SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
ERINVALE ESTATE, WESTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA
19-20 NOVEMBER 2012

RAPPOREURS
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Acknowledgments

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the governments of Norway, Sweden, and Austria for their generous support which made possible the holding of the policy advisory group seminar, “South Africa in Southern Africa” at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012. CCR would also like to thank the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland for their continued support of its Africa Programme.

About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012 on “South Africa in Southern Africa”. The meeting focused on seven key themes relating to regional integration in Southern Africa: the history of regionalism; peace and security; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and South Africa’s development finance institutions (DFIs); democratic governance; South Africa’s sub-regional role; migration and food security; and the role of the European Union (EU) and China.

1. The History of Regionalism in Southern Africa: From SADCC to SADC

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was launched in 1980 to reduce the sub-region’s economic dependence on South Africa and to support the struggle against the apartheid state. The Conference’s nine founding members comprised the Frontline States (FLS) – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – as well as Malawi. In 1992, the bloc expanded to include Namibia and renamed itself the Southern African Development Community (SADC), becoming a treaty-based organisation that adopted shared values including the pursuit of integrated development, peace and stability, and “good governance” in the sub-region; and the establishment of sub-regional institutions to support these goals. South Africa joined the Community after its first democratic election in 1994. During SADC’s transition to a Community, some inherited models of integrated energy production and supply, railway transport, and university education were dismantled, although new sub-regional energy and transport projects have subsequently re-built trans-national capacities.

Angola has replaced Zimbabwe, which previously occupied a leadership role in SADC, as Southern Africa’s second largest economy, and its evolving strategic relationship with South Africa could provide a new engine for sub-regional development in SADC. However, Tshwane’s ability to drive greater inter-governmentalism in Southern Africa is constrained by its domestic socio-economic challenges, and the legacy inherited from SADCC of a minimalist integration agenda that confirmed the inviolate sovereignty of member states. The continuing prevalence of some autocratic regimes in Southern Africa has stymied the adoption of common political values, resulting in non-compliance with sub-regional norms, and weakening SADC’s institutions. The sense of a shared Southern African identity has been further undermined by a relatively unchecked multiplication of SADC members, although the enlarged membership has brought the benefits of more diversified trade. Region-building efforts have also been inhibited by the adoption of inappropriate free-market models for development, and unrealistic timetables for introducing economic integration instruments.

2. Peace and Security

In the past decade, the number of wars in the SADC sub-region has fallen, although political instability continues in Zimbabwe; Madagascar remains riven by a constitutional crisis; violent protests have broken out in Mozambique, Malawi, and Swaziland since 2009; and civil war has persisted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1996. The creation of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG) – Southern Africa’s contribution to
the African Standby Force (ASF) – is relatively advanced. In December 2012, SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) decided to deploy a 4,000-strong force to the eastern Congo. The move has highlighted uncertainty over which body or bodies (the AU and/or sub-regional organisations) can authorise interventions – and the related issue of how collective decisions on logistical and operational issues should be taken within SADC. To ensure properly capacitated missions that meet African needs, the division of labour between SADC and the United Nations (UN) also needs to be clearly defined. Fears over SADCBRIG’s dependence on South Africa’s defence capacity, compounded by Tshwane’s leadership ambitions on the wider continent, have led to calls for greater genuine inter-state military planning and training. The shifting dynamics of global demand for sub-regional natural resources – such as key minerals sought by military manufacturers that are mainly found in the DRC – can shape Southern African conflicts beyond the control of SADC. Southern Africa also faces unique issues of border and maritime security.

Moving away from the “fire-brigade” response to responding to conflicts, SADC should pursue a more preventive approach to security premised on shared values. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, conflict mediation in Southern Africa has mainly been managed from within the sub-region. South Africa has led efforts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and the DRC, following a model that seeks to establish an interim government of national unity that can pave the way to elections. However, SADC mediation efforts have often remained ad hoc, have suffered from a limited capacity to enforce the deals that are brokered, and have been disrupted by the annual changes of membership in the Organ’s Troika.

3. Regional Integration: SACU, the DBSA, and the IDC

SADC’s integrated development efforts, including its free trade area (FTA) introduced in 2008 (but still a work in progress in 2013), have led to the removal of trade barriers and the increased movement of goods, people, and capital across national borders. However, the economic dominance of South Africa, which accounts for over 80 percent of SADC’s trade, and Tshwane’s inconsistency in its efforts to develop the sub-region, have exacerbated the economic polarisation of Southern Africa. SACU has not created a single cross-border project in its more than 100 years of existence. Furthermore, South Africa remains outward-looking commercially, with about 90 percent of its trade conducted beyond the sub-region. Since 1994, South Africa has sought greater economic integration for itself and Southern Africa in the world economy, joining the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping in 2011, prioritising the creation of a tripartite FTA between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) by 2014, and promoting deals with external trade blocs. Serious questions have been raised about the relative benefits that may accrue to South Africa rather than its neighbours from these new arrangements.

However, South Africa has also championed infrastructure building in the sub-region through the government-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The DBSA has sought to support sub-regional energy, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure projects, including a North-South transport corridor from Durban to Mombasa, as well as sectors that promote exports and economic diversification, including mining, tourism, manufacturing, and agri-business. The DBSA also encourages investor confidence in markets that other financial institutions may consider too challenging, such as Zimbabwe. However, the DBSA has been criticised for not consulting sufficiently within the sub-region, and Angola’s establishment of its own development fund could represent a sign of this dissatisfaction.
4. Democratic Governance

Southern African governments have generally established electoral machineries that meet the standards and norms set by SADC and address nation-building and national reconciliation concerns. More than 50 national polls were held between 1989 and 2005 in the sub-region. Although electoral disputes and violence remain serious challenges, an increasing number of these have been successfully resolved through mediation. The roles of political parties, parliaments, judiciaries, and civil society are also being strengthened to ensure the transparency of polls. However, the rules governing the democratic system are often fiercely contested and applied unevenly, undermining the impartiality and independence of the process. Furthermore, only Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa have exceeded the 30 percent benchmark set by SADC in 1997 for the representation of women in national legislatures. The politics of patronage and a lack of democratic participation beyond elections can also frustrate citizens, turning polls into ritualistic exercises and impeding economic, as well as political, development. Most states also often lack the capacity to meet rising demands for the delivery of services that can result from greater political accountability.

In the DRC, stability is now more likely to be provided by steps to strengthen the authority and accountability of the government in Kinshasa than by actions to counter Rwandan incursions. South Africa has the capacity to lead sub-regional efforts to foster more democratic processes in the sub-region, but can be constrained by the intransigence of regimes such as those in Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

5. South Africa in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

Africa has become the fastest growing region globally, with average annual growth rates of more than five percent, underpinned by a boom in demand for its minerals. However, this demand may slow soon, and infrastructural constraints continue to hamper the continent’s growth prospects. Notwithstanding the progress made in improving transport corridors in the sub-region, SADC’s integration efforts have had limited success in liberalising and boosting trade across Southern Africa. The establishment of SADC’s customs union, which was supposed to begin in 2010 - followed by a common market by 2015, a monetary union by 2016, and a common currency by 2018 - has presented the challenges of creating joint external tariffs, equitable revenue-sharing, and common trade and industrial policies, with no guarantee that the results would significantly boost sub-regional trade.

Tshwane has identified equitable industrialisation of the continent as a fundamental priority to promote diversified production and support “developmental regionalism” in Africa. In particular, South Africa is championing the tripartite FTA to create the necessary economies of scale – 26 countries, almost 600 million people, and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) approaching $1 trillion – to compete globally. However, fears have been expressed within Southern Africa that South Africa is abandoning agreed sub-regional developmental priorities in pursuit of its grander economic goals and leadership aspirations on the continent. Tshwane has negotiated bilateral agreements with its neighbours to facilitate trade and industrial collaboration, build technical capacity, develop human resources, and construct infrastructure that addresses sub-regional supply-side constraints. South Africa has also encouraged outward investors to form joint-venture partnerships with local companies, and source goods and services locally, although some South African companies have been widely criticised for their “mercantilist” behaviour in the sub-region.
6. Human Security: Migration and Food Security

Although South Africa remains the urban and industrial hub of the sub-region and a magnet for migrant workers, Tshwane still does not regard such labour as a vector for increased intra-regional trade. Its immigration policy is based on a protectionist approach that has fuelled xenophobia. South Africa also lacks the institutional capacity to tackle migration flows across its borders effectively.

A series of food crises in Southern Africa have been compounded by frequent droughts and floods. Member states including Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have confronted serious problems in ensuring sufficient food for their populations. Lessons should be learnt from SADC’s effective coordination of food aid during a drought in 1992, and, by contrast, the inadequate response to a food crisis in Lesotho twenty years later in 2012. Pressures on food supply and quality are likely to be exacerbated by increasing urbanisation, high poverty levels, and rising food prices, all of which could create the conditions for serious social instability. SADC should therefore adapt its policy framework to promote the diversification of agricultural outputs, increased intra-regional trade in food, greater investment in farming, and improved equipment and technological expertise in this sector. Land reform policies to promote smallholdings that create employment and are less reliant on heavy inputs, such as those created by the break-up of Zimbabwe’s large white-owned farms, can also produce real benefits. SADC should further protect its raw materials sovereignty, as global biofuel and food producers buy up huge tracts of arable land across Africa.

7. External Actors: The EU and China

The 27-member European Union’s trade relations with Africa seek to ensure a secure supply of primary products to feed European industry and consumer markets, as well as a ready market for its exports of processed goods. The EU’s negotiation of separate trade deals in Southern Africa – including interim Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) signed with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique in 2008, and with Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe in 2009 – have exacerbated divisions between SADC member states and constrained the sub-regional bloc’s power to direct economic policy in the sub-region. Trade between the EU and South Africa is shaped by the stand-alone Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of 1999 and Tshwane’s relationship with Brussels as one of the EU’s ten strategic economic partners worldwide. The TDCA has been criticised for having failed to take into account South Africa’s SACU allies, or SADC’s trade protocols, compromising regional integration efforts.

China has established robust political and trade ties in Southern Africa in line with its national interests. However, initial optimism about the benefits of investment by Beijing has been tempered by Chinese vertically-integrated business models that demand few African inputs and often disregard labour rights, environmental protections, and other governance standards on the continent. In order to redress an asymmetrical economic relationship that is largely shaped by China, African actors should be more proactive in prioritising their own economic development agendas.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the policy advisory group seminar:

1. A team of individuals and countries that can drive regional integration in SADC is needed to provide leadership within Southern Africa on key security and economic issues. Effective regional leadership is predicated on qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. The adoption by South Africa of a legitimate leadership role within SADC must be based on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of economic dominance. Tshwane should adopt more than a functional role and provide assurances to smaller states in the sub-region that it poses no threat to them, while establishing sub-regional alliances with anchor states such as Angola, in order to forge the necessary Southern African consensus;

2. To ensure properly capacitated peacekeeping missions that meet African needs, the division of labour between SADC and the United Nations needs to be clearly defined. SADC’s standby brigade should be a rapid reaction force that is brought under the UN’s umbrella within no more than six months after it has been deployed. Better coordinated and more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional approach to peace and security in the sub-region. A group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other pressing domestic responsibilities – could be established to mediate and oversee the implementation of the sub-regional body’s peace plans;

3. SADC should acknowledge and work within its limitations. The organisation needs to refocus on key sectors such as food security, water, transport, energy, and communications, and needs to be directly present in the lives of its 257 million citizens in concrete ways in order to gain popular support for, and participation in, region-building efforts. SADC lacks bureaucratic capacity and should adopt a decentralised approach that seeks to mobilise sectoral projects and harnesses their institutional capacity to long-term region-building;

4. South Africa needs to link its rhetorical support for the equitable industrialisation of the continent to SADC’s practical integration efforts, eschewing inappropriate free-market models and unrealistic timetables for introducing economic integration instruments. The country should seek greater input from the sub-regional body on the trade facilitation programmes undertaken by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which has earmarked $300 billion to spearhead and improve infrastructure for railways and ports in the sub-region;

5. As the world’s “last investment frontier”, Africa needs to take advantage of the current commodity boom and diversify beyond traditional providers of finance to source the cheapest capital available to create important infrastructure that will support the continent’s future economic growth. Infrastructure construction should extend beyond the mine-to-port model that focuses only on the export of Africa’s raw materials. This supporting infrastructure should seek to achieve the broader goal of helping people and goods to move faster and further across Southern Africa, thus supporting the diversification of production and trade, as well as the creation of jobs.
6. SADC must keep sight of the importance of setting minimum realisable standards for “good governance” – such as the holding of credible free and fair multi-party elections – in order to safeguard the democratic gains already made. The sub-regional body should be accorded powers of enforcement so that non-compliance with its instruments comes at a high price to member states;

7. It is important to frame the debate about democratic aspirations beyond the regularity of elections. In order to promote democratic governance, external actors should not be afforded a decisive role in supporting national governments; opposition parties need to be treated as legitimate political actors; the roles of parliaments as agents of accountability and democratisation should be improved; and the diverse interests of civil society – such as those of the youth, women, and rural communities – must be fully represented in government;

8. South African companies have been widely criticised for their “mercantilist” behaviour in the sub-region and beyond. In order to encourage companies to become responsible sub-regional citizens, Tshwane should seek to formulate and implement a corporate code of conduct that would foster economic diversification and promote common values;

9. SADC should establish a focal point to promote the sub-region’s interests more effectively in EPA negotiations with the EU, with Tshwane providing strategic support for SADC’s efforts in this area. Brussels should agree to strengthen SADC’s negotiating and regulatory capacity as a sub-regional trade organisation; and should also support the development of agricultural production in Southern Africa by abolishing the massive subsidies that it extends to its own farmers. SADC should be more proactive in promoting a common approach and developing a coherent agenda for China’s engagement in Southern Africa to support region-building, and should seek to reinforce the negotiating capacity of its member states to ensure that they conclude proper enforceable economic agreements that bring appropriate and mutual benefits; and

10. As part of a people-centred SADC migration policy, South Africa needs to prioritise the integration of migrants and adopt a coherent multi-disciplinary strategy on immigration that moves beyond regarding the phenomenon as a threat to state and societal security, and promotes migration as a tool for diversifying intra-regional trade and boosting economic growth. On food security, SADC should strengthen its early warning mechanisms, improve its transport corridors, and promote the creation of integrated agricultural value-chains that balance production with nutrition and end not just at the market, but beyond, at the level of promoting the health of consumers and the economic development of the sub-region.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012 on “South Africa in Southern Africa”. This report is based on discussions at this meeting as well as further research.

The seminar brought together about 30 mostly Southern African policymakers, civil society actors, and scholars to discuss, and provide concrete policy recommendations in support of, the foreign policy goals of South Africa’s region-building efforts within Southern Africa. CCR has been actively involved in the past decade in exploring the challenges faced by Southern Africa, producing three books and seven policy reports from this work. Building on this expertise, the Western Cape meeting focused on seven key themes relating to regional integration in Southern Africa: the history of regionalism; peace and security; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and South Africa’s development finance institutions (DFIs); democratic governance; South Africa’s sub-regional role; migration and food security; and the role of the European Union (EU) and China.

For over a century, South Africa’s mines, farms, and industry have attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from neighbouring states, and the country continues to dominate the Southern African sub-region by virtue of its economic strength, accounting for about 80 percent of the economy of the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) and about 20 percent of its population. Tshwane (Pretoria) has leveraged its economic power and its status as a moral beacon following the successful overthrow of apartheid in 1994 to win substantial diplomatic influence sub-regionally, continentally, and internationally, and has become central to many debates on region-building efforts in Southern Africa. Having established strong democratic institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms at home, South Africa is a key member of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC); has contributed to peacemaking efforts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and is expected to continue to play a leading role in the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG) of an evolving African Standby Force (ASF). The country’s corporations and franchises are ubiquitous across Southern Africa. South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and its Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) are well placed to play a potentially developmental role in the sub-region. Other initiatives fostered by Tshwane are the Maputo Trade Corridor with Mozambique and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP).

Yet South Africa’s relationship with Southern Africa continues to be complicated. An estimated one million people were killed and $60 billion dollars in damages resulted from South Africa’s destabilisation of Southern Africa in the 1980s alone, creating a distrust of South African interventionism that remains strong today. Much of the SADC sub-region remains mired in poverty, while peace and stability, especially in the DRC, remains fragile. Political
instability also continues in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Madagascar (suspended from SADC in March 2009 after an unconstitutional change of government). Although South Africa, led by Jacob Zuma since 2009, has actively engaged in sub-regional peacemaking efforts in Zimbabwe and Madagascar on the authority of SADC, Tshwane’s larger continental and international diplomatic ambitions continue to be regarded with suspicion across Southern Africa. In July 2012, Tshwane’s minister of home affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was elected Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission. South Africa also completed a second two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 2012. Furthermore, Tshwane is the only African member of the Group of 20 (G-20) major economies, as well as the only African strategic partner of the European Union.

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa against foreigners, largely from Southern Africa, in May 2008, resulted in 62 deaths and about 100,000 displaced persons, exacerbating fears over the strength of Tshwane’s commitment to genuine region-building in Southern Africa. In this regard, the country’s past history of aggressive hegemonic dominance has made its post-apartheid leaders cautious about appearing to impose their will on weaker neighbours. For example, although South Africa has played a leading role as the facilitator of sub-regional efforts to bring political stability to Zimbabwe, this is a process over which SADC has retained formal authority. South Africa has also recently shown enthusiasm for a policy of “developmental regionalism”. Policymakers in Tshwane are increasingly conscious of the need to promote investment and industrialisation policies that benefit their neighbours. In 2004, South Africa agreed to restructure the Southern African Customs Union to render greater benefits to its other members, as well as to democratised decision-making within the organisation. However, the divisions that occurred within SACU in 2008/2009 over proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU were a clear sign that there continue to be serious strains in the region-building project in Southern Africa.

Objectives

The four key objectives of the November 2012 policy advisory group meeting were:

1) To help contribute to the policy development efforts of the South African government, and those of other SADC countries;
2) To strengthen cooperation between South Africa and its neighbours and to foster dialogue among SADC members about critical governance and security issues in Southern Africa;
3) To assess critically South Africa’s leading role in promoting regional integration and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, as well as its relationship with members of SADC, SACU, and key external actors such as the EU and China; and
4) To explore strategies that can potentially encourage South Africa and SADC members to continue promoting foreign policy goals consistent with human rights, peace and security, and democratic governance.
1. The History of Regionalism in Southern Africa: From SADCC to SADC

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was launched in April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia, with the aim of reducing the sub-region’s economic dependence on South Africa, and thus supporting the struggle for democratic majority rule in the apartheid state.

The founding nine members of SADCC comprised the Frontline States (FLS) – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – as well as Malawi. The new conference was driven not by legal instruments but by solidarity, particularly among the former liberation movements that now led the governments in most of the conference’s nine founding states – which, significantly, included Zimbabwe, although this country only achieved independence later in the same month that SADCC was launched. The decentralised bureaucracy of the new conference gave responsibility to independent states to implement its common aims to promote inter-state economic and infrastructure projects, mobilise resources for development, and secure international understanding of, and support for, the group’s goals. The issue of reducing economic dependence on South Africa was perhaps most critical for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which had all been in a customs union with South Africa since 1910, and had belonged to the Southern African Customs Union since 1969.

In August 1992, the Southern African sub-regional body expanded to include Namibia, which had freed itself from South African rule and claimed independence two years earlier in 1990 (when it also become the fifth member of SACU). In the same month, SADCC changed its name to the Southern African Development Community and transformed into a treaty-based organisation that formally adopted a range of shared values including the pursuit of integrated development in the sub-region. SADC recognised the need for peace and stability, “good governance”, the building of regional institutions to support these goals, and the importance of broadening the sub-regional body’s popular base. South Africa joined the Community two years later, after its first democratic election in 1994 brought institutionalised apartheid to an end, and led to the official dissolution of the Frontline States.

Many contradictions arose during SADC’s transition from a conference to a community. Under a new ‘Towards a Common Future’ slogan, the body sought to promote the pooling of regional resources to address development problems that some individual countries lacked the capacity to resolve on their own – an approach that has subsequently become a development paradigm in Africa and beyond. However, some inherited models of integrated infrastructure and services, which had been created under the previous system of relatively ad hoc bi- or multi-national sectoral coordination, suffered as a result. For example, existing trans-national institutions and agreements for energy production and supply (between Zambia and Zimbabwe), railway transport (among Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and university education (among Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) were dismantled while simultaneously trying to build new sub-regional projects in these sectors. Nevertheless, key new sub-regional projects have built trans-national capacities and policy – for example, the Southern African Power Pool which was created in 1995 to bring together national electricity utilities, and SADC’s Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) which was established in the same year.

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3 This paragraph and the next two are largely based on a presentation made by Kaire Mbuende at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
to pursue policies that enhance macroeconomic stability and development in the sub-region. Institutional capacity and sufficient resources are key to the implementation of Southern Africa’s integrated development agenda. SADC, however, lacks bureaucratic capacity and should therefore adopt a decentralised approach that seeks to mobilise sectoral projects and harnesses their institutional capacity to long-term region-building.

South Africa faces many of the socio-economic issues experienced by its neighbours, including the challenges of alleviating poverty, and providing basic services and adequate housing. These domestic issues can constrain Tshwane’s ability to support regional development. However, although expectations that South Africa can solve sub-regional problems on its own are unrealistic, the country has much to offer Southern Africa in terms of its technical capacity. Tshwane has been positive in promoting bilateral and multilateral relations with other Southern African governments that support regional development. However, the post-apartheid government’s intentions do not always reflect events in the sub-region in terms of bilateral trade and the actions of large South African companies, whose ways of doing business have often led to charges of mercantilist behaviour. In this respect, South Africa often operates more as a supplier of goods and services to, rather than an export market for, its neighbours, although the lack of productive capacity of these neighbours is also an issue.

A team of individuals and countries that can drive regional integration in SADC is needed to provide leadership within Southern Africa as well as coordination between the sub-region and external actors on key economic and security issues. Effective regional leadership is predicated on qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. The sub-regional body was previously led by Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. Subsequently, after 1980, newly liberated Zimbabwe, under Robert Mugabe, fostered close people-to-people ties with Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, and maintained friendly relations with Tanzania, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The sense of sub-regional political cohesion provided by Harare enabled it to act as a leader for Southern Africa.

The inclusion of South Africa in SADC in 1994 marked a major transformation of the organisation. However, the sub-regional body was not fully prepared for South Africa’s entry. Subsequently, Tshwane’s ability to provide effective leadership and strengthen inter-governmentalism in Southern Africa has been weakened by a range of legacies. SADCC’s minimalist integration agenda confirmed the inviolate sovereignty of member states. The continuing prevalence of some autocratic regimes also stymied the adoption of common political values across the sub-region, and resulted in non-compliance with sub-regional norms, weakening Southern African institutions and stalling the process of ‘developmental regionalism’.

Furthermore, the sense of a shared Southern African identity has been undermined by a relatively unchecked multiplication of members – in particular, the inclusion of the DRC and Madagascar as members of SADC in 1997 and 2005, respectively – although the enlarged membership has brought the benefits of more diversified trade, such as that between the DRC and South Africa. SADC currently constitutes 15 member states: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar (which has been suspended from the bloc since March 2009), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The legacy of which countries actually belong to the organisation continues to haunt the sub-region, with multiple memberships of more than one sub-regional bloc presenting a particular challenge. Eight SADC member states

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4 This paragraph and the next are largely based on a presentation made by Gilbert Khadiagala at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
- the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – are also members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The geography of SADC thus needs to be reviewed and agreement reached on the most efficient arrangement to promote regional integration. Genuine vision is required to reimagine Southern Africa in order for it to achieve this goal. Following the paradigm for regional integration in Africa outlined by the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL), both of 1980, the continent’s sub-regions should seek to escape the silos in which they often operate in order to coordinate their inter-regional efforts better. African self-reliance – and the timely and regular payment of dues by states to the relevant sub-regional and regional bodies – is also important in this respect to ensure sustainable region-building free of external support.

The role of anchor states in driving region-building in Africa is also critical. The adoption by South Africa of a legitimate leadership role within SADC must be based on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of economic dominance. In order to create the political conditions for effective economic integration, Tshwane should adopt more than a functional role and provide assurances to smaller states in the sub-region that it poses no threat to them in order to forge the necessary consensus within Southern Africa.

Historical loyalties between national liberation movements – such as those in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe – can lead to disagreement between these states being resolved in private rather than in more open ways within SADC. Zimbabwean and South African leadership was key to SADC – but now Angola has replaced Zimbabwe as Southern Africa’s second largest economy and is establishing a development fund with five percent of the country’s oil revenues. The relationship between Angola and South Africa could potentially provide a new engine for sub-regional development in SADC.

Meanwhile, the adoption of obstructive positions by Zimbabwe in policymaking within SADC has proved increasingly problematic; particularly given the leadership role that Harare previously occupied in the organisation. In relation to SADC’s core governance goals, cases of impunity have become more widespread: Zimbabwe has ignored the rulings of the SADC Tribunal; Swaziland’s King Mswati III sidelined his Parliament; while Madagascar’s Andry Rajoelina came to power through a coup d’état in March 2009. SADC should be accorded powers of enforcement so that non-compliance with its instruments comes at a high price to member states.

The drive to strengthen intergovernmentalism within Southern Africa has been further inhibited by a conceptual model for region-building that follows an inappropriate free-market template; as well as unrealistic timetables for introducing economic integration instruments: 2010, 2015, and 2018 were initially set as targets for establishing a sub-regional customs union; monetary union; and single currency respectively. Tensions can also arise between member states as a result of disagreements that may be aired during trade and development financing talks, which can often be more contentious than those between diplomats. For example, sharp divisions have emerged over how decisions should be made on the dispersal of SADC development funds.

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SADC cannot do all things for all people, and should acknowledge and work within its own limitations. The organisation needs to refocus on key sectors such as food security, water, transport, energy, and communications, and should be directly present in the lives of its 257 million citizens in concrete ways in order to gain popular support for, and participation in, region-building efforts. Southern African economies have been integrated not only through sub-regional instruments, but also through the market realities of daily and longer-term trade and investment. Efforts to promote the diversification of trade and to improve sub-regional infrastructure can create mutual benefits, foster industrialisation, and add value to the production of goods and services.

After apartheid formally ended in 1994, South Africa’s destabilisation of its neighbours was also brought to an end. SADC could now pay greater attention to the economic rather than security aspects of regional integration. Against this background, the organisation’s increasing focus on peace and security issues in the sub-region may be seen as having occurred at the expense of its efforts to promote economic integration, although it is clear that there can be no development without security. As well as diverting attention and capacity from the body’s economic agenda, SADC’s security efforts have been criticised for failing to build on existing initiatives such as the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) which was created in 1995. However, the sub-regional bloc is currently creating a military force, the SADC Brigade, as part of the African Standby Force being established by the African Union.
2. Peace and Security

Region building is linked to peace and security and cannot succeed without it. Similarly, peacebuilding cannot take place in one country in isolation, since conflicts can spill over into neighbouring states. Regional considerations often have a major bearing on whether or not peacebuilding efforts succeed. Establishing peace and security throughout the SADC sub-region could potentially help to attract greater foreign direct investment.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000 allowed interventions on the continent in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Since the establishment of the AU two years later, the number of wars in the SADC sub-region has fallen, although political instability continues in Zimbabwe; Madagascar remains riven by a constitutional crisis that erupted in 2009; and violent protests have erupted in Mozambique, Malawi, and Swaziland since 2009. In addition, civil war has persisted in the DRC since 1996, resulting in over three million deaths. To support the AU’s new interventionist role, a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in Addis Ababa in 2003 to direct peacemaking efforts, and plans were made to establish an African Standby Force comprising five sub-regional peacekeeping brigades from Southern, Central, West, East, and North Africa. However, full operationalisation of the ASF, which had been originally set for 2010, has been repeatedly delayed.

Nevertheless, the establishment of Southern Africa’s contribution to the African Standby Force – the SADC Brigade – is relatively advanced. It was officially launched in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2007, with its planning element based in Gaborone, Botswana. Training for the brigade is being organised by SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, as well as through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation, both based in Zimbabwe. The brigade has conducted a series of extensive training exercises. In December 2012, a summit of the SADC Organ, attended by the presidents of South Africa, Tanzania, and Namibia (the Troika), took a decision to deploy a 4,000-strong force to the eastern Congo, with Tanzania and South Africa pledging one battalion and logistics support respectively for the mission. SADC’s move to intervene in the DRC has highlighted a lack of sub-regional and continental guidelines on authorising African peacekeeping deployments; the complexity of the ASF’s structure and chain of command, particularly in relation to the question of subsidiarity (decisions being taken at the lowest possible level); as well as the related issue of how collective decisions on logistical and operational issues should be taken within SADC. The lack of clarity on the brigade’s operationalisation could also weaken the continent’s capacity to identify the role of external militaries – such as UN missions – in peacekeeping in Africa, and to determine how such interventions should be coordinated.

After the end of the Cold War by 1990, and the consequent demise of apartheid rule in South Africa in 1994, conflict mediation in Southern Africa has mainly been managed from within the sub-region. South Africa has led some of these efforts – in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and the DRC – informed by its experience of negotiating its own transition, and following a model that seeks to establish an interim government of national unity that can

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7 This paragraph and the next two are largely based on a presentation made by Chris Saunders at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “South Africa in Southern Africa”, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.

pave the way to elections. However, SADC mediation efforts have often remained ad hoc, have sometimes appeared to substitute for any real progress in reaching agreement, and have suffered from a limited capacity to enforce the deals that are brokered under the organisation’s auspices.

In addition, the annual changes of membership of SADC’s security Troika often disrupt the continuity of the sub-regional body’s peacemaking efforts. For example, South Africa’s term as Chair of SADC’s security organ ended in August 2012, raising the concern that this could potentially disrupt the progress of peacemaking talks to resolve the constitutional impasse in Madagascar, following the coup d’état that brought Andry Rajoelina to power in March 2009. Previously, Tshwane had played a direct role in facilitating the Malagasy mediation, also offering important logistical and political backing to the bloc’s peacemaking initiative in Madagascar led by former Mozambican president, Joaquim Chissano.

In general, the nature of security threats and concerns in the SADC sub-region is evolving rapidly. For example, the patterns of the demand and supply of natural resources in Southern Africa is changing – the DRC possesses minerals such as cobalt and coltan that cannot be found in such large quantities anywhere else in the world, and are sought by international military manufacturers, placing unique pressures on the country’s war economy. The shifting dynamics of the supply and demand of sub-regional natural resources within the global economy – such as Zimbabwe’s increasingly dominant position as a source of diamonds, and Mozambique’s growing coal production – can shape Southern African conflicts beyond the control of the sub-regional body and its mechanisms.

Southern Africa also faces unique issues of border and maritime security, including the current dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over underwater drilling rights on Lake Malawi. On the continent’s east coast, only South Africa and Egypt have the capacity to combat widespread piracy. On the west coast, offshore drilling for oil and gas is increasingly coming under threat. Other challenges include relatively porous borders that permit, for example, cattle rustling in Lesotho, as well as other organised inter-regional crime. Cyber-crime also represents a mounting security threat.

Adequate equipment and training are essential to effective peacekeeping. To ensure properly capacitated missions that meet Africa’s security needs, the division of labour between SADC and the United Nations needs to be clearly defined. The centrality of the UN’s role in African peacekeeping was demonstrated by the world body’s missions in Namibia (from 1989 to 1990), Angola (from 1988 to 1997), and Mozambique (from 1992 to 1994), as well as its mission in the DRC since 1999. The AU’s intervention in Burundi from 2003 to 2004, which was led by South Africa, supported by Mozambique and Ethiopia, and then re-hatted from 2004 to 2006 by the UN, demonstrated that the continental body still lacks the capacity to undertake such missions on its own. SADC’s standby brigade should be a rapid reaction force that is brought under the UN’s umbrella within no more than six months after it has been deployed. A draft national defence review conducted by South Africa in 2012 recommended that Tshwane should pursue a multilateral approach – with SADC, the AU, and the UN – and also forge bilateral partnerships in Africa in order to promote peace, security, and development on the

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10 This paragraph and the next are largely based on a presentation made by Sagaren Naidoo at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
11 Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner; and Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011), p. 16.
continent. However, the draft report failed to address the tensions that have arisen in the relationships between Africa’s sub-regional and regional organisations, and the UN, over their respective duties in this area. The powerful UN Security Council has sometimes tried to shirk its peacekeeping responsibilities in Africa (for example in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Darfur) and to shift its peacekeeping burden to Africa’s under-resourced sub-regional organisations. The review’s call for Africa’s sub-regional organisations to take greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent thus risks absolving the UN from shouldering this burden.

South Africa has set ambitious targets for the operational standards that should be met by Southern Africa’s standby force. However, greater funding from member states is needed to achieve the long-term goal of a force that can provide more than conventional military might, such as the strategic lift required to tackle natural disasters. In the meantime, SADC needs to ensure that its troops deployed to AU and UN missions have adequate and relevant equipment which meets UN standards, as well as proper training and political direction to be effective in peace operations. Practically, the draft *South African Defence Review 2012* recommended increasing South Africa’s cooperation with, and support for, security and defence agreements and mechanisms with partner nations and sub-regional and continental bodies. It reiterated specific pledges on the level of ground, air, sea, and logistical support to be supplied by South Africa to the SADC Brigade. The promised South African military contribution included two infantry battalions, the supply of a brigade tactical headquarters, and some mortar, engineering, signal, medical, and intelligence support. However, the draft review lacked details on South Africa’s contribution to SADCBRIG. Members of the defence review committee also acknowledged during the consultation process in May 2012 that the country’s pledge of troops to SADCBRIG had been scaled down.

Better coordinated and more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional approach to peace and security in Southern Africa. A group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other more pressing domestic responsibilities – could be established to mediate and oversee the implementation of the sub-regional body’s peace plans. The role of external actors, whether African (such as Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC) or external (for example, France in Madagascar), however, needs to be carefully managed. Moving away from the “fire-brigade” responses embodied by the ASF and the SADC Brigade, the sub-regional body should pursue a preventive approach to security premised on the idea of shared values. During the period of apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation of Southern Africa, the sub-region’s defence pact sought to protect Southern Africa from the apartheid army. Subsequently, such destabilising threats have receded, and South Africa has assumed a leading role in sub-regional mediation and interventions. However, apprehension has risen in Southern Africa about dependence on South Africa’s military and logistical capacity, as well as Tshwane’s leadership ambitions on the wider continent, leading to calls for greater genuine inter-state military planning and training within the sub-region. The draft *South African Defence Review 2012* stressed the centrality of Africa to South Africa’s foreign policy and referred to the developmental challenges facing the continent, as well as global economic and political inequalities between North and South that need to be redressed. However, the document focused more on “hard” security issues such as “ethnic and religious extremism”; terrorism; weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and international crime that are prioritised by rich countries. In an increasingly globalised economy, the draft report foresaw a “new Scramble for Africa”. It also envisaged technological might and private security companies playing a greater role in the “African battle space”. Critics have, however, argued that, instead of emphasising the imagined threat of rapacious foreign powers, Tshwane’s defence policy should

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focus more on post-conflict peacebuilding, since over a third of all conflict countries in the post-Cold War era have relapsed into war as a result of inadequate reconstruction efforts.

Partly to create greater synergy between its security and economic development policies, SADC revised its Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation of 2004 in November 2012, and produced SIPO II. The new plan identified policing as a separate area of concern and also expanded its political objectives to include the development of common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern. In the defence sector, piracy was identified as a new challenge; and the sub-regional plan shifted its focus from defending Southern Africa from military aggression, to contributing to Africa’s peace and security architecture, with the operationalisation of the SADC Brigade and the full implementation of a Mutual Defence Pact by member states identified as priorities in support of this aim. The procurement of equipment and the inter-operability of armies and materiel were identified as other key areas in which member states needed to take collective decisions to support the Brigade. The new plan also sought to incorporate prison officers into peacekeeping operations; and to enhance sub-regional early warning and disaster management capacities. Additional state security challenges identified by SIPO II included: climate change; transnational organised crime; illegal migration; economic threats; and foreign interference. The revised document further sought greater cooperation from research and academic institutions, specifically on international relations, in support of its new policymaking efforts. But like SIPO I, this document has been criticised for being unfocused, incoherent, and lacking proper prioritisation and implementation mechanisms.

3. Regional Integration: SACU, the DBSA, and the IDC

While regional integration in Southern Africa has been pursued for more than three decades, with the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in 1980, market integration still lags behind. The "new regionalism" that has been created by SADC’s integrated development efforts, and, in particular, its free trade area introduced in 2008 (but still a work in progress in 2013), has led to the removal of trade barriers and the increased movement of goods, people, and capital across national borders. Although this has removed the uneven application of tariffs within the sub-region that has historically damaged the economic interests of SADC’s smaller countries – for example, South Korean car manufacturer, Hyundai, shifted production from Botswana to South Africa in 1999 as a result of tariff barriers – the free trade area has also eased the entry of South African multinational corporations into new markets in the sub-region. In 2007-2008, SACU imports constituted only two percent of South Africa’s total imports. To counter the resulting developmental imbalance within the Southern African Customs Union – in which South Africa produces 91 percent of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – Tshwane should offer a non-reciprocity clause in a renegotiated SACU deal that would allow the other members of the pact – Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland – preferential access to the South African market. Tshwane should also seek to give the smaller SACU states a greater share of total tariff revenues. South Africa has led the customs union since its creation in 1910, contributing 98 percent of its revenues, and dominating its internal trade, accounting for about 75 percent of Botswana and Namibia’s imports, and 95 percent of Lesotho and Swaziland’s imports. However, after the criteria for the distribution of the union’s tariff revenues were revised in 2002 – with the new agreement implemented in 2004 – the disbursement to Swaziland, which accounts for a significant part of its national budget, fell sharply, by almost 25 percent in 2010 to 2.6 billion Rand, leading to large government cuts and plunging the country into an economic crisis.

The polarisation of development in Southern Africa has inevitably been exacerbated by South Africa’s dominant financial, manufacturing, and research muscle in the sub-region. However, within SADC, the South Africa “core” has been inconsistent in its efforts to develop the sub-region’s economic “peripheries”, particularly its landlocked economies – such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – mostly with relatively small populations of less than 10 million. The failure of market integration efforts to strengthen the weaker economies through robust trade is evidenced by South Africa’s outward-looking trade patterns. Though the country accounts for 80 percent of overall trade within SADC, about 90 percent of South Africa’s trade is conducted outside its sub-region. South Africa can support the development of smaller states through the infrastructural projects that it is promoting such as the tripartite North-South trade corridor agreed between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the East African Community (EAC), an

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17 This paragraph and the next two are largely based on a presentation made by Dawn Nagar at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
expanded sub-regional rail network; a trans-African energy grid; and improved ports that will access more international trade. For example, Tshwane’s development of a new international transhipment hub in the Eastern Cape can service the Southern African hinterland by connecting the sub-region to a major trade conduit and shipping route from China and Southeast Asia to Brazil and the rest of South America.

South Africa has played a key role in establishing new trade partnerships to integrate Southern Africa with external markets. SACU agreed trade deals with China in 2004, the United States (US) in 2008, India in 2009, and South America’s Common Market - Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) - in 2009. Within Africa, Tshwane has prioritised a tripartite trade arrangement between SADC, COMESA, and the EAC that is driving the creation of the North-South road corridor from Durban to Mombasa, for which $600 million of funding has been pledged by the African Development bank (AfDB). However, serious questions have been raised, about the relative benefits that may accrue to South Africa rather than the sub-region from these new joint trade arrangements and projects, particularly since Tshwane’s accession to the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc in 2011.

The World Bank has estimated that Africa would require $83 billion on an annual basis to address its infrastructure gap. However, since the global economic crisis of 2008/2009, traditional Western financial partners have increasingly channelled capital to addressing their own problems: a fiscus cliff in the US; an increasingly unworkable common currency in the European Union; and the impact of long-term recession in Japan. In addition, new liquidity rules requiring banks to hold greater assets have reduced the amount of aid available for development, increasingly leaving Africa to raise its own resources. As the world’s “last investment frontier”, Africa needs to take advantage of the current commodity boom and diversify beyond traditional providers of finance to source the cheapest capital available to create important infrastructure that will support the continent’s future economic growth. China, the world’s second largest economy and its third largest investor, represents the current main external source of development capital for Africa.

Southern Africa, through SADC, has identified four Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs)—energy, oil and gas extraction, electrical power generation, and water and transport. The SDIs were created between 1993 and 1996 to provide a platform for functional economic linkages within Southern Africa. Substantial efforts have since been made in the development of transport corridors: the Maputo Corridor through Mozambique and South Africa was created in August 1995; while the Trans-Kalahari Corridor connecting Namibia’s port of Walvis Bay to South Africa was agreed in 1998. The September 2003 SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses, ratified by two-thirds of SADC members, could be instrumental in managing the sub-region’s 15 shared river basins. Electrical energy is a further important social and economic development sector for the effective functioning of Southern Africa’s states, which undertook their first initiative to combine major national utilities by creating the Southern African Power Pool in 1995.

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20 This paragraph and the next two are largely based on a presentation made by David Monyae at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
The creation of adequate infrastructure in Southern Africa is regarded as critical to the sub-region’s development efforts and has been championed by South Africa through development finance institutions such as the government-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation, as well as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The DBSA has sought to play the role of a sub-regional bank until such an institution is created within Southern Africa. Using private-sector standards of probity to invest its funds, the DBSA seeks to work with government partners to initiate and manage projects with high sub-regional impacts. The bank has granted financial assistance to development projects in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. As well as aiding development through its support for key infrastructure projects in the energy, telecommunications, and transport sectors, including the North-South corridor, the DBSA encourages investor confidence in key markets – such as in Zimbabwe: the bank funded a $206 million road-improvement project there. The DBSA also seeks to support sectors that promote exports and economic diversification, including mining, tourism, manufacturing, and agri-business.

Originally created in 1983 by the apartheid government to fund the regime’s system of bantustans (homelands), the DBSA continues to make the bulk of its investments at the local government level in South Africa. However, 30 percent of its portfolio is now invested in the SADC sub-region beyond South Africa, with almost 40 percent of this going to projects in Zambia and Mozambique, and a further 20 percent earmarked for intra-regional initiatives. In particular, significant sub-regional benefits could accrue from the bank’s investment in the Inga III dam on the Congo river, which is due to begin construction in 2014 and is expected to produce 4,000 megawatts of electricity to be shared evenly between South Africa and the DRC. However, the amount of funding required for new projects in Southern Africa continues to outstrip available capital. The DBSA is thus seeking to leverage further financing through the launch of an international arm in which governments in the sub-region can own shares, as well as through increased coordination with other development banks within the BRICS grouping. The proposed new BRICS development bank could be another source of such financing. Beyond external aid and remittances from the African Diaspora, the continent can also seek to raise capital through issuing government bonds.

The DBSA proclaims a vision of pursuing greater synergies with government and regional authorities such as SADC and the African Union, as well as responding proactively to initiatives, programmes, and projects within SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of 2001. There are, however, criticisms that the DBSA does not consult with the sub-region in making decisions, and Angola’s establishment of a development fund with five percent of the country’s oil revenues could represent a sign of this dissatisfaction. In 2012, SADC governments also decided to establish a fund to develop sub-regional infrastructure with $1.2 billion of seed capital to be raised by member states and the private sector. In addition, SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan continues to inform sub-regional policy, although its Botswana-based Secretariat lacks the capacity to implement and administer effectively the systems for inter-state and cross-sectoral cooperation proposed by this ambitious document.

The effective exploitation of natural resources – including the mineral wealth of the DRC, Angola, and Zambia, and the substantial oil reserves held by Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Madagascar – is key to sub-regional development. However, the construction of infrastructure in support of the extraction of these resources – such as new roads from Zambia to the DRC, and state-of-the-art border posts between the two countries – should extend beyond the mine-to-port model that focuses only on the export of Africa’s raw materials. This supporting infrastructure should seek to achieve the broader goal of helping people and goods to move faster and further across Southern Africa, thus promoting the diversification of production and trade, and the creation of jobs.
Southern Africa’s political and developmental concerns remain intimately linked. The economic feasibility of the tripartite North-South corridor from Durban to Mombasa depends, to a great extent, on the political situation in Zimbabwe. In turn, the corridor and its supporting network of roads could promote stability in Zimbabwe, just as the Maputo corridor with South Africa, launched in 1996, provided an enormous boost to Mozambique’s economic development efforts. In the meantime, the exact path of the proposed route from Durban to Mombasa remains prey to national and regional political pressures in the countries through which the corridor would pass.

While Zimbabwe remains mired in political instability, and as Angola’s economic strength grows, Luanda should increasingly partner Tshwane in driving sub-regional development in SADC. However, Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth and the underlying strength of the country’s education infrastructure could eventually revive Harare’s leading role in the sub-region.

In support of greater sub-regional stability, effective processes for investment in development can also directly promote ‘good governance’. For example, development finance institutions and projects can serve as channels for policy implementation, and are most successful when supported by public policies conceived in consultation with civil society actors.
4. Democratic Governance

Historically, colonial rule in Southern Africa by a succession of European powers generally lasted longer than colonialism elsewhere on the continent and was accompanied by the establishment of racially-motivated settler regimes in the sub-region.23

Substantial white settler populations still live in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, as well as Botswana and Zambia. Southern Africa’s liberation struggles focused on capturing and retaining state power. As a result, democratic and autocratic practices can often co-exist to varying degrees in the sub-region’s new post-colonial dispensations. Although the nature of the national transitions to democratic rule in Southern Africa have varied greatly since the end of the Cold War, more than 50 national polls were held in the sub-region between 1989 and 2005. A range of electoral systems have been introduced as part of Southern Africa’s nation-building efforts, including first-past-the-post systems in Zambia and Malawi, and proportional representation in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. Most countries in the sub-region have formally constituted electoral bodies that derive their authority from legislative mandates to oversee free and fair elections, although their dependence on state and external funding have sometimes made them vulnerable to political manipulation. These bodies also sometimes lack the capacity to prepare for elections effectively by creating consensus on when polls should be held, ensuring adequate voters’ rolls, and educating the electorate on their rights and responsibilities. Such challenges have often been exacerbated by inadequate registration procedures and documentation, including a lack of proper identification papers.

Southern African governments have invested great effort and resources in establishing electoral machineries that generally conform to the high standards and norms set by SADC. Relatively elaborate electoral systems have been crafted to address nation-building and national reconciliation concerns. Electoral disputes and violence remain serious issues, but an increasing number of these have been successfully resolved through mediation – although some disputes about election outcomes, such as in Malawi and Lesotho, indicate underlying political and social divisions. Electoral conflicts are also being addressed by efforts to strengthen the roles of political parties, parliaments, judiciaries, and civil society in order to ensure the transparency of polls. However, countries that have been prone to electoral violence, such as Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique, have few mechanisms for managing such conflicts. The potential for elections to precipitate violence needs to be considered carefully in electoral planning processes. In relation to gender equality, women continue to be left behind in social progress in the sub-region, bearing the brunt of poverty in Southern Africa, and facing a triple oppression based on race, class, and gender. Only Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa have exceeded the 30 percent benchmark set by SADC in 1997 for the representation of women in national legislatures, achieving 38, 39, and 42 percent respectively.24

Although Southern Africa has made great strides in embedding forms of democracy, serious obstacles to the substantive implementation of democratic values remain. For example, Swaziland’s absolutist monarchy has remained unchanged and is yet to move towards democratic governance; and Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and the DRC have held elections, which have been flawed and/or riddled with unrest and violence.25 Angola also recently held elections in August 2012 which the ruling party won easily amidst claims of an unfair process by

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23 This paragraph and the next are largely based on a presentation made by Garth Le Pere at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
the opposition. Furthermore, the politics of patronage continue to undermine the capacity of several countries to unite in pursuit of national development goals. A lack of political participation beyond elections can also frustrate the electorate and turn polls into ritualistic exercises. The rules governing the democratic system are often fiercely contested and applied unevenly, undermining the impartiality and independence of the process. For example, laws are often interpreted selectively, and constitution-making sometimes remains under the control of ruling autocrats. High levels of corruption continue to damage public confidence in elected representatives in several countries. Most states also often lack the capacity to meet rising demands for delivery of services that can provide greater accountability. In order to promote democratic governance, external actors should not be afforded a decisive role in supporting national governments; opposition parties need to be treated as legitimate political actors; the roles of parliaments as agents of accountability and democratisation should be improved; and the diverse interests of civil society – such as those of the youth, women, and rural communities – must be fully represented in government.

As the post-colonial history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has indicated, four key factors can shape a government’s capacity to meet the fundamental aspirations of its population for political freedom and economic prosperity: the validity of the ruling party’s moral claim to state power; the strength and status of the opposition; the role of external forces and actors; and the relative vibrancy of civil society. When Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko seized power in 1965 with American assistance, his coup d’état was initially well received by many Congolese citizens because of his populist promises. However, the regime’s dependence on US (as well as French and Belgian) support undermined its credibility, and its excesses led to increasingly vocal protests by students and the Catholic church, as well as an invasion by Katangese soldiers from Angola in 1977. External and internal pressures on the regime to reform resulted in the establishment of a relatively democratic national assembly between 1977 and 1980. However, the government’s strategy of responding to pressure for greater accountability by merely reshuffling leading officials and implementing limited institutional reforms, failed to meet Congolese demands for genuine political change. Popular opposition mounted during the 1980s as Mobutu stepped up the repression of opposition actors, and the prescriptions of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) caused increasing economic hardship. By the 1990s, Mobutu was forced to give ground to the new Democratic Movement, and a Sovereign National Conference – Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) – was established between 1990 and 1992 to establish a more consensual model for the country’s governance. However, rather than institute an open multi-party democracy as demanded by civil society and other political activisists, Mobutu instituted a three-party system which he largely funded, co-opting opposition leaders and remaining in power – thus effectively reproducing the political machinery that had kept him in power for nearly three decades. External actors – notably France on the UN Security Council – continue to play the lead role in the DRC. Notwithstanding the failings of the CNS, the Conference created the important political legacy of a shared Congolese commitment to national unity that has survived to the present.

In the DRC, stability is now more likely to be provided by genuine steps to strengthen the authority and accountability of the national government than by actions to counter Rwandan incursions which could only fuel further instability. The dynamics of nation-building efforts in fragile states during transitions like the DRC may require strong central governments. Moreover, the transition after the current government of Joseph Kabila’s term comes to an end in 2016 needs to be closely monitored, as moves by the ruling party to perpetuate itself in power without a proper electoral mandate could lead to renewed war in the Congo. South Africa has the capacity to lead sub-regional efforts to build peace in the DRC, but must forge a Southern African consensus

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26 This paragraph is largely based on a presentation made by Mustafik Mwanasali at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
for its role and actions in the Congo. Nevertheless, Tshwane can be constrained in its efforts to foster more
democratic processes in the sub-region as a whole by the intransigence of regimes such as those in Swaziland
and Zimbabwe, which may resist governance reforms.

Although SADC agreed comprehensive Principles and Guidelines for Governing Democratic Elections in 2004,\(^{27}\) it
needs to ensure that these are effectively implemented, and that its member states are held accountable to these
principles. While leaders who have seized power in the sub-region realise that they are in violation of SADC’s norms,
the sub-regional body has sometimes failed to establish proper organs to implement its standards of democratic
governance. For example, the SADC Tribunal became a de facto sub-regional court from 2005 although the
protocol for its establishment had not been fully ratified. This was exploited by Zimbabwe’s government to push
SADC to suspend the tribunal in 2010. SADC also failed to ensure that its 2004 principles governing the holding of
elections were followed during polls in Zimbabwe in 2008. However, the organisation has actively supported
mediation efforts conducted since then under South Africa’s leadership, and sought to create the conditions for
future free and fair elections there. SADC has also promoted talks to try to restore constitutional rule in Madagascar.

SADC should promote economic development in order to address democratic deficits in the sub-region. However,
it must also keep sight of the importance of setting minimum realisable standards for “good governance” – such as
the holding of credible free and fair multi-party elections – in order to safeguard the democratic gains already made.
It is also important to frame the debate about democratic aspirations beyond the regularity of elections and analyse
the extent to which political systems in Southern Africa contribute genuinely to the participation of populations in
electoral processes. Beyond free and fair elections, a key component of democratic governance is the strengthening
of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to SADC’s 257 million citizens. These include public sector
reform as well as the sound management of public finances and institutional capacity-building, particularly within
national civil services. Such efforts will be vital for strengthening checks and balances within and outside the state
through empowering parliaments; ensuring the independence of judiciaries; and safeguarding the autonomy of
oversight institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, human rights commissions, auditing institutions, and
ombudsmen. Outside the realm of the state, civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance
issues across Southern Africa.\(^{28}\) Governments as well as regional organisations therefore need to create space for the
effective participation of civil society actors in governance issues.

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*From left, Dr Garth le Pere, Senior Partner, DAJO Associates, and Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa; Ms Lomcebo Dlamini, Programme
Coordinator, Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations, Mbabane, Swaziland; and Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Joint
5. South Africa in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

There has been a renewed interest in the concept of “developmental regionalism” since the notion of a “developmental state” became central to economic policy debates in South Africa during the second term of the presidency of Thabo Mbeki between 2004 and 2008.

Although the “developmental regionalism” paradigm proposes a more selective and regulatory approach to trade liberalisation than the alternative neo-liberal model of “open regionalism”, it does not preclude integration of developing countries into the world economy, and can provide a vehicle to achieve global competitiveness.

South Africa is thus championing regional integration in Africa based on its own interests and within a developmental framework. In pursuit of this goal, Tshwane has identified equitable industrialisation of the continent as a fundamental priority. Africa has a population of one billion people; a gross domestic product of $2.6 trillion dollars; and a relatively young and increasingly urbanised demographic. The continent boasts significant mineral wealth; 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land; and has become the fastest growing region globally, with average annual growth rates of more than five percent. Africa’s recent economic expansion has been underpinned by a mineral products boom driven by Asian industrial demand; growing information and communications technology (ICT) consumption on the continent; the relative absence of a systemic debt crisis (though there is still an external debt of $290 billion); and some increased investment in infrastructure. However, rising demand for Africa’s raw materials may slow since Asian countries cannot expect to continue to grow on the back of manufactured exports, and the huge emerging economies of China, India, and Brazil are likely to turn increasingly to their domestic markets for growth.

Africa also faces the challenge of an economy that is fragmented among its 55 states. The huge economic, demographic, and geographical disparities between African countries can hamper prospects for regional integration, with particularly damaging results for the continent’s smaller economies. Compared with other parts of the world, intra-regional trade in Africa represents a relatively small share of total continental commerce – a mere 10 percent – although manufactured goods represent the largest share of this trade, and the figure increases to 21 percent once oil exports have been removed from the equation. South Africa, which is the continent’s single largest national economy with a GDP of 3 trillion Rand in 2012, has a huge trade surplus with all African countries apart from oil-producing Angola and Nigeria. On the global stage, South Africa’s exports with Asia were worth 19.5 billion Rand; and with the EU more than 16 billion Rand in 2010. The country also accounted for about 85 percent of all foreign direct investment, and 70 percent of all multinational corporations (MNCs) in Southern Africa. But South Africa’s total trade with other SADC countries amounted to less than 6 billion Rand, while its imports from SADC countries were worth a derisory 2.3 billion Rand. Thus the promotion of economic growth through equitable industrialisation and diversified production on the continent represents a common cause that can drive regional integration.

29 This section is largely based on the presentation made by South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.
The theory of customs unions proposed by the Canadian economist, Jacob Viner, that informs many of Africa’s regional integration efforts, raises some key challenges. Viner proposed a ladder of integration, starting with a preferential trade area, and then moving, in turn, to a free trade area; a customs union with a common external tariff; a common market with free movement of labour, goods, and services; a fiscal union; and, finally, a political union. As long as trade creation exceeds trade diversion along this path to integration, then genuine economic benefits can be produced. However, inadequate production capacity and infrastructural support (which is often mine-to-coast rather than intercontinental in Africa) seriously restrict the opportunities for the diversification of markets and the creation of new trade opportunities across the continent, thus necessitating an alternative, more developmental approach to regional integration.

South Africa, under president Jacob Zuma and his trade minister, Rob Davies, is championing an ambitious regional integration and developmental agenda which seeks to go beyond SADC and to build a tripartite free trade area for goods and services between SADC, COMESA, and the EAC, thus creating the necessary economies of scale to compete more effectively on the global stage. This strategy has also targeted the mineral- and agri-processing, as well as pharmaceutical industries as key to Africa’s development. However, although a 2014 deadline has been set for negotiation on the formation of the tripartite free trade area, which will comprise 26 countries with a combined population of almost 600 million and a joint GDP approaching $1 trillion, concerns have been expressed by policymakers at the African Union that North Africa is being left out of the continent’s evolving sub-regional and inter-regional arrangements. In addition, fears have been expressed within Southern Africa that South Africa is abandoning agreed sub-regional developmental priorities in pursuit of the grander goals of the tripartite plan.

In contrast to its activist support for the tripartite arrangement, Tshwane’s engagement in the Southern African Customs Union and SADC is more limited in scope and ambition. Notwithstanding SACU’s revised redistributive revenue-sharing formula in 2002, the body, which was historically a colonial arrangement for the benefit of South Africa, has not created a single cross-border project in its more than 100 years of existence. SACU currently focuses on facilitating trade among its five members; providing economic support through common tariffs; and establishing joint trade institutions and policies. In 1986, a common monetary area (CMA) agreement was signed by South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, while Namibia joined the “Rand zone” after it became independent in 1990. However, Tshwane’s separate negotiation of its own deal with the European Union in 1999 – the Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) – negatively impacted SACU. SADC’s region-building efforts have also been limited. The bloc’s free trade area, which was to have been implemented in 2008 (a deadline that was, however, missed), was supposed to have been extended from covering substantially all trade to literally all trade in 2012. But customs duties had still not been lifted on all intra-regional trade by 2013. Consolidation of this free trade area is urgently required before the creation of a customs union across the whole of Southern Africa can be considered by SADC’s member states. In addition, greater infrastructural and sectoral coordination is needed to leverage the economic benefits of such regional integration mechanisms. The establishment of SADC’s customs union which was supposed to begin in 2010

34 The Common Monetary Area agreement provides fixed exchange rates among its members, a common bloc for intra-regional capital accounts and financial transfers, and use of the South African Rand as a common currency. The South African Reserve Bank sets interest rates for the CMA.
(followed by a common market by 2015, a monetary union to reduce the transaction costs of trade by 2016, and a common currency by 2018) has presented profound political and institutional challenges – such as the difficulties of creating joint external tariffs, an equitable revenue-sharing arrangement, and common trade and industrial policies – with no guarantee that the resulting union would effectively address the major economic obstacles to higher levels of trade in Southern Africa.

In general, notwithstanding the progress made in improving railways and transport corridors in the sub-region, SADC’s integration efforts have also had limited success in liberalising and boosting trade across Southern Africa. The sub-regional body should therefore seek to cultivate and implement more home-grown strategies for integration and institution-building, instead of simply importing Western models. SADC should also consider reviewing its use of external consultants who often provide inappropriate advice on regional integration policies and programmes that could damage national and regional interests. An example of this was the SADC Tribunal which was drafted by European consultants.

In recognition of the development responsibilities that flow from its dominant economic position in the sub-regional market, South Africa encourages outward investors to form joint-venture partnerships with local companies, and source goods and services locally (rather than importing them from South Africa) in order to raise the productivity and competitiveness of the economies of host countries. Tshwane also negotiates bilateral agreements with its neighbours to facilitate trade and industrial collaboration, build technical capacity, and develop human resources; and assigns a sub-regional role to its development finance institutions and technical agencies. In particular, South Africa supports investment to build infrastructure that addresses sub-regional supply-side constraints. Tshwane is currently supporting the launch of a development bank by the BRICS bloc as a source of funding for infrastructure in Africa, as initiated at the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013. However, South African companies have been widely criticised for their ‘mercantilist’ behaviour in the sub-region and beyond, and Tshwane should prioritise the implementation of a code of conduct to regulate the behaviour of its companies across Africa. Regional integration efforts in Southern Africa have to date produced little real trade liberalisation. Where strong trade links exist, they have generally been created through strong bilateral deals with South Africa, such as those agreed with Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in 2000.

Although South Africa has the capacity to play a key role in regional integration efforts, widespread suspicions have also persisted within Southern Africa over Tshwane’s continental and global leadership aspirations. South Africa recently served second terms on the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council; it is a member of the Group of 20 major economies and the BRICS; and led the signing by SACU of a series of trade deals with China, India, and South America’s Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur). Fears over South Africa’s ambitions were also previously stoked by the AU’s adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development of 2001, which was seen as a direct product of the country’s own conservative economic policies at the time. Tshwane needs to reassure its Southern African partners of its commitment to consensual region-building, and link South Africa’s rhetorical support for the equitable industrialisation of the continent to SADC’s practical integration efforts. In addition, South Africa should seek greater input from the sub-regional body on the

trade facilitation programmes undertaken by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which has earmarked $300 billion to spearhead and improve infrastructure for railways and ports in the sub-region. Other issues on which South Africa needs to consult more closely with its neighbours include the implementation of common policies and protocols on migration to ease the free movement of business people and to minimise the disruption of existing employment protections for migrant labourers.

A further factor that has complicated Southern Africa’s integration efforts has been the multi-track market access arrangements negotiated by the 27-member European Union in the sub-region. South Africa signed a stand-alone Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1999, and has subsequently been identified by Brussels as one of ten strategic partners globally. In addition, differences emerged within SACU, when South Africa and Namibia resisted signing an interim joint economic partnership agreement with the EU in 2008 due to concerns over Brussels’ demands for market access and trade liberalisation. SACU members remain deeply divided on the question. Despite opposition from South Africa and Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho have signed interim EPAs for fear of losing out on EU aid and market access. However, the lessons learned from South Africa’s negotiation of its own TDCA may enable SACU to negotiate a more favourable EPA without the controversial provisions earlier sought by Brussels, although such a deal would not incorporate all of SADC. In addition, the EU has set tight deadlines for the conclusion of its EPAs – the EU Commission has announced that they should be concluded by 2014, although the European parliament has recommended 2016.

37 The other nine EU strategic partners are: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and the US.
6. Human Security: Migration and Food Security

Migration

Immigration policies generally seek to protect state and societal security. However, South Africa’s border policing has historically proved an ineffective tool for controlling the movement of people into the country. The sub-region has a long history of migrant labour. From 1911, South Africa’s mines, farms, and industry attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from neighbouring countries, and migrant labour became a major source of revenue for Mozambique, Malawi, and Lesotho. These workers were not offered permanent residence in South Africa, despite contributing to building the country for decades, until amnesties in 1995-1997 granted about 124,000 foreigners South African citizenship. By 1999, an estimated 55 percent of mine-workers in South Africa came from neighbouring countries. South African farms also employed workers from Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, often on seasonal contracts. South Africa remains the urban and industrial hub of the sub-region and a magnet for migrant labour. Other major underlying factors behind cross-border migration are poverty, conflicts, and/or autocratic regimes. The complexity of migration makes it difficult for planners to craft relevant solutions. Free movement of people remains a critical issue for SADC, which adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in 1995.

After the introduction of democratic rule in 1994, plans were made to transform South Africa’s immigration policy to embrace a more market-based approach, but this never happened. Although the bantustans (homelands) were immediately incorporated into the new democratic state, the country’s external borders remained static. South Africa still does not regard labour as a market and a vector for increased intra-regional trade. Consequently, its immigration policy continues to be based on a protectionist, rather than liberal, approach to migrant labour. Furthermore, Tshwane lacks the institutional capacity to tackle migration flows across its borders adequately.

Although South Africa represents economic opportunity for many migrants from the sub-region, it also faces serious challenges of its own such as high unemployment, great socio-economic inequality, and huge under-development. Local governments in South Africa have often proved incapable of delivering adequate basic services and amenities, including water, shelter, and education. At the level of local communities, these factors have invariably translated into fierce competition over scarce resources that can result in violence and xenophobic attacks on African immigrants. South Africa’s lack of a coherent approach to migration and its adoption of increasingly protectionist labour policies and practices have also fuelled xenophobic tendencies.

South Africa needs to prioritise the integration of migrants and adopt a coherent multi-disciplinary strategy on immigration that moves beyond regarding the phenomenon as a threat to state and societal security, and promotes migration as a tool for diversifying intra-regional trade and boosting economic growth. Such a policy would foster bottom-up integration of migrants, creating a climate of opinion in which foreigners are less likely to
be scapegoated for domestic socio-economic hardships and government service-delivery shortcomings. To this end, cross-border initiatives also need to be enhanced among Southern Africa's states as part of a common sub-regional migration policy that addresses the social and cultural complexities of the phenomenon more holistically. SADC's migration policy should move away from a state-centric to a people-centred approach, and this should be promoted at both national and local government levels. Civil society organisations should also work closely with governments and migrant populations to support the development and implementation of this approach. Some practical steps that Tshwane could take to improve its integration of migrants include offering them incentives to register on the voters' roll, and facilitating the transfer of their remittances internationally.

**Food Security**

A related issue of human security involves SADC’s unpredictable regional food security situation. Member states like Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe continue to experience challenges in ensuring sustainable supplies of food for their populations. A series of food crises in Southern Africa have been compounded by frequent droughts and floods, for which the sub-region was inadequately prepared, reducing already insufficient investments in agriculture. This food insecurity is also exacerbated by poor access to agricultural inputs and markets; and inadequate technological development of the farm sector. Consequently, the import of food and food aid into Southern Africa has almost doubled over the past 15 years. Forty percent of SADC's population is currently living below the poverty line. According to the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, if regional cereal production is used as an indicator of food security, production has remained static since 1990, even as the sub-region’s population increased by nearly 40 percent in the same period.42

The UN Development Programme’s *African Human Development Report* of 2012 uses the concept of “human security” to align the issues of food provision, state security, and overall economic development with each other, and seeks to promote a multidisciplinary approach to addressing them.43 In this context, continuing social and demographic changes in Southern Africa, in particular the sub-region's increasing urbanisation, requires the adoption of new policy approaches by SADC to ensure food security.

SADC’s strategies to tackle food insecurity includes improving access to food through promoting employment and developing safety nets for vulnerable groups; increasing general nutrition; developing effective forecasting and early warning systems for disasters; building capacity to implement food security programmes; and taking account of gender issues in the agricultural sector.44 However, although the sub-regional body has taken important steps to tackle widespread hunger in Southern Africa – issuing a *Declaration on Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development* in 2008,45 and convening a ministerial task force to improve the coordination of food security efforts – SADC’s policies and strategies are not always sensitised to broader concerns relating to agricultural development and employment, and the availability of food across the sub-region. Southern Africa’s policy framework must promote the diversification of agricultural outputs and greater intra-regional trade in food, addressing the related issues of insufficient investment in farming, limited access to agricultural inputs and markets; and inadequate

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43 This section is largely based on a presentation made by Scott Drimie at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “South Africa in Southern Africa”, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.


technological development and expertise in this sector. To promote the benefits of diversification, South Africa’s food retailers such as Shoprite should reconsider the terms of their commercial engagement in the sub-region and source products in host countries, rather than importing goods from existing suppliers in South Africa. To encourage companies to become responsible sub-regional citizens, SADC should seek to formulate and implement a corporate code of conduct that can foster economic diversification and promote common values.

Sub-regional policy also needs to define the kinds of agricultural development that may be most beneficial. For example, the benefits of small-holdings that create employment and are less reliant on heavy inputs, such as those created by the break-up of Zimbabwe’s large white-owned farms, can outweigh the production efficiencies of larger farms. The short term boost created by Malawi’s petrol subsidies for road-based transport in support of agriculture could increase longer-term dependence on expensive oil-based inputs. In addition, SADC should analyse the issue of raw materials sovereignty in Africa, as global energy and food shortages lead biofuel and food producers in the US, China, and the Middle East to buy up huge areas of arable land on the continent to satisfy the demands of their domestic consumers. Such land purchases in Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zambia, and the DRC – often for large-scale soya plantations that can produce biofuels – have pushed farmworkers off the land and disrupted local agricultural production. The impact of external plans for exploiting Africa’s agricultural capacity – such as the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – also need to be analysed properly in order to inform coherent African responses to them.

The relative effectiveness of sub-regional responses to natural disasters linked to the El Niño phenomenon, which have periodically threatened food security in Southern Africa with droughts and floods over the past 20 years, have been shaped by a range of factors including the existence of adequate early warning systems; transport corridors; and food stocks; as well as effective policies to manage the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the sub-region. In 1992, SADC’s food security unit coordinated with the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) and external donors through the UN to provide emergency food aid to 20 million people. Ten years later in 2002, a less severe drought had a relatively greater impact due to social fragility caused by the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic and changing systems for providing remittances. Nevertheless, SADC’s commitment to addressing the crisis and its establishment of an effective vulnerability assessment committee (VAC) helped it to meet the emergency nutrition needs of 16 million people. In 2012, consecutive droughts and floods resulted in a food crisis in Lesotho, exacerbated by increasing urbanisation, a continuing reduction in cultivated land, the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and unaffordable food prices. By June 2012, about 700,000 people – 40 percent of the country’s population - needed food aid. However, international donors had provided insufficient funds through the UN, and South Africa’s grain surpluses had been earmarked for Mexico on the international grain futures exchange.

Lessons should be learnt from SADC’s effective management of the 1992 drought, and, by contrast, the inadequate response to the crisis in Lesotho twenty years later. Meanwhile, the sub-region’s capacity to feed its populations appears to be increasingly vulnerable to climate variability. This indicates a need to re-engage in the debate on the impact of climate change, as well as a range of new emerging trans-boundary challenges to food security in Southern Africa. The sub-region’s population is growing rapidly and is increasingly moving to the cities. Although cereal production has risen in SADC’s member states, this cannot be taken as a strong indicator for overall food security. For example, South Africa, Malawi, and Zambia alone among SADC members

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currently produce more than their national requirements. Southern Africa’s natural resources such as water, fisheries, forest, and wildlife should be much better utilised for the benefit of its citizens. In addition, food security cannot be isolated from the land question. Land reform and land redistribution can potentially help to eliminate poverty in countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

In addition, the quality of the food being produced by the sub-region’s agri-processing industry needs to be addressed in order to mitigate the stunted growth of many people in Southern Africa – studies of the ratio of height to age indicate that 50 percent of children are too small. The pressures on food quality are likely to be exacerbated by increasing urbanisation – it is estimated that half of the continent’s population, 760 million Africans, will be living in cities by 2030. These demographic trends in conjunction with high poverty levels and rising food prices could create the conditions for great social instability. Bread riots erupted in Mozambique in 2010. Chronic food shortages and steep prices also sparked discontent that contributed to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.

Food security can be a mobilising principle for region-building. In order to address potential future crises in food supply, SADC should strengthen its early warning mechanisms and improve its transport corridors. It must also assess the impact of changing patterns of farming and increasing urbanisation, collecting data on chronic vulnerability to hunger, and seeking to align the policies of its member states with each other to address these issues. SADC should promote the creation of agricultural value-chains that balance production with nutrition and end not just at the market, but beyond, at the level of promoting the health of consumers. Greater subsidies for vegetable farming should be implemented to support this approach. The sub-regional body should also share and promote understanding of innovative projects that foster more beneficial integrated development of the farming sector, such as the support offered by Lilongwe to Malawi’s small farmers through the subsidised supply of fertiliser, and Zambian initiatives that directly link agricultural production to combatting malnutrition. Integrated development of the sector is also being supported by the $250 million Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor funded by the Development Bank of Southern Africa which connects farmers and agri-businesses in the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique, thus enabling value-added production and easing access to markets in the sub-region and beyond through the Mozambican port of Beira. Sub-regional policy could also encourage more climate-sensitive approaches to farming, moving away from oil-based agricultural inputs and making greater use of new ecological methods.
7. External Actors: The EU and China

The EU

As the strongest economy in Southern Africa, South Africa has a significant impact on SADC’s economic framework and integration agenda through the trade relations and commercial deals that it negotiates with external actors such as the European Union and China.\(^\text{50}\) However, although East Asian imports into South Africa have risen sharply since 2005, imports from the EU have declined over the same period, as the aftershocks of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 continue to undermine European growth prospects and the credibility of its currency: the Euro. Meanwhile, the EU’s trade relations with Africa continue to be predicated on ensuring a secure supply of primary products to feed European industry and consumer markets and a ready market for its exports of processed goods. This asymmetrical trade relationship is eased somewhat by EU financial assistance to Africa of $12.3 billion a year on average from 2008 to 2010.\(^\text{51}\) A joint plan agreed by the EU in consultation with the African Union in Lisbon in 2007 established practical modalities for the partnership between the two continents, with substantial follow-up and monitoring mechanisms. In March 2013, Brussels indicated its intention to focus on the linkage between national and regional development in consultations to identify the priorities for its funding of SADC from 2014 to 2020.\(^\text{52}\)

A crucial tool that has been used by the EU to shape its trade arrangements in Southern Africa is the Economic Partnership Agreements introduced under the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the European body and the 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group.\(^\text{53}\) The EU’s negotiation of separate trade deals, including EPAs, with different bilateral partners and blocs in Southern Africa, have caused serious divisions in the sub-region and raised questions over whether the European body can really champion development in Africa and globally, or will retreat behind the exigencies of Realpolitik to protect its more parochial economic interests as the global financial crisis continues to bite. From some African perspectives, EPAs are not seen as instruments for deepening regional integration and delivering development outcomes, but rather commercial strategies that address the EU’s internal constraints and respond to the new wave of globalisation driven in part by emerging powers such as China.\(^\text{54}\)

Since 1994, South Africa has sought greater economic integration for itself in the world economy, which has diverted its attention from efforts to support the diversification of the sub-regional economy. The bulk of South Africa’s exports to the EU consist of fuel and mining products, machinery, transport equipment, and semi-manufactured goods. Europe, in turn, exports manufactured goods, machinery, and chemicals to South Africa.\(^\text{55}\) The trade between the two sides is shaped by their stand-alone Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, and Tshwane’s relationship with Brussels as one of the EU’s ten strategic economic partners worldwide. South Africa was initially sidelined in negotiations between the ACP and the EU over the terms of the new 20-year partnership between them – the Cotonou Agreement – which was agreed in 2000. In this context, the TDCA represented an attempt by Tshwane to protect its national strategic interests at the time. Nevertheless, the agreement has been criticised for having been negotiated by South Africa without taking its SACU allies into

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\(^{50}\) This section on the EU is largely based on a presentation made by Charles Mutasa at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “South Africa in Southern Africa”, Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.


\(^{52}\) “Communiqué: SADC-EU Ministerial Political Dialogue”, Maputo, Mozambique, 20 March 2013, p.3.


account. The terms of the TDCA also diverge from those of SADC’s trade protocols, thus compromising Southern Africa’s integration efforts. In particular, the TDCA’s rules of origin on trade block the export of SADC products, and the intellectual property protections for European companies safeguarded by the deal contradict the development of affordable drugs by Southern Africa’s pharmaceuticals industry, which forms part of SADC’s efforts to combat malaria, cholera, and HIV/AIDS in the sub-region. Tshwane’s relationship with Brussels is further challenged by both sides’ competing visions of regional integration and development in Africa. South Africa seeks development through infrastructure construction and the diversification of production, while the EU pursues it by opening markets. Tshwane also differs with Brussels over reform of the Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – and the G-20, and seeks to redress European over-representation on these bodies. Furthermore, South Africa is wary of Western ‘interference’ in Africa, which can compete with its own efforts to extend its sphere of influence on the continent. In particular, Tshwane criticised the sidelining of the African Union by the UN-sanctioned intervention in Libya in 2011, which was conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and led by France and Britain.

The EU has insisted on adopting different approaches in its trade negotiations with South Africa, which it classifies as a ‘developed’ country, and its neighbours, which are classified as ‘developing’ countries. After South Africa failed in 2006 in its attempts to align its TDCA with the Economic Partnership Agreements being negotiated by the EU with Southern Africa, interim EPAs were signed with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique in 2008, and with Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe in 2009. The signing of these EPAs exposed some of the divisions and the lack of a common agenda within SADC, and have constrained the body’s power to determine and implement economic policy in the sub-region. These agreements established different tariff regimes which undermine the prospects for a customs union with common tariffs. They also clearly marked the limits of South Africa’s economic influence in the sub-region. Tshwane could not provide its neighbours a viable alternative to the aid and market opportunities offered by the EU – for example, for beef exports from Botswana and sugar exports from Mauritius. Brussels has also sought to include goods and services in its agreements that go beyond World Trade Organisation (WTO) requirements, and has demanded that it be extended the benefits of preferential terms agreed in any subsequent third-party trade deals negotiated by its partners. Meanwhile, the subsidies that the EU offers to its own farmers (about 50 billion Euros a year) continue to block the profitable export of African agricultural products to Europe.

SADC should continue to resist what critics have described as the economic ‘Balkanisation’ of Southern Africa by the EU using EPAs, and should establish a focal point to promote the sub-region’s interests more effectively in such negotiations. Tshwane, for its part, should provide strategic support for SADC’s efforts in this area. In addition, the terms of South Africa’s detailed agreements with the EU can be used as a model by its neighbours when negotiating their own trade deals. Southern African states should further review the EPAs that have been agreed to address and resolve the tensions inhibiting the realisation of regional integration. SADC needs to create effective procedures to ensure that its member states report on, and are held to, their obligations to implement its amended Protocol on Trade of 2005, which seeks to establish a free trade area in the sub-region. SADC should also insist that Tshwane upholds the core terms of the SADC Treaty of 1992 in all its trade agreements. The EU should further agree to strengthen SADC’s negotiating and regulatory capacity as a regional trade organisation; and must also support the development of agricultural production in Southern Africa by abolishing the massive subsidies that it extends to its own farmers. SADC should further adopt realistic positions and leverage the technical support offered by the EU when conducting economic partnership negotiations. In addition, Europe may provide a useful counter to the rising influence of the BRICS, enabling African actors to leverage greater benefits in trade talks.
China

During the 1950s and 1960s, China promoted an anti-imperialist foreign policy that supported anti-colonial struggles and newly liberated states in Africa through friendship treaties, cultural exchanges, and economic aid and development projects. Initially, the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation founded in 1957 was the main vehicle for Chinese influence on the continent. However, after Beijing split with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, it pursued a more aggressive form of solidarity in Africa, directly supporting a range of liberation movements. Meanwhile, Southern African guerrilla groups sought ideological and material support, including arms, from a range of external backers such as China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, and even Sweden. During the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing provided $2.5 billion of aid to 36 African countries, including $484 million for the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway – the greatest symbol of China’s engineering prowess and political commitment to the continent at the time. The railway was completed in 1975, relieving land-locked Zambia’s dependence on export routes through the former Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, Chinese support for African governments became increasingly pragmatic rather than ideological, often motivated by Beijing’s drive for recognition of its ‘One-China’ policy. After the establishment of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994, Tshwane established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1998, although the African National Congress (ANC) had previously been backed by Taiwan. In Southern Africa, only Swaziland continues to support Taipei, thus forgoing diplomatic ties with China.

After Tshwane and Beijing agreed the terms of a new bilateral strategic relationship with the Pretoria Declaration of 2004, trade between both countries grew rapidly. By 2009, China had become South Africa’s single largest commercial partner with annual trade of more than 260 billion Rand. Beijing has invested in South Africa’s Standard Bank, while South African companies have made large investments in China’s mining, engineering, and beverage sectors. Elsewhere in Southern Africa, the Export-Import Bank of China approved a $2 billion oil-backed loan to Angola in 2005, and again in 2007, as well as an extended credit facility of $2.9 billion. By 2008, Angola’s oil exports to China amounted to 500,000 barrels a day – Beijing’s third largest source of oil and almost all of Angola’s exports. China is Zimbabwe’s second largest investor after South Africa. Beijing also continues to rehabilitate Zambia’s ailing copper industry, although the labour practices of some of the 200 Chinese companies there have tarnished its reputation as a progressive partner. China has invested more than $800 million in Tanzania, and has established strong annual trade with Namibia worth $150 million in 2010. Botswana has signed 80 percent of its government procurement contracts with Beijing. The Export-Import Bank of China has also provided a $2.3 billion loan to construct the Mepanda Nkua dam and hydroelectric plant in Mozambique. Beijing has further invested $3 billion for infrastructure improvements and $2 billion to develop mines in the DRC. In 2007, China agreed a $9 billion deal with the DRC which promised direct access to Congolese mineral wealth in exchange for infrastructure projects.

China has a muscular diplomatic and economic presence in Southern Africa and has established robust political and trade ties in line with its national interests. Beijing’s demand for raw materials and new markets in Africa bears comparison with the industrial needs of nineteenth century European imperialists. Initial optimism

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56 This paragraph and the next are largely based on a presentation made by Garth le Pere at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, "South Africa in Southern Africa", Cape Town, 19-20 November 2012.

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about the benefits of China’s investment in Africa, and the possibility of it providing an alternative paradigm for
development, have been tempered by Chinese business practices on the ground. Beijing often provides its own
Chinese labour and suppliers for the large-scale projects that it funds in Africa. China’s vertically-integrated
business models demand few African inputs, and also often disregard labour rights, environmental protections,
and other governance standards. China has also been criticised for selling arms to African governments,
condoning autocratic regimes, and destroying African textile sectors through the export of cheap Chinese
goods – South Africa and Lesotho have been particularly adversely affected. Meanwhile, African governments
can be too readily swayed in their business negotiations with Beijing.

China has positioned itself as a strategic partner and offers new economic opportunities, as US and European
engagement in Africa eases and tariff and non-tariff barriers inhibit trade globally. Today, China has become Africa’s
largest bilateral trading partner and the world’s second largest economy after the US. Beijing has signified its intention
to play an increased role in peace and security issues on the continent, recently contributing 1,700 troops to seven
UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. China’s establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)\(^\text{60}\)
in October 2000 began a triennial ministerial conference that aimed to provide a mechanism for collective
consultation, dialogue, and cooperation between Beijing and African countries. While China has a structured, long-
term view of engaging Africa at FOCAC, the continent has yet to develop a coherent multilateral response to the
initiative. In order to redress an asymmetrical economic relationship that is largely shaped by Beijing, African actors
should be more proactive in prioritising their own economic development agendas. Although China is investing in
the African Union – for example, with the construction of the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa by 2012 – it has not
been engaged sufficiently at the sub-regional level on the continent. Beijing has not been invited to join SADC’s
forum for external partners. Southern Africa should promote a common approach and develop a coherent agenda
for China’s engagement in the sub-region to support region-building efforts, and should seek to reinforce the
negotiating capacity of SADC member states to ensure that they conclude proper enforceable agreements that
bring appropriate and mutual benefits to all concerned. Ethiopia represents a good case study for how to take
pragmatic advantage of Beijing effectively as a partner.

\(^{60}\) See, for example, Ampiah and Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon?
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy advisory group seminar:

1. A team of individuals and countries that can drive regional integration in SADC is needed to provide leadership within Southern Africa on key security and economic issues. Effective regional leadership is predicated on qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. The adoption by South Africa of a legitimate leadership role within SADC must be based on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of economic dominance. Tshwane should adopt more than a functional role and provide assurances to smaller states in the sub-region that it poses no threat to them, while establishing sub-regional alliances with anchor states such as Angola, in order to forge the necessary Southern African consensus;

2. To ensure properly capacitated peacekeeping missions that meet African needs, the division of labour between SADC and the United Nations needs to be clearly defined. SADC’s standby brigade should be a rapid reaction force that is brought under the UN’s umbrella within no more than six months after it has been deployed. Better coordinated and more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional approach to peace and security in the sub-region. A group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other pressing domestic responsibilities – could be established to mediate and oversee the implementation of the sub-regional body’s peace plans;

3. SADC should acknowledge and work within its limitations. The organisation needs to refocus on key sectors such as food security, water, transport, energy, and communications, and needs to be directly present in the lives of its 257 million citizens in concrete ways in order to gain popular support for, and participation in, region-building efforts. SADC lacks bureaucratic capacity and should adopt a decentralised approach that seeks to mobilise sectoral projects and harnesses their institutional capacity to long-term region-building;

4. South Africa needs to link its rhetorical support for the equitable industrialisation of the continent to SADC’s practical integration efforts, eschewing inappropriate free-market models and unrealistic timetables for introducing economic integration instruments. The country should seek greater input from the sub-regional body on the trade facilitation programmes undertaken by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which has earmarked $300 billion to spearhead and improve infrastructure for railways and ports in the sub-region;

5. As the world’s ‘last investment frontier’, Africa needs to take advantage of the current commodity boom and diversify beyond traditional providers of finance to source the cheapest capital available to create important infrastructure that will support the continent’s future economic growth. Infrastructure construction should extend beyond the mine-to-port model that focuses only on the export of Africa’s raw materials. This supporting infrastructure should seek to achieve the broader goal of helping people and goods to move faster and further across Southern Africa, thus supporting the diversification of production and trade, as well as the creation of jobs;

6. SADC must keep sight of the importance of setting minimum realisable standards for ‘good governance’ – such as the holding of credible free and fair multi-party elections – in order to safeguard
the democratic gains already made. The sub-regional body should be accorded powers of enforcement so that non-compliance with its instruments comes at a high price to member states;

7. It is important to frame the debate about democratic aspirations beyond the regularity of elections. In order to promote democratic governance, external actors should not be afforded a decisive role in supporting national governments; opposition parties need to be treated as legitimate political actors; the roles of parliaments as agents of accountability and democratisation should be improved; and the diverse interests of civil society – such as those of the youth, women, and rural communities – must be fully represented in government;

8. South African companies have been widely criticised for their ‘mercantilist’ behaviour in the sub-region and beyond. In order to encourage companies to become responsible sub-regional citizens, Tshwane should seek to formulate and implement a corporate code of conduct that would foster economic diversification and promote common values;

9. SADC should establish a focal point to promote the sub-region’s interests more effectively in EPA negotiations with the EU, with Tshwane providing strategic support for SADC’s efforts in this area. Brussels should agree to strengthen SADC’s negotiating and regulatory capacity as a sub-regional trade organisation; and should also support the development of agricultural production in Southern Africa by abolishing the massive subsidies that it extends to its own farmers. SADC should be more proactive in promoting a common approach and developing a coherent agenda for China’s engagement in Southern Africa to support region-building, and should seek to reinforce the negotiating capacity of its member states to ensure that they conclude proper enforceable economic agreements that bring appropriate and mutual benefits; and

10. As part of a people-centred SADC migration policy, South Africa needs to prioritise the integration of migrants and adopt a coherent multi-disciplinary strategy on immigration that moves beyond regarding the phenomenon as a threat to state and societal security, and promotes migration as a tool for diversifying intra-regional trade and boosting economic growth. On food security, SADC should strengthen its early warning mechanisms, improve its transport corridors, and promote the creation of integrated agricultural value-chains that balance production with nutrition and end not just at the market, but beyond, at the level of promoting the health of consumers and the economic development of the sub-region.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One Monday 19 November 2012

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Opening Remarks
Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Cape Town, South Africa

09.30 – 11.00 Session I: The History of Regionalism in Southern Africa: From SADCC to SADC
Chair: Dr Simba Makoni, former Executive Secretary, Southern African
Development Community (SADC)
Speakers: Dr Kaire Mbuende, former Executive Secretary, SADC
Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of Department of International Relations,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

11.00 – 11.15 Coffee Break

11.15 – 12.45 Session II: Peace and Security
Chair: Mr Sehoai Santho, Director, Moruo Consulting Company, Ladybrand,
South Africa
Speakers: Mr Sagaren Naidoo, Director: Defence Policy, South Africa’s Department of
Defence, Tshwane
Professor Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor of History, University of Cape Town

12.45 – 13.45 Lunch

13.45 – 15.15 Session III: Regional Integration: SACU, the DBSA, and the IDC
Chair: Mr Martin Gärtner, Chargé d’Affaires, Austrian Embassy, Tshwane
Speakers: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Mr David Monyae, Senior Policy Analyst, Development Bank of Southern
Africa, Midrand, South Africa
15.15 – 15.30 Coffee Break

15.30 – 17.00 Session IV: Democratic Governance

Chair: Ms Lomcebo Dlamini, Programme Coordinator, Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations, Mbabane, Swaziland

Speakers: Dr Garth le Pere, Senior Partner, DAJO Associates; and Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa

Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, African Union/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia


Chair: Dr Simba Makoni, former SADC Executive Secretary

Speakers: Dr Kaire Mbuende, former SADC Executive Secretary

Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand

20.30 Dinner
Day Two  
Tuesday 20 November 2012

09.30 – 11.00  Session V:  South Africa in Southern Africa: Problems, Progress, and Prospects

Chair:  Dr Kaire Mbuende, former Executive Secretary, SADC

Speakers:  Dr Rob Davies, South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry
         Dr Agostinho Zacarias, UN Resident Coordinator, and UN Development Programme Resident Representative, Tshwane

11.00 – 11.15  Coffee Break

11.15 – 12.45  Session VI: Human Security: Migration and Food Security

Chair:  Ambassador Muyeba Chikonde, High Commissioner of Zambia to South Africa

Speakers:  Professor Audie Klotz, Associate Professor, Syracuse University, New York, United States
           Dr Scott Drimie, Extraordinary Associate Professor, Interdisciplinary Health Sciences, University of Stellenbosch; and Independent Researcher, Johannesburg

12.45 – 13.45  Lunch

13.45 – 15.15  Session VII: External Actors: The EU and China

Chair:  Ms Sanusha Naidu, Senior Researcher, South African Foreign Policy Initiative, Open Society Foundation, Cape Town

Speakers:  Mr Charles Mutasa, Independent Development Policy Consultant, Harare, Zimbabwe
           Dr Garth le Pere, Senior Partner, DAJO Associates, Midrand; and Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria

15.15 – 15.45  Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms
15:45 – 16.15 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Mark Paterson, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

16h15 – 17h00 Session IX: The Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speakers: Mr Sehoai Santho, Director, Moruo Consulting Company

Dr Eddy Maloka, Special Advisor to the Minister, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane
# Annex II

## List of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Organization/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dr Adekeye Adebajo</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ms Marie Bergström</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Embassy of Sweden, Tshwane, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mr Sondre Bjotveit</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy, Tshwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mr Fritz Brand</td>
<td>Assistant Director: Human Resources Management</td>
<td>Valkenberg Hospital, Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ambassador Muyeba Chikonde</td>
<td>High Commissioner of Zambia to South Africa</td>
<td>Tshwane, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dr Rob Davies</td>
<td>South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>Tshwane, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ms Lomcebo Dlamini</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations, Mbabane, Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dr Scott Drimie</td>
<td>Extraordinary Associate Professor, Interdisciplinary Health Sciences, Stellenbosch University, Independent Researcher</td>
<td>Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr Martin Gärtner</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>Embassy of Austria, Tshwane</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ms Sayuri Govender</td>
<td>Deputy Director: Southern African Development Community (SADC)</td>
<td>South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mr Robert Kahendaguza</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor and Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>High Commission of Tanzania, Tshwane</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Professor Gilbert Khadiagala</td>
<td>Head of Department of International Relations</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Professor Audie Klotz</td>
<td>Associate Professor of Political Science</td>
<td>Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Dr Dan Kuwali</td>
<td>Malawi Defence Force</td>
<td>Lilongwe, Malawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
15. Dr Garth le Pere  
   Senior Partner, DAJO Associates; and Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria  
   South Africa

16. Mr Nkonde Lombanya  
   Protocol Officer  
   Zambian High Commission  
   Tshwane

17. Dr Simba Makoni  
   Former Executive Secretary, SADC; and President of the Mavambo Kusile Dawn Party  
   Harare, Zimbabwe

18. Dr Eddy Maloka  
   Special Advisor to the Minister  
   South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
   Tshwane

19. Mr Buti Manamela  
   South African Member of Parliament  
   Cape Town

20. Dr Kaire Mbuende  
   Former Executive Secretary, SADC  
   Windhoek, Namibia

21. Mr David Monyae  
   Senior Policy Analyst: Development Planning Division, Development Bank of Southern Africa  
   Midrand

22. Mr Tsepe Motumi  
   Director-General  
   South Africa’s Department of Military Veterans  
   South Africa

23. Mr Charles Mutasa  
   Independent Development Policy Consultant  
   Harare

24. Dr Musifiky Mwanasali  
   Senior Political Affairs Officer, Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism  
   African Union / United Nation (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

25. Ms Dawn Nagar  
   Researcher  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

26. Mr Sagaren Naidoo  
   Director: Defence Policy  
   South Africa’s Department of Defence  
   Tshwane

27. Ms Sanusha Naidu  
   Senior Researcher: South African Foreign Policy Initiative, Open Society Foundation  
   Cape Town

28. Mr Mark Paterson  
   Senior Project Officer  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

29. Ms Antonia Porter  
   Project Officer  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

30. Mr Bary Rafatrolaza  
   Consul-General  
   Consulate of Madagascar  
   Cape Town

31. Mr Sehoai Santho,  
   Director  
   Moruo Consulting Company  
   Ladybrand, South Africa
32. Professor Chris Saunders  
    Emeritus Professor of History  
    University of Cape Town

33. Mr Hirikeshsing Unnuth  
    Second Secretary  
    Embassy of Mauritius  
    Tshwane

34. Dr Kudrat Virk  
    Senior Researcher  
    Centre for Conflict Resolution  
    Cape Town

35. Dr Agostinho Zacarias  
    UN Resident Coordinator, and UN  
    Development Programme Resident  
    Representative  
    Tshwane

Conference Team

36. Ms Abigail Kabandula  
    Research Assistant  
    Centre for Conflict Resolution  
    Cape Town

37. Ms Lesley Tuchten  
    Senior Events Coordinator  
    Centre for Conflict Resolution  
    Cape Town
### Annex III

#### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act (US)</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCBG</td>
<td>Committee of Central Bank Governors (SADC)</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common monetary area</td>
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<td>CNS</td>
<td>Conférence Nationale Souveraine (DRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development finance institution</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ENSO</td>
<td>El Niño Southern Oscillation</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAL</td>
<td>Final Act of Lagos</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-African Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free trade area</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20 major economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
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</table>
RISDP Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)
RPTC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC)
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG SADC Brigade
SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPP Southern African Power Pool
SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SADC)
SATCC Southern African Transport and Communications Commission
SDI Spatial Development Initiative
SIPO Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ
SOE State-owned enterprise
TDCA Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement
UN United Nations
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
US United States
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
VAC Vulnerability assessment committee
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This two-day policy seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of ‘prosecution versus amnesty’ for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN: DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 9 to 20 April 2010 considered how to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in consolidating peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK: STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP
This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.
Notes
South Africa accounts for about 80 percent of the economy of the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) and about 20 percent of its population. However, the adoption by Tshwane of a legitimate leadership role within SADC should be based on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of economic dominance. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, brought together about 30 mostly Southern African policymakers, civil society actors, and scholars to discuss, and provide concrete policy recommendations in support of, the foreign policy goals of Tshwane’s region-building efforts within Southern Africa. The meeting focused on seven key themes relating to regional integration: the history of regionalism in Southern Africa; peace and security; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and South Africa’s development finance institutions; democratic governance; South Africa’s sub-regional role; migration and food security; and the role of the European Union (EU) and China.