THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

A POLICY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING BY
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN,
AND THE CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, JOHANNESBURG

MISTY HILLS, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA
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About the Organisers

The Centre For Conflict Resolution

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is affiliated with the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. The organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations, as well as on policy research on South Africa’s role in Africa; the United Nations’ (UN) role in Africa; African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) relations; and HIV/AIDS and Security.

The Centre for Policy Studies

The Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, South Africa, is an independent policy research institution which seeks to influence policy debate and dialogue through original policy research in the areas of governance, democratisation and development. CPS also serves as a forum for debate among policymakers, scholars, analysts and other stakeholders in the policy community.

About the Rapporteurs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in July 2002, at the Heads of State Summit in Durban, South Africa, increased hopes for the African continent as it grappled with a broad range of challenges. These hopes were further bolstered with the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as the AU’s framework for development. NEPAD is set to be integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006. NEPAD recognises governance, peace, and security as central preconditions for development.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), by which African countries are judged on their compliance with stated norms of governance, is a remarkable innovation designed to facilitate the delivery not only of good governance, but also peace and security. Moreover, security within the context of a new African Union has taken on a broader meaning since the end of the Cold War, from a traditional state-centric and ideologically-inspired concept to encompassing a human security approach. From this holistic perspective, the threats to human security in Africa remain a challenge for the AU and NEPAD. Similarly, failure to manage Africa’s diverse peoples and resources has resulted in devastating conflicts across the continent.

While governance and security are not the only challenges in Africa, it seems clear that any process towards the continent’s renewal would need to proceed on a sound governance and security base. Moreover, as the dominant institutions and programmes representing the collective vision of the continent, success in dealing with Africa’s security and governance issues will largely depend on the AU and NEPAD.

It was against this background that the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, South Africa, held a two-day policy advisory group meeting at Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004, on the theme, “The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture”.

Bringing together about 50 participants comprising policy-makers, academics, representatives of international institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), diplomats, journalists, and personnel from the AU and NEPAD secretariats, the seminar analysed and assessed the state of governance and security in Africa under the AU and NEPAD. Participants underscored the need to strengthen the capacity of the AU to deal with Africa’s security challenges, and noted the various contributions of the international community towards Africa’s peace and security architecture. Participants also noted that international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), as well as bilateral donors, could still do more to assist Africa.
The following themes and issues arose from the presentations and discussions during the CCR/CPS policy seminar:

**Promoting Democratic Governance: The AU and Sub-regional Organisations**

Many participants agreed that the AU and NEPAD are new processes that represent a remarkable break from the past. While acknowledging that there were flaws in NEPAD, some of which stemmed from its construction and design, there are grounds to believe that this initiative is qualitatively new and different from previous programmes. First, NEPAD was formulated by African leaders and represents the commitment of the continent to revitalise its image. Second, the AU focuses on a discourse of peace and security as being central to Africa's development and calls for intervention in protection of human rights and to stem domestic and regional instability. Furthermore, the AU and NEPAD have placed governance on the continental agenda and seek to achieve their goals through the African Peer Review Mechanism. Although the APRM lacks instruments to compel errant governments to reform their ways, it is a remarkable innovation that sets the AU/NEPAD governance architecture apart from previous initiatives.

In spite of the potential of regional bodies in Africa such as the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) to serve as vehicles of democratic governance, there are formidable, though not insurmountable, challenges which have weakened the capacities of Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations. In addition to resource constraints, which, in the case of ECOWAS, continue to undermine its effectiveness, sub-regional organisations tend to depend heavily on the goodwill of external donors. Negotiating a dilution of sovereignty with states is a challenge that the AU and NEPAD will have to grapple with. This is especially the case in a region in which many countries have only recently attained statehood and are determined jealously to guard it. Ceding sovereignty to the new AU's supranational institutions may be difficult and could potentially affect the effectiveness of the AU to monitor governance performance on the continent.

**Promoting Democratic Governance: The Role of Civil Society**

The Johannesburg seminar underscored the importance of civil society in strengthening the AU/NEPAD governance and security architecture. Two important institutions created by the AU which could facilitate the contribution of civil society to the AU's governance architecture are the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). ECOSOCC, whose establishment was influenced by the African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation of 1990, is an advisory organ that provides a forum for civil society to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes.

Because membership of ECOSOCC is neither by nomination nor by appointment by governments, a general civil society conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2005, and a professional working group held
elections into the body. As it continues, the process is certain to meet challenges and controversies, not least defining the criteria for selecting civil society organisations (CSOs) for membership of ECOSOCC. Despite this problem, the consultative and election process give further credence to the AU's governance and democracy projects.

The Pan-African Parliament, which was inaugurated in 2004 and sits in South Africa, is another institution through which civil society can contribute towards deepening democratic governance on the continent. Although members of the PAP are appointed by governments and exercise only advisory powers, this is nonetheless a significant institution serving as a forum for deliberating the common affairs of the continent. Among its current functions, the PAP debates the budget of the AU and the reports of the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), while its president sits in on the meetings of the Assembly of AU Heads of State. The PAP is expected to become more effective after five years, when it becomes elective and assumes full legislative and oversight powers. Direct election into the parliament will enhance the role of civil society in the governance process of the AU; this will also serve as another vehicle for civil society to influence policy implementation and monitoring of the AU/NEPAD process.

An additional constituency that the AU regards as its sixth region is the African Diaspora. Although the question of how the African Diaspora can be integrated into the AU agenda has not received as much attention as other agenda items of the AU, the importance of the African Diaspora to the new AU governance architecture cannot be over-emphasised. Historically, the African Diaspora, especially African-Americans, have engaged Africa, since colonial times, on policy issues by trying to influence US policy towards Africa, and by interacting with African governments and civil society organisations on the continent. Moreover, since resource mobilisation remains a key objective of the AU and NEPAD, there is a need to engage the African Diaspora as it has remained an invaluable source of revenue to African countries.
Strengthening Africa’s Human Security Regime

Human security came to feature in the development discourse of Africa in the wake of the Cold War. It emerged as an additional agenda in the security discourse, premised on the belief that national security is insufficient to guarantee holistic development. In Africa, the new thinking on security developed alongside renewed initiatives on regional integration. This dualism was informed by a new policy direction: that the cause of both state and human security would better be served under a paradigm of regional co-operation. The AU and sub-regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS have thus developed various programmes for promoting human security.

A new human security threat in Africa is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The importance of this threat is underscored by the gravity of the epidemic and the sobering statistics in Africa. HIV/AIDS has resulted in 22 million deaths in the last 20 years - 2.3 million in 2003 alone. It has emerged, above conflicts, as the major killer in Africa. There are an estimated 25 million adults and children on the continent currently living with HIV/AIDS, while the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates the number of HIV/AIDS orphans in Africa to be around 11 million.

Africa and External Actors

Historically, Africa has had strong engagements with external actors, both multilateral and bilateral. Such engagements have not only centred on peace and security, but also on general economic and social development. The two external actors on which presentations were made at the seminar were the United States and the United Nations.

The US

According to US Ambassador to South Africa Jendayi Frazer, the US has historically been a strong supporter of Africa’s institutions and programmes. She argued that this support has been demonstrated much more clearly under the George Bush Jr. administration since 2001. Currently, the US supports Africa within the broader framework of Washington’s strategic approach, which has three components. First, Washington’s policy focuses on strategic states in each sub-region in sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa (Southern Africa); Nigeria (West Africa); Kenya (East Africa) and Ethiopia (Horn of Africa). The second component of the approach is to engage with sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC and the East African Community (EAC). Of these sub-regional organisations, ECOWAS has the oldest relationship with the US, dating back to peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and, more recently, in Côte d'Ivoire. The third component is a close working relationship with the AU and NEPAD as the continent’s pre-eminent institutional leaders for transformation.
The second broad aspect of US engagement with the AU and NEPAD relates to Washington's policy priorities. These include promoting economic prosperity; resolving conflicts and fighting terror; and combating HIV/AIDS. The US has assisted Africa in matters of conflict resolution over the last several years, unilaterally, bilaterally and through the UN system. Washington is working closely with the AU and the UN to deal with the crisis in Darfur, providing nearly $300 million towards humanitarian efforts. In 2003, the value of US development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was about $2 billion. Washington provides $15 billion for the war on HIV/AIDS. Of this, $9 billion goes to 15 focus countries, 12 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.

The UN

UN peacekeeping in Africa has a mixed record of success. After the Congo crisis of 1960 – 1964, the UN did not intervene in Africa for 25 years (when it oversaw the independence of Namibia in 1989 – 1990). The August 2000 Brahimi Report on peacekeeping sought to introduce innovations in UN peacekeeping efforts, such as the pre-approval of expenditure on peacekeeping operations and improving the deployment of civilian personnel to UN missions. It also increased the staff in the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) from 400 to 600. Innovative though it seemed, the report came under heavy criticism in Africa.

Among other things, the report failed to highlight the UN's tendency to shy away from conflicts and peacekeeping in Africa. It also failed to focus attention on the relationship between Africa's regional organisations and the UN. The Brahimi Report was also criticised for warning the UN not to become involved in conflicts in which it could not guarantee success, which was perceived by many Africans as prejudiced code for the UN to avoid African conflicts.

The need for UN peacekeeping in Africa cannot be over-emphasised. Africa has the highest incidence of conflicts, and nearly half of the 50 UN peacekeeping missions in the world in the post-Cold War era have been in Africa, while the largest and most numerous peacekeeping operations today are also in Africa. The report of the UN High-Level Panel established by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to study global security threats, challenges and change, which was published in December 2004, took a slightly more positive view of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The report highlighted the importance of relations between the UN and Africa's regional organisations, though it also failed, like the Brahimi Report, to give sufficient attention to this critical area. UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa have fallen well short of expectations. In 1993, the UN withdrew from Somalia after the death of 18 American peacekeepers. The UN also shamefully failed to react to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in which 800,000 people were killed. If implemented, the proposed reforms of the UN Security Council may hold some hope for Africa. Two permanent African seats in the Security Council may help sustain UN interest in, and support for, peacekeeping efforts on the continent.
Africa’s Evolving Peace and Security Role

Africa’s security challenges must be seen first and foremost as human security challenges. Hence, the central question is whether the AU/NEPAD emerging security and governance architecture is capable of meeting the needs of the continent. Africa’s human security challenges are reflected in a number of issues. One of these is poverty, which is not only widespread, but also on the increase. Currently, between 40 percent and 60 percent of the continent’s 800 million people live below the poverty line – the threshold of $1 per day. To tackle poverty, public policy must simultaneously address the question of empowerment, since the poor are the most marginalised members of society. Such measures must aim at empowering the poor to ensure that policy reflects their views and voices.

The AU places great emphasis on the promotion of human security, which is now acknowledged as a critical precondition to development. The central instrument of the AU’s new peace and security architecture is the African Peace and Security Council. The protocol establishing the PSC was adopted in July 2004. The PSC is modeled after the UN Security Council with 15 members, but unlike the latter, the former does not have members with veto powers; nor does it have permanent members. However, the PSC has five countries elected for a three-year period, while the remaining 10 are elected for a two-year period. Also, like the UN Security Council, the African PSC is mandated to make crucial decisions on peace and security, in particular whether or not a particular incident in a member country warrants the AU’s intervention.
The AU is attempting to establish an African Standby Force by 2010, built on five sub-regional brigades for deployment to Africa conflicts, as well as a conflict early-warning system. The AU also acknowledges the threats posed by international terrorism, especially after the events of 11 September 2001. Accordingly, the AU Terrorism Convention of 1999 was revised in 2003 to take a broader and long-term perspective of this threat. In addition to addressing the effects of terrorism, the new convention addresses both the root causes and the effects of terrorism by stressing the need to strengthen capacities, information sharing, and joint monitoring and manning of borders in Africa. Other concerns that the AU seeks to address are small arms proliferation, landmines and the question of mercenaries. In pursuing these issues, the AU faces enormous challenges, including finance, human resource capacity and a commitment to implementing the policies that it formulates.

The Peace and Security Role of Sub-regional Organisations: SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD

Sub-regional organisations in Africa have in various ways responded to the security concerns in their respective regions. Their security mechanisms are now involved in building the capability of Africa’s evolving security architecture. Participants at the Johannesburg seminar highlighted five themes relating to the roles of SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD in building peace in Africa.

First, these sub-regional mechanisms embrace agendas that transcend economic co-operation to include peace and security. In furtherance of this objective, these organisations are in the process of establishing stand-by forces to deal expeditiously with threats to security.

Second, in all of these sub-regional organisations, the process of integration and the agenda on peace and security are driven by states, which advances an agenda that is consistent with the AU’s broader security architecture but de-emphasises human security.

Third, the role of non-state actors, especially civil society, is minimal in the peace and security process of these sub-regional bodies.

Fourth, the emerging peace and security architecture fails to address the question of leadership, that is, the question of regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria which have led peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Finally, all of these sub-regional bodies, although currently concerned with governance and security, were initially designed to promote economic integration. These new responsibilities, in many ways, explain the slow process and, in some cases, the difficulties in building durable governance and security structures on the continent.
Promoting Democratic Governance: The AU and Sub-regional Organisations

The African Union (AU), which succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, was determined to be different from its predecessor. One of its major objectives was the promotion of peace and security. The AU is different from the OAU in that it seeks to mobilise every resource - human, economic, social - for the development of the continent. In particular, the AU seeks to promote popular participation in pursuit of peace and security. Although the OAU seemed to have somewhat departed from popular mobilisation, its creation was inspired by popular movements. Contrary to many critics, the AU seems to be a partnership between governments and civil society. Two critical institutions giving meaning to this evolving partnership are the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).

It was against this background that the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, South Africa, held a two-day policy advisory group meeting at Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004, on the theme, "The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture".

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A central question of concern of the seminar, in the light of the failures of previous developmental initiatives, was whether the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are really new processes that represent a true break from the past. NEPAD is set to be integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006. While acknowledging flaws in NEPAD, some stemming from its construction and design, there are grounds to believe that these are qualitatively new and different from previous programmes. First, the AU and NEPAD are the direct creation of African leaders and represent the commitment of the continent to revitalise its image; second, the AU focuses on a discourse of peace and security as central to Africa’s development.
Importantly, NEPAD places governance on the continental agenda. A central instrument designed to facilitate good governance is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to which 26 African states have signed up. Although the APRM lacks instruments of compulsion to compel errant governments to reform and transform, it is a remarkable innovation that sets the AU/NEPAD governance architecture apart from previous similar initiatives.

The shift from the old political dynamics of the OAU – characterised largely by procrastination, inaction and an incapacity to police good governance norms – to an AU/NEPAD with determined vigour, and the establishment of institutions such as the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) to promote democratic governance and engage with civil society, is clear testament to the seriousness of the AU/NEPAD initiatives. The AU is in the process of setting up a governance, democracy and election unit to develop guidelines on democracy.

However, despite the opportunities for these new initiatives to contribute to Africa’s peace, security and development, the continent’s institutions have a number of challenges to overcome. The potential of the AU/NEPAD/CSSDCA structure to accelerate the continent’s integration, particularly as it relates to democracy and good governance, is also demonstrated by the redefinition and reshaping of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Member states of these organisations have signed protocols on governance, peace and security, as well as declarations, in the case of SADC, enjoining governments to promote respect for human rights and sound governance practices. Both SADC and ECOWAS member states have passed declarations denouncing unconstitutional changes of government. Regional bodies have also established electoral norms and standards. SADC in particular has made important strides in this direction. During its summit in July 2004, SADC adopted electoral principles, norms and standards that must be met by member countries in the conduct of electoral polls. These standards have since become the basis of opposition agitation for leveling the electoral playing field in Zimbabwe. SADC also promotes popular participation and gender equality.
In spite of the potential of the AU and sub-regional bodies to serve as vehicles of democratic governance, there are formidable challenges which could weaken the capacities of Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations. The AU and NEPAD will have to contend with the enduring issue of sovereignty. It is widely believed that one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the OAU was the reluctance of its member states to cede any sovereignty – the difficult decision to compromise national for regional interest. Questions relating to sovereignty and national interests are certain to impact negatively on the AU’s institutions, especially the Pan-African Parliament. The PAP will be effective in discharging its functions as a democratic institution only at the cost of the ceding of some sovereignty by member states.

These challenges are exacerbated in cases in which many members of the AU have serious economic problems and are experiencing the negative consequences of globalisation and adverse terms for trade. In addition to resource constraints, which tend to undermine their effectiveness in promoting peace, security and governance, regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa tend to depend heavily on the goodwill of external benefactors. Such heavy dependence has tended to incapacitate these organisations in the absence of external donors. For example, many of the conflicts in West Africa have been protracted because of the failure of ECOWAS to mobilise quickly resources to contain crises before they escalate. The tying of aid also compromises the ability of the AU and Africa’s bodies to chart autonomous courses of action. Such conditionalities often compel Africa’s regional institutions to pursue programmes that may not be the most urgent or in the immediate interest of African states. Conditionalities also have the added effect of making governments more introspective, rather than promoting the larger interest of the region.

Promoting Democratic Governance: The Role of Civil Society

The importance of civil society in strengthening the AU/NEPAD governance and security architecture cannot be over-emphasised. Criticisms initially levelled against NEPAD came from civil society and centred on the lack of consultation by leaders with African people in the designing of the programme. NEPAD was also accused of having been the brainchild of western creditors, thus enjoying more legitimacy abroad and little credibility at home. In the absence of consultations, NEPAD was viewed as being elite-driven and remote from the people whose interests it purported to be serving. The criticisms of civil society also centred on the inclination of NEPAD to integrate Africa further into the global economy without corresponding changes in the global terms of trade. The effects of the lending conditions of the dominant financial institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – along with the operation of the current international trade regime under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were seen as negative to the developmental aspirations of the continent. Thus, the thrust of civil society’s criticism is that the neo-liberal agenda of NEPAD as represented by the “Washington Consensus” is certain to compound Africa’s already weak position in the global economy.

Consistent with its inclination towards neo-classical orthodoxy, NEPAD fails to enhance the role of states and governments in development. NEPAD restricts the state’s role merely to creating an “enabling environment” – a socio-political context within which capital and neo-liberal programmes can thrive. Privatisation, which is often a hallmark of neo-liberal programmes, will lead inevitably to retrenchment. According to its critics, NEPAD’s neo-liberal prescriptions exacerbate the already tenuous position of African states. Some suggest that calls to curtail the state’s role in development serve to delegitimise it. Such criticisms are premised on the truism that historically, neo-
liberal programmes have not helped the course of African development. A classic example has been the disappointing results of the ubiquitous, yet unpopular structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) which have tended to compound rather than ameliorate development crises in Africa. Moreover, in many African countries, multi-party elections have been stage-managed, with long-serving autocrats often able to manipulate the process. These views underpin the argument that it is critical to incorporate civil society into the AU structures and accentuate the importance of ECOSOCC.

Established through the influence of the African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation of 1990, ECOSOCC is an advisory organ that provides a forum for civil society to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes. Through this forum, civil society is expected to contribute to the achievement of the AU's governance goals. Its establishment was a tacit recognition by African leaders that meeting the overall goals of the AU would be difficult, if not impossible, without the active involvement of civil society. Democratic governance could easily stall without the watchdog role of civil society, the frailty of which is often attributed to the failure of democracy in much of Africa.

Because membership in ECOSOCC is neither by nomination nor by appointment by governments, a general civil society conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2005 and a professional working group held elections into the body. Wangari Maathai, Kenya's Nobel laureate and environmental activist, was chosen to head this body, openly creating tensions because she is a serving minister in the Kenyan government now heading up the AU's civil society organ. The objective of the process is to ensure representivity and transparency, in line with the AU's spirit of democratic governance. As it continues, the process is certain to meet challenges and controversies, not least defining the criteria for selecting civil society organisations (CSOs). Despite this problem, the consultative and election process give further credence to the AU's governance and democracy projects.

Within the context of its 'watchdog' role, civil society can be seen as important in at least three respects – as a normsetter, as a critic, and as a vehicle for deepening democracy. As a norm-setter, civil society plays a crucial role in the governance and security architecture of the continent, in promoting respect for human rights, and in challenging state excesses. Civil society has established parallel structures to interrogate issues of peace and security, governance, development, poverty alleviation and gender issues, among other things. Many of the norms and standards of elections, for example, are set by civil society. While these norms may be parallel, they are often quite different from those set by regional organisations.

Civil society also serves as a critic to keep governments honest. This role is becoming critical for a number of reasons, two of which are germane here. First, the rise of dominant parties: strict party discipline often prohibits internal criticisms, and the fragmentation of opposition has reduced its ability to criticise governments. Thus, the traditional function of the opposition is sometimes being assumed by civil society. Second, there is an accelerated homogenisation of norms and values through cultural diffusion as a result of globalisation.

Civil society acts as a critic of practices and programmes meant to conform to global norms which do not necessarily serve the long-term development interests of the continent. In acting as a critic, civil society also seeks to serve as a watchdog in protecting the public interest. As noted already, the bulk of the criticisms against NEPAD centre on its inclination towards conforming to global norms at the cost of African development. According to its critics, the neo-liberal policies inherent in NEPAD are seen as compounding poverty, unemployment, debt, inequality and could possibly undermine state efforts at fighting HIV/AIDS.
In serving as a watchdog over the public interest, civil society also acts as a vehicle for deepening democratic governance. In this role, civil society co-operates with, but sometimes opposes, government measures. Its input in shaping policy gives meaning to popular participation. One of the shortcomings of African governments has been the tendency to shelve good and well-conceived programmes. The contribution of civil society in this regard lies in its ability to pressure governments to follow through on policies to the implementation stage. Civil society's effective watchdog role can, for example, be critical in the way in which it ensures that the SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) is implemented.

The PAP, which was inaugurated in 2004 and is located in South Africa, is another institution through which civil society can contribute towards deepening democratic governance on the continent. Although members of the PAP are appointed by governments and exercise only advisory powers, this is nonetheless a significant institution serving as a forum for deliberating the common affairs of the continent. Among its current functions, the PAP debates the budget of the AU and the reports of the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), while its president sits in on the meetings of the Assembly of AU Heads of State. The PAP is expected to become more effective after five years, when it becomes elective and assumes full legislative powers. Direct election into the parliament should enhance the role of civil society in the AU's governance process: this could also serve as another vehicle for civil society to influence policy implementation and monitoring of the AU/NEPAD process.

While highlighting its contribution in strengthening the AU/NEPAD/CSSDCA governance and security architecture, it is also imperative to recognise the limitations of civil society in this regard. It is naïve to consider civil society in Africa as a monolithic group of actors pursuing common goals and purposes. On the contrary, civil society is a deeply fractured and heavily segmented entity with various sectors pursuing specific objectives. Sections of civil society benefiting from authoritarian politics directly or indirectly have little interest in transforming or reforming political systems.
It is those sections of civil society that feel the heaviest brunt of bad governance in the form of marginalisation, exclusion and corruption that are more willing to agitate for democratic and other governance reforms. In Kenya, for example, the elite civic actors with strong connections to former president Daniel Arap Moi, along with the middle segments of society, were scarcely interested in democratic reforms. It was the lower echelons of society, ‘popular civil society’¹, that led the campaign for reforms. Similarly, in Nigeria, ethnic and religious considerations have often determined who became part of the campaign for good governance from the 1990s.

According to several participants, some civil society organisations (CSOs) operating in Africa lack internal democratic practices. Within some organisations, leaders are unelected and unaccountable. Corruption, embezzlement, nepotism and various forms or anti-developmental practices are the norm in these organisations. An inherently undemocratic organisation of this sort can hardly claim to champion the cause of good governance at the state, let alone on a continental level. Other civil society organisations are too dependent on external donors, such that their agendas and programmes tend to be designed externally.

The heavy dependence on external actors for financial and technical support tends to compromise the autonomy of CSOs. A great deal of international funding has gone towards supporting the activities of civil society groups, with little emphasis placed on evaluating the outcome of these activities. Some activities initiated by civil society therefore end up making very little contribution to the overall actualisation of the public interest. In spite of these problems, civil society remains one of the most viable vehicles for enhancing the governance and security architecture of NEPAD and the AU.

Discussions on the contribution of civil society to governance and security in Africa cannot exclude the African Diaspora, which the AU considers as its sixth sub-region.

The African Diaspora is a generic term referring to three constituencies:

- The historical Diaspora communities derived from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, giving rise principally to new, African-descended nationalities in the western hemisphere: Afro-Cubans, Afro-Brazilians, African-Americans and Afro-West Indians;
- African Diaspora-derived nation states: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti; and
- African expatriate communities from existing member states of the AU who are either citizens or otherwise residing in non-African countries.

Although the question of how the African Diaspora can be integrated into the AU agenda has not received as much attention as other agenda items of the AU, the importance of the African Diaspora to the new AU governance architecture cannot be over-emphasised. Historically, the African Diaspora, especially African-Americans, have engaged Africa, since colonial times, on policy issues by trying to influence US policy towards Africa, and by interacting with African governments and civil society organisations on the continent. It is, therefore, logical to view the African Diaspora as a critical component of the continent’s civil society, and hence an integral part of the AU’s ECOSOCC. Moreover, since resource mobilisation remains a key objective of the AU and NEPAD, there is a need to engage the African Diaspora, as it has remained an invaluable source of revenue to countries in the AU.

There are a number of proposals relating to the best way in which the AU can integrate the African Diaspora into its governance architecture. One proposal gaining currency on how to integrate the Diaspora into the AU’s agenda is the Co-ordinating Conference model. This involves the establishment of geographically-designated sub-regional co-ordination conferences for regions in the Diaspora: North America, South and Central America, the Caribbean, the United Kingdom, the European Union and possibly Diaspora residing in Africa itself. These various conferences could be co-ordinated by, or represented within, the AU’s ECOSOCC. This is coupled with an inter-related proposal that the PAP become the centrepiece of a Pan-African Inter-Parliamentary Union as a forum for African and Caribbean parliamentarians, as well as for legislative caucuses like the Congressional Black Caucus and parliamentarians of African descent from other non-African countries.

**Strengthening Africa’s Human Security Regime**

Historically, the notion of security as it existed in the post-1945 period, including the security architecture as enshrined in Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, was shaped by the Western-dominated Westphalian state system. This was a security regime that enabled states to confront self-defined threats to security and was shaped by the Cold War’s context. Security was defined principally around the state, with threats perceived to be external. States relied on military solutions to combat security threats. Post-independence Africa was characterised by intrastate conflicts, which raised questions about the conventional notion of security. Questions relating to “whose security?” began to change perceptions on the continent.

The process of Africa’s marginalisation, and its effects as reflected by poverty, unemployment and inequality, also helped to reshape and, in fact, broaden the concept of security from the security of states to the security of people. The new thinking was informed by a view that states should not be the sole reference points for security. However, redefinitions of security do not displace or replace state-based security. Rather, human security has emerged as an additional agenda on the security discourse, and premised on the recognition that national security is insufficient to guarantee human security. While human security cannot be guaranteed without state security, the reverse is also true. Human security will have little meaning without the rule of law and respect for human rights. In Africa, the new thinking on security developed alongside renewed initiatives on regional integration. This dualism was informed by the idea that the cause of both state and human security would be better served under a paradigm of regional cooperation. The AU and sub-regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS have therefore developed various programmes for promoting security.

A new human security threat in Africa is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The importance of this threat is underscored by the gravity of the epidemic and the sobering statistics in Africa. HIV/AIDS accounted for 22 million African deaths in the last 20 years - 2.3 million in 2003 alone. It has emerged, above conflicts, as the major killer in Africa. There are an estimated 25 million adults and children currently living with HIV/AIDS, while the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates the number of HIV/AIDS orphans on the continent to be around 11 million. Currently, 50 percent of hospital beds in certain African countries are occupied by AIDS patients. Agricultural and industrial production have declined in certain countries as a result of AIDS, while it is estimated that nearly 10 percent of all African school teachers will succumb to AIDS in the near future.
Although African governments have recognised the gravity of the HIV/AIDS problem and have made promises to combat it, many of these pledges have remained unfulfilled. African governments committed 15 percent of their national budgets to health under the Abuja Declaration of 2001. However, only very few have met this commitment. It is also yet to be seen whether African governments will fulfill promises made under the Maputo Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria of 2003, in which they pledged renewed commitment to combating these diseases.

As programmes of the AU, NEPAD and the CSSDCA recognise not only the link, but also the centrality of human security as a condition for development. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted at the Millennium Summit of 2000:

“Human security in its broader sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflicts. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and ensures that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflicts. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy, natural environment – these are the inter-related building blocks of human and, therefore, national security.”

Recognising the inextricable link between security and conflict, the AU has incorporated human security issues into a number of its policy frameworks as a way of simultaneously tackling the dual threats of conflict and insecurity. At its Maputo Summit in 2003, the AU voted to insert African AIDS Watch, an initiative by eight heads of state, into the

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AU system, specifically under its Department of Social Affairs. African AIDS Watch will form part of a grand HIV/AIDS strategic plan to be formulated by the AU. These initiatives represent positive signs of the AU leading the fight against HIV/AIDS, and this is one of the key areas in which the AU needs external assistance.

The establishment of a human security unit in the office of the UN Secretary-General should boost the AU’s HIV/AIDS efforts. Kofi Annan’s human security unit will produce a report on human security in Africa, which will be preceded by consultations with African civil society, including the AU Commission. Participants at the Johannesburg seminar noted that there is an urgent need for scaled-up international assistance to help Africa to deal with its various security threats. However, several participants also cautioned against accepting interventions wholesale: external support promoting human security should be co-ordinated and contribute to legitimate African strategies.

Africa and External Actors

Historically, Africa has had strong engagements with external actors, both multilateral and bilateral. Such engagements have not only centred on peace and security, but also on general economic and social development. The Johannesburg seminar focused on two external actors: the United States and the United Nations. Though by no means the only major external actors in Africa, both have clearly had a great impact on Africa’s peace and security architecture.

The US

According to US Ambassador to South Africa Jendayi Frazer, the US has historically been a strong supporter of Africa’s institutions and programmes. She argued that this support has been demonstrated much more clearly under the George Bush Jr. administration since 2001. Although there is a widespread view that, as the world’s sole remaining superpower, the US is doing little to help Africa, the ambassador argued that this was, in fact, not the case. Although there is still scope for expanding American assistance to Africa’s security and governance efforts, Washington is substantially assisting the continent. An area in which US assistance is crucial as far as governance, peace and security are concerned is the field of capacity-building.

According to Ambassador Frazer, it is important to understand the philosophy and the general thrust of US assistance to Africa. Washington supports Africa within the broader framework of America’s strategic approach, which has three components. First is Washington’s policy of identifying strategic states in each sub-region in sub-Saharan Africa. These states are South Africa (Southern Africa); Nigeria (West Africa); Kenya (East Africa) and Ethiopia (Horn of Africa). The second component of its approach is to engage with sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC and the East African Community (EAC). Among these sub-regional organisations, ECOWAS has the oldest relationship with the US, dating back to peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and, more recently, in Côte d’Ivoire. The third component of US policy in Africa is working closely with the AU and NEPAD as the continent’s blueprint framework for transformation.
A broad aspect of US engagement with the AU and NEPAD, according to Ambassador Frazer relates to Washington’s policy priorities. These include: promoting economic prosperity; resolving conflicts; combating terror; and fighting HIV/AIDS. The US has assisted Africa in matters of conflict resolution over the last decade, unilaterally, bilaterally and/or through the UN system. According to Ambassador Frazer, in the last five years, Washington has supported every UN resolution on conflict management in Africa. Examples abound of Washington’s assistance to Africa’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping initiatives. For example, the US has worked with Kenya and the United Nations to persuade Sudan’s warring factions to negotiate peace. Similarly, Washington has worked closely with the AU and the UN to deal with the crisis in Darfur.

According to Ambassador Frazer, it was the characterisation of the situation in Darfur as “genocide” by the US government that generated the necessary international attention to the crisis. This is a conflict in which tens of thousands of people have been internally displaced; several thousands killed; and over 140,000 forced into exile. The US has subsequently pushed resolutions through the Security Council to get the UN more actively involved in both the military and humanitarian aspects of the conflict. In addition to this multilateral approach, Washington has provided financial support of about $300 million towards humanitarian efforts in Darfur. The US also assisted in airlifting Rwandan and Nigerian peacekeepers to Darfur.

Even before Darfur, Washington supported ECOWAS in the 1990s through the International Contact Group, using Ghana as a lead country to mediate between the government and rebels in Liberia. In these mediation efforts, the US had a representative on the contact group. Washington also assisted in efforts to support the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in its disarmament activities in Liberia between 1996 and 1997. ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone were trained under US peacekeeping programmes such as Operation Focus Relief in 2000, initiated under the Bill Clinton administration (1992 – 2000), and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Close to 9,000 soldiers have been trained for emergency peacekeeping and peace-enforcement duties under ACRI (which has now been renamed ACCOTA - Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance). The US was also instrumental in pressuring the conflict-fuelling Liberian President Charles Taylor to leave power in August 2003.

In addition to assisting conflict resolution efforts in Africa, Washington has, according to Ambassador Frazer, also provided opportunities for economic growth in Africa. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a case in point. Under AGOA, 37 of Africa’s 53 countries can access the American market in selected areas. In the long term, AGOA could contribute to peace and stability on the continent since it seeks to create jobs, reduce conflicts and promote development. Development assistance also deserves a mention. In 2003, the value of US development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was about $2 billion - the highest ever. This excludes the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which factors in ‘good governance’, investments in health and the promotion of economic entrepreneurship. Eight of the countries in the MCA are in sub-Saharan Africa. The MCA will provide $5 billion in aid over the next three years and, in a sense, doubles US development assistance. Several participants, however, noted that Washington could still provide more assistance to Africa, and expressed concerns that strategic interests in America’s ‘war on terror’ could negatively affect and distort such support.

Other areas of US economic support cited by the ambassador are Washington’s campaign for debt relief for sub-Saharan African countries and its contribution towards the fight against HIV/AIDS. Washington provides $15 billion for the war on HIV/AIDS. Of this, $9 billion goes to 15 focus countries, 12 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa;
$5 billion goes to other countries with bilateral HIV and AIDS programmes with the US, while the remaining $1 billion goes to the UN Global AIDS Fund.

In spite of this assistance, there are still areas in which the US can do more. One of these is in training and specifically military assistance through ACOTA. At a paltry $20 million a year, ACOTA can be greatly expanded to help establish an AU stand-by force. The US, in co-operation with the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries and with a focus on Africa, has committed to train and, where appropriate, equip up to 75,000 African troops by 2010. The objective is to train peacekeepers that will be available to support peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa.

The UN

UN peacekeeping in Africa has a mixed record of success. After the Congo crisis of 1960 - 1964, the UN did not intervene in Africa for 25 years (when it oversaw the independence of Namibia in 1989 - 1990). The August 2000 Brahimi Report on peacekeeping sought to introduce innovations in UN peacekeeping efforts, such as the pre-approval of expenditure on peacekeeping operations and improving the deployment of civilian personnel to UN missions. It also increased the staff in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) from 400 to 600. Innovative though it seemed, the report came under heavy criticism in Africa.
Among other things, the report failed to highlight the UN’s tendency to shy away from conflicts and peacekeeping in Africa. It also failed to focus attention on the relationship between Africa’s regional organisations and the UN. The Brahimi Report was also criticised for warning the UN not to become involved in conflicts in which it could not guarantee success, which was perceived by many Africans as prejudiced code for the UN to avoid African conflicts. The need for UN peacekeeping in Africa cannot be over-emphasised. Africa has the highest incidence of conflicts in the world, and nearly half of the 50 UN peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era have been in Africa, while the largest and most numerous UN peacekeeping operations are also in Africa.

The report of the UN High-Level Panel established by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to study global security threats, challenges and change, which was published in December 2004, took a slightly more positive view of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The report highlighted the importance of relations between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, though it also failed, like the Brahimi Report, to give sufficient attention to this critical area. UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa have fallen well short of expectations. In 1993, the UN withdrew from Somalia after the death of 18 American peacekeepers. The UN also shamefully failed to react to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in which about 800,000 people were killed. A slow UN response to the Liberian conflict in 1990 compelled ECOWAS, a regional organisation for promoting economic integration, to constitute itself into a peacekeeping body, although it was quite clear that the regional body was completely unprepared for conflict management.

Five factors have affected the success of peacekeeping missions in Africa. Although by no means exhaustive, the list include the following key factors:

- The willingness of warring parties to implement agreements they have negotiated;
- The development of effective strategies to deal with ‘spoilers’ - factions determined to wreck peace processes;
- The absence of conflict-fuelling resources;
- The co-operation of regional and external actors; and
- Good leadership of peacekeeping missions.

All these conditions may not necessarily be met in every peacekeeping situation, but the very existence of these factors can often facilitate the success of peacekeeping. For example, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994 succeeded because many of these conditions existed. In Somalia, the UN mission in 1993 was well-equipped, while in Rwanda, in 1994, the peacekeepers were logistically ill-equipped and not well-funded. Both missions, however, collapsed because of the failure of contending factions to demonstrate the necessary political will to stick to negotiated agreements, and external support crumbled after the killing of American and Belgian soldiers in Somalia and Rwanda, respectively. The Sierra Leonean mission succeeded in large part because of the active support of Britain.

South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki has been active in peacemaking efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2002. He succeeded in getting the factions to agree on the formation of a transitional government to precede general elections. A 16,700-strong UN peacekeeping force has been deployed to the country, with 1,500 South African soldiers participating in the mission. However, the government of national unity remains disunited and characterised by factionalised politics. A further disconcerting aspect of the peace process is the lack of emphasis on either demobilisation or disarmament. This is a vast country the size of Western Europe with dilapidated infrastructure. The negotiated peace in the DRC thus remains extremely fragile.

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Finally, 40 percent of UN peacekeepers in Africa are African, giving an unfortunate impression of the higher value placed on the lives of non-African peacekeepers. Africa's hopes now partly hinge on the proposed reform of the UN Security Council, with the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change's report of December 2004 proposing two African permanent seats and an additional rotating seat (to add to the existing three) in a Security Council expanded from 15 to 24 members. If implemented, this may help stimulate UN interest and action in peacekeeping efforts on the continent. The panel also suggested that the UN consider financing peacekeeping missions conducted by Africa's regional organisations.

Africa’s Evolving Peace and Security Role

Africa’s security challenges must be seen first and foremost as human security challenges. Hence, the central question is whether the AU/NEPAD emerging security and governance architecture is capable of meeting the security needs of the continent. Africa’s human security challenges are reflected in a number of issues. One of these is poverty, which is not only widespread, but also on the increase. Currently, between 40 percent and 60 percent of the continent’s 800 million people live below the poverty line – the threshold of $1 per day.

The majority of those seriously afflicted by poverty are the most vulnerable sections of society, including rural communities, women, children, and the aged. The side-effects are often overwhelming: famine, malnutrition and HIV/AIDS, which present serious governance challenges for Africa. Poverty is frequently exacerbated by inequality, and it is often an inexplicable paradox that some of the poorest of the poor in Africa are found in the richest and most endowed countries on the continent. To tackle poverty, public policy must simultaneously address the question of empowerment, since the poor are most often marginalised. Such measures must aim at empowering the poor to ensure that policy reflects their views and voices.

Besides poverty, Africa also faces other human security threats in the form of inter- and especially intra-state conflicts. Currently, 8 of the UN’s 16 peacekeeping operations are in Africa, while 14 of the 53 countries in Africa are either experiencing or are just recovering from conflicts.

The AU places great emphasis on the promotion of human security, which is now acknowledged as a critical precondition to development. The central instrument of the AU’s new peace and security architecture is the African Peace and Security Council. The protocol establishing the PSC was adopted in July 2004. The PSC is modeled after the UN Security Council with 15 members, but unlike the latter, the former does not have members with veto power. However, the PSC has five countries elected for a three-year period, while the remaining 10 are elected for a two-year period. Also, like the UN Security Council, the African PSC is mandated to make important decisions on peace and security, in particular whether or not a particular incident in a member country warrants the AU’s intervention.
The AU's new security architecture, which represents a remarkable shift from the non-intervention posture of the OAU, includes the possibility of intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. The AU provides for intervention to be mandated by the PSC if it deems developments in a particular country to be threatening to regional peace and security. The AU has identified four cases that may warrant intervention:

- Genocide;
- Gross violation of human rights;
- Instability in a country which threatens broader regional stability; and
- Unconstitutional changes of government.

Although these conditions are subject to diverse interpretation, they nonetheless demonstrate the AU's determination to place security firmly on its agenda. In fact, the PSC has been mandated to establish an African Standby Force built around five sub-regional brigades for deployment to Africa conflicts by 2010, as well as a conflict early-warning system.

The AU governance and security architecture also underscores the importance of civil society to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In practice, however, there has been a huge gap between the rhetoric of the AU to promote the role of civil society and the willingness of governments to welcome civil society in this role. Containment doctrines also form part of the new AU/NEPAD/CSSDCA security architecture. Current efforts are being made by sub-regional organisations and the AU to prevent current conflicts from escalating or spilling over borders. These include efforts by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki and Ghana's John Kufour in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and the DRC, and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo's efforts in Sudan. The AU's objective under its new peace and security architecture is to prevent conflicts from occurring and, where they do occur, to contain them.
The AU also acknowledges the threats posed by international terrorism, especially after the events of 11 September 2001. Accordingly, the AU Terrorism Convention of 1999 was revised in 2003 to take a broader and long-term perspective of this threat. This new convention seeks not only to address speedily the effects, but also the root causes, of terrorism. Thus, the convention stresses the need to strengthen capacities, information sharing, and joint monitoring and patrolling of borders in Africa. To demonstrate its commitment to the fight against terror, the AU has established a Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) in Algeria. Linked somewhat with terrorism is the AU’s concern over the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the continent. The AU is interested in establishing a framework for dealing with the threat posed by these weapons, and civil society has suggested that the AU dialogue with arms manufacturers and suppliers as a way of controlling the flow of arms into the region. Other issues recognised by the AU as inimical to peace and security on the continent include the scourge of landmines and the phenomenon of mercenaries. The AU seeks comprehensively to address these concerns under its new peace and security regime. The AU is certain to face challenges in meeting its peace and security objectives. Key among these is finance and funding. Non-payment of dues by some states leaves the AU in a poor financial state, unable to meet its objectives. In 2004, the AU’s budget stood at $43 million, with government arrears totalling $26 million. But in the light of its expanding agenda on governance, peace and security, the AU Commission, under the leadership of the former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, proposed a revised budget for 2005. This budget was negotiated with the input of member states and approved at $158 million, of which $72 million will go towards peace and security initiatives. Member states have committed themselves to devising a new scale of assessments and paying $63 million of the total budget, while a ‘solidarity budget’ of $95 million is to be raised through voluntary contributions. Meeting this budget may prove difficult, given the tendency of many states to default on their debts. In terms of this plan, four countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Libya) will each contribute 8.25 percent of the AU’s budget. Besides finance, the human resource capacity of the AU is limited and needs to be improved in terms of both quality and quantity.

A further challenge will be the commitment of member states to implement the bold, new policies that are being formulated. History has shown that African organisations are good at policy formulation but poor on policy implementation. The ability of the AU to implement what it proposes will, to a large extent, determine its chances of meeting its peace, security, and governance goals in a new millennium.

Ms Sandelle Scrimshaw, left, Canada’s High Commissioner to South Africa, and Ms Kemi Williams, of DFID Southern Africa.
The Peace and Security Role of Sub-regional Organisations: SADC, ECOWAS, and IGAD

Sub-regional organisations in Africa have in various ways responded to the security concerns in their respective regions. The regional mechanisms are now involved in building the capability of Africa’s evolving security architecture. Participants at the seminar highlighted several themes relating to the roles of SADC, ECOWAS, and IGAD in building peace in Africa.

• First, these sub-regional mechanisms embrace agendas that transcend economic co-operation to include peace and security. In furtherance of this objective, all these bodies are in the process of establishing stand-by forces to deal expeditiously with threats to security;
• Second, among these sub-regional organisations, the process of integration and the agenda on peace and security are driven by states, which advance an agenda that is consistent with the broader security architecture of the AU;
• Third, the role of non-state actors, especially civil society, is minimal in the peace and security process of these sub-regional bodies. Further, because of the state-centric and state-driven nature of these bodies, along with the ever-present threat of conflicts, they lack adequate focus on the other critical imperatives necessary for nurturing durable peace, namely a focus on human security. In addition, the emerging peace and security architecture fails to address the question of leadership, that is, the question of regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria;
• Finally, all these sub-regional bodies, although currently concerned with governance, peace and security, were initially designed to promote economic integration. These new responsibilities, in many ways, explain the slow process and, in some cases, the difficulties in building durable governance, peace and security structures on the continent.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community is one of the key sub-regional organisations in Africa and has developed a mechanism for collective security. Its creation in 1980 was informed not so much by geographical factors as by a common struggle against apartheid South Africa. This, for example, explains why Tanzania, which geographically belongs to East Africa, was politically part of southern Africa.

Historically, SADC’s security architecture was preceded by an informal arrangement of the Frontline states, which, threatened by apartheid South Africa, were committed to the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. Following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed to, among other things, counter the destabilisation policies of the apartheid state in the region, through a reduction of reliance on South Africa. Following the phenomenal changes that occurred in the wider international environment at the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the growing indications that apartheid was crumbling, SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, and was joined by South Africa after its political transition in 1994.
A sub-regional body, SADC confronts governance and security issues. However, the process of dealing with these issues has led to the emergence of two views. One view, championed by Zimbabwe, favoured a continuation of the informal and confidential consultations that characterised the Frontline states approach to security. The second view, led by South Africa, favoured the development and institutionalisation of security structures that are more transparent.

In 1996, a decision was reached among SADC heads of state to set up an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). A final decision on the details of the OPDS was, however, overtaken by two SADC military interventions in 1998 – one in the DRC and the other in Lesotho. These interventions underscored the need for speedily establishing the OPDS, but further complicated the details concerning the Organ.

By May 2000, the issue had been resolved, at least at the formal level, and in August 2001 the SADC summit of heads of state approved a protocol on the establishment of the OPDS, bringing to an end the five-year wrangling over the nature and operation of the organ. Yet, even between 1996 and 2000, the military co-operation committee established under the era of the Frontline states and which subsequently became known as the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (IDSC), continued to function at the level of officials and sometimes at the level of ministers. This drew together a number of co-operation mechanisms on military training. In 2004, SADC unveiled a five-year Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO).

The critical part of the OPDS was Article 6.1, which called for automatic collective action by all SADC states against any armed attack on another member state, including internal attacks. This provision has, however, been seen by some observers as controversial because of its potential to legitimise potentially irresponsible regimes. In terms of structure, the OPDS places the 13-member SADC summit of heads of state at its apex. However, SADC’s day-to-day operation of the organ is carried out by two troikas – one led by a troika of heads of state and the other by OPDS chairs. The two troikas do not have the same members. The current OPDS troika comprises Lesotho, South Africa and Namibia, with South Africa in the chair. Under the Organ’s troika is a ministerial committee. Subordinate to this committee are two functional committees – the Interstate Defence and Security Committee and the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (IPDC). These have other sub-committees, including the sub-committee on state security, public safety, and defence.

The OPDS is a security mechanism that seeks to provide comprehensive security co-operation and an over-arching framework within SADC and the emerging regional elements of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, as well as a common African defence and security policy. Not only is the OPDS mandated to deal with inter-state conflicts, but also intra-state eruptions such as civil wars, military coups, gross violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and large-scale communal violence. In effect, the role of SADC’s OPDS is similar to that of the 15-member UN Security Council and that of the AU’s Peace and Security Council.

The OPDS emphasises the use of preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and the use of force as a last resort. The powers, functions and operation of the Organ are thus consistent with Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. Yet another important provision of the SADC security architecture is its provisions on non-aggression which requests states to refrain from nurturing, harbouring or supporting individuals or groups whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, economic or social security of another member state.
Notwithstanding the novelty and promises of the OPDS in raising the profile of SADC’s security architecture, daunting challenges remain. One of these is the question of sovereignty which states are often reluctant to cede. The history of regional integration and security mechanisms in Africa has shown that the difficulties of negotiating sovereignty between states and supranational bodies has been a large part of the reason for the ineffectiveness of the latter.

Many of the states in southern Africa have only recently attained independent statehood and still jealously guard their sovereignty. Much of the economic sovereignty of these states has been eroded by the dominant international financial institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - and major bilateral donors. Yet, part of state sovereignty has to be ceded if the OPDS is to be effective. Another issue concerns democracy and human rights, especially the way in which the OPDS manages security and human rights issues. The more important question is whether SADC, as an institution is prepared to intervene on human rights and democracy issues in southern Africa. Thus far, it is clear that SADC has not done so, apart from a few attempts at “quiet diplomacy” in places like Zimbabwe. With instances of human rights abuses and democratic failures in the region, SADC will have to do more in this critical area.

A further concern is SADC’s tendency to use military approaches to tackle issues that are technically non-military in nature. This stems from the fact that SADC’s structures on defence and security are running far ahead of those on political issues. For example, there are more talks on defence co-operation and SADC regional military brigades when, in fact, a large proportion of the organisation’s security challenges are non-military human security issues requiring political and civilian co-operation. Also of concern is how SADC can incorporate civil society into its emerging security architecture, an area that ECOWAS and IGAD seem to have made more progress on.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States, founded in 1975, is Africa’s first sub-regional organisation to engage in conflict resolution. Its conflict resolution and management initiatives date back to 1990 when it was thrust into the Liberian conflict. Besides Liberia, ECOWAS was also involved in efforts to resolve the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and the organisation is currently part of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS was initially established to promote economic development and integration in West Africa. The initial protocol establishing ECOWAS did not explicitly place issues of governance and human security on the agenda. However, before it was ready to take on the region’s economic and development challenges, ECOWAS had to take on military responsibilities, as conflicts and the maintenance of regional peace and security became dominant on its agenda.

The Liberian civil war of 1990 – 1997 presented the first post-Cold War test for ECOWAS peace and security structure to deal with threats to regional security. By most accounts, ECOWAS successfully contained the Liberian crisis through diplomacy and military means through ECOMOG. However, one major challenge that has faced ECOWAS, not just in the Liberian conflict but also in its other peace and security initiatives, has been finance. Nigeria, which initially provided 90 percent of ECOWAS finances and logistics, is increasingly reluctant, with its own domestic problems, to continue to do so in the absence of international support.
Other challenges facing ECOWAS include the anglophone-francophone divide in West Africa and the role of France, which often attempts to influence the regional policies of its former colonies. Charles Taylor’s insistence, after winning the Liberian election in 1997, that the country was sovereign and therefore should decide for itself the future role of ECOMOG in Liberia, prematurely forced the peacekeepers out of the country. Based on the experience in Liberia, an ECOWAS security structure was instituted in 1999 by a protocol with three important arms: the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission, and the Council of Elders. These three institutions decide on issues of peace and security in West Africa.

Discussions are far advanced on arrangements to establish an ECOWAS stand-by force, which would be deployed in response to crises. There are four clear conditions, agreed upon by ECOWAS heads of state, under which ECOMOG forces would be deployed:

- Instances of aggression and conflict within a member state;
- Conflicts between two or more member states;
- Internal conflicts that can cause grave humanitarian crises;
- Cases in which the ECOWAS Council decides that conditions are appropriate for the deployment of such a force.

These conditions, though plausible and justifiable, can nevertheless be controversial in practice. ECOWAS recognises the critical importance of certain external players to its security architecture. These include the US, which played a critical role in the Liberian conflict; Britain, which has been instrumental in the resolution of the Sierra Leone civil war; France, which is deeply involved in the Ivorian crisis where its 4600 troops are separating the belligerents; and the UN, which has supported regional peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS accepts that no effective security architecture can be constructed in the sub-region without the involvement of these external players.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is another of the sub-regional organisations building a security architecture. Based in Eastern Africa, a sub-region rife with intra- and interstate conflicts, IGAD has to be sensitive to the security realities in the region. Unlike the fairly cordial relations between SADC members, the relations between IGAD member states have often been characterised by suspicion and mistrust. Tensions have erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea; Eritrea and Sudan; and Uganda and Sudan.

This stems from various factors, notable among which is IGAD’s recent assumption of a peace and security role, although it was initially established for purely civil and development issues. Nevertheless, IGAD recognises that meaningful development and human security is unattainable in a sub-region marked by incessant conflicts and serious security threats. Thus, IGAD has remained resilient and continues to serve as a forum for addressing threats of destabilisation in East Africa. For example, representatives of Eritrea and Ethiopia met in 2004 under the auspices of IGAD to talk, though at an informal level. IGAD has been engaged in peacemaking efforts in Sudan and Somalia, and its members have agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force to Somalia. IGAD thus increasingly provides a forum for formulating a common security agenda among states in the region.

The East African Brigade is an emerging example of the new security architecture in the region, although it extends beyond the traditional IGAD countries to include Mauritius, Seychelles and Rwanda. At the next IGAD summit in 2005, defence chiefs (the Council of Ministers) will discuss a memorandum of understanding on the brigade. The defence chiefs have agreed in principle that the East African Brigade will be based in Ethiopia, while the secretariat responsible for planning missions will be based in Kenya. These proposals will be placed before the 2005 heads of state summit for approval.

Although the brigade is expected to be in place and ready for action by 2010 as part of the AU stand-by force, modalities for deployment still remain to be agreed. Similarly, police chiefs in the region have agreed to establish an information-sharing protocol on counter-terrorism as part of a larger strategy to fight terrorism. However, one area of concern is the absence of a memorandum of understanding between the AU and IGAD on how the latter should deal with terrorism. Similarly, there is no memorandum of understanding on how the East African Brigade will fit into the larger AU stand-by force. An earlier memorandum prepared by the AU on this matter was rejected by IGAD member states.

Despite these uncertainties, IGAD continues to push peace processes in the region. In Sudan, for example, despite some obstacles, IGAD has contributed significantly to the peace process in that country. Here, special credit is due to the former Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, for engaging the warring parties in Sudan. Similarly, although not yet completely successful, IGAD has been the sub-regional organisation that has consistently engaged warlords in an effort to broker peace in Somalia. IGAD was part of the process of establishing, through elections, the extraterritorial government currently based in Nairobi. The reality is that the Kenya-based ‘exile’ Somali government remains fragile and unstable. So far, five of its cabinet ministers have resigned for various reasons.

As part of its conflict resolution and management system, IGAD heads of state agreed in Sudan in 2000 to establish a Conflict Early Warning System and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for the region. The Khartoum conference then mandated the IGAD secretariat in Djibouti to propose detailed modalities for establishing
CEWARN. Subsequent consultations led to the protocol that established CEWARN, and the protocol further gave CEWARN a legal and political foundation to perform an intrusive function, namely, to collect and analyse information on conflict early warning. But the challenge here is whether, given the security realities on the ground and a region characterised by mutual suspicion and mistrust, member states are willing to share such sensitive information with each other.

In the light of this potential challenge, IGAD’s objective is to engage member states and relevant stakeholders on what information they are willing to share. Cross-border conflicts among pastoral communities, for example, have provided good entry points to develop a framework for gathering information on a timely basis. This framework involves mechanisms for monitoring and tracking conflict and co-operation indicators over time. IGAD has developed mechanisms for all these tasks.

Yet, although IGAD has mechanisms on early warning systems within CEWARN, the organisation still lacks definite mechanisms for early response. As part of the process of developing a comprehensive response mechanism, IGAD intends to use existing institutions and institutional linkages, especially those involving civil society. In retrospect, the importance of civil society in IGAD’s security architecture was underscored at the Khartoum conference in 2000. This meeting led to the creation of the IGAD Civil Society Forum (ICSF). In practice, however, it is difficult to institutionalise the organisation’s engagement with civil society because of the different levels of development of NGOs in the region. The CEWARN protocol, however, fully commits governments to engage civil society on long-term conflict prevention efforts in East Africa.

CONCLUSION – THE WAY FORWARD

Participants at the Johannesburg policy seminar addressed nine key themes relating to the AU and NEPAD’s evolving security and governance architecture. The presentations and discussions raised a number of policy issues which need to be brought to the attention of key decision-makers within the AU/NEPAD framework and require further research.

First, is the need for the AU and NEPAD to evolve mechanisms to deal with other non-conventional human security threats such as natural disasters – floods, earthquakes, epidemics, locusts and other catastrophes - that do not often feature in the conventional discourse on security. The recent tsunami in Asia indicates that equally devastating human security threats can emanate spontaneously from the environment.

Second, although the AU/NEPAD security and governance architecture is responding energetically to global demands and challenges, one issue lagging behind is the integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) into the AU/NEPAD system for the benefit not just of regional and sub-regional institutions, but also for the population of the continent. An ever widening digital divide can potentially marginalise Africa in a global setting in which the continent is already marginalised economically.

Third, participants were also concerned that many of the regional efforts at conflict resolution are often ineffective. In other words, these efforts often target the symptoms and not the root causes of conflicts: bad governance,
corruption and the manipulation of ethnicity. The AU/NEPAD security architecture therefore requires a radical shift away from addressing symptoms to a peacemaking agenda that tackles the root causes of the problem. The practice of addressing symptoms rather than root causes has largely explained the eruption of conflicts in cases that should have been resolved.

Fourth, NEPAD needs to address Africa’s developmental crisis as a way of promoting security. Concerns were raised about the neo-liberal orthodoxy of NEPAD. The implementation of NEPAD’s prescriptions are certain to set governments and civil society on a collision course. Genuine development has to be delivered by NEPAD to demonstrate its commitment to Africa and not to the Group of Eight industrialised countries. In meeting its development objectives, ways must be found to make Africa’s development partners keep their promises.

Fifth, the problem of the need for co-ordinating Africa’s numerous and often overlapping governance and security programmes must be urgently addressed. Africa has seen so many well-thought out but unimplemented development, governance and security programmes over the last four decades (such as the 1980 Lagos plan of action), yet the proliferation of these initiatives tends to create further confusion rather than addressing the critical issues for which they were initially established. There is also functional duplication of institutions. A key challenge for the AU’s security and governance regime is to develop ways of rationalising Africa’s many regional institutions and co-ordinating programmes to avoid duplication and the waste of scarce resources.

Sixth, the African Peer Review Mechanism – of which about 26 African governments are members, and which serves as the selling point of NEPAD to donors – seems in its current form to be toothless in instigating democratic governance. It might be useful to empower civil society, through the AU’s ECOSOCC, to play a role in monitoring the governance and security performance of governments. This initiative should complement rather than take over the work of the Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) which is responsible for reviewing governments under the APRM.

Seventh, the AU’s governance and security architecture must address the escalating phenomenon of inequalities and deprivations that characterise much of Africa’s social life. The AU/NEPAD security regime should begin to consider poverty as part of Africa’s conflict early-warning system. Without doubt, many of the conflicts in Africa are rooted in poverty, deprivation and inequality. The effects of conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping will continue to be ephemeral as long as these basic human security needs remain unmet.

Eighth, citizenship and identity questions also need to be placed on the AU/NEPAD agenda. While the redrawing of Africa’s colonially-inherited borders does not seem to be an alternative at present, it is imperative that the AU/NEPAD security architecture takes a closer look at the question of citizenship, with the aim of averting the controversies and conflicts which often attend such contestations. The AU may require policies that will help resolve current citizenship-inspired conflicts such as those in eastern DRC and Côte d’Ivoire.

Finally, the AU must develop creative ways of reversing the “brain drain” from Africa to the West. A shortage of human resources on the continent is a social security threat. Participants at the seminar recognised the enormous constraints facing the AU and NEPAD, and argued that attracting Africa’s most talented citizens back to the continent, the efficient use of scarce resources, and international assistance, could contribute to addressing some, if not all, of Africa’s security and governance challenges.
ANNEX I

Change and Renewal in Africa: Prospects and Challenges of the African Union/NEPAD

ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI
UN UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA

Prof Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa.
December 11, 2004

Mr Chairman,
Ladies and Gentleman,

I am most grateful to Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and Dr. Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, for the opportunity to participate in this policy seminar. Collaboration between Africa’s research or ‘think tank’ institutions is essential to the process of identification of, and finding solutions to, our myriad of public policy problems. The example shown by these two centres in jointly convening this seminar needs to be replicated at the national and regional levels.

My presentation will focus on the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is a programme of the African Union. The international interest in NEPAD has a lot to do with its novel features which I will refer to later. Meanwhile, I will be making a more wide-ranging assessment of trends in Africa encompassing the political, economic and social developments in the region because, as I understand it, the invitation to speak at this forum has given me much latitude. This is consistent with goal one of this seminar, which is to undertake a critical assessment of the African Union and NEPAD and their implementation of a ‘people-centred’ approach to security.

Indeed, a distinguishing feature of NEPAD is that it recognises the nexus between peace and development while also responding to the deep yearnings of African people for social justice, economic growth and political stability. The evidence of this is that NEPAD recognised governance as an important factor in economic development and therefore devised the African Peer Review Mechanism as an instrument to pursue that goal. The importance that NEPAD attaches to good governance is significant in another respect: good governance stands at the intersection between the traditional notion of state security and human security.

Important signs of hope and progress

Africa is on the cusp of change and renewal, so much so that some observers point to many parallels between now and the immediate post-independence era of the 1960s. Then, as now, there was considerable hope about the course of events in the African region. Democracy was also in the ascendancy. There was a crop of (new) leaders in most African countries, who were inspired by and committed to pan-Africanism. Where the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 as a practical expression of political commitment to a regional political solidarity, the African Union which was inaugurated in 2002, has reinforced the growing importance of regionalism in an era of globalisation. Taken together, the African Union and NEPAD - which was adopted in 2001 - are key instruments for the region’s political, economic and social renewal. The African Union and NEPAD have come to symbolize the hope and progress in Africa today; indeed, what some African leaders have referred to as the African Renaissance.
A different political order

Yet, there are a number of significant differences between now and then in the political situation. Conflicts that haunt the region today were virtually absent then. At the time the OAU was established in 1963, the fear that unravelling the colonially-imposed borders might result in irredentist wars led to proclaiming the borders acquired at independence inviolate. This became an article of faith in intra-African states' relations and was a legal device that minimised inter-state conflicts. But little did anyone realise that Africa would suffer severe and disruptive intra-state conflicts such as we have witnessed in the last 15-20 years. The persistence of intra-state conflicts, albeit in a dwindling number of countries, is the first of the seven key features of Africa's political scene today, which I would like to highlight in this presentation.

As the recognition has grown that durable peace is a necessary condition for development, regional and international efforts to develop mechanisms to mediate and manage conflicts in Africa have multiplied. The United Nations has played and continues to be actively engaged in mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Africa. The newly-established African Union is building its capabilities in these areas.

In this regard, the AU had adopted, in July 2004, the Peace and Security Protocol, an instrument that should enable the AU to play an effective role in peace and security matters and conflicts resolution. One of the most attractive aspects of this Protocol is the establishment of the African Peace and Security Council as a standing decision-making body for the prevention and management of conflicts and promotion of peace on the continent. The responsibilities of the African Peace and Security Council include the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, from early-warning to peace-building activities. The Protocol has entered into force since 19 December 2003 and the Peace and Security Council has been constituted and is functioning. Furthermore, some of the regional economic communities in Africa have established peace and security mechanisms, including non-aggression pacts. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are also gaining recognition as the pillars on which Africa’s economic integration will be built.

With the assistance of the G8 countries, the European Union and the United Nations, the AU is currently involved in efforts to enhance its capacity to undertake peace operations on the continent. For instance, in what is currently known as the Berlin process, the G8 decided to extend financial and technical assistance towards the establishment of a continental Early-Warning System; an African Standby Force; a Military Staff Committee; and a Panel of the Wise. Strengthening the continental capacity for conflict resolution and management is the second most prominent feature of Africa today.

Beginning in the late 1980s, the democratic movement began to be renewed in Africa. A number of reasons or hypotheses have been advanced to explain the surge of democracy in Africa. Initially, some analysts attributed the democracy movement in Africa to the spill-over effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Others reasoned that the French-speaking African countries drew renewed inspiration from the bicentenary of the French revolution that same year. Yet others thought that it was a product of donors’ pressure and newfound emphasis on good governance. Still others attributed the revival of democracy in Africa to more homegrown causes, citing the fact that one-party or military regimes had pushed African citizens to the point of desperation, forcing them to fight for their basic civil and political rights. In retrospect, some of these explanations were more fanciful and fashionable rather than factual. What is obvious is that democracy has made more steady progress in Africa than we have dared to hope a few years ago. The march of democracy is the third main feature of the change and renewal in Africa.
As democracy has begun to take root, there is a growing sense that Africa must not lapse into unconstitutional processes that brought some regimes to power in the past. Two measures have been adopted to foster and strengthen the process of democratic, constitutional civil rule in Africa: (a) the OAU Algiers Declaration of 1999 that prohibits unconstitutional changes of government and denies recognition to any government that comes to power through such means; and (b) the African Peer Review Mechanism established under NEPAD which seeks to promote adherence to codes and standards in political, economic and corporate governance. Though participation in the APRM is voluntary, the number of countries subscribing to it has grown to 26. Compliance with the codes will be monitored by an Eminent Persons Panel which will conduct reviews on agreed indicators of performance with the authority and full support of the APRM Forum of the Heads of State and Government of the participating countries. Setting codes of desirable political conduct and seeking to monitor them for compliance is the fourth main feature of contemporary Africa.

Even so, the wind of democracy has yet to blow to every corner of our vast continent. But in politics, as much else in human affairs, perfection is an ideal and not a reality. This is not an excuse or a plea for mitigation for lack of democracy in any place. Rather, it is a reminder that democracy seldom comes in tidal waves but in incremental steps. One recent, important, incremental step in regional democracy was the inauguration of the Pan-African Parliament which will serve as an important forum to debate regional issues. The fact that democracy sits and is accorded unprecedented legitimacy by the African Union alongside the reality of non-democratic regimes is the fifth feature of change and renewal in Africa.

Though the transition to democracy might be incomplete, the changes and reforms in the political sphere are having a discernible impact in one important respect: there is a greater emphasis on transparency and accountability in public affairs. A striking illustration of this trend is highlighted in the establishment of anti-corruption commissions or equivalent bodies in a growing number of African countries. Some may caution and have, indeed, argued that the creation of these institutions should not be confused with progress in the fight against corruption. This may be true. But the existence of these bodies reflects the recognition that there is a challenge to be addressed, and the anti-corruption bodies are a key tool in meeting that challenge. The sixth feature of renewal and change is greater public and political support for enhancing transparency and accountability in public affairs.

Role of Civil Society

When public trust is abused and national resources are wasted through corruption and maladministration, members of civil society, and in particular, the poor and unemployed suffer the consequences. Consequently, it is in the interest of civil society to ensure that public officials manage these resources in an efficient, transparent and accountable fashion. Furthermore, civil society plays a critical role in strengthening democracy in that it has capacity to bring about the movement from a bureaucratic to a more representative administration by providing a credible bridge between the rulers and the citizens. Civil societies help to build social capital by enhancing security, building trust and creating organisational capacity.
By strengthening democracy, civil society is a key ingredient of the NEPAD initiative, subsequently having a net effect on sustainable peace, security, stability and development. Civil society should, however, develop its own monitoring mechanism to evaluate the performance of the leaders of the African Union and of NEPAD member countries, independent of the APRM, and should develop their own codes of conduct and monitoring mechanisms for their own performance. The sustained engagement of civil societies with AU and NEPAD is the seventh most prominent feature of change and renewal in Africa.

NEPAD as an instrument for renewal and hope

NEPAD is a programme of the African Union and embodies the collective vision of African leaders for a peaceful and prosperous continent. The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union complements the implementation of NEPAD by deepening the regional economic integration process. However, there are two most frequently encountered questions about NEPAD: How significantly different is it from the other previous development plans and initiatives on Africa? And, Would NEPAD make a difference to Africa’s economic development?

Concerning the first question: NEPAD has already proven to be very different from the other previous plans and initiatives. It has been driven at the highest political level and it reflects the commitment of African leaders to launch the region on a path of sustained growth and development. It is designed and is being implemented on the premise of African leadership and ownership of their development. It is the framework around which the international community is increasingly rallying to support Africa. NEPAD has also provided the platform for high-level policy dialogue between leaders from Africa and its main development partners’ countries. Moreover, it explicitly acknowledges that peace and security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development.

The latter question turns critically on whether NEPAD can be an instrument of renewal in Africa’s economic development. In other words, what are the prospects and challenges that NEPAD would face in playing the role of an agent of change and renewal? Admittedly, Africa faces myriads of development challenges, which are too well-known to warrant being listed here. However, it is fair to say that NEPAD aims to address those challenges in a comprehensive manner but with a focus on selected priority areas. It has selected and is currently implementing programmes in the following areas: peace and security (with the African Union in the lead); agriculture; infrastructure (energy, water and sanitation, transport and information and communication technologies); environment; market access; human resource development (health and education), science and technology, and addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These areas are key to reducing poverty and improving the living standards in Africa: objectives that are consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which emanated from the Summit of World Leaders at the United Nations in 2000.

Nonetheless, there are internal and external pre-conditions to the successful implementation of NEPAD. The internal pre-conditions include the availability of technical capacity for programme articulation and development; creating the institutional framework for implementation; promoting partnership between the public and private sector, including civil society organisations for implementation; and adequate financial outlay for the programmes.
Securing adequate financing for NEPAD will be as much dependent on external finance as on the effectiveness of domestic resource mobilisation. Those who articulated NEPAD realised very early that African countries could not rely on domestic resources alone to implement NEPAD’s programme. This explains the importance that NEPAD has placed on international partnership for NEPAD. That partnership has yielded results in terms of increased attention to Africa’s development and increased pledges of official development assistance, although much international support is still required, especially in areas such as trade and debt relief.

The United Nations family has been supportive of NEPAD and the implementation of its programmes. For example, in its resolution 57/7 of November 4, 2002, the General Assembly endorsed NEPAD as the framework for international support for Africa’s development. The Assembly, through Resolution 53/300, also called for the creation of the Office of Special Adviser on Africa which the Secretary-General subsequently established in May, 2003, to, inter alia, promote UN system-wide and international support for NEPAD. Furthermore, through the Regional Consultations Mechanism, established with the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as convenor, the UN has created seven thematic clusters covering priority areas of NEPAD in order to better respond to the NEPAD Action Plan. And in October, 2004, at the UN Headquarters, the Secretary-General inaugurated his High-Level Advisory Panel on International Support for NEPAD. The distinguished panelists, led by Chief Emeka Anyaoku (former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth), have since commenced their work and their report is expected in April 2005.

Nonetheless, a fundamental policy challenge in international support for NEPAD is achieving coherence of policy actions, as a recent report by the UN Secretary-General makes clear. Policy coherence is not yet at the core of assistance to Africa. The need for policy coherence in international assistance to Africa is highlighted by the lack of complementarities in debt, aid and trade policies towards Africa. For example, for a period stretching back over 20 years, ODA to Africa has been almost offset by debt service requirements and loss of export earnings as a result of subsidies put on agricultural products (such as cotton) by Western countries. If increases in ODA is to be matched by complementary donor policies and actions in the areas of trade and debt relief, Africa will be better able to devote adequate financial resources to NEPAD’s programmes.

Conclusions

There is no question that the establishment of the African Union and the adoption of the NEPAD are good auguries for Africa’s quest for political stability, regional integration and economic development. There is also no question that African leaders have recognised the need to take the responsibility to address Africa’s challenges. But there is no doubt that much more commitment and perseverance will be needed on the part of African countries.

Integrating NEPAD into the processes and structures of the AU will be an important part of Africa’s making of that commitment. The process of integration is work in progress. The most important criteria for a well functioning process is that it is cost effective and eliminates any potential for duplication in the three components of integration: statutory, functional and financial. Inasmuch as there is a common understanding that Africa’s transformation is a shared goal, I am confident that the integration can proceed smoothly.
Much international spotlight has been cast on the severity and magnitude of Africa’s problems. Tackling those problems in a new co-operative spirit should nurture and sustain change and renewal in Africa. The people of Africa, wherever they live, expect no less. Rising to that expectation is our main challenge. And to the extent that we do so, there will be credibility in our demand for international support through the United Nations (where African states constitute the single largest bloc of Members) and the international community as a whole. This seminar should therefore make important contributions to Africa’s collective efforts, including through the AU and NEPAD, to promote change and renewal on the continent with the necessary and due support of the international community.

Thank you.
ANNEX II

AGENDA

Day One: Saturday 11 December 2004

Welcome and Introductions
9h00 - 9h10
Dr Adekeye Adebejo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Dr Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

Session I
Keynote Address
9h10 – 10h15
Chair: Ms Sandelle Scrimshaw, Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa
Professor Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa: "Change and Renewal in Africa: Prospects and Challenges of the African Union/NEPAD"

Coffee Break
10h15 – 10h30

Session II
Promoting Democratic Governance: The AU and Sub-regional Organisations
10h30 – 12h00
Chair: Ms Yasmin Sooka, Director, Foundation For Human Rights, Pretoria
Dr Jinmi Adisa, AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)
Dr Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

Session III
Special Address
12h00 - 13h00
Chair: Adonia Ayebare, Ambassador of Uganda to Rwanda
Mr Cunningham Ngcukana, Deputy Director-General, NEPAD Secretariat: ‘Whither NEPAD? Progress and Prospects’

Lunch Break
13h00 – 14h00

Session IV
Promoting Democratic Governance: The Role of Civil Society
14h00 – 15h30

Chair: Dr Mark Chingono, Senior Manager, Research, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Dr Tandeka Nkwane, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Mr Ebrahim Fakir, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

Coffee Break
15h30 – 15h45

Session V
Strengthening Africa’s Human Security Regime
15h45 – 17h00

Chair: Ms Kemi Williams, United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID)
Ms Frene Ginwala, former Speaker of South Africa’s Parliament
Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, AU Commission

Day Two: Sunday 12 December 2004

Session VI
External Actors: The UN and the US in Africa
09h00 – 11h00

Chair: Professor Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa
Professor Jendayi Frazer, US Ambassador to South Africa, Pretoria
Dr Adekeye Adeboye, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Coffee Break
11h00 – 11h15

Session VII
The Peace and Security Role of Sub-regional Organisations: SADC, ECOWAS, and IGAD
11h15 – 13h00

Chair: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director of Research, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg
Professor Gavin Cawthra, Centre for Defence and Security Management, Johannesburg
Mr Charles Mwaura, Co-ordinator, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi, Nigerian Foreign Ministry

Lunch Break
13h00 – 14h00

Session VIII
Africa’s Evolving Peace and Security Regime
14h00 – 15h30

Chair: Dr Garth le Pere, Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa
Dr Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg
Mr Francis Kornegay, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg

Coffee Break
15h30 – 15h45

Session IX
The AU and NEPAD: Towards a New Governance and Security Architecture
15h45 – 17h15

Chair: Dr Jinmi Adisa, AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)

Rapporteurs
Dr John Akokpari, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town
Mr Shaun Mackay, Centre For Policy Studies, Johannesburg
ANNEX III

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   Pretoria
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3. Dr Jinmi Adisa
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THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

A POLICY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING BY
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, AND THE CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, JOHANNESBURG
MISTY HILLS, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 11 – 12 DECEMBER 2004

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