Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building
PEACE IN SOMALILAND: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building

Burao, Borama, and Sanaag Conferences

Tuduc
Sow Godobi surinkaad martaba sabab qarsoon maaha,
Sow Nabadi sahaydaada ood sidato uun maaha

Verse
Isn’t a feud a hidden danger that lies wherever you walk,
Isn’t peace just a provision you carry with you

by the classical poet Gabay-xaddi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building

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Somaliland Map: Courtesy of Mark Bradbury, 2008, James Currey

This research study was made possible by the generous contributions of the interviewees, Working Group, peer reviewers, and colleagues at the APD, including Mohamed Said Gees (Director), and Abdi Yusuf Bobe (Research Coordinator), in sharing their unique experiences as well as historical documentation and photographs. Rita Glavitza (PhD intern) provided valuable support.

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The study is a chapter in a forthcoming publication representing the findings of the peace mapping study.
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ACRONYMS

APD Academy for Peace and Development
NGO Non Governmental Organization
SCPD Somaliland Center for Peace and Development; subsequently known as Academy for Peace and Development (APD)
SDRA Somalia Development and Relief Agency
SNM Somali National Movement
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC Somali Revolutionary Council
UN United Nations
UNDP-EVE United Nations Development Programme-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
UNITAF United Nations Task Force
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
US United States of America
USC United Somali Congress
USP United Somali Party
WSP International War-torn Societies Project International; now known as International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)
PREFACE AND METHODOLOGY

Working to consolidate peace and support better governance across the Somali region

Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about rebuilding relationships at all levels, restoring the people's trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real. In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In the Somali region, neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

Interpeace (formerly known as WSP International) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somalia known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peace-building institutions established with the programme’s support – the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – Interpeace has employed a highly successful ‘Participatory Action Research’ methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peace-building and state formation. Interpeace’s experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace. The Dialogue for Peace programme has provided unique opportunities for the three partners to engage with each other in collaborative studies and shared projects across their borders – such as this peace mapping study - while managing their respective components of the Dialogue independently. The three partners meet regularly with Interpeace’s Somali programme team as well as with a ‘Dialogue Support Group’ comprising the programme’s donors at the European Commission, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UK, and USAID.

Methodology of the Peace Mapping Study

In January 2007, Interpeace and its Somali partner organisations began a study of peace initiatives in the Somali region as part of Phase II of the Dialogue for Peace Programme. The study complements the “conflict mapping” exercise undertaken in partnership with the World Bank in Phase I of the programme. No comparable study of peace initiatives in the Somali region had yet been undertaken, despite the numerous reconciliation processes in the Somali region since 1991, at local, regional and national levels. While some of these have failed to fulfill expectations of resolving violent conflict, others have provided a basis for lasting stability, peace and development but are unknown beyond their immediate context. Interpeace and its partners consider that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these initiatives for both Somali and international policy makers, in terms of key factors that influence their success, sustainability or failure, and in terms of the relationship between peace processes and state building.

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1 Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, World Bank report based on research by CRD, PDRC, APD and the Centre for Creative Solutions (Hargeisa), 2005.
The overall aim of the study was to enhance current approaches to and capacities for reconciliation and the consolidation of peace - both in the Somali region and in other contexts – by studying and drawing lessons from local, regional and national peace initiatives in the Somali region since 1991. The specific objectives were to:

- Document key local, regional and national peace initiatives over the past 16 years in the Somali region (including those that may have failed to achieve the anticipated results);
- Identify key factors that influence successful peace initiatives and factors that may undermine the sustainability;
- Synthesise lessons learned from these reconciliation initiatives for the way forward;
- Study the relationship between peace initiatives and state building in the Somali region

The study was designed with four phases, facilitated by Mark Bradbury in collaboration with the Interpeace Somali program team, with the field research undertaken by the three partner organisations. During the preparatory phase the three organisations established their research teams and compiled inventories of peace meetings in the Somali region. Following a workshop in April 2007, at which a research framework and a work plan for the study was agreed, the researchers conducted literature reviews, interviews and group discussions to develop a historical Overview of peace initiatives in their respective areas. This research was reviewed at a joint workshop, before undertaking a third phase of detailed research on case studies while the Audio Visual Units of the organisations prepared films (in Somali and English) to accompany the research and reach a wider audience. Additional support was provided by a number of colleagues and the CRD also undertook research on internationally sponsored national peace conferences in collaboration with Professor Ken Menkhaus.

In the series of workshops that marked the transition between the project phases, the researchers received training in designing a research framework, analytical tools, interviewing techniques and comparative learning. Information was gathered through individual interviews and group discussions with people who had been involved in or witnessed the events, many in the places and communities where the peace conferences took place.

In line with Interpeace’s Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, Working Groups of knowledgeable individuals were convened in each region to provide guidance and comment on the research. Many of the interviews were recorded on audio tape and film and now comprise a historic archive of material on Somali peace processes, together with written documentation on the meetings, including copies of signed peace agreements. Finally, the research reports were peer reviewed before being completed.

This report forms part of the final series of five publications presenting the findings of the peace mapping study – both as a record for those involved, and as a formal presentation of findings and recommendations to the national and regional authorities, the broader Somali community, and international policy makers. Together with the short documentary films that accompany the reports, it is hoped that these publications will provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned on peace and reconciliation initiatives in the Somali region.

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Resource people included Dr Justin Willis of the British Institute for East Africa and Andy Carl of Conciliation Resources.
1 OVERVIEW

1.1 Background

After the collapse of Siyaad Barre’s regime in 1991, the Somali nation was in tatters. The Somali National Movement (SNM) had taken control of most of the Northern Regions or Gobolada Waqooyiga of the erstwhile Somali Democratic Republic\(^1\). Their area of dominance extended from Erigavo through Burao, Hargeisa and Borama to Lawya’addo, which shares a border with Djibouti, and it was this territory in which the Isaaq-dominated SNM focused on agreeing ceasefire pacts with the non-Isaaq clans who had supported Siyaad Barre.

Most people in the Northern Regions come from one of five main clans: the Isaaq, Gadabuursi, Esa, Dhuulbahante and Warsangeli (see Figure 2). The Isaaq clan-family is the most populous group in present-day Somaliland and formed the backbone of the SNM. The Isaaq divide into six main clans: the Habar Yoonis and ‘Iidagalle (collectively known as the Garhajis), Habar Tol Je’lo (commonly shortened to Habar Je’lo), Habar Awal (including the Esa Musa and Sa’ad Musa lineages), Arab and Ayuub. Historically, the largest sections of the Isaaq have been the Habar Awal, Habar Garhajis (especially the Habar Yoonis) and Habar Je’lo. The Gadabursi and Esa form part of the Dir clan-family\(^2\). The Warsangeli and Dhuulbahante form part of the Harti federation (together with the Majeerteen of Puntland), a subsection of the Darood clan-family. A subordinated ‘caste’ of tradespeople known in the Northern Regions as the Gabooye live alongside the major clans throughout the area.

Figure 2: Northern Clan Lineages

In the western-most corner of the Northern Regions, cessation of hostilities between the SNM and the Gadabuursi was agreed after confrontation between the respective clan militia. In the Isaaq areas, including the environs of Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao, government forces removed themselves or were captured, while in Eastern areas, truce agreements had been negotiated between the SNM and each of the opposing clans, at the instigation of one or other party, over the months preceding the fall of the Mogadishu government. In the second half of February 1991, the SNM leadership and delegates from all the Isaaq and major non-Isaaq clans\(^3\) in the area, including the Dhuulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadabuursi, and Esa, met in

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1 The area is widely known amongst Somalis as Gobolada Waqooyiga, literally translating as ‘the Northern Regions’, an area consistent with the borders of the colonial-era British Protectorate of Somaliland. The term Somalileyn, a transliteration of ‘Somaliland’, has also been used on occasion to refer to the same territory. Conversely, the term waqooyi galbeed, literally meaning ‘north-west’, refers only to the western area of the ex-British Protectorate, and was, until recently, the name of the region that includes Hargeisa (Waqooyi Galbeed region is now officially renamed Maroodi Jeex). Some international agencies prefer the term ‘north-west’ for the whole of Somaliland, but to avoid confusion, this paper will use the more literal translation ‘Northern Regions’.

2 Some Somalis include the Isaaq within the Dir family, although many, including a large proportion of Isaaq, reject this categorisation. The Esa are also excluded by some from the Dir group. Discussions and extensive reviews of literature both recent and contemporary, provide little evidence of a consensus view on this matter. Figure 2 must therefore be viewed as representative of a single non-definitive perspective.

3 The distinction between the English terms clan-family, clan, sub-clan and so on tends to be fluid. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘clan-family’ will be used to describe the larger groupings, of which the primary examples in Somaliland are Isaaq and Darood (or Harti). ‘Clan’ will be used to refer to the next level down: for example, Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo and Habar Awal within the Isaaq; the Gadabuursi and Esa; and Warsangeli and Dhuulbahante within the Darood. There are various groups and instances in which this typology doesn’t work effectively, so as far as possible, it will be made clear within the text what level is being discussed.
Berbera. At that conference, all parties confirmed their bilateral agreements to end inter-clan hostilities, and to continue reconciliation efforts between the clans and to hold another conference, this time in Burao, to make further necessary decisions on the administration of the Northern Regions.

On 18th May 1991 at this second national meeting, the SNM Central Committee, with the support of a meeting of elders representing the major clans in the Northern Regions, declared the restoration of the Republic of Somaliland, covering the same area as that of the former British Protectorate. The Burao conference also established a government for the Republic; an administration that inherited a war-ravaged country in which tens of thousands of people had been killed, many thousands injured, and the main cities, Hargeisa and Burao, almost entirely destroyed. The territory had been extensively mined, yet with the establishment of peace, hundreds of thousands of internally and externally displaced people were starting to return home. At the same time, thousands of clan-affiliated militia (both SNM and opposing clans) were rendered surplus to requirements, yet remained armed.

Given the extent of this destruction of infrastructure, the enormous displacement of people, and the daunting range and magnitude of the many related challenges, the transformation of Somaliland in the past 16 years has been remarkable. Today, Somaliland boasts a degree of stability that exceeds that of the other Somali territories and has taken many credible steps towards the establishment of a genuinely pluralistic democracy. The system of governance has evolved from a beel (clan-based) system, to one of multi-party democracy, in which clan affiliation continues to play a significant part. Somaliland has had three presidents since 1991, each of them selected on a peaceful basis: Presidents Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, and the incumbent, Dahir Rayale Kahin, who won an election in 2003 by a handful of votes. In spite of achieving a wafer-thin majority over his main challenger, Rayale’s success was confirmed without violence. In addition to a peaceful process of presidential selection, a new Constitution was approved by referendum on 31 May 2001 by 97.1% of voters, and successful elections have also been held for local administrations (December 2002) and the lower house of Parliament (September 2005). There have nevertheless been numerous incidents of harassment of journalists by the authorities, including their imprisonment on dubious grounds, which undermine an otherwise relatively high level of press freedom.

Lack of international recognition has nevertheless proven an impediment, restricting access to many international political fora and global economic and aid institutions. In many urban areas, basic services have been gradually restored, with service provision overwhelmingly dominated by the private sector. Small factories and construction businesses have mushroomed, and the money transfer, transportation and telecommunications sectors have seen the rapid growth of several relatively large and well-managed companies. There is, however, little other medium- or large-scale industry. In education, the number of primary and secondary schools is gradually increasing, and the availability of trained teachers is improving. However, provision is heavily weighted towards urban areas, where Islamic madrassas go some way to filling the enormous gaps in the secular system. Universities (both multi-faculty institutions and schools of business and computer science) have been established in Burao, Hargeisa and Borama (Amoud), a College of Fisheries and Maritime Studies in Berbera, plus well advanced plans for at least two more.

In spite of this often remarkable progress, though, considerable challenges lie ahead. It is to be hoped that the lessons learned from the 1991-1997 peace and reconciliation processes can be applied to the resolution of future issues without recourse to the violence that sometimes accompanied the initiatives of that period.

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4 The reference to a pre-existing political entity refers not just to the period in which the area was administered by the British as a protectorate, but also the five day period immediately following independence in 1960 during which Somaliland enjoyed brief recognition by some 30 nations as a sovereign and independent state, before uniting with previously Italian Somalia on 1st July.

5 By 1991, almost all of the schools in Somaliland were reported to have been destroyed, and certainly none were operating a formal educational programme. By 2003, “… 171 functioning formal schools … [are] providing access to basic education for [17]% of the country’s children …” (Bekalo et al., 2003: 470).
1.2 Xeer: Somali Conflict Resolution

Traditionally, disputes and conflicts in Somali society are resolved through recourse to an unwritten code of conduct or social contract called xeer: traditional law agreed upon by the clans in each area, and dependent on the deliberations of elders who gather to resolve specific problems within a clan or between clans. A gathering of senior elders considering issues of governance and general well-being is known as a guurti, although the same term can be applied at different levels, depending on the magnitude of the issue under consideration. The Somali system employs a mix of Islamic sharia and customary law, in which precedence plays a considerable part, and is applied to all issues from the smallest to the largest. Social and criminal matters are guided by unwritten sets of moral and social rules, which form the basis for resolution of issues arising within or between clans or sub-clan groups. New xeer rules are developed to address unforeseen occurrences, so the system is a dynamic and evolving one.

Aggrieved parties may negotiate under the auspices of a guurti or else a group of mediators known as ergo may be despatched to attempt to mediate between the parties without becoming overly engaged in the subject-matter of the dispute. If a settlement is not agreed at this stage, a xeerbeegti or jury, may be appointed to pass judgement on a given case with each party being expected to accept the verdict. The disputing parties must be satisfied that members of either the ergo or xeerbeegti are independent and qualified for their task in terms of their knowledge of customary law and expertise on traditional mechanisms for resolution of clan conflicts. In addition, the venue for negotiation must be considered neutral by those involved. These comments must be considered indicative: there is a great deal of fluidity in the terminology used from case to case.

Both blood-ties and xeer link every individual to his or her respective lineage, sub-clan, clan, and to the clan-family. Somali society follows a system based on agnatic or patrilineal descent, where individuals trace descent through the male line and take the name of their father (Lewis, 1961/1999). Furthermore, there is also an extensive practice of intermarriage between different sub-clans in order to establish and to strengthen inter-clan relationships and xeer agreements, especially on the usage of grazing and water resources (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006).

1.2.1 Elders and their Traditional Roles

The Somali honorific ‘aaqil has been adopted from the Arabic, meaning ‘brain’, ‘sane’ or ‘knowledgeable’. The Somali implication is similar: a man of good judgement and, more specifically, the head of a diya-or mag-paying group. In a similar vein, the Somali term ‘garaad’ carries the meaning ‘understanding, judgement, wisdom, intelligence’ (Somali-Partner-Academicians, 2000).

As the head of the diya-paying group, an ‘aaqil is selected by them. He is actively involved in resolving conflicts amongst his diya group members as well as with other groups. One of the ‘aaqil’s roles, with the support of clan elders, is to negotiate the amount and timing of any payment under xeer (customary law). Each sub-clan or sub-sub-clan may have one or more ‘aaqil, all of whom are subordinate to the clan garaad, suldaan or ugaas (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b). However, all of these roles rely on a high level of dialogue and debate; none offer the incumbent autocratic authority. All the roles named above are elders, although each clan will also recognise many other, untitled elders (the generic term oday can be applied), as well as religious leaders (sheekh) who are actively involved in clan affairs, and businessmen. The Somali

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6 In fact, the Arabic term carries a very similar meaning to the Somali usage: as well as denoting sanity and good judgement, the traditional Arabic translation can also carry the meaning ‘blood-money’, with the term (‘aaqila) referring to ‘a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay [blood-money] for each of its members’ (Cowen, 1976: 630).

7 Diya or mag refers to blood compensation (see Annex V: Peace Mapping Glossary).
proverb *raganimo dantaa moogibay ku jirtaa*, meaning that true respect can be achieved by ‘neglecting your own business to focus on the interests of all’, gives a flavour of the expectations placed on elders. Elders are traditionally the first actors to become involved in dispute-resolution.

Somali society has been exclusively oral until relatively recently, so the skilled orator (*hadal yaqaan*) is highly respected. Indeed, oratory is a talent that can help one qualify to become a very important member of the clan. A good orator is one who can convince others through rhetoric, and such a person can then become a successful negotiator for his clan, provided he is *xeer yaqaan* (conversant with customary law). A religious scholar or sheekh is also a respected authority in the clan and can play a major role in conflict-resolution. The term guurti is applied to a group of elders selected to resolve a specific problem within a clan or between clans. When a problem arises among the clans or sub-clans, elders come together to discuss possible resolutions, and in so doing form a guurti.

The Somali system of clan-based discursive democracy, famously characterised by Ioan Lewis in the title of his seminal text as a ‘pastoral democracy’ (Lewis, 1961/1999), underpinned much of the operational structure of the SNM. Some of the traditional institutions were adapted for the purposes of a civil war – notably, the SNM guurti took on a much more prominent role in resource mobilisation than occurs in peacetime – but many of the essential elements remained in place.

Traditional clan democracy and xeer were the bases on which internal SNM conflicts were generally resolved, and many of those traditions carried through to the post-SNM phases, and continue to the present day.

The system allows for considerable participation in issues relating to governance, conflict resolution and so on for all adult males. As such, women are systemically excluded from the formal process of negotiation, debate and state-building. However, for men, the system is remarkably open to participation for those who wish to do so.

In dealings between clans, there is a strong expectation that positions of responsibility will be shared, with each clan holding a degree of influence that is commensurate with size and historic significance. This principle carried through to the operational structure of the SNM. Members of the Central Committee of SNM were, to the maximum extent possible, distributed evenly among the Isaaq clans, and the important posts tended to be reserved for the big Isaaq clans, with the post of SNM Chair rotated amongst them. The first two chairmen, Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid ‘Jim’aale’ and Sheekh Yusuf Ali Sheekh Madar, were both Habar Awal, so the next chairman, Abdilqaadir Koosaar was from Habar Yoonis. It was then the turn of Habar Je’lo and Ahmed Sillaanyo held the position for six years. A new cycle started again with a Habar Yoonis chair, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’, who assumed the role in March 1990, retaining it through the period when the SNM took control of the Northern Regions in 1991. He then became the first President of Somaliland for the two years of SNM rule. As will be noted from the case study, ‘Tuur’ lost the presidency in Borama partly as a result of a perception that it was the turn of another clan.


During the period of his government, Siyaad Barre’s policies of patronage were seen by many, including the Isaaq clans in the Northern Regions as designed to reduce their own control over traditional rangelands, and consequently generated a sense of grievance against his administration. Although Siyaad Barre’s regime was initially marked by strong anti-clan rhetoric, he increasingly resorted to exploitation of clan divisions in an effort to retain his hold on power, especially after the disastrous war with Ethiopia over the Ogadeen in the late 1970s (Drysdale, 1994: 136). Perhaps inevitably, it ultimately cost him his leadership. There is no question that he deliberately targeted the Isaaq, attempting to conscript the efforts of the non-
Isaaq northern clans in this pursuit. With deliberate exploitation of clan division such a notable feature of the conflict, it was possibly inevitable, although also the subject of considerable internal debate, that the SNM itself became heavily identified as an Isaaq opposition movement. This politicisation of clan affiliation was further complicated by the fact that many of the clans on opposing sides of the conflict had long histories of inter-marriage, trade and shared borders and pasture areas. For those in the Northern Regions, this deepened distrust between clans, and when open conflict came it was the more brutal and personalised as a result.

While it can be misleading to view this period of conflict as resting purely on a clan base, it is also true that relative success in establishing peace and stability in Somaliland was achieved as a result of a series of peace and reconciliation conferences between the northern clans. A notable factor in enabling this process lay in the SNM’s commitment, increasingly applied over the course of their insurgency, to create linkages with other clans (Saleebaan Afqarshe in ‘Adami’, 2008; APD, 2007a; Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, line 23).

This study has identified some 39 peace conferences and meetings that took place between 1990 and 1997\(^8\). These peace initiatives fulfilled a variety of roles, including:
- Restoration of relations between communities affected by the war;
- Establishment of a relatively stable security regime in which law and order has increasingly fallen within the ambit of a system of partially decentralised government;
- Establishment of local and national institutions of governance; and
- Creation of an environment conducive to economic growth and the beginnings of what might be considered a more broadly-defined process of development.

The conflict process and then the peace and reconciliation can be divided into five phases, in which numerous local and national conferences helped to stabilise Somaliland and to re-establish institutions of governance and law and order:
1. **SNM Insurgency**: The period of the civil war between the SNM and the Siyaad Barre regime, concluding with the fall of Siyaad Barre in January 1991;
2. **Peace-Building**: The five months from January to May 1991, culminating in the Burao conference at which the independence of Somaliland was declared;
4. **Institution-Building**: June 1993 until February 1997, during which Somaliland was divided by civil war, but progress was also made in establishing government, culminating in the 1997 Hargeisa conference; and
5. **Democratisation**: The period after the 1997 Hargeisa conference, through until the present day.

In order to provide maximum focus on the nature of reconciliation and peace and institution-building in Somaliland and the lessons derived from them, this Overview focuses on the first four phases, while the majority of the report concentrates more specifically still on the sequence leading up to the Burao conference, followed by that leading to the Borama conference, as well as the parallel Sanaag process. While the conferences held through each of the four periods following the insurgency differed in terms of organisation, scope and attendance, all shared a number of key characteristics: they were funded largely or wholly by Somaliland communities themselves, including those in the diaspora; they involved the voluntary participation of the key figures from each of the clans affected; and decisions were taken by broad consensus amongst delegates. The 1997 conference in Hargeisa was the last in the series leading to the establishment

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\(^8\) There is considerable disagreement amongst observers and commentators as to the location and timing of such meetings, and in some instances whether they occurred at all. The estimate included here covers those conferences between two or more clans (therefore omitting the Libaan conferences of the Garhajis and one or two others) and for which research generated a reasonable degree of evidence.
of an administrative system that has since proven relatively stable. It involved a number of highly significant milestones, including the adoption of an interim Constitution and the extension of the government’s mandate in managing conflicts within Somaliland (WSP-International, 2005). Since this establishment of a broadly accepted administrative system across much of the country, the number and role of inter-clan peace conferences of the type described has diminished. The exception has been in Sool and eastern Sanaag in eastern Somaliland, where elders have continued to play a significant role in resolving conflicts in areas still contested with Puntland.

1.3.1 PHASE 1 (1981 – December 1990): The SNM Insurgency

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in London on 6 April 1981, with the purpose of organising armed resistance to the Siyaad Barre regime (Drysdale, 1994: 136). From the beginning, the Movement practiced a degree of internal democracy unique amongst the Somali resistance movements of the period (Drysdale, 1994). Indeed, over the course of the insurgency, the SNM had five leaders; each was selected in accordance with the SNM constitution, and involved a peaceful transition (Duale, 2007d: 450; Sillaanyo, 2007a, line 490).

By 1982, the SNM had established bases in Ethiopia, from where they engaged in guerrilla-style conflict against Siyaad Barre’s forces in Somalia. In May 1988, an all-out offensive was launched against government forces in Hargeisa and Burao. The government responded with a brutal ground and aerial bombardment. Over 50,000 civilians are estimated to have died and more than 500,000 to have fled across the border to Ethiopia (WSP-International, 2005: 13). The two largest towns in the Northern Regions and many surrounding villages were systematically looted, destroyed and mined by government forces.

As the SNM gained control over territory in the north, approaches were instigated, in some instances by the SNM themselves, and in others by opposing clans. In one of the most significant early examples of such an approach, the Dhulbahante’s Garaad Abdiqani initiated talks in the Ethiopian towns of Qararro, Danood, Gashaamo and Gowlalaale in February 1990 with representatives of the Habar Je’lo clan of the Isaaq. A similar conference took place in August of the same year in Gashaamo with the Habar Yoonis. These discussions resulted in truce agreements between the parties, and underlined the SNM commitment to reaching peaceful settlements with neighbouring clans (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a; Drysdale, 1994: 139). The fact that these reconciliations involved separate negotiations with two of the three largest Isaaq clans (the Habar Awal were not involved) reflected two dynamics: firstly, tensions between the Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis were becoming pronounced, a factor that would later result in outright conflict between them; and secondly the Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis had long lived closest to the Harti clans Dhulbahante and Warsangeli. They had consequently amassed a large number of mutual grievances, as well as more complex inter-relationships with the Harti than other Isaaq clans. It was feared that fighting might spread from urban locations to pastoral areas; an eventuality that would have benefited neither side.

However, while these agreements did amount to significant steps towards cessation of hostilities, the process remained incomplete. Of the major sub-clans, the Gadabuursi had yet to agree a truce (‘Adami’, 2008), and many specific issues remained unresolved between each of the clan groupings. There was therefore an urgent need to address a raft of complex and often inter-related issues. At this point, in the words of the notable commentator John Drysdale, “…to have taken or encouraged vengeance would have resulted in internecine warfare, as happened in the south. Instead, the SNM relied on a traditional approach, invoking the skills of the clan elders … [in an effort to] heal the rifts … [amongst the northern clans]”

9 There are different accounts as to the timing and exact location of Garaad Abdiqani’s initiative: some say talks commenced in Gowlalaale in February, while others suggest different dates or locations (Duale, 2007b, line 17; 2007d: 423 & 428; Gir, 2007). It seems clear though that Abdiqani did make a first approach early in 1990. For more detail, refer to ‘2.3.1 Peace-Building between Isaaq and Dhulbahante (February-September 1990)’, below.
This remarkably far-sighted policy was largely pursued with vigour and is perhaps one of the major factors in enabling the stability which, with notable but thus far contained exceptions, has prevailed since.

1.3.2 PHASE 2 (January – June 1991): Peace-Building

In order to begin the process of addressing the web of outstanding issues, the SNM held a series of localised peace conferences, building up to a national meeting in Berbera in February 1991, which in turn set the scene for a larger national conference to be held in Burao in April/May.

**Oog Conference (2nd to 8th February 1991)**

When the SNM entered Burao in January 1991, Dhulbahante elders and garaaads in the Laas ‘Aanood area made contact through the small number of Dhulbahante in the SNM and told them that the Dhulbahante were ready to continue the reconciliation process with the Isaaq.

The SNM agreed to attend a meeting to be hosted by the Dhulbahante in the town of Oog. Contact was made on 28th January, and the meeting was set for the beginning of February, to be attended by members of Habar Je’lo, Habar Yoonis and Esa Musa (Habar Awal) (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a).

The SNM delegation duly arrived, led by the Regional Commander of Togdheer, Mohamed Kahin, and the Togdheer Governor, Hassan Adbdille Walanwal ‘Kayd’, accompanied by twenty trucks of Isaaq delegates. The Dhulbahante remained suspicious that the SNM delegation might engage in reprisals, so the delegation was ordered to disarm, to leave their transport, and to mingle with the Dhulbahante to show their peaceful intent. This display allayed Dhulbahante fears and the meeting took place successfully (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a).

The Dhulbahante delegation was led by Garaad Abdiqani, Garaad Saleebaan, and other Dhulbahante elders, intellectuals and military officers. Because the Warsangeli had been unable to send delegates to the meeting, the Dhulbahante delegation also spoke on their behalf. The Oog meeting was essentially an opportunity to determine the next steps in the reconciliation process, and agreement was consequently reached that a further and more substantial conference would take place in Berbera in one week’s time. The Dhulbahante agreed to inform the Warsangeli of this arrangement, and to seek their participation in Berbera. In the intervening week, the Dhulbahante returned to Laas ‘Aanood for their own internal conference of sub-clans, and the Warsangeli agreed to meet the Dhulbahante delegation in Oog in time to travel with them to Berbera on 8 February (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a).

**Tulli (Dilla) and Borama Meetings (early February 1991)**

With the SNM now in control of most of the Northern Regions, or else having agreed ceasefires with local sub-clans, the Gadabuursi in Awdal region, western Somaliland, were the last large clan group with whom the SNM had yet to agree a ceasefire. Once the SNM had defeated Siyaad Barre’s 26th Division in Hargeisa in the early days of 1991, they had retreated to the Dilla area in Awdal. The SNM had given chase, and ultimately entered Borama briefly, taking prisoners and confiscating technicals and other equipment. In the process the SNM artillery had bombarded Dilla, and fighting there and in Borama resulted in casualties on both sides (Aw Ali Farah, 2007b; Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007a).

At this stage, the Gadabuursi Sheekh Ali Jowhar called for an end to the fighting. In response the SNM commander Haybe Omer Jama ordered his militia to withdraw to Goroyo ‘Awl, and Abdirahman Aw Ali
Farah, an SNM leader and one of the few Gadabuursi members in the Movement, stepped up the process of negotiating a ceasefire with his clanspeople. Aw Ali’s next move was to meet a delegation of Gadabuursi elders in Tulli (some kilometres from Dilla) and to agree a ceasefire. Talks then moved to Borama, where Aw Ali established a 21-person Gadabuursi Guurti with whom the SNM could negotiate and assumed the position of Governor of Awdal (Abdi Iidde Amaan in APD, 2007d; Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 47-49). A series of meetings in Borama culminated in reconciliation between Jibril Abokor (Habar Awal, Isaaq) and Gadabuursi, with other sub-clans following suit after some delay. Amongst the agreements reached at this stage was acceptance that some buildings and vehicles confiscated by each side during the conflict would be returned to their owners (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 101-108).

On 8 February, Aw Ali met with the Gadabuursi Guurti, and the Gadabuursi delegation, led by Jama Rabile, formerly a minister in the Siyaad Barre government and a Gadabuursi elder, travelled by ICRC plane to Berbera (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a; Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 158-160).

**Berbera Conference (15th to 27th February 1991)**

Following hard on the heels of this intensive series of peace-building meetings in the east and west in the first two weeks of February, delegations from all the clans of the Northern Regions converged on Berbera on 15 February for the first national conference, known as Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga (Brotherhood Meeting of Northern Clans). Berbera was chosen primarily because it was the largest town to have avoided destruction by Siyaad Barre’s forces (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007a). The conference collectively confirmed the ceasefire across the Northern Regions, and determined that there would be a second national conference in Burao, starting in April. Dhulbahante prisoners held by the SNM were also returned to the Dhuulbahante at this stage.

The Berbera conference was not intended to reach any substantive decisions beyond confirming bilateral ceasefire agreements, but to set the stage for the Burao conference, at which specific details of the territory’s future governance were to be discussed.

**Burao Conference (27th April to 4th June 1991)**

This Burao conference, known as Shirweynaha Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga (Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans), was intended to continue the process of confidence building amongst the northern clans and to discuss the future administration of the region. All the Northern clans participated on a voluntary basis (Duale, 2007b, line 41), and funding came primarily from the communities and diaspora of the Northern Regions (APD, 2004: 1), with women playing a substantial role in fundraising and logistical organisation (Shukri Harir Ismail and others in APD, 2007e; Duale, 2007b).

The conference is now best known as the forum at which the independence of Somaliland was declared, and that was indeed the meeting’s most far-reaching decision, though other important resolutions were also passed. The manner by which these decisions were reached is also edifying.

The SNM by this stage was clearly the victor in the Northern Regions, and by far the most powerful military organisation. The primary decision-making body was therefore the SNM Central Committee (Duale, 2007b). However, as an extension of the SNM’s policy of reconciliation, leaders from each of the northern clans were
invited to join a meeting of traditional leaders, timed to precede the Central Committee meeting. The Isaaq, Gadabuursi, Esa, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans were each represented by ten elders (APD, 2004: 1). This elders’ meeting was charged with considering options for presentation to the Central Committee of the SNM, and after some discussion, they submitted seven recommendations (Duale, 2007b). 13

The Central Committee then met. They considered the elders’ resolutions, strengthened the wording of the one declaring Somaliland’s independence, added a seventh, and endorsed the package. The Chair of the SNM, Abdirahman ‘Tuur’, then publicly announced all of the resolutions to a crowd enthusiastically waiting to hear the declaration of independence. The Central Committee meeting then resumed, agreeing an interim system of government and electing the office-holders.

1.3.3 PHASE 3 (June 1991–May 1993): Establishing Security and Government

Burao and Berbera Conflicts

Tensions were by this time mounting between erstwhile allies within the SNM. An underlying issue was the succession for the Presidency, to which Abdulrahman ‘Tuur’, as Chairman of the SNM, had been appointed in Burao. ‘Tuur’s’ mandate was due to expire in May 1992, and Habar Awal (Sa’ad Musa and Esa Musa) felt that it was their turn (Gilkes, 1992: 13). Also at issue was control of Berbera port, and the port duties collected there (ibid). ‘Tuur’ inflamed the situation by sacking a number of members of his government (primarily from the Habar Je’lo), while his plans to draw clan militia together into a united national army were viewed with suspicion by many (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 8)14. The tension escalated into a week of fighting in Burao between Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis militia in January. Then, in May, ‘Tuur’ ordered Sa’ad Musa units of the army to Berbera to prevent a renegade Esa Musa colonel, Abdullahi ‘Degaweine’, from entering the port city. Both being Habar Awal, the Esa Musa refused and ‘Tuur’ was forced to send a Habar Yoonis force instead. This was seen by the Habar Awal as a Habar Yoonis invasion, and inflamed the situation to breaking point (Gilkes, 1992: 13).

Initially, Degaweine was keen to avoid direct confrontation, pulling back to Sheekh. However, when a minor dispute between two Habar Yoonis sub-clans resulted in the assassination of a Habar Yoonis suldaan in August, he took advantage of their weakened position in Berbera and re-entered the city, also securing the road halfway to Hargeisa. As a result, the government was deprived of its primary source of income in the form of port duties, and opposition to ‘Tuur’s’ administration had grown to encompass groups from a diverse array of clans (Gilkes, 1992: 13-14). It is important to note that much of the conflict occurred within the SNM, between clan-affiliated militia factions, but that this frequently did not translate into popular clan-based support for these militia groups (Rashid Gadhweyne and Yusuf Shaa’ir in APD, 2007b). ‘Tuur’s’ Gadabuursi Minister of Education, Abdirahman Aw Ali, and a multi-clan collection of five cabinet colleagues resigned from the government in protest at the escalating crisis (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 245-251), and conflicts within Habar Yoonis grew more heated. By September, Degaweine was threatening to march on Hargeisa, and the government’s control had become clearly tenuous. Lootings, shootings and petty violence had become frequent in Hargeisa and it was clear that the situation would soon come to a head (Gilkes, 1992: 14).

In response to the situation, a peace committee known as Kulanka (meaning simply ‘the meeting’) was convened in October, 1992 in Berbera. The group was comprised of 30 individuals, selected in equal numbers from the Government and opposition groups. The Kulanka agreed that Berbera’s port, airport and fuel storage depots should be placed under government control. However, this agreement was rejected by Esa Musa leaders in Berbera, who argued that all public facilities in the country, including Hargeisa Airport, which was controlled by the ‘Iidagalle (from the Garhajis, and therefore close allies of Habar Yoonis), should

13 A translation of the elders’ resolutions is available on page 33.
14 A number of more detailed conflicts are recounted by witnesses as occurring in Burao between SNM militia factions associated with Habar Yoonis and Habar Je’lo, mostly involving petty disputes over weapons (Rashid Gadhweyne, Yusuf Sha’ir and Abdullahi in APD,
similarly come under the control of the Government (WSP-International, 2005: 62). The Gadabuursi Guurti offered to mediate between the factions, in support of the Esa Musa position that all clans should handover public facilities to the government. Their initiative was accepted by all the parties to Kulanka. This was the second time in living memory (the first having been in the 1950s) that a Gadabuursi group had mediated in a dispute between Isaaq clans (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 281-282). It reflected the work of individuals within the Gadabuursi, and in particular that of Abdirahman Aw Ali, to utilise the relative neutrality imparted by their status as non-Isaaq to further reconciliation between Northern clans (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a; WSP-International, 2005: 62).

Also, in October, and after much initial resistance, the government agreed that 750 UNOSOM troops would be placed in Berbera and at Hargeisa airport; some believe the government was persuaded that that this might lead to international recognition (Gilkes, 1992: 13-14). The Kulanka agreement and the promise of UN troops helped to calm the situation, assisted by preparations for another reconciliation conference in the town of Sheekh.

**Sheekh Conference (23rd October to 8th November 1992)**

As with the series of conferences that preceded and set the scene for the Burao conference, the conference in Sheekh, which was known as Tawfiiq (or ‘best decision’), continued the string of meetings that would eventually culminate in another major national conference in Borama. The Kulanka had, with the mediation of the Gadabuursi, agreed a ceasefire between the Esa Musa and Habar Yoonis. The Sheekh conference was intended to consolidate that peace and to assemble a national Guurti consisting of representatives from all the Northern clans (WSP-International, 2005: 62). At the invitation of the Gadabuursi Guurti, Garaad Abdiqani sent a delegation of 20 Dhulbahante, led by Mohamed Ali Shire from Laas ‘Aanood to join delegations coming from Hargeisa and Borama (Garadka in APD, 2007b).

Once again, women played a significant but overlooked role in fundraising and providing logistical support. A number of women were also pressing for a greater role in the meetings themselves. Shukri Harir Ismail, for example, recounts the effort she was involved in during the lead-up to the Borama conference (the meetings in Hargeisa and Sheekh being part of this), when a group of women organised protests at meeting venues. For one such protest, the group prepared a written statement of their position. Beginning their demonstration at dawn, the proceeded to walk around town, reading the statement, declaring:

* That they would not stop their protest until solid decisions had been made:
* That a letter be written to the UN stating that UNOSOM forces should not be deployed to Somaliland;
* That functional water reticulation systems be reactivated; and
* Promising to pay for food and clothes for a police force, if one were created

They also purchased microphones and speakers, which they placed inside the meeting room, enabling them to listen to proceedings, and then kept their promise to stand outside the venue until all issues had been dealt with (APD, 2007e).

Amongst the decisions taken, the initiative to bring the different clan Guurtis together to meet as a national council was one of the most significant achievements of the Tawfiiq conference. The following resolutions ending the immediate intra-Isaaq conflict were also agreed (WSP-International, 2005: 62):

1. Fixed assets taken during the war were to be returned to owners on both sides;
2. Militias were to be withdrawn from the battlefield;
3. All roads were to be cleared of armed militias and opened for traffic, especially the road between Burao and Berbera; and
4. Prisoners of war were to be exchanged.
While the Tawfiiq conference was successful in concluding the conflicts in Burao and Berbera, the peace throughout Somaliland remained fragile, so a decision was taken at Sheekh that a further national conference should take place in the first months of 1993. At the conference in Burao, the SNM had mandated themselves a period of two years in which they would run the country, after which they would hand over power to a civilian administration (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 188-191; Siilaanyo, 2007a, line 124). That period was due to expire in May 1993, thus also warranting a further conference in which to make the momentous decision on how that transfer would take place.

The situation was compounded by failure in 1992 to hold either of the two Central Committee meetings required annually by the SNM Constitution. Consequently the expiry of Tuur’s mandate as President midway through the year was not addressed. Ignoring the constitutional difficulties that this created, ‘Tuur’ unilaterally formed a new government in early December; a move that was not popular, particularly amongst the newly instituted national Guurti (Drysdale, 1994: 142-143).

Borama Conference (January to May 1993)

The national Guurti, led by Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Madar and numbering 150 individuals from all the northern clans, were keen for the Borama conference to also include a cross-section of delegates from all the main Northern clans. In the end, 500 people attended. The UN supplied some air transport, but no financial or other support, with the majority of the funds for the conference being contributed by Somalilanders themselves (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 418-421; Bradbury, 1997; Drysdale, 1994: 143). Some minority clans (Gabbooye and other smaller groups) were not represented (WSP-International, 2005: 64), but it was notable that a small delegation of women (17 in total from a variety of clans) did attend. That group reiterated their position on UNOSOM as stated in the lead-up meetings, supported the formation of the national Guurti, and demanded a greater role for women in future conferences (Anab Omer Ileeye in APD, 2007e).

The Borama conference debated a wide range of topics, agreeing a security framework or ‘peace charter’ and a national constitutional structure (Drysdale, 1994: 143). It was agreed that a system of executive president would be retained, with a vice president and the power to appoint ministers. A bicameral parliament was to be formed, consisting of the 150 voting members of the conference, split into an upper and lower house, each with 75 members, a system embodied in the National Charter (WSP-International, 2005: 63).

Proceedings then moved to the election of President and Vice President, with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal winning out over Omar Arteh15 and Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ to become President, while Abdirahman Aw Ali secured the post of Vice President. Both of Egal’s rivals for the presidency vowed to support his election (Drysdale, 1994: 143-145).

The Borama conference is widely seen as having been one of the most successful of the major national conferences, and is compared favourably with the later Hargeisa conference. The reasoning is that there was no single party strong enough to wield undue political influence (WSP-International, 2005: 80). Whatever the reason, this national meeting can reasonably be seen to have achieved a great deal, including the ever-contentious task of making the transition from a military government to a civilian one. In another notable milestone, the pressure applied by women’s groups for a greater involvement in the political process did result in the appointment of Somaliland’s first female Minister, Deeqa Ali Joog of Sanaag (Shukri Harir Ismail in APD, 2007e).

15 Omar Arteh was Ali Mahdi’s Prime Minister who had made a surprise return to Hargeisa, and ended up making substantial financial contributions to the Borama conference (Drysdale, 1994: 144).
Sanaag Conferences (February 1991 – October 1993)

While the various conflicts, meetings and conferences described thus far were taking place, a parallel process was occurring in Sanaag region. The reconciliation initiatives in this area were unquestionably of great importance in the wider Somaliland context. A total of fifteen of small conferences culminated in a grand conference in Erigavo between August and October 1993. The following is a list of the conferences, with abbreviated comment on the outcome of each:

1. December 1990 in El Qohle: ceasefire and share of grazing land agreed between Habar Yoonis and Warsangeli.
2. February 1991 in Yagoori: military ceasefire agreed between Dhulbahante and Habar Je’lo.
3. 18th June 1991 in Yubbe (Yubbe1): ceasefire agreed between Warsangeli and Habar Yoonis.
4. 6th-9th October 1991 in Yubbe (Yubbe 2): consolidation of ceasefire, and regulation of trade and agreement on borders between Warsangeli and Habar Yoonis.
5. 30th October 1991 in Oog: regulation of trade and prisoner exchange between Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante.
6. 10th May 1992 in El Qohle: agreement to strengthen security, regulate trade and enhance inter-community movement between Habar Je’lo and Warsangeli.
7. 1st-22nd June 1992 in Kulaal/Awrboogeys: final agreements on peace between Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante.
8. 16th-21st August 1992 in Shimbiraale (lsuboodo): cessation of hostilities, return of looted property and agreement for each clan to assume responsibility for security in own area between Habar Je’lo, Warsangeli, Dhulbahante and Gahayle.
10. 5th-9th November 1992 in Jiidali: agreement that each clan responsible for security in own area and selection of disputes resolution committee between Habar Yoonis & Warsangeli.
11. 23rd November – 1st December 1992 in Garadag (Jeegaan): agreement to convene a grand conference in Erigavo (provided Habar Yoonis support could be gained) between Habar Je’lo, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Gahayle.
12. 2nd January – 5th February 1993 in Dararweyne: cessation of hostilities and agreement by Habar Yoonis to host Erigavo conference, between Habar Yoonis and Dhulbahante (SDRA/MCC, 1994).
14. June 1993 in Figifulye: informal meeting to confirm invitation to Erigavo conference, between Habar Yoonis and Dhulbahante
15. June 1993 in El Afweyn: agreement that both clans would settle final difference in Erigavo, between Habar Je’lo & Habar Yoonis.
16. 19th August – 11th November 1993 in Erigavo: Sanaaq Grand Peace and Reconciliation conference. A Peace Charter was agreed for the Sanaaq Region, plus an administrative statute. All Sanaaq clans were involved: Habar Je’lo, Habar Yoonis, Warsangeli, Dhulbahante, Gahayle and Jibraahiil

As with other conferences, funding was primarily raised from the Somaliland community, with women playing a significant role in mobilising resources, and providing food and other urgent support. The role women played in mediating between clans was also particularly pronounced, though not unique, in Sanaag. This reflected the mix of clans in the area, and the high degree of inter-marriage that had traditionally occurred between them. By straddling clan lines, women were able to provide message courier services across the front-line when fighting took place, and on occasion found themselves quite literally forming a barrier between warring factions. A number lost their lives in these activities (Baar Saeed Faarah in APD, 2007e).

16 The primary source for the list was the research of the team preparing this report, augmented by Farah and Lewis’s report on the Sanaag process (Farah and Lewis)
1.3.4 PHASE 4 (June 1993 – February 1997): Institution-Building

**Hargeisa and Burao Conflicts**

The Egal administration was initially able to proceed on the basis of the broad support he enjoyed in the wake of the Borama conference (WSP-International, 2005: 65). However, Habar Yoonis were dissatisfied with having lost both the presidency and a number of positions in the administration. In July 1993, they held a clan conference in Burao, called *Libaan I*, at which they announced the cessation of Habar Yoonis cooperation with Egal’s government. The following year, *Libaan II* declared the administration ‘illegitimate’. Following this declaration, ‘Tuur’ led a delegation of Garhajis to Mogadishu, declaring support for Aydiid and a united Somalia (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 9; WSP-International, 2005: 65). While not all Garhajis supported these actions – indeed, the ‘lidagalle never endorsed the Libaan declarations (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 13) – they nevertheless contributed significantly to the mounting discord. By November 1994, tensions had again reached intolerable levels, and fighting broke out in Waqooyi Galbeed region, around Hargeisa, when the government attempted to enforce the Sheekh and Borama agreements, and take control of Hargeisa airport. A number of Garhajis elders worked with others to reconcile the parties, but they proved unable to control their militia (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 437-447; Bryden and Farah, 1996: 9; WSP-International, 2005: 66).

In March 1995, fighting erupted again in Burao between the Garhajis and government militias. Although the conflict failed to fully engage the constituencies on either side, the fighting was fierce enough to force large portions of the populations of the cities affected to flee (WSP-International, 2005: 66).

While the fighting was clearly an irritant to the government, the failure of the Garhajis militia to gain unified support from even their own disparate components, let alone from other clans, effectively prevented the conflict from threatening the government itself (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 11). The low intensity of the fighting enabled the dispute to drag on for a protracted period, and also made resolution more difficult; in the end, the conflict which had started in November 1994 was not fully concluded until July 1996, while a full settlement did not occur until the Hargeisa conference in early 1997.

**Somaliland Peace Committee (1995 to 1997)**

The Guurti, who had achieved so much in Sheekh and Borama, proved unable to end the Burao/Hargeisa war, primarily because the Garhajis elders, although negotiating in good faith, were unable to gain the acquiescence of their own militia (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 11). In fact a number of groups attempted to intervene in the process, and at best, each achieved modest success.

One such group assumed the moniker ‘Somaliland Peace Committee’, and their story is edifying in part because it shows the efforts put into many Somaliland peace processes by groups or individuals who don’t necessarily enjoy the success they were hoping for. Case studies, including as those upon which this report is based, can tend to give the impression that the sometimes heroic efforts of individuals or groups lead, with the logical certainty imparted only by hindsight, to successful outcomes. In fact, unsuccessful initiatives have long been as much a part of the Somaliland peace process; often enough at great personal cost to those involved.

In March and April of 1995, a US-based individual originally from Hargeisa, Dr Hussein Bulhan, had visited Hargeisa, Djibouti and Addis Ababa to ascertain support for a peace initiative. His final meetings in Addis Ababa had resulted in the establishment of a group called the ‘Peace Committee for Somaliland’, which

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17 Garhajis are the clan grouping that combines the Iidagale and Habar Yoonis, who trace common lineage.
based itself in Addis Ababa, seeking financial and other support from the Ethiopian government, UNDP’s Ethiopia Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (UNDP-EUE) and others (Bryden and Farah, 1996; Peace-Committee, 1995). Apart from limited funds, financial support was not forthcoming, so the group largely financed their own activities, with the support of Somalilanders in Somaliland and the diaspora (Peace-Committee, 1997), although some non-financial support was also provided by international agencies (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 17). As ever, women were frequently central to fundraising efforts, and also cared for and fed the injured, and played as active a role as possible in encouraging peace efforts18 (APD, 2007e).

The Committee began, in late 1995, with preliminary consultations with Somalilanders in Addis Ababa (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 19), then divided the facilitation group into two negotiation teams; one to work with each side (Peace-Committee, 1997: 1, point 3). These teams, recruited prominent individuals to the cause in the form of a ‘peace caravan’, making contact with the opposing parties and holding preliminary discussions in the early months of 1996 (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 20; Peace-Committee, 1997: 1, point 3).

Meanwhile, in September, just as the reconciliation process was getting underway, Egal’s term in office expired. With elections a difficult proposition in view of the conflict, parliament agreed to extend the term of his government by one and a half years (WSP-International, 2005: 66).

Initially, the Peace Committee’s focus was on those involved in the fighting in the Hargeisa area, where they believed the issues involved might be easier to resolve (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 20). Having gathered support from a wide array of sources, the Committee was able to organise a meeting with much of the Hargeisa community in May 1996. The ‘Iidagalle did not attend, but progress was nevertheless possible, with the meeting agreeing the text of a letter to the ‘Iidagalle that recognised their grievances, and stating their readiness to attend a reconciliation meeting. The Committee delivered the letter to the ‘Iidagalle who signalled their acceptance. Camp Abokor was selected as the site of that meeting, which was scheduled to commence on 3 June 1996. The meeting agreed that all parties would “… honour and observe the peace process until 15 August when the concluding peace conference would take place in Baligubadle …” (Peace-Committee, 1997: 3-4, section A). In the event, the Baligubadle conference never took place, both because the Peace Committee’s funds were exhausted by the expensive process of organising the Camp Abokor, and because Egal continued to vacillate in his support for the peace process, issuing a letter two days before the scheduled commencement, demanding that the Committee suspend their activities and leave the process to the government (Peace-Committee, 1997: 3-4, section A). Egal’s letter was only one instance in a series of flip-flops with regard to the Committee’s efforts to facilitate reconciliation. As early as November 1995, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had issued a press release critical of the ‘Peace Proposal’ that had been drawn up by the Committee, yet this was followed shortly after by a reception hosted by Egal to welcome the Committee. Later the government established a committee headed by Abdirahman Aw Ali to work with the Committee, and provided US$5,000 towards their activities. The rationale behind this erratic approach is difficult to ascertain, but one explanation is simply that the government did not know how to react to an external mediation initiative (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 21-22).

Although the Baligubadle conference failed to proceed, a parallel reconciliation process had developed momentum in Togdheer (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 20). A preliminary round of discussions culminated in a meeting in July in Waraabeeeye village which set the ground for a full conference later in the same month in Duruqi. The agreement reached at Duruqi was the most comprehensive in the process to date, resulting in a cessation of fighting in Burao, and the creation of a representative administration in Togdheer (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 20-21).

While these negotiations had been taking place, the national Guurti had announced that a ‘General Congress of Somaliland Communities’ would take place in Hargeisa in October 1996. The announcement received a

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18 Shukri Haji Bandare tells of instances where women bribed security guards to prevent squabbling meeting delegates from leaving the venue until a decision had been reached (APD, 2007e).
mixed reaction, with many of those involved in the Hargeisa and Burao conflicts concerned that the timing and government organisation might inflame the situation. The Peace Committee asked the government to delay the commencement and made a number of recommendations for changes in the conference. Some of these suggestions were accepted, but the date was not shifted (Peace-Committee, 1997: 2, points 7-8). For their part, Garhajis leaders stated that they would not attend the conference.

In many ways, the Peace Committee had failed to achieve the breakthrough they were pursuing, although their efforts were nevertheless significant. The meeting in Duruqsi did generate a significant agreement, and some feel that this was the foundation on which the final stages in the peace process could take place. However, the process itself was not complete as the Garhajis remained alienated. Against this backdrop, a final conference, designed to conclude reconciliation between the Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis was organised in Beer for September 1996, with the Habar Je’lo initiating the invitation and agreeing to host the meeting (Siilaanyo, 2007b).

**Beer Conference (September 1996)**

After much discussion, the Beer gathering ended with a decision that a delegation involving both parties would be sent to the Hargeisa conference. However, it was also agreed that a statement be sent expressing strong reservations about the legitimacy of the conference, and calling on the government to allow the conclusion of reconciliation conferences throughout the country before attempting to map a constitutional programme (Peace-Committee, 1997: 5-6, section B).

Prisoners were also exchanged at Beer, and it was this Habar Je’lo-hosted meeting that completed a peace process that had, by then, involved a great deal of time, effort and perseverance on the part of a wide variety of different groups and individuals. Amongst other accommodations, the agreement of the Garhajis to attend the Hargeisa conference represented the conclusion to a difficult period (Siilaanyo, 2007b).

**Hargeisa Peace and Reconciliation Conference (October 1996 – February 1997)**

In contrast to previous occasions, including the obvious precedent, 1993’s national Borama conference, the Hargeisa event was funded by the government, and more than twice the number of delegates attended (315 in total). That total was made up of the 150 members of parliament’s two houses, plus an additional 165, representing all the Northern clans, for the first time including minority clans and female observers (WSP-International, 2005: 67 & 120n). Organisation was, once again, along beel (clan or community) lines, with numbers of delegates apportioned amongst clans using a formula adjusted from Borama to include minorities, and to increase representation for Habar Yoonis (WSP-International, 2005: 67 & 120n).

However, dissatisfaction remained widespread, with many echoing the issues raised by the Garhajis and complaining of government manipulation (WSP-International, 2005: 67). Having had to deal with government confusion over their own role, the Peace Committee, for example, found it difficult to present an image of neutrality, noting in one report, prepared during the conference, that:

“the political atmosphere is highly charged as factionalism and clan politicking (often funded by Egal) runs rampant. There is serious inter-clan and inter-regional polarisation as the political alignment becomes clear: Egal (with all the public resources at his disposal) against all the other candidates … The situation is fraught with danger and the potential for violence is high, especially if Egal buys his way back to power.” (Peace-Committee, 1997: 6)

Whether for that reason or not, Egal was reinstated as President and Dahir Rayale Kahin was elected as vice president for a term of five years. The conference also appointed 164 members to the House of Representatives and Guurti for terms of five and six years respectively, and replaced the National Charter with a provisional constitution introducing multi-party democracy and subject to approval by a referendum (WSP-International, 2005: 67).
1.4 Conclusion

1.4.1 Learning Lessons

The process of drawing ‘lessons’ from any process such as the one under discussion must be done with care. On the one hand, no interpretation or analysis of events can hope to escape a degree of subjectivity, no matter how hard the authors might try. On the other hand, were a given hypothesis widely accepted, it would run the risk of being adopted as some kind of blueprint for similar processes elsewhere, belying the huge degree of local specificity that must exist in any given situation. However, it is perhaps useful to consider some of the patterns that emerge from such an analysis. With cautious interpretation, there are doubtless lessons that can be learned and transferred in one form or another.

In the process of researching this report, a total of 39 peace and reconciliation conferences have been identified between February 1990 and February 1997. Of these, four were national in scope, of which two (Berbera and Burao, both in 1991) were concerned primarily with establishing a cessation of hostilities, while another two (Borama in 1993 and Hargeisa in 1997) were concerned with establishing the basis for future government. Another conference (Erigavo in 1993) involved all the clans in a specific region (Sanaag), while the remaining 34 involved two or more sub-clans or clans in resolving more localised issues.

A strong pattern is evident from this: clusters of localised conferences prepared the ground for the five national and regional meetings. In this manner, sub-clans were to resolve immediate disputes and agree the terms of future discussion before moving on to tackle issues of ongoing governance and national reconciliation.

There can be little doubt also that the SNM policy of reconciliation between Northern clans was a vital factor in enabling the process to begin in reasonably good faith.

An analysis of the actors taking part in the process is less consistent, but equally interesting. Traditional leaders often played a vital part (the meetings in Sheekh and Borama in 1992 and 1993 being excellent examples). However, there were also times when customary leadership failed to achieve significant headway (the Hargeisa/Burao conflicts of 1994-96 being the most obvious example). In such instances, the group with the greatest military (for example, the SNM in Berbera and Burao in 1991) or political strength (the Egal government in 1997) can contribute to a productive conference. On other occasions, local business-people or groups of concerned diaspora or citizens prove successful at initiating peace talks, while in other instances the initiative came from a clan or sub-clan. By and large, whoever takes the lead, some combination of these groups is needed in support.

It is also vital to recognise the role played by women in efforts to negotiate or facilitate peace. That role has taken many forms, but the degree to which the women spoken to thus far in this research insist on their role in pushing overwhelmingly male-dominated groups to work for peace cannot be ignored. The tactics they have adopted are frequently innovative and have often resulted in clear changes in decision or direction. It is also worth noting the enormous amount of effort and sacrifice that has driven the process forward. A good deal of that commitment has not resulted directly in successful outcomes, yet it is arguably one of the most important factors in success that many groups are looking for ways of achieving reconciliation. Perhaps in itself, this is a reflection of a society that is broadly (though obviously never solely) committed to finding peaceful means of resolving conflict.

In terms of funding, the vast bulk of the money required in Somaliland's reconciliation meetings was sourced from Somalilanders – either in the diaspora or within the country. In the case of the 1997 Hargeisa conference, funding was provided by the Government, but in all other cases, all but small contributions were raised from private sources. Again, the role played by women in raising funds for conferences should also be noted. Women's groups are frequently central to fundraising in general, so the same pattern might be observed in raising cash to fuel conflict as well. Either way, the part women play in resource mobilisation is clearly significant.
Given these contextual conditions, it is quite reasonable to describe the Somaliland process as largely ‘homegrown’ – domestically or diaspora-financed and organised as a result of initiatives taken by a diverse range of actors, drawing on broad support. Perhaps the most critical result of this was that the process was allowed to occur ‘organically’, with little external pressure to meet deadlines. Conversely, few people profited materially from the process beyond the benefits accruing from stability itself, meaning that there was little incentive for anyone to prolong the process.

There can never be any doubt that issues remain to be resolved, although whether this is a fact of an ever-evolving social and political environment, or a failing of the peace process, is open to debate. Somaliland and Puntland still dispute the status of Sool region, and while military advances by Somaliland in 2007 are significant, it remains to be seen whether the dispute itself has been resolved through military means. The Dhulbahante of the area were amongst the earliest of the SNM’s northern opponents to make peace, yet they have drifted from the process, with many becoming disillusioned with the reality of Somaliland. Perhaps, rather than a failing of the reconciliation process, this simply reflects the historic desire of the Dhulbahante to retain their independence. Unresolved issues also remain in Sanaag, where Puntland and Somaliland advance conflicting territorial claims. Again, though, it is hard to characterise this simply as a failing of the peace process.

Perhaps the major problem is that the vigorous process of peace-building that characterised the period between 1990 and 1997 seems to have stalled somewhat in more recent years. The establishment a functioning system of government has seen disputes politicised in an environment where the distinction between clan, party and government is sufficient to draw the lines of conflict, but as yet unable to provide the platform for its resolution.

1.4.2 Case Studies

The remainder of this report will focus on three ‘case study clusters’. The case studies were selected for several reasons: specifically, the need to examine a range of conferences, each of which were pivotal in some manner, but also had unique characteristics. In each case, it proved impossible to separate the concluding conference from the series of meetings that preceded it. Each case study therefore examines a series of meetings and conferences, culminating in one large conference. Each of the culminating conferences has a significantly different flavour, and in several ways this difference permeates the series leading to it, and justifies the selection of that cluster as a case study. A brief review of each of the concluding conferences, with a rationale for selection, follows:

**Burao conference, April-May 1991**

This conference marked the final stage in the cessation of hostilities, and was therefore the pivotal point in the first stage in the reconciliation process. The period immediately following Burao was also notable as one of lost opportunities: following a successful conference, the SNM government promptly lost the goodwill it had fostered.

**Borama conference, January-May 1993**

Another national conference, the nature of Borama was very different from Burao: the purpose of the conference was not to settle past grievances, so much as to establish the system of governance that would be employed in the future. It also marked the institutionalisation of the Guurti as a national political body with a role in initiating peace-building.

**Erigavo conference, August-November 1993**

Again, a different affair from those in Burao or Borama. The Erigavo conference was the culmination of a regional process marked by shifting clan alliances, and deep disagreements on the best way forward politically. The process deliberately excluded talk of national political reconciliation, yet occurred very much in parallel with the national process, and affected it and was affected by it.
2 BURAO CONFERENCE CASE STUDY

2.1 Introduction

After the 1991 collapse of Siyaad Barre’s authoritarian regime, the Somali National Movement (SNM), with their support based firmly within the Isaaq clan-family, was instrumental in ending hostilities with the clans that had supported the regime. They set about consolidating the peace and establishing security and a degree of governance in the Northern Regions. This was achieved through a series of meetings and conferences conducted between and within clan-families and clans, employing locally initiated clan-based conflict resolution approaches.

The first inter-clan conference on state-building and governance in the Northern Regions of former Somalia was held in Burao in May 1991. That conference is now remembered as the venue where all the clans in the Northern Regions combined to declare the restoration of the sovereignty of the State of Somaliland. It was also at the Burao conference that the first government of the new republic was established. In order to contribute to the consolidation of the peace in Sanaag, a peace-making committee comprising members from all the major clans in the Northern Regions was formed and despatched to the Sanaag region.

This case study examines the context in which the conference took place including the series of peace meetings that preceded it, and then moves on to examine the conference itself. The study will address the question of and how and why the decision was made to declare the restoration of Somaliland independence, and it will offer an analysis of the process of peace-building and state formation, with comments on lessons that can be drawn from it.

2.2 Context

2.2.1 Somali National Movement (SNM)

In 1981 the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in London by a group of Isaaq diaspora with the aim of ending the authoritarian rule of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Over time, Barre’s military regime, whose 1969 coup had initially been welcomed by many Somalis, had become increasingly brutal and repressive, and the Isaaq bore the brunt of many of its most extreme actions. With the formation of the SNM, the regime redoubled its campaign against the Isaaq in reprisal for their support for the rebel movement. Activities such as confiscation of property, arbitrary detention, torture and execution became frequent occurrences (Drysdale, 1994).

In 1982, the SNM established bases in Ethiopia, transforming their struggle into an armed one and enabling them to launch cross-border operations through the Isaaq-inhabited territories on the border with northern Somalia. The SNM’s armed struggle was mainly confined to the Northern Regions where they were better able to mobilise human and material resources from Isaaq clans who were sympathetic to their cause19.

The northern diaspora also played a critical role, providing the SNM with considerable material, moral and political support. The SNM had a strategy of creating linkages with non-Isaaq clans in an effort to diminish the effect of the divisive clan politics that had sustained Siyaad Barre in power. During the war, he had particularly attempted to mobilise Darood support for what he presented as a Darood government. This policy was partially successful. In Sanaag region for example, Siyaad Barre’s regime organised the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli (from the Harti branch of the Darood) to fight the Isaaq clans who were

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19 The SNM formed various strong alliances with resistance movements in the south, and at one time they included a significant Hawiye membership. However, these details are related to this study only in tangential terms, and will be raised only in the context in which they were important to the review herein.
supporting the SNM\textsuperscript{20}. He also curried favour with other non-Isaaq clans in the north by creating districts or regions to provide a political and administrative hub for the clan in question. In 1986, he created Awdal region for the Gadabuursi clan, Sool region for the Dhulbahante, and two districts, Dhahar and Laasqoray, for the Warsangeli (Gees, 2008a).

From its inception in 1981, the SNM experienced a great deal of internal conflict, yet achieved a notable capacity to resolve issues through dialogue. The first leader was Ahmed Mohamed Guuleed, elected on 6 April. Between April 1981 and May 1991, the movement had five chairmen\textsuperscript{21}; a rare feat for an insurgent movement, and unparalleled amongst the Somali resistance militia.

In April 1988, tiring of the expense of fighting each other when both had internal conflicts to worry about, Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopian and Siyaad Barre's Somali regimes reached a peace accord in Djibouti ('Gurey', 2007). The agreement included a commitment from the two dictators to end support for the guerrilla movements fighting each others' administration. For the SNM this meant loss of access to their bases in Ethiopian territory, as well as the end of weapons and ammunition supplied by Ethiopia. At the same time, the SNM's own internal struggles had reached such a critical point that the leadership had imprisoned their commanders in the western areas, and these factional disputes had grown beyond a simple political-military split to one that set military officers against each other. Faced with the loss of Ethiopian patronage and deep internal divisions, the SNM had a stark choice: either give up the struggle, or to adopt a much higher risk strategy of waging their war from within Somali territory ('Gurey', 2007).

Unwilling to capitulate, in May 1988 SNM fighters invaded military bases in Hargeisa and Burao and inflicted heavy damages on Siyaad Barre's regular army. Government forces retaliated with heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, targeting civilian residential areas in both cities. Thousands were killed or disabled and Hargeisa and Burao were largely destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of people, including many women and children, fled across the Ethiopian border to the Somali-inhabited Ogadeen as refugees. Others fled to territories in the northern regions where they had livestock and kinship links, and returned to a pastoralist lifestyle.

The Isaaq elders took a major role in the struggle against Siyaad Barre's regime. They collected subscriptions to support the struggle, and recruited militia from their clans. They also acted as mediators within the SNM in an effort to maintain cohesion. The SNM recognised the importance of this role, increasingly formalising a council of elders or guurti as an advisory body within the Movement whose remit extended to resource mobilisation (Sillaanyo, 2007a).

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\textsuperscript{20} Siyaad Barre himself identified with his father's Marehan clan, of the Darood clan-family. However, notwithstanding his success in mobilising many Harti to fight for his regime, the Majerteeen (also of the Harti branch of Darood) became some of his primary adversaries. Many of these wider clan conflicts are outside the remit of this study.

\textsuperscript{21} Ahmed Mohamed Guuleed ‘Jim’aale’ was replaced after one year by Sheekh Yusuf Ali Sheekh Madar, who won reelection in July 1983. He was replaced by Abdulqadir Koosar Abdi after only four months, who was in turn replaced by Ahmed Mohamed Sillaanyo in August of 1984. Sillaanyo also won

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Hassan Esa Jama on SNM as a model for democracy:

“Some of our Ethiopian friends were very curious to understand SNM’s internal conflict resolution. They often asked us how a movement in a struggle frequently changed its leadership, in a peaceful manner, and without affecting the progress of its struggle... They wanted to learn democracy from the SNM as democracy requires change of leadership without separation or fighting each other”.

[Hassan Esa Jama was a founder of SNM, Vice Chair in 1991, and the first Somaliland Vice-President.]

(Jamaac, 2007)
2.2.2 Talks with Dhulbahante

While the majority of Isaaq tended to side with the SNM, and many of the Harti with the government, the pattern was by no means absolute. In fact, a Dhulbahante group led by Garaad Ali Garaad Jama had met with the SNM in its earliest days, and later sought to join the Movement. There were contradictory opinions within the SNM leadership about Garaad Ali’s proposed membership (Gees, 2007a; Kaahin, 2007b) along with some suggestion that the Garaad and his team were not fully prepared to abandon their Mogadishu support to join the SNM (Kaahin, 2007b). At the time, the majority of the Dhulbahante were more inclined to follow Ahmed Sulaiman Daffle, who was supporting the regime of Siyaad Barre and who was the head of the National Security Service (NSS) (Kaahin, 2007b). When Garaad Ali Garaad Jama died, Garaad Abdiqani took his position as the first Garaad of Dhulbahante, who continued to maintain contact with the SNM.

Several peace initiatives, led by Garaad Abdiqani, took place in 1990 between the Isaaq and Dhulbahante in the towns of Qararro, Gowlalaale, Dannood and Gashaamo in the Ogadeen. This series of meetings led to early agreement on a cessation of hostilities between the two sides; a process that was continued in Oog in 1991 when the SNM took control of the region (APD, 2007a; Aw Ali Farah, 2007b; Kaahin, 2007b).

2.2.3 SNM Deal with USC and SPM

In order to widen its struggle to topple the dictator, and with Ethiopian support, the SNM had helped General Mohamed Farah Aydiid to establish the armed wing of the United Somali Congress (USC) and to initiate military operations in the Hawiye-inhabited regions of central Somalia. They had also supported the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogadeen clan-based armed movement, led by Colonel Ahmed Omer Jees in the Ogadeen-inhabited areas in the Lower Jubba region (Siilaanyo, 2007a).

The longest serving of the SNM chairmen, Ahmed Mohamed Siilaanyo, recalls SNM agreements with both the USC and the SPM to come together after the defeat of the regime to decide an appropriate joint approach to the establishment of a government in Somalia (Siilaanyo, 2007a). The SNM had no official policy to establish a separate government in the Northern Regions (Duale, 2007b; Kaahin, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a).

In 1991, the Somali National Movement took control of most of the Northern Regions of the former Somali Democratic Republic as the regime in Mogadishu was toppled. This area of dominance extended from Erigavo to Burao, Berbera, Hargeisa, Borama, and Lawya‘ado, which shares a border with Djibouti, and south to the Haud border with Ethiopia.

The SNM immediately set about organising meetings to consolidate the peace, and to initiate dialogue with those clans who had been hostile to it. The biggest, although not the first, of these meetings was in Burao which ran from late April until June 1991. Prior to this meeting the SNM leadership and other non-Isaaq northern clans had been upset by the declaration of an interim government in Mogadishu by Ali Mahdi’s section of the USC, without consultation with the SNM, which broke the earlier agreement between the SNM, USC and SPM (Siilaanyo, 2007a). Perhaps more than any other single factor, this was the catalyst for the SNM and the clans in the Northern Regions to declare the establishment of a separate government in the Northern Regions.
2.3 Origins of Burao Conference

2.3.1 Peace-Building between Isaaq and Dhulbahante (February-September 1990\textsuperscript{22})

Before the fall of the Siyaad Barre regime, the SNM had established a policy of rapprochement with the non-SNM clans\textsuperscript{23} (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a; Aw Ali Farah, 2007a; Kaahin, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a). Inevitably, there was a great deal of nervousness about whether that policy would be applied, but remarkably it was.

Isaaq and Darood clans share grazing lands and water resources in the vast Somali-inhabited Ogadeen in Ethiopia, as well as within Somaliland’s borders. During the war with the Siyaad Barre regime, the Ethiopian towns of Dannood and Gashaamo were particularly prone to resource-based conflicts. The hostilities between them restricted pastoralists’ movement in search of grazing and water.

Early in 1990, Garaad Abdiqani Garaad Jama of the Dhulbahante initiated a peace mission with the aim of ending these hostilities between the Dhulbahante and Isaaq. The Garaad started his peace mission by sending two men with a message to the Habar Yoonis in Dannood inviting them to meet. The Habar Yoonis accepted the invitation and fixed a date when his delegation would travel to Dannood for the discussion. Dannood is a small village, famous for its water reservoir which has been shared by Isaaq and Darood for more than a century.

On 10th February, Garaad Abdiqani visited Qararro, a Dhulbahante settlement also in the Ogadeen, to consult with his people about the meeting they would have with the Habar Yoonis in Dannood. While Abdiqani was there, the Habar Je’lo in Gowlalaale, a few kilometres from Qararro, heard news of Abdiqani’s peace initiative. A number of elders and young men walked to Qararro to meet Garaad Abdiqani to discuss peace, and they held an impromptu but formal meeting, agreeing to exchange looted livestock and to share grazing lands peacefully. During that meeting, Abdiqani extended an invitation to the Habar Je’lo to participate in the planned meeting with the Habar Yoonis in Dannood. When the Habar Je’lo had returned to Gowlalaale, they organised a more powerful delegation to participate in the Dannood peace meeting.

The Dhulbahante and the Habar Je’lo both travelled to Dannood on 20th February as planned to participate in the meeting. However, when they arrived, the Habar Yoonis refused to join them as they had been expecting only the Dhulbahante delegation. Unwilling to leave empty-handed, the Dhulbahante and the Habar Je’lo delegations opened their own meeting in Dannood and agreed to consolidate the peace that they had already agreed in Qararro.

Once the Qararro meeting had concluded, the Dhulbahante sent a complaint to the Habar Yoonis asking why they had refused to attend the Dannood meeting, to which the Habar Yoonis responded with an invitation for the two parties to meet in Gashaamo. They agreed to meet after the SNM’s Sixth Congress in Baligubadle, which was to be held in March and April 1990. As planned, the two delegations travelled to Gashaamo once the Congress had finished, and as with the Habar Je’lo earlier, the two agreed to cease hostilities and to share grazing lands peacefully.

Before this, and immediately prior to the Baligubadle Congress, the Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante had also held another meeting in Gowlalaale. It was larger than that in Qararro, involving high-ranking Habar Je’lo officers from the SNM. The two clans strengthened their earlier understanding and made further agreements regarding the peace between them. At that meeting, the Habar Je’lo invited Abdiqani to visit the SNM base in Baligubadle (Giir, 2007).

\textsuperscript{22} Much of the detail in the account about these early meetings between Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante is based on an interview with Saeed Ali Giir, who was the secretary of the Dhulbahante delegation which travelled with Garaad Abdiqani during his peace mission in 1990 to the Isaaq clans.

\textsuperscript{23} During the time of the Siyaad Barre regime the Esa from Awdal had formed an alliance with the SNM, effectively becoming the most significant non-Isaaq clan to become a part of the SNM resistance (as opposed to joining as individuals who happened to be non-Isaaq).
Garaad Abdiqani Garaad Jama accepted the invitation, arriving at the SNM headquarters in Baligubadle on 15th September. They stayed in the town for some ten days; a visit that culminated with a meeting with the SNM Executive Committee on 25th and 26th September. At that meeting, the Garaad and his delegates expressed their regret at the scale of the crimes committed by Siyaad Barre’s regime against the Isaaq in 1988. The two sides agreed to continue the peace process that was already underway, and the SNM also accepted that crimes committed by the Siyaad Barre regime would not be attributed to specific clans, although individuals would still be held responsible for their own misdeeds (Duale, 2007d). Garaad Abdiqani left Baligubadle to continue his peace-building in the Dhulbahante-inhabited areas around Laas ‘Aanood and Buuhoodle. However, he left some members of his delegation in Baligubadle at the request of the SNM, who wanted to show their commitment to avoiding conflict with the clans that supported Siyaad Barre’s regime. By continuing to host some of the Dhulbahante group in Baligubadle, they hoped to demonstrate this goodwill, showing their focus on fighting the army of Siyaad Barre, rather than the militia of non-Isaaq clans. (Kaahin, 2007b).

The Gadabuursi politician, Jama Rabile, also visited the SNM in Ethiopia in the hope of initiating a similar dialogue between the Gadabuursi and SNM. His approach did not come to anything at the time, although it did give the SNM hope that the Gadabuursi might be willing also to drop their opposition to the SNM (Aw Ali Farah, 2007b).

### 2.3.2 Oog Meeting (February 1991)

When the SNM took over the Northern Regions in January 1991, Dhulbahante elders and military officers in Laas ‘Aanood contacted the SNM leadership by radio and fixed a date for the parties to meet in the village of Oog, on the road between Burao and Laas ‘Aanood. Oog has traditionally been inhabited by both Dhulbahante and Isaaq clans, although at that time, it was occupied mainly by the Dhulbahante (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a).

In early February 1991, senior officers of the SNM together with Isaaq elders (Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo and Esa Muse) went to Oog and met with the Dhulbahante delegates. Initially, the Dhulbahante were suspicious that the SNM may not be trustworthy and that they might intend to attack them (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a). To demonstrate their intent, the SNM delegation agreed to leave their weapons outside Oog. They and their Dhulbahante counterparts then talked together and chatted, renewing acquaintances and friendships that had been suspended during the war (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a; Kaahin, 2007b).

It was an exceptional meeting, at which people who had been fighting each other for almost ten years finally sat down to eat together. The two sides agreed on a cessation of hostilities and a continuation of the peace process that had begun in 1990. They also decided that each side should take responsibility for the creation of a non-hostile environment in their own areas, informing their people that peace had been agreed between the clans (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a). It was agreed that a meeting would be held in Berbera to

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24 The SNM group included Mohamed Kaahin and Hassan Kayd; the Dhulbahante included Da’ood Ismail Hassan, Ibrahim Aydik, Sa’eed Awad Banaar and Abshir Saah, all of whom had been colleagues in the Somali army, although they had not seen each other for the decade prior to the Oog meeting (Saleebaan ‘Afqarshe’, 2008).
To prevent the continuation of any more killings between the warring militias, the elders of the Jibril Abokor and the Gadabuursi came together in Dilla, in February 1991, while the dead bodies were still there, and agreed to go to Borama for a peace-making meeting. SNM militia were in Borama and were under the control of Haybe Omer and Abdirahman Aw Ali [both were SNM colonels: Haybe from Jibril Abokor; Abdirahman from Gadabuursi]. The latter was also charged with the overall responsibility of the Awdal region. The elders from the two sides held a three-day meeting in Borama and agreed to end hostilities between the clans. A committee of fourteen persons comprising of Gadabuursi and Jibril Abokor was selected to convey the peace agreement to their clans-men. The Jibril Abokor elders of the committee went to the coastal areas where at that time the SNM armed militias were around Zeila area, which was a passage of merchandise from Djibouti. The Gadabuursi elders went to their settlements and explained to their clans-men the peace agreements reached between the Gadabuursi and the Jibril Abokor. The elders, during their peace mission, met a lot of problems as the area was mountainous and it was difficult for the available lorries to get to the required destinations. Sometimes when some of the elders were unable to walk, their colleagues used to carry them on the back of camels. The elders were in a peace caravan for fourteen days and they dissipated the enmity between the clans. They came back to Borama for the continuation of their peace mission and to address the problems on the ground: visible looted properties and land confiscated from the owners.

(Chief ‘Aaqil Abdi ‘Idlle Amaan in APD, 2007d)
2.3.4 Berbera meeting (15th to 27th February 1991)

While these local meetings were taking place in Awdal, the SNM organised a meeting in Berbera from 15th to 27th February to agree a ceasefire at a national level. The Executive Committee of the SNM, augmented by 30 members of the Central Committee hosted a meeting of all the major clans of the Northern Regions. Warsangeli, Dhulbahante and Gadabuursi elders all attended along with the Isaaq clans and their Esa allies (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a; Kaahin, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a).

This was the first peace meeting to involve all the large clans of the Northern Regions, and it was known as Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga (Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans). Berbera was selected as the venue because it had suffered considerably less structural damage than the other large Isaaq towns at the hands of Siyaad Barre's forces (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007a).

The major point of discussion was a reiteration of the SNM policy that they would not undertake reprisals against the clans that had supported the defeated regime, and a negotiation as to how this policy would work in practice. Many officers and soldiers of the Siyaad Barre regime had been captured in Berbera, so the SNM's actions with regard to them offered an example of how the policy of non-retribution might be applied. Some officers who had committed war crimes were tried on the spot and executed, but the majority were given safe passage to return home (ICG, 2003: 8). The indications were sufficient for the conference to agree to a general ceasefire.

The following specific points were adopted (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007a):
1. The reconciliation process between the clans was to be continued;
2. The government formed in Mogadishu was irrelevant to the people in the Northern Regions;
3. A conference for the Northern clans would be held in Burao in April to agree a process of state building;
4. The SNM would take responsibility for the administration of the country until the next Conference in Burao;
5. Clans would refrain from reprisals and other actions which might provoke war;
6. All clans would participate fully in the scheduled Burao conference, which would take place two months after the Berbera conference had concluded (and after Ramadan had finished);
7. Every clan would be responsible, in the meantime, for its own technicals and militias.

2.4 Burao Conference (27th April to 4th June 1991)

With a ceasefire agreed and a level of trust established amongst the clans of the Northern Regions, they assembled in Burao for a conference that was primarily intended to establish governance across the Northern Regions. The Burao conference known as Shinweynaha Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga (Grand Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans) took place from 27th April to 4th June. Burao had been chosen as the venue on the basis of its location at the centre of the Northern Regions (Duale, 2007a).

A preparatory committee had been formed at the Berbera meeting to prepare an agenda, to identify suitable venues and to secure funding for the conference (Duale, 2007a). The Berbera meeting had already established the conference objectives, with the main items being the consolidation of the peace process, and the appointment of a government. Each clan had also agreed to supply a larger delegation than had been present at the Berbera meeting.

Representatives of all the Northern clans, including politicians, diaspora, business people, poets, women, religious men and traditional elders (Garaads, Sultans, Ugaas and other respected elders without titles) all attended, with nominated delegates participating in the formal proceedings (Duale, 2007a).
The conference consisted of two meetings: a meeting of the elders representing all the major clans in the Northern Regions; and a meeting of the Central Committee of the SNM (Duale, 2007b; Kaahin, 2007b). The venue selected for the Central Committee meeting was a hall built by a former Somali government in Burao's Sha'ab area, which had been the site of government offices since the colonial period (Kaahin, 2007b). The building itself had been severely damaged during the war, and was missing its roof, so required hasty renovation before the meeting could start. The elders’ meeting was held under a tree near to the Central Committee's hall.

2.4.1 Elders’ Meeting (27th April to 5th May 1991)

The meeting of the elders commenced on 27th April. The meeting was organised by the chairing committee (shirguddoon) of the Isaaq Guurti, which had been created at the SNM's Sixth Congress in Baligubadle. Each sub-clan sent representatives according to traditional clan formulae. The Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Gadabuursi had ten representatives each, while the Isaaq were represented by the Guurti mandated by the SNM, giving the Isaaq delegation a slight majority. The Esa, which had an alliance with the SNM at that time, were represented within the SNM structure. The meeting was chaired by Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yussuf Sheekh Madar, the Chair of the Isaaq/SNM Guurti while the Guurti secretariat prepared the agenda and recorded the proceedings (Duale, 2007a; Habane Dheere, 2007).

The elders’ meeting covered a number of critical issues: the need to secure a lasting peace; to agree a system for the return of physical assets such as houses and vehicles that had been looted; and to identify an appropriate system under which the Northern Regions could be governed in the future (Shukri Hariir in APD, 2008). According to Adan Ahmed Diiriye the elders discussed what advantage had been gained by the Northern Regions from its union with the south, concluding only that it had led to a huge loss of life and the destruction of their main cities. However, they also agreed that what had happened could not be attributed to any clan or clans.

The elders focused particularly on the existence of historical relationships and traditional values shared amongst the clans in the Northern Regions. They discussed previous cycles of conflict and peace, and the systems that had been used in the past to resolve difficulties. The conclusion the reached on a number of occasions was that the unification with the southern and eastern Somali territories to form Somalia had effectively undermined many of the traditional conflict-resolution systems (Duale, 2007a). These deliberations reflected the strong popular feeling in favour of establishment of a separate administration based on the pre-independence borders of the British Somaliland Protectorate (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a; Duale, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a). Ultimately, they agreed seven resolutions to be submitted to the Central Committee as recommendations (Elders’-Meeting, 1991).

1. That the North would proceed separately from the South;
2. That Sharia law would be adopted;
3. That the security of the North would be ensured;
4. That a government would be established in the North as quickly as possible;
5. That local and national government positions and national constituencies would be distributed justly amongst the northern clans; and
6. The issue of peace in Sanaag would be pursued by a special committee.
7. The SNM veterans would be a priority in the recruitment of jobs.

After the elders had agreed the six points they selected a group of seventeen elders, plus the Chair, to sign the resolution on behalf of all the Northern clans. The signed resolution was then submitted to the Central Committee for endorsement and so that they could publicly announce the decision.
2.4.2 SNM Central Committee Meeting (5th May to 4th June 1991)

Once the elders’ meeting had concluded, the Central Committee started their own meeting under the chairmanship of Ibrahim Maigag Samatar, who had been elected Chair at the Baligubadle congress. He read out the resolutions from the elders’ meeting, and there was discussion (Jamaac, 2007). The Committee did not consider each resolution separately: they dealt with them as a package, but the most significant resolution was obviously that declaring Somaliland’s independence from the South. Full independence had never been SNM policy, and a majority of the SNM leadership (notably including Abdirahman ‘Tuur’) did not support it, probably preferring some kind of decentralised autonomy within a Somali state (Ali, 2007; Duale, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a), believing the economy too weak to survive in the face of international rejection (Drysdale, 1994: 139-140).

However, abandonment of the union with the South was widely popular amongst many people in the Northern Regions – particularly but by no means exclusively amongst the Isaaq (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a; Duale, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a). While the meeting of the elders had been underway, the crowd outside the venue was building, including many armed militia and civilians from throughout Somaliland. The gathering was voluble, and increasingly they were demanding independence. The sentiment had already been fuelled by Ali Mahdi’s 31 January declaration of a Mogadishu-based government to cover “… the whole of Somalia, from Zeila … to Ras Kamboni …” (Siilaanyo, 2007a). That declaration had been made without consultation with the SNM, and in direct challenge to their closest ally in the southern United Somali Congress (USC), General Mohamed Farah Hassan ‘Aydiid’ (Drysdale, 1994: 140).

The clamour reached a crescendo on 15th May. With the Central Committee meeting underway, Radio Mogadishu announced that SNM leaders had agreed to attend a meeting in Cairo even though SNM Foreign Affairs Secretary, Suleiman Gaal, had explicitly rejected their participation. The spectre of a return to unilateral rule from Mogadishu loomed, and the northern reaction was vociferous. While the mood in Burao was generally celebratory, support for independence was also accompanied by a latent threat of violence from the many militia in the crowd (Duale, 2007b; Siilaanyo, 2007a).

In the event, the unilateralism of Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu and the emotion outside the Burao meeting hall proved impossible to resist. The Central Committee’s concern turned instead to the resolution itself. While the intent behind the statement that the North would ‘proceed separately’ from the South might have been clear, the wording that the elders’ meeting had adopted was not. The resolution didn’t state explicitly that Somaliland would become a sovereign nation, based on colonial borders. The Committee therefore altered

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A Warsangeli view on Somaliland Independence

When the restoration of Somaliland independence was declared, every clan selected a spokesman to show their support. Garaad Saleebaan Dahir Afqarshe recalls the comments of Ahmed Sheekh Salah, the Warsangeli delegate and later a member of the Somaliland national Guurti (Gees, 2008a): “The Isaaq made agreements with the colonial governments to enter the country in the 19th Century and we accepted that decision; the Isaaq initiated the struggle against colonial rule and we accepted that; the Isaaq initiated and agreed in 1960 to the unification of Somaliland with Somalia and we accepted; the Isaaq initiated the struggle against the government of Siyaad Barre without consulting us; and today the Isaaq initiated and agreed to revoke the union from Somalia and we are firmly accepting that too. Now the Isaaq should keep in mind that we will never accept it, if tomorrow you decide to re-unite with Somalia.” The participants in the conferences roared with laughter and applause.

(Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007d)

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25 Aw Ali actually notes that the Gadabuursi had made a specific decision in Borama to push for independence some time before the Burao conference (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a).
the wording to state that Somaliland would ‘revert to the legal status it held on 26th June 1960’, when the country had received independence from Britain (Duale, 2007b).

Finally, the Committee added a seventh resolution stating that SNM mujaahidiin would be preferred when positions were being filled with the establishment of the new government (Duale, 2007b). The intention was to use this as a means of facilitating the demobilisation process and rewarding the service of those who had contributed to the SNM’s military success. In the event, the first batch of Somaliland police were recruited from amongst demobilised militia, and international NGOs and UN agencies also recruited a few as security staff (Duale, 2007a).

The six resolutions put forward by the Elders’ Meeting are presented in Somali in ‘Annex II: First Somaliland Council of Ministers’, below, and in English on page 34, above. An English version of the resolutions endorsed by the Central Committee is as follows (Duale, 2007b):

1. Northern Regions to revert to the legal status held on 26th June 1960;
2. Sharia law to be adopted;
3. To assure the security of the Northern Regions;
4. To establish a Northern government as soon as possible;
5. To distribute government positions and national houses equally to all of the northern clans;
6. Peace in Sanaag should be pursued with the nomination of a special committee to facilitate negotiations; and
7. The SNM mujaahidiin to be given priority in recruitment for government positions.

The seven Committee members present26 endorsed this amended package of resolutions, and according to Drysdale, ‘Tuur’ then sent a message to Ali Mahdi as early as Thursday 16 May, warning him of the intention to declare independence two days later (Drysdale, 1994: 140).

On 18th May 1991, the Central Committee had a large open space prepared for a big gathering. All the participants at the Burao conference, including delegates to both of the conference meetings: garaads, suldaans, members of the Guurti and the Central Committee itself, SNM militia and officers, diaspora members and business people and many others assembled. There were hundreds in the immediate area, with thousands nearby, all waiting expectantly for the declaration of independence. When the time came, the Chair of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’, stood in front of the crowd and read out the seven resolutions that had been adopted by the Central Committee. The first of the resolutions was the one confirming restored sovereignty for Somaliland and it was met with a huge cheer, then once the speeches were over, the festive atmosphere continued long into the evening (Kaahin, 2007a).

The meeting continued for almost three weeks after the declaration of independence, ultimately concluding on 4 June. With independence publicly declared, debate within the Central Committee moved on to the system of government, with much argument centred on the extent of presidential power. A full day was allowed for this discussion alone. Some favoured a distribution of responsibility between a non-executive president and a prime minister: a system that they felt would reduce the capacity of a strong president to act in an authoritarian manner. Others felt that this would unnecessarily confuse the situation, and that a strong leader was needed to steer the country through the daunting challenges ahead. For that group, an executive president, unimpeded by competition with a prime minister was the logical option (SNM-Central-Committee, 1991b). ‘Tuur’ initially sided with Siilaanyo in supporting a prime minister (Siilaanyo, 2007a) but, part-way through the debate, he changed his position, and the final vote showed a majority of 13 in favour

26 The Central Committee had a total of 99 members, elected at the Sixth Congress held in Baligubadle in April and May 1990. In addition, ten reserve positions had been created to allow for new members from the non-SNM clans (Duale, 2007a).
of an executive president; a position that ‘Tuur’ himself then assumed, as Chair of the SNM (Drysdale, 1994: 141-142).

The vice-chairman of the SNM, Hassan Esa Jama, was confirmed as the new Vice President, and a Council of Ministers was created, consisting of 18 ministers and 4 vice-ministers and reporting directly to the President as part of the executive branch (the names of those appointed are listed in ‘Annex II: First Somaliland Council of Ministers’). This government was given an initial tenure of two years and the names of those appointed are listed in ‘Annex II: First Somaliland Council of Ministers’. The Central Committee itself was transformed into a Constituent Assembly, who would act as a parliament. Seats were added for representatives of the non-Isaaq clans; these new assembly members were to be selected by their clans in time to join the Assembly for its first meeting on 15th July 1991.

The agenda for the rest of the meeting focused on the challenges facing the country at what was a turbulent time. The delegates discussed the history and aftermath of the war with the Siyaad Barre regime, and the decisions that would need to be made before the meeting concluded. Amongst other issues, they were keen to establish the context and rationale behind the declaration of independence. Consequently, they developed a short statement intended to precede the written record of the resolutions, a translation of which reads as follows (SNM-Central-Committee, 1991a):

- At the time of independence from colonial rule in 1960, British Somaliland and the Italian Trusteeship of Somalia were different entities and had experienced different and separate recent histories;
- The Constitution formalising the merger of the two countries had never been legally ratified;
- The people of the Northern Regions had clearly rejected that unifying Constitution in a referendum in 1961; and
- During the period following unification with the ex-Italian Trusteeship, the people of the Northern Regions had been subject to deliberate injustice, destruction, and killings.

They also determined that a committee be established to select a national flag and emblem, and some time was spent debating the name of the newly proclaimed state (Duale, 2007a). Three names were suggested; namely Somaliland, Puntland, and Shankaroon. Each of these options bore some historical connection with the Northern Regions. Somaliland reflects the eighty years of colonial rule in which the territory was known as the Protectorate of British Somaliland. Puntland is derived from the word ‘punt’, which in turn relates to the frankincense and myrrh grown in the Sanaag mountains near Erigavo. The ancient Egyptians are said to have used incense from those trees and many believe that this was the area they referred to as the ‘Land of Punt’. Shankaroon, literally meaning ‘better than the five’, alludes to the five Somali territories of ex-Italian Somaliland, ex-British Somaliland, Djibouti (ex-French Somaliland), the Northern Frontier District in Kenya, and the Haud/Ogadeen under the control of Ethiopia. Each of these areas is populated predominantly by ethnic Somalis, and it is to these five territories that the five-pointed star on the flag of the Somali Republic refers. Once independence had been won from the British and Italians in 1960, the northern clans had willingly united with the South in the belief that the other three would follow their lead. That hope was quickly dashed when Djibouti rejected the proposal in a referendum. In the end, the name Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliland or Republic of Somaliland was selected.

2.4.3 Funding

The Burao conference was resourced by local and diaspora Somalilanders, with the diaspora contributing funds and local people providing sheep and camels as well as other support (Saleebaan ‘Afqarshe’, 2008). Women and elders played prominent roles in raising money and mobilising resources. Indeed, the elders had
long played a fairly formal role in terms of organising resources for the SNM, with women integrally involved behind the scenes. After almost a decade of war, the SNM by this stage had established a highly effective capacity for fund-raising and resource mobilisation, which they employed for the Burao conference. As the delegates were organised on the basis of clan, they also received an individual *sahay* (per diem) contributed by their clan groups (Duale, 2007a).

### 2.4.4 Outputs of the Conference

The most memorable, and arguably the most significant output of the Burao conference was the declaration of the restoration of sovereignty on 18th May. However, the conference also had to deal with a great many immediate issues. Paramount amongst these was the need to agree the terms under which a fragile peace could be confirmed across the Northern Regions, including provision of support for peace-building activities in areas where that peace was still some way off, in particular in Sanaag. Another facet of this focus on security was the need to find a means to demobilise SNM militia without outbreaks of conflict. Government institutions were largely non-existent, and after years of war, there was no civil service whatsoever, so the process of building a viable administration also demanded urgent attention.

Agreeing the seven resolutions detailed above was therefore only the start of the work done by the Central Committee. The process of appointing a government has already been related, and clearly represents another major conference output. They also determined that the new government would be required to draft a constitution within its two-year mandate. In the event, this process was hampered by a lack of the necessary understanding, skill-levels and commitment, and was not achieved within the timeframe allocated (the study of the Borama conference relates the process of agreeing a National Charter, which was effectively the constitution which the ‘Tuur’ administration failed to draw up).

The Sanaag peace process is also detailed elsewhere in this report, but the degree to which the difficulties in that region impacted on the Burao conference is also notable in this context. The complex nature of the conflict between the clans of Sanaag, and the way in which alliances were shifting between the two Isaaq and two Harti clans, generated a great deal of discussion in Burao. The Elders’ Meeting proposed a special committee with representatives from each of the northern clans be sent to Sanaag to assist with reconciliation, a recommendation endorsed by the Central Committee.

The falling out between the Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis in Sanaag, and the tensions between the eastern Isaaq (Isaaq-bari) and their central clans-folk, illustrated the fragile nature of the peace established in Burao, which did indeed flare into open conflict, as related elsewhere in this report.

### 2.5 Analysis

#### 2.5.1 Why Somaliland Independence was Restored

The immediate context to the decision to declare the restoration of Somaliland sovereignty has already been outlined. As was noted, a number of members of the Central Committee were not in favour of the move, and it was never SNM policy. However, the surge of vociferous public support, and the missteps of politicians and military leaders in Mogadishu forced the issue. However, this is obviously not the full story, and it is worthwhile reviewing some of the history that led to the declaration.

An appropriate starting point in recent Somali history is the process of decolonisation that occurred just prior to and after independence from the Italian and British powers in 1960. At the time of independence, those in the Northern Regions enthusiastically opted for union with the south, hoping that the other Somali
regions in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti would join the ex-Italian and British Somalilands. This was not to be, and northern dissatisfaction with the union was not long in surfacing.

The new government established Mogadishu as the seat of government, a southerner was appointed President, and the majority of senior cabinet posts were allocated to southerners as well. To make matters worse, the Somaliland Prime Minister, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, was not told of plans for the new leadership structure until after they had been leaked to the British. Egal initially only received the post of Minister of Education (although he was later to be appointed Prime Minister) and the feeling that the north had been unfairly overlooked was significant. When a referendum was held in June 1961 to approve the new Constitution, northerners overwhelmingly rejected it, and six months later, a group of British-trained officers attempted a coup aimed at restoring independence to Somaliland. The rapidity with which initial enthusiasm for the union had evaporated was remarkable (Drysdale, 1994: 132-134).

Initially, many Somalis welcomed Siyaad Barre’s coup in 1969 as the removal of a corrupt civilian government. However, once again, northern disillusion grew quickly. Disaffection was mitigated when he attacked Ethiopian forces in the Ogadeen, an event which served to unite Somalis for a time. When that venture ultimately failed, however, he increasingly resorted to a reign of terror, employing torture, extra-judicial detention, summary execution, and ultimately the bombardment and the destruction of the two biggest cities in the North. By the end, there was no question that his regime had deliberately targeted the Isaaq (amongst others), and resistance had become entrenched (Drysdale, 1994: 134-136).

With the launch of the SNM in 1981, and more particularly, the heavy-handed attack on a Hargeisa student demonstration in February 1982, that resistance found an armed expression. As a result of the violent repression of the Hargeisa protest, the SNM moved operations to Ethiopian territory, and began attacks on Siyaad Barre’s forces (Drysdale, 1994: 136-137). During the subsequent struggle, the idea of a separate government for the Northern Regions gained popularity (Siilaanyo, 2007a). The issue was discussed in the last SNM Congress in Baligubadle in 1990 in which Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ was elected as the chairman of the movement (Kaahin, 2007b). Northern independence was never adopted as SNM policy, but remained a popular underlying sentiment amongst the rank and file of the SNM. A minority group in the SNM, many of them within the leadership, opposed independence, but by the time of the Burao conference, enough amongst them had obviously changed their minds for the resolution to be passed. There is little doubt that the destruction of Hargeisa and Burao was a key factor in changing the minds of those who were unsure (Mohamed Ismail Adan in APD, 2007c; Duale, 2007b; Kaahin, 2007b), as was the clamour of support amongst those who gathered in Burao when the decision was being made. But perhaps the most critical immediate catalyst was Ali Mahdi’s declaration of the formation of a government in Mogadishu. Ali Mahdi’s declaration came without consultation with the SNM, and broke the agreement they had with the USC, on whose behalf he claimed to be acting. That development seemed to confirm that

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**A Dhulbahante view of independence**

The elders and the people of Dhulbahante were in favour of independence ... There was a general consensus among the Dhulbahante at the time that favoured secession ... The reasons were that the situation that existed that day was completely different from the present situation because all the people needed peace and cooperation ... The SNM demonstrated honesty, responsibility and a willingness to seek consensus ... Many personalities, who now clamoured against the separate government of the North were in Burao on that very day and witnessed the decision taken by the masses ... Garaad Jama was against the merger with Somalia even in 1960 ... The elders who recommended the decision were those who had taken part in the independence gained from Britain in 1960 ... The people who wanted independence restored were happy because intellectuals and politicians supported the decision. (*Aaqil Ismail Ahmed Gaas in APD, 2007c*).
Siyaad Barre’s clan politics and the old Mogadishu-based hegemony would be replayed by the next regime (Drysdale, 1994: 140; Siilaanyo, 2007a).

Ali Mahdi’s announcement occurred on 31 January 1991, two weeks prior to the Berbera conference, called to agree a northern ceasefire. Once the Berbera conference had finished, each clan had two months in which to meet within their sub-clans and to select representatives for the Burao conference. During that time, there was much discussion about the future direction of the Northern Regions.

Views undoubtedly hardened during that time. The Gadabuursi, for example, discussed the matter in Borama and decided before they came to Burao to support the idea of establishing a separate government for the Northern Regions (Habane Dheere, 2007). Many amongst the Dhuulbahante had also reached a similar position (see boxed text).

Ahmed Haji Ali ‘Adami’, a member of the Warsangeli delegation at the Burao conference (and more recently the first Chair of the National Electoral Commission of Somaliland), noted a similar sentiment within his clan: “… the situation in Mogadishu was very dangerous for the Darood people after the fall of Siyaad Barre in January 1991. Non-Isaaq clans had no expectation of returning to Mogadishu at that time. We rented a special aeroplane from Nairobi to participate in the Burao conference … The elders, the Garaads and the politicians of the Non-Isaaq clans were there and opted to cooperate with the SNM and the Isaaq clans in the Northern Regions.” (‘Adami’, 2008).

2.6 Lessons Learnt

The Burao conference and the build-up to it followed a similar pattern to that which is evident in each of the Somaliland case studies: issues were dealt with in a series of peace-making and conflict resolution meetings in which clan groups resolved the most pressing problems first before moving on to higher level issues of governance and the mechanics and principles to be applied in future conflict resolution. This meant the first step had to be an agreement to end hostilities between rivals, followed by the return of looted property and exchange of prisoners, before progressing to the demobilisation of militia and the formation of a government. The Burao conference was the culmination of the first of these series.

A number of factors contributed specifically to the success of the series of meetings leading to the Burao conference:

- Initially, the SNM’s military dominance in the Northern Regions was clear, providing an unequivocal focus for negotiation between clans;
- The SNM policy of non-recrimination against the non-SNM northern clans enabled a meaningful dialogue between adversaries, in which clans that had supported the Siyaad Barre regime were able to play a genuine part in negotiating the terms of peace;
- The civil war had been fought between the SNM and the Siyaad Barre regime, rather than being a clan-based conflict. This can be a difficult distinction to analyse, because Siyaad Barre clearly employed a policy designed to accentuate divisions between clans in an effort to sustain his own rule. However, the fact that the Harti and Gadabuursi played such an important role in post-war reconciliation and peacemaking is perhaps an effective illustration of this;
- When divisions within the SNM flared into conflict, the system of customary leadership remained sufficiently strong for elders to apply traditional conflict resolution procedures;
- Events in the south served as a powerful reminder of many of the things that were most despised about successive governments after the union in 1960. The announcement by Ali Mahdi of the establishment
of a government in Mogadishu without consultation with the SNM and in violation of agreements between the SNM and USC was probably the single most important of these.

There were also a number of more general factors that can be said to have contributed to the broader process of reconciliation in the Northern Regions. One of these is undoubtedly the sense of local ‘ownership’ of the process. Negotiations occurred largely away from the view of external actors. There was some awareness and some limited support for conferences, but the peace process was overwhelmingly an indigenous one. The reconciling parties were therefore familiar with the conflict resolution traditions that formed the basis for meetings and negotiations. Traditional elders, who were known to their clans-fold and largely trusted by them, played an important role, and the influence of external factors (individuals or organisations) with foreign agendas was limited.

This ‘localisation’ of the process extended to funding: the vast majority of the resources required to run the meetings and conferences was sourced from local people, or from Somaliland diaspora. This undoubtedly constrained the process at times, but more significant was the effect it had in sustaining the sense of local ‘ownership’ and focusing the minds of those taking part on the resources available for negotiation. There is an apposite Somali proverb: *haddii la doonayo in cid nabadda la ogoleysiyo daankaa lagu dilaa*, meaning ‘if it is intended to make one side accept the peace that side should be burdened with feeding the guests’. There was always an awareness of who was paying, how far the resources would stretch and the implications for the process itself (Rashiid Gadhweyne in APD, 2007b).

This can be contrasted with some of the conferences that have occurred elsewhere in the Somali territories, which might better be described by the phrase *waxbaa meesha lagu futeynayaa*, or ‘a thing on which extravagant expenditure is lavished’. Such an approach can be criticised for allowing participants to forget the burden of peace-making, and thus to forget the importance of their own role in it (Rashiid Gadhweyne in APD, 2007b).

3.1 Introduction

The period immediately after the declaration of the restoration of sovereignty in Burao was marked by rapid economic growth, social stability and a sense of euphoria. Livestock exports showed rapid growth, and many took advantage of the new-found sense of security and freedom to rebuild domestic and commercial premises, to establish or develop businesses and generally to resume the normal activities of daily life. However, this initial moment of stability did not last long. Tension amongst Isaaq sub-clans, which had been suppressed during the struggle against Siyaad Barre, started to surface and was exacerbated by the number of young fighters who suddenly found themselves armed yet unemployed. Petty disputes over allocation of weapons, distribution of aid and similar issues were allowed to escalate, breaking into open conflict in Burao and then in Berbera. The potential for a descent into renewed widespread conflict was significant, and the process of avoiding it was by no means assured or simple.

Paradoxically, the conflict between Isaaq clans and erstwhile SNM allies had the effect of reassuring many Gadabuursi and Harti that Isaaq would not dominate an independent Somaliland (Garaadka in APD, 2007b, line 30; Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 58-67). Indeed, the difficult and protracted process of reconciliation seemed to contribute (somewhat counter-intuitively) to a sense of national identity. By drawing in the Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante as mediators in a series of Isaaq conflicts, this arguably served to advance a sense of Somaliland nationhood when it might have been expected that such a period of instability would instead fracture it.

After a painful and difficult sequence of meetings and negotiations punctuated by sometimes bloody conflict, the period ended with national agreement on a reconciliation framework or Peace Charter and a constitutional system or National Charter that essentially underpin the political system that exists in Somaliland today. As significant as these steps were, the period after the seminal Borama conference nevertheless saw renewed conflict, and it was not until the Hargeisa conference of 1997 that a relatively sustainable peace was instituted. However, while the Borama conference did not resolve issues sufficiently to achieve a definitive end to the particular sequence of conflicts in Somaliland, it nevertheless marked an enormous step forward in the territory’s coherence as a nation, and in the establishment of a system of government that has persisted.

3.2 June 1991 – February 1992

The initial period after the momentous 18 May 1991 announcement of the restoration of sovereignty was marked by a sense of jubilation and a rapid expansion in economic activity. The construction sector boomed as war-damaged infrastructure was repaired; the service sector expanded rapidly, with notable growth in small businesses (SCPD, 1999: 44); while, most significantly, livestock exports quickly recovered to pre-war levels. The Minister of Planning and Development in 1992, Mohamed Abdi Dhinbiil Galbeedi, estimates that US$6million worth of livestock was exported to the Gulf in the second half of 1991 (Dhinbiil in Haji, 2001: 374). Precise comparative figures for animal exports by value are unavailable, but data from 1991 indicating the number of heads of livestock shipped through Berbera port (which accounts for the vast majority) supports the view that recovery was rapid. In 1992, the first full year after the war, the total
number of camels, sheep, goats and cattle processed in Berbera jumped by 35%. The subsequent year saw an even more remarkable 66% leap (WSP-International, 2005: 228).

In spite of this initial optimism though, a number of small-scale conflicts are recounted by witnesses quite early in the period. These isolated outbreaks of fighting tended to involve rival militia factions within the SNM, particularly between those in Burao identifying with the Habar Yoonis and Habar Je’lo (Gadhweyne, Shaa’ir and Abdillaahi in APD, 2007b; Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 68-72). There was a notable feeling amongst many of those involved that they had received less than their ‘fair share’ of weaponry when the conflict ended, with this sense of grievance being directly responsible for a number of specific clashes (Abdillaahi Yassin in APD, 2007b, lines 55-58). Looting of UN and international NGO warehouses in Berbera was also reported, along with looting of NGO and UN vehicles in Hargeisa, and banditry on the roads between the main cities (Dhinbiil in Haji, 2001: 375). These violent incidents occurred against a backdrop of, ‘Tuur’s’ efforts to unite disparate militia into a national army.

On the whole, the instances of open conflict were isolated and contained, although their frequency had increased by late 1991 and into January 1992. Commentators at the time suggested a number of reasons for this breakdown in stability, including (Gulaid, 2007):

- the large number of armed individuals, largely youth, traumatised by conflict and whose excessive expectations of the ‘spoils of victory’ had been dashed;
- the easy availability of arms (exacerbated by Siyaad Barre’s policy of stockpiling weapons);
- an ‘irreconcilable’ conflict between traditional clan society and the democratic nation-state; and,
- according to Mohamed Dhinbiil, a “lack of meaningful and massive response from the international community” (in Haji, 2001: 375).

It was becoming increasingly clear that tensions between both the leadership and rank and file of SNM, which had been held in check while Siyaad Barre loomed as a common threat, were not going to be easily contained now that the threat had vanished.

### 3.3 Intra-SNM Conflicts

#### 3.3.1 Burao Conflict (February 1992)

The situation escalated markedly early in 1992, with the outbreak of fighting between militia from Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis in Burao. The conflict was brief, lasting only a week, but nonetheless marked a significant worsening in the situation.

The causes of this conflict were much the same as those behind the rash of minor squabbles in the preceding months: the proliferation of arms and the number of young men who found themselves with little to occupy themselves after the cessation of conflict (Gadhweyne, Shaa’ir and Yassin in APD, 2007b). The week-long conflict was resolved when three groups intervened as mediators: the first was a group of twenty despatched from Laas ‘Anood by Garaad Abdiqani and led by Mohamed Ali Shire; the second consisted of national Guurti members travelling from Hargeisa; while a third group of Gadabuursi elders and led by Sheekh Musa Goodaad travelled from Borama (Shaa’ir and Garaadka in APD, 2007b, lines 13-17; Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 68-74; Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 182-187). Mohamed Ali Shire was well-respected amongst the Dhulbahante and was unusual in the Somaliland context for having been a member of Siyaad Barre’s SRC (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 182-186). This cooperation between Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante elders working with the Hargeisa-based Guurti was to become pivotal in the subsequent few years, culminating in the Borama conference.
3.3.2 Berbera Conflict (March-October 1992)

In spite of the resolution of the Burao conflict, tensions remained between erstwhile SNM allies. As well as the immediate and primarily petty grievances outlined above, there were two more substantial issues at stake. One was the succession to the presidency: ‘Tuur’s’ mandate was due to expire in May 1993, and the Habar Awal (Sa’ad Musa and Esa Musa) felt that it was their turn to hold the post (Gilkes, 1992: 13; Siilaanyo, 2007b, lines 90-119). The second was control of Berbera port, and the port duties collected there – one of the only substantial sources of finance available to the government. Berbera had traditionally been inhabited by several groups with the Habar Awal sub-clan, Esa Musa, holding a dominant position, but antipathetic towards the government (Gilkes, 1992: 13).

An SNM veteran, Abdillaahi ‘Degaweyne’, had moved to assert clan control over the port, but in May 1992 ‘Tuur’ ordered Sa’ad Musa militia units to prevent him from entering Berbera. As a sub-clan of the Habar Awal, the Sa’ad Musa refused the order and ‘Tuur’ was compelled to send Habar Yoonis forces in their place. Amongst the government’s increasing array of opponents, this was interpreted as a Habar Yoonis invasion of Berbera (Rashid Gadhwayne in APD, 2007b, line 120; Gilkes, 1992: 13).

The Habar Je’lo, too, played a role. Although they had generally accepted ‘Tuur’s’ accession to the Presidency (Siilaanyo, 2007b, lines 81-83), relations with the Habar Yoonis were strained; a tension that had already flared into open conflict in Burao. Those Habar Je’lo militia who were close by at the time of the fighting (including their leader, Siliyanto, who was in Berbera) largely refrained from active participation but were clearly associated with the Esa Musa in opposition to the government (Siilaanyo, 2007b, lines 71-76). Incensed at this growing insubordination, ‘Tuur’ further alienated them by sacking a number of Habar Je’lo members from his government (Bryden and Farah, 1996: 8). This series of events had the effect of accentuating clan divisions in what might otherwise have been a ‘political’ dispute, in which each side boasted an array of clan affiliations.

Worthy of note at this point is the role played by a number of women in urging an end to the stand-off. There were several instances in which women called explicitly for hostilities to cease (Shukri Harir Ismail in APD, 2007e, lines 121-123), with one community group, the Somaliland Women’s Organisation, distinguishing themselves as the only group in Somaliland to openly petition ‘Tuur’s’ government to sue for peace, as well as organising demonstrations in Hargeisa (Bradbury, 1994: 72).

Faced with the prospect of a battle against fellow SNM fighters, Degaweyne was initially inclined to avoid conflict and he pulled back to Sheekh. However, in August, a minor dispute within the Habar Yoonis suddenly escalated when a suldaan was murdered. Degaweyne saw his chance and entered Berbera. He then chased the government forces out of the city, advancing much of the distance along the road to Hargeisa. Loss of access to Berbera deprived the government of the port fees on which they was so reliant, and further consolidated the strength of their opponents. As the government’s hold on power became increasingly fragile, law and order began to deteriorate in other parts of the country, with lootings, shootings and petty violence becoming increasingly frequent in a number of towns, including Hargeisa (Gilkes, 1992: 13-14).

The Berbera conflict had proved costly for all involved, in terms of both human life and property (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 150-154). The Government’s plans to draw militia together into a united national army was set back substantially and many who had previously been close to ‘Tuur’ were becoming disillusioned with his leadership. Abdirahman Aw Ali, the Gadabuursi Minister of Education, along with five cabinet colleagues from a range of clans, resigned in protest (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 245-251).
3.4 Kulaanka (Nabadeed), Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao (October 1992)

With the Esa Musa under Degaweyne’s leadership now in control of Berbera, and therefore port revenues, and keen to press on towards Hargeisa, the crisis for ‘Tuur’s’ administration was extreme. Opposition and government groups had in fact been meeting for some 8 or 9 months in Hargeisa in the hope of resolving the stand-off, but without achieving much headway. At this stage, a new meeting was convened, called simply ‘Kulaanka’\(^{27}\), and involving groups representing the two factions: an opposition group of 15 led by Siilaanyo, and a government-allied delegation of 16, led by Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Ali Sheekh Madar (Duale, 2007c, lines 4-8; Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 121-125). This group accepted that port, airport, road and fuel storage facilities in Berbera would be placed under government control. However, once the deal was presented to Esa Musa leaders, they rejected it, pointing out that it would be unfair for them to surrender their public facilities when those in other parts of Somaliland remained under the control of other clans. The issue was particularly keenly felt over the ‘Iidagalle’s control of Hargeisa airport who, as Garhajis, were closely allied to the Esa Musa’s Habar Yoonis adversaries (Habane Dheere, 2007; WSP-International, 2005: 62).

This created a new stalemate: Kulaanka continued to meet but were unable to resolve issues to the Esa Musa’s satisfaction. With the need for a new mediation initiative from someone removed from the dispute itself, a group of Gadabuursi elders took the lead. They first met the Kulaanka groups in Hargeisa, then travelled to Berbera to meet the Esa Musa in late September 1992 (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 133-139). This was probably the first time that the Gadabuursi had taken a central role in mediating between Isaaq factions since the 1950s, so marked a significant development in contemporary relations between the northern clans (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 281-282; WSP-International, 2005: 62).

After lengthy discussions with the Esa Musa, the Gadabuursi mediation group gained their agreement that it would be acceptable if all public facilities throughout Somaliland were placed under Government control. Hargeisa airport, Seylac port and Eillaayo port were all explicitly included in the list, along with Berbera port and airport. This proposal was then taken to the two Kulaanka factions, who also accepted it (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 121-149). However, a number of other issues remained unresolved: each side still held prisoners and the Esa Musa were unhappy with what they saw as a lack of acceptance on the part of the government and Habar Yoonis to admit the role they had played in initiating the conflict. Also, the mediating committee had proposed that the human and physical cost of the war had been so high that compensation would be impossible to calculate and should be waived; a position rejected by the Esa Musa (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 150-154).

By this stage, and buoyed by their success in mediation, the Gadabuursi group had agreed with other parties that a national meeting would be held in the town of Sheekh to formalise the reconciliation and push the agenda towards wider national political reconciliation (WSP-International, 2005: 62). However, the feeling amongst the mediating committee was that the remaining Esa Musa grievances would have to be resolved before the Sheekh meeting could take place.

The Habar Yoonis and Esa Musa each took responsibility for gathering their people for several days of discussion in Burao and Berbera respectively. By the end of that period, the Esa Musa accepted that no compensation would be paid for deaths or destruction of property that had occurred during the conflict, and that the peace could be confirmed between the two parties. Both sides also accepted that physical property that had been confiscated by either side and remained undamaged from the war should be

\(^{27}\) Kulaanka translates as ‘the meeting’, with some preferring to add the epithet ‘nabadeed’, rendering it ‘the peace meeting’.
returned to the owners (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 155-159). This left the issue of prisoner exchange, the terms for which it was agreed would be confirmed in Sheekh.

The role played by clans as opposed to political groupings is complex and difficult to untangle, yet it is vital to our understanding of each conflict and subsequent reconciliation that some attempt is made to clarify this situation. It is clear from the narrative provided to this point that, on one level, the Berbera conflict set Habar Yoonis against Esa Musa, and these two clan groupings certainly played a vital role in negotiating a settlement after the conflict. Equally, the mediation committee met with success in large part because they were able to use their ‘outsider’ status as Gadabuursi to present themselves as removed from the conflict, and therefore to hold a degree of objectivity. However, it is equally clear that the conflict was essentially about the control of resources and revenue streams that were important to Somaliland as a political entity, as well as a struggle between those who wanted to remove the President from office and those who wanted him to remain. In other words, it was a political conflict in which the government found themselves in a position where they felt they had to face down an opponent who was undermining their position and capacity to govern. On another level again, the conflict had its roots within the SNM, rather than between the clans themselves. During the conflict with Siyaad Barre, he had represented a potent common enemy, and once he was gone, and well-armed militia suddenly found themselves with nothing to retain their focus, internal divisions quickly came to the surface. Sometimes these occurred along clan lines, but not always. As the Berbera conflict evolved, the sense that it was an Esa Musa/Habar Yoonis affair grew stronger, and during the mediation process, the clan structures were the ones most useful in reaching agreement. In many ways, though, it would be a mistake to view the conflict itself as being fundamentally clan-based: clan was one amongst several factors, and arguably played a greater role in resolving the situation than in creating it (Rashid Gadhweyne and Yusuf Shaa’ir in APD, 2007b; Duale, 2007c; Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 96-106).

3.5 Sheekh Conference (Tawfiiq) (23rd October to 8th November 1992)

The conference in Sheekh was known as Tawfiiq, meaning ‘best decision’, and was intended to build on the ceasefire between Esa Musa and Habar Yoonis that was agreed in Kulaanka. All the northern clans were invited, and the success of the conference in building a national consensus was dependent on cross-clan participation. However, a final hurdle remained. As outlined, the Esa Musa had already agreed the terms of their attendance but, with the meeting about to start, the Habar Yoonis indicated they would absent themselves. In an effort to assuage their fears, a group which included Habar Yoonis members travelled to Oodweyne in mid-October. After five days of negotiation, their efforts apparently having failed, they were boarding their transport for Sheekh when a Habar Je’lo delegation offered to attempt a last minute intervention of their own. The original delegation delayed their departure for a day, and the Habar Je’lo initiative bore fruit: the Habar Yoonis accepted the Habar Je’lo urging to attend and they agreed to play a full part in the conference (Saleh, 2007, lines 92-101).

In Berbera and Burao meetings, the Gadabuursi had assumed a pivotal organisational role. This role had expanded by Kulaanka to the degree that the Gadabuursi mediating committee had essentially facilitated the resolution themselves. In Sheekh, though, the Dhulbahante assumed a much more prominent role, with Garaad Abdiqani taking an active interest from Laas ‘Anood, represented on the ground by Mohamed Ali Shire (Garaadka in APD, 2007b, lines 18-24; Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b). The Chair for the meeting was Abdi Waraabe (Saleh, 2007, line 135).

The Tawfiiq conference reached a number of conclusions, dealing with both the immediate concerns of the protagonists in the Berbera conflict, and also more generalisable principles for the conduct and resolution of future conflicts. Some 19 principles were agreed at this latter more general level including agreement on
a number of clan boundary disputes. Central to the agreement was the principle ‘ama dalkaa qab, ama dadkaa qab’28, which translates approximately as ‘either you have your land or you have your people’, and which contextually carries the meaning ‘each clan is responsible for whatever is committed in their territory’. This was a restatement of a principle that had historically been employed on occasion in reconciliation talks. However, it was not recognised as a universal principle, and the significance of the decision in Sheekh was its explicit adoption as a generally applicable basis for future negotiation and action. It in turn led to the agreement of an additional principle to the effect that each clan should be responsible for establishing the capacity to administer its territory, and to achieve a degree of stability within it (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 80-89). Effectively, a process of bottom-up decentralisation!

The following resolutions were also agreed with respect to the immediate and localised conflict (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 160-165; WSP-International, 2005: 62):
1. Vehicles, buildings and other fixed assets taken during the war and not damaged during it were to be returned to the owners;
2. Militias were to return to their own clan areas and remain in designated military areas;
3. All roads were to be cleared of armed militia and opened for traffic, especially the road between Burao and Berbera; and
4. Prisoners of war were to be exchanged.

These agreements were sufficient to create a fragile peace, but it was clear that a more broadly based conference would be required to consolidate it. In addition, the SNM Constitution specified a two year period of SNM rule before the administration would be transferred to civilian hands. That initial two year period was due to expire in May 1993 – two years after the date on which the Burao conference had elected Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ as President (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 188-191; Siilaanyo, 2007a, line 124). Technically, decisions on the process of transition to civilian rule should have been taken by the SNM Central Committee, who were required to meet twice every year. However, once in power, ‘Tuur’ had shown little interest in convening a meeting, and in any case, he found himself in conflict with many members of the Committee, meaning that the Chair of the Committee, Ibrahim Maigag Samatar, was unable to gain a quorum whenever he did attempt to convene a meeting (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 255-260).

Faced with this stand-off, ‘Tuur’ and Ibrahim Maigag met with key elders in early November and asked them to take on a mediation role between the government and the opposition (Duale, 2007c, lines 57-63). The significance of this change was profound as it marked the moment at which the President and Chair of the Central Committee explicitly offered a mandate to the elders to mediate and to reach a decision on the way forward – effectively handing to an expanded national Guurti the role that had previously been played by the Central Committee. This shift was to play a significant role in the events that were to unfold in the coming months (Duale, 2007c, lines 79-84).

Women played a significant and frequently overlooked role in the Sheekh conference, particularly in raising funds and providing logistical support for the conference29. There was also some pressure for women to be given a greater formal role in the peace process itself. Shukri Harir Ismail particularly notes the coordinated activities of a group she was involved with during 1992, which included protests and efforts to raise the awareness of delegates to meetings of issues that they felt were important to women (Shukri Harir Ismail in APD, 2007e, lines 124-146). These issues ranged from demands that the role already played by women be more explicitly acknowledged, through to positions on specific issues, including water supply, formation

28 The specific phrasing ‘ama dalkaa qab; ama dadkaa qab’ seems to be recognised in some quarters, but not others. The principle, though, is widely recognised, and forms a fundamental component in later agreements such as the Peace Charter adopted by the 1993 conference in Borama.
29 These roles were not new: women had long played a central part in all of these activities. Arguably, though, women’s presence and influence on proceedings in Sheekh and later in Borama was more pronounced – or perhaps just more widely acknowledged, than had been the case before. The issue is also commented on below in relation to the Borama conference.
of a police force, and opposition to the proposed deployment in Somaliland of a UNOSOM force. Shukri recounts a particular instance, apparently at the Sheekh meeting, where her group had been refused entry to the meeting venue itself. They responded by purchasing microphones and speakers; the microphones they placed inside the venue, connected to the speakers outside. This enabled them to follow proceedings closely. They then made it clear that they would stand outside the venue and do their best to prevent delegates from leaving until all key issues had been dealt with. They then prepared a letter and placards outlining their stand on a number of points (Shukri Harir Ismail in APD, 2007e, lines 136-142):

- A written communication should be sent to the UN stating rejecting the deployment of UNOSOM forces in Somaliland;
- Functional water reticulation systems must be reactivated; and
- A national police force should be created, for which they would sew uniforms and provide food.

With the successful conclusion of the conference, the focus shifted to implementation of the terms agreed. A top priority was the exchange of prisoners from the Berbera conflict; a process that suffered an immediate hitch when a Habar Yoonis man, dissatisfied with his treatment by fellow clan-members, hijacked the prisoners held by the Esa Musa while they were in transit to Burao. After a tense stand-off in which the Gadabuursi mediating committee insisted on remaining in Burao until the exchange had taken place, the Habar Yoonis were able to placate the individual involved and the handover was completed. With the exchange concluded, the committee then moved to Hargeisa where they continued to work towards the implementation of the terms of the deal struck in Sheekh; a process that continued throughout the final weeks of 1992 (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 166-178).

The Sheekh conference had achieved the goal of building on the specific peace agreed at Kulaanka by gaining the agreement of all the major northern clans on principles for future conflict resolution. As such, it marked a significant advance towards building a base for the establishment of some form of administrative framework that might enjoy legitimacy throughout Somaliland. However, many of the most critical decisions on national governance clearly remained, making the need for a follow-up conference clear. Having played such a vital and successful role in mediation in the preceding period, the Gadabuursi accepted a role as hosts for a grand conference to be held in their main town of Borama.

3.6 Borama Conference (January to May 1993)

3.6.1 Fundraising and Conference Preparation

While the mediation committee was working in Burao and then Hargeisa, the process of fundraising and preparation for the Borama conference was frantic. The national Guurti, led by the Chair of the SNM Guurti, Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Madar, were keen for the conference to include a cross-section of delegates from all the main northern clans. In order to facilitate this, they formed a seven-member preparatory committee (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 209-210; Saleh, 2007, lines 72-77). Numerous groups and individuals took responsibility for seeking contributions both domestically and from Somalilanders in the diaspora. These efforts continued up to and beyond the point at which the conference itself was due to open on 24 January 1993. One such delegation, led by conference chair Sheekh Ibrahim, visited Djibouti in the final days in search of financial support, while another eight-member group, led by a Dhulbahante man Sheekh Dahir and including Abdillaahi Habane Dheere, visited Sool and Sanaag (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 179-186). Most of the funding for the conference was contributed through

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30 The latter group was due to fly back to Hargeisa in a light aircraft loaned for the purpose by UNDP before travelling to Borama. However, when the pilot attempted to land in Hargeisa, they were refused permission, apparently at the request of the Government. The reason for this refusal is unclear. However, forced to spend an unscheduled few days in the eastern regions, they ended up making a surprise appearance at the Dararweyne peace conference in Sanaag between Habar Yoons and Dhulbahante, which continued until early February, and which is covered in the Sanaag case study (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 183-186).
initiatives like these and on a smaller scale by domestic and diaspora Somalilanders (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 418-421; Bradbury, 1997; Drysdale, 1994: 143).

Omar Arteh, Ali Mahdi’s Prime Minister and also the last Prime Minister under Siyaad Barre, had earlier made a surprise return to Hargeisa, before attending the Borama conference to stand as President. He made his own ‘substantial’ financial contribution to the conference (Drysdale, 1994: 144).

International agencies did also provide some support. UNDP supplied the light aircraft used by the group that visited Sool and Sanaag (see the footnote), though no direct financial support. The UNOSOM mission did not offer any support at all, though a number of foreign governments, NGO and faith groups did contribute. These included Community Aid Abroad, the Mennonites and the French and US embassies in Djibouti (Bradbury, 1994: 73). The Life and Peace Institute also provided some US$70,000 (Svensson, 2007), while another informant recalls a contribution of US$50,000 from the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian funds were paid in several tranches; one as a result of a discussion with a Somaliland delegation that had travelled to Addis Ababa during the Borama conference to speak at the Somalia reconciliation conference being held there at the time31 (Xaamud, 2008, lines 57 and 131-132). There were also some grants in kind – largely foodstuffs – from bilateral agencies (Xaamud, 2008, lines 132-137).

Once in Borama, the 150 official delegates were to be billeted in the buildings of the Sheekh Ali Jowhar School where the formal conference sessions took place, while others found accommodation elsewhere (Xaamud, 2008, lines 124-126). The school itself had been badly damaged during the fighting in 1991, and required some rehabilitation before the conference could proceed (Xaamud, 2008, lines 124-125).

3.6.2 Delays and Grievances

A number of groups did not want the Borama conference to go ahead, particularly supporters of the government, some of whom saw it as an attempt to change the government. Some groups attempted to persuade the Habar Je’lo that the outstanding dispute was between Habar Yoonis and Esa Musa, and that Habar Je’lo should therefore not attend (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 244-246). Indeed, Habar Je’lo leader Siilaanyo did not attend, as his clan were not putting forward a candidate (Siilaanyo, 2007b, lines 87-90). Having chosen to participate anyway, the Habar Je’lo delegation was then delayed en route to the conference by armed militia. It is not altogether clear whether this was politically motivated, or simply an example of the insecurity present throughout the area. Some certainly feel that the militia were directed by the government in the hope that, without the Habar Je’lo vote, they might carry the day against the opposition (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 244-248).

The Jibril Abokor sub-clan of Habar Awal are also accused of having blocked the road to Borama, although there does not appear to have been a political motivation behind that action (Xisbi in APD, 2007b, lines 134-135). While it seems quite possible that some of the difficulties encountered by delegations travelling to the conference were motivated by political concerns, it is quite clear that a number of problems were motivated by little more than a desire by local communities to maximise the financial return on conference traffic. Along the length of the road between Hargeisa and Borama, each community had established roadblocks, so even if they escaped the attentions of government or opposition militia, conference delegates still had to negotiate ten or more check points, paying money to each, and in some cases being robbed of personal effects (Xaamud, 2008, lines 113-118).

31 A reconciliation conference for ‘all Somalia’ had been organised in Addis Ababa at the same time as the Borama conference, in large part as a result of the personal efforts of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles. Some 20 Somaliland delegates attended as observers; a group that was led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who spoke at the conference (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 194-196). Although observing and speaking, Somaliland refused to play a more active role in Addis Ababa. Given the hopes placed by the UN and Ethiopian Government in the Addis Ababa conference, the Borama event would have been considered at best a distraction, if not direct and unwelcome competition.
Some minority clans (Gabbooye and others with small numbers) were not represented (WSP-International, 2005: 64), but it was notable that a small but recognised delegation of women (17 in total, from a variety of clans) did attend. That group reiterated the position on UNOSOM stated in the lead-up meetings, supported the formation of the national Guurti, and demanded a greater role in future conferences (Anab Omer Ileeye in APD, 2007e).

3.6.3 Conference Organisation

It was determined that the conference would be chaired by a non-voting, eight-man committee (shirguddoon), with Sheekh Ibrahim as overall convenor, assisted by three co-convenors. The members were:

- Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Madar (Chair)
- Sheekh Ahmed Nuux Furre (co-chair)
- Suldaan Sheekh Musa Jamac Goodaad (co-chair)
- Sheekh Daahir Xaaji Xassan (co-chair)
- Haaji Abdi Hussein Yuusuf ‘Waarabe’
- Cusman Cashuur Cabdulle
- Abdi Nuur Samater
- Suldaan Abdirahman Sheekh Mohamed and
- Abdi Xuseen Saeed (Guurti, 1993).

Each sub-clan was allocated a number of votes as a proportion of the 150 voting delegates, and following an established formula\(^{32}\). However, the Warsangeli and Esa were both dissatisfied with their allocations, which were significantly lower than their relative populations. An agreement was ultimately reached that the Habar Awal would relinquish three of their votes, while the Garhajis would give up two of theirs. Of these, three would go to the Esa, and two to the Warsangeli. The resulting calculation, including this final transfer, determined an allocation as follows (Habane Dheere, 2007; Madar, 1993; Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b; Xaamud, 2008):

| Isaaq: 90 votes (originally 95) | Ayuub 6 |
| Habar Awal 17 (gave up 3)       | Harti 34 (originally 32) |
| Garhajis 18 (gave up 2)         | Dhulbahante 27 |
| Muse Sheikh Isaaq (Habar Je’lo) 20 | Warsangeli 7 (2 from Isaaq) |
| Tolje’lo 6                     | Gadabuursi and Esa 26 (originally 23) |
| Sanbuur 4                      | Gadabuursi 20 |
| Arab 13                        | Esa 6 (3 from Isaaq) |
| 'Imraan 6                      | |

The Dhulbahante efforts to resolve issues internally and with their neighbours in the east\(^{33}\) were drawing to a close by the time the Borama conference started, but they still had work to complete, even after the Dararwanye conference was concluded – they met in Boo’ame to agree the delegates they would send to Borama. 53 delegates were selected (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007c, line 9), amongst whom were the 23 ‘voting delegates’ that were allowed under the formula detailed above.

In the end, a large number of people from all the major northern clans attended the Borama conference. The conference was intended to debate and decide upon a wide range of topics, with the stated purpose being that it was to decide the ‘destiny’ of Somaliland (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007c). There was much

\(^{32}\) There is disagreement as to whether the formula dates from the Parliament formed in 1960 upon independence (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, line 294), or on that established by the SNM in Baligubadle with the addition of additional votes for non-Isaaq clans (Duale, 2007c, lines 269-278). The 1960 formula distributed parliamentary amongst the Isaaq, Harti and Isla/Gadabuursi on the basis of 21, 7 and 5 respectively.

\(^{33}\) The peace process in Sanaag was reaching a critical stage as the Borama conference was being organised: see Sanaag case study for detail.
debate as to what ‘destiny’ might cover (Habane Dheere, 2007), but eventually it was agreed that a security framework should be agreed before debate shifted to the national constitutional structure (Drysdale, 1994: 143).

As with many large meetings, most conference activity took place outside the formal meetings with a constant array of side meetings, inter- and intra-clan lobbying and negotiation and so on. Issues were largely decided in these peripheral meetings, and ratified in the formal sessions, and the peripheral events ranged in formality from chaired debates such as those run by Professor Saleeabaan Gulaid, an academic who had previously held an administrative post in Siyaad Barre’s time, to the inevitable qaad-chewing sessions (Garaad, 2007; Gulaid, 2007; Saleeabaan Afqarshe, 2007b).

The series of debates chaired by Professor Saleeabaan serve as an example of the type of process that occurred. A committee largely drawn from the Gadabuursi hosts, but also including some Dhulbahante members took on the role of organising the sessions. They would call representatives from one or other clan or faction to attend an evening meeting to present their case. Professor Saleeabaan would facilitate discussion between the presenting faction and opponents who would also be given the opportunity to present their position. Topics dealt initially with the reconciliation necessary if the security framework was to be agreed, then once that had been finalised, the focus switched to issues of governance, and finally to the election of key officeholders. Professor Saleeabaan recalls that it was through these meetings and as a result of his own experience with the Ethiopian Transitional Charter that he suggested that the reconciliation and governance agreements should be written up as two formal charters, hence the Peace Charter and the National Charter, which are now recognised as the primary outputs of the conference. Although influential, these and similar ‘extramural’ meetings, debates and discussions held no formal status within the conference, and many of the individuals involved in them, including Professor Saleeabaan, did not take part in formal conference proceedings (Gulaid, 2007).

Decisions at the conference were usually taken on a consensus basis: positions were thrashed out in the side meetings, and by the time delegates returned to the main conference venue, the relative weightings of those positions were clear, and a ‘consensus’ position merely required ratification. Voting was only used for intractable situations which were nevertheless not considered critical enough to warrant extended dialogue. Faced with a suggestion from the chair that a particularly contentious issue be decided by vote an elder, Abdi Waraabe, captured the general sentiment with his comment ‘voting is fighting; let’s opt for consensus’ (Saleh, 2007, lines 250-251). The conference frequently did strike issues that had not been agreed in time for the scheduled session, and rather than resort to a vote, the parties would be given deadlines by which agreement was to be reached. At times, with issues still unresolved, the session would be cancelled due to the ‘illness’ of the chair or some similar excuse, allowing the delegates to continue discussion until a compromise could be reached (Duale, 2007c, lines 174-180).

3.6.4 Peace Charter: Clan Reconciliation

The Sheekh conference had formalised principles for conflict management and resolution, and the first priority at Borama was to build these basic principles into a broader framework. This framework was formalised as the ‘Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter’ (Axdiga Nabadgaladyada ee Beelaha Soomaaliyadda) around which the first phase of the conference revolved.

The key provisions of the Peace Charter were that:

- Each community would take responsibility for the actions of bandits (budhcad or deydey) in their territories, each would establish a security council to oversee law and order, and a clan-based police force was to be created by each which would ultimately become part of a national force;
- Each community would disband their militia, all militia weapons would henceforth be considered government property, and arms would no longer be carried in urban areas or at public gatherings;
- International assistance would be sought for de-mining and demobilisation efforts;
- Each community would cooperate in resisting any incursion from outside Somaliland; and
• Each community vowed not to attack any other.
  (Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter, translated by Mohamed Hamud Sheik in Bradbury, 1994)

Essentially, the principles agreed in Sheekh were elaborated in Borama. In accord with the ‘ama dalkaa qab, ama dadkaa qab’ principle, clans took responsibility for events in areas controlled by them, with an Inspection and Monitoring Committee to be established to oversee the discharge of clan responsibilities.

The Charter also established a hierarchy of appeal: community elders would be responsible for mediating disputes, with a local ‘guurti’ or council of elders responsible for local affairs, and higher level councils available at each level up the clan chain. The Charter explicitly established that the highest such body was to be the executive committee of the ‘Grand Committee of Elders of Somaliland’, a group that was initially to be appointed at the Borama conference (Articles XIX and XX). Thus, the role and existence of a national guurti was formalised (Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter, translated by Mohamed Hamud Sheik in Bradbury, 1994).

3.6.5 National Charter: A System of Government

With regard to the system of government, several proposals were floated, with a number of groups presenting draft national charters of their own which incorporated their preferred system (Gulaid, 2007; Saleeibaan Afqarshe, 2007b):

1. Five rotating presidents; each representing one of the Northern clans (Harti, Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo, Habar Awal, and one for Gadabuursi/Esa combined) and holding the Presidency for a fifth of the total term;
2. A constitutional president with high-level responsibility for national unity and constitutional order, but few administrative powers, presiding over a strong prime minister and parliament; and
3. A strong executive president with a council of ministers, and a parliament providing checks on executive power.

A compromise between the rotating presidency and the more traditional presidential system, in which there would be a rotating prime minister, was also suggested at one stage (Saleeibaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 328-329).

Different groups favoured different positions: the Calan Cas group34 were lobbying for a strong executive with the intention of removing Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ from the position, while the ‘Tuur’ and his government supporters also favoured an executive president, though clearly with himself holding that position. The Gadabuursi preferred a strong prime minister with a constitutional presidency and a powerful parliament (Garaad, 2007, lines 148-152), as did the Dhulbahante (Gees, 2007a), who had their own candidate in mind for prime minister – Dr Ali Khalif Galaaid, who ultimately went on to become Prime Minister of the Somali Transitional National Government at Arta, Djibouti in 2000 (Saleeibaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 356-361). Negotiations over the system of government were intense, with no group initially willing to give way. Garaad recounts how, after lengthy debate, the conference Chair, Sheekh Ibrahim, declared that the parties should come to a decision within 24 hours. This was the signal for renewed intensity, with meetings continuing through the night. The rotational presidency had by then been discounted as a viable option, with the Harti the main proponents for a prime minister on one side, and a diverse and otherwise disunited group including Calan Cas and supporters of the existing government arrayed on the opposing side in favour of an executive president. The Gadabuursi felt the responsibility as hosts to break the impasse, so at this point one of the Gadabuursi leaders, Haji Abokor, stood before the formal meeting one morning and declared

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34 A series of groups with the name ‘Calan Cas’ (meaning ‘red flag’) had been active in Somali politics for some years. The group that was known by the title through the later period of the civil war, at the Borama conference and afterwards was a multi-clan collective who became known as opposition to the government of Tuur. They had a strong military component. The organisational structure was semi-formal. Although, as the name suggests, there had at one time been an affiliation with Marxist or socialist ideology, this was no longer the case by the Borama conference (Duale, 2007c; Kaahin, 2007b).
that his clan had decided that, as no agreement could be reached, they would drop their support for the parliamentary/prime ministerial system and instead vote in favour of the presidential option. (Garaad, 2007; Gulaid, 2007; Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 294-307). The change in Gadabuursi position was sweetened by a promise that their candidate would be supported for the role of Vice President (Gees, 2007a). This Gadabuursi decision meant that the presidential lobby now held sufficient votes to win, and consequently a strong executive presidential system was adopted.

There was also considerable argument about the size of the Guurti and House of Representatives. Some maintained that the two houses should include the same number of members in order to effectively balance the power of each. Others were critical of such reasoning, arguing that the Guurti should be smaller to reflect the likelihood that their workload would be lighter (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 80-95). In the event, the houses were established with equal numbers: a bicameral parliament consisting of the 150 voting members of the conference, with each house having 75 members (WSP-International, 2005: 63).

3.6.6 Election of President and Vice-President

Dissatisfaction with ‘Tuur’, who had been outside the country prior to the conference, remained pronounced. Opponents found another opportunity to criticise him when he chose to travel directly to Borama without returning to Hargeisa: they felt that he should have met with government members prior to the conference (Xisbi in APD, 2007b, lines 139-141). While he did his best to remain confident in public, he seemed aware of his unpopularity and, according to witnesses, had become ‘dispirited’ by the time of the conference (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, line 365), so perhaps his reluctance to spend time politicking within Somaliland was unsurprising. Nevertheless, he remained one of the strongest candidates.

Mohamed Ibrahim Egal meanwhile had also decided to attend the conference, and had also put his name forward as a presidential candidate. There is some disagreement over whether he attended on his own initiative and with little specific assurance that he would receive support in any bid for political power or whether he was asked to attend and to stand for the leadership by the Calan Cas (Habane Dheere, 2007, lines 232-233). Whatever the circumstances of his candidacy, though, it had not been widely predicted prior to the conference, with many expecting the Habar Awal to put forward a candidate such as Mohamed Hashi or Musa Bixi (Siilaanyo, 2007b, line 91).

Omer Arteh Qaalib’s unexpected return to Somaliland also placed him in a position to put his name forward, as did Ahmed Mohamed Hala.

As had been the case throughout the conference, the decision on which candidate each faction would support was largely worked out prior to the actual vote. However, the issue was highly charged and divisive, so the final outcome was to be decided by a vote. The Habar Je’lo had agreed prior to the conference that it was the ‘turn’ of the Habar Awal for the presidency, so their votes were already committed to Egal (Siilaanyo, 2007a, line 582), as were those of the Harti and Gadabuursi. The Garhajis (Habar Yoonis and ‘Iidagalle) formed the core of the government’s support and so were firmly behind ‘Tuur’s’ candidacy, while the multi-clan Calan Cas were implacably opposed to ‘Tuur’, and threw their weight behind Egal. There was a little room for dissent within these groups – for example, a single Gadabuursi delegate voted against Egal – but the overwhelming majority of each group voted in line with the agreed position (Garaad, 2007). In the end, the margin was clear: Mohamed Ibrahim Egal won 99 of 150 votes (Garaad, 2007, lines 301-304), lifting him well clear of both Omer Arteh and Abdirahman Tuur. Hala fell well back in the final voting. The Gadabuursi candidate, Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah secured the post of Vice President (Jamhuuriyadda-Soomaaliya, 1993). Both Egal’s main rivals for the presidency vowed to support his election (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, line 370; Drysdale, 1994: 143-145).

35 As noted above, Egal had attended the UN-sponsored conference in Addis Ababa, and was apparently disillusioned with either his own prospects or those of Somalia as a whole as a result of what he had observed at that conference.
3.6.7 Aftermath

With the conference completed and Egal and Abdirahman Aw Ali confirmed as President and Vice President respectively, the new executive team faced immediate and daunting challenges. The need to complete the demobilisation of militia was notably urgent, given the need for delegates to once again tackle the trip away from Borama, and for the government to set about the task of establishing a viable level of law and order. With the assistance of Calan Cas and other military leaders, the presidential entourage was able to proceed to Hargeisa unhindered (Gulaid, 2007, lines 304-327). Approximately 6,000 militia members, after surrendering weapons, were taken to Mandheera camp for a demobilisation programme, with the aim of providing training for future roles in a national army and police force (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 387-388). Disarmament was effective across much, although not all, of the country. Aw Ali estimates that militia groups across approximately 70% of Somaliland voluntarily and peacefully took part in the disarmament process (Aw Ali Farah, 2007a, lines 405-406).

While many were very happy with the conference, and continue to laud the organisational skills of the largely Gadabuursi committee, the ‘Iidagalle and Habar Yoonis (Garhajis) were bitter at having lost the presidency without gaining, in their eyes, compensatory positions. They left Borama disgruntled, and Egal’s government quickly recognised the need to placate them. He assembled a group of some 120 delegates to travel to Burao for talks, but this initiative was unsuccessful. The Garhajis organised two conferences of their own: Libaan I and II. From those meetings, they issued a declaration stating that they did not recognise the Egal administration as legitimate. Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ travelled with several of his supporters to Mogadishu to join the government in the south, having been enticed by the UN to participate in another internationally sponsored conference there. It was not long after this that conflict flared between the Garhajis and the Egal government (Garaad, 2007). For all the successes of the Borama conference, then, it was not wholly successful in establishing a sustainable peace in Somaliland. That task would not be completed until the 1997 Hargeisa conference, at which a constitution was agreed.

3.7 Lessons Learnt

Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction of the Garhajis, the Borama conference is widely seen as having been one of the most successful of the major national conferences, and is contrasted with the later Hargeisa conference. The reasoning is that there was no single party strong enough to wield undue political influence (WSP-International, 2005: 80). Whatever the validity of this view, the conference can be seen as having achieved a great deal, including the ever-contentious task of making the transition from a military government to a civilian one. In another notable milestone, the pressure applied by women’s groups for a greater involvement in the political process did result in the appointment of Somaliland’s first female Minister, Deeqa Ali Joog of Sanaag (Shukri Harir Ismail in APD, 2007e).

In many ways, the conference operated as a model of Somali negotiation, which tends to work on the basis that consensus is the best foundation for decision. Abdi Waraabi’s comment that ‘voting is fighting’ (see page 65) is indicative of this idea. The business of the conference therefore tends to take place outside the formal conference sessions. This system typically tends to take longer than is the norm under more hierarchical or representative systems, a fact to which the Borama conference’s near five-month duration is testament. The system of dynamic deadlines, mediation and behind-the-scenes lobbying that was so evident in Borama is essential to the effective operation of a conference of this type.

The process of mediation is worth expanding on briefly, as it played such a critical and distinctive role in Borama. The non-Isaaq clans, and especially their few SNM members, were very active in conference organisation and facilitation. Both the Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante played key roles as ‘outside’ mediators in internal Isaaq/SNM conflicts, and in the Borama conference itself. In addition, at many of the key meetings, including Berbera, Burao and Borama, conference resolutions were drafted by a group consisting of Garaad Saleebaan (Dhulbahante and SNM), Aw Ali Farah (Gadabuursi and SNM) and Maxamuud Abdi Ali Bayr (Warsangeli). They were well aware of the strategic significance of working as a non-Isaaq drafting committee (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 193-206).
There is always a great deal of debate about the role of clan in conflict. Disputes over perceived slights/inequities by one clan against another sometimes take precedence over the issue of what is best for the country (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007b, lines 398-418), and lead to conflict. However, it is also readily apparent that clan fora are frequently the most effective settings for the resolution of ‘political’ conflicts. The relationship is complex, but it is not difficult to argue that a conflict such as that in Berbera was essentially one of the government fighting opponents in an effort to secure access to resources, and particularly to a key revenue stream: in other words a political or economic conflict rather than primarily a clan one. Understandably, but probably unwisely, ‘Tuur’ reacted to a deteriorating political situation by leaning increasingly heavily on those he was closest to, and this accentuated clan divisions. However, the resolution to the conflict was also heavily reliant on clan-based conflict resolution procedures. To that extent, and coupled with the preceding observation regarding the role of ‘external’ clans as mediators, it is perhaps not too much of a stretch to argue that the institutions of clan have proven themselves the appropriate ones for the resolution of complex clan-political conflicts, and by no means their sole root cause.

In addition, it would be a notable omission to exclude some mention of the importance of agreeing overriding principles in advance of detailed negotiation. The principle expressed by one commentator as ‘ama dalkaa qab, ama dadkaa qab’ was not a new one, but it’s adoption as a fundamental basis for the future attribution of responsibility was critical in allowing the transition from ceasefire to the much more difficult process of agreeing systems of resource and, ultimately, national governance.

The success of the disarmament and demobilisation process is also worthy of comment. Although the process did not proceed smoothly, with the early conflicts in Berbera and Burao particularly arising as a direct result of difficulties in demobilising militia, the success in the aftermath of the Borama conference in removing road blocks and in achieving a widespread acceptance that arms must not be carried by members of the public in urban areas was remarkable. It’s hard to pinpoint a single factor behind this achievement, and it is perhaps most reasonable to suggest that general public weariness with conflict combined with the successful election of a civilian government to create a mood in which the majority were willing to set aside differences. In addition, business leaders were keen to establish a secure environment for trade, and government promises of employment served to placate many people. There can be little doubt that the extended process of reconciling immediate and small-scale differences before moving onto broader grievances and decisions on a national system of governance created an environment in which most people were finally prepared to move beyond the mistrust and conflict of the past years. In the final analysis, though, this combination of factors was complex, and no one part of the process stands out as the catalyst for what was nevertheless an astonishing achievement.

It is often commented that Somaliland has succeeded in terms of reconciliation and state-building where other Somali areas have failed. This is frequently, and apparently correctly, attributed to a sustained focus on resolving issues at a community-level before attempting to tackle issues such as national government, although similar processes have also occurred in the south (Garaad, 2007, lines 33-59). There was a constant process of setting deadlines, putting pressure on groups and an immense amount of hard work by the various individuals and groups that took on mediation roles. Indeed, the biggest lesson of all must be the importance of sheer persistence, energy and commitment on the part of a trusted few. In the specific case of Borama conference, it was the coalescence of a national Guurti with a mandate to assume a role previously held by the SNM Central Committee that enabled success. This observation has often been proffered, and as much as it is true, it should not be allowed to obscure the simultaneous importance of the many other groups and individuals who contributed. Indeed, one of the prevalent features of the various mediation groups and committees that intervened in the period between mid 1991 and the conclusion of the Borama conference in mid 1993 was that they tended to arise almost spontaneously. They were not ‘institutionalised’ bodies; rather they were ad hoc groups, who through persistence and goodwill were able to convince antagonists of their trustworthiness and commitment. This suggests that the process of ‘institutionalising’ a regime which embodies this conflict resolution capacity will remain a challenge in the future. Perhaps the key factor differentiating the Somaliland experience from that in other Somali territories was the lack of international intervention, which seems to have exercised a malign influence on some of the critical peace- and trust-building processes described above.
Not just a handshake – a symbol of allegiance, Hargeisa, 1993 © Hamish Wilson
Egal is elected at the Boroma conference, Sheik Ali Jowhar Secondary School Hall, 1993 © Hamish Wilson
Clans hand over their weapons, Hargeisa stadium, 1993 © Hamish Wilson

Elders arrive at the Burao conference, 1991 © Bobe Yusuf Duale
The public attend festivities after the announcement from the Burao conference, 18 May 1991 © Bobe Yusuf Duale

Crowds gather to hear the outcome of the Burao conference, 1991. © Bobe Yusuf Duale
4 BEFORE SANAAG PEACE PROCESS AND THE LEAD UP TO ERIGAVO CONFERENCE; JUNE 91-NOV 1993

4.1 Introduction

The process of building a viable peace in Sanaag occurred in parallel with similar processes elsewhere. In common with a number of Somali reconciliation efforts, local issues were dealt with first, followed by a gradual escalation to higher-level issues of governance and inter-clan accommodation. The culmination of the Sanaag process was the Grand Conference in Erigavo, which took place in August 1993, and which was timed to occur in the immediate aftermath of the Somaliland conference in Borama.

The Sanaag peace process is notable in its own right on a number of bases:
• It illustrates the complex and diverse nature of Sanaag region’s community, requiring resolution of issues between four clans: two of whom are Isaaq and two Harti;
• The whole process, including the Grand Conference in Erigavo, was locally initiated and driven;
• Much of the process evolved without a strong leading party, and in that sense has been described as ‘organic’; and
• It ran parallel to the 1991 and 1993 Somaliland conferences in Burao and Borama, and its success depended on agreements reached at the Burao conference in particular.

The following narrative will consider the context, origins and phases of the Sanaag peace process, including the proceedings of the concluding conference in Erigavo, and will offer a view on the significant features, catalysts and lessons derived from a review of the process.

Initially the study was not designed around this structure, but as the research evolved, the gradual, almost organic, process in Sanaag became more apparent. The initial intention was to examine specific inter-clan meetings and conferences in Sanaag, and to seek to develop an analytical treatment around these key events. However, as the research progressed, it became clear that such an approach risked isolating meetings as if each was a discrete occurrence. We feared that this approach would diminish our ability to consider the complexity of relationships and negotiations that lay behind the more formal parts of the process. This review is therefore presented in the context of a series of phases, within each of which we examine the events that preceded or followed notable meetings, including the outcomes and decisions that sometimes arose from meetings, and at other times occurred outside of formal gatherings.

The success of the disarmament and demobilisation process is also worthy of comment. Although the process did not proceed smoothly, with the early conflicts in Berbera and Burao particularly arising as a direct result of difficulties in demobilising militia, the success in the aftermath of the Borama conference in removing roadblocks and in achieving a widespread acceptance that arms must not be carried by members of the public in urban areas was remarkable. It’s hard to pinpoint a single factor behind this achievement, and it is perhaps most reasonable to suggest that general public weariness with conflict combined with the successful election of a civilian government to create a mood in which the majority were willing to set aside differences. In addition, business leaders were keen to establish a secure environment for trade, and government promises of employment served to placate many people. There can be little doubt that the extended process of reconciling immediate and small-scale differences before moving onto broader grievances and decisions on a national system of governance created an environment in which most people were finally prepared to move beyond the mistrust and conflict of the past years. In the final analysis, though, this combination of factors was complex, and no one part of the process stands out as the catalyst for what was nevertheless an astonishing achievement.
It is often commented that Somaliland has succeeded in terms of reconciliation and state-building where other Somali areas have failed. This is frequently, and apparently correctly, attributed to a sustained focus on resolving issues at a community-level before attempting to tackle issues such as national government, although similar processes have also occurred in the south (Garaad, 2007, lines 33-59). There was a constant process of setting deadlines, putting pressure on groups and an immense amount of hard work by the various individuals and groups that took on mediation roles. Indeed, the biggest lesson of all must be the importance of sheer persistence, energy and commitment on the part of a trusted few. In the specific case of Borama conference, it was the coalescence of a national Guurti with a mandate to assume a role previously held by the SNM Central Committee that enabled success. This observation has often been proffered, and as much as it is true, it should not be allowed to obscure the simultaneous importance of the many other groups and individuals who contributed. Indeed, one of the prevalent features of the various mediation groups and committees that intervened in the period between mid 1991 and the conclusion of the Borama conference in mid 1993 was that they tended to arise almost spontaneously. They were not ‘institutionalised’ bodies; rather they were ad hoc groups, who through persistence and goodwill were able to convince antagonists of their trustworthiness and commitment. This suggests that the process of ‘institutionalising’ a regime which embodies this conflict resolution capacity will remain a challenge in the future. Perhaps the key factor differentiating the Somaliland experience from that in other Somali territories was the lack of international intervention, which seems to have exercised a malign influence on some of the critical peace- and trust-building processes described above.
Figure 4: Sanaag Region Map

(FSAU - Somalia, 2008)
4.2 Context

Sanaag is located in the remote eastern region of Somaliland, which is bordered by approximately 380 kilometres of Red Sea coastline to the north and by Puntland to the east. The eastern areas of the region are inhabited by members of the Harti clan, and territorial control is contested by Puntland and Somaliland. The region has great economic potential in livestock, agriculture, fisheries, and commerce, but in terms of development, Sanaag has been largely neglected by the former central governments of Somalia, the current Somaliland government, and by international agencies and NGOs. Indeed, few international agencies have been visible in the region since 1992, and engagement has tended to be sporadic due to its remoteness and lack of infrastructure. It is a predominantly rural region. There are no surfaced roads and social services are mostly limited to the main towns and villages.

Table 1: Sanaag Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Erigavo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>El Afweyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Laasqoray, Dhahar, Garadag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Maydh, Dararweyne, Fiqifulye, Hiis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(Regions and Districts Law, 2002, 6(3))

Sanaag is the largest region in Somaliland, and was established in 1972 by the government of Siyaad Barre, covering 55,000 square kilometres or over 31.6% of Somaliland's land mass (SDRA/MCC, 1994: 4). Erigavo is the regional capital and the capital of Erigavo District. There are two other principal districts; El Afweyn and Badhan (sometimes, although less frequently, referred to as Laasqoray). Siyaad Barre's government divided the region into five districts during the civil war: Erigavo, Badhan, El Afweyn, Dhahar and Laasqoray, with a further six districts created since by the Somaliland government: Hingalool, Dararweyne, Fiqifulye, Garadag, Hiis, and Maydh. The administrative structure, established under (Law 23/2002), drops Hingalool district, retaining the other ten. That law establishes ‘grades’ of district, where the grade (denoted as A, B, C or D) indicates the size, population and natural resource endowment of the district and also has an impact on its the administrative structure (see Table 1).

According to popular belief all major Somali clan-families (Darood, Hawiye, Isaaq, Esa, Gadabuursi, Ashraaf and Dir) originated in Sanaag and their ancestors are buried there. For many, members of their clans and sub-clans remain in the region, but two major clan-families are predominant: the Isaaq and the Darood (more specifically, the Harti section). These two clan-families account for four of the sixteen clans present in Sanaag, and are the focus of this case study. They are the most populous clans and were the primary parties during conflicts and, consequently, the most significant participants in the regional peace conferences. Two of the four clans, Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis, belong to the Isaaq family, while the remaining pair, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli, are Harti/Darood. The other 12 clans are smaller in size and some, like the Gahayle, Jibraahiil, Ogayslabe, Abaas and Reer Dood live alongside the major four, by whom they are protected (see figure 4). The eastern, southern and northern parts of Sanaag are mainly inhabited by the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante, while the western part is the home of the Habar Je’lo-bari and Habar Yoonis-bari36 (Yusuf, 2000).

Clan relationships and alliances are fluid and are generally more complex than can be represented through simple lineage diagrams. For example, although the Gahayle and Jibraahiil trace their lineage to the Darood, they both traditionally lived with the Habar Yoonis. During inter-clan negotiations, however, minority clans tend to work with their traditional allies. During the peace process in Sanaag, therefore, the Gahayle were in

36 The suffix ‘bari’ translates literally as ‘east’, distinguishing the Isaaq in Sanaag from their western kin.
Figure 2: Clans of Sanaag

Isaaq

Habar Je'lo (Muse Aabar)
Habar Yoonis (Muse Ismail)

Gabooje

Madhibaan  Yibro  Turmaal

Musa Dharie

Erigavo

Harti

Warsangeli

Dhulbahante

Majeerteen

Darood

Ogadeen

Reer Dood  Bihi Door  Miisaale
(Miisaale (pre Somali))

Magaadle  Arab
(pre Somali)

Ogaslabe  'Abaas (Dir)

Gahayle  Jibraahiil

--- Patrilineal kin

No direct kinship but traditionally allied and living in same area
alliance with the Harti. In the case of the Gabooye sub-clans, they traditionally live with one or other of the four major clans. For example, Musa Dharie live alongside the Harti, while Madhibaan live with the Habar Yoonis; with the Yibro and Tumaal dispersed amongst all the clans in the region.

Sanaag’s harsh environment has always contributed to the tensions and conflicts between clans as they compete for use of grazing and water resources. Relationships were inevitably more fractious and complicated between those groups who shared land or boundaries. This was the case, for example, with a number of sub-clans of Habar Yoonis and Dhulbahante, who have a long history of competing for resources as well as inter-marriage (Yusuf, 1998).

The complexity of inter-clan relationships arguably made the war in Sanaag particularly damaging and traumatizing, compared to other areas in Somaliland. Individuals were forced to take sides and to fight others they knew well, and in some cases even relatives. This situation caused considerable bitterness, not least because of the perception that the war was not of their making, but was brought to them from Mogadishu and Ethiopia.

Territorial claims to grazing and to water resources are said to be more entrenched in Sanaag than in other regions of Somaliland. This is partly due to the large mix of competing clans and sub-clans, but were reinforced by colonial rangeland policies during the British Protectorate, then strengthened by the Barre government which extended the colonial practice of granting private ownership of what had previously been common land.

A sense of marginalisation translated into a deepening politicisation of the conflict between the Isaaq and Darood. The SNM in Sanaag became increasingly associated with the Isaaq, involving few if any non-Isaaq members towards the end of the civil war. Siyaad Barre’s regime exploited this polarisation to encourage members of other clan to side with the government. This strategy initially met with some success, but the government found it increasingly necessary to resort to clan-partisan tactics in an effort to retain control. As general law and order deteriorated, it found it increasingly difficult to control a fractious army, and resorted to arming clan-based militia.

Isaaq groups feared Darood domination through a clan-based government, while the Darood felt a similar threat from an Ethiopian-supported and Isaaq-dominated SNM. When the SNM attacked and briefly held Burao and part of Hargeisa in 1988, the sporadic conflict that had been fuelled by these tensions flared into full civil war. The Harti clans, supported by the government, initially dominated the local Isaaqs. Consequently, the war ceased to be a conflict between the SNM and the government, but became much more personalised and evolved into an inter-clan conflict in the eyes of many of those affected.

Between 1988 and mid-1991, it has been estimated that 3,000 people in the region were killed, 7,000 wounded, 30,000 heads of livestock and 2,000 houses were destroyed37. Previously moveable and porous borders between clan territories were entrenched and, on occasion, vigorously defended. Given the intensity and personalised nature of the fighting, the psychological damage has had an even more profound and long-lasting effect on those living in the area, than the loss of life and physical damage (SDRA/MCC, 1994).

37 Records of deaths, injuries and property losses are traditionally collected by elders, who are then responsible for agreeing diya or compensation payments.
4.2.1 Intra-SNM and Harti Divisions

By the end of 1989, differences of opinion were also beginning to become evident amongst the Sanaag SNM militia and their counterparts elsewhere in the Northern Regions. The bases for these disagreements were diverse, and each grievance tended to compound previous issues. A few instances include:

- The inability of the central SNM leadership to spare ammunition and logistical support for their Sanaag units when they came under attack from government troops and their allies;
- Some SNM members in Sanaag believed they did not receive a fair representation within the organisation following elections in the SNM Congresses;
- When the Sanaag SNM seized ships in the Gulf of Aden, they did not share the ransom money with the central SNM.

By early 1990, the rift between the Sanaag SNM and their colleagues to the west had reached such a level of antagonism that those in Sanaag met in Daallo to discuss the possibility of coordinated action against their colleagues (Talaabo, 2007).

The sense of injustice on the part of the Sanaag SNM was further compounded when, after taking control of the Northern Regions in 1991, the central SNM leadership did not contact the Sanaag group in advance of steps to invite non-SNM clans, including the Sanaag Harti, to take part in national reconciliation talks (Nur, 2007).

In January 1991, the SNM leadership had struck a deal with Warsangeli individuals living in Berbera and sent them to Lasqoray by sea with the intention that they would inform their people of the planned Berbera meeting, and invite them to attend. At the same time, senior members of the SNM leadership met with the Dhulbahante in Oog and invited them to the conference in Berbera. Isaaq delegates from the SNM Central Committee, including Adan Bahnan and Xussein Ali Xirsi, were also sent to Erigavo to invite representatives of the eastern Isaaq to the conference. In treating the eastern Isaaq as the equals of the Harti, and assuming that their own peace process could be subsumed as part of the national process, the eastern Isaaq felt marginalised by the SNM leadership at the expense of their erstwhile adversaries (Gees, 2007b). Indeed, the eastern Habar Yoonis tried to make radio contact with the Warsangeli in order to discourage them from attending the Berbera conference before local issues were resolved. However, their advances were unsuccessful, as the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli delegates had already arrived in Berbera.

This position so incensed the Sanaag SNM that, when the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante returned from the conference, the SNM leadership in Sanaag confronted the Harti clan, seeking an explanation as to why they travelled to Berbera before reaching a local agreement. This increased the tension with SNM’s national leadership, and led to the opening of local talks between the Sanaag Harti and Isaaq. As a result, the Sanaag SNM assumed greater autonomy over their own decisions, thus paving the way for what was to become a Sanaag-based reconciliation process that would proceed in parallel to the national initiative (Gees, 2007b).

During the period of the Berbera and Burao conferences in 1991, the Sanaag SNM attacked Dhulbahante and Warsangeli towns, killing civilians and rustling livestock, in the expectation that the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli would withdraw from peace talks with the SNM in protest. Instead, these incidents strengthened the Harti commitment to the peace initiative in the west (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007d); this was in spite of the fact that the Warsangeli delegates to the Burao conference were actually informed during the conference that their towns were under attack by the Sanaag SNM.

Although the Harti delegates were remained committed and optimistic about the reconciliation and state-building process, they nevertheless felt betrayed by the Sanaag SNM attacks. While the Sanaag SNM’s attacks on Warsangeli towns during the Burao conference generated a heated argument in which the Warsangeli delegation condemned what they saw as specifically Habar Yoonis-bari aggression (Gees,
Conference participant, Jaama Mohamed Qaalib, a well known politician with a Warsangeli mother and Garhajis father, initiated a meeting between the Habar Yoonis-bari and Warsangeli delegations in Burao. This was the first meeting between the Habar Yoonis and Warsangeli, and initiated a peace dialogue between them (Gees, 2008b).

The complexity and delicacy of the situation in Sanaag is reflected in the fact that one of the seven resolutions adopted at the Burao conference stated that ‘peace in Sanaag should be pursued with the nomination of a special committee to facilitate negotiations’. This was the only reference to a local reconciliation process amongst any of the resolutions (Duale, 2007a).

Fundamentally, the SNM in Sanaag objected to the proposed cease-fire because they felt that the SNM should seize control of all Somaliland’s borders while they had the military power to do so. Failure to accomplish that at this stage, they felt, would lead to further trouble in the future (Talaabo, 2007).

Economically, the Habar Yoonis-bari were isolated from the rest of Somaliland, with only limited trade passing through the tiny port at Maydh, which dwindled once Berbera became operative\(^{38}\). The Warsangeli, on the other hand, had access to the Bossaso and Lasqoray ports and had good economic relations with the Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante (Nur, 2007; Talaabo, 2007). This sense of isolation was a significant factor in the Habar Yoonis-bari desire to press home the advantage now that the SNM had so clearly prevailed militarily.

The dynamics were no less complicated within the Sanaag Harti. After the collapse of the Siyaad Barre regime, the Harti were divided between those who allied with the United Somali Party (USP)\(^{39}\), and those who allied themselves with the SNM (Saleebaan Afqarshe, 2007d).

### 4.3 Origins of the Peace Process

#### 4.3.1 Women and Elders as Peace Activists

Even during periods of fighting, communication between the clans continued. It was often facilitated by women, who were able to liaise between their paternal clan on one side, and that into which they married on the other. In many instances, this allowed meaningful communication even when other channels were closed.

Elders also played a significant role in restoring peace, as mediators and through the traditional justice system of xeer. The inability of the SNM central command to establish a viable regional administration in

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\(^{38}\) During the war, Maydh was an important lifeline for the SNM and supported a great deal of illicit trade, but its potential for large-scale livestock trade is limited by the small size of the port.

\(^{39}\) See Peace Mapping report covering Puntland for more detail on the USP.
the immediate aftermath of their military victory resulted in a power vacuum, which in turn facilitated the emergence of the authority of clan elders throughout the region (Yusuf, 2006).

4.3.2 December 1990 to June 1991

The first attempt to end hostilities in Sanaag can be traced back to the end of December 1990, and the location of El Qohle. The Isaaq clans of Habar Je’ilo and Habar Yoonis and the Harti clans of Dhuulbahante and Warsangeli had been engaged in protracted fighting, and both sides were tired of the war. Each side was dug in on opposing banks of a dry river bed when two men, Mohamed Osman Ahmed of the Habar Yoonis, and Mohamed Duale Qoorsheel of the Warsangeli, took matters into their own hands and announced their wish to agree a cease-fire by standing within sight of their adversaries. They displayed a sheet of fabric, a practice known as *go’isu taag* (wave the flag) and broadly similar to the white flag or sheet used to denote ceasefire in other cultures. Trust between the two sides was low, so the process of reciprocation was slow. But, one by one, men would stand and show themselves: first from one side, then from the other. Eventually, sufficient numbers from each side were standing for both to be confident that the sentiment was reciprocated on a reasonably wide scale. Equal numbers remained on the fringes, still armed, while those standing moved forward to speak with their adversaries. The process began spontaneously, and spread as a result of the personal choices made by individuals. No order was given by leaders on either side. As a result, an informal meeting was held between the two sides, leading to an oral agreement that fighting would cease in El Qohle, and that grazing land would be shared (Ahmed, 2007; Jaafaal, 2007).

A short time later, in January 1991, peace meetings were held in Oog and Yagoori at the instigation of the SNM, with the aim of extending the peace to all the clans. These SNM-initiated meetings, which the Habar Je’ilo, Habar Yoonis and Dhuulbahante attended, marked the end of the war in the east of Somaliland, and were intended to pave the way for the Berbera conference. Discussions covered the return of fixed assets and livestock, as well as cease-fire and the resumed sharing of water-wells and grazing lands. But, like the attacks on the Warsangeli villages described above, the Dhuulbahante were also targeted in retaliation for past attacks made during the time of the Siyaad Barre regime. While ceasefire talks were progressing in Oog, Yagoori and then Berbera, SNM militia based in Kulmiye in Sanaag, attacked Dhuulbahante civilians in Dararwanye, Hudun and Sanirgood. Dhuulbahante civilians were captured and some were killed in custody, which caused long-standing grievances among the Dhuulbahante (Nur, 2007; Talaabo, 2007).

Following the collapse of the Siyaad Barre regime, the Warsangeli met in Lasqoray in February 1991, where Chief ‘Aaqil Bashir argued with the rest of his clan that they should not attend the conference in Berbera. He believed that it was necessary to resolve issues with the Isaaq in Sanaag first. However, he was not successful, and a delegation led by Ismail Suldaan, the representative of Warsangeli Suldaan Abdisalan, duly left for Berbera40. ‘Aaqil Bashir then went to ‘Aduur, a village in the Erigavo area. There he met a woman called Asha Ali Taar, who was from the Muse Ismail sub-clan of Habar Yoonis by birth and married to a Warsangeli man. Bashir sent her as a messenger to invite the elders and SNM officials in Erigavo to meet with him. Asha travelled to Erigavo and gave the message to one of the Habar Yoonis leaders and an SNM commander, Yusuf Esa ‘Talaabo’, who went to ‘Aduur himself to meet Bashir. Once in ‘Aduur, Bashir invited Talaabo to accompany him to the town of Hadaaftimo, which had, by then, become the centre of activities for the Warsangeli (Nur, 2007).

Upon his return to Erigavo, Talaabo gave a speech to the town about the good conditions he had witnessed in Hadaaftimo. The audience included a number of militant groups. The speech gave rise to a division between those elders who wanted to push ahead with the peace process, and a group of militia who

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40 It was at this point that the Habar Yoonis also attempted to contact the Warsangeli to urge them to remain in Sanaag and to pursue a local peace settlement rather than travelling to Berbera, as recounted previously.
wanted to continue fighting and wanted revenge against the Warsangeli, who they felt had escaped the ravages of the war experienced by the Habar Yoonis. Against the urgings of the elders, a number of the militia decided to attack Hadaaftimo and the Warsangeli town of Damalahagare. They even ignored the warnings of Habar Yoonis Chief ‘Aaqil Ismail Musa, who declared that they would be cursed if they attacked the town. In the event, the curse quickly began to look prescient: the militia vehicles became bogged down in muddy conditions as a result of unusually heavy rain, and several never returned from Hadaaftimo as a result of a series of car accidents in which many perished (Nur, 2007).

As has been mentioned, by early 1991, Hadaaftimo had become a base for many Warsangeli suldaans and elders. Clan delegates to the various peace conferences and meetings taking place around the country would return there to report on their engagements. At this time, the Warsangeli decided to reinforce their military strength to ensure they were capable of defending their towns and people. It was agreed that this defence force would be based in Damalahagare (Gees, 2007b).

When the Habar Yoonis in Erigavo heard that the Warsangeli had reinforced Damalahagare, a number of militia members once again attacked the town; again dismissing the warning of Chief ‘Aaqil Ismail Musa. The fighting was severe and many died from both sides. Damaxalagare has two parts: one a Warsangeli settlement; the other, close by and within sight of the Warsangeli area, a Dhulbahante town. When the Habar Yoonis militia attacked the Warsangeli, the Dhulbahante counter-attacked from the other side in support of their Harti colleagues. Eventually, this resulted in defeat for the Habar Yoonis militia, and the Warsangeli captured twelve men. The Habar Yoonis also captured one of the Warsangeli fighters, killing him while he was in custody – an act that was to become a point of contention in the future. The Habar Yoonis survivors then returned to Erigavo and swore that they would listen to the Chief ‘Aaqil’s advice in the future. From this point onwards, the Habar Yoonis became united in seeking peace (Gees, 2007b).

However, unaware of this new Habar Yoonis consensus for peace, the Dhulbahante feared revenge attacks by the Habar Yoonis, so they decided to relocate to the Sool region, traditionally the Dhulbahante heartland. In response, the Warsangeli moved into and occupied most of the territory from which the Dhulbahante had retreated, meaning that, for the first time, the Warsangeli shared borders with the Habar Je’lo.

At this time, the SNM were also internally divided. In the eastern areas, the Habar Je’lo from the Hawd had gathered a militia group in the Saraar area of Togdheer, closed the road, and were hijacking passing vehicles and robbing passengers. When this situation was discussed in Erigavo, it exacerbated existing tensions that split the SNM in Sanaag SNM into Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis factions. During the war, Habar Yoonis had harboured suspicions that the Habar Je’lo were sabotaging their efforts. One particular incident which triggered distrust and animosity between the two clans is illustrative of this. Ismail Haji Nur and Ahmed Mirreh, both of Habar Yoonis, travelled in 1990 to Gashaamo, where the SNM were meeting, to request weapons for the war effort in Sanaag. On their way back to Erigavo, accompanied by Habar Yoonis militia, were confronted by a Habar Je’lo militia who attempted to seize the weapons. The situation was resolved without loss of life, but the level of trust between the two clans deteriorated (Nur, 2007).

Another incident occurred in April 1991, when two vehicles were on their way from Hargeisa to Erigavo to assess needs and to deliver supplies. One car belonged to the Suldaan of the Iidagalle, a clan who, with the Habar Yoonis, make up the Garhajis; the other belonged to an expatriate aid worker. The two vehicles were hijacked by Burao-based Habar Je’lo militia near their base in Saraar. The militia then drove the vehicles to Erigavo, causing unrest in the town and settled in a location in Erigavo called Berde (an old tree and a local landmark). Habar Yoonis leaders asked that the cars be turned over to the SNM military in Erigavo. When the militia refused, the Habar Yoonis SNM attacked them, forcibly retrieving the vehicles, which were then returned to the owners. This issue so affected relations with the local Habar Je’lo, that they decided
to relocate from Erigavo to towns like Yufle and Dayaxa, where many Erigavo Habar Je’lo had family ties (Nur, 2007; Talaabo, 2007).

4.3.3 June 1991 to June 1993

The picture thus far is that the first half of 1991, which saw sporadic efforts at reconciliation, punctuated by periods of hostility and, on occasion, fighting. By June, 1991, though, the peace lobby was beginning to gain the ascendancy. For the following two years, this study will review the relationships and meetings that took place between the clans as the reconciliation process gained momentum. The pattern tended to be for two clans to meet and agree terms, before the negotiations moved on to other clans, or else additional parties were sometimes drawn into expanded talks. This review will reflect that pattern: most of the relationships considered start as bilateral discussions, before either concluding or expanding.

Figure 5: Sanaag Peace Conference Timeline

The pyramid diagram shows both the timeframe in which the peace conferences took place, and the process of convergence between the various parties. As can be seen, the Habar Yoonis and Habar Je’lo clans held separate negotiations with the two Harti clans. The SNM also initiated its own meetings, although lines of communication tended to become fused with those of the Habar Je’lo and the Harti. It was not until the middle of 1993 that all the parties had reached sufficient common understanding that they could all meet together. The Erigavo peace conference was the outcome of this process. It is notable that the two clans who had not held direct, formal negotiations with each other prior to the Erigavo conference were not adversaries from the civil war, but the two SNM allies: the Habar Yoonis and the Habar Je’lo.
All negotiations took place in the context of a traditional shir, generally called geed and traditionally held under a large tree. The tree now represents the assembled council that used to sit under the shade of its branches when resolving conflict or discussing matters of significance. The basis of the process was always provided for by xeer or Somali customary law, as discussed previously.

Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante

Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante have traditionally shared long borders in both Sanaag and Togdheer regions, in stark contrast to Habar Je’lo and Warsangeli, for whom common borders were a new experience that occurred only when the Dhulbahante withdrew from Sanaag land after the fighting in Damalaahagare. The rate of intermarriage between Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante is also correspondingly high. Relations between these two are consequently heavily interlinked; more so than between other sub-clans. While this provided opportunities for communication, it also meant that the deaths, livestock looting, and loss of property gave rise to grievances that have proven particularly personal and enduring.

The reconciliation process between the Habar Je’lo and the Dhulbahante originated in early 1990, in meetings, referred to in the previous case studies, in Gowlalaale, Qararro, followed by Oog and Yagoori in February 1991 and Kulaal/Awromooyays in June 1992. Those peace meetings were initiated by the Dhulbahante and the central SNM command with the aim of agreeing a cessation of hostility, resuming the sharing of grazing land and the exchange of prisoners. At those meetings, representatives from the Sanaag branches of the Habar Je’lo and the Dhulbahante negotiated on behalf of their own people, albeit in the context of national talks. For this reason, there were fewer local-level meetings between these two clans than there were between some of the other Sanaag groups.

As with the Dhulbahante and Habar Je’lo, the Warsangeli and Habar Yoonis have strong marriage relations and share borders. The relationship has been relatively dynamic, with people dramatically shifting from being relatives to enemies and back. Inter-marriage, however, also provides a basis for trust and negotiation.

After the December 1990 go’isu taag ceasefire in El Qohle, the first formal meeting between the two clans took place on 18th June 1991 at Yubbe, a meeting which has been dubbed Yubbe1.

After the damage to family relations and the personal and clan cost of the war, many women and elders were determined to end the fighting. With this encouragement, the Yubbe1 meeting was initiated by Warsangeli Chief ‘Aaqil Bashir, who made radio contact with Warsame Hersi, the Habar Yoonis chairman in Erigavo. Bashir invited Warsame and other elders in Erigavo to meet with the Warsangeli in Yubbe. A town populated by the Nuh-Omar sub-clan of the Warsangeli, Yubbe was chosen for the meeting because of its proximity to the Warsangeli-Habar Yoonis border. The invitation was accepted and seven delegates led by Warsame travelled to Yubbe for the meeting. The two delegations agreed to end hostilities, to share grazing land and to hold a follow-up meeting in order to expand the discussion to more complex issues of governance and so on (‘Bidaar’, 2007). As the meeting hosts, expenses were covered by the Nuh Omar sub-clan of Warsangeli. Three months later, the follow-up meeting took place, again at Yubbe and is now known as Yubbe2.

Jaama’ Warsame Jaafaal (Warsangeli, Erigavo):

“We have maternal relations with the Habar Yoonis and they have maternal relations with Habar Je’lo ... that is what exists ... you call that ‘garabeyshan’ [shouldering each other]. A letter with Habar Yoonis names was brought to us by the two other clans and they said this letter was written by Habar Yoonis and that Habar Yoonis are rejecting peace. Then we said ‘kir! [ie rebuffed the letter bearers]: we came from Habar Yoonis recently and we do not accept this letter. We will be responsible for whatever goes wrong’, and we threw the letter away.”
Many things were discussed at Yubbe2, but the final agreements covered exchange of prisoners and borders between clan areas. It was agreed that decisions on the restitution for property and land would be deferred to a later meeting. Yubbe2 was organised and managed by the elders, suldaans, ‘aaqils, rural people, women and SNM leaders. All expenses were paid for by the Warsangeli residents of Yubbe as they were hosting the meeting in their town.

It was during the exchange of prisoners that the Warsangeli realised, as mentioned earlier, that one of their men had died at the hands of the Habar Yoonis after being taken prisoner. This offended the Warsangeli; they had treated twelve Habar Yoonis prisoners well, and felt that the Habar Yoonis action was unacceptable. Many amongst the Warsangeli then demanded that they be permitted to keep one of the Habar Yoonis prisoners who would be killed as an act of revenge. Fearing that it would damage the peace process, the Warsangeli elders refused to allow that to happen. Instead, a full diya payment was promised by Suldaan Abdirashid of the Habar Yoonis. This promise could not be fulfilled at the time, as the war had left the Habar Yoonis without the necessary wherewithal, but the promise was not forgotten. When the payment had still not been paid almost two years later, when the Grand Conference in Erigavo commenced, the whole Bihi Door sub-clan of the man that was killed refused to attend the conference (‘Bidaar’, 2007).

The issue was only finally resolved in 1997, when President Egal was elected. Suldaan Abdirashid of the Habar Yoonis and Suldaan Saeed of the Warsangeli met and discussed the options for settling the diya payment. Suldaan Abdirashid maintained that it was not possible to collect the necessary funds from the Habar Yoonis, as people had lost so much of their wealth during the war. Eventually, they agreed to write a joint letter to the government, requesting assistance in covering the compensation. Some feel that this
amounted to a bribe to the whole sub-clan to participate in the 1997 Hargeisa conference, but regardless of the motivations, in 1999 the Egal government did pay the sum in full (‘Bidaar’, 2007; Gees, 2007b).

The final meeting between the two parties in this sequence took place just over a year later, from the 5th to the 9th of November 1992, when a large number (approximately 400 delegates) of Warsangeli and Habar Yoonis-bari met in the town of Jiidali. Jiidali had long been a Dhulbahante town, but the Habar Yoonis had occupied the area after the Dhulbahante retreat to Sool following the Damalahagare conflict. For this reason, the Dhulbahante were offended when the town was selected as the venue for the meeting and subsequently held a grudge against the Warsangeli for agreeing to meet there (Gees, 2007b).

The meeting was a continuation of the previous meetings in Yubbe. Its objectives were to secure peace, to agree a basis on which the two clans could co-exist in the future, and to resolve incidents that had occurred since the start of the peace talks. The two parties agreed that each clan would be responsible for maintaining law and order in its own territory⁴¹, and a joint local committee of 30 members would be responsible for settling conflicts according to the terms laid down at the conference. As hosts, conference expenses at Jiidali were met by the Habar Yoonis.

More specific principles in relation to access to grazing land in times of drought, and issues such as compensation in the case of armed banditry were also agreed. For example, if more rain fell in the land of one clan, the guest community attracted by the pasture would be responsible for the protection of the lives and livestock of the host community. On the other hand, if an armed robbery were to result in death, injury or the loss of property and the perpetrator were unable to pay compensation, the burden would fall upon

Saeed Mohamed Ismail ‘Bidaar’

In May 1993, with the Warsangeli disagreement over Habar Yoonis intentions still unresolved and the Borama conference drawing to a close, Saeed Bidaar, one of the few Warsangeli who believed the Habar Yoonis commitment to peace, decided he would go to Erigavo himself to see if his confidence was well founded.

He contacted Ismail Haji Nur in Erigavo, who advised him against the trip for his own safety. However, at considerable risk to his life, he travelled anyway. After a long and troubled journey, Bidaar found Ismail Haji Nur’s house. On finding his unexpected guest at the front door, Ismail feared for Bidaar’s safety, hid him in his house and locked the door in an effort to keep his presence a secret from the Erigavo militia. He then went in search of key elders, returning with them later. After considerable discussion between Bidaar, Ismail and the elders, Ismail presented Bidaar to a public meeting in the Erigavo park (darista). The meeting accepted his case and agreed to send him with eleven selected Habar Yoonis men to meet with the Warsangeli elders in Hadaafimo. The group of eleven Habar Yoonis delegates included Ismail Haji Nur along with Mohamud Dirir, Saeed Elmi Hoori and eight others. (Significantly, the Habar Yoonis delegates were either born ofWarsangeli mothers or had married Warsangeli women.)

The group got as far as Yubbe, where they were told that many of the Warsangeli who were against peace with the Habar Yoonis had found out about the travelling party’s intention to proceed to Hadaafimo. It was therefore too dangerous for the Habar Yoonis delegates to continue. Bidaar resolved to continue from Yubbe alone, driving Habar Yoonis SNM leader Ahmed Mirre’s car in order to prove that he had been to Erigavo. Arriving in Hadaafimo, he met with the Warsangeli, who agreed to send a group to meet the eleven Habar Yoonis delegates that had been left in Yubbe. Saeed Bidaar’s trip contributed significantly to preventing the Warsangeli from attacking Erigavo. (‘Bidaar’, 2007; Nur, 2007).

⁴¹ Although the precise phrase was not used in Sanaag during the period of our research, the principle is the same as that articulated by some delegates at Sheekh as ama dalkaa qab, ama dadkaa qab (see the relevant case study).
his father and brother, rather than on the whole mag-paying group. This provision was intended to force males to exercise control over immediate family members.

Having successfully concluded the resolution of immediate issues between the two clans, the Warsangeli delegates travelled to the meeting in Garadag described below, which started some two weeks later. The Habar Yoonis did not attend Garadag, although they were invited. Their absence remains the source of much discussion, which is also reviewed below.

After the Warsangeli left Garadag in early December 1992, they reported back to their clan in Hadaaftimo, including on the critical issue of Habar Yoonis intentions towards the peace process. Their decision not to attend the Garadag meeting, and the issue of the letter explaining their reasons (see boxed text above, and detail on the Garadag conference below), generated a great deal of suspicion amongst the Habar Je’lo, the Dhulbahante, and some of the Warsangeli. The Hadaaftimo meeting was split: most distrusted the Habar Yoonis and were prepared to fight, but a few elders felt that Habar Yoonis truly wanted peace. The Borama conference was about to begin, however, and the conviction of those who believed the Habar Yoonis genuinely desired peace was such that no action was taken immediately.

At the conclusion of the Borama Conference, the Warsangeli delegates returned to Hadaaftimo to discuss the conference outcomes. At this point, Saeed Bidaar also travelled back from Erigavo to Hadaaftimo (see boxed text).

At about the same point, a new element assumed considerable significance. In early May 1993, the UN Task Force (UNITAF) had given way to the UNOSOM II mission in southern Somalia, and there was considerable pressure on Somaliland to allow members of the UNsanctioned force to enter that territory as well. This proposal generated a great deal of debate in Somaliland, and much opposition. However, the Warsangeli were divided. Some argued that Somaliland had no need of the proposed intervention, while others suggested that the peace initiative in Sanaag should be abandoned as the UNOSOM II force would disarm the militia without the need for further negotiations. This dispute came close to derailing Warsangeli participation in the peace process by exacerbating the divisions that had been only partially addressed by Saeed Bidaar’s efforts. Throughout the debate, the proponents of peace had tended to be outnumbered, making it the more remarkable that they managed to muster sufficient support at critical moments for the Warsangeli to remain a party to peace negotiations throughout (Gees, 2007b; Nur, 2007).

In June 1993, immediately after the regrouping in Hadaaftimo, Yubbe3 took place. The eleven Habar Yoonis delegates who had accompanied Saeed Bidaar (see boxed text) met with a group of ten Warsangeli from Hadaaftimo. The Warsangeli delegation described events at the Garadag meeting, noting that the Habar Je’lo and Dhulbahante, and some of the Warsangeli. The Hadaaftimo meeting was split: most distrusted the Habar Yoonis and were prepared to fight, but a few elders felt that Habar Yoonis truly wanted peace. The Borama conference was about to begin, however, and the conviction of those who believed the Habar Yoonis genuinely desired peace was such that no action was taken immediately.

While the meeting was taking place, an argument had developed in Hadaaftimo, where a group of elders who supported Warsangeli engagement in the Somaliland peace process discovered that, unbeknownst to them, several of the ten delegates in Yubbe were determined to undermine the peace process in the hope that this would, in turn, undermine Somaliland’s quest for independence. A group of half a dozen elders...

After talks with the enlarged Warsangeli delegation, the Habar Yoonis agreed that they were committed to the peace process themselves. The Warsangeli group then persuaded them to send delegates to the Habar Je’lo and Dhuulbahante to confirm that commitment, and to invite the other Sanaag clans to attend a Grand Conference in Erigavo.

The group of eleven Habar Yoonis elders agreed to undertake that task themselves, eight of them travelling to Fiqifuliye in June 1993 to meet the Dhuulbahante. At that meeting, five delegates from each of the two clans were nominated to represent their people on matters pertaining to peace negotiations in the future, and it was agreed that the Dhuulbahante would take part in the Erigavo conference (‘Bidaar’, 2007; Nur, 2007).

Warsangeli and Habar Je’lo

Until the Dhuulbahante withdrew in the wake of the Damaalahagare incident in 1991, the Habar Je’lo and Warsangeli had not traditionally shared borders. Consequently, intermarriage between the clans was considerably rarer than between any of the other Sanaag clan pairings. However, the Dhuulbahante withdrawal allowed the Warsangeli to move into an abandoned Fiqifuliye, and then on to Kulaal where they came face to face with Habar Je’lo people and militia.

From that point, there was a need for the two of them to agree conditions for cooperation. Issues of security, trade and movement between the two territories thus formed the agenda for the only formal meeting solely between the Warsangeli and Habar Je’lo during the period under review. The Habar Je’lo initiated the approach, feeling they needed to make separate contact with the Warsangeli, although they were also discussing such a meeting with the Dhuulbahante around the same time, and indeed, a three-way liaison was arranged a few months later (Saleeabaan Afgarshe, 2007d). The venue was the Habar Je’lo town of El Qohle, and the meeting took place on 10th May 1992.

Dhuulbahante, Warsangeli and Habar Je’lo, Gahayle

As noted previously, there had been an active programme of negotiation and discussion between the Dhuulbahante and Habar Je’lo since 1990 within the context of SNM/Dhuulbahante negotiations. When they had met in Kulaal/Awrboogays, between 1st and 22nd June 1992, shortly after the 10th May meeting between Habar Je’lo and Warsangeli, they agreed that the Dhuulbahante would invite the Warsangeli to a joint gathering involving all three clans. By this time, the Habar Je’lo had fallen out with the Habar Yoonis and withdrawn from Erigavo. They were aware that there had been talks between the Habar Yoonis and the Warsangeli, and they were keen to expand their contact with the Warsangeli in the hope of countering Habar Yoonis influence. The Habar Je’lo were also deeply unhappy with what they perceived as a Habar Yoonis national government of Abdirahman ‘Tuur’ (Gees, 2007b; Hawl, 2007). Cooperation between the two Harti clans, and the Habar Je’lo therefore appeared an attractive proposition.

Keen to expand their new links with the Warsangeli, several Habar Je’lo men, including Yusuf Mohamed Ali ‘Tuke’, went to Hadaaftimo and Badhan to seek additional talks. They were successful in arranging to meet in Shimbiraale from the 16th to the 21st August 1992. The Warsangeli hosted the meeting and the Dhuulbahante also attended. Agreement was also reached to establish a formal coalition, to be known as Danwadaag Bari (Eastern Coalition), and to form joint ‘Standing Committee for Peace’, to settle any
disputes between the three parties. In addition to these notable advances, the meeting agreed a number of more specific points (Ali, 2007):

- With effect from 18th August, any property stolen or looted must be returned immediately;
- Any group who suffers injury or death of members at the hands of members of one of the parties to the agreement must not take revenge themselves, but must inform the Standing Committee for Peace. Anyone who initiates their own revenge will be treated as a bandit;
- The Standing Committee for Peace will use the services of the peace forces [in other words, the members of clan militia charged with maintaining the peace] when needed;
- Anyone killed or injured while engaged in acts of banditry will be treated as a ‘dead donkey’[dameer bakhtiyay: no diya would be payable] and will be denied any rights;
- Any sub-clan engaging in acts of banditry which cause death or material loss must pay for any damages, plus a bond of 100 female camels.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Habar Je’lo offered to host the follow-up meeting and to invite the Habar Yoonis. This offer was accepted and Garadag was selected as the venue. All the Harti clans in Sanaag, including the Gahayle as well as the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante would be invited (Ali, 2007), along with the Habar Yoonis.

The Garadag conference started on 23rd November, with the initial phase running to 1st December 1992. The aim was to confirm and extend the resolutions agreed at previous meetings; all of which, apart from Shimbiraale, had involved only two of the parties at Garadag, and none of which had included the Gahayle. An explicit aim was to involve the Habar Yoonis-bari in a common quest to establish peaceful relations in Sanaag.

The conference eventually extended over some 40 days (‘Bidaar’, 2007) with many delegates arriving and leaving at points during the event. A total of 720 delegates attended during the course of the conference, with clan affiliation distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Habar Je’lo</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsangeli</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhulbahante</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahayle</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished guests</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four senior members of the governing SNM, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, Osman Kasim Kodah, Mohamoud Ahmed Ali, and Ali Haji Abdi Du’ale, also attended as observers. The conference was chaired by a committee (shirguddoon) of seventeen elders who were assisted by a nine-member secretariat (Farah and Lewis, 1993).

The Habar Je’lo had taken responsibility in Shimbiraale for inviting the Habar Yoonis-bari to attend the Garadag meeting, and they had duly despatched a delegation to Erigavo for that purpose. They returned to Garadag at the start of the conference to report that the Habar Yoonis had declined the invitation, and had sent a letter. This letter remains a cause of considerable disagreement, and amongst the Harti, much insult. The Habar Yoonis acknowledge that they sent a letter, saying that it apologised for their absence and wished those attending success in the meeting. However, they believe that that version had been replaced by another by the time it reached Garadag. Whatever the case, both the Harti clans took offence at the version that was read at the conference, believing that it called on the Habar Je’lo to abandon their Harti allies in favour of their Isaaq colleagues, the Habar Yoonis. Many of the Habar Je’lo members interviewed for this research deny that the letter existed at all.
Whatever the truth, the Dhulbahante and many of the Warsangeli favoured an attack on Erigavo, and if there was such a letter, it did nothing to allay Habar Je’lo concerns regarding the Habar Yoonis either. Initially, this common mistrust of Habar Yoonis’ intentions strengthened the ‘Eastern Coalition’. However, as has also already been noted, some amongst the Warsangeli did not believe that the letter was a true reflection of Habar Yoonis intent, and as the clan who already had the strongest communication channels with Habar Yoonis, they who assumed responsibility for addressing the issue with Habar Yoonis. Thus the ground was set for the Yubbe3 meeting outlined above, which occurred in June 1993, after an interlude to allow for the Borama national conference (‘Bidaar’, 2007; Hawl, 2007; Nur, 2007).

Although the goal of involving the Habar Yoonis in the wider peace process was not achieved at the time, there were a number of positive outcomes agreed at Garadag, including the return of property looted during fighting, a return to the traditional system of common access to pasture and water, promotion of the free movement of goods and people, a mechanism for the return of stray animals, implementation of many previously agreed resolutions, and a commitment to settle outstanding ones. These points were embodied in a full written agreement (Farah and Lewis, 1993).

The conference acted as a catalyst for a number of subsequent negotiations and conferences, including Yubbe3 and El Afweyn. Ultimately, it also paved the way to the Grand Conference in Erigavo, although not without also throwing up new challenges that had to be overcome.

Habar Yoonis and Dhulbahante

Much as is the case with the Habar Je’lo, the Dhulbahante have long shared borders and inte-married with the Habar Yoonis, so connections are deep, and grudges can be long-remembered. In each of these relationships, this has led to difficulties in initiating peace talks as well as offering channels of communication through family links.

After the war the Habar Yoonis had become somewhat isolated from the other Sanaag clans. They had established themselves in arguably the strongest military position in Sanaag, winning control of Erigavo, and felt no need to engage with the others. However, by December 1992 and after the Garadag meeting, it was clear that this isolation could lead to conflict with an alliance of Habar Je’lo, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli: the Eastern Coalition. The Warsangeli were clearly split in terms of their feelings towards the Habar Yoonis, but they had taken on the task of approaching them for talks on behalf of the Coalition. However, there were a handful of dissenters amongst the Dhulbahante. Immediately after the Garadag conference, a group of ten young Dhulbahante men, all of whom had lived in Erigavo and owned property there, decided to try and meet with Habar Yoonis representatives themselves. They first made radio contact, then, against the advice of their own people, set out from Sool and travelled as far as Fiqifuliye on the route towards Erigavo. Again, they made contact with Habar Yoonis elders, who agreed to meet them further along the road. Seven Habar Yoonis elders led by Saeed Ali Dualeh, the representative of Suldaan Rashid, welcomed them to Habar Yoonis territory, and the two groups reached an agreement that the Habar Yoonis and

Account of the letter by Ismail Xaji Nur
(Habar Yoonis)

Chief ‘Aaqil, Ismail Musse, who was estimated to be around 130 years old was the one to order Habar Yoonis to write a letter to say ‘we have peace, continue with your meeting’. A different letter from that one was read at Garadag which made the Harti angry. That was the start of new problems. Many Harti delegates were present when the letter was read.
(Nur, 2007)

42 When the Dhulbahante retreated to Sool after the Damalahagare conflict, they left Fiqifuliye and the town remained largely deserted until contacts with the Habar Yoonis had been re-established. As the meetings described in this section took place, confidence in the relationship strengthened, and Dhulbahante families began to return. On several occasions the town served as a meeting point between Habar Yoonis and Dhulbahante.
Dhulbahante should meet officially in Dararweyne\textsuperscript{43}. However, many amongst the Dhulbahante did not favour this initiative, so the ten returned to Sool to attempt to persuade their Dhulbahante colleagues to attend the Dararweyne meeting (Nur, 2007).

The Habar Yoonis delegation arrived in Dararweyne in early December 1992. But they faced a long wait, as the Dhulbahante had not yet agreed amongst themselves to take part. The primary Suldaan of all Habar Yoonis (not just the Sanaag branch), Esa Hirsiqani, was one of the delegates and he sent a message to the Dhulbahante that if they didn’t come to Dararweyne, he would personally travel to Awrboogays to see them. After receipt of the Suldaan’s message, and after the Habar Yoonis group had been waiting for 23 days, the Dhulbahante delegation finally arrived (Nur, 2007).

In Dararweyne (2nd January to 5th February 1993), the Habar Yoonis-bari and Dhulbahante sat face-to-face for their first full meeting since the fall of the Siyaad Barre regime, two years earlier. The objective of the Dararweyne conference was to enhance peace between the clans and to establish access to pastoral resources (Farah and Lewis, 1993).

‘Aaqil Ismail Musse was absent due to illness after his long journey (see boxed story), so his son Jama Ismail Musse, now Chief ‘Aaqil, attended on his behalf. Many things were discussed including looted livestock, land and other property, and also human losses. Dhulbahante delegates raised their grievances over incidents that had occurred in Sanirgood (see page 65) and Dogobleh. In response, the Habar Yoonis members pointed out that there had been significant losses on all sides, and suggested that it was time to move on and to learn from the mistakes committed during the conflict (Nur, 2007).

As the hosts, Habar Yoonis covered the meeting expenses, and a mixed committee was appointed to organise and manage the meeting.

The Dararweyne meeting was successful in building trust between the two clans, and enabled neighbours to share grazing land. Furthermore, as the relationship flourished it facilitated further interaction, including social links and trade, which in turn contributed indirectly to the stabilisation of Sanaag as a whole (Farah and Lewis, 1993). And, not least, it was another significant step towards a region-wide conference in Erigavo. A written agreement was signed by both parties at the conclusion of the Dararweyne meeting.

The Dararweyne meeting occurred while the Borama national conference was starting, so there was a break in the meeting schedule for a few months. The next significant contact between the two clans was when eight out of the eleven Habar Yoonis delegates to the Yubbe\textsuperscript{3} conference with the Warsangeli travelled to Fiqifuliye in June 1993 to meet with Dhulbahante elders and to invite them to the Grand Conference in Erigavo (‘Bidaar’, 2007; Nur, 2007).

\textsuperscript{43} Dararweyne was selected for the meeting because it was a Habar Yoonis town separated by only some two kilometres from the town of Kulaal, its Dhulbahante twin.
Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis

The Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis are both clans of the Isaaq family, and many of their sub-clans share borders and inter-marry. During the war with the Siyaad Barre government, they were both united under the the SNM, while the Harti mostly supported the government. The relationship between the two Isaaq clans after the war was in many ways less complex than was the case for the others, as they shared a common lineage. However, the relationship was not always smooth.

As noted, during the war, there had been some disagreements within the SNM, and this contributed to their split in Erigavo. After June 1991, the majority of the Habar Je’lo pulled out of Erigavo to other areas around Sanaag. The first formal meeting between the two did not take place until two years after the war had ended, when the Chief ‘Aaqil of Habar Yoonis, Ismail Musse, took the initiative and went to El Afweyn in February 1993, following the Garadag and Dararweyne conferences. Ismail Musse returned to El Afweyn in June 1993 with between seven and ten elders for one week, where he gathered a group of Habar Je’lo and they all travelled together to Yufle. He invited them to come to Erigavo for the final summit with all the clans. He then left the majority of his group in Yufle and returned to Erigavo, bringing a few of the Habar Je’lo members back with him (Nur, 2007).

4.3.4 The Erigavo Grand Peace Conference – 19th August to 11th November 1993

During the Borama conference, in the first months of 1993, all the delegates from Sanaag gathered together to discuss the Sanaag peace process. They decided then that it was time to complete the long process of meetings, and collectively announced their intention to hold a grand conference in Erigavo.

After more than two years of meetings between two or (occasionally) three clans at a time, each addressing specific grievances and tensions, all the major Sanaag clans finally came together in Erigavo for the Grand Peace Conference. The conference officially opened on 19th August and lasted until 11th November 1993. As with the preceding meetings, the Grand Conference followed traditional Somali negotiating procedures with senior elders (suldaans, garaads, and ‘aaqils) representing the clans in a traditional grand council of elders (Guurti).

Objectives

Although the Erigavo conference followed hard on the heels of the Borama national conference, and many of the delegates at Erigavo had also been in Borama, there was agreement that the Erigavo event would focus exclusively on Sanaag issues; a position accepted also by Egal, who had just been elected President of Somaliland (Renders, 2006: 231).

However, a ‘peace reinforcement group’ led by Jama Mohamed Qaalib with Suldaan Mohamed Abdilqadir, Suldaan Esa Hirsiqani and other elders of the western Garhajis also attended the conference having travelled from a Garhajis meeting in El Hume, Togdheer. Their stated aim was to help to ensure that the Grand Conference proceeded without disruption, and to ally the Garhajis with the Harti clan, pressuring the Habar Yoonis-bari to cooperate in the peace process. In effect, this provided a necessary impetus to the Erigavo conference, encouraging the Sanaag people to settle their issues (Gees, 2008b).
Before Sanag Peace Process and the Lead-up to Erigavo Conference:

The purpose of the conference was to end hostilities, to negotiate the return of looted property and to set basic rules for living together, including rights of free movement and trade across clan boundaries. Agreements were formalised in a regional peace charter, establishing relative stability and normal economic and social relations among the conflicting clans (Yusuf, 2006).

Participants and Foundations

Each of the biggest Sanaag clans were equally represented. Initially 30 representatives were invited from each clan, but an additional 20 per clan were added later. Minority clans, including the Jibraahiil and Gahayle also sent delegates. Elders were responsible for mediating or negotiating agreements, and proceedings were subject to Somali customary law (xeer). Islamic Sharia principles were also widely respected, reflecting the importance of both Islam and tradition. The opening of the conference involved lengthy speeches and the extensive use of hadith (oral traditions recalling the words and deeds of the Prophet), sura from the Quran and poetry (Gees, 2008b). Eloquent speeches recalled previous conflicts, and the lessons learnt from them. Proverbs and poems were employed to express opinions, initiate negotiations and to ease tensions.

As well as the ‘peace reinforcement group’, a number of other senior politicians, military and religious leaders and poets took part.

Women played a major role in preparing, organising, and facilitating the conference, but were excluded from participation in the decision-making process.

Management/Facilitation

A preparatory committee was established to organise and manage the conference, with members representing Habar Je’lo, Habar Yoonis, Warsangeli and Dhulbahante in equal numbers. Each clan appointed their own representatives. This preparatory procedure followed that of Yubbe3, where the preparatory committee consisted of five members from each community, with the exception of the hosts – in this case Habar Yoonis – who provided seven representatives. The committee therefore numbered 22 in total.

We (Ahmed Ali ‘Adami’, Mohamed Saeed ‘Gees’, Mohamoud Abdi Hamud ‘Nine’ and Mohamoud Ahmed Ali ‘Bayr’) went to Erigavo to assess the situation as the first Warsangeli committee for the Erigavo Conference. There were no other Harti in the town, except for two girls from our clan, who were also assisting with preparation for the conference, and were looking after us. We requested that the girls prepare a qaad-room (a room to meet and chew qaad) for us, and they offered us their own room, which they rented from the locals. When we arrived at the room I [Gees] felt very emotional, as the house belonged to my grandfather and the Habar Yoonis were occupying and renting it unlawfully.

As we were sitting in the room, the door was forcefully opened by four militia with weapons. Suddenly one of them asked us “who is Mohamud Abdi Hamud ‘Nine’?”. We were shocked into silence as we didn’t know what they wanted him for! One of us then asked “do you know him?”. They replied “we’re his brother in-laws. We heard he is in town, and we have come from Jiddali to protect him”. Everyone was relieved to hear that!

(Warsangeli Advance Party in Erigavo)

(Gees, 2007b)
They opened an office in Erigavo from where the process was managed. Invitations were despatched from that location; first for 30 delegates from each clan, then for an additional 20 (‘Bidaar’, 2007). The increase from 30 to 50 delegates from each clan became necessary because the invitation process did not work as planned: each of the clan leaders eventually arrived with a contingent from their sub-clan which included all those they felt needed to attend, which exceeded the limit of 30. Under Somali customary law, it is not acceptable to impose limits on the number of representatives attending a shir (meeting), so the preparatory committee felt it unwise to request that each leader reduce their number of representatives. Instead, the limit was raised for all (‘Adami’, 2008). Even then, many leaders were ultimately accompanied by more delegates than was allowed under the revised limit, so the decision on limits was somewhat symbolic.

The consequently large number of delegates were organised into four groups: the preparatory committee being the first; a chairing committee (shirguudoon); a negotiating committee; and an ‘ad hoc’ committee. The convocation of all delegates then formed a General Assembly.

The negotiating committee consisted of eleven ‘aaqilis or elders from each clan, selected by each delegation for an initial total of 44. However, several additional positions were later created for Gahayle representatives. That committee was then responsible for holding a cycle of meetings, with one for each clan pairing. Those meetings took place outside the General Assembly and resulted in agreements between clans on outstanding issues. Once those agreements were made, they were taken to the General Assembly for ratification. Thus, major issues were resolved in private and by mutual agreement, with the Assembly providing the wider recognition of each new raft of agreements.

The General Assembly itself was comprised of three groups: the shirguudoon; a group of independent observers, and body of clan representatives.
The shirguddoon numbered eight, with two members elected by their respective clan from each of the large Sanaag clans, and was chaired by Ali Warsame Guleed. They were responsible for chairing the Assembly meetings that publicly endorsed the agreements passed on by the negotiating committee. They would read out each decision for the Assembly to endorse.

There were also independent observers, including garaads, suldaans, elders, religious people and poets from all over Somaliland who came to strengthen the peace.

The ‘ad hoc’ committee was a group of Sanaag intellectuals and politicians, including members from each of the four major local clans, who had been active in the peace and reconciliation process in the past. Initially they had come to the conference with their clans, but had decided that they wished to work on a non-clan basis, so sought to avoid identification with one clan or another. They took on a role assisting with matters of protocol and publicity, working very closely with the preparatory committee and then with the shirguddoon. They delegated a four-person secretariat to work with the shirguddoon, supported by some incentive payments from SDRA. They produced a small newspaper informing readers about the issues under discussion and matters relating more generally to peace-building.

There were also a number of sub-committees who worked under the direction of the shirguddoon. These included security and logistics sub-committees, who were responsible for keeping the peace, and for provision of food, housing and transportation. Womens groups, who were independent from clans also worked closely with the logistics committee, providing much support in that area (Gees, 2008b).

The organisational chart (Figure 5) illustrates the relationships between the various committees.

**Funding**

Once the intention to hold the Grand Conference in Erigavo had been made public during the Borama conference, the next priority was to secure the financing for it. Over a thousand people would participate, yet the local people in Sanaag had sustained heavy losses during the civil war and could not easily raise the funds on their own. Ismail Suldaan of the Warsangeli approached the Somali Development and Relief Agency (SDRA), based in Djibouti, requesting assistance with raising funds for the conference. The SDRA accepted the proposal in principle, but asked that the application be put in writing. Representatives from the four main Sanaag clans worked together to produce the required document. In response, SDRA organised a fundraising programme on behalf of the communities. They were successful in securing contributions from a number of international and national organisations; some in-kind, including food and labour; others in cash. SDRA themselves provided land, air and sea transport for food and medicine from Djibouti. They also paid incentives, and provided office equipment and transportation for the four-member secretariat (Xaamud, 2008).

In the event, the group who wrote the application for SDRA underestimated the amount of support that would be needed, leaving a significant shortfall. They had based their estimates on 500 delegates, meeting for a maximum of 45 days. Instead, over 1,000 delegates participated, and the conference took some 120 days. Local people, along with the organisations listed above, made additional contributions to cover the deficit.
Table 2: Initial Contributions to Erigavo Conference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organisation</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid, UK</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoviour Technologies, Djibouti</td>
<td>Air transport: staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Embassy, Djibouti</td>
<td>Dried food: rice, flour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Agro Action (GAA)</td>
<td>Dried Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief Organisation, Djibouti</td>
<td>Food: dates, flour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and Peace Institute (LPI)</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam America, Boston</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam in UK</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalaid, Geneva</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Development and Relief Agency</td>
<td>Transport: secretariat, medical supplies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>incentive payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadfast Voluntary Organisation (SVO)</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(SDRA/MCC, 1994; Xaamud, 2008)

Figure 5: Relative Local and International Contributions

(Xaamud, 2008)

As well as providing cash donations, Sanaag communities also provided many in-kind contributions, including:

- **Food** livestock, perishable food, tea
- **Housing** accommodation for guests
- **Services** voluntary labour for myriad tasks required
- **Organisation** management and preparation
- **Energy** firewood, water, lighting/electricity
- **Transport** vehicles for conference delegates and guests

The relative contributions (cash and in-kind) of international agencies and local communities for each category is indicated in Figure 6. Overall, the local contribution is estimated to have covered two-thirds of the total required, while international agencies contributed the remaining one-third.
Outcomes

At the conclusion of the conference, a Peace Charter consisting of nineteen articles (see appendix IV), was adopted. The topic dealt with in each article is as follows (SDRA/MCC, 1994):

44. The adoption of peace
45. The promulgation of the preceding peace agreements in the region
46. Final status of the agreed terms
47. Determining the immovable properties of the communities and individuals
48. The individual's right to life
49. Ending raiding, rustling, killing and injuries
50. Sharing of grazing, water and camping resources
51. Measures to be taken against violators of peace
52. The responsibility of the guurti of each community for peace, law and order
53. The regional Guurti and Administration as the primary organs for maintaining peace
54. Creation of the Good-Office committee of the Guurti
55. Creation of a regional security force
56. District Responsibilities for peace
57. Composition of the regional peace and law and order enforcement agencies
58. Public property
59. Amendment to the charter
60. Special honours by the region to those in the struggle
61. Recognition of the Day of Peace as 11 November 1993

Follow-Up and Implementation

Clan elders took it upon themselves to ensure the implementation of the Peace Charter, and their first priority was to spread news about the agreements reached to all the communities in the region, and to promote peaceful movement between each territory. It was to take a further two years before the implementation process could reach its culmination, with the restoration of land occupied during the conflict to its owners. One of the early tasks for elders was to appoint committees that would be responsible for overseeing implementation of the terms of the Charter in their local areas, and in particular to oversee the process of return of land. Membership of the committees had to be based on the expertise, knowledge of customary law, and residence in the area of a past dispute. The decision was made that the restoration of land should take place after a good rainy season, as the abundance of good pasture would make the transition easier. The process of land restoration began in 1995, with the committees appointed by the elders responsible for preparing plans with families concerned, for setting dates and for monitoring progress. The process of restoring land to its original owners was mostly completed after a year, but the Habar Yoonis took much longer to restore the agreed properties to the Dhulbahante. Faced with such slow progress, the Dhulbahante demanded that the Habar Yoonis swiftly comply with their obligations. A meeting was organised between the two clans in July 1996, with the aim of completing procedures for the return of the properties. A total of 300 delegates gathered in Erigavo, 150 from each clan, and the meeting took three months to conclude successfully, and enabling the finalisation of the process shortly after (Yusuf, 1998).

The Charter also mandated the establishment of a regional administration, and this was duly accomplished, with Jama Salah Ahmed as Governor, although unfortunately, this body did not function for long. A police-force was also created, albeit weak and ill-equipped (Saleebaan Afqarshe in APD, 2007a).
Unresolved Issues

Although most issues were resolved at the Erigavo conference, some disputes regarding land ownership remained unaddressed. Due to the collapse of the Siyaad Barre regime, many land policies and formal records had been destroyed. As a consequence, for example, some disputes remain between Habar Yoonis and Warsangeli over land to which both claim rights of ownership that predate the conflict. The Dhulbahante and Habar Yoonis also have some similar outstanding issues (Gees, 2007b).

4.4 Analysis

The peace process in Sanaag was influenced, perhaps counter-intuitively, by the national peace initiatives of the SNM. Each had a different agenda: for the SNM leadership the priority in the east was to bring the Harti and Isaaq together at a national level; whereas local initiatives were intended to solve the local issues first, and which included disputes within the Isaaq clans. In the end, local efforts were sufficiently persistent to ensure that the process continued in spite of setbacks, and also that issues in Sanaag were raised in the context of the national process. The SNM leadership at time exacerbated divisions among their eastern colleagues, but they also showed some willingness to try to understand the Sanaag dynamics and to avoid derailing the peace process. The inclusion of Sanaag in the Burao resolutions is indication of this, as perhaps is the low profile played by the national committee appointed in Burao to mediate in Sanaag.

The actors in the many Sanaag peace conferences were a cross-section of all parts of society: community leaders (suldaans, ‘aaqils and garaads), intellectuals, poets, business people, politicians, military officers, religious men, and also women. Although women played a crucial role in the peace process, tradition did not permit their direct participation in the decision-making process. However, the review of the peace meetings shows time and again the crucial, if often invisible, roles played by women.

Individuals, both men and women, played a crucial role, as highlighted in the stories in the boxed text. Indeed, the significant impact of certain individuals on the process itself – interventions that were often made at considerable risk, cost or inconvenience to the person involved – was a key factor that sustained that process through numerous challenges and over a sufficiently long period to enable its conclusion.

Traditional Customary Law (Xeer)

The Sanaag peace process took place over a two-year period, culminating in the Erigavo conference in August 1993. In the course of that process, a number of different approaches were employed, but with the exception of the first contacts between the Isaaq clans (particularly Habar Je’lo) and Dhulbahante in Oog and Yagoori, all were locally instigated. In all cases, reconciliation negotiations and agreements were based on xeer or customary law, with guidance from traditional leaders. In effect, xeer underpinned everything, including: communication styles; leadership choices; methods of negotiation; participation of the parties to the conflict and of external parties; decision-making structures and processes; the system of recompense for wrongdoing, as well as the determination of wrongdoing and appropriate punishments; processes for expressing remorse, confession, forgiveness and reconciliation; and rituals for marking closure and new beginnings.

Xeer embodies common wisdom and constitutes an unwritten but widely accepted code of conduct. It emphasises the values of interdependence and inclusiveness and thus forms the basis for a ‘social contract’ between lineage groups, combining both Islamic sharia and customary law. It defines the obligations, rights, and collective responsibilities (including sanctions) of the parties. The ‘xeer’ lays down the rules for responsible cooperation, and is a source of protection for both individual and group rights. It does not eliminate strife but provides accepted and workable ways of dealing with disputes and conflicts. Among
the most important xeer (in this case the word refers to specific agreements) are those which govern entitlements to common resources, water and pasture.

**Councils and Juries of Elders (Guurti and Xeerbeegti)**

During the Sanaag process, all agreements between clans were made by councils of elders (guurti) or by elders’ juries called upon to pass judgement in specific cases (xeerbeegti). In one or the other form, these assemblies of elders traditionally deal with relations between groups, in both war and peace, and lay down the laws and principles by which all members will act. While all adult males are entitled to participate and be heard in a shir, elders tend to command the greatest authority and respect. Elders exist at every level of clan-segmentation and may gain their prominence and influence through a variety of attributes, ranging from age, wealth, wisdom, religious knowledge or powers of oratory. Traditionally, though, an elder is a representative (almost always male), rather than a leader with great personal authority, and acts as a delegate of and for his clan. As such, clan elders monitor grass-roots opinion and can significantly influence it. Ideally, they try to influence opinion on the basis of enlightened clan interest, because they know this will produce the most efficacious results.

**The Meeting Process**

Meetings (shir) were initiated in different ways as the peace process evolved. However, the first contacts tended to be initiated by elders, supported by women messengers and rural people, or by individuals who took personal risks to pursue what they saw as opportunities for peace.

The nature of the conflict in Sanaag was particularly complicated as the warring sides (Isaaq and Harti) traditionally had close relations through intermarriage and shared borders. The situation was further complicated as the rivalry between the two main Isaaq clans in the area deepened producing new alliances between the Habar Je’lo and Harti clans, which left the Habar Yoonis isolated, and threatened to become a source of renewed conflict.

In a number of instances, it was rural people who were the catalyst for peace, as they had a need to share pasture and water. Communication channels were therefore opened between clans, relieving tensions and mistrust.

The meetings that resulted were not pre-planned, and occurred at different levels, addressing local grievances first before progressing to broader inter-clan or regional issues, and culminating in the Grand Conference in Erigavo. This approach required a common commitment to invest the time and resources needed for the meetings to occur. There was considerable emphasis placed on the selection of venue, with meetings occurring in a range of settlements and towns, and hosted by the local clan. On occasion, the selection of a given location proved contentious – as was the case in Jiidali when the Dhulbahante felt aggrieved that Habar Yoonis chose to host a meeting in a town that they had recently taken over from them.

In line with this sense that the process must be allowed to take its time to run its course, there were no externally imposed deadlines. As the process progressed, the level of formality did increase, and the greater need for planning meant estimates had to be made of end-dates and delegate numbers. However, these were always allowed to change, with additional resources found to cover shortfalls as required. The most notable example of this combination of flexibility and formality was undoubtedly the Erigavo conference,

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Adan Awad Ahmed (Habar Je’lo)

The whole peace came into being by concession. So many men were killed in the war … properties were looted by opposing clans … cities were burnt … if there had been no concessions … there would not have been what is called peace … not only concessions but too many concessions.

(Ahmed, 2007)
which was the largest, most extensively planned and most formal of all the meetings. The series of meetings
tended to work on a number of issues at the same time:
63. Ceasefire, breaking barriers to communication, agreeing the cessation of hostilities and sharing of
grazing land;
64. Defining clear borders, exchanging prisoners, and returning looted livestock;
65. Rebuilding relationships between clans, including a review of damages and moves to improve internal
clan relationships and to identify ways to resolve outstanding issues;
66. Extending agreements to include other clans or sub-clans in the region;
67. Agreeing the principles and rules for the maintenance of the peace and future conflict resolution.

Funding

With the exception of the Erigavo conference, all conferences were locally funded. Clans or took turns to
host and therefore to fund gatherings. Donations were collected from rural people in the form of livestock,
business people contributed dried food and money, and the Diaspora sent funds. Women played a vital role
by collecting money, food and clothes; by cooking food for delegates; by voluntarily preparing venues; and
by providing and maintaining accommodation. Some women contributed financially by selling family gold
and by sharing household income.

The Erigavo conference also benefited from all of these forms of support, but was also partially funded by
international agencies through SDRA.

Agreements

All meetings resulted in specific agreements, although the outcomes were different depending on each
meeting's objectives. As noted, each series of meeting tended to follow a hierarchy of stages, with first
generating basic agreements on a cessation of hostilities or on sharing pasture and water. The second stage
meetings generated agreements on prisoner exchanges, return of livestock and land demarcation, while
the final stage meetings ultimately generated a regional peace charter that recognised specific individual
rights to move, trade and access pasture across clan boundaries. The terms of each agreement was
communicated and fostered through the elders by sharing information with each other, and within their clan
(Yusuf, 2006). Many agreements were recorded in writing, especially at the higher levels of the hierarchy,
although this was not always the case.

Role of Women

Women played many roles, as has been noted. One of the roles was in opening or maintaining communication
channels, as they frequently delivered messages between clans. Due to the fact that women had ties to
more than one clan – one through marriage and other through paternal relationship – they could facilitate
communication between warring sides. They were more confident that they would not be harmed when
crossing clan boundaries, because of their multiple clan affiliations; a protection which is recognised under
xeer, which secures the integrity of women, children and elders (Farah and Lewis, 1993).

Implementation

As a direct result of the gradual, locally-based approach employed, almost all agreements were implemented.
In cases where one party seemed to be slow to fulfil its obligations, as was the case with transfer of land
from Habar Yoonis to Dhulbahante after the Erigavo conference, another meeting was called to address the

44 Some agreements were also disseminated by broadcasting them on the BBC Somali service, a process which was facilitated by
international agencies who were in contact with the BBC.
issue. This left only the issue of diya compensation promised to the Warsangeli for the death of a prisoner in Habar Yoonis custody unfulfilled after the Erigavo agreements had been met. As described, this matter was ultimately settled by the government.

There are a number of small-scale land disputes that remain which cause periodic conflicts between sub-clan groups or families. However, the Sanaag peace process contributed substantially to the reestablishment of principles and processes for the resolution of such disputes.

4.5 Lessons Learnt

Many of the lessons that can be drawn from the Sanaag peace process can be summarised in terms of the conditions that were applied to the process itself. All derived from or were consistent with the customary principles of xeer, and were thus immediately comprehensible to those participating.

- The discussion of national politics where forbidden at the Erigavo Grand Peace Conference. This was one of the major factors for its success, as there were diverse political opinions;
- In the absence of a government with the capacity to impose peace, elders became the primary legitimate actors in initiating the process. Their role was facilitated by a reliance on traditional law (xeer);
- Issues were tackled in order of ‘localisation’: specific issues of immediate importance to the everyday lives of individuals and communities were tackled first, followed by issues of future dispute resolution, the involvement of additional clans and so on;
- Individuals were active in the process of initiating peace discussions, sometimes at great personal risk or cost;
- Women played a crucial role even though they were prevented from participating directly in decision-making processes. Their value in carrying messages between warring parties, creating bridges and defusing hostilities enabled the process to continue, as did their assistance with organising and fundraising for meetings;
- The local nature of both the process and the mediators involved generated a level of legitimacy that made agreement and implementation of agreements easier;
- The importance of the principle of xalaydhalay, or forgetting grievances and starting afresh, also cannot be over-emphasised. The closeness of many of the combatants to each other make reconciliation difficult, and this essential principle is seen by many as the only way that a sustainable peace could have been achieved;
- In spite of the lengthy period of conflict, there was a realisation that peace and order were vital if past mistakes were to be avoided: essentially, it was widely accepted that the cost of ongoing conflict and of patronage favouring one clan over another was borne primarily by local people, thus providing a strong incentive to sustain a commitment to the reconciliation process;
- The elders’ expertise in conflict avoidance was also important: oftentimes, meetings were designed to avoid the introduction of disruptive arguments at too early a stage, or initiatives were specifically configured to remove elements that were known to be conflictual.

The Sanaag peace process therefore provides vital insights into the wider process of peace-building in Somaliland. In many ways, it was precisely the unique situation of Sanaag that makes it an illuminating example of reconciliation, utilising Somali customary law (xeer) and relying on local-level initiative. For many, it stands alongside the national Borama conference as an example for similar endeavours in Somali territories (Yusuf, 2006). The diversity of its actors, the informal structure followed, as well as the lack of national funding and pressure, illustrated that peace could be achieved with persistent efforts despite many complications as described above. A local initiative merely supported by elders and the community brought forth a peace charter between the warring clans.
Annex 1: Resolution from Burao Elders' Meeting

Burco 5/5/1991

KU: GUDOMIYE-ku xigeanka ururka wa n M AWA GUDOMIYAHU SHIRKA AAYA KA TALINTA WAGOOYI.

Shirka aayo ka talinta waqooyi oo ay isugu yimaadeen guurtida iyo sidaanada iyo dhayaasha wax garaska ah ee beela'a waxa waa oo maanta lagu gabbay waxa alaab u xaguyo godobadaan nooc ku qorani-

1. In waqooyi gaar isu taago oo la raacin Koonfur
2. In waqooyi gaar isu taago oo la raacin Inalaanka
3. In si dhaqan ah loo dhex dawladda Waqooyi
4. In cadaadooda dawlad waqooyi
5. In cadii ururka iyo dawladadda si cedaadah ah loogu qaabta beela'a Waqooyi
6. Arrinta: Nabagobadda Samag in gaar ah wax looga gabbay oo qayb haddii ahaan.

MAGACAYADUU SAGEEXAY

1. Sildaa Maxamed Faarax G/W/Galbeed
2. Shilax Ibrahaam Si. Yusuf M. Nader Gudoomiye ah
3. Guurtida reer Shilax Isaaq ah
4. Sildaa Cabdi Si. Maxamed G/W/Galbeed
5. Sildaa Maxamed Wantaan Hafir G/W/Galbeed
6. Sildaa Yusuf Sildaa Xraa G/Togteero
7. Sildaa Soqayr Sildaa Nima G/W/Galbeed
8. Sildaa Xaad Si. Sildaa Cali G/Sanoog
9. Sildaa Nima Sildaa Maxamed D/Laarcay
10. Axmed Shilax Sagaal
11. Shilax Daroir Xasan Xasan
12. Axmed Xraa Cawl
13. Sildaa Maxamed Jaamac
14. Xasan Umar Saameed
15. Maxamed Warsame Shil
16. Garan G/Sool Garan Jaamac
17. Sildaa Cali Muuse

Qotl iyo Geberimo

Xogmayabu Shilax
Aadan Axmed Dirax
Annex II: First Somaliland Council of Ministers (1991)

The first government of Somaliland was headed by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ as President and Hassan Esa Jama as Vice President. The first Council of Ministries endorsed by the SNM Central Committee were as follows:

1. Minister of Internal Affairs and Municipalities: Saleebaan Mohamed Aadan
3. Minister of Finance: Ismail Mohamoud Hurry
4. Minister of Reconstruction & Rehabilitation: Hasan Adan Wadadid
5. Minister of Defence: Mohamed Kaahin Ahmed
6. Minister of Commerce & Industries: Daahir Mohamed Yusuf
7. Minister of Religion & Justice: Ahmed Ismail Abdi
8. Minister of Health & Labour: Abiib Diiriye Nuur
9. Minister of Education, Youth & Sports: Abdirahman Aw Farah
10. Minister of Fisheries & Coasts: Omer Eisa Awale
11. Minister of Planning & Development: Jama Rabile Good
12. Minister of Minerals & Water: Mohamed Ali Aateeye
13. Minister of Housing & Public Works: Mahdi Abdi Amarre
14. Minister of Information Tourists: Osman Aadan Dool
15. Minister of Livestock: Yasin Ahmed Haji Nur
16. Minister of Telecommunications & Transport: Mohamoud Abdi Ali Bayr
17. Minister of Agriculture & Environment: Sa’ed Mohamed Nur
18. Minister of Presidency: Yusuf Mohamed Ali
19. Vice Minister of Internal Affairs: Ahmed Jambir Suldan
20. Vice Minister of Defence: Dahir Sheekh Abdillahi
21. Vice Minister of Finance: Aadan Jama Sahar
22. Vice Minister of Justice: Sheekh Mohamed Jama Aadan

Annex III: Erigavo Peace Charter

List of the Body of Chairpersons:

Ali Warsame Gulaid (Chairperson) (Habar Yoonis)
Mohamed Ali Shire (Vice-chairperson) (Dhulbahante)
Mohamed H. Du’ale (Habar Je’lo)
Ahmed Sheik Salah (Warsangeli)
Ahmed Hassan Badhasab (Ogeyslabe)
Hassan Sheekh Du’ale (Habar Je’lo)
Abdalla Boss Ahmed (Habar Yoonis)
Mohamed Ahmed Abdullle (Dhulbahante)

Secretariat

Abdillahi Jama Farah (Habar Yoonis)
Suleman Dahir Afqarshe (Dhulbahante)
Dalmar Abdi Derie (Habar Je’lo)
Mohamed H. Jama. Ali ‘Bayr’ (Warsangeli)
Regional Administrative Statute
Consists of a preamble, and following integrated articles:

Article 1 Establishment of a regional administration
Article 2 Emblem of the Region
Article 3 General Principle to be applied by the region
Article 4 The Organic structure of regional administrative bodies
Article 25 Recognition of national laws
Article 26 Changes of Statutes
Article 27 Coming into Force

Article I: Adoption of Peace

The communities of the Sanaag Region have collectively opted for instituting peace among themselves, and hereby request every member of their respective communities to uphold the agreements ending the inter-communal strife within the Region and re-instituting peace and harmony.

Article II: The Promulgation of the Preceding Peace Agreement

This charter is founded on the peace agreements concluded by the communities of the Region from the middle of 1991 to 1993, and their various terms are hereby promulgated as being the sources and complement of this protocol.

Article III: The Informing of the Agreed Terms

The conclusions reached and agreed upon by the General Assembly of Peace of the Sanaag Region communities during the session between 19 August and 8 November 1993 represent the final definition and delineation of the struggle for peace in the Region, and their enforcement and respect are vested with special social regional and legal significance.

Article IV: Determining of the immovable Properties of the Communities and the Individuals.

80. This protocol determines and guarantees the immovable property rights of each community and its members.
81. The rights of the communities and individuals determined and guaranteed by the preceding paragraph will be assured by their combined social, religious and legal dimensions.
82. The committees for the transfer of immovable properties established in their bilateral meetings by the communities are assimilated, in respect of the validity of their decision to the Executive Committee of the Regional Administration.

Article V: The Individuals Right to Life

83. Further to the agreements reached in the bilateral meetings of the communities on the quantity of compensatory damages payable for the loss of life and personal injuries, the present protocol establishes individuals’ legal rights to his life and property.
84. Every person committing the premeditated killing of another shall henceforth be executed in accordance with the precepts of Islamic Sharia.
85. When the killing of another person is not intentional but is due to accidental factors or is committed in
the course of reasonable self defense, the provisions of Islamic Sharia and Somali customary law will apply.

**Article VI: Raiding, Rustling, Killing and Injuries**

86. If robbing, raids and rustling are committed by a community or any of its members after the coming into force of this charter, the community concerned will be held responsible jointly with the members directly implicated.

87. In the case of death and personal injuries, caused during a raid or rustling, the parties directly involved bear jointly the full legal consequences.

88. Collective community culpability for pillage, death and injury as well as other criminal acts shall be abrogated by this protocol as contained in the above sub-sections 1 and 2 of this article.

89. The attackers who get killed or injured during their raid, rustling or robbery are entitled to no legal rights or remedies.

90. Stray livestock will be returned to their rightful owners in accordance with the terms of the peace agreement and those of this Charter.

**Article VII: Sharing of Grazing Water and camping**

91. Shall the distribution of rainfall caused better grazing and water to be concentrated in the traditional grazing area of a particular community, the grazing, water and camping will be open to all the communities.

92. The responsibility for the facilitating the joint camping for sharing such grazing and water among the communities of the traditional occupiers of the area and those of the visiting communities falls on the community of the traditional occupiers.

93. Further to provisions of the preceding paragraph, the communities so gathered shall form a joint good offices committee to look into and find a solution for any fraction or dispute among the communities.

**Article VIII: Measures against Violators of Peace**

94. The Sanctions against a community or a sub-section of a community who disturb inter communal peace in violation of the provisions of the protocol shall include unlimited proprietary fines, whether in cash or livestock and collective censuring by the others.

95. The Guurti (Council of Elders) determines the traditional norms and applicable, the amount and nature of the fine imposed and other sanctions taken against the offending community or sub-section.

**Article IX: Responsibility for Peace and law and Order**

96. Peace and law and order in the Region is the direct joint responsibility of each community's guurti, the organs of the Regional Administration and those of its districts.

97. The organs for the maintenance of peace shall be the Region's security forces (police and custodial corps) the guurti (council of Elders) and those aiding them at the time.

**Article X: The Guurti and the Regional Administration as the Primary Peace Maintenance Organs**

98. The Guurti of the Regional Administration and those of its Districts are the organs traditionally responsible for maintaining peace, and shall therefore form among themselves good offices committees to examine inter-communal frictions and disputes and find peaceful solutions for them.

99. The Executive Committee of the Regional Administration is entrusted with the duty of organising the law and order institutions for the maintaining the peace including the Police and Custodial Corps and Law Courts.
**Article XI:** Creation of the Good-Office Committee of the Guurti

The Regional Guurti shall constitute in the first formal meeting a Regional Committee or Good Office, composed of those who led the campaign for the prevailing peace and inter-communal harmony. The role of such committee shall be to instil in the public the social significance of peace and the restoration of inter-communal harmony.

**Article XII:** The Creation of a Regional Security Force

100. To provide solid permanent foundations for the prevailing peace, a Regional Security Force composed of all the communities of the region and consisting of Police and Custodial Corps shall be created.

101. The Regional Administration shall do its utmost to place the members of the existing forces of each of the communities of the region in productive endeavors, including the acquisition of technical skills.

**Article XIII:** Responsibility for Peace in Districts

102. Until such time as the regional Police Forces is able to extend its peace-keeping role to all parts of the Regional, peacekeeping in the districts shall be responsibility of their respective communities.

103. Assuring the complete security of foreigners in the Region, consisting at present essentially of officers of international aid entities who are engaged in promoting the welfare of the people of the region, is the collective responsibility of the people of Sanaag, and specifically that of the Districts of their respective residence.

104. In the areas of multi-communal habitation, like towns, responsibility for peace and law and order shall be entrusted to a multi-communal ad hoc force.

105. All the Security organs of the districts shall conform to the extent possible to the model established for those of the region.

**Article XIV:** The Regional Peace and Law and Order Forces

In view of the communal sensitivities engendered by the recent inter-communal strife, the criteria for selecting the members of the Regional Security Force shall be (i) exceptional personal attributes, (ii) nationalism, and (iii) clean sheet of conduct. Preference shall, in addition be given to the former members of one of the services of the Somali armed forces.

**Article XV:** Property of Public Domain

106. Responsibility for the custody and management of all state assets in the Region shall be vested exclusively in the Regional Administration and its District Officers, who in turn shall be responsible to the State for safeguarding and proper utilization of such assets.

107. The Natural resources of the region, including the wildlife, fish the vegetation, shall enjoy Regional protection and the Regional Administration shall use its own powers and those of the districts, including the Security Forces, to protect such resources from abuse.

**Article XVI:** Amending this Charter

108. This charter may be amended, after it enters into force, by the Region's General Assembly of Peace. The General Assembly may delegate the authority to make the needed amendments in some specific matters or field to a plenary meeting of the Regional Guurti.

109. The plenary meeting of the Regional Guurti is empowered to make, in the cases of urgent necessity, provisional amendments of the protocol.
110. If there is a conflict between any of the provision of this Charter and those of the State, the State Law shall prevail.

111. Proposals for the amendment of this Charter may be made by any organ of the Regional Administration and of its inhabitants by sending the request to the Guurti of the region.

112. Meetings of the Regional General Assembly of Peace may be called only by the Regional Guurti.

**Article XVII: Special Regional Honors**

The region hereby awards exceptional honors to the persons who led struggle for peace among the communities of the Region on account of their devotion to the happiness and the prosperity of the people of the region.

**Article XVIII: Recognition of the Day of Peace**

This protocol recognizes 11 November 1993 as the official day of Peace of Sanaag, representing and embodying the prevalence of peace and progress in the region.

**Article XIX: Status of Preceding Bilateral Agreements**

The agreements concluded in the bilateral meetings which preceded the adoption of this protocol constitute an integral part of this protocol.
## Annex IV: Sanaag Reconciliation Conferences and Meetings 1991-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of Meeting</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1990</td>
<td>El Qohle</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Yoonis &amp; Warsangeli</td>
<td>El Qohle in Sanaag</td>
<td>Agreed on ceasefire, &amp; to share grazing land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1991</td>
<td>Yagoori</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Dhuulbahante &amp; Habar Je’lo</td>
<td>Yagoori in Sool</td>
<td>End hostilities, and reach out to Sanaag region for peace reconciliations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 June 1991</td>
<td>Yubbe 1</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Warsangeli &amp; Habar Yoonis</td>
<td>Yubbe in Sanaag</td>
<td>End hostilities and to share pasture and water, continue with peace initiating efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 October 1991</td>
<td>Yubbe 2</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Warsangeli &amp; Habar Yoonis</td>
<td>Yubbe in Sanaag</td>
<td>Follow up meeting to Yubbe1, prisoner exchange and confirming borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October 1991</td>
<td>Oog</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Yoonis, Habar Je’lo &amp; Dhuulbahante</td>
<td>Oog in Sool</td>
<td>Regulated commercial activities and arranged for an exchange of prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1992</td>
<td>El Qohle</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Je’lo &amp; Warsangeli</td>
<td>El Qohle in Sanaag</td>
<td>Resolutions were made to strengthen security, regulate commerce &amp; inter-community movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-22 June 1992</td>
<td>Kulaal/Awrboogeys</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Sub clans of Habar Je’lo &amp; Dhuulbahante</td>
<td>Awrboogeys in Sanaag</td>
<td>Final agreements on peace accountability of former agreements and treaties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-21 August 1992</td>
<td>Shimbiraale (Isuboodo)</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Je’lo, Warsangeli, Dhuulbahante &amp; Gahayle</td>
<td>Shimbiraale in Sanaag</td>
<td>To end hostilities and to return any properties looted from this date, clans/family to take responsibilities of their groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 1992</td>
<td>Hudun</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Dhuulbahante &amp; Habar Je’lo</td>
<td>Hudun in Sool</td>
<td>1 day of exchanging live stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 November 1992</td>
<td>Jidali</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Yoonis &amp; Warsangeli</td>
<td>Jidali in Sanaag</td>
<td>Each clan to maintain law and order in their own territory. To name committee to be responsible settling conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November - 1 December 1992</td>
<td>Garadag Jeegaan (rainbow)</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Habar Je’lo, Dhuulbahante, Warsangeli, Gahayle</td>
<td>Garadag in Sanaag</td>
<td>Agreement to convene a grand inter-community peace and reconciliation conference in the regional capital of Sanaag, Erigavo (provided Habar Yoonis support could be gained).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Name of Meeting</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 January – 5 February 1993</td>
<td>Dararweyne</td>
<td>Clan Habar Yoonis and Dhibbitante</td>
<td>Dararweyne in Sanaag</td>
<td>End hostilities and unite together for the grand conference in Erigavo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>Yube 3</td>
<td>Clan Habar Yoonis</td>
<td>Yube in Sanaag</td>
<td>Agreed to hold the final conference for all clans in Sanaag, and HY to invite HJ and Dhibbitante.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>Fiqiulye</td>
<td>Informal Habar Yoonis &amp; Dhibbitante</td>
<td>Fiqiulye in Sanaag</td>
<td>Habar Yoonis invited the DHB for the Erigavo final conference, it was agreed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>El Afweyn</td>
<td>Clan Habar Je'lo &amp; Habar Yoonis</td>
<td>El Afweyn &amp; Yule</td>
<td>Both clans agreed, to meet in Erigavo final conference to resolve outstanding issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 August – 11 November 1993</td>
<td>Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation conference</td>
<td>Clan Habar Yoonis, Warsangeli, Dhibbitante, Galayle and Jibrahiil</td>
<td>Sanaag in Erigavo</td>
<td>Peace Charter of the Sanaag Region, for details, please, look at the Erigavo peace charter.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex V: Timeline of Somaliland Peace Conferences 1990-1997
Annex VI: Peace Mapping Glossary

1. Aafti: no man's land/ buffer zone
2. 'Aaqil see Caaqil below
3. Aarsi: revenge/reprisal
4. Adable: black soil
5. Afjar: conclude/bring to an end
6. Afduub: taking hostage, kidnapping, abduction, taking prisoner 2. a terrorizing act against someone
7. Aqabal keen: acceptance of an idea
8. Ardaa: families/ clans share of blood compensation (mag)
9. Arrin keen: one who initiates an idea
10. Baad: ransom, extortion, to obtain property from another by intimidation 2. food eaten in solid food – mostly used for animal pastoral such as grass
11. Baadisooc: buffer zone
12. Baanis (Baaniso): boastful/rhetoric
13. Baaqnabadeed: call for peace
14. Bariidin: morning greetings
15. Baraago dumin: destroying water reservoirs, demolishing water reservoirs
16. Barakac: displacement
17. Beel: clan/community
18. Beero gubid: setting on fire for farms, burning agricultural fields
20. Billiloo: looting, plundering, robbery, prowling 2. raiding
21. Birmagaydo: preserved from harm "spared from the spear"
22. Boob: looting, prowling, raiding, pillaging
23. Boog: moral wound
24. Booga dhayid: healing the wounds, recovering
25. Caaqil (‘Aaqil): chief
26. Caasikaay: rebel hide out
27. Baqaangabadeed: call for peace
28. Daacad: Honest
29. Dagaal: War
30. Dakharo: injuries
31. Damaanadqaad: guarantee, assurance, promise, pledge, certification
32. Dan: interest/need
33. Dayday: extorters, freelance militiamen
34. Debcsanaan: flexibility
35. Debdemis: put off tension
36. Dedaal Nabadeed: peace initiative
37. Deegaan: environment/settlement
38. Dhexdhexaad: mediating
39. Dhac: robbery
40. Dhul-gubid: set areas on fire, destroy with fire, the act of burning a piece of land
41. Dib u dejin: settlement, relocation 2. immigration, movement, journey
42. Dil: kill
43. Dooy: sun soil
44. Duco: blessing
45. Dulqaadahso: tolerance/patience
46. Dulxaadis: overview
47. Duudsi: dismiss/forget
48. Dib u heshiisiisn: reconciliation
49. Ergo: delegation/envoy
50. Ergo Nabadeed: peace delegates/peace envoy
51. Fadhi: session
52. Faq: private discussion
53. Fardh: hearing/verdict
54. Faraxumayn: the act of molesting, misconduct against someone
55. Gaadiid: transport
56. Galad: favour
57. Gaadmo: off guard, surprise attack, unexpected action against someone, quick raid against unaware person
58. Gar cadaawe: strict adjudication
59. Gar: hearing/verdict
60. Gar Sokeeye: flexible adjudication
61. Gablan iyo wiil la’aan: childless, have no baby, without sons
62. Gadood: strike, mutiny, revolt, to become furious
63. Gacansarrayn: having upper hand, being victorious, winning the battle/game
64. Gacansarrayn: having upper hand, being victorious, winning the battle/game
65. Galad: favour
66. Gar: hearing/verdict
67. Gammaan: horses and donkeys
68. GarSokeeye: flexible adjudication
69. Gar: hearing/verdict
81. Garawshiiyo: concession
82. Garnaqsi: defend; to justify or vindicate
83. Gardhigasho: bringing your case to the mediators
84. Gar-diliddo: unwilling to accept any ruling
85. Garyigil: willing to accept any rules
86. Gargaadasho: acceptance of a verdict
87. Gawaari dhicid: car hijack, car seizure, car robbery
88. Gebogebo: wrap up/ conclusion
89. Gashi: grudge
90. Geed: traditional venue under a tree
91. Geed’yare’: mini conference
92. Geel dhicid: camel looting, robbery of camels
93. Geesi: warrior
94. Gembis: dismissal
95. Go’aan: decision
96. Go’aan qaadasho: decision taking, determination, taking an action/measure
97. Gobanimo: freedom/ boldness
98. Godob reeb: exchange of women for strengthening peace
99. Godob: guilt
100. Godobtir: special price for women being jealous
101. Godobxir: to condolence the victim by giving something: girl, money or livestock
102. Go’isu taag: raising a sheet as a white flag (surrender)
103. Gogol: peace venue
104. Gole fadhiisin: make somebody sit before the traditional court or Geed
105. Gole: jury
106. Gorgorton: bargaining; negotiation
107. Guddi: committee
108. Guddida Qabanqaabada: preparatory committee
109. Gumaad: up-rooting, massacre, butchery, mass murdering, mass destruction
110. Gunaaad: conclusion
111. Gurmad: cavalry/ reinforcement
112. Gurgurshe Qowrac: killing burden animal as a punishment or in war
113. Guuxay: appreciate
114. Guurti: elders’ meeting to address an issue, especially pertaining to governance or general wellbeing
115. Guuxay: appreciate
116. Habaar: curse
117. Haladayg: no concession/dare saying
118. Hanjabaad: threatening, intimidating, hostile/ frightening
119. Hantiboob: property looting, robbery, taking by force
120. Hanti celis: property restitution, restoration of property
121. Hayin, Biyo Ma daadshe: humble person/ obedient
122. Heshiis: agreement
123. Heshis buuxa: agreement accepted by all sides, having the means to implement the peace deal in place
124. Heshiis: conciliation/ taking role of reconciliation
125. Hibasho, Hiirtaamy: reminisce about bad event
126. Hiif: reprimand
127. Hub-dhigis: disarm
128. Hubka-dhig horta Adigu-dhig: disarm, first you disarm
129. Imaan Qowrac: kill lactating animal as punishment or in a war
130. Is afagaranwaa: disagreement
131. Is afgarasho: understanding
132. Isbaaro: road block
133. Isaasaamixid: forgiveness, trustfulness, cooperation
134. Isa soo horfarisiin: direct talk, convene sides at roundtable for negotiation
135. Isgacan-qaadis: shaking hands with each other
136. Isgacansaarid: shaking hands with each other 2. fit for fighting
137. Is qancin: convince one another
138. Ishin: camels and cows
139. Is mariwaa: deadlock, impasse, stalemate, gridlock, standstill
140. Is nabad gelin: Give peace to each other
141. Isu soo dhoweyn: to narrow differences, enable parties to resolve their problems, convince contesting sides into negotiation
142. Isu tanaasul: compromise; give and take
143. Jajuub: pressure
144. Jidgooyo: ambush, waylay, lie in wait 2. surprise attack
145. Jifo: family lineage
146. Jiri: extorters, freelance militiamen
147. Joogid: presence
148. Kala bogsi: forgiveness
149. Kala Kac: standoff
150. Kala bogsi: forgiveness
151. Khaarajin: unlawful killing, organized murdering, assassination
152. Kicin dadweyne: public agitation/ campaigning
153. Kufsi: rape, a sexual attack
154. Kulan: meeting
155. Laabxaadhasho: try to make somebody
102. Shir: meeting
103. Shirguddo: chairing committee
104. Shirqool: conspiracy, plot, machination, set-up
105. Soo hayasho: giving in, surrendering, yielding, giving way
106. Sooroo: food for guests
107. Suldaan: higher in rank than chief (*aaqil)
108. Sulux: traditional mechanism of settling disputes, peace making, reconciliation, way of resolving a social dispute through mediation
109. Sumal & Sabeen: ram and lamb paid as apology
110. Tabasho: resentment
111. Tashi: consultation
112. Tol: clans binding together
113. Tolweyne: the greater clan
114. Toogasho: shooting, shelling, gunfire, assassination, murdering, execution
115. Turxaan bexin: trouble shooting/ problem solving
116. Tusaalayn: examples
117. Umaas: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
118. Uurkutaal: anxiety
119. U kala dab-qaadiid: peace shuttling, mediation mission, or coordinating diplomatic message between two parties
120. Wabar: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
121. Wada hadal: dialogue
122. Wadatashi: consultation
123. Waran sib/ Waranjiifis: lay down weapons
124. Weerar: attack
125. Weer-xidhasho: trouble shooting
126. Xaal marin: redress for losses for wrong doings
127. Xaal: apology in kind
128. Xabad joojin: ceasefire
129. Xidhi: closing
130. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
131. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
132. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
133. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
134. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
135. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
136. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
137. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
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143. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
144. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
145. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
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153. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
154. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
155. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, by force
156. Labadubley: restrain one’s hands
157. Maato-lays: innocent killings
158. Madal: venue, forum
159. Madaxfurasho: ransom, extortion
160. Majo-xaabin: back stabbing, setback, undermining, destabilizing
161. Mag: blood compensation
162. Magdhow: compensation, paying back the cost of damage done, refund for losses
163. Magnaansho: absent
164. Maraado: punishment for individuals who will not abide by peace agreement
165. Mudo-Diyo: fixed time to pay blood compensation
166. Marti: guests
167. Martigelin: hosting
168. Mili: infection
169. Mooraduug: deprivation, dispossession, denial of properties
170. Mooryaan: extorters, freelance militiamen (same as Jiri, Dayday)
171. Muddeyn: give fixed time
172. Muddo: period
173. Mushxarad: jubilee
174. Nabadeyn: peace making
175. Nabad raadis: peace searching
176. Nabad: peace
177. Nabdgelin: give peace
178. Nabadiid: peace rejecter/ anti-peace
179. Nabadoon: peacemaker/ peace seeker
180. Nabad sugid: securing peace
181. Nabadiid: peace rejecter/ anti-peace
182. Odayaal: elders
183. Qaadhaan: material and/ or financial contribution
184. Qaan-sheegad: claim for compensation
185. Qaan: liability
186. Qabanqaabo: preparation
187. Qaybgal: participation
188. Qax: flee, run away, dislocation
189. Qolo: clan X
190. Qoorsad: sceptical
191. Qorhiibasho: giving the mandate to the mediation committee
192. Qorituur: draw lots
193. Raas: sub-sub-clan
194. Rafiso: 20% advance of blood compensation given to the victim
195. Reer: clan
196. Samirsiin: help someone to accept the situation with patience, to be tolerant
197. Samotalis: somebody who works for the sake of goodness
198. Shafshafo: cures for wounded person
199. Shir weyne: conference
200. Shir: meeting
<table>
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<tr>
<th>m/f</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>I/v or fg details</th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Lives in</th>
<th>Conference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abdillahi Aw Dahir (Kulmiye, SNM, doctor. No big role in Burao, but played substantial role in 1994 Beer conference and one of Peace Committee chairs)</td>
<td>Burao focus group</td>
<td>Habar Yoonis</td>
<td>Burao</td>
<td>Burao</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abdillahi Mohamed Abdiraxman (Guddoomiye Awal Bari)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Abdillahi Mohamed Ali ‘Gugunfadhi’</td>
<td>[no recording available]</td>
<td>Dhuulbahante</td>
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<td>Abdillahi Yassin</td>
<td>2nd Focus Group</td>
<td>Sa’ad Muse</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
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<td>Abdiraxman Aw Ali Farah</td>
<td>2 x I/vs</td>
<td>Gadabuursi</td>
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<td>Burao/Borama</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Abdiraxman Ibrahim Mohamed ‘Abdi Dheere’ (Erigavo Police Chief)</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>Habar Je’lo</td>
<td>Erigavo</td>
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<td>Abdisalan Mohamed Jama (Kulmis women’s LNGO)</td>
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<td>Aden Mohamed Ismacil (Central Committee, SNM)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Ahmed Mohamed Sillaanyo</td>
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<td>Ahmed Hashi Diriye (oday)</td>
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<td>Ahmed Maxamud Barre Garaad</td>
<td>1 x I/v; 1 x 2nd focus gp</td>
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<td>Borama</td>
<td>Borama</td>
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<td>Baar Saeed Faarax</td>
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<td>Warsangeli</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Babysaad Faarax</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Bobe Yusuf Duale</td>
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<td>Sa’ad Muse</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Canab Omer ileeye</td>
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<td>Burao, Borama</td>
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<td>Deyr Mohamed Elmi (oday associated with SNM)</td>
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<td>Garaad Saleeabaan Afqarshe</td>
<td>1st &amp; 2nd focus groups; 3 x I/vs; 1 x video I/v</td>
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<td>Habar Je’lo</td>
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<td>Baro Saeed Faarax</td>
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<td>Haroon Yusuf</td>
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<td>Hassan Mohamed ‘Dhoolayare’ (Caaqil)</td>
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<td>Ismaciil Ahmed Gaas (Caaqil)</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Ismaciil Haji Nuur (Erigavo Mayor)</td>
<td>[some recording, but requested non-attribution]</td>
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<td>Jama Warsame Jaavaal</td>
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<td>Mahamed Ibrahim Hadraawi</td>
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<td>Maryan Jama ‘Dhuxul’</td>
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<td>Habar Yoonis</td>
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<td>Mohamed Farah Jibril (Go’dane)</td>
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<td>Maxamud Dirir Hassan</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Mohamed Kaahin</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Mohamed Saeed ‘Gees’ Mohamed</td>
<td>Interviews and personal</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Musa Ali Farur</td>
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<td>Garhajis</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
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<td>Sa’ad Musa</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Musa Hisbi</td>
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<td>Hargeisa</td>
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This publication was made possible through generous contributions and support from donors.