Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years was assessed at the seminar on which this report is based, along with other important questions about the dramatic changes in a relationship that was based largely on ideological and political solidarity in the past. The gap in understanding the factors that can contribute to achieving mutual interests between China and Africa was a particular focus of the seminar. A key concern was the need to identify strategies to ensure that Africa is able to define clearly its interests towards China in a way that is beneficial to the continent.
CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON?

CHINA AND AFRICA:
ENGAGING THE WORLD’S NEXT SUPERPOWER

A POLICY SEMINAR HOSTED BY
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
17 AND 18 SEPTEMBER 2007
SEMINAR REPORT

RAPPORTEURS
ANGELA NDINGA-MUVUMBA AND LUCY CORKIN
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is affiliated to the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Established in 1968, the organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations, as well as on policy research on South Africa’s role in Africa; the United Nations’ (UN) role in Africa; African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) relations; and HIV/AIDS and Security.

The Rapporteurs

Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba was a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, and is now with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, South Africa. Ms Lucy Corkin was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, and has published extensively on Africa/China relations.
Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, convened a two-day policy seminar in Cape Town on 17 and 18 September 2007 on the theme, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa: Engaging the World’s Next Superpower”.

The Cape Town seminar brought together 35 scholars and policymakers – largely from Africa, but also from Asia, Europe, Canada and the United States (US) – to examine a multiplicity of important issues in the growing relationship between Africa and China. The meeting provided an opportunity to assess Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years and to address important questions about the dramatic changes in a relationship that was for decades predicated largely on ideological and political solidarity. A particular focus of discussion was the gap in understanding the factors that can contribute to achieving mutual interests between China and Africa. A key concern of the meeting was the need to identify strategies to ensure that Africa is able to define clearly its interests towards China in a way that is beneficial to the continent. The seminar focused on contributing to the existing scholarship and study of China-Africa relations and encompassed three main objectives:

• To diversify the voices of Afro-sinologists drawing from African, European and Chinese scholarship;
• To deepen the empirical knowledge of China-Africa relations; and
• To compare the China-Africa relationship with the continents’ interactions with other key global actors such as Japan, the United States, France and the European Union (EU).

The following seven key themes were addressed during the seminar:

• Setting the Scene: China and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era;
• China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Southern Africa;
• China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Eastern Africa;
• China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Central Africa;
• China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: South Africa and Nigeria;
• Great Power Rivalries: China and the West in Africa; and
• Great Power Rivalries: China, Japan and Peacekeeping in Africa.

China and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era

Chinese trade and assistance to Africa resumed markedly at the end of the Cold War and has grown exponentially over the past 17 years. Sino-African trade increased from $6.5 billion in 1999 to $56 billion at the end of 2006. A number of resource-rich African countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger, and Zambia, have experienced trade surpluses with China notably due to their substantial oil and mineral deposits. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000, with the first Ministerial Conference taking place in Beijing in that year. With 44 African countries participating, the Forum was China’s largest-ever multilateral undertaking. FOCAC has been the locus of important policy developments, such as China’s Special Preferential Tariff Treatment programme, which removed import tariffs on 190 different items from 25 African countries when it was implemented in January 2005. At the FOCAC forum in November 2006, China made further pledges to Africa with a development package that included $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in preferential buyers’ credits over the next three years.
In 1996, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that the five cornerstones of China’s Africa policy are: sincere friendship; equality; unity and co-operation; common development; and looking to the future. This foundation has been reaffirmed and expanded upon by the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, in his six pillars of Sino-Africa relations: non-interference; African ownership in dealing with problems; mutual trust and co-operation; the increase of economic assistance with limited political conditions; lobbying for the international community to pay more attention to Africa; and the promotion of an international environment more conducive to Africa’s development. China’s pragmatic policy focus on economic issues in Africa has been met with rising concern by other powers, notably the United States and European countries such as France, which have had to reassess their relations with the continent as a result.

China-Africa Bilateral Relations

In 2004, China and Angola finalised negotiations that would result in China becoming the biggest contributor to Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction. China’s Exim Bank extended an oil-backed $2 billion credit line to Angola. The loan was increased by $1 billion in March 2006 when nearly $18 billion of the original $2 billion loan from China’s Exim Bank had been spent. The loan is payable at favourable rates over 17 years, including a grace period of five years. In exchange, China is entitled to 10,000 barrels of Angolan oil per day. Payment on the loan is made to Chinese companies undertaking construction of infrastructure projects. In May 2007, an additional $500 million was negotiated to assist with ‘complementary actions’ such as the provision of transportation for pupils to newly-constructed schools in the interior provinces of Angola. The significance of the oil-backed loan is tremendous for the government of Angola. Before China stepped in, the government had experienced difficulties in securing large-scale, long-term loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The prospect of an alternative source of financial capital at a time when oil prices were on the increase put the Angolan government in a stronger bargaining position. There is, however, a lack of local employment of Angolans due to what some believe is Beijing’s inflexible labour policies.

China’s involvement in Zimbabwe has been equally strategic to both parties. Beijing has gained an advantage in securing mining concessions, while China has provided commodity-based loans at an extraordinary value because of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. However, a major aspect of trade relations were supposed to have consisted of textile, clothing and leather goods exports from Zimbabwe to China, yet cheap Chinese goods have led to enormous job losses in Zimbabwe’s fledgling manufacturing and textile industries. The influx of Chinese goods has also contributed to the weakening of Zimbabwe’s already “bankrupt” economy.

Trade between South Africa and China increased from $1.5 billion in 1997 to about $9 billion in 2006, making South Africa (with about 20 per cent of Chinese trade in Africa) Beijing’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Angola today. While China exports manufactured and agricultural goods, electronics and textiles to South Africa, it imports manganese, gold, copper, tobacco, aluminium, car parts and chrome ore from South Africa. China is also exporting electronic goods to ten other mostly southern African countries from South Africa. South African brand-names such as SAB Miller, Anglo-Gold Ashanti, Anglo American, Standard Bank, and Spur all have a presence in China.

Tensions in this relationship have evolved around Chinese exports of about 74 per cent of imports of garments which led to job losses estimated at between 23,000 and 85,000, and South African labour unions successfully lobbied for curbs in such Chinese imports in 2006. South African president, Thabo Mbeki, warned in December 2006 that Africa risked entering into a “colonial relationship” with Beijing if the continent continued...
to export raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured goods. But another danger is that both South Africa and China could come to be regarded as the new economic imperialists in Africa.

Ideological affinities with China during the Cold War period resulted in significant Chinese support to Tanzania. This was a high-water mark in Tanzania’s rate of industrial employment and also represented the period of Tanzania’s ujamaa socialism and self-reliance that mirrored China’s own development strategy. In the post-Cold War era, Tanzania-China relations have been less ideologically driven and there has been a focus on trade and investment in raw materials and infrastructure. Sino-Tanzanian trade has more than doubled from $124 million in 2003 to $347 million in 2007, though most of this growth has been in Chinese exports to Tanzania. Technology transfer from China could, however, help African countries such as Tanzania to industrialise and would create more jobs. Indeed, advocates of China-Africa technology transfer have even proposed technology barter exchanges.

China is seen by some as a rogue investor in Sudan, flouting international sanctions. The conflict and humanitarian disaster in Sudan’s Darfur region in which about 200,000 people have been killed since 2003 have been widely viewed as being linked to the Khartoum government. A Western outcry has alleged that Chinese business interests are propping up the government and protecting it from United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions. However, many Western firms operating in China have been able to benefit from collaboration between Chinese companies and the Sudanese government in terms of infrastructure such as the provision of electricity.

China’s relations with central African states continue to be an emerging phenomenon. Beijing is primarily interested in establishing trade links with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in order to access that country’s mineral wealth. The DRC is currently in an advanced transitional and fragile post-conflict stage. Its government is emerging from a protracted civil conflict and China’s arrival is perceived by Congolese leaders to be an opportunity for the country’s economic take-off. China National Machinery Import and Export Company also won the tender to develop Gabon’s iron ore deposits in the Belinga region, pledging an investment of $500 million in order to develop reserves valued at $3 billion. The Chinese company’s bid was accepted over other tenders, notably that of Brazilian mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), as the infrastructure development component of the Chinese proposal was more extensive. Due to the lack of transparency in such agreements, however, they are open to various interpretations.

The World Bank and the IMF have noted that China ignores many of their lending criteria, principally, standards for transparency, open bidding for contracts, environmental impact studies, and assessments of debt and fiscal policies. China’s more flexible standard for fiscal lending also has the potential to benefit local elites who are therefore not held accountable to government oversight and sound business policies. The danger in this approach is that, without adherence to good business practice and transparency, local elites could make deals with Chinese companies that ruin the local environment and deplete natural resources without investing in local labour, industry and infrastructure.

In Zambia, Chinese businesses have been accused by human rights practitioners of exploiting local workers. In 2006, for example, 46 miners were killed in a mining accident in a Chinese-owned mine in the Zambian town of Chambishi. Finally, Chinese companies often import their own countrymen and women as workers, particularly for construction programmes in Africa, instead of creating local employment. These problems undermine the value of Chinese investment for African countries.
Sino-Nigerian relations have involved economic co-operation on a multiplicity of projects. Nigeria is currently a crude-oil exporting country that is unable to provide reliable and predictable supplies of petroleum to its own population. The country will need an urgent overhaul of its public power supply that can meet the needs of any burgeoning manufacturing industries. It is possible that strategic co-operation between Nigeria and China could contribute to the improvement of the country’s infrastructure. Abuja has striven for the last seven years to pursue relations with China on this basis, particularly in rehabilitating Nigeria’s railway infrastructure.

**Engaging the World’s Next Superpower**

Recent initiatives by African governments to build stronger ties with China demonstrate the continent’s urgent desire to reduce its dependence on the West. Some analysts have argued that it is shortsighted to presume that African states are passive observers in China’s rise. African leaders may be calculating that the centre of global capitalism (and, therefore, power) is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region and that the continent must position itself to take advantage of this development. Indeed, total oil imported by China from Africa was 8.7 per cent in 2006, compared to the 33 per cent of the US, and the EU’s 36 per cent. The question is whether African leaders themselves have not only the vision, but sufficient developmental and regulatory frameworks to prevent China from behaving like exploitative Western imperialists did in Africa, during the colonial period in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Africa must leverage its new relationship with China in the interest of its own economic development. African governments must use this historic opportunity to capture capital in order to diversify African economies and reduce aid dependency. China’s interest in the continent’s oil and mineral wealth should not be squandered. Its loans and investments should be used to develop local economies and escape the trap of being dependent on external commodities markets for foreign income. At the same time, China’s ‘government-business’ strategy and its principle of non-interference must be balanced against the long-term costs of doing business with governments that are undermining the human rights of their own citizens. Africa-China relations have major potential to break pre-existing and failed development paradigms by focusing on trade and investment and promoting joint peacemaking on the continent.

Four key recommendations emerged from the seminar:

1. Develop a long-term perspective on Africa-China relations;
2. Establish African consensus on what is expected from China;
3. Formulate a pro-active engagement strategy; and
4. Engage China through regional organisations rather than bilateral relations.

1. **Developing a long-term perspective:** China has adopted a strategic long-term perspective in relation to its engagement with Africa. African leaders need to complement Beijing’s long-term view with their own perspectives on the continent’s long-term goals for the mutual benefit of both parties. The opportunity to utilise Chinese capital, training and investment for Africa’s economic development should not be wasted. Strategies are needed for building the continent’s skills base and human resources, diversifying oil and mineral-based economies; and ensuring that local infrastructure is built. These outcomes would have long-term benefits for China’s African partners.
2. **Finding consensus**: China has clearly defined principles and priorities for co-operation with Africa. Similarly, African countries must develop their own consensus on the rules for Chinese trade, investment and aid on the continent. Consensus should be built through regional and continental forums such as the African Union (AU) and communicated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. While it is difficult to ensure that all African governments will adhere to a collective approach, consensus-driven engagement with China would reduce opportunities for China to exploit divisions and gaps among African countries.

3. **Formulating a pro-active engagement strategy**: The mechanisms for Sino-African interaction and the agenda set for FOCAC meetings should not be dominated by China. African leaders need to engage China pro-actively in terms of the continent’s own needs, demands and expectations.

4. **Engaging China through regional organisations**: Finally, consensus should be based on the relative strength of African countries operating as a cohesive economic and political bloc, rather than negotiating bilaterally with China. This is also informed by the experience of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Laos and the Philippines). In addition to the AU, a coherent consensus on engagement with China could emanate from regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which have the potential to constitute similar forums for China-Africa relations.
1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, convened a two-day policy seminar in Cape Town on 17 and 18 September 2007 on the theme, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa: Engaging the World’s Next Superpower".

The Cape Town seminar brought together 35 scholars and policymakers – largely from Africa, but also from Asia, Europe, Canada and the United States (US) – to examine a multiplicity of important issues in the growing relationship between China and Africa. The meeting provided an opportunity to assess Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years and to address important questions about the dramatic changes in a relationship that was for decades predicated largely on ideological and political solidarity. A particular focus of discussion was the gap in understanding the factors that can contribute to achieving mutual interests between China and Africa.

A key concern of the meeting was the need to identify strategies to ensure that Africa is able to define clearly its interests towards China in a way that is beneficial to the continent. The seminar focused on contributing to the existing scholarship and study of China-Africa relations and encompassed three main objectives:

- To diversify the voices of Afro-sinologists drawing from African, European and Chinese scholarship;
- To deepen the empirical knowledge of China-Africa relations; and
- To compare the China-Africa relationship with the continents’ interactions with other key global actors such as Japan, the United States, France and the European Union (EU).

The following seven key themes were addressed during the seminar:

- Setting the Scene: China and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era;
- China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Southern Africa;
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- China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Central Africa;
- China-Africa Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: South Africa and Nigeria;
- Great Power Rivalries: China and the West in Africa; and
- Great Power Rivalries: China, Japan and Peacekeeping in Africa.

This report is a synthesis of the discussions and recommendations from the meeting, CCR’s seminar concept paper, and supplementary issues addressed in the papers presented at the Cape Town seminar in November 2007, including a short section on South Africa-China relations.

Africa-China relations have evolved in tandem with global political and economic developments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) provided military and non-military support, equipment and training to a variety of African liberation movements, particularly in southern Africa, including Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Namibia,

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1 See Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2008).
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. During the early 1970s, Chinese economic aid to newly-founded African governments consisted primarily of soft commercial loans focused on infrastructure and development and the construction of high-profile projects such as the Tanzam (now TAZARA) railway between Tanzania and Zambia. China also received decisive support from the continent in 1971 when 26 African countries voted in favour of its permanent membership to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in place of Taiwan, which had previously occupied the seat.

However, following the domestic political turmoil resulting from the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1976, the Chinese government became more inward-looking and the China-Africa relationship lay dormant throughout the 1980s. By the late 1990s, PRC Premier Deng Xiaoping’s gradualist market-driven socialism began to show results. China has, since Xiaoping’s reforms, had an economic growth rate of nine to 11 per cent and a 400 per cent increase in real per capita income. The country is the third largest in the world (after the US and Japan), accounts for 12 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product, seven per cent of global manufacturing production, and 13 billion consumers. China’s capitalist-oriented economy has produced transformations in trade and industry that have made it the second-largest energy consumer after the US and it needs oil, strategic minerals, food and agricultural inputs and forestry resources to maintain its exceptional growth rate.

Chinese trade and assistance to Africa resumed markedly at the end of the Cold War and has grown exponentially over the past 17 years. Sino-African trade increased from $6.5 billion in 1999 to $56 billion at the end of 2006. As a result, a number of resource-rich African countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia, have experienced surpluses, notably due to their substantial oil and mineral deposits. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000, with the first Ministerial Conference taking place that year in Beijing. The Forum was China’s largest-ever multilateral undertaking – 44 African countries participated in the meeting. FOCAC has been the locus of important policy developments, such as China’s Special Preferential Tariff Treatment programme, which removed import tariffs on 190 different items from 25 African countries when it was implemented in January 2005. At the FOCAC forum in November 2006, China made further pledges to Africa with a development package that included:

- $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in preferential buyers’ credits over the next three years;
- The doubling of China’s 2006 aid assistance to Africa by the year 2009;
- A China-Africa development fund of $5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa;
- Increasing the preferential zero-tariff treatment programme from 190 to more than 440 products;
- The establishment of ten Chinese agricultural technology demonstration centres on the continent over the next three years, and
- An increase in the number of Chinese government scholarships from 2000 to 4000 by 2009 for Africans to study in China.

3 These include Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
In 1996, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that the five cornerstones of China’s Africa policy are sincere friendship; equality; unity and co-operation; common development; and looking to the future. This foundation has been re-affirmed and expanded upon by the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, in his six pillars of Sino-African relations: non-interference; African ownership in dealing with problems; mutual trust and co-operation; the increase of economic assistance with limited political conditions; lobbying for the international community to pay more attention to Africa; and the promotion of an international environment more conducive to Africa’s development. China’s pragmatic policy focus on economic issues in Africa has been met with rising concern by other powers, notably the US and European countries such as France, which have had to reassess their relations with the continent.

Ibid., p.146.
2. Setting the Scene: China and Africa in the Post-Cold War Era

China and Africa’s evolving relationship in the post-Cold War era could be one of the most significant developments in the international relations of this period. The exceptional increase in trade between Beijing and several African countries has generated enormous debate and concern among other global actors.

Importantly, the extraordinary developments taking place in Sino-Africa relations are merely a part of China’s spectacular ascendancy and impact on the world economy: trade between China and Africa in 2005 barely represented 2.5 per cent of China’s total foreign trade.

However, many of the resources imported from Africa are strategic for China’s rise to superpower status. China is now Africa’s third-ranked trade partner (after the US and France), from a much lower base 25 years ago, passing Britain, Portugal, Japan, India, Italy, and Germany on the continent’s global trade list. It is therefore with some trepidation that these external powers view China’s perceived infringement on traditional Western spheres of influence, coupled with further perceptions that China’s focus on ‘government-business’ is weakening international efforts to isolate autocratic governments, strengthen democratic governance, and promote human rights.

China has strategic economic interests in Africa and is increasingly in need of certain strategic natural resources, mainly crude oil. In 2005, Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan and Chad supplied 28 per cent of China’s crude oil imports, compared to nine per cent from Nigeria, Angola and Gabon in 1995. This compares with the Middle East’s 47 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively, in the same period; East Asia’s seven per cent and 41 per cent; and Russia’s ten per cent and 0 per cent. As a result of China’s increased dependence on Africa for crude oil, trade between Beijing and Africa continues to rise.

Chinese demand for raw materials has helped to increase world prices for commodities, favouring African countries and increasing their revenues. According to Chinese official sources, Sino-African trade increased from about $10 million in 1950 to $100 million in 1960.  This trade took another 20 years to increase from $100 million to $1 billion, and required yet another two decades to rise from $1 billion to $10 billion. However, it took only four years for this trade to grow from $10 billion in 2000 to $30 billion in 2004. Remarkably, the total trade between Africa and China reached $55.5 billion in 2006: a 40 per cent increase over 2005. Consequently, at the FOCAC meeting of November 2006, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, proposed that Beijing and African governments should increase their co-operation and aim to boost bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2010.

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8 See CCR seminar concept note, September 2007, p.7.
9 Ibid., p.8.
Oil alone represented 71 per cent of Africa’s trade with Beijing, followed by metal-ferrous ore that accounts for 13 per cent. Chinese exports to Africa are more diversified: textile (16 per cent); clothing and footwear (14 per cent); transport vehicles (eight per cent); electrical appliances (seven per cent); industrial equipment (five per cent); and other (42 per cent). Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Africa is also growing steadily. Between 1979 and 2002, almost ten per cent of Chinese FDI went to Africa; while by 2004, China provided Africa with over $900 million of the total $15 billion in FDI that the continent received. Chinese official sources have also noted that, in the first ten months of 2005, “Chinese companies invested a total of $775 million in African countries, primarily on oil exploration projects and infrastructure”.

The economic benefits of this growing relationship are considered promising due to investments directed at Chinese infrastructural development being undertaken in Africa, and generous aid packages and soft loans that African governments are receiving from Beijing. Angola, for example, recently benefited from favourable conditions in securing a $2 billion loan from China. But there are enormous risks involved in the economic ties between China and Africa. For example, there are concerns that as a result of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with African governments, Beijing can ‘dump’ cheap consumer retail products such as textiles, garments, leather goods, and electronics on African markets, thereby undermining the efforts of local competitors and increasing joblessness in these sectors. It is therefore unclear how African economies stand to gain if China continues to ‘dump’ its low-priced goods on African markets. China may also be exploiting its comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector, leading to reduced growth, investment, and development by African industries in countries like South Africa and Nigeria. Chinese investments have consequently triggered a public outcry from key political actors in Zambia, as well as civil society actors in South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

To counter these criticisms, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, announced in February 2007 that Beijing would lend African states $3 billion in preferential credit over three years. China has also promised to double economic assistance and to extend more interest-free loans to Africa during the same period. This followed an offer by the Chinese president, in 2006, to provide $5 billion in loans and credit to African countries, with the promise to double aid to the continent.

The military component of China’s growing relations with Africa also require rigorous analysis, especially with regard to Beijing’s growing role in United Nations peacekeeping operations in African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Western Sahara. China’s bilateral military agreements with several African countries is also worthy of closer scrutiny.

One of the five permanent veto-wielding members of the 15-strong UN Security Council along with the US, Russia, France, and Britain, China has committed itself to co-operating with the UN, the African Union (AU) and

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other African sub-regional organisations in conflict mediation and resolution in Africa. Having previously blocked UN action in the Security Council, Beijing has, more recently, played an important and positive role in encouraging the Sudanese government to accept a hybrid UN/AU force in the Darfur region by July 2007. But China has supplied arms to countries such as Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Sudan – which undermines its more constructive and evolving contribution to peacekeeping on the continent.8

In August 2005, Ethiopia and China agreed to mutual military co-operation and exchange of military technologies.14 Such agreements have contributed to the increase in Chinese arms sales to African states, and are a facet of the growing relationship between Beijing and its African partners. Between 1996 and 2003, for example, China sold more arms to Africa than any other arms-producing country except Russia. Some officials have maintained that Beijing’s arms sales are based on purely commercial interests, but the impact on African security of unmitigated arms flow requires serious examination.15

3. China-Africa Bilateral Relations — Case Studies: Southern Africa

Angola

Angola and China established official diplomatic ties in January 1983. Importantly, China provided support to the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) during the Angolan civil war. This occurred after relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated and was part of a Chinese strategy to counter Soviet support to the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government.

Chinese support to UNITA, however, placed it on the same side as its Cold War adversary, the United States, and with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Sino-UNITA relationship was the principal reason for the delay in establishing strong ties between MPLA-ruled Angola and Beijing. Indeed, it was not until the late 1980s that the Chinese embassy opened in the Angolan capital of Luanda.

In 2004, Angola and China finalised negotiations that would result in Beijing becoming the biggest contributor to Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction. At the conclusion of Chinese vice-premier Zhang Peiyang’s visit to Angola in March 2004, China’s Exim Bank extended an oil-backed $2 billion credit line to Angola. The loan, payable at favourable rates over 17 years and including a grace period of five years, was increased by $1 billion in March 2006 when nearly $1.8 billion of the original $2 billion loan from China Exim Bank had been spent. In exchange, China is entitled to 10,000 barrels of Angolan oil a day. Payment on the loan is made to Chinese companies undertaking construction of infrastructure projects. In May 2007, an additional $500 million was negotiated to assist with ‘complementary actions’ such as the provision of transportation for pupils to newly-constructed schools in the interior provinces of Angola.

The oil-backed loan is significant for the government of Angola. Before China stepped in, the MPLA-ruled government had experienced difficulties in securing large-scale, long-term loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The prospect of an alternative source of financial capital at a time when oil prices were rising put the government in a stronger bargaining position. Indeed, the China Exim Bank has increased the amount of the loan several times. Currently, loans managed by the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN) – the National Office for Reconstruction – are estimated to be in excess of $9 billion.

While the China Exim Bank loan provides financial capital for rebuilding Angola’s infrastructure, it has its own conditions, one of which is that 70 per cent of the public tenders for construction and civil engineering contracts must be awarded primarily to Chinese businesses. These companies do not have to register with the Angolan National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP), but with a separate Public Investments Programme (PIP) in the sectors of public works, health, energy, water, agriculture, telecommunications, fishing, and education. Concerns

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20 Interview by Lucy Corkin with a director of a foreign-invested bank in Luanda, 7 June 2006.
have been raised by non-governmental organisations such as Global Witness about the procurement process of construction tenders managed by GRN. Meanwhile, about 45 per cent of Angola’s oil exports go to China.

The oil-backed agreement exemplifies the barter system (the “counter-trade” model or commodities backed-loan), and has since come to be known as the ‘Angola Model’, after one of the few countries that has a large trade surplus with China. Chinese state-owned enterprises have also invested in Angola’s telecommunications sector. The impact of China’s oil-backed agreement with Angola has been viewed by many as having the potential to create a stimulus for economic growth through increased investment in long-term infrastructure in Angola. For example, the deal’s infrastructure component could lead to an improved road and railway system, while increased investment could result in stemming the country’s inflation. There is, however, a lack of local employment opportunities for Angolans due to what some believe to be Beijing’s inflexible labour regime in which Chinese workers are brought in to implement projects instead of using local labour.

Zimbabwe

The relationship between Zimbabwe’s ruling party – the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) – and China was historically strong, and also part of Sino-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War era. While its counterpart, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), was aligned to Moscow, ZANU utilised Maoist ideology in its guerrilla strategy and political education. On 21 December 1979, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed by the Patriotic Front, represented by Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of ZANU on the one hand, and the former Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government – represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, of the United African National Council, and former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith – on the other. ZANU’s leadership of the country was consolidated after elections in March 1980, with 63 per cent of the national vote. Despite ZANU-PF’s allegiance to Chinese-inspired ideology, it was not until the beginning of 2000 that Harare and Beijing renewed close economic co-operation. In part, this was because of the Mugabe regime’s deteriorating relationship with Britain and other Western countries at the turn of the century.

By the end of 2004, Chinese investment in Zimbabwe was approximately $600 million. Bilateral trade between Harare and Beijing was estimated to be $100 million in 2007. Importantly, the bulk of trade is barter exchange. In return for fertiliser, agricultural machinery and other finished goods, Zimbabwe provides China with its tobacco, beef and mineral products such as copper and platinum. These goods partly helped to repay a $100 million loan from the China National Aero Technology Import and Export Consortium to the Zimbabwe national power utility in 2005. China announced plans to invest in Zimbabwe’s steel and communications industries, its railway and in energy production. Notably, China has also been keen to secure rights to platinum mines in Zimbabwe, since the country holds the second largest reserves in the world, and has supplied passenger aircraft and other aviation equipment. China’s involvement in Zimbabwe has been strategic: Beijing has gained an advantage in securing mining concessions and training opportunities; it provides commodity-based loans at an extraordinarily good value.

because of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. Furthermore, a major aspect of trade relations consists of textile, clothing and leather goods exports from Zimbabwe to China. Yet, cheap Chinese goods have led to large-scale job losses in Zimbabwe’s fledgling manufacturing and textile industries. There is fierce competition between Chinese and Zimbabwean manufacturers, and between Chinese-owned shopkeepers and traders and local retailers. Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector has also been negatively affected, though there has been importation of goods such as fertiliser and tractors from China.

The influx of Chinese goods has contributed to the weakening of Zimbabwe’s already bankrupt economy. However, the freedom with which Chinese mercantilist interests have been able to operate in Zimbabwe could be attributed to Mugabe’s short-term interests in his regime’s survival at a time when the country is in an economic free-fall. This raises the question of the conditionalities of Chinese investment and aid in Africa.

Zambia

Zambia’s mining industry is the mainstay of its economy. The country is a leading copper producer. To a lesser extent, the country also produces zinc, lead, silver and cobalt and has large nickel and iron-ore deposits. Despite this wealth, Zambia is dependent on external investment to develop its mining sector. Further investments are integral to job creation and an improved standard of living for Zambians. China’s increasing demand for raw materials and minerals is therefore viewed as a strategic opportunity for Zambia. The main concern, however, is how external demand for Zambia’s mineral wealth can translate into revenue that can be used for the country’s economic development.

Zambia needs both local and foreign capital in order to develop a productive economy as well as to utilise its abundant natural resources. However, the creation of jobs is, in turn, predicated on an increased supply of educated or skilled labour. Basic infrastructure inputs such as transportation (railways and roads) and the production and use of energy (power plants and other sources of energy) also need to be in place for the country to utilise its natural resources effectively. Zambia and other countries in the region face serious short, medium and long-term power shortages, possibly undermining future economic growth and its attendant demand for electricity. Thus, Lusaka needs capital, first to build its infrastructure and to take full advantage of its raw materials and, secondly, to diversify its economy and to create jobs.

Zambia, however, has great difficulty attracting foreign capital. Yet, in order for Zambia to attract foreign investment, it must develop its infrastructure with particular emphasis on transportation and energy. Thus, while Lusaka needs capital in order to build its infrastructure, it needs its infrastructure to attract foreign investment. Similarly, if Zambia enhances its global competitiveness by building a skilled, knowledge-based labour pool, the country could attract greater investment and add value to its raw materials through manufacturing.

For countries such as Zambia, Chinese investment could provide an effective solution to the problem of generating capital. Bilateral co-operation has included tariff-free access for 452 Zambian products into China. Access for Zambians to Bank of China financing has facilitated local manufacturing operations for exports to China. Chinese investments in Zambia include the Chambishi Copper Mine, Mulungushi Textiles Ltd and Kabwe General Hospital. Beijing is partnering with Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) to develop

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a hydro-electric plant in the lower Kafue Gorge. A Chinese manufacturing company is setting up a tractor assembly plant to serve the southern African region in the Chambishi zone. While Chinese firms in Zambia will be exempted from import duties and value-added taxes, they are expected to create 60,000 new jobs for Zambians between 2007 and 2010. For these reasons, Chinese investment in Zambia can be viewed as a positive development.

The World Bank and the IMF have noted that China ignores many of their lending criteria, principally, standards for transparency, open bidding for contracts, environmental impact studies, and assessments of debt and fiscal policies. Beijing's more flexible standard for fiscal lending also has the potential to benefit local elites who are therefore not held accountable to government oversight and sound business policies. The danger in this approach is that, without adherence to good business practices and transparency, local elites could make deals with Chinese companies that negatively affect the local business and governance environment and deplete natural resources without investing in local labour, industry and infrastructure.

A Chinese-run coalmine in Maamba in southern Zambia, for example, was shut down when it was reported that workers were being sent underground without protective gear. Chinese businesses have also been accused by local human rights activists of exploiting local workers. In 2006, 46 miners were killed in a mining accident in a Chinese-owned mine in Chambishi. Finally, Chinese companies often import their own workers from China, particularly for construction programmes, instead of using Zambian workers. These problems could undermine the value of Chinese investment in Africa.

The structural problems of some African economies may weaken the capacity of local partners to collaborate with Chinese companies and gain long-term benefits. For example, some African economies have limited human resources and shortages in skilled labour means that they are unable to take advantage of new jobs created through Chinese investment and trade. Furthermore, in some African countries, the lack of a strong legislative framework to protect local interests means that it is difficult for African governments to monitor labour standards, workplace safety and guarantee the quality of Chinese products. These problems predate China’s investment in African markets. However, they need to be addressed through stronger governance and oversight mechanisms in order to generate sustainable economic growth and benefit from Chinese investment.
4. Bilateral Relations — Case Studies: Eastern Africa

Tanzania\textsuperscript{25}

As with other countries in Africa, Tanzania is attempting to balance its partnerships with Western countries, while enhancing new relations with China. African countries are also clear as to the importance of developing their own strategic objectives when dealing with China.

A relationship with what has been called an “emerging superpower” is perceived as beneficial, particularly for a country such as Tanzania, which has had long-standing ties with China. Tanzania’s “founding father”, Julius Nyerere, first visited China in 1964, and the then premier of China, Zhou Enlai, made a return visit to Tanzania in 1965. The visits led to a Chinese trade exhibition in Dar es Salaam.

Dar es Salaam also hosted the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) liberation committee and Tanzania played a pivotal role in the struggle against apartheid and decolonisation. Ideological affinities with China during this period resulted in Beijing’s support to Tanzania including the building of Friendship Textile Mill and the establishment of the Mbarali Rice Farm, Kiwira Coal Mine and Mahonda Sugarcane Factory.\textsuperscript{26} With Chinese assistance in the form of capital and technical expertise, Tanzania focused on industrialisation and began import-substitutions to produce textiles and farm equipment. This was a highlight in Tanzania’s rate of industrial employment and also marks the period of Nyerere’s ujamaa socialism and self-reliance, which mirrored China’s own development strategies. Finally, the Chinese built the TAZARA railway linking Zambia with Tanzania which provided land-locked Zambia with transport linkage that circumvented its dependence on the ports of apartheid South Africa. Importantly, Tanzania and Zimbabwe had requested support from both Western governments and the Soviet Union to build the railway.

In the post-Cold War era, Tanzania-China relations have been less ideologically driven and there has been a focus on trade and investment in raw materials and infrastructure. Trade has more than doubled from $124 million in 2003 to $347 million in 2007. However, most of this growth has been Chinese exports to Tanzania. The balance of trade is tilted in favour of China and the imbalance continues to grow. Tanzania imports Chinese textiles, food supplies, chemical and light industrial products, and mechanical and electrical appliances. Tanzanian dry seafood, raw leather, wood, iron, steel and coarse copper are sold to China. Chinese projects in Tanzania constitute eight per cent of its total foreign projects, making China the fourth leading foreign direct investor in the country.

Tanzania sees collaboration with China as inevitable, given the current context of globalisation. However, Beijing could also become an important partner in terms of economic development for Africa, particularly in the case of skills and technology transfer.\textsuperscript{27} Technology transfer from China could help African countries such

\textsuperscript{25} This section is based on, Mwesiga Baregu, “China-Tanzanian Relations in Historical Perspectives”, presentation made at the CCR seminar, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa: Engaging the World’s Next Superpower, Cape Town, South Africa, 17 and 18 September 2007.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{27} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Assistance in the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, 17 November 2000.
as Tanzania to industrialise and to create more jobs. Indeed, advocates of China-Africa technology transfer even propose technology barter exchanges. Beijing could also offer a geo-strategic advantage as an alternative source of support and partnership. For example, China can be used to counter US efforts to impose conditions linked to its ‘war on terror’. However, in order for these advantages to be meaningful, African countries such as Tanzania will need to negotiate more consistently in the interests of industrial transformation and through collective continental efforts to take advantage of China’s enormous market.

Sudan

China’s relations with African countries cannot be assessed in a vacuum, and the effects of globalisation are indeed an important consideration when examining this developing relationship. Is China an aspirant great power that wants to challenge the status quo, or to reinforce it? Some experts believe that Africa may be the crucible in which China’s ‘soft power’ is tested. Sudan-China bilateral relations, in particular, illustrate the complexity and nuanced nature of Beijing’s relations with African countries.

China’s oil investments in Sudan coincided with Western withdrawal and the deployment of an isolation management strategy. China is seen by some Western observers as a ‘rogue investor’ in Sudan, flaunting international sanctions. However, many Western firms operating in China have been able to benefit from collaboration between Chinese companies and the Sudanese government in infrastructure such as the provision of electricity.

The web of interests that link China to Africa and to the rest of the world are complex and run across both public and private sectors. It is these interests that are carefully scrutinized in the midst of major crises such as the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region. The large-scale humanitarian disaster in Darfur that has seen an estimated 200,000 deaths since 2003 has been widely viewed as linked to the Khartoum government and an international outcry has alleged that Chinese business interests are propping up the government and protecting it from sanctions in the UN Security Council.

Essentially, China’s engagement in Sudan can be seen in three different stages. In 2005, the Chinese leadership maintained the stance that business was separate from politics and that Beijing’s ‘non-interference’ policy would be rigidly observed. In a second phase, by 2006, China agreed with the UN that some intervention in Sudan was necessary, but only with Khartoum’s consent. The Sudanese government’s repeated rejection of proposals to deploy a UN peacekeeping force and its reluctant co-operation with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) undermined China’s position. In a third phase, during 2007, China consolidated its position on the Darfur issue, publicising its own efforts to practice the politics of influence as opposed to the politics of interference.

31 Ibid.
The implication has been that Beijing’s non-interference does not mean it is not involved in solving the Darfur crisis. With international pressure, China was forced to modify its approach to “government-business” in Sudan. Chinese policymakers are, however, cautious about the emerging doctrinal shift away from the non-interference principle – which has been a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy in the developing world. China appointed Liu Guijin, former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, as its Special Envoy to Darfur and encouraged Khartoum to accept the AU-UN Hybrid Force approved by the UN Security Council in July 2007. This raises the question as to whether China’s stance on non-interference is a strategic tactic or an immutable principle.\footnote{Ibid.}
5. Bilateral Relations — Case Studies: Central Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

China’s relations with central African states continue to be an emerging phenomenon. Beijing is primarily interested in establishing trade links with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to access the country’s mineral wealth.\(^\text{33}\)

The DRC is currently in a transitional and fragile post-conflict stage. Entrenched predatory economic relationships have torn apart the resource-rich country and control over these resources is not yet fully consolidated by the government of Joseph Kabila.\(^\text{34}\) As a weak government emerging from a protracted civil conflict, China’s arrival is perceived by Congo’s leaders to be an opportunity for its economic take-off. This is particularly the case since Western engagement in the Congo has historically been detrimental to the country’s political and economic development. Mobutu Sese Seko’s phenomenally corrupt 32-year autocratic rule was largely maintained by Western patronage. Beijing is now seen by the new government as an alternative model of economic development and partnership.\(^\text{35}\)

China is cautious not to propagate it own development models in other countries. Instead, Beijing has emphasised the need for countries to contextualise and develop their own growth models. Especially pertinent to this is the fact that the DRC resembles China more closely in 1949 than China in 1979, on the eve of its own economic take-off. Differing from Western actors - at least rhetorically - China, however, does not promote democratisation as a pre-requisite for economic development.


\(^{34}\) Ibid.

Essentially, whether or not engagement with China will be detrimental to the DRC is unclear. It is certainly unlikely that Chinese exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources will be any worse than the involvement of Western actors. Similarly, it is equally unlikely that Chinese investment will be particularly beneficial to the DRC’s sustainable growth and the entrenchment of normative behaviour such as ‘good governance’, which are viewed as secondary to China’s own imperatives to secure access to the DRC’s natural resources. Although Beijing has made important commitments to the UN’s peacekeeping force in the DRC in the form of personnel, it continues to distance itself from Western-led initiatives to solve the problems of the Congo. In September 2007, China announced an $8 billion agreement with the DRC towards infrastructural development and investment in the Congo’s mining sector.

Gabon

Due to rising instability in the Middle East and uncertainty in other regions of the world, Africa is becoming a more strategic source for energy and raw materials – despite holding only nine per cent of the world’s oil reserves. China has been quick to capitalise on this, and within six years, has cultivated interests in every major oil-producing country on the African continent. Despite the fact that Gabon’s oil reserves are soon to reach maturity, the central African country is no exception.

Gabon typifies the kind of underdevelopment characterised by resource-rich countries. The country’s wealth lies in non-renewable resources, such as oil, timber, iron and manganese. These nations lack economic diversification and rely heavily on extractive commerce. A continued economic dependency on France due to its membership of the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) zone – which tied the currencies of its African members to the French franc – further exacerbated this problem in Gabon. The economy is further constrained by strong networks of patronage between oil companies and Gabonese elites under Africa’s longest-serving autocrat, Omar Ondimba-Bongo.


China National Machinery Import and Export Company won the tender to develop Gabon’s Belinga iron ore deposits, pledging an investment of $500 million in order to develop reserves estimated at $3 billion. The Chinese company’s bid was accepted over other tenders, notably Brazilian mining giant Companhia Rio do Vale Doce (CVRD), as the infrastructure development in the Chinese proposal was more extensive.  

Due to the lack of transparency in such agreements, such deals are open to various interpretations. Despite Africa’s evident need for infrastructural development, it must be recognised that infrastructure can be built for a number of reasons that are not always beneficial to the host state, particularly if the state lacks the capacity to protect and promote local interests. The terms established under such agreements that include infrastructure development initiatives thus need to be linked to viable local capacities to monitor their implementation. Without a credible monitoring of the ‘value-added’ of these infrastructure projects, corruption could grow instead of an enhanced infrastructure in exchange for natural resources, and the country may gain very little from this trade.

China has a clearly formulated strategy in terms of its objectives for engaging Africa. However, African leaders are still uncertain as to what they want to achieve from strengthened relations with China. Without a focused strategy, and without a mechanism to monitor China’s pledges made during the 2006 Beijing Summit of FOCAC, Africa will struggle to set the agenda in terms of its future relations with China.

FROM LEFT: Professor Muna Ndulo, University of Cornell, Itacha, United States; Mr Ghulam Asmal, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Tshwane, South Africa; Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo, Lead City University, Nigeria

6. Bilateral Relations — Case Studies: South Africa and Nigeria

South Africa

Apartheid South Africa had recognised Taiwan, and China had traded covertly with the racist regime in Pretoria as well as supported South African-backed anti-Soviet rebels in Angola and Mozambique.

Diplomatic relations between the ‘new’ South Africa and the People’s Republic of China were thus established only in 1998. High-level visits have occurred, and South Africa and China established a Bi-national Commission (BNC) in 2001 through which to co-ordinate their relations and to promote increased investment, trade, skills transfer and cultural exchanges. The BNC met in Beijing and Pretoria three times between 2001 and 2007, during which time a Centre for Chinese Studies was established at the University of Stellenbosch; a $5 billion China-Africa Development Fund was established; and a free-trade agreement planned between China and the countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

Trade between South Africa and China increased from $15 billion in 1997 to about $9 billion in 2006, and South Africa (with about 20 per cent of Chinese trade in Africa) has become Beijing’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Angola. While China exports manufactured and agricultural goods, electronics and textiles to South Africa, it imports manganese, gold, copper, tobacco, aluminium, car parts and chrome ore from South Africa. China is also exporting electronic goods to ten other mostly southern African countries from South Africa. South African brand names such as SAB Miller, Anglo-Gold Ashanti, Anglo American, Standard Bank, and Spur all have a presence in China. Tensions in this relationship have evolved around Chinese exports of about 74 per cent of imports of garments that led to job losses estimated at between 23,000 and 85,000, and South African labour unions successfully lobbied for curbs in such Chinese imports in 2006. South African president, Thabo Mbeki, warned in December 2006 that Africa risked entering into a ‘colonial relationship’ with Beijing if the continent continued to export raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured goods. But another danger is that both South Africa and China could come to be regarded as the new economic imperialists in Africa.

Nigeria

Sino-Nigerian relations have involved economic co-operation on a multiplicity of projects. Between 1972 and 1974, China imported about $14 million in goods from Nigeria, while Lagos imported Chinese goods estimated at $249 million in this period. However, in the new global order, Nigeria’s oil revenues and its increasing attractiveness to foreign investors may be reshaping the relationship. The country has ambitiously claimed that it would like to be a major economic player by the year 2020. However, as evidenced by trade imbalances with


North America, Europe and Asia; the country will require enormous transformation in order for this aspiration to be realised. Nigeria is currently the world’s sixth largest oil exporting country, but is unable to provide reliable and predictable supplies of petroleum to its own population of 140 million citizens.

Enhanced basic infrastructure will be a critical first step in this regard. Nigeria needs an overhaul of its public power supply that can meet the needs of any burgeoning manufacturing industries. Currently, many businesses must source their own electricity, water and even develop accessible roads. The country’s railway system and major road arteries also require additional improvement. It is possible that strategic co-operation with China could contribute to the improvement of Nigeria’s infrastructure. Nigeria has become China’s fourth largest trading partner in Africa, and multi-billion dollar contracts have been signed for Chinese firms to improve Nigeria’s infrastructure and exploit its oil.
7. Great Power Rivalries: China and the West in Africa

Recent initiatives on the part of African governments to build stronger ties with China demonstrate the continent’s urgent desire to reduce its dependence on the West. Some analysts have argued that it is short-sighted to presume that African governments are passive observers in China’s rise and that African states have their own agendas in their evolving relationship with China.41

African leaders may be calculating that the centre of global capitalism (and therefore power) is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region and that the continent must therefore position itself to take advantage of this development. Western reservations about China’s economic ascendency has led to the tactical composition of a recurring theme by the leadership in Beijing to the effect that China is only ‘pursuing the goal of rising in peace’, an idea that is apparently predicated on the new concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’.42 This is indicative of China’s strategic recognition of America’s hegemonic dominance of international politics in the post-Cold War era. However, while hierarchy within the international political system is recognised by less powerful actors, this does not prevent such powers from using (instrumentally and subversively) dominant definitions to pursue their own parochial agendas. China may be rising peacefully, but its ‘peaceful development’ may also be a means to a greater ambition, which is to restore its past glory. This may well lead to a more assertive foreign policy that could ultimately challenge US unilaterism and dominance.

Some African leaders and civil society groups have contended that Western engagement in Africa has had little benefit for the continent. For example, the US was solely interested in the containment of Communist China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to the exclusion of all else, including the promotion of democracy and sustainable economic development in Africa.43 Washington’s rhetoric changed from a containment strategy to a drive to expand democracies in Africa in the post-Cold War era. However, its investments in Africa focused on oil-producing countries (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon) and on South Africa. The US continued to provide $2 billion in aid to Egypt while 48 sub-Saharan African states shared less than $1 billion in support from Washington44 though the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) passed in May 2000 provided access to African goods in selected sectors of the American market. African apparel exports to the US amounted to $100 million in the first seven months of 2002 and AGOA resulted in about 200,000 new jobs between 2000 and 2002.

Following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration refocused American attention on security issues. In 2002, a US Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Command was established in Djibouti, with between 1,200 and 1,400 American soldiers, to prevent terrorist activities in the region. The move has been viewed by some as foreshadowing a return to Cold War tactics of supporting autocratic regimes in the name of US economic and security interests. During the Cold War, Washington supported Kenya, Somalia and Sudan, despite poor human rights records in all three countries, in order to protect strategic sea routes for transporting oil from the Middle East. The US base in Djibouti has been viewed by some as a similar strategy to protect American economic interests. In 2003, a US-supported programme totaling $100 million –
the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) – was launched to provide training and equipment to the region and President Bush reopened the US Agency for International Development (USAID) office in Djibouti.\footnote{The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, “Djibouti”, March 2003, p.41.}

The US also strengthened security ties with Eritrea as well as Ethiopia. In February 2007, Washington announced plans to establish a new Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the continent by September 2008. AFRICOM sought to facilitate American efforts to fight terrorism, prevent conflict and provide humanitarian assistance to Africa. However, widespread concerns were expressed on the continent that AFRICOM could stir up anti-American sentiment among Muslim communities and bring instability, rather than stability to the continent, resulting in a new ‘Cold War’ in Africa in which ‘anti-terrorism’ replaces ‘anti-communism’ as the main criterion for American support of African regimes. France has also consistently promoted its own interests, particularly in francophone Africa. Over the last five decades, successive French administrations cultivated and benefited from an intricate and sometimes corrupt network of political, military, economic and culture ties with a select group of mainly autocratic African leaders. At the end of the Cold War, France hoped to foster its power and spread the French sphere of influence on the continent and elevate its own diminishing great power status.

In reality, the socialist government of Lionel Jospin reduced France’s co-operation budget with Africa from 8.3 billion French francs (1992 figure) to 6.7 billion in 1997. France also reduced its military presence on the continent from 8,000 to about 5,600 troops and closed two military bases in the Central African Republic. In reality, Paris could not continue to maintain previous levels of patronage. The tragic events of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda provided a terrible example of France’s record in Africa. Having trained and armed elements of the genocidal regime in Rwanda, France’s suspect humanitarian intervention, Opération Turquoise, allowed génocidaires to escape into neighbouring Zaire (now the DRC) in July 1994. France now seeks to intervene in African countries like the DRC and the Central African Republic as part of multilateral European Union interventions.

French engagement in Africa has become increasingly problematic. France responded to the murder of two of its officers in the Central African Republic in January 1997 with force, leaving 150 people dead.\footnote{See “La Coopération dans le sang” by François Soudan, Jeune Afrique, 8-14 January 1997, p.7.} In Congo-Brazzaville in October 1997, Paris helped Denis Sassou-Nguesso retain power after losing an election.\footnote{See Guy Martin, “France’s African Policy in Transition: Disengagement and Redeployment”, in Chris Alden and Guy Martin (eds), France and South Africa: Towards a New Engagement with Africa (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2003), p.105.} The changing relationship between France and Africa was further evidenced during Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war after 2002 which saw 4,600 French troops deployed alongside a UN peacekeeping force. In November 2006, after French soldiers were killed in Côte d’Ivoire, Paris destroyed the country’s Air Force planes, leading to violent anti-French demonstrations and a mass exodus of nearly 10,000 French citizens living in the country. Finally, it is increasingly clear that France will maintain links with wealthier Francophone countries such as Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon and increase its trading partnership with South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria, but its broader engagement on the continent, particularly in the sphere of economic development, is rapidly evolving.

Western concerns that China is behaving badly in Africa appear disingenuous in light of the historical American and French record in Africa. Indeed, total oil imported by China from Africa was 8.7 percent in 2006, compared to the US importing 33 per cent of its oil, and the EU importing 36 per cent. The question is whether African leaders themselves have not only the vision, but sufficient developmental and regulatory frameworks to prevent China from behaving as the West has done in Africa.
8. Great Power Rivalries: China, Japan and Peacekeeping in Africa

Despite Japan’s earlier engagement in Africa, particularly in the area of development aid, China has rapidly surpassed Japan in recent years. In March 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi embarked on a tour of Africa, visiting Ethiopia and Ghana.

This trip was seen to be in direct response to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and the Seychelles one month earlier. In June 2007, China unveiled a $5 billion fund to be managed by the China Development Fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. In an exceptional move, Japanese politicians warned that Beijing should be held to international standards in its investments in Africa. Japan and China’s foreign policies towards Africa are fundamentally different. China’s adherence to the earlier mentioned Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and its relations with many of its African partners seem independent of Western normative expectations. Japan, however, places similar conditions on its trade, aid and investments in Africa as many Western governments do.

The history of China and Japan’s relations in Africa explain these divergent approaches to the continent. China developed from a fractured semi-colonial entity into a communist state after 1945 and began to reintegrate into the global economy after 1978. Japan, on the other hand, declined from a colonial power in the 1800s to becoming a junior ally of the US during the Cold War, though with the world’s second largest economy. While both countries attended the Bandung Conference in 1955, Japan was a reluctant participant, while China emerged as a vigorous power through its representative, Premier Zhou Enlai. Similarly, while Beijing supported liberation movements in southern Africa, Japan adopted a mercantilist strategy toward Africa, sometimes in collaboration with Britain. Tokyo ignored the international sanctions placed on apartheid South Africa and continued bilateral trade with the regime in Pretoria. Japanese companies, for example, contributed to the

ABOVE: From left: Dr Kweku Ampiah, University of Leeds, England; Dr Scarlet Cornelissen, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; Mr Chen Wenbing, First Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Tshwane, South Africa; Dr Shogo Suzuki, University of Cambridge, England; Professor Amitav Acharya, University of Bristol, England

Sishen-Saldanha Bay Development Project in South Africa in the early 1970s. Japan-South Africa trade totalled over $3 billion in 1983. Japan has since modified its approach, instituting the new reformed Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993, which also took place in 1998, 2003 and 2008. TICAD has, however, had a limited impact, particularly compared to the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. TICAD is narrowly linked to Japan’s foreign policy objectives and is embedded in a development paradigm of multilateralism. The main goals of TICAD II were economic growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, TICAD’s role has been to focus more on social development and co-operation under its parameters than on concrete and actionable trade and investment objectives. Consequently, trade and investment flows between Japan and Africa have remained stagnant, while Africa’s share of Japan’s total imports has remained largely unchanged. Meanwhile, China has continued to expand its economic co-operation in Africa.

Chinese contribution to international peacekeeping in Africa has been criticised as pandering to Western audiences. This observation emerged, in part, because Beijing did not historically engage actively in peacekeeping because it viewed these missions as tools for the superpowers in buffer zones or warring states during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the paradigm of peacekeeping has changed dramatically.

perhaps explaining China’s new engagement in these operations. However, the presence of Chinese peacekeepers in the DRC, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Western Sahara does raise questions about Beijing’s evolving interpretation of its non-interference principle.

Given these issues, and the fact that peacekeeping in Africa is not an immediate security concern for China, the motivation for Beijing’s participation in these missions should be questioned. China has, firstly, realised that globalisation has softened the rigidity of state sovereignty. Secondly, Beijing’s growing socialisation into international norms has led it to accept that sovereignty can sometimes be less sacrosanct in the light of humanitarian crises. China has criticised interference on procedural claims, not on sovereignty issues, and its stance on Darfur, as discussed earlier, has changed. Thirdly, and most importantly, China seems to want to be accepted as a responsible global actor. If African governments are to exert more concerted and co-ordinated agency in their relations with China, what types of multilateral engagement with Beijing can serve as models?

As an example, China’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can provide interesting lessons for the African Union. China’s rise is the most important development since the end of the Cold War in the ASEAN region, and arguably, the same is true for Africa. Furthermore, both regions, when interacting with China, are a grouping of economically weak states whose positions would be strengthened through collective engagement. There are, of course, differences between the ASEAN and the AU. While there are vast geographical and cultural differences among the ASEAN members (as these are in Africa), each country in Southeast Asia is home to large numbers of the Chinese diaspora. Beijing has also lent substantial economic and financial support to Southeast Asia, particularly to counter the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Nevertheless, ASEAN countries have benefited from leveraging Japanese, Chinese and Indian interests and generating competition among these powers. Several countries have security agreements with the US, and India has been granted the status of “full dialogue partner” of ASEAN and invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). African countries, through the AU, could similarly work collectively to foster competition for their raw materials and markets between China, the US and Europe.

Finally, Southeast Asian countries have adhered to a multilateralist approach and encouraged the institutionalisation of relations with China. Central to this strategy has been presenting ASEAN as a forum for continued dialogue, consultation, confidence-building and problem-solving with Beijing. While China has, in the past, been reluctant to embrace multilateralist approaches, it has become more responsive to the ASEAN approach. The regional institution is now very much integrated into Chinese policymaking as an outlet for communicating Beijing’s political, economic and security priorities. FOCAC, the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have the potential to be similar forums for China-Africa relations. Like ASEAN, African leaders must, however, avoid letting China set the terms of the relationship, and instead of travelling to Beijing to hold meetings, they should ensure more forums are held in Africa to cultivate a relationship of equality.

53 See Kweku Ampiah, “The Ideological, Political and Economic Imperatives in China and Japan’s Relations with Africa”.
54 This was experienced by China on joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001 amidst the requirements to fulfill certain economic criteria.
55 The member states of ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Laos and the Philippines.
57 Amitav Acharya, “China and Southeast Asia: Some lessons for Africa”.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
9. Conclusion

Africa must leverage its new relationship with China in the interest of its own economic development. African governments must use this historic opportunity to capture capital in order to diversify African economies and reduce aid dependency. China’s interest in the continent’s oil and mineral wealth should not be squandered. Its loans and investments should be used to develop local economies and escape the trap of being dependent on external commodities markets for foreign income. At the same time, China’s “government-business” strategy and its principle of non-interference must be balanced against the long-term costs of doing business with governments that are undermining the human rights of their own citizens. Africa-China relations have major potential to break pre-existing and failed development paradigms by focusing on trade and investment and promoting joint peacemaking on the continent.

Policy Recommendations

Four key recommendations emerged from the seminar:

1. Develop a long-term perspective on Africa-China relations;
2. Establish African consensus on what is expected from China;
3. Formulate a pro-active engagement strategy; and
4. Engage China through regional organisations rather than bilateral relations.

1. Developing a long-term perspective: China has adopted a strategic long-term perspective in relation to its engagement with Africa. African leaders need to complement Beijing’s long-term view with their own perspectives on the continent’s long-term goals for the mutual benefit of both parties. The opportunity to utilise Chinese capital, training and investment for Africa’s economic development should not be wasted. Strategies are needed for building the continent’s skills base and human resources; diversifying oil and mineral-based economies; and ensuring that local infrastructure is built. These outcomes would have long-term benefits for China’s African partners.

2. Finding consensus: China has clearly defined principles and priorities for co-operation with Africa. Similarly, African countries must develop their own consensus on the rules for Chinese trade, investment and aid on the continent. Consensus should be built through regional and continental forums such as the African Union (AU) and communicated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. While it is difficult to ensure that all African governments will adhere to a collective approach, consensus-driven engagement with China would reduce opportunities for China to exploit divisions and gaps among African countries.

3. Formulating a pro-active engagement strategy: The mechanisms for Sino-African interaction and the agenda set for FOCAC meetings should not be dominated by China. African leaders need to engage China pro-actively in terms of the continent’s own needs, demands and expectations.
4. Engaging China through regional organisations: Finally, consensus should be based on the relative strength of African countries operating as a cohesive economic and political bloc, rather than negotiating bilaterally with China. This is also informed by the experience of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Laos and the Philippines). In addition to the AU, a coherent consensus on engagement with China could emanate from regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which have the potential to constitute similar forums for China-Africa relations.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One: Monday 17 September 2007

9h00 – 9h15 Welcome and Opening
Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

9h15 – 10h45 Session I: Setting the Scene: China and Africa in the post-Cold War Era

Chair: Ms Yasmin Sooka, Executive Director, Foundation for Human Rights, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Garth Le Pere, Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, “The Geo-Strategic Dimensions of the Sino-African Relationship”
Ms Trudi Hartzenberg, Executive Director, Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Stellenbosch, Cape Town, “The Trade Aspects of the Sino-African Relationship”

10h45 – 11h00 Coffee Break

11h00 – 12h30 Session II: Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Southern Africa

Chair: Professor Sam Moyo, Executive Director, African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers: Dr Lloyd Sachikonye, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, “Zimbabwe and China”
Ms Lucy Corkin, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, “Angola and China”

12h30 – 13h30 Lunch

13h30 – 15h00 Session III: Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Eastern Africa

Chair: Dr Iqbal Jhazbhay, Senior Lecturer, University of South Africa, Tshwane

Speakers: Mr Sharath Srinivasan, Oxford University, England, “Sudan and China”
Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, “Tanzania and China”

15h00 – 15h15 Coffee Break
15h15 – 16h45  Session IV: Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Central Africa

Chair: Mr Solomon Rutega, Minister/Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Uganda, Beijing

Speakers: Dr Douglas Yates, American University of Paris, France, “Gabon and China”
Dr. Devon Curtis, Cambridge University, England, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo and China”

18h00 – 19h30  “The Legacy of Bandung: China, Asia and Africa”

CCR Public Seminar at the Centre for the Book, Cape Town

Chair: Professor Ben Turok, Member of Parliament, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Kweku Ampiah, University of Leeds, England; and Professor Amitav Acharya, University of Bristol, England

Day Two: Tuesday 18 September 2007

09h00 – 10h30  Session V: Bilateral Relations – Case Studies: Nigeria and Zambia

Chair: Mr Ghulam Asmal, Director, Southern African Development Community, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Tshwane

Speakers: Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo, Lead City University, Nigeria, “Nigeria and China”
Professor Muna Ndulo, Cornell University, United States, “Zambia and China”

10h30 – 10h45 Coffee Break

10h45 – 12h15  Session VI: Great Power Rivalries: China and the West in Africa

Chair: Dr Xu Jian, Vice-President, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, “China, the US and France in Africa”
Dr Daniel Bach, University of Bordeaux, France, “China and the European Union in Africa”

12h15 – 13h15 Lunch
13h15 – 14h45  Session VII: Great Power Rivalries: China, Japan and Peacekeeping in Africa

Chair: Dr Scarlett Cornelissen, Lecturer, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Kweku Ampiah, University of Leeds, England, ‘China and Japan in Africa’
Dr Shogo Suzuki, University of Cambridge, England, ‘China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa’
Professor Amitav Acharya, University of Bristol, England, ‘China’s Relations with ASEAN: Lessons for Africa’

14h45 – 15h00 Coffee Break

15h00 – 16h00 Session VIII: How to Produce an Academically-Rigorous and Policy-Relevant Book from the Seminar

Chair: Mr Glenn Cowley, Publisher, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Dr Kweku Ampiah, University of Leeds, England

16h00 – 16h15 Filling out evaluation forms and Coffee Break

16h15 – 17h15 Session IX: Rapporteurs’ Report and the Way Forward

Chair: Mr Chen Wenbing, First Secretary, Embassy of China, Tshwane

Speakers: Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Ms Lucy Corkin, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
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   Cape Town, South Africa

2. Professor Amitav Acharya
   University of Bristol, England

3. Dr Kweku Ampiah
   University of Leeds, England

4. Mr Ghulam Asmal
   South African Department of Foreign Affairs
   Tshwane, South Africa

5. Professor Daniel Bach
   University of Bordeaux, France

6. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
   University of Dar es Salaam
   Tanzania

7. Mr Brendan Boyle
   Sunday Times
   Cape Town, South Africa

8. Mr Paul Bradnum
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   Cape Town, South Africa

9. Mr Christopher Brown
   Canadian Consul-General
   Cape Town, South Africa

10. Ms Yaliwe Clark
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    Cape Town, South Africa

11. Ms Lucy Corkin
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    University of Stellenbosch
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12. Dr Scarlett Cornelissen
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14. Dr Devon Curtis
    Cambridge University
    United Kingdom

15. Ms Trudi Hartzenberg
    Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa
    Stellenbosch, South Africa

16. Dr Iqbal Jhazbhay
    University of South Africa
    Tshwane, South Africa

17. Dr Xu Jian
    China Institute of International Studies
    Beijing, China

18. Dr Garth le Pere
    Institute for Global Dialogue
    Midrand, South Africa

19. Mr David Monyae
    Development Bank of Southern Africa
    Midrand, South Africa
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<th>Number</th>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Professor Sam Moyo</td>
<td>African Institute for Agrarian Studies</td>
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<td>Harare, Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba</td>
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<td>Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo</td>
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<td>Mr Mark Paterson</td>
<td>Independent Consultant</td>
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<td>Ms Karin Pretorius</td>
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<td>Mr Tor Sellström</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution</td>
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<td>Ms Yasmin Sooka</td>
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<td>Mr Sharath Srinivasan</td>
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<td>Professor Ben Turok</td>
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<td>Ms Elizabeth Myburgh</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>Ms Pippa Segall</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Ms Selma Walters</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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# Annex III

## List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>US Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>ANIP</td>
<td>Angolan National Agency for Private Investment</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CVRD</td>
<td>Companhia Rio do Vale Doce</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Co-operation</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreements</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GRN</td>
<td>Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Programme of Public Investments</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

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HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY: AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA
The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This seminar in Cape Town from 20 – 22 August 2005 made policy recommendations on how the AU’s institutions, including NEPAD, could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005 explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations in 2000.

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (EECASC), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

The seminar held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006 sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 28 and 29 June 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2006 in Cape Town, South Africa.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.

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VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13-15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted interrelated issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’, or crimes against humanity.

VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8-10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN AFRICA

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.
Notes
Notes
Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years was assessed at the seminar on which this report is based, along with other important questions about the dramatic changes in a relationship that was based largely on ideological and political solidarity in the past. The gap in understanding the factors that can contribute to achieving mutual interests between China and Africa was a particular focus of the seminar. A key concern was the need to identify strategies to ensure that Africa is able to define clearly its interests towards China in a way that is beneficial to the continent.