Labour Studies
P O Box 678
Maitland
7404
South Africa

66. Mr. André Zaaiman
Presidential Support Unit
P O Box 37
Menlyn
0063
Pretoria
South Africa

67. Ms. Lindiwe Zulu
Embassy of South Africa to Brazil
Brasilia
Brazil

68. CONFERENCE TEAM:
Ms. Dawn Alley
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa

69. Ms. Fiona Lunda
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
c/o Rhodes Gift Post Office
7707
South Africa

70. Mr. Fanie Jason (Photographer)

NOTES

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
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DDC
DSC
SDC
COSUDE



DANIDA



EMBASSY OF
FINLAND



CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
C/O RHODES GIFT POST OFFICE, RONDEBOSCH, 7707

TEL: +27 21 422 2512 FAX: +27 21 422 2622

E-MAIL: mailbox@ccr.uct.ac.za

Home page: <http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/>