THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN:
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM REPORT
30-31 AUGUST 2012, BERLIN, GERMANY
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RAPPORTEUR
MARK PATERSON
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Acknowledgments

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Berlin, Germany, for its generous support that made possible the holding of the international colloquium “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality” in Berlin, from 30 to 31 August 2012. CCR would also like to thank the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden for their continued support of its Africa Programme.

About the Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is a German private non-profit organisation committed to the principles and values of social democracy. Today, FES supports education, research, and international cooperation from its head offices in Bonn and Berlin, as well as through its offices in more than 90 countries. In view of the FES mandate to promote international understanding, the organisation works directly with host and partner countries, as well as through multilateral fora. FES activities are designed to promote the participation of its partners in the global South through dialogues with multilateral organisations.

The Rapporteur

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Berlin, Germany, hosted a colloquium in Berlin, from 30 to 31 August 2012, on “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality”.

The year 2013 marks the 50th anniversary of post-independence pan-Africanism with the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. As the golden jubilee is celebrated, this report reflects on the hopes for an ‘African Renaissance’ embodied by the continental body’s successor, the African Union (AU), and the challenges that it faces in fulfilling its role of promoting political unity, democratic governance, and economic development on the continent. The AU was founded in 2002 on a wave of optimism about Africa’s future, and was equipped with stronger administrative mechanisms and greater powers of intervention in the affairs of its member states than its predecessor, the OAU. Since its birth, the AU has sought to establish integrated frameworks to address Africa’s security, governance, and development challenges. The Berlin 2012 colloquium analysed the AU’s achievements and challenges, and crafted concrete recommendations to strengthen its effectiveness. The meeting considered the history of the AU; reviewed the implementation of its peace and security architecture; compared the regional integration efforts of the AU and the European Union (EU); assessed African strategies to achieve socio-economic development; and reviewed the AU’s global role.

1. A Decade of Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture

The OAU, which was created in May 1963, sought to protect Africa’s newly independent states by declaring their colonial boundaries inviolable and forbidding interference in their internal affairs. This led to serious violations of human rights being ignored in some African countries. With the end of the Cold War by 1990, civil conflicts increased on the continent. A genocide in Rwanda in 1994 resulted in about 800,000 deaths. The United Nations (UN) sometimes ignored its responsibilities to keep the peace in Africa, and the OAU often lacked the capacity and the resources for peacekeeping interventions.

The creation of the African Union established a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) with the power to intervene in cases of egregious human rights abuses and unconstitutional changes of government. AU peacekeeping missions were launched in Burundi from 2003 to 2004, and in Darfur from 2004 to 2007, both of which were later taken over by the UN. Today, over 90 percent of the AU’s peace and security efforts are funded by external actors. However, the AU’s lack of influence over external interventions led by the UN Security Council and its five permanent members (P-5) – the United States (US), China, Russia, France, and Britain – who often have their own more parochial interests, has sometimes resulted in undesirable outcomes.

The continental body’s peace and security architecture includes a Panel of the Wise, which promotes high-level mediation efforts; a rapid-reaction African Standby Force (ASF) built around five sub-regional brigades; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a Military Staff Committee (MSC); and a Peace Fund. The AU has adopted a holistic approach to peacebuilding that seeks to link peace, security, and development, and emphasises the importance of national ownership of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is mandated to coordinate the efforts of Africa’s eight major Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the East African Community (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the South African Development Community (SADC); and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
(COMESA); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) – as well as to involve civil society actors. The AU’s access to local knowledge and its status as an African institution confer legitimacy on its conflict management efforts – although these have been inhibited by resource constraints and a failure to clarify the necessary division of labour among the RECs, the continental body, and the UN.

2. Regional Integration: The African Union and the European Union

The African Union has sought to model itself on the European Union, although the supranational template for region-building adopted in Europe may not be appropriate for Africa. Many of the 500 million inhabitants of the 27 countries in the EU have profited from European integration. In contrast, Africa’s integration efforts have failed to redress colonial patterns of commerce – trade among the AU’s 54 countries represents less than 10 percent of the continent’s total – and have delivered few tangible benefits to its 800 million citizens.

The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957 to support peacemaking after the Second World War ended in 1945. The OAU’s creation was informed by a pan-African ideology of liberation. African integration has moved forward in fits and starts, and not necessarily in alignment with the realities of the continent’s diverse political economy. Although the AU is seeking to move from norm-setting to implementation, the critical engagement of African countries in the work of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has weakened. The Commission’s effectiveness also continues to be hampered by low staffing levels: it employed 669 people in 2012, compared with more than 33,000 employees at the EU in the same year. The European body’s region-building efforts in Africa have been criticised for their ineffectiveness in addressing development issues, though €100 million a year has been provided to support the AU’s peacekeeping efforts. Some EU states have also been criticised for supporting autocratic leaders in Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, and Rwanda.

3. The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was established as a core AU economic programme in 2001, has sought average annual growth of seven percent, as well as a doubling of agricultural capacity. The initiative has overseen important infrastructure and water-management projects, and attracted external funding of $25 million for its development initiatives in 2012. However, the pace of implementation has been lethargic. Low rates of intra-African trade continue to be exacerbated by poor infrastructure, high tariffs, unwieldy customs procedures, and a lack of diversity in production. Furthermore, agreement on a comprehensive international aid mechanism for NEPAD has not been reached, interim donor funding remains unpredictable, and international promises to forgive the large external debts of African countries of about $290 billion have frequently been broken. NEPAD has also been stymied by the uneven development of Africa’s RECs and their overlapping memberships, which have often resulted in duplication of efforts.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) were both established in 2003 in support of NEPAD’s work. By January 2013, 33 countries had joined the APRM, which sets and investigates standards of governance. The voluntary mechanism has sought to address democratic deficits and to oversee important tax and electoral reforms – 17 countries have undertaken its review process. However, compliance with the mechanism has been hampered by the non-binding nature of its findings and capacity constraints at the national level. The CAADP seeks to provide a policy
framework for the agricultural sector, which generates 35-40 percent of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs about 70 percent of its population. Thirty African countries had joined the programme by February 2013, but a mere eight are allocating 10 percent of their national budgets to agriculture as pledged in 2003, and only 26 have established appropriate plans and monitoring.

4. More Than Rhetoric? The Balance Sheet after a Decade of Democratisation

Between 1960 and 1990, no single ruling party in Africa lost power. Between 1989 and 1998, the number of multiparty political systems in Africa increased from five to 35. After 2002, ruling parties were voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. However, the quality of democracy in many countries has arguably been declining since 2005, in particular with the curtailing of political rights during elections. Furthermore, although the number of civil wars has decreased since the creation of the AU from eight in 2002 to four in 2012, the number of localised crises that turn violent has risen. The AU Peace and Security Council is increasingly focusing on these conflicts. Between 2003 and April 2013, 11 coups d’état took place in Africa. The AU suspended Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and CAR from its membership between 2008 and 2013. However, the continental body’s responses to unconstitutional changes of government has been criticised for only sanctioning military coups and not extensions to presidential term limits.

The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 established 17 key institutions, some of which have overlapping mandates, while others represented aspirations for future integration rather than serving present needs. For example, the planned birth of the African Court of Justice (ACJ) did not take place and was overtaken by a 2008 agreement to merge it with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AhCHR), which had been created in 2006. Only five countries had ratified the founding protocol for the new merged court by April 2013, far short of the 15 required. Indeed, Africa’s governance framework relies on voluntary compliance. If the cooperation of member states is withheld, the system is undermined. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance of 2007 only reached its threshold of 15 signatories in January 2012.

To foster the role of civil society in its work, the AU established the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in 2004, and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) a year later. However, the PAP has yet to be granted legislative powers, while ECOSOCC has been largely ineffective in fulfilling its mandate of mobilising grassroots participation in the AU’s bodies.

5. Strengthening Africa’s Voice in Global Politics

Africa continues to have limited influence over the strategic direction of key multilateral bodies such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), all of which continue to be dominated by powerful largely Western countries. For example, the invitation of African leaders to the Group of Eight leading industrialised nations (G8) has represented, for many Africans, a form of participation without voice. Influential Western states have resisted the AU’s push for greater recognition of its interests under international instruments such as Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and the continental body was sidelined in multilateral decision-making during the Libyan conflict in 2011.
The exclusion of Africa’s voice in international diplomacy can be reversed through increased coordination among its diplomats, greater professionalism in its representation, and the joint development of more innovative foreign policy strategies. Acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity, under which Africa’s RECs act as the AU’s implementing organs, could also improve the coherence of African responses to crises. African governments should not be diverted from their duty to represent the continent’s interests by squabbles about permanent seats on the UN Security Council that are currently not on offer.

NEPAD’s mission to develop Africa, and the continent’s continued marginalisation, represent major causes around which continental leaders can campaign, with the AU, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) acting as key advocates. African national governments must be serious about financing continental institutions – external actors will provide over 55 percent of the AU’s core budget in 2013 – to avoid dependence on outside aid and its conditionalities. Implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which aim to halve poverty by 2015 – must also be prioritised.

Policy Recommendations
The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Berlin colloquium:

1. The administration, capacity, funding, human resources, and planning challenges faced by the AU should be addressed by implementing the recommendations of the Audit of the African Union of 2007, and the 2010 assessment study Moving Africa Forward: African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The issue of institutional duplication within the continental organisation needs to be urgently addressed, and some of the AU’s bodies should be streamlined;

2. The AU Peace and Security Council must improve its accountability to African civil society organisations in order to enlist their support in enhancing the continent’s early warning reporting. The AU also needs to strengthen its mediation capacity by providing greater administrative support to the Panel of the Wise and through developing an improved database of expert African mediators;

3. African governments should prioritise the establishment of infrastructure to create free movement of people, goods, and services, and must mobilise resources – such as through taxation – to create more inclusive employment opportunities, and enhanced capacity to domesticate regional norms;

4. The AU’s decision to recognise only eight RECs should be implemented as a priority, and continental and sub-regional bodies need to be strengthened simultaneously;

5. Africans should foster cross-fertilisation among think-tanks, institutes of higher education, and policymakers, and use their own centres of knowledge-production to promote policy development and implementation in support of the continent’s integration efforts;

6. The AU and its member states must raise awareness of the organisation’s role among African publics to enhance popular ownership of its programmes. Africa’s regional mechanisms should seek broader participation from the private sector and civil society to enhance the accountability of national governments, which can also be improved by quantifying the extent to which they are meeting APRM targets;
7. Capable African presidents could be appointed as continental spokespersons on critical global issues, and the AU should seek to appoint a foreign policy tsar on a biannual basis;

8. African diplomats in multilateral fora in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna must coordinate their positions more effectively. Consideration should also be given to creating a mechanism to formalise how the AU selects African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of the three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa’s major powers; another between the continent’s middle powers; and the third between smaller African states;

9. African policymakers need to define the respective roles of the RECs, the AU, and the UN in relation to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with the AU also crafting new approaches that address the root causes of conflicts on the continent. AU-led peacekeeping missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body, in line with the recommendations of the UN’s 2009 Romano Prodi report on peacekeeping. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) should thus be transformed into a UN force; and

10. The AU and the RECs should develop clear, coordinated positions on their political and economic goals and the strategies for achieving them in relation to external economic actors, particularly in relation to China in the context of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Japan in the context of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the BRICS economic bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and contentious negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Berlin, Germany, hosted a colloquium in Berlin, from 30 to 31 August 2012, on “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality”.

The meeting brought together about 30 policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors from across Africa and Europe to analyse the African Union’s (AU) achievements and challenges since it was founded in 2002, and to craft concrete recommendations to improve the organisation’s effectiveness. This report is also based on further research after the Berlin colloquium.

The year 2013 marks the 50th anniversary of post-independence pan-Africanism with the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. As the golden jubilee is celebrated, this report reflects on the hopes for an “African Renaissance” embodied by the continental body’s successor, the African Union, and the challenges that it faces in fulfilling its role of promoting political unity, democratic governance, and economic development on the continent. Building on previous CCR and FES seminars and publications in this area, the 2012 Berlin meeting considered the history of the OAU, and the aspirations that were expressed at the inception of the AU, with a focus on the continental organisation’s rationale, aims, and priorities. The Berlin colloquium reviewed the implementation of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); compared the regional integration efforts of the AU and the European Union (EU); assessed several strategies to achieve socio-economic development in Africa, including the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of 2001 and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of 2003; examined democratisation and governance processes in Africa since the AU’s birth; and reviewed ways of increasing the continental body’s “voice” in global politics.

Background

In May 1963, 30 African states met in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa and signed the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, effecting the disintegration of the three rival African blocs of Casablanca, Brazzaville, and Monrovia. Two noteworthy institutional flaws in the OAU Charter plagued the organisation during its three decades of existence. First, the charter rendered the OAU’s executive and administrative branches ineffective by assigning them only limited powers. Resolutions of the OAU Assembly were not legally binding on members, and this rendered the Assembly little more than a deliberative forum and “talk shop” with no implementation mechanisms. Second, the OAU’s Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, set up as the organisation’s diplomatic machinery for conflict resolution, was not a judicial organ and did not...
have any powers of sanction. Along with the Economic and Social Commission; the Educational, Cultural, Scientific, and Health Commission; and the Defence Commission, the OAU’s conflict resolution machinery remained largely moribund after its creation in 1963. The continental body’s aspirations for a Pax Africana were further weakened by the increasing number of “proxy wars” waged by the superpowers – the United States (US) and the Soviet Union – in Africa, as well as the ubiquitous and often pernicious French political and military role on the continent.

But despite its shortcomings, the OAU deserves credit for its firm commitment to the decolonisation of Africa and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. The continental body displayed pragmatism and flexibility in pursuit of these goals which united most of its 51 members. The organisation furnished ideological and diplomatic support to African liberation movements through multilateral fora in which it was well represented. African governments sponsored resolutions in the United Nations (UN) condemning Rhodesian and South African excesses, which led to the imposition of economic sanctions against the two white minority-led pariah states – the first such sanctions in UN history.

Tanzania’s Salim Ahmed Salim served as Secretary-General of the OAU from 1989 to 2001, the longest tenure in the institution’s history. His main contribution to African unity was in the area of peace and security. He warned African leaders of the need to observe human rights and abandon the notion of state sovereignty as absolute: “We should talk about the need for accountability of governments and of their national and international responsibilities. In the process, we shall be redefining sovereignty.” Salim regarded Africa’s regional organisations as the “first line of defence”, calling on them to promote democracy, human rights, and economic development. He further argued that “every African is his brother’s keeper”, and called for the use of African culture and social relations in managing conflicts. He finally succeeded in his efforts to convince African leaders to establish an OAU conflict resolution mechanism at its Cairo summit in 1993.

A decade later, in 2002, a new wave of optimism about Africa’s future swept through the continent. Under the agitation of African leaders such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, and Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a vision and strategy was crafted towards Africa’s own development and integration that would no longer rely on donor initiatives. The result of this thinking was the

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5 See Adekeye Adebajo, “Towards a New Pax Africana”.
9 See, for example, Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (New York: International Peace Institute, 2000).
creation of the African Union in the South African port city of Durban in July 2002, and the adoption of NEPAD in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in October 2001. Pushed by Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, the AU supported a vision of a “United States of Africa” and encouraged political and economic integration among its 53 member states. However, most countries did not adopt Qaddafi’s federalist vision, opting instead for a gradualist approach that sought to build continental unity on the pillars of strengthened sub-regional organisations in Southern, East, West, Central, and North Africa.

The objectives of the AU are to promote the unity and solidarity of African states; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the continent’s 800 million citizens; to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; to promote international cooperation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); and to coordinate and harmonise member states’ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical, and defence policies. The continental body also seeks to boost development, to eradicate poverty, and to incorporate Africa into the global economy. It further set a goal of establishing an African Common Market by 2028.

The AU Commission’s secretariat is headed by a Chair and nine Commissioners. Its main task is to implement the decisions of AU organs. The initiatives, institutions, and programmes of the AU and its flagship economic development programme, NEPAD, depend on the efforts of its eight recognised sub-regional organisations: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the East African Community (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). These bodies are tasked with improving democratic governance, economic development, and conflict management in their respective sub-regions.

Despite the optimism at the launch of the AU, the African continent has subsequently continued to experience security and governance challenges. An “Afro-Arab spring” swept across North Africa beginning in January 2011, toppling long-ruling autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The emerging state of South Sudan, which was created in July 2011 after five decades of bitter civil war, remains fragile. Military coups took place in Madagascar in 2009, and in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and conflicts have continued in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sudan, as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR). Peacebuilding also remains incomplete in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Algeria, Angola, Rwanda, and Burundi, while a self-determination referendum is yet to take place in Western Sahara.

However, there has also been some progress in building Africa’s security and governance architecture. NEPAD introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003, which, although arguably still flawed, does give Africans the opportunity to evaluate their own progress towards sound governance and democratic principles. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme of 2003 is recognised as a sound approach to rejuvenating and strengthening agricultural production and resource management, as well as food security on the continent. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), which was established in 2004 as a mechanism for civil society to promote democratic governance in Africa, is in its third term, though it has yet to acquire legislative powers.

“In essence, CAADP is about bringing together diverse key players - at the continental, regional and national levels - to improve co-ordination, to share knowledge, successes and failures, to encourage one another, and to promote joint and separate efforts to achieve the CAADP goals ... Overall, CAADP’s goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6 percent.” See CAADP, “About CAADP” (accessed at http://www.nepad-caadp.net/about-caadp.php).
1. A Decade of Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture

The actions of the United Nations during its intervention in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 dashed the expectations of many African leaders that the UN would serve its purpose as an impartial guarantor of global peace, and reinforced reservations over the powers vested in the Security Council and, in particular, in the hands of its five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5): the United States, China, Russia, France, and Britain.\footnote{See, for example, Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Catherine Hoskins, The Congo Since Independence, January 1960-December 1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); and Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (London: Hutchinson, 1962).}

After it intervened with the stated aim of resolving the secession of mineral-rich Katanga province, the UN, with 20,000 peacekeepers deployed, failed to support, or even protect, the Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, who had become the country’s first elected prime minister in June 1960 and was murdered seven months later. The accusation that the world body had taken sides in the civil conflict in the country led to a “Congo Allergy”, as Africans sought to avoid further intervention from the UN in Africa.\footnote{This paragraph and the following three are based partly on a presentation made by James Jonah at the CCR and FES colloquium, ‘The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality’, Berlin, Germany, 30-31 August 2012.} The crisis thus accelerated the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963.

The OAU’s founding document declared that no African states should challenge colonial boundaries, which saved the continent from many territorial disputes. Support for the principle of state sovereignty also led to the inclusion of a clause forbidding interference in the internal affairs of member states, which was modelled on a similar sanction in the UN Charter of 1945. The OAU’s policy of non-intervention led to serious violations of human rights being ignored in ‘Biafra’ (during the civil war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970); Uganda (in particular under the rule of Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979 during which an estimated 300,000 people were killed); and Sudan (where civil war broke out again between the North and the South in 1983 after a ten-year interval resulting eventually in over three million deaths).\footnote{Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner; and Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2011).} The OAU was established as more than a security organisation and aimed to foster pan-African unity. It sought to end colonialism in Africa, fight apartheid, and promote socio-economic development. However, its efforts to promote unity on the continent were hampered by the limited powers accorded to its administrative branches and organs, and the legally non-binding nature of the resolutions issued by its ruling body, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In addition, progress on development was stymied by Western control of, and weighted voting in, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nevertheless, under the OAU during the 1960s and 1970s, African solidarity in international fora on political issues concerning the continent was considered to be of paramount importance. During this period, unlike in the current era, no major decisions were taken in the UN General Assembly without taking account of African views. The continent’s influence has since greatly declined.

With the end of the Cold War by 1990, threats to peace and security in Africa mounted. Tanzania’s Salim Ahmed Salim, as Secretary-General of the OAU, supported the principle of African interventions to protect the human rights of the populations of member states. While the UN continued to ignore its responsibilities to keep the
peace in Africa, and the OAU lacked the mandate and/or the resources to intervene as required. Nigeria stepped into the breach and, as the sub-regional hegemon and leader of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), undertook major peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2003— which later won official UN backing. Nigeria suffered 1,500 fatalities in these interventions. In 2002, the African Union was established with a specific mandate to “intervene in a Member State ... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”

The AU has sometimes had to rely on sub-regional hegemons such as Nigeria and South Africa to implement some of its decisions on peace and security, within a clear legal framework. In line with this principle of subsidiarity, sub-regional bodies—such as ECOWAS under the guiding hand of Nigeria, and SADC under South Africa—have taken effective action to promote peace and security, although the role of sub-regional hegemons in such arrangements can generate a sense of insecurity and resentment among the smaller participating states. However, the success of peacekeeping operations initiated by Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) can also lead the UN to seek to abandon its responsibilities in this area. Increasingly, the model pursued by African sub-regional and regional bodies has been to initiate missions and then lobby for the UN’s buy-in— as ECOWAS did after the peacekeeping interventions of ECOMOG in Liberia (1990-1998, and 2003), Sierra Leone (1998-1999), and Côte d’Ivoire (2003-2004). Similarly, South Africa convinced the UN to take over the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which it had led between 2003 and 2004.

The AU has led the development of new kinds of joint peacekeeping missions with the UN, intervening first and then winning the world body’s support for the missions that it established in Sudan’s Darfur region, which was replaced by 2008 by the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and in Somalia since 2007, which the AU is seeking to place under a UN umbrella. The continental body’s lead has enabled effective engagement with governments and leaders—such as Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum—who have otherwise obstructed external interventions. In this regard, African leaders have increasingly challenged the apparent bias shown by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague—all of the 30 defendants indicted by the Court by April 2013 were African—and have sought greater international support for African mediators. In March 2013, Kenyan voters defied the ICC by electing one of its indictees—Uhuru Kenyatta—as its president.

Since the end of the Cold War, African leaders have successfully won international support for some important peacekeeping initiatives on the continent. However, the AU’s lack of influence over external interventions led by the UN Security Council and the “coalitions of the willing” that the Council mandates to implement its decisions— which often have their own more parochial interests—has sometimes resulted in undesirable outcomes. The three African votes on the UN Security Council cast by South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon in favour of action in Libya in March 2011 allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in the country, and critics regarded these votes as contradicting the AU’s own roadmap for peace in Libya. Dependence on the influence of Western powers has historically left African governments prey to external strategic interests.

Since its creation in 2002, the AU has adopted a holistic approach to peacebuilding, based on a definition of the concept popularised by Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report An

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The report defines peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The African Peace and Security Architecture established by the AU provides for a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), which has the power to intervene in cases of egregious human rights abuses and unconstitutional changes of government, and which has held six annual meetings with the UN Security Council since 2007 to coordinate peace and security activities in Africa. A Panel of the Wise also acts in support of PSC objectives, particularly by promoting high-level mediation efforts. The AU continues to oversee the establishment of a rapid-reaction African Standby Force (ASF) built around five sub-regional brigades – from Southern, East, West, Central, and North Africa – and designed to be deployed within 30 days in response to security crises. This security system also consists of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Military Staff Committee (MSC), and a Peace Fund.

Following the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, the AU agreed a policy framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in 2006. The framework outlines a duty for the AU to coordinate the peacebuilding efforts of the continent’s eight major Regional Economic Communities, African civil society actors, the private sector, and the UN. It seeks to link peace, security, and development, and emphasises the importance of national ownership of all initiatives, recognising that transitions to peace should be informed by the political and socio-economic circumstances of the countries concerned. The system also recognises the importance of multilateral and other partners, and the need to work toward common objectives and to synchronise actions effectively. However, implementation of the framework has stalled, partly because it has failed to clarify the necessary division of labour and responsibilities between the African Union and the RECs on which it depends. Failures in international coordination, and the prevalence of the “liberal peace” model in shaping external peacebuilding engagements in Africa – with its disproportionate emphasis on holding democratic elections and liberalising markets – may also continue to hamper peacebuilding efforts on the continent. In addition, serious resource constraints have inhibited the AU’s implementation of its own peacebuilding framework. In 2008, the AU and its flagship economic programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, asked donors for $50 million over a three-year period to support post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives. The AU has also sought funds from the private sector, partners in the global South, and the African diaspora. The AU Commission, however, in its 2009-2012 strategic plan, allocated only $144 million for peace and security issues, although this excludes peacekeeping. This resource gap is mirrored by bureaucratic constraints that include little institutional memory of work in this area, inadequate information technology support, and low staffing levels. For example, in 2012 only 23 staff – 10 in the conflict resolution room and 13 in the field – were working in the AU’s continental early warning system, established in 2002. External actors such as the UN and the World Bank have more peacebuilding experience and resources than does the AU, although their interventions sometimes lack legitimacy and funds are often inadequate. The UN Mediation Support Unit (MSU) can play a useful supporting role in this regard.

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18 Boutros-Chali, An Agenda for Peace.
21 This is drawn from the presentation made by Devon Curtis at the CCR and FES colloquium, “The African Union at Ten”.
The AU needs to strengthen its mediation capacity, including by providing greater bureaucratic support to the Panel of the Wise and by continuing to develop a database of expert African mediators. The continental body will also continue to play an important peacemaking role, even if only on a transitional basis, due to its strengthened capacity to respond or initiate action; its access to local knowledge; and its political leverage as a pan-African institution and the legitimacy that this confers. However, though the AU missions in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia were praiseworthy, they also exposed the organisation’s financial and logistical weaknesses. It may be more useful in future for the continental body to conduct peacekeeping under a UN umbrella. The recommendation in the Romano Prodi report of 2009 that these missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body should be implemented. In particular, more support for the 17,000-strong AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) should be provided, with the backing of the European Union, and this mission should also be brought under a UN umbrella. The AU should further seek to craft models for security sector reform that reflect local needs, as well as alternative peacebuilding approaches that can address crises and conflicts on the continent. In general, the continental body should perhaps leave peacebuilding to better-resourced organisations, while seeking to foster national ownership of peacebuilding processes.

The five-year audit report of the African Union in 2007, which highlighted administrative failures, problems of political infighting, and the many capacity, funding, human resources, and planning challenges faced by the AU and its members; as well as the 2010 assessment study on the African Peace and Security Architecture, which advises on the need for greater coordination among the elements of this architecture, should be implemented as urgent priorities. If prioritised and strengthened with sufficient staff, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), established in Addis Ababa in 2010, could help to forge and strengthen joint peacebuilding efforts between the two organisations. However, African policymakers need to delineate the appropriate relationships between the UN, the AU, and the RECs carefully. In addition, there needs to be more awareness-raising of the continental body and its role among African publics to enhance popular ownership of its programmes.

2. Regional Integration: The African Union and the European Union

The impact of visionaries and hegemons in both Africa and Europe has played a significant role in promoting, and overcoming obstacles to, regional integration. In Europe, French technocrat, Jean Monnet, oversaw the creation of the European Union’s precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which brought together France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

In Africa, Nigerian scholar-diplomat, Adebayo Adekeye, helped to found the Economic Community of West African States before joining the UN to lead its Addis Ababa-based Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) from 1975 to 1991. At the ECA, Adekeye continued his efforts to promote economic integration in Africa, leading the creation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Economic Community of Central African States in 1981 and 1983 respectively. However, economic integration in Africa has been far from successful, with less than 10 percent of the continent’s trade currently occurring among its 55 countries. In Europe, French technocrat, Jacques Delors, took up the European integration project started by Monnet, overseeing the births of a single market, a single currency, and, in 1993, the European Union itself. In Africa, Mali’s former president, Alpha Konaré, led the new African Union from 2003 to 2008, successfully overseeing its adoption of a new peace and security role as an actor prepared to intervene when states fail to protect their citizens. He sought to move the organisation from a principle of “non-intervention” to one of “non-indifference”. However, Konaré had dysfunctional relationships with his fellow AU Commissioners and failed to win the confidence of his staff at the Commission, in which widespread administrative failings included massive underspending of budgets by 70 to 90 percent. The creation of both the AU and the EU were led by national partnerships under the helm of determined leaders: German chancellor, Helmut Kohl (1982-1998), together with French president, François Mitterrand (1981-1995); and in the African context, South African president, Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), together with Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007). As Germany had allowed France to lead, so also did Mbeki let Obasanjo take the helm of the new African integration project after they were both elected as national leaders in 1999. The reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War (1939-1945) was greatly supported by the $100 million provided by the Marshall Plan, implemented by the United States from 1947. Since the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, integration efforts have led to the creation of effective regional political, financial, and judicial institutions and real economic benefits for many of the 500 million inhabitants of the 27 countries that currently compose the European Union, such as its small-scale farmers. By contrast, the regional integration project in Africa has delivered few tangible benefits to most of the continent’s 800 million citizens. The exports of African countries remain competitive rather than complementary, and vertical colonial trading patterns continue. There is a Euro, but no currency named the “Afro.”

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28 This section is based on presentations made by Adekeye Adekeye and Frederik Söderbaum at the CCR and FES colloquium, “The African Union at Ten.”
29 AU, Audit of the African Union.
30 Adekeye, “Towers of Babel?”
The African Union has modelled its key institutions and strategies on those of the EU. For example, in relation to economic integration, the Abuja treaty of 1991, which created an African Economic Community (AEC), follows a plan based on the European model. The template proposes first establishing free trade areas; then founding customs unions; then coordinating economic policies more closely; and finally creating a monetary union. However, the prospects of success for this model of economic integration are undermined by Africa’s low rates of intra-regional trade and development. The EU model should not be regarded as the paramount reference point for other region-building projects. The supranational model for region-building, while favourable in the context of European history, offers only a distinct solution to a particular set of problems and may not be readily transferable or appropriate to the African context. Clear structural and historical distinctions exist between the AU and the EU. The OAU’s creation was informed by a pan-African ideology of liberation, while pan-Europeanism was founded as an exercise in peacemaking – seeking to prevent another war between France and Germany.

EU institutions evolved organically and diverse actors benefited from regional integration efforts, thus garnering approval for the project; by contrast, African integration has been a less synchronised process, moving forward in fits and starts, and not necessarily in alignment with the realities of the continent’s diverse political economy or linked to the planning processes of member nations. The European Union possesses a complex institutional structure that favours mediation and compromise and promotes alignment of its strategies with those adopted at the national level. By contrast, the AU and its sub-regional blocs, the RECs, lack capacity as institutions, enabling powerful leaders and regimes to wield disproportionate influence over them at times. The AU Commission’s secretariat, which is headed by a Chair and nine Commissioners, has struggled to establish its independence. Under the leadership of Alpha Konaré between 2003 and 2008, the Commissioners acted as if they were accountable to the national leaders who had elected them rather than to the Commission’s Chair. Like in the EU, the AU’s bureaucrats too sometimes demonstrate loyalty to the priorities of their national missions at the expense of those of the regional organisation. In addition, the relatively weak links between Africa’s regional organisations and national governments, and inadequate machineries to coordinate planning with the RECs, which often possess insufficient staff and information technology systems, have often led to a lack of strategic synchronisation. The AU’s mandate to coordinate the sub-regional bodies has also sometimes proved difficult to implement because blocs such as ECOWAS and SADC consider that they have greater conflict management experience than the AU, which is a younger institution.

The structural foundations of the AU and the EU are vastly different. The EU is founded on its member states alone and has no sub-regional groupings. The AU is founded on the pillars of Africa’s eight major Regional Economic Communities. However, although the AU can not follow the European Union’s institutional growth path, it can usefully adapt lessons from Europe to its own specific circumstances. The AU is increasingly moving from norm-setting to implementation, although the body’s effectiveness continues to be hampered by low staffing levels. Only 669 people were employed at the AU Commission in 2012, which represents under 70

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33 Bach, “The AU and the EU”.
34 Adebafo, “Towers of Babel?”.
35 AU, Audit of the African Union.
36 AU, Audit of the African Union.
percent of the total approved staff of 1,002 – the number that was approved in 2003 – and compares with more than 33,000 employees at the EU in 2012. In addition, there is a high turnover of AU staff. Notwithstanding these constraints, staff at the Commission have overseen the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and have successfully drafted several important policy documents. However, although strong national political will and support is critical for the implementation of the norms that have been created by the continental body over the past decade, the engagement of African countries in the AU Commission’s work in Addis Ababa has weakened. Nominations for AU Commissioner posts also fell from 87 in 2003 to 34 in 2012. In order to accelerate the implementation of Africa’s new regional norms, the capacity of national institutions needs to be urgently enhanced. Africans must use their own think-tanks to support policy development and implementation by the continental organisation, rather than seeking merely to import Western ideas and development. New centres of African knowledge-production have developed separate from universities, and greater cross-fertilisation should be encouraged among these think-tanks, institutes of higher education, and policymakers.

The distinction that is commonly made between the AU and the RECs is a false one, since the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 is predicated on close symbiosis between them. In line with the African Union’s gradualist vision of pan-African integration, which seeks to build continental unity based on strengthened sub-regional pillars, SADC, COMESA, and the EAC are engaged in a tripartite process to establish a free trade area from the Cape to Cairo. In support of such political momentum, the AU’s decision to recognise only eight RECs should be implemented as a priority, and the need to strengthen the continental and sub-regional bodies should simultaneously be emphasised.

The issue of funding for the AU and its RECs may be less important than how that money is spent and the political will of African member states to strengthen the Union. Almost all of the AU’s 54 members had provided their assessed contributions in 2012, although the DRC and Somalia were lagging. The EU has pledged €300 million for the period 2011-2013 to support the continental body and its sub-regional organisations in the areas of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, as well as peacebuilding. The African Peace Facility (APF), created in 2003, is the main EU funding instrument for promoting peace and security in Africa. Between 2003 and 2011, the EU provided more than €1 billion to the Facility. Originally designed to provide funding for African-led peace support operations and for capacity-building, its remit was subsequently broadened under the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), established in 2007, with the additional twin goals of enhancing dialogue on African peace and security challenges and operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture. EU peace- and region-building efforts in Africa have been criticised for their lack of impact – partly caused by the complexity of EU structures directing the work – making them more symbolic than practical in their effects.

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Furthermore, EU peacebuilding efforts tend to favour military solutions, limited approaches to security sector reform, and the ‘liberal peace’ model that promotes general elections and economic liberalism. They rarely include concrete strategies to prevent conflict or to address broader development issues effectively.43

The EU can usefully take steps to reverse the damage done by unfavourable Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that it has reached with some African countries,44 and should adopt a less paternalistic stance in drafting its new development programme for Africa. European states such as France and Britain should also stop supporting autocratic leaders in Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, and Rwanda. In addition, the relationship between the EU and Africa’s regional bodies and countries should complement rather than duplicate those of individual European member governments with African regional bodies and states. African governments and regional organisations may also usefully leverage China’s continued economic and political engagement with the continent to improve the trade and aid deals offered by Europe. China has become the world’s second largest economy, and, in 2009, surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest bilateral trade partner, with total trade of $79.8 billion.45 Its trade with Africa increased from a mere $2 billion in 1999 to $200 billion in 2012.46

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3. The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which was established as a core economic programme for Africa in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2001, seeks “to enhance Africa’s growth, development and participation in the global economy”, although confusion remains widespread about the precise nature of the institutional relationship between the AU and NEPAD, and about the continental body’s commitment to the programme.

As a strategy to eliminate marginalisation, poverty, and underdevelopment, NEPAD has sought a doubling of agricultural capacity since 2000 – and has scored some successes. Poverty rates have fallen in Africa, and the continent recorded growth rates of five percent a year on average between 2000 and 2010. Six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world are in Africa, and it is the world’s fastest growing continent. In addition, NEPAD has attracted some important partners in line with the programme’s stated goal of seeking external financing for much of its development work – its founding charter notes that “the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent”, and an estimated $64 billion would be needed annually. External partners include the Group of Eight leading industrialised nations (G8), the Group of 20 major economies (G20), the EU, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as agencies of the United Nations including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Economic Commission for Africa, the UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP). NEPAD has coordinated with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank to enhance South-South partnerships. It attracted external funding of $25 million for its development initiatives in 2012. In addition, its South Africa-based secretariat has supported important infrastructure projects, partly through its Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICCI), including the construction of key road and rail links and a natural gas pipeline. NEPAD has also prioritised water management and the economic development of rivers.

A decade ago, when optimism was high about Africa’s development prospects, South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki popularised the idea of an ‘African Renaissance’ as a vision for a prosperous future for the continent. NEPAD was to be the development vehicle through which the Renaissance would be fulfilled. The pace of NEPAD’s implementation, however, has been lethargic, and the underlying economic conditions of much of the continent remain fundamentally unchanged in many respects. A durable and effective development model remains elusive. Intra-African trade has continued to account for only 10 percent of the continent’s total imports and exports, which in turn constitute only 32 percent of global trade.

48 This paragraph draws from the presentation made by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul at the CCR and FES colloquium, “The African Union at Ten”.
49 This paragraph is based partly on a presentation made by Charles Mutasa at the CCR and FES colloquium, “The African Union at Ten”.
50 The ‘Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising’, The Economist, 3 December 2011. Six African countries with populations of at least 10 million were listed as among the world’s ten fastest-growing economies from 2001 to 2010: Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda. See “The Lion Kings?”, The Economist, 6 January 2011.
Issues of poor physical and communications infrastructure, high tariffs, and cumbersome customs procedures, as well as a lack of diversity in production, still pose major challenges to Africa’s economic development and integration initiatives. Efforts to track a new people-centred, self-sufficient development path for the continent have also been thwarted by limited financial resources; broken international promises to forgive large external debts of $290 billion (much-publicised commitments to provide massively increased aid made by the leaders of the G8 at a summit held in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005 remain unrealised); and the unpredictability and complexity of donor aid streams – Japan and the US continue to fund NEPAD on a bilateral basis, owing to a lack of final agreement on a joint international aid mechanism for the Partnership. NEPAD has been criticised for not taking proper account of the views of civil society in its prescriptions and for its similarity to the unpopular neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) previously imposed on African countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It has also been accused of spreading its efforts too widely and of not focusing sufficiently on African economic integration efforts as originally proposed. The Partnership’s efforts have been stymied by the uneven development of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities, which have widely different capacities and have achieved varying levels of integration within their sub-regions. The lack of coherence among the RECs has been increased by their overlapping memberships, which have often resulted in duplication of efforts, and, at times, competing interests. NEPAD has also failed to develop a common African strategy for responding to the economic advances of the EU and its Economic Partnership Agreements that have been, and continue to be, negotiated between the EU and Africa’s RECs. The EPAs were supposed to create free trade. However, potential African partners were often pressured into accepting their terms and were played off against each other, while regional and sub-regional mechanisms have not always been able to safeguard African interests – although the interim EPA negotiated with the East African Community has been regarded by some as mutually beneficial. Though the principles underlying NEPAD may inform negotiations with external actors – the Partnership seeks to influence talks with new donors like China in making decisions on how development aid can best be employed – they do not necessarily define or structure the subsequent economic relationships created. Indeed, African members have resisted the inclusion of China in the partnership forum that they have established with members of the G8 and the OECD to promote NEPAD. Tensions can also be created during discussions at multilateral economic fora between the promotion of the interests of leading African states and those of the African Union, as well as between NEPAD’s economic goals and those of its external donors. In addition, fears have mounted among the international diplomatic community that the issue of external engagement with African development challenges may slip down the agenda at multilateral fora such as the G8, where African representation in discussions may become increasingly limited.

In order to increase its impact, NEPAD should perhaps focus more on issues of political and economic governance, as well as agricultural development. In these areas, the Partnership established the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, both in 2003.
Membership of the APRM, which sets and measures standards of political and economic governance, is voluntary. The aim of the mechanism is to help countries address democratic deficits and create the economic transparency needed to attract investment and to nurture growth. In particular, the APRM has initiated dialogue between private and government stakeholders and civil society actors on areas for improvement and challenges such as corruption, capital flight, and tax avoidance. The mechanism has further overseen progress on governance, tax, and electoral reform, and has usefully focused political attention on important events that have challenged African governments – for example, xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008; and the violence that accompanied national elections in Kenya in 2007/2008. The 33 countries participating in the APRM in 2013 have been made aware of their strength and weaknesses. However, engagement in the process is costly. A lack of government and civil society capacity – for example, the dearth of institutions of oversight such as ombudsmen – has further hindered the implementation of recommendations after APRM reviews have been conducted. In addition, the mechanism is governed by a memorandum of understanding and its findings are not legally binding on its member governments – although a good rating from it may increase access to donor support. The presence of undemocratic countries within the APRM may be expected of a body that employs voluntary peer review as its modus operandi. Nevertheless the mechanism, like other continental and sub-regional bodies and norms, can also be undermined when African leaders and governments unilaterally derogate from, or ignore, obligations to which they have agreed once the conditions of membership in the agreed institution become too onerous. For example, Zimbabwe’s continued defiance of the rulings of SADC’s tribunal led to the body being suspended pending a review of its mandate in August 2010, and strict limits subsequently being placed on its jurisdiction in August 2012, barring individuals and companies bringing cases to it. Broader participation of the private and civil society sectors in the implementation of Africa’s regional mechanisms could enhance the accountability of national governments to them. In addition, a need for quantifiable benchmarks to measure the progress made by African governments in meeting terms set by the APRM has been identified.

NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme has sought to prioritise the agri-business sector, which generates between 35 and 40 percent of the continent’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provides employment for about 70 percent of its population. The programme, which may be characterised as a policy framework rather than a supranational intervention, seeks to promote an African-owned and led farming sector and has an agreed target of 10 percent of national budgets to be spent on agriculture. It also outlines a range of measures to strengthen food distribution and production and to alleviate poverty. A sub-regional and country implementation process forms the backbone of CAADP, providing a set of tools for analysis, design, implementation, and evaluation of agricultural investment programmes. Thirty African countries had signed up to CAADP by January 2013, but only eight are allocating 10 percent of their national budgets to this vital sector as pledged in 2003. Development and implementation of policies in line with the CAADP framework remain

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60 This draws from the presentation made by Charles Mutasa at the CCR and FES colloquium, ‘The African Union at Ten’.


62 The programme is based on four pillars: sustainable land and water management; market access; food supply and hunger; and agricultural research. See AU and NEPAD, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme: framework document, 2003, p.2.

uneven at sub-regional and national levels, and the programme needs to promote greater ownership by, and more partnerships among, its signatories – only 26 member states had established appropriate plans and monitoring mechanisms for investment in agriculture and food security by 2013. In addition, CAADP has failed to address adequately the challenges that climate change poses to rain-fed agriculture, and participating farmers have been less than forthcoming about the environmental issues that they face. Africa’s agricultural framework could receive greater funding support if the guidelines of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation were adopted as principles by the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

The UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which aim to halve poverty by 2015 – represent another tool that can be used to address the continent’s development challenges. The MDGs have helped to sharpen the focus of governments on issues of poverty, inadequate national health budgets, and gender inequality – including on how women continue to face broad inequalities in many areas such as political representation, access to finance, and employment opportunities. The goals have also helped to increase funding in key areas, and enhanced results-based monitoring, although large gaps in the available data represent a continuing problem. Africa is making some progress in achieving several of the goals. Although it is unlikely that the continent will achieve all the targets by 2015, much of Africa is on track to achieve: universal primary education; gender parity at all levels of education; lower HIV prevalence among 15-24 year olds; an increased proportion of the population with access to antiretroviral drugs; and an increased proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments by 2015. However, there remains a lack of ownership of the goals at the national level on the continent. In addition, the MDGs are limited in scope relative to Africa’s challenges and take insufficient account of how disease seriously burdens the continent and inhibits its development. Despite the continent’s qualified successes – measured in terms of quantities – the quality of social service delivery; inequality; unemployment; increased vulnerability to shocks; economic, social, and environmental sustainability of performance; and inclusive growth, remain recurrent challenges. Key issues also include the need to improve education beyond primary schooling, and to address the challenges posed by continuing mass migration from rural areas to African cities.

Africa needs developmental states with strong redistributive policies that can guide markets and domesticate regional policies in order to create greater and more inclusive employment opportunities that strengthen people-to-people connections across national boundaries, and help to create confidence and counter alienation from political processes. In order to promote development through trade, investments in physical and human capital are needed alongside the lifting of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The continent must work to establish the infrastructure required to create free movement of people, goods, and services. African leadership is critical to creating and sustaining the vision and process of regional integration. For example, in 2012 it was the African Development Bank – rather than the World Bank, which was continuing to impose strict conditionalities on the release of funds – that was helping to resolve the outstanding economic issues between Juba and Khartoum that were threatening to derail the peace process in Sudan and South Sudan. The AfDB has also disbursed $40 million to Darfur, where political instability has led European actors to object to allocation of international funds. Although the AfDB is largely owned by non-African shareholders, its approach has encouraged African actors to continue to work more closely with it, and the bank appears to enjoy greater

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65 The Millennium Development Commission, which oversees implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is headed by Britain.
legitimacy on the continent than the World Bank and the IMF. Other donor instruments, such as TradeMark, are also working towards leveraging funds for physical development. 66 In addition, China is investing heavily in Africa’s infrastructure sector, especially in building roads and railways, although this economic engagement has been criticised for its lack of African inputs.

There is thus an urgent need for African countries to mobilise domestic resources – such as through taxation and remittances – for development. Such mobilisation can significantly reduce aid dependence according to a 2007 report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 67 NEPAD seems to implement a large number of projects, support for which is based on national needs-assessments. Issues of coordination and competition often arise in relation to national projects that may be deemed to have a sub-regional impact, as well as sub-regional projects with clear national impacts. In these cases, contestation over which governments and bodies should take the credit may be less important than the question of who pays for what and who benefits – particularly in relation to key transnational projects such as oil pipelines.

4. More Than Rhetoric? The Balance Sheet after a Decade of Democratisation

Although the African Union enjoys greater powers of intervention in the affairs of its member states than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, it is no more of a supranational organisation than was the OAU. Nevertheless, the shift from “non-intervention” to “non-indifference” — Article 10 of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 — outlines an obligation to take action when regional security is threatened and has led to greater assertiveness in this area.

The number of diplomatic missions to the AU from non-African states, regional bodies, and international organisations stood at over 70 in April 2013. This is clear testimony to the continental body’s enhanced global reputation as an important diplomatic force. The AU has been shaped by a 1990 declaration made by the OAU on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa, which emphasised the nexus between peace, democracy, and development. The AU’s institutional architectures in the three areas of peace and security; democracy; and development, are based on the principle that democracy and development can help promote peace. Each of the three areas has its own protocol – the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 2002, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance of 2007, and the NEPAD Framework Document of 2001. Each also has a legal instrument with an implementation mechanism – the Peace and Security Council; the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit; and the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency respectively. The three sectors are intended to coordinate their efforts closely.

The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 established 17 key institutions. Some of these have overlapping mandates – for example, those of the peace and security and the governance frameworks. Some have competing mandates – for example, African heads of state have resisted the oversight that the Pan-African Parliament is supposed to exercise over the continental body by continuing to deny it legislative powers. In addition, other bodies, such as the African Central Bank, represent aspirations for future integration rather than serving present needs, and have perhaps been created before their time. The issue of institutional duplication at the AU thus needs to be urgently addressed, and some of these newly-created regional bodies may have to be radically streamlined. Another challenge faced by the AU is the relative powerlessness of its institutions. African member states sometimes do not comply with norms to which they have agreed, both on the continent and internationally. In addition, unlike the UN Security Council, the AU does not have a body with the power to enforce its decisions. The AU Peace and Security Council often lacks the power to implement its decisions – with the possible exception of suspending countries whose soldiers have staged coups d’état.

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68 This draws from the presentation made by Musifiki Mwanasali at the CCR and FES colloquium, ‘The African Union at Ten’. Mwanasali’s presentation informs much of this section.
74 NEPAD, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
Africa’s governance framework relies on the voluntary compliance of member states for its implementation. If this cooperation is withheld, its structural mechanisms are undermined – for example, the APRM’s authority has weakened since Tshwane questioned its findings on xenophobia in South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki’s government objected to criticisms made in a 2007 report issued by the body, in particular dismissing its warning about a xenophobic threat in South Africa as “simply not true”. Less than a year later, 62 African immigrants were killed and 100,000 displaced in xenophobic attacks. Furthermore, other key AU agreements remain unratified by many member states. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance only reached its threshold of 15 signatories in January 2012. The many states that have not signed the document are not obliged to observe its principles. Indeed, about one-third of AU member states actively oppose its efforts to entrench human rights and democracy principles and protocols, while many others appear to support its goals merely in response to peer pressure. Only 33 African countries have acceded to the APRM, of which a mere 17 had undertaken the review process by January 2013. Many African countries have also not signed the agreements regarding women’s rights (ratified by 36 states), and combating corruption (ratified by 34 states). Moreover, seven African states have not signed the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council.

A lack of political support also prevented the planned birth of the African Court of Justice (ACJ), which was overtaken by a 2008 agreement to merge it with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) that had been created in 2006. By April 2013, only five countries – far short of the 15 required – had ratified the founding protocol for the new merged court, which is called the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and will be based in Arusha, Tanzania. The plan is for the Court to have two sections: one to deal with disputes over the powers of the AU and breaches of treaty obligations, and another to hear human rights cases. However, after Egypt and Tunisia led other African states to deny automatic access to the new institution by individuals and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) wanting to lodge human rights complaints, applicants have been limited to state signatories to the Court’s founding protocol, African intergovernmental organisations, and the Banjul-based African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Individuals and non-governmental organisations from countries that have explicitly accepted jurisdiction of the Court can also appear before it, although only six countries had agreed to this as of February 2013. Meanwhile, the ACHPR has been active, tackling issues such as the violation of the rights of women; refugees and internally displaced persons; and prisoners. The Commission, which takes up about 50 complaints a year, has contributed significantly to the interpretation of human rights protection in many African countries. However, since 2006, the ACHPR has been obliged to

76 APRM, ‘Communique Issued at the End of the Eighteenth Summit’. The 17 countries that had undertaken the APRM peer review process by January 2013 are: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
submit such complaints to states against which they are lodged before passing them on to the AU Assembly. Thus the Commission cannot bring cases or implement its decisions if the states concerned refuse to comply.

In addition, the uneven development of, and tensions between, Africa’s RECs have continued to impede the effective functioning of the continent’s peace and security framework. In West Africa, French interventions and the difference of approaches between the sub-region’s francophone and anglophone countries have obstructed the effective functioning of ECOWAS. Central Africa falls under multiple overlapping RECs and widespread French influence, and lacks a single strong sub-regional body. In Southern Africa, SADC’s independent streak often poses a challenge to its accountability to the AU. In general, the RECs, which are to serve as the building blocks of African integration, need to be strengthened at a more even rate in support of the whole.

Between 1960 and 1990, no single ruling party in Africa lost power. After 2002, ruling parties were voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. In 2000, the OAU sought to end unconstitutional changes of government. The number of multi-party systems in African countries increased from five in 1989 to 35 in 1998, while the number of one-party states decreased from 29 to two. However, the quality of democracy arguably declined between 2005 and 2012, with political rights and civil liberties improving in 15 countries but deteriorating in 18 other states.

Although elections held throughout sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 signalled a growing formal commitment to democratic rule, some African leaders have deployed violence and curtailed rights during election periods in a bid to hold on to power. In 2011, state security forces in the DRC and Uganda used excessive force against opposition party supporters, and targeted journalists, opposition party candidates, and civil society activists, as well as citizens. At least 42 people were killed in the DRC in the days before and soon after national polls in 2011, in some cases as a result of soldiers shooting at groups of opposition supporters. In some countries, the difficult aftermath of elections in 2010 resounded throughout 2011. Substantial electoral violence accompanied national polls in Kenya in 2007-2008, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011. Between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa are marred by conflicts, although the rise in poll-related violence, while indicating a need for greater post-election engagement, also bears testimony to the increase in free and fair elections on the continent. Conflicts at the polls often relate to issues such as land rights, employment, and marginalisation.

Meanwhile, debates over the length of time that heads of state can remain in office have generally been resolved in favour of extending their stay in power to a third term and beyond. Since 1998, only four of 13 bids to extend presidential terms have failed. In addition, there were 11 coups d’état between 2003 and April 2013, with Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African

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86 Since 2003, coups have taken place in the Central African Republic (March 2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (July 2003), Guinea-Bissau (September 2003), Togo (February 2005), Mauritania (August 2005 and again in August 2008), Guinea (December 2008), Madagascar (March 2009), Niger (February 2010), Mali (March 2012), and Guinea-Bissau (April 2012).
Republic all suspended from the AU between 2008 and 2013. The regional body’s responses to unconstitutional changes of government, the definition of which has been revised to sanction constitutional redrafting that infringes on democratic principles, have been criticised for only sanctioning military coups and not extensions to presidential term limits.

The continental body tends to follow a predetermined policy script in response to overthrows of governments: condemnation by the AU Commission’s Chair is often followed by a meeting of the Peace and Security Council at which the offending state is suspended for six months until constitutional order is restored. In the meantime, the Chair may launch a fact-finding mission seeking the contribution of leading Africans, enlist the collaboration of the relevant REC, and seek the imposition of sanctions by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The continental body’s responses to constitutional crises are often rapid, but also legalistic and inflexible, in particular raising the problem of what to do if the formula for action has failed to repair the situation. However, criticisms of the AU’s performance in this area may indicate new frontiers for improvement rather than a lack of progress in tackling the continent’s governance challenges. The role of AU mediators has also sometimes been criticised as idiosyncratic, and should be reviewed carefully with a view to professionalising the mediation support on offer and clearly defining the role of the AU’s Panel of the Wise. The continental body’s Peace and Security Council must also improve its accountability and reporting back to civil society in order to garner the technical support of this sector in “undertaking early warning reporting, and situational analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC” as outlined by the Livingstone Formula of 2008 (which puts forward a programme for cooperation between the PSC and civil society).

To foster the role of civil society in its work, the AU established the Pan-African Parliament in 2004 and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) a year later. The PAP, based in Midrand, South Africa, and comprising 265 parliamentarians elected by the legislatures of AU members, is supposed to provide a vehicle through which African citizens can advise on how to deepen democratic governance on the continent. It has set up committees to investigate issues such as agriculture, finance, trade, immigration, conflict resolution, transport, communications, health, labour, education, culture, gender, justice, and human rights. It has also sent observer missions to Darfur, the DRC, and Mauritania. However, following controversy over the Parliament’s financial management and a dispute over its accountability, or lack thereof, to the AU Assembly, it has yet to be granted the legislative powers it was due to have been given in 2009. ECOSOCC, which is composed of 150 civil society organisations representing national, sub-regional, continental, and Diasporic interests, has a mandate to serve as an advisor to the African Union. However, critics have noted that it has been largely ineffective in mobilising grassroots participation in the continental body’s institutions.

Although the number of civil wars in Africa has decreased since the creation of the AU, from eight in 2002 to four in 2012, the number of localised crises that turn violent has risen. In addition to the instability caused by uprisings

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87 Engel, “The State of Democracy in Africa”. Engel’s presentation informs much of this and the following paragraph.
91 AU, Audit of the African Union; and Adekeye Adebajo, “Paradise Lost and Found”.
in 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, conflicts persisted or broke out in 2012 in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, and the DRC. The continued influence of military brass hats in Egypt and Algeria could also reverse recent democratic gains. Post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in other countries, such as the Central African Republic (which saw the ousting of François Bozizé through a military rebellion in March 2013), Burundi, Guinea, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, have also been prioritised on the agenda of the AU Peace and Security Council. Close coordination between the AU Commission and Africa’s RECs has also been promoted in order to support conflict prevention efforts, although the development of early warning mechanisms remains a work in progress, and the division of labour among these bodies requires greater definition.

The AU has developed and promoted strong positions on African crises – for example, during the “Afro-Arab spring” in 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council and the Chair of the AU Commission, Gabonese diplomat, Jean Ping, took a clear stance on resolving the conflict in Libya by condemning Tripoli’s human rights abuses and calling for an immediate end to the violence. However, Africa’s three non-permanent members of the UN Security Council at the time – Nigeria, South Africa, and Gabon – took their own decisions over the Libya crisis (with complaints about a lack of clear direction from the AU Commission in Addis Ababa), and the AU’s influence was critically weakened. The war resulted in the violent death of Muammar Qaddafi, who had pushed for the creation of the continental body and chaired its ruling assembly in 2009-2010. In general, resistance has been encountered among powerful Western members of the UN Security Council as the AU Commission has sought to strengthen itself as a regional body pushing for greater recognition of its interests and positions under relevant international instruments such as Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The world body has also emphasised that it wants regular report-backs on AU mediation efforts.

The contest in 2012 over the election of a new Chair of the AU Commission between the incumbent, Jean Ping, and South African home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, which was won by the latter, led to a six-month paralysis of the body. However, the hope has been expressed that the contested election did no lasting damage, and the new Chair’s domestic reputation as an effective bureaucratic reformer has held out the prospect of much-needed improvements in creating a more effective AU Commission. Others are more sceptical that an individual in this position can transform an organisation with historical structural and administrative weaknesses dominated by strong-willed and sometimes erratic African heads of state.
5. Strengthening Africa’s Voice in Global Politics

Notions of a common voice and a shared interest are key tests of the degree of integration in any political union.\(^2\) The foundation of the OAU in 1963 represented a compromise between a pan-African ideology that sought the rapid political unification of the continent as the best means to liberate Africans (a view most eloquently expressed by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah), and a more pragmatic approach adopted by the majority of African governments that aimed to integrate the continent through the strengthening of sub-regional bodies responsible for creating common policies and shared institutions for the OAU’s member states.

The organisation’s founding charter committed members to work towards “a larger unity”, while Article 3 promised respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and emphasised non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.\(^3\) The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 also balances continental solidarity with territorial sovereignty. However, notwithstanding the voluntary nature of many of the AU’s compliance mechanisms, and the body’s intergovernmental rather than supranational nature, it has been equipped with greater capacity and powers to increase continental unity than was its predecessor. The regional body has been strengthened by an improved administrative structure, including the AU Commission; through efforts to establish common policies in key areas including defence, as outlined in the Constitutive Act; and through the creation of the Peace and Security Council, which has the power to intervene in cases of constitutional crisis, including coups d’état, and to protect the lives and human rights of Africans.

It is perhaps unfair to expect a single African voice to emerge from the AU, given the multiplicity of African views expressed by its 54 member states, and given the context of Europe, which, despite the EU’s successful integration efforts, continues to lack a single voice in many areas. For example, although the EU has made advances in the promotion of a single trade diplomacy for Europe, its member states generally continue to speak for themselves in bilateral and multilateral political fora, and the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Britain’s Catherine Ashton, and the President of the European Council, Belgium’s Herman Van Rompuy, can only speak on foreign policy matters that have been agreed by all the body’s 27 members.

Nevertheless, the AU Commission is increasingly assertive, although not yet in a position to speak on behalf of Africa. The continent also lacks adequate representation on, or influence over, the strategic direction and actions of the UN Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the IMF – and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), all of which continue to be dominated by powerful largely Western countries. In the context of an increasingly globalised world, the exclusion of a significant African voice at such fora must be reversed as a matter of urgency through increased leverage and professionalism representing Africa’s interests. Specialised agencies on the continent should network to provide lists of African experts who can be called upon to attend important multilateral meetings and help to shape policy, particularly in the key area of international law. In addition, certain national leaders could be appointed as spokespersons on critical issues.\(^4\)

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\(^{2}\) This draws from Martin Uhomoibhi, “Who Speaks for Africa?” presentation at the CCR and FES colloquium, “The African Union at Ten”.


\(^{4}\) Uhomoibhi, “Who Speaks for Africa?” This presentation informs this and the following paragraph.
Africa could also consider appointing a foreign policy tsar and/or ask the Chair of the AU Assembly to be appointed on a bi-annual basis. Acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity, under which Africa’s RECs are mandated to act as the AU’s implementing organs, could improve the coherence of African responses to crises. Despite its strong call on both sides for an immediate end to the violence in Libya, in February 2011, the continental body was effectively sidelined in multilateral decision-making during the crisis. As the late Kenyan Nobel peace laureate and first chair of the AU’s ECOSOCC, Wangari Maathai, noted: “Surely the AU should have been among the first international organisations consulted as internal conflict engulfed AU member states in North Africa. Why wasn’t it? If such conflicts were taking place in Europe, surely the EU would be central to a resolution.”

Africa’s lack of international voice is partly due to the AU’s financial dependence on external actors, who provide over 90 percent of its funding in the security area. In addition, African foreign policy positions are often expressed in a predictable way, which can detract from their impact. African diplomats in multilateral fora in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna must coordinate their positions more effectively. The African Group of Ambassadors in key capitals already seeks to harmonise disparate views before these are presented to the rest of the world, and, with the help of improved coordination with national capitals, these diplomats could more effectively voice African positions on areas of common interest. African governments should not be diverted from their duty to promote the continent’s interests by squabbles about permanent seats at the UN Security Council that are currently not on offer. Consideration should be given, however, to creating a mechanism to formalise how the AU selects African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of Africa’s three non-permanent seats could be rotated between the continent’s major powers (including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia); another between its middle powers; and the third between smaller African states.

Strong leadership is forged by effective responses to important contemporary issues. NEPAD’s drive to promote Africa’s socio-economic development and to eradicate poverty, and the continent’s continued marginalisation, represent major causes around which continental leaders can campaign and frame global debates. However, the preponderance of the voices of the more powerful African states at different multilateral fora on these and related issues can sometimes fragment African voices rather than provide continental leadership. The invitation of African leaders to the G8 has represented, for many Africans, a form of participation without voice. And the G20, according to critics, does not reflect African priorities, even though South Africa is part of this body. The AU and the RECs should develop clear, coordinated positions on their goals and the strategies for achieving them – for example, in relation to China at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Japan at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and in respect of other rapidly emerging economies in the global South such as Brazil and India. In particular, the sub-regional and regional bodies should adopt a clear, common position on engaging the BRICS economic bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and its African content.

96 Proposal made by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Special Representative of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship, Lagos, Nigeria, 9-10 June 2012.
97 This paragraph is informed by a presentation made by Gilbert Khadiagala at the CCR and FES colloquium, The African Union at Ten.
The AU, the African Development Bank, and the UN Economic Commission for Africa should also provide more effective economic leadership to avoid fragmentation of African voices. In addition, African national governments must be serious about financing continental institutions – external actors are expected to provide over 55 percent of the AU’s core budget in 2013 – in order to strengthen their effectiveness and credibility and avoid dependence on external aid and its conditionalities. African political elites further need to foster greater collectivity at the national and continental levels, and to support the development of stable democratic states as the building blocks of a strong, united Africa. The AU and its member states should train journalists and set up media structures that can counter the misreporting of the continent in Western media and enable Africans to tell their own stories to the world based on their own lived experiences. Only then can the dreams and aspirations of the OAU’s ‘Founding Fathers’ begin to be realised.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Berlin colloquium:

1. The administration, capacity, funding, human resources, and planning challenges faced by the AU should be addressed by implementing the recommendations of the Audit of the African Union of 2007, and the 2010 assessment study Moving Africa Forward: African Peace and Security Architecture. The issue of institutional duplication within the continental organisation needs to be urgently addressed, and some of the AU’s bodies should be streamlined;

2. The AU Peace and Security Council must improve its accountability to African civil society organisations in order to enlist their support in enhancing the continent’s early warning reporting. The AU also needs to strengthen its mediation capacity by providing greater administrative support to the Panel of the Wise and through developing an improved database of expert African mediators;

3. African governments should prioritise the establishment of infrastructure to create free movement of people, goods, and services, and must mobilise resources – such as through taxation – to create more inclusive employment opportunities, and enhanced capacity to domesticate regional norms;

4. The AU’s decision to recognise only eight RECs should be implemented as a priority, and continental and sub-regional bodies need to be strengthened simultaneously;

5. Africans should foster cross-fertilisation among think-tanks, institutes of higher education, and policymakers, and use their own centres of knowledge-production to promote policy development and implementation in support of the continent’s integration efforts;

6. The AU and its member states must raise awareness of the organisation’s role among African publics to enhance popular ownership of its programmes. Africa’s regional mechanisms should seek broader participation from the private sector and civil society to enhance the accountability of national governments, which can also be improved by quantifying the extent to which they are meeting APRM targets;

7. Capable African presidents could be appointed as continental spokespersons on critical global issues, and the AU should seek to appoint a foreign policy tsar on a biannual basis;

8. African diplomats in multilateral fora in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna must coordinate their positions more effectively. Consideration should also be given to creating a mechanism to formalise how the AU selects African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of the three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa’s major powers; another between the continent’s middle powers; and the third between smaller African states;
9. African policymakers need to define the respective roles of the RECs, the AU, and the UN in relation to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with the AU also crafting new approaches that address the root causes of conflicts on the continent. AU-led peacekeeping missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body, in line with the recommendations of the UN’s 2009 Romano Prodi report on peacekeeping. The AU Mission in Somalia should thus be transformed into a UN force; and

10. The AU and the RECs should develop clear, coordinated positions on their political and economic goals and the strategies for achieving them in relation to external economic actors, particularly in relation to China in the context of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Japan in the context of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, the BRICS economic bloc, and contentious negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU.

Participants of the international colloquium “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality”, Berlin, Germany
Annex I

Agenda

Day One    Thursday 30 August 2012

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Speakers:  Ms Christiane Kesper, Director, Division for International Development Cooperation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin, Germany

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

09.30 – 12.00 Session I: A Decade of Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture

Chair:     General Louis Fisher, former Commander of the Botswana Defence Force

Speakers:  Dr James Jonah, former United Nations (UN) Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs

Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, University of Cambridge, England

12.00 – 13.15 Lunch

13.15 – 15.15 Session II: The African Union and the European Union

Chair:     Ms Michèle Auga, Head, Africa Department, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin

Speakers:  Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Fredrik Söderbaum, Professor for International Relations, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

15.15 - 15.30 Coffee Break

15.30 – 17.00 Session III: The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa

Chair:     Mr Alex Vines, Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London, England
Speakers: Mr Charles Mutasa, Independent Development Consultant, and former Vice-Chairperson, Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union (AU)

Hon Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Member of the German Parliament, and former German Federal Minister of Development Cooperation

19.00 Dinner

Day Two Friday 31 August 2012

09.00 – 10.30 Session IV: More Than Rhetoric? The Balance Sheet after a Decade of Democratisation

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the AU’s Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Professor Ulf Engel, Professor for Global Studies, University of Leipzig, Germany

10.30 – 10.45 Coffee Break

10.45 – 12.15 Session V: Strengthening Africa’s Voice in International Politics

Chair: Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Coordinator, Africa Democracy Programme, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin

Speakers: Dr Martin Uhomoibhi, Permanent Secretary, Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja

Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

12.15 – 13.45 Lunch

13.45 – 14.30 Session VI: Rapporteurs’ Report and Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteur: Mr Mark Paterson, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Annex II

List of Participants

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37. Dr Siphamandla Zondi  
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Annex III

List of Acronyms

ACHPR  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ACJ  African Court of Justice
AEC  African Economic Community
AfCHPR  African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AIDB  African Development Bank
AMIB  AU Mission in Burundi
AMISOM  AU Mission in Somalia
AMU  Arab Maghreb Union
APF  African Peace Facility (EU)
APRM  African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA  African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF  African Standby Force
AU  African Union
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAADP  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAR  Central African Republic
CCR  Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEN-SAD  Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS  Continental Early Warning System (AU)
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC  East African Community
ECA  Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG  ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC  Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (AU)
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community
EEC  European Economic Community
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement
EU  European Union
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)
FES  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FOCAC  Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G20  Group of 20 major economies
G8  Group of Eight leading industrialised nations
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
ICC  International Criminal Court
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MSC Military Staff Committee (AU)
MSU Mediation Support Unit (UN)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSAA Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN)
P-5 Five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain)
PAP Pan-African Parliament
PCRD Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU policy framework)
PICI Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (NEPAD)
PSC Peace and Security Council (AU)
REC Regional Economic Community
SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UN United Nations
UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNOAU UN Office to the AU
US United States
WFP World Food Programme (UN)
WTO World Trade Organisation
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.

Other publications in this series
(Available at www.ccr.org.za)
VOLUME 9  
**WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10  
**HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11  
**AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

**BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE**

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12  
**HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13  
**SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14  
**AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006 analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15  
**THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16  
**UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN: DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK: STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
Notes
The African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 on a wave of optimism about the continent’s future, and was equipped with stronger administrative mechanisms and greater powers of intervention in the affairs of its member states than its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Since its creation, the AU has sought to establish integrated frameworks to address Africa’s security, governance, and development challenges. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Berlin, Germany, hosted a colloquium to analyse the challenges facing the AU and to build on its achievements. The meeting considered the history of the AU; reviewed the implementation of its peace and security architecture; compared the regional integration efforts of the African continental body and the European Union (EU); assessed the AU’s strategies to achieve socio-economic development; and reviewed its global role.