GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA

SEPTEMBER 2013
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CCR),
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

AUTHORS
ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, DAWN NAGAR, MARK PATERSON, KUDRAT VIRK, AND JILL KRONENBERG
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, SOUTH AFRICA
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, and the Authors v

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 6

1. Governance and Democratisation 8
   1.1. Assessing the State of Democracy in Southern Africa 8
   1.2. SADC and the Electoral Landscape in Southern Africa 11
   1.3. SADC and the Role of Civil Society 16

2. Political Dynamics and Peacemaking 18
   2.1. Key Strategic Relationships 18
   2.2. SADC’s Peacemaking Role in Zimbabwe 24
   2.3. SADC’s Peacemaking Role in the DRC 28
   2.4. SADC’s Peacemaking Role in Madagascar 32

   3.1. Historical Background: From the Frontline States to SADC 36
   3.2. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security 37
   3.3. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ I (2004) 39
   3.4. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ II (2012) 40
   3.5. The SADC Brigade 42
   3.6. Peacebuilding and State-building 43

Policy Recommendations 46

Annexes

I. SADC Organogram 48

II. List of Acronyms 49
Acknowledgements

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, in Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the government of Norway, which funded this report. CCR would also like to thank the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland for their continued support of its Africa Programme.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa, Region Building and Regional Integration on the continent; Africa and the European Union (EU); and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa.

The Authors

Adekeye Adebajo is the Executive Director, Dawn Nagar is a Researcher, Mark Paterson is a Senior Project Officer, Kudrat Virk a Senior Researcher, and Jill Kronenberg is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa.
Executive Summary

This report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region’s progress towards democracy, and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts — particularly in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Madagascar.

Inspired by the concept of conflict resolution developed by the first African United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, the report argues that appropriate early action can help to prevent the escalation of disputes into open conflict, and in the case of fragile, war-affected countries, a relapse into renewed violence. In his report, Boutros-Ghali put forward a comprehensive view of conflict resolution, envisaging it as a continuum of preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peacebuilding. Not only must the root causes of conflicts be tackled through addressing governance challenges, but effective peacemaking and peacekeeping mechanisms must also be developed, as well as a comprehensive strategy for post-conflict peacebuilding.

Democracy and “good governance” are critical for effective peacebuilding and fostering economic development in Southern Africa. Credible multi-party elections, in particular, provide the main legal channel for the orderly transfer of power between competing political groupings, as well as enabling SADC’s 257 million citizens to participate in political processes. Over the past two decades, the Southern African sub-region has experienced a wave of political change, moving from protracted civil war and colonial or authoritarian rule towards peace and more democratic modes of governance, although the nature and pace of democratisation has varied widely across SADC’s 15 member states. Between 1992 and 2012, more than 60 national and presidential elections have been held in Southern Africa, with only Swaziland’s absolutist monarchy running counter to the sub-regional trend towards participatory democracy. Civil society has grown increasingly vocal, and a critical media has emerged in many parts of the sub-region. Democratic institutions, such as parliaments, electoral bodies, and judiciaries, too, have become more assertive in challenging domestic abuses of power. Since its establishment in 1992, SADC has sought to enshrine human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as commonly held political values, and the consolidation of democratic, legitimate, and effective governance has become an integral component of the organisation’s commitment to security and region-building in Southern Africa. This is reflected in the SADC Treaty of 1992 (revised in 2001); the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation of 2001; the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SIPO) of 2004 (revised in 2012); and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections of 2004.

However, electoral processes have not always been free and fair, fuelling insecurity and not only harming societies in the countries concerned, but also undermining sub-regional stability. In several Southern African countries, such as the DRC and Zimbabwe, elections have become a source of tension and conflict. While SADC has played a key role in establishing guidelines, norms, and standards, and thereby providing a platform for the improvement and consolidation of transparent and participatory governance, the organisation has been less successful at translating declaratory commitments into practice. The 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines have often not been observed by individual member states, and have been occasionally disregarded by the organisation itself, as in the cases of elections in Zimbabwe and the DRC in 2005 and 2011 respectively.
Elections are often poorly managed, occasionally violent, and sometimes subject to rigging, irregularities, and weak independent oversight. In addition, the propensity of ruling parties to centralise control of campaigning and monopolise national media has often hindered the ability of opposition parties to participate freely and fully in electoral processes. Although most countries have formally constituted electoral management bodies, these have suffered from significant capacity, competence, and credibility deficits in cases such as Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.

In view of SADC’s institutional, operational, and resource constraints, civil society organisations can play an important role in implementing the organisation’s governance agenda and ensuring that democratic principles are entrenched across all levels of society. Only a few of SADC’s more than 40 protocols have been implemented effectively so far. Southern Africa features a strong civil society network, which has frequently demonstrated its expertise on issues relating to democracy, “good governance”, and the protection of human rights, as well as conflict resolution. However, SADC’s policy instruments lack clarity on the modalities for engaging civil society in the bloc's activities. From the viewpoint of grassroots organisations in particular, SADC’s workings are opaque, and interaction with it has been the preserve of a few select bodies. Furthermore, at the national level, there is a measure of hostility from governments in a number of SADC countries towards civil society organisations, especially groups supported by foreign funding.

Southern African governments have been reluctant to cede any significant power to the Botswana-based SADC Secretariat, which lacks autonomous operational capacity and instead relies primarily on the political will, resources, and actions of its member states for the implementation of its objectives and activities. Under the auspices of SADC, and in its bilateral relationships, South Africa – the largest economy on the continent and the sub-regional hegemon, which accounts for 80 percent of SADC’s economy – has been a key player in responding to crises, and has led conflict mediation efforts in the sub-region, including in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. In 2002, then South African president, Thabo Mbeki, brokered the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and a power-sharing agreement, which included dispatching 1,400 South African troops to the 20,000-strong UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC). In 2008, Mbeki helped produce a Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe, providing for a government of national unity that subsequently increased political and economic stability in the country. His successor, Jacob Zuma, continued to lead SADC’s efforts to implement this agreement. Zuma also engaged in seeking a resolution to the constitutional crisis in Madagascar in 2010, and South Africa has adopted an active role on the issue, particularly after it assumed the Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 2011. From May 2013, South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi deployed a 3,000-strong force in the eastern DRC. Given the inter-governmental rather than supranational nature of SADC, the dynamics between Southern Africa’s leading states have largely shaped the nature of the sub-regional body’s peacemaking interventions.

South Africa faces similar socio-economic challenges to those experienced by its neighbours, and its peacemaking efforts have been informed by the experience of negotiating its own democratic transition. Under President Zuma, the country’s most important strategic relationship in Southern Africa has been with oil-producing Angola, which has replaced Zimbabwe as the sub-region’s second largest economy and is South Africa’s largest trading partner in the sub-region. Angola has not been shy about projecting its military power abroad, boasting a strong, battle-hardened army that has intervened successfully in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville. The diplomatic thaw between the two sub-regional powers, with Tshwane (Pretoria) recognising the need to make Luanda a collaborator rather than a competitor, marks an important shift in Southern Africa’s post-apartheid security dynamics, which was reflected in South Africa’s strong diplomatic support for the Angolan
position during the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. In turn, Angola strongly supported South Africa’s successful campaign to make its candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission in 2012. If this bilateral relationship can be institutionalised, the resulting strategic partnership could potentially revive SADC, and provide a powerful diplomatic ally for South Africa in its broader relationships in Southern Africa and the wider continent. Another important strategic relationship in Southern Africa is that between Tshwane and Maputo. Mozambique was South Africa’s largest export market in Africa and its second largest trading partner in the sub-region in 2012, while South Africa is Mozambique’s largest investor. The two countries have continued to support each other’s regional peacemaking initiatives. In particular, Mozambique supported the tougher line adopted by SADC’s South African-led mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, while Tshwane offered important logistical and political backing to the bloc’s peacemaking initiative in Madagascar, led by former Mozambican president, Joaquim Chissano.

Notwithstanding South Africa’s close ties with Mozambique and its new prioritisation of its relationship with Luanda, Tshwane has also remained intimately engaged both politically and economically with Zimbabwe. South Africa spearheaded SADC’s mediation efforts in its immediate neighbour which led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2008. However, slow progress on the implementation of the GPA subsequently hardened SADC’s position towards Robert Mugabe’s regime, and challenged the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, with Mugabe seeking to undermine the credibility of the South African mediation team and his allies arguing unsuccessfully for Zuma’s removal as SADC Facilitator. In August 2013, after Mugabe won a presidential poll held a month earlier, the issue of Zimbabwe was removed from SADC’s agenda. Although Tshwane led the facilitation of the GPA, its efforts were conducted under a SADC umbrella, and successive summits supported the direction taken by the South African mediation team. In this respect, Tshwane has sought diplomatic influence in the sub-region through a multilateral approach, based on the understanding that the adoption of a legitimate leadership role within SADC depends greatly on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of its economic – and hence political – dominance.

SADC’s decision-making is centralised at its annual Summits of Heads of State, to which the institution’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation is also accountable. However, decisions at SADC summits are made on a consensual basis, thus representing the views of the lowest common denominator. Given the concomitant weakness of the SADC Secretariat, this also creates a power vacuum between the Community’s annual summits. In addition, the predominance of the heads of state within SADC has reinforced positions based on national sovereignty over those that may stem from a collective authority. The principle of solidarity that guided Southern Africa’s national liberation struggles has placed a premium on the autonomy of states and their freedom from external meddling. Furthermore, historical loyalties forged between national liberation movements, which have become ruling parties in countries across the sub-region, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique, can often lead to disagreements between these states being resolved informally on the sidelines of SADC meetings rather than in the sub-regional body’s open sessions, thus reducing the transparency and accountability of decision-making processes.

SADC’s region-building is linked to peace and security across Southern Africa and cannot succeed without it. Countries in the sub-region that have experienced armed conflicts and political crises over the past four decades include Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. In 2001, the organisation restructured its security organ through the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation in an attempt to provide its member states with an improved institutional framework to coordinate their foreign, defence, and security policies as well as to promote joint conflict prevention and
peacemaking initiatives. Although the Organ is accountable to the bloc’s governing Summit of Heads of State, it operates under its own executive Troika of heads of state and has its own structures and mechanisms for decision-making. Consequently, there have been persistent problems in the relationship between the Organ and the SADC Secretariat, including those related to staffing capacity.

In 2004, SADC sought to consolidate its peace and security agenda by adopting a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, which was revised in 2012. The revised SIPO covers a range of objectives and activities in the political, defence, state security, public security, and police sectors, though it has been criticised as vague and ineffectual, not unlike its predecessor. In order to strengthen Southern Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, SADC has also undertaken to establish a SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG), as one of the five sub-regional brigades of an African Standby Force (ASF) being coordinated by the African Union. However, many details about the effective functioning of SADCBRIG remain unclear. Moreover, the ASF is still a long way from being able to undertake any of its ambitious goals, and the deadline for its operationalisation has been moved from 2010 to 2015.

One of the key constraints on the consolidation of peace and security in Southern Africa has been the failure to undertake effective and sustained post-conflict peacebuilding in countries such as the DRC, Angola, and Mozambique. Peacebuilding in war-affected countries aims to promote not only political peace, but also social peace, and the redressing of economic inequalities that could lead to further conflicts. Both Zimbabwe and the DRC underline the enormous challenges of reconstructing and rebuilding fragile states, where peace and stability remain under threat in the absence of sufficient financial support and political will. SADC clearly lacks the requisite resources and technical expertise to undertake comprehensive peacebuilding on its own, and will have to devise effective, locally-driven strategies with key international actors to ensure that the root causes of conflicts are tackled timeously and that fragile countries do not slide back into conflict in the future as a result of ineffective peacebuilding and state-building.

Policy Recommendations

The following ten key policy recommendations emerge from this report:

1. More robust implementation of the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections is needed. Southern African countries should move from rhetoric to action and properly empower parliaments; ensure the independence of judiciaries; safeguard the autonomy of oversight institutions; and encourage free and independent media;

2. SADC member states must undertake public sector reform to ensure the effective delivery of basic social services to their citizens through, inter alia, the improved management of public finances; institutional capacity-building, particularly within national civil services; and, programmes to address corruption;

3. Individual countries, as well as SADC as a whole, need to create space for effective participation by civil society to promote democratic governance across the sub-region. Key structures, such as the National Committees that support the sub-regional bloc, must be strengthened and provided with more resources to enhance their role, functions, and visibility to non-state stakeholders. Greater efforts are also required to improve the channels of engagement of civil society actors with the SADC Secretariat. In this respect, SADC could benefit from sharing “best practices” with sub-regional organisations in other parts of Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
4. Non-governmental organisations in Southern Africa have financial and functional weaknesses that need to be urgently addressed. Efforts at collaboration have been constrained by in-fighting, competition, and disunity, and civil society therefore needs to organise itself more effectively, networking across borders and building a culture of cooperation, in order to engage more robustly with SADC;

5. Better coordinated, more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional and less ad hoc approach to peace and security in the SADC sub-region. A group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other national priorities – could be established to oversee the implementation of the organisation’s peace accords;

6. While South Africa has greater technical, military, and financial resources than other SADC members, it has serious domestic socio-economic issues, and its political legitimacy is still questioned by some member states, making it imperative for Tshwane to act collectively rather than unilaterally in sub-regional peacemaking efforts;

7. A more institutionalised approach, including the establishment of a properly funded early warning and mediation unit within the SADC Secretariat and the provision of training to enhance democratic control over armed forces, could enhance the capacity of the organisation to support complex and long-running peace talks, while reducing its current dependence on the political will and capacity of its more powerful member states;

8. The role of the SADC Executive Secretary in policy development and implementation requires urgent strengthening;

9. SADC should spearhead participatory processes to articulate security priorities for the sub-region. Key policy instruments, such as the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, the 2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the 2003 Mutual Defence Pact, and the 2012 SIPO, need to be linked more closely in an integrated plan of action and further developed into coherent implementation and monitoring programmes; and

10. SADC, alongside other African sub-regional organisations, must ensure that the UN assumes its proper peacekeeping and peacebuilding responsibilities on the continent, supporting and then taking over regional peacekeeping missions to ensure sufficient legitimacy and resources and adequately funding post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.
Introduction

This report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region’s progress towards democracy, and its intergovernmental peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.

In 1992, the first African United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Egyptian scholar-diplomat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for proactive conflict resolution and peacemaking in his report An Agenda for Peace. The document sought to enable the world body to respond quickly and effectively to threats to peace and security in the post-Cold War era, and identified four major areas of activity: preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peacebuilding. The report envisaged a continuum between these activities: from efforts to resolve disputes before they became violent, talks to stop ongoing conflicts, and the use of third-party armed forces to secure peace deals, to the long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace. In particular, the document promoted the idea that peacebuilding, if effectively undertaken, can help avoid further interventions through early prevention of potential conflicts. This CCR report follows a similar approach, focusing on governance issues that are the root causes of many sub-regional conflicts and assessing the tools of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding employed by SADC to tackle these challenges.

Southern Africa was instrumental in pioneering international peacebuilding with ‘second generation’ post-Cold War UN missions in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique between 1989 and 1992, in which efforts were made to adopt a holistic approach to resolving conflicts. Since its establishment in 1992, SADC’s region-building efforts have also been integrally linked to maintaining peace and security in Southern Africa, and seeking to resolve its intra-state conflicts, which have sometimes spilled over into neighbouring countries. Democratic governance is a prerequisite for effective peacebuilding in the sub-region. Over the past two decades, Southern Africa has experienced a wave of political change, moving from protracted civil war and colonial or authoritarian rule towards peace and more democratic modes of governance, although not all of SADC’s 15 member states are moving towards democratic governance.

The holding of elections, in particular, has become widespread in the sub-region. However, “free and fair” elections alone are insufficient to entrench democracy – another key component is the strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to SADC’s 257 million citizens. In this regard, some of SADC’s leaders have contributed to conflicts in their own sub-region through poor governance and a failure to manage diversity effectively. Crafting of decentralised states and the concession of autonomy to “minority” groups have often been rejected. Apartheid in South Africa was declared a “crime against humanity” by the UN General Assembly, while autocratic rule and/or one-party states proliferated in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe during the apartheid era. Despite the efforts of sub-regional civil

society actors to curb government excesses, dominant-party states remain widespread in the post-apartheid era. Ethno-regional differences have sometimes been exacerbated by nepotism and favouritism in appointments to military, political, and bureaucratic positions. The state has often been used to wield patronage by a small group of political elites. Urban bias in development policies has further created an aggrieved countryside with a ready army of unemployed youth who became the cannon fodder of warlords in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and whose disempowerment remains a major concern. Despite the widely disparate levels of development and public policies among SADC’s states, many of the bloc’s key members are, in 2013, still governed by parties that led armed struggles against colonialism and apartheid, and their leaders remain united in part because of that past history of solidarity. In addition, few SADC members can claim to have a functioning National Committee that acts as the interface between the country and the sub-regional body. Southern African governments remain reluctant to cede any significant power to the sub-regional bloc. In particular, given the inter-governmental rather than supranational nature of SADC, the dynamics between Southern Africa’s most powerful states – and particularly those with its hegemon, South Africa – have often shaped the sub-regional body’s peacemaking interventions, in particular in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. However, the importance of the military, financial, and political support provided by Tshwane (Pretoria) to SADC’s peacemaking efforts has highlighted the ad hoc nature of the bloc’s peacemaking efforts and its lack of administrative capacity or authority to support complex peace talks and to implement the deals that it brokers.

As an inter-governmental organisation, SADC’s decision-making is centralised at its annual Summits of Heads of State, where decisions are made on a consensual basis. In 2001, the organisation adopted a Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation in order to develop strategies to streamline the foreign policies of its 15 member states, and to implement conflict prevention and peacemaking initiatives. The primary mechanism of SADC’s security architecture - its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), which was established in 2001 - is accountable to the assembled SADC heads of state, although it is run by a Troika of member states with a one-year rotating Chair. In July 2013, the triumvirate of heads of state on this powerful Organ – consisting of the current, previous, and next Chair – were Tanzania, South Africa, and Namibia respectively. The Chair of the Organ Troika, and the Chair of the broader Troika of SADC’s main assembly - Mozambique’s president, Armando Guebuza, in July 2013 - are supported by the bloc’s Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. In 2004, SADC adopted a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SIPO), which was revised in November 2012. SADC is also establishing a peacekeeping brigade, and has ambitions to undertake post-conflict peacebuilding activities.

The first section of this report will thus assess the governance challenges in the SADC sub-region that have often contributed to conflicts and the potential of sub-regional civil society actors to help address them. The second part will examine the political dynamics of the sub-region and its peacemaking efforts under South Africa’s leadership. The final section will assess the SADC security Organ and its peacekeeping and peacebuilding ambitions.
1. Governance and Democratisation

Poor governance has often resulted in conflicts and crises in SADC countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Free and fair elections, which are critical to democratisation efforts in Southern Africa, are a necessary but sometimes unrealised requirement for democratic consolidation processes.

Furthermore, the holding of credible elections is not a panacea. Another key component of democratic governance is the strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to citizens. In the SADC sub-region, this includes public sector reform, the sound management of public finances, and institutional capacity-building, particularly within national civil services. Such efforts will be vital for strengthening checks and balances within and outside the state through empowering parliaments, ensuring the independence of judiciaries, and safeguarding the autonomy of oversight institutions.

Outside the realm of the state, civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance issues across Southern Africa. Governments as well as regional organisations therefore need to create space for the effective participation of civil society actors in governance issues. This first section of this report considers efforts to promote democratic governance across Southern Africa, which can foster economic development and encourage external investment in the sub-region.

1.1. Assessing the State of Democracy in Southern Africa

In the past two decades, Southern Africa has experienced a wave of political change, moving from protracted civil war and colonial or authoritarian rule towards peace and more democratic modes of governance characterised by political pluralism, openness, and the holding of regular elections. This growth of more democratic rule has formed part of the so-called “third wave” of democratisation, which accelerated in Africa with the end of the Cold War by 1990. Several countries have progressed from de facto one-party rule to multi-party regimes in the sub-region, with Botswana and Mauritius having the longest records as constitutional democracies: regular elections have taken place in both countries since independence in 1966 and 1968, respectively. After 23 years of one-party rule (1970-86) and military dictatorship (1986-93), Lesotho made the transition to multi-party democracy with elections in 1993. Following its emergence from a protracted 27-year civil war in 2002, Angola has introduced stronger parliamentary rule, while Namibia and South Africa have made much progress towards achieving democracy since 1990. Though often weak and poorly organised, civil society in Southern Africa has grown increasingly vocal and a critical media has emerged in many parts of the sub-region. Democratic institutions such as parliaments, electoral bodies, and judiciaries, too, have become more assertive in challenging domestic abuses of power. Indeed, only Swaziland, with its absolutist monarchy, has openly bucked the sub-regional trend towards more participatory democracy.

---

However, democratic transition and consolidation do not follow linear paths.\(^8\) Democratisation is an inherently difficult and long process, and the political landscape in SADC's 15 member states varies widely. Democratic and more authoritarian political systems exist side-by-side in the sub-region, and the entrenchment of inclusive and constitutional systems of governance remains an ongoing challenge, particularly in countries that are also struggling with the twin burdens of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Of particular note is the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where political instability has been a chronic problem since 1960. Following the adoption of the current Constitution, which established the country as a republic with a system of presidential democracy in 2005, elections have been held in the DRC twice, first in 2006 and then in 2011. A 20,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission – the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – is currently deployed in the country, having been transformed in 2010 from the previous UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) that had been established in 1999. Over three million people have died from war-related causes, while 3.1 million people remained internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees in July 2013.\(^9\) The humanitarian situation in the Congo is one of the world’s most complex and long-standing.\(^10\)

Elsewhere in the SADC sub-region, while some countries, such as South Africa, Botswana, and Mauritius, have established transparent and participatory governance structures and are maturing as democracies, others have dealt less ably with the processes of transition and consolidation. Despite SADC’s explicit goal of promoting “good governance”\(^11\) in Southern Africa, democracy is fragile in a number of countries, where electoral and oversight processes continue to be weak and institutions of governance have been compromised by corruption, human rights violations, and/or disregard for the rule of law. For example, the recurring incidence of post-election conflict and tension has marred Lesotho’s transition to democracy. The violence that followed the 1998 elections nearly resulted in a civil war in the small land-locked country, prompting a controversial military intervention by South Africa and Botswana to restore constitutional rule.\(^12\) However, the 2012 national election in Lesotho, which saw a change of regime, was relatively peaceful, marking a break in the country’s tortuous electoral history.\(^13\) In Zimbabwe, the forced compromise of a power-sharing government after 2008 was a fragile and tense process. The effectiveness of current constitutional arrangements remains uncertain in a number of countries, while ruling parties even in SADC’s more established democratic systems such as Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique have sometimes acted in a heavy-handed manner towards their political opposition. Furthermore, the institutional architecture of governance varies across the states of the sub-region, and with it, the degree of representation and accountability. In Zimbabwe, for example, the political dominance of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) combined with the executive’s dominance over the legislature has hindered the proper functioning of an effective system of checks and balances, instead centralising power and authority in the presidency of Robert Mugabe and resulting in a regime that won power through a dubious electoral process in 2008.\(^14\) A power-sharing agreement between the ZANU-PF and the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which was brokered in 2008 by former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, acting as SADC’s mediator, subsequently moderated “Zimbabwe’s hyper-presidentialism”\(^15\). However, a failure to implement the terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was

---

10 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (http://www.unocha.org/where-we-work/democratic-republic-congo-drc).
supposed to help democratise the Zimbabwean state, and the renewal of Mugabe’s presidency in a national election won by Zanu-PF in July 2013 may reverse this tendency.

Four categories of democratic transitions in Southern Africa have been identified, based on their differing nature and pace. The first category is “blocked transitions”, in which the transition has not occurred in a meaningful sense, or has come to a standstill, and political instability remains a challenge – Angola and Swaziland fall into this category. The second is “conflict-prone transitions”. In countries in this category, some movement has occurred towards greater liberalisation and democratisation, but uncertainty prevails and conflict and instability, especially before and after elections, are still a threat to the process of political change – this category includes the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. “Embryonic transitions” constitute the third category, and these are characterised by relative stability, though tensions and signs of backsliding can appear from time to time – Mozambique and Namibia fit this description. The fourth category is “maturing transitions”, in which the transition has existed for a long duration, is stable, and anchored in credible institutions, and the main challenge is consolidation – Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa are in this category.

It is worth noting that these categories are not static and states can move from one to another. Even in more stable political systems, the initial enthusiasm for democracy that existed in the early 1990s has waned somewhat. In South Africa, for example, the inability of successive African National Congress-led (ANC) governments, since the transition to democracy in 1994, to reduce poverty and increase economic opportunities, particularly for youth, poses one of the greatest challenges to continuing democratic consolidation. Inequality has, in fact, persisted: in 1995, the Gini coefficient was 0.64, and in 2008, it stood at around 0.63, making South Africa the most unequal society in the world. Estimated at about 40 percent (officially it is 25 percent), the country’s unemployment rate is also among the world’s highest. Corruption, with its potential to undermine the effective delivery of public services, is an added concern.

SADC leaders meet for talks in Maseru, Lesotho, in August 2006. From left, Marc Ravalomanana, president of Madagascar; Festus Mogae, president of Botswana, Tomaz Salomão, Executive Secretary of SADC; Timothy Thohane, Finance Minister of Lesotho; Chairman of SADC Pakalitha B. Mosisili, a Zimbabwean official, Thabo Mbeki, president of South Africa; Levy Mwanawasa, president of Zambia; and Bingu Wa Mutharika, president of Malawi. (Photo by Pieter Bauermann/Blomberg via Getty Images)

16 Le Pere, ‘Sub-Regional Report’, p. 28.
17 The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of inequality, expressed as a ratio that varies between 0 and 1, where 0 represents complete equality and 1 represents complete inequality.
1.2. SADC and the Electoral Landscape in Southern Africa

Article 4 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 identifies “human rights, democracy, and the rule of law” as foundational principles, while Article 5 (of the Treaty, as modified in 2001) enjoins states to “promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate, and effective” and “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability.” In August 2004, at their annual Summit in Mauritius, SADC heads of state and government adopted Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which are a cornerstone of the normative architecture of democracy in the sub-region. These principles and guidelines build on the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, which commits sub-regional states to promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices at home, and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, which emphasises the need for democratic consolidation in the sub-region (see section 3 for more details). The SADC Principles and Guidelines are informed not only by the Community’s own legal and policy instruments but also by, inter alia, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) of 2000, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of 2001, and the AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa of 2002. In 2011, the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) was established to encourage its 15 member states to adhere to these principles, which prescribe: full participation of citizens in the political process; freedom of association; political tolerance; regular intervals for elections as constitutionally provided; equal opportunity for all political parties to access state media; equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for; independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; voter education; acceptance of election results proclaimed to have been free and fair by competent national electoral authorities; and the challenge of election results as provided for by the law.

The 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines complement two earlier instruments. The SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region of 2001, developed by parliamentarians, cover elections and individual rights; elections and the government; and the fostering of transparency and integrity in electoral processes. These norms and standards have also been used to observe elections in the SADC sub-region. The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the SADC Region have been jointly developed by two civil society organisations, the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) – now the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa – and were adopted by more than 100 electoral stakeholders from SADC’s 14 member states in 2003 (Madagascar joined SADC in 2005). Importantly, the SADC Principles and Guidelines are a public commitment by governments to the peaceful and democratic conduct of elections. They are not legally binding, and are subordinate to national constitutional processes, but they provide a benchmark for state practice to which SADC members individually – as well as the Community as a whole – can, at least in theory, be held accountable.

Alongside the evolution of this normative framework, the regular conduct of elections has become a common feature of democratisation processes in Southern Africa. Between 1992 and 2012, more than 60 national and presidential elections have been held in the sub-region. Credible multi-party elections, during which...
appropriate processes are properly observed, can indeed help to build democracy. First, transparent elections
enshrine the importance of providing citizens with legal channels through which they can participate in political
processes. This is vital for the creation of the peaceful, democratic environment necessary for socio-economic
development. Second, elections provide the main legal channel for the orderly transfer of power between
competing political groupings. The absence of such channels and mechanisms generate the conditions in which
citizens may feel that they have to resort to violence in order to effect change. However, if they are not free, fair,
transparent, and credible, elections can fuel insecurity and even discredit the very notion of democracy, while
rubber-stamping authoritarianism. In several Southern African countries, such as the DRC (2011) and Zimbabwe
(2008), elections became a source of insecurity for citizens and opposition political parties.

The SADC Principles and Guidelines have often not been observed, and several election processes in the sub-
region have been unfree and unfair. In March 2005, the guidelines faced their first test when Zimbabweans went
to the polls. Although serious concerns were raised about the credibility of the electoral process by local civil society
organisations, SADC declared that Zimbabwe had complied with the Community’s Principles and Guidelines
Governing Democratic Elections, laying itself open to the charge that it had failed properly to police one of its most
prominent member states. Similarly, the 2011 presidential elections in the DRC were accompanied by violence and
accusations of electoral fraud and malpractice, as a consequence of which the results enjoyed neither full public
confidence nor popular legitimacy. Warnings by civil society groups, issued a year ahead of the elections that
electoral rules and institutions were being manipulated, had gone largely unheeded. The SADC Principles and
Guidelines were flouted by the incumbent Zimbabwean and Congolese governments. Nevertheless, SADC
endorsed the 2011 DRC results, as it had the 2005 Zimbabwe results. The organisation subsequently took an
increasingly firm stance towards the situation in Zimbabwe, particularly at a Summit held in Livingstone, Zambia, in
March 2011, when SADC heads of state made clear that the SADC Principles and Guidelines of 2004 should
continue to provide a critical frame of reference for the credibility of polls held in July 2013.

Article 7 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines defines the responsibilities of the member state holding
elections. To ensure “scrupulous implementation”, SADC member states are required to, inter alia, establish
national electoral management bodies that are ‘impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable ... [and] staffed by qualified personnel’. Most countries have formally constituted electoral management bodies, and
for the most part, their authority and functions conform to the principles and guidelines defined by SADC. In
Angola, for example, an independent National Electoral Commission, set up in 2005, supervises all election-
related activities, including voter education and the equitable disbursement of public funding to candidates and
parties. South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission, which was first established in 1993, has overseen the
conduct of four peaceful general elections, and the country’s various electoral conflict management
mechanisms are a positive example for the sub-region. However, the functioning of electoral management

24 Khabele Matlosa, ‘Background Paper’, prepared for the 8th African Governance Forum (AGF-VIII), Democracy, Elections and the Management of
Diversity in Africa, p. 4.
25 Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide,
29 Matlosa, “Elections and Conflict Management”, p. 82.
bodies has been problematic in a number of cases such as Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. First, the independence and impartiality of such bodies is often compromised by how and by whom they are staffed and financed. Second, they tend to lack sufficient resources and capacity to carry out their mandates effectively. These institutions often do not have sufficient time and logistical support to prepare voters’ rolls and registration materials properly, and to ensure adequate staffing levels for observation, vote-counting, and related functions in all areas. The Malawi Electoral Commission, for example, has suffered from political meddling in the appointment of commissioners, and continues to face significant capacity challenges. Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission has a similar credibility and competence deficit, which is reflected in the country’s history of post-election violence though the 2012 election was a success. In Zambia, the method by which members are appointed by the president to the country’s Electoral Commission has sometimes contributed to perceptions of partisanship in the view of opposition parties and other local actors. The capacity, transparency, and independence of Mozambique’s National Electoral Commission, too, were a matter of concern during the country’s national elections in 2009.

The quality of electoral management and governance, therefore, varies widely across Southern Africa. Notwithstanding the SADC Principles and Guidelines, electoral processes have occasionally featured centralised control of campaigning and monopolisation of the media by ruling parties in the sub-region. This has created an uneven political playing field, hindering the ability of opposition parties to participate freely in electioneering. Furthermore, in the majority of countries in Southern Africa, a multiplicity of parties contests polls. Yet, the outcomes of such polls at the local as well as the national levels are often known in advance. In cases where the polls have not been free and fair and have been accompanied by political violence and the harassment of opposition figures, this has fostered widespread cynicism about their representativeness. However, certainty of outcomes is not entirely reducible to weak implementation of SADC norms, but also speaks to a feature of the wider landscape of governance architecture in the sub-region that cuts across different regime types. The “dominant-party syndrome” is widespread across Southern Africa – many political parties enter the fray in successive elections, but one party typically takes victory and then stays in power for a long time, as is the case in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This is the consequence of a complex set of factors, including the sub-region’s national liberation struggles, which left the parties of liberation in strong positions to assume state power in the post-colonial arena, and the nature of the state-making processes that have followed.

The power of such ruling parties and the support that they gain from solidarity with other such governments in Southern Africa can undermine SADC’s institutions. Zimbabwe’s resistance to judgments handed down in favour of white farmers in the country by SADC’s Namibia-based Tribunal in 2008 led to the effective dissolution of this body by SADC heads of state in August 2012. The demise of the Tribunal, which was established in 2003 to ensure the adherence of member states to the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments, has weakened the organisation’s authority and raised serious questions about its commitment to the rule of law. Supporters of this action have argued that the Summit had little choice but to dissolve the

---

34 Le Pere, “Sub-Regional Report”, pp. 8, and 16.
Tribunal since its ruling for the farmers fundamentally questioned the validity of a constitutional provision to confiscate land approved by Zimbabwe’s Parliament and courts – and hence the sovereignty of a member state. However, SADC states should adhere to the rules of institutions they have themselves established, and give more rigorous consideration to such initiatives before setting them in motion.

Free and fair elections are critical to democratisation efforts in Southern Africa. While SADC has played a key role in establishing guidelines, norms, and standards, and thereby providing a platform for the improvement and consolidation of transparent and participatory governance, it has been less successful in translating declaratory commitments into policy practice. In many countries in the sub-region, elections are poorly managed, occasionally violent, and sometimes subject to rigging, electoral irregularities, and weak independent electoral oversight. Southern African governments have been reluctant to cede any significant power to SADC. The organisation is still merely building its own operational and resource base, and also has limited autonomous capacity. Rather, it relies primarily on the political will, resources, and actions of its member states for implementation. Indeed, the institutionalisation of democratic governance, including “elections with integrity”, is first and foremost a challenge at the national level, as a vital ingredient of state-making and nation-building processes across Southern Africa.

Furthermore, elections are important, but they are not synonymous with greater democracy. Botswana, for example, is one of the sub-region’s oldest and most stable democracies, but the country’s record of conducting regular multi-party elections has largely stifled debate about the democratic control, or lack thereof, of its security sector. Although the security sector has always been subordinated to civilian control, this does not automatically mean the sector is subject to proper democratic control. In 2007, a new intelligence and security framework was established. A code of secrecy underpins the intelligence and security system’s operations, denying key actors access to important information and undermining the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. Growing concern has been expressed that Botswana could become a “police state” in which the civil liberties of citizens are suppressed. Also, the growing role of serving and retired security officers in government institutions has given rise to fears of a progressive securitisation and militarisation of the state apparatus. For example, the president of Botswana, General Ian Khama, and his vice-president between 2008 and 2012, General Mompati Merafhe, are both former commanders of the Botswana Defence Force.

While SADC has made some progress towards creating the conditions for proper elections, governance challenges in the sub-region also include weak state capacity, insufficient citizen participation, and poorly delivering states. In most countries, the transition to more democratic regimes has not translated into substantive improvements in the lives of ordinary people. This highlights a disconnect between the values of socio-economic development within the democratic context, and the capacity and will of states to engender such development. Several SADC governments are plagued by corruption, and remain incapable of delivering basic social services and infrastructure to their citizens. This failure to address pressing socio-economic issues manifests in various

---

37 The Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security defines “an election with integrity as any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle”. Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, Deepening Democracy, p. 6.
ways, including voter apathy, mass protests, public cynicism, and withdrawal from policy implementation by citizens. The strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to the Community’s populations is therefore a key component of building and consolidating democracy in the sub-region. Poor governance can not only harm national societies, but can also undermine sub-regional security and stability.

SADC member states need to move beyond focusing narrowly on elections, which risk becoming “merely ritualistic plebiscites”, and must instead put in place mechanisms to ensure that democratic principles are entrenched across all levels of society. Among other things, achieving this objective requires strengthening cooperation with Southern Africa’s civil society – at the sub-regional and national levels – in order, inter alia, to advocate for adherence to the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines, buttress checks and balances within and outside states, educate voters, hold public institutions accountable for the delivery of citizen services, and promote public participation in electoral processes in particular, but also political life more generally. It is a matter of concern that in a 2002 survey of public opinion, barely one in three people in South Africa believed that members of parliament (MPs) should hold the president to account. Furthermore, “only 10 percent thought that voters should hold MPs to account, whereas as many as four out of ten believed that presidents should be able to ‘decide everything’.” In view of SADC’s institutional, operational, and resource constraints, civil society organisations can be an important source of support for implementing the organisation’s governance agenda.

Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA, now known as the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa)

1.3. SADC and the Role of Civil Society

Outside the realm of the state, civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance issues across Southern Africa. The SADC Treaty of 1992, which was amended in 2001, provides the legal framework for participation in sub-regional policymaking by civil society organisations. Article 23 of the Treaty dealing with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) declares the Community’s intent to involve fully, and support, the initiatives of the sub-region’s citizens and NGOs in contributing to its objectives. At the operational level, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ of 2004 spells out the scope for civil society participation in a number of areas such as research, public debates and seminars, as well as conflict management efforts. This has since been replaced by the revised SIPO, signed by SADC heads of state and government in 2010 and launched in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 2012 at a conference with broad civil society participation. SIPO II seeks to enhance this interaction, recognising NGOs as key stakeholders in the sub-regional project to promote democracy, peace, and security. At the country level, National Committees are responsible for building cooperation and collaboration between state and non-state actors.

Southern Africa features a strong civil society network, which has frequently demonstrated its expertise on issues relating to democracy, ‘good governance’, and the protection of human rights, as well as conflict resolution. The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation, developed jointly by the Electoral Commissions Forum and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, are a prime illustration of the positive and instructive contributions that civil society can make to SADC. The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa was also instrumental in the creation of panels with grassroots involvement for the mediation of election-related conflicts in South Africa, Zambia, and Lesotho. Similarly, the Electoral Platform of Civil Society for Elections, a forum of NGOs in Angola created in 2005, has been active in election observation and civic education, while the Oasis Forum – alongside other civil society organisations – is a vocal participant in Zambia’s ongoing constitution-making process. Other examples abound, and include the work done by the Southern Africa Forum against Corruption (SAFAC). In terms of the role of civil society in the SADC sub-region, the work of women’s groups is of particular note. Gender parity in politics is a key goal, and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development of 1997 called on member states to ensure that 30 percent of their parliamentarians are women. Persistent lobbying by women’s groups led Southern African policymakers to increase the quota for women representatives in political office from 30 to 50 percent in August 2005. Only South Africa had met this quota by August 2013.

Although SADC’s policy instruments reflect awareness of the key role that non-state actors can have in fostering genuinely participatory governance, SIPO II of 2012 – not unlike SIPO I of 2004 – lacks clarity on the modalities for civil society participation in SADC’s activities. For example, SIPO II identifies effective interaction between the sub-regional body’s security Organ and civil society in promoting common political values and institutions as a key outcome. The Plan has mainly organised discussions and identified research institutions with which to collaborate. Since SIPO was launched in 2004, NGOs have remained by and large uncertain about which SADC Secretariat directorate to engage, and have often met with resistance and political caution in their efforts to assist the Secretariat. From the viewpoint of grassroots organisations in particular, SADC’s workings are

---

opaque, and interaction with it has been the preserve of a few select organisations. Furthermore, at the national level, there is a measure of hostility towards civil society organisations from national governments in a number of SADC countries, especially groups supported by foreign funding. Notably, in Zimbabwe and Botswana, the effective participation of civil society in political life has been severely limited through restrictive legislation. For example, Zimbabwe’s Non-Governmental Organisations Bill of 2004, along with a number of other legal instruments directed at the media, effectively deprived civil society of a vital watchdog role. In Botswana, the Media Practitioners Act of 2008 has faced similar criticism for being unduly restrictive, while the government’s dominance of the country’s press remains a matter of concern. Similar criticisms have been levelled at the government in Swaziland.

At the same time, Southern Africa’s NGOs, too, have a number of weaknesses that must be urgently addressed. Civil society is not a homogenous group, but made up of many diverse actors drawn from varied walks of life with different areas of knowledge and expertise. These groups also represent a variety of interests and agendas, which often do not allow them to speak with consensus on particular issues. In 1998, the SADC Council of NGOs (SADC-CNGO) was established to coordinate civil society collaboration with the SADC Secretariat. An umbrella body of NGOs and civil society organisations in the sub-region, the Council has made some progress, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC Secretariat in 2003 outlining the framework for civil society participation in the organisation’s activities. In 2013, the Council has continued its campaigns for a SADC Parliament and to re-instate the SADC Tribunal, as well as for the free movement of people in Southern Africa. However, due to in-fighting and internal competition, combined with functional and financial weaknesses, the Council has not been able to act as a proper counterweight to national governments. Furthermore, many NGOs in Southern Africa rely heavily on funding from external donors, and consequently, a number of organisations have found themselves compromising their autonomy, duplicating activities, and competing for scarce resources.

Despite these challenges, commitment is required from both civil society and SADC to continue exploring possibilities to maximise opportunities for cooperation. Civil society could be a crucial source of support for the SADC Secretariat, which faces “an implementation crisis”, with few of its more than 40 protocols having been implemented. In this endeavour, the sub-region could benefit from “best practices” from other parts of Africa. For example, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have demonstrated greater willingness to collaborate with civil society by granting them observer status at their official meetings. Key SADC structures, such as the National Committees, must be strengthened and better resourced to enhance their role, functions, and visibility to non-state stakeholders. In order to build and consolidate democracy in the sub-region, with full participation from, and accountability to, its citizens, SADC member states individually, as well as the Community itself, must also create more space for the effective participation of civil society actors in governance issues. Civil society further needs to organise itself more effectively, networking across borders and building a culture of cooperation in order to engage more robustly with SADC to help democratise the sub-region.

47 CCR, The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Southern Africa.
50 CCR, Whither SADC?, p. 34.
2. Political Dynamics and Peacemaking

Since its establishment in 1992, SADC and its members have shouldered the responsibility for peacemaking in Southern Africa. This development was also based on the recognition that sustained peace is an essential prerequisite for effective region-building.

However, despite the success of some of these efforts, peace and stability remain fragile in parts of the sub-region. Civil war has persisted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1996 resulting in over three million deaths. In July 2013, the United Nations expressed concern at a continuing humanitarian crisis in which more than 3.1 million people have fled from their homes following escalating violence in the eastern Congo. Political uncertainty continues in Zimbabwe, where important security sector reform remains a distant prospect, although national elections were held relatively peacefully in July 2013 when the term of the current Parliament expired. Madagascar remains riven by a constitutional crisis after Andry Rajoelina replaced president Marc Ravalomanana in March 2009 following a coup d'état that resulted in the country's suspension from SADC. Although Rajoelina and Ravalomanana’s wife, Lalao, as well as former president Didier Ratsiraka, were subsequently suspended from standing for election, the date of the repeatedly delayed presidential poll remained an issue for discussion in August 2013.

In Swaziland, where Southern Africa’s only absolute monarch retains power, protests erupted in 2011 and 2012 amidst a growing economic crisis. Socio-economic and political challenges also resulted in “bread riots” in Mozambique in 2010, and demonstrations in Malawi in 2011.

2.1. Key Strategic Relationships

Under the auspices of SADC, and in a bilateral role, South Africa – the largest economy on the continent and the sub-regional hegemon which accounts for 80 percent of SADC’s economy – has been a key player in responding to these crises, in particular in contributing to peacemaking efforts in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. In a reversal of the militarist, destabilising role adopted in the sub-region by South Africa’s apartheid government, Tshwane has sought to avoid the role of a bully in the post-apartheid era. South Africa has preferred to act under the authority of SADC, or other bodies such as the AU, forestalling criticisms that it was seeking to dominate the sub-region. Nevertheless, given the inter-governmental rather than supranational nature of SADC, the dynamics between Southern Africa’s leading states – and particularly those with its most powerful country, South Africa – have largely shaped the nature of the sub-regional body’s peacemaking interventions. This second section of this report considers the dynamics of key sub-regional relationships and SADC’s peacemaking efforts in Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Madagascar.

South Africa faces similar socio-economic challenges to those experienced by its neighbours, which has sometimes led to violent internal conflicts. For example, in August 2012, South African police shot dead 34 protesters during a strike at a platinum mine in Marikana. However, while such conflicts can divert Tshwane from supporting sub-regional peacemaking efforts, South Africa has much to offer the sub-region in terms of its greater technical, military, and financial resources, although expectations that it can solve Southern Africa’s problems on its own are unrealistic.

---

54 “Madagascar Court Bars Rajoelina and Lalao from Election”, Reuters, 18 August 2013.
Since the end of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic government under president Nelson Mandela in 1994, successive South African leaders have led mediation efforts in the SADC sub-region. Tshwane’s peacemaking has been largely informed by its experience of negotiating its own transition, and generally follows a model that seeks to establish an interim government of national unity that can pave the way to elections. In 2002, South African president, Thabo Mbeki, brokered the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and a power-sharing agreement, which included despatching 1,400 South African troops to the 20,000-strong UN Mission in the Congo – now the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. In 2008, Mbeki helped produce a Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe, providing for a government of national unity and increasing political and economic stability.

His successor, Jacob Zuma, continued to lead SADC’s efforts to implement this agreement. Zuma also engaged in seeking a resolution to the constitutional crisis in Madagascar in 2010, and Tshwane adopted an active role on the issue, particularly after it assumed the Chair of the SADC Organ in August 2011.

Since Jacob Zuma became South Africa’s president in May 2009, Tshwane’s most important strategic relationship in Southern Africa has been with Angola. Africa’s second largest oil producer (after Nigeria) with reserves of four billion barrels and a major global source of diamonds, Angola has replaced Zimbabwe as Southern Africa’s second largest economy and South Africa’s largest trading partner in the sub-region. Furthermore, Luanda has not been shy about projecting its military power abroad, boasting a strong, battle-hardened army that has intervened successfully in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville. Angola also appears to be on the brink of enhancing its influence in the sub-region as it seeks to establish a development fund with five percent of the country’s oil revenues. In recognition of Angola’s status as a growing rival to South Africa’s leadership in Southern Africa, Tshwane has recognised the need to make Luanda a collaborator rather than a competitor. However, Angola’s relations with the post-1994 government in South Africa have historically been strained, particularly after then deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, was singled out for criticism by Luanda for promoting accommodation with Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels as part of a proposed peace deal. The purchase of Angolan diamonds in UNITA-controlled areas by South African mining giant De Beers was another source of friction. Nelson Mandela’s visit to Angola in 1998 helped to ease tensions somewhat, but relations between Angolan leader, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, and Mbeki never became warm, even after the latter’s ascent to the presidency.

Notwithstanding the acrimonious diplomatic ties, Angola entered the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the South African-inspired New Partnership for Africa’s Development in July 2004, and bilateral trade prospered: Angolan imports from South Africa increased by 500 percent between 2007 and 2008, and Luanda became Tshwane’s second largest African oil supplier after Nigeria. By 2012, bilateral trade had increased to 31.2 billion Rand. Furthermore, South Africa’s current president Jacob Zuma has overseen a thawing in relations between both countries, proving his determination to transform the bilateral relationship into a strategic one by making Angola his first presidential state visit in August 2009. In return, Dos Santos paid his first ever state visit to South Africa in

60 This paragraph is based on Adebajo, ‘The Bicycle Strategy of South Africa’s Bilateral Relations in Africa’.
61 CCR, South Africa in Southern Africa.
62 This paragraph is based on Adekeye Adebajo, ‘South Africa and Angola: Southern Africa’s Pragmatic Hegemons’, Regional Integration Observer, No. 1, Vol. 6, April 2012.
63 It was reported that Angolan president, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, funded legal costs of Mbeki’s main political rival, Jacob Zuma, after he was charged with corruption following his removal from the post of South Africa’s deputy president in 2005. At the same time, South African media gave prominent coverage to allegations that Angolan intelligence were planning to support Zuma in unseating president Mbeki. See ‘Inside the Browse ‘Mole’ Row’, Mail and Guardian, 3 August 2007.
December 2010, when Zuma awarded him the Order of the Companions of O.R. Tambo: the highest South African honour for a foreign citizen. Thousands of Angolan students now study in South African secondary schools and universities – a potential source of pro-South Africa elites in future. A key driver of South Africa’s recent courting of Angola appears to be the lucrative relations of its BRICS partners (Brazil, Russia, India, and, in particular, China) with Luanda in its own backyard. On the back of huge oil exports to China, Angola has become Beijing’s largest trading partner on the continent, accounting for 25 percent of total Sino-African trade, which surpassed $160 billion in 2011. Diplomatically, South Africa supported Angola’s position on the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, during which the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to cede power to Alassane Ouattara, despite widespread international support for Ouattara’s victory in national elections. Angola reportedly backed Gbagbo militarily and politically, and, following a visit by Dos Santos to South Africa, Zuma refused to recognise Ouattara’s victory – although Tshwane later reversed this position. In turn, Angola strongly supported the successful campaign of South Africa’s minister of home affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to become SADC’s official candidate for the Chair of the AU Commission by January 2012. South Africa’s new relations with Angola represent an important shift in its post-apartheid foreign policy. If the ties can transcend the current overreliance on the personal relationship between the two countries’ presidents, the resulting strategic partnership could potentially revive SADC, and provide a powerful diplomatic ally for South Africa in its broader relationships in Southern Africa and the continent.

Another important strategic relationship in Southern Africa is that between Tshwane and Maputo. Mozambique was South Africa’s third largest export market in Africa and its second largest trading partner in the sub-region in 2012, with 29.7 billion Rand. A Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation was set up between the two countries in July 1994, as well as a heads of state Economic Bilateral Forum which was established in 1997 and meets quarterly. South Africa is Mozambique’s largest investor, helping to diversify its agricultural economy with industrial investments that reached $4.6 billion between 1994 and 2001. Many of these investments sought to promote technology and skills transfer in the Maputo Trade Corridor between Mozambique’s capital and South Africa’s industrial heartland of Gauteng. By 2006, South Africa had also become the largest investor in Mozambique’s western neighbour, Zambia, creating an estimated 22,000 jobs in the process – as well as trade valued at 251 billion Rand in 2012. By the mid-1990s, 320,000 Mozambicans were living in South Africa, and a bilateral labour migration agreement was signed in 2003 to protect the 60,000 Mozambican miners and 12,000 farm workers in South Africa. In May 2008, xenophobic attacks in South Africa disproportionately targeted Mozambicans (and Zimbabweans) forcing thousands of them to return home and damaging perceptions about South Africa across the continent. The violence prompted calls for SADC to introduce robust policies to facilitate the free movement of people across the sub-region and prevent similar attacks in future. Meanwhile, Maputo and Tshwane have continued to support each other’s regional peacemaking initiatives. Mozambique deployed troops with South Africa to Burundi between 2003 and 2004, and increasingly supported the tougher line adopted by SADC’s South African-led mediation efforts in

66 This paragraph is based on Adeba (ed.), South Africa and Angola: Southern Africa’s Pragmatic Hegemons.
68 Cobus Coetzee, ‘SA Businesses Invited to Mozambique’s Trade Fair’, Bua News, 26 June 2012; and South African Revenue Service (SARS), ‘Detailed Bilateral Trade Data by Country’, January to December 2012, from which other trade data in this report is drawn.
70 This paragraph is based on Adeba, ‘The Bicycle Strategy of South Africa’s Bilateral Relations in Africa’, which draws on Conchiglia, ‘South Africa and Its Lusophone Neighbours’.
71 CCR, Building Peace in Southern Africa.
Zimbabwe after 2009, while Tshwane offered important logistical and political backing to the bloc’s peacemaking initiative in Madagascar led by former Mozambican president, Joaquim Chissano.\(^{72}\)

Notwithstanding Tshwane’s close ties with Maputo and its new prioritisation of its relationship with Luanda, South Africa has also remained intimately engaged both politically and economically with its immediate neighbour, Zimbabwe. Formerly South Africa’s largest commercial trading partner on the continent, Zimbabwe in 2012 still ranked as its fourth largest commercial partner in Southern Africa with bilateral trade totaling 23 billion Rand. The two countries’ importance to each other has been magnified by their parallel historical struggles against white settler regimes. South Africa spearheaded SADC’s mediation efforts in Zimbabwe following the widely reported arrest and assault of opposition politicians, including MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, by Zimbabwean police in March 2007. As president, Thabo Mbeki initially led the talks, seeking to “contain” the situation through a policy of “quiet diplomacy” which sought – through the discreet fostering of contacts – to bring Zimbabwe’s government and opposition together in an interim government.\(^{73}\) Mbeki felt that his country had few alternative policies to deal with the crisis, particularly since an implosion in Zimbabwe would increase the flow of refugees to, and exacerbate instability in, South Africa – more than one million Zimbabweans are estimated to reside in the country at present. Although this approach was widely criticised as the appeasement of an increasingly autocratic Robert Mugabe by many Western governments and media, as well as some South African analysts,\(^{74}\) Mbeki remained sensitive to South Africa’s past difficulties in rallying regional support on political initiatives in the DRC and Lesotho, as well as to accusations that South Africa was acting as a surrogate for promoting Western interests in Africa. Taking care not to become diplomatically isolated within the sub-region over the issue of Zimbabwe, Mbeki refused to adopt the unilateral sanctions advocated by many of his critics against the human rights violations of Mugabe’s regime. Furthermore, claims of Mbeki’s naïve cuddling of Mugabe\(^{75}\) would appear to be contradicted by reports of South African intelligence officers working with high-level ZANU-PF officials to understand the internal workings of the ruling party, as well as by the recent history of bilateral trade between the two countries. South Africa’s protectionism and heavy-handed use of its economic muscle in trade negotiations with Zimbabwe has also created serious tensions since 1994.\(^{76}\) By 1998, bilateral trade disparities led Harare to impose a 100 percent tariff to protect its industries.\(^{77}\) A proposed loan of $500 million from South Africa to Zimbabwe in 2005 reportedly included requirements of purchasing agricultural inputs and petroleum from South Africa, as well as both political and economic liberalisation conditionalities on the government of Zimbabwe. In November 2012, South Africa’s finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, received a request from Zimbabwe’s finance minister, Tendai Biti, for $150 million to help plug his budget deficit. Tshwane noted that the aid would be considered “within the context of progress in implementing the Global Political Agreement” following the granting of a similar budget support grant of 300 million Rand in 2009, which had also been based on political conditionalities.\(^{78}\) In April 2013, Biti said that he

---


73 This analysis is drawn from Adebajo, ‘The Bicycle Strategy of South Africa’s Bilateral Relations in Africa’.

74 Much criticism focused on Tshwane’s opposition to United Nations efforts to sanction Zimbabwe during South Africa’s first term on the UN Security Council from 2006 to 2007.

75 Such claims stem partly from the fact Thabo Mbeki spent some of his exile during apartheid in Zimbabwe.


had received $100 million in answer to the November 2012 request.  

Meanwhile, South African companies have also increased their market share in Zimbabwe’s tourism, services, and mining sectors, obtaining bargains during the economic crisis there.

In September 2008, the Mbeki-led SADC mediation resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement between ZANU-PF and two opposition MDC formations. An interim inclusive government was created in February 2009, after which SADC appointed South Africa’s new president, Jacob Zuma, to replace Mbeki as the sub-regional body’s mediator in Zimbabwe. Slow progress on the implementation of the GPA, which was frustrated by political wrangling largely instigated by ZANU-PF, led to a hardening of SADC’s position towards Mugabe’s regime. In March 2011, Zuma, as Chair of the SADC Organ, presented a report to a summit of the Organ’s Troika accusing president Mugabe and his party of stalling the implementation of the GPA. After the report was issued, ZANU-PF sought to undermine the credibility of the South African mediation team and argued, unsuccessfully, for Zuma’s removal as SADC Facilitator. However, heads of state at successive SADC Summits supported the direction taken by the South African mediators despite these challenges to their authority. In August 2013, after Mugabe won a presidential poll held a month earlier, the issue of Zimbabwe was removed from SADC’s agenda. Although Tshwane played a leading role as the facilitator of sub-regional efforts to bring political stability to Zimbabwe, it is important to note that this was a process over which SADC formally retained primary authority.

South Africa’s adoption of a legitimate leadership role within SADC depends greatly on its capacity to facilitate equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than an assumption of its economic – and hence political – dominance. In pursuit of diplomatic influence, Tshwane has thus pursued a multilateral approach, which has entailed cooperation with Harare. For example, in order to promote its peacemaking goals in the DRC, which culminated in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, South Africa needed the assistance of Zimbabwe and Angola in resolving the conflict in the Congo. Between 2001 and 2003, president Mbeki visited Harare frequently with Nigeria’s president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as part of their efforts to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. Though Zambia (under Levy Mwanawasa between 2002 and 2008) and Botswana (under Ian Khama) openly criticised Mugabe, most SADC governments pursued a similar line to that of Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”, with Zimbabwe’s sub-regional allies, Angola and Namibia, even often showing strong support for Mugabe. The success of Tshwane’s sub-regional multilateralism may be indicated by the fact that it was Tanzania as Chair of the SADC Organ that had asked Mbeki to mediate in Zimbabwe in 2007, recognising its own lack of resources to sustain protracted talks.

As an inter-governmental organisation, SADC’s decision-making is centralised at its annual Summits of Heads of State, to which the institution’s Organ is also accountable. Decisions at these meetings are made on a consensual basis, thus representing the views of the lowest common denominator. In addition, the predominance of the heads of state within SADC has reinforced positions based on national sovereignty over those which may stem from the collective assembly’s authority. The principle of solidarity that guided Southern Africa’s national liberation struggles

---

85 This analysis is drawn from Adebajo, ‘The Bicycle Strategy of South Africa’s Bilateral Relations in Africa’.
against colonialism and apartheid\textsuperscript{87} made possible the conscious integration of the sub-region\textsuperscript{88} – but also placed a premium on the autonomy of the new states and their freedom from external meddling, particularly from former Western colonial powers. SADC’s 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation places significant emphasis on the threat of external aggression.\textsuperscript{89} Historical loyalties forged between national liberation movements in Southern Africa can often lead to disagreement between these states being resolved informally on the sidelines of SADC meetings rather than in the sub-regional body’s open sessions.\textsuperscript{90} Interestingly, the liberation movements of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, which have all become ruling parties, have met annually since 2010 at summits in Tanzania, Angola, and Zimbabwe to discuss matters of mutual concern.\textsuperscript{91}

SADC’s interventions in Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Madagascar, while demonstrating the sub-regional body’s commitment to stable constitutional governance, have also exposed the \textit{ad hoc} nature of its peacemaking efforts and its lack of capacity to implement the deals that it brokers. Although the revised 2001 SADC Treaty\textsuperscript{92} provides non-military powers of enforcement, such as sanctions, these have rarely been employed. Madagascar’s suspension from SADC in 2009 following its unconstitutional change of government was not accompanied by any sanctions to isolate the new regime other than its exclusion from the sub-regional body’s meetings. In addition, the continuity of SADC’s peacemaking initiatives has been disrupted by the annual changes of membership in the Troika of its Organ and its associated committees. For example, South Africa’s deputy foreign affairs minister, Marius Fransman, established important relations with key Malagasy political leaders as part of the SADC Organ’s mediation efforts in Madagascar, but subsequently withdrew from negotiations after South Africa’s Chair of the Organ Troika ended in August 2012. Better coordinated, more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional approach to peace and security in the sub-region. In order to support coordination of sub-regional peacemaking, a group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other national priorities – could be established to oversee the implementation of the sub-regional body’s peace accords.\textsuperscript{93}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mandela_mbeki_zuma.png}
\caption{Former South African president Nelson Mandela celebrates his 90th birthday with then South African president Thabo Mbeki, right, and then African National Congress (ANC) president, Jacob Zuma, in August 2008. (Photo by Gallo Images / Foto24 / Leon Botha)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{87} Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe fought for liberation.
\textsuperscript{90} CCR, South Africa in Southern Africa.
\textsuperscript{93} CCR, South Africa in Southern Africa.
2.2. SADC’s Peacemaking Role in Zimbabwe

Robert Mugabe’s electoral defeat at 2008 parliamentary polls and a subsequent SADC-sponsored agreement on an interim power-sharing government with opposition MDC formations created an opportunity for the eventual departure of the long-ruling Zimbabwean leader, who had been in power for 32 years since 1980. However, SADC’s earlier failure to censure Mugabe following widespread political repression and the economic crisis in Zimbabwe since the end of the 1990s, led critics to describe SADC’s strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Harare’s Government of National Unity (GNU) as a policy of appeasement that had contributed to a lack of political progress. SADC had clearly been divided on how to respond to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Most of the Community’s members were supportive of Mugabe, with the notable exception of Zambia’s late president Levy Mwanawasa and, more recently, Botswana’s president Ian Khama. The Southern African body’s history of solidarity and its acknowledgement of Mugabe’s ‘struggle credentials’ contributed to the reluctance of both SADC and the AU to adopt a tougher stance towards his regime. Initial attempts by SADC to intervene in Zimbabwe were further hampered by structural factors: the relatively new protocols and principles of the sub-regional body (the decision to establish a SADC security organ was only taken in 1996) limited the effectiveness of its response to the situation in Zimbabwe.

However, the criticism of SADC’s ‘constructive engagement’ approach takes little account of the sub-regional body’s sustained institutional support for the intra-Zimbabwe dialogue between ZANU-PF and the two formations of the MDC. This dialogue was initiated in 2007 after a widely reported attack by police on MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, sparked international outrage, including from Mwanawasa, who questioned the autocratic nature of Mugabe’s rule. SADC’s Facilitator of the Intra-Zimbabwe dialogue (represented by South African president, Jacob Zuma, in 2013) and the AU subsequently became the guarantors of the Global Political Agreement between the ruling party and the opposition. SADC’s OPDSC has periodically reviewed the agreement’s implementation.

Furthermore, SADC took an increasingly firm stance towards the situation in Zimbabwe after the GPA was agreed. Following the formation of the interim inclusive government in 2009, the sub-regional body repeatedly insisted on timely and full implementation of the GPA. In November 2009, the Troika of the SADC Organ gave the Zimbabwean signatories to the GPA a month to implement the agreement. In August 2010, the heads of state and government set a further 30-day ultimatum. The sub-regional body’s language hardened further at an Organ Troika summit held in Livingstone, Zambia, in March 2011, when SADC heads of state criticised state intimidation and violence, issuing a strong call for the speedy completion of the Parliament-led constitutional reform process in advance of elections which were held in July 2013. The Livingstone summit also made clear that SADC’s Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections of 2004 should continue to provide a critical frame of reference for the credibility of the forthcoming polls. At another Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 2011, SADC insisted that its planned timetable for a new Zimbabwean Constitution and elections be finalised as a matter of urgency, although issues of security sector reform and electoral oversight remained outstanding. SADC leaders at the meeting also committed themselves to continuing to encourage Western powers to lift economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in 2000 – and in July 2012, the European Union (EU) agreed to suspend most sanctions against the regime in Harare once a credible referendum on a new Constitution had been held.

95 See ICG, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II) p.16.
In an effort to overcome the obstacles to full implementation of the agreement in time for the national polls held in 2013, SADC subsequently limited the issues to be addressed in its draft election roadmap to eight: sanctions; the Constitution; media reform; electoral reform; rule of law; freedom of association; the legislative agenda; and the election. However, GPA provisions on the reform of state organs and national security did not feature on this list, raising serious concerns about the continuing pervasive engagement of national military, intelligence, and policing agencies in Zimbabwean politics. Fears over the response of the security forces and ZANU-PF to a potential opposition victory at the 2013 national polls were exacerbated after Zimbabwe’s justice minister, Patrick Chinamasa, stated in October 2012 that neither the party nor the military would accept a ‘foreign-sponsored’ electoral defeat by MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai because of fears that he would reverse the gains of the country’s independence.

The hardline tenor of Chinamasa’s remarks reflected that of many of ZANU-PF’s public utterances during its wrangling over the implementation of the GPA. In March 2011, SADC’s Facilitator, Jacob Zuma, in his report to the Organ Troika, accused Mugabe’s party of stalling implementation of the GPA. Mugabe responded that ZANU-PF was within its rights to reject Zuma’s mediation if the ‘interference’ continued, and reportedly sought, unsuccessfully, to have him removed as SADC Facilitator. Mugabe’s party attacked Zuma and his facilitation team as unprofessional and incompetent. ZANU-PF propaganda chief and politburo member, Jonathan Moyo, claimed that South African mediators had “provoked us to attack them” and sought to silence a key member of Zuma’s facilitation team, Lindiwe Zulu. Some ZANU-PF members claimed that SADC had been subverted into a vehicle for “regime change”. A subsequent propaganda campaign before the SADC Summit of Heads of State in Luanda in August 2011 argued that Zuma could not be both the organisation’s Facilitator and head of the Organ’s Troika, although this matter was not formally raised at the meeting itself after ZANU-PF’s attacks appeared to gain little political purchase among the sub-region’s leaders.

The Zuma-led SADC mediation team continued to face challenges to its authority to implement a roadmap for the 2013 elections – in particular over the issue of appointees to the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), which was created in 2009 to oversee the enactment of the GPA. In June 2011, ZANU-PF resisted deployment of SADC technical advisors to JOMIC and rejected the involvement of the Organ Troika’s representatives in monitoring the accord’s implementation. In September 2011, Jonathan Moyo was seconded to JOMIC. However, Zuma’s international relations adviser, Lindiwe Zulu, adopted a positive outlook, noting that the objections to JOMIC did not represent ZANU-PF’s official position. Generally, the attempts to undermine Zuma’s facilitation were given short shrift by SADC’s heads of state, including Mugabe’s traditional allies: Angola, Namibia, and Swaziland. In particular, SADC sought to boost the electoral oversight capacity of JOMIC and emphasised the urgency of agreeing an interim Constitution in light of “the necessity to hold free and fair elections” in 2013. Indeed, the issue of capacity rather than any political fallout appeared to hamper Tshwane’s mediation efforts. With many pressing domestic and foreign engagements after November...
2010. Zuma did not visit Zimbabwe for nearly two years until August 2012, arguably sustaining through his absence an impasse over the elections roadmap, though his representatives, Lindiwe Zulu, Mac Maharaj, and Charles Nqakula did continue to visit on his behalf.

Notwithstanding the important mediation role played by South Africa in Zimbabwe, key elements of the 2008 GPA remained unfulfilled when national and presidential elections were held there in July 2013. After a new Constitution was adopted following a successful referendum in March 2013, ZANU-PF called a snap election in July 2013, which were monitored by 573 SADC observers – the largest such mission ever deployed by the bloc – election monitors from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), and an AU observation team headed by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. Opposition calls for the elections to be delayed to allow the provisions of the new Constitution to be implemented properly thus promoting fairer polls had been supported by Zuma with the backing of SADC. But the MDC factions were comprehensively outmanoeuvred by ZANU-PF and the objections to an early poll were quashed by the country’s new constitutional court. In July 2013, Mugabe criticised South African support for attempts to delay the poll to allow for further reforms and threatened to withdraw from SADC if the bloc did anything “stupid”. The electoral roll and polling arrangements that were hastily prepared by Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) were subsequently widely criticised as “shambolic”, and the opposition described the polls as rigged (though the main MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai [MDC-T] withdrew its legal challenge to the polls in August 2013). In addition to significant concerns about the conduct of the elections, key issues relating to security and media fairness contained in the GPA and reiterated in Zuma’s report as SADC Facilitator to the sub-regional body in June 2013 were ignored by Mugabe – in particular SADC’s request to emphasise publicly that Zimbabwe’s security forces were banned from taking political sides. Civil society groups noted that due to widespread impunity, perpetrators of the violence that had accompanied the previous national election in 2008 still lived in the communities that they had victimised, posing a continuing threat to opposition supporters. In the immediate aftermath of the polls, both SADC and AU observers described the elections in which Mugabe claimed victory easily as “free”, although the Southern African bloc refrained from calling them “fair”. Similarly, Tshwane restricted its praise for Zimbabwe to the technical conduct of the elections rather than to their fairness. Nevertheless, although Botswana broke ranks with fellow SADC countries and called for an investigation into the election, the rest of the bloc appeared unwilling to oppose Mugabe’s victory and Jacob Zuma was reported to be planning to step down as SADC Facilitator in August 2013 on the grounds that his mission had been accomplished. In addition, Zimbabwe was appointed to the new Troika for SADC as a whole at the August 2013 summit.

---

107 Brian Latham and Godfrey Marawanyika, ‘Mugabe Threatens to Quit SADC over Election Date Dispute’, Bloomberg.com, 5 July 2013.
113 Peter Fabricius, ‘Zuma Posed to End Role as Zim Mediator’, Cape Times, 13 August 2013.
Southern African economies are estimated to have lost more than $36 billion in potential investments in Zimbabwe as a result of its economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, which saw living standards and life expectancy fall more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. In addition, SADC countries provided $200 million of credit to Zimbabwe in 2009. In June 2011, Botswana agreed a credit line of $76 million to assist struggling Zimbabwean companies. In October 2011, the South African-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) granted a $206 million loan for a road development project in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{114} With an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only $10.8 billion in 2012, and growth rates forecast at between 2.2 and 8 percent in 2013,\textsuperscript{115} it remains in SADC’s interests to continue to support a sustainable political settlement in Zimbabwe on the road to the country’s national recovery.

\textsuperscript{114} CCR, State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe

\textsuperscript{115} Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Economist Intelligence Unit have forecast growth rates of 8, 6, and 2.2 percent respectively for 2013. See Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Country Report: Zimbabwe’, 30 November 2012, p. 21.
2.3. SADC’s Peacemaking Role in the DRC

The fragile nature of the post-conflict settlement in the DRC was highlighted in November 2012 by the invasion of the eastern Congolese city of Goma by rebel M23 forces backed, according to UN investigators, by Rwanda. The city was subsequently reoccupied by the national army – the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) – within only a few weeks. In a move welcomed by Congolese president, Joseph Kabila, SADC responded to the crisis by urging Kigali ‘to cease immediately its interference’, and sending its new Chair, Mozambican president, Armando Guebuza, to convey this position to Rwandan leader, Paul Kagame. In December 2012, a SADC Organ summit attended by the presidents of South Africa, Tanzania and Namibia, on behalf of the Organ Troika, as well as the president of Mozambique, and the vice-presidents of Angola and Malawi, as members of the broader SADC Troika, agreed to deploy SADC’s standby force to the eastern DRC, with Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi pledging one battalion and logistics support for the intervention.

In March 2013, the force was officially integrated into the UN mission in the DRC as an ‘intervention brigade’ – the first time that the UN has authorised the incorporation of such a unit within a traditional peacekeeping mission. However, as South Africa deployed troops as part of its pledge to provide 1,345 peacekeepers to the offensive force, fresh fighting broke out between M23 and Congolese government forces in July 2013, swelling the numbers of internally displaced persons in the eastern provinces of North Kivu to 900,000 and reflecting a breakdown in peace talks being held in the Ugandan capital of Kampala under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

The events in Goma also signalled the final collapse of an earlier multilaterally-negotiated conflict resolution plan in the Kivus between Joseph Kabila’s government and the former rebel Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), which was agreed on 23 March 2009 - the date that gives the M23 rebels their name. The subsequent failure of this deal, which was facilitated under the auspices of the UN by two former African presidents, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo and Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa, echoes some of the challenges that have characterised regional peacemaking efforts in the DRC since the African Union-sponsored Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was launched in 2001.

The ICD was hailed as a major breakthrough at the time, in the aftermath of three decades of oppression, kleptocracy, and the collapse of state institutions under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. It brought real hope of ending a raging war in the DRC that has claimed more than three million lives and involved seven regional armies since it first broke out in 1996. The Dialogue was brought to fruition under South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki, in Sun City between 2002 and 2003, after the peace talks had been relocated from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, due to mainly logistical and financial problems. Tshwane’s involvement was largely

---

118 “South Africa Deploys Troops to DR Congo”, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 21 June 2013.
119 “Congo-Kinshasa: North Kivu Sees Fresh Clashes As Peace Talks Stall in Kampala”, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 18 July 2013.
121 Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Chad.
guided by its key foreign policy goal of supporting peace and security efforts in Africa in order to promote development and economic growth on the continent. It was argued at the time that SADC’s prospects for success in the area of regional integration would be greatly boosted by bringing stability to strategic states such as the DRC with its vast territory and immense natural resources. However, Tshwane’s active participation in the Congolese peace process also gave rise to questions about South African ‘imperialistic’ designs in the country. Critics charged that Tshwane was simply interested in securing access to the Congo’s minerals for South African corporations. In the face of such criticisms and concerned that South Africa’s reputation as a successful peacemaker could be tarnished if the Inter-Congolese Dialogue collapsed, Thabo Mbeki personally intervened to support the facilitation of Botswana’s former president, Ketumile Masire, and to rein in the belligerents in the DRC and their foreign backers. South Africa also deployed 1,400 troops to the UN Mission in the DRC.

The South African-led peace process, which resulted in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 2002, featured many elements that bore remarkable similarity to those previously employed in South Africa’s own transition: a power-sharing transitional government; the establishment of a new national army; and democratic elections. In general, South Africa’s attempts to ‘export’ its peacemaking ‘model’ to the DRC was criticised for failing to address the Congo’s particular circumstances and context: the weak authority of the Congolese state; the disparity between the diverse interests of domestic, sub-regional, and external actors; and the overall political economy of the conflict in the Great Lakes region. In this context, critics have argued that the 2002 accord was, for its signatories, more a route to power in a post-war Congo than a plan for fulfilling the country’s democratic aspirations.

Although the agreement led to the adoption of a Constitution and the establishment of a new parliament, electoral commission, and judiciary by 2006, with the DRC holding its first election in 40 years in 2006/2007, political power has subsequently been consolidated by political elites who have shown little political will to implement the agreements and reforms upon which effective peacebuilding depends.

The Congo’s instability has also been exacerbated by foreign military interventions since Laurent Kabila succeeded in overthrowing Mobutu’s regime in 1997 with the backing of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Burundi. In 1998, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia intervened militarily in the DRC, without the backing of the UN or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in support of then president, Laurent Kabila, to repel an invasion by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. Although the three SADC countries justified their intervention as a response – through the SADC Organ, which was then chaired by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe – to a formal request by a member state to help it to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, each had its own strategic and economic reasons for involvement. Angola sought to deny secure rear bases in the Congo to UNITA insurgents, to protect its petroleum and diamond resources in the enclave of Cabinda, and to buttress its credentials as a regional power. Zimbabwe’s intervention was driven largely by Robert Mugabe’s ambition to assert his leadership as a regional power-broker, and to further the economic interests of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite. Namibia’s participation was encouraged by the long-term friendship between Laurent Kabila and then Namibia’s president from 1990 to 2005, Sam Nujoma, who was also a close ally of both Harare and Luanda. The armies of the three SADC members reportedly reaped great economic spoils from the vast mineral wealth of the DRC.

---

South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland criticised the ‘unilateralism’ of Harare, Luanda, and Windhoek’s 1998 military intervention in the DRC, preferring instead an approach that emphasised preventive diplomacy. SADC itself had to cede its peacemaking role to the AU after the differences of approach within SADC to the Congo crisis effectively paralysed the sub-regional body. However, its members subsequently played significant roles in later diplomatic efforts. South Africa brokered the July 2002 Pretoria Agreement on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Congo, while Angola oversaw the Luanda Agreement of September 2002, governing the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC. In general, SADC’s role in the Congo has been constrained by its limited peacekeeping experience and its lack of financial resources for peacebuilding. To an extent, the UN Mission in the DRC, which led peacekeeping efforts there after 1999, has stepped into the breach, maintaining peace in large parts of the country and overseeing the return of more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons by 2009. However, Kivu and Orientale provinces remain unstable and the UN mission has lacked capacity to operate as a fully integrated operation. SADC states such as South Africa, Madagascar, and Zambia contributed peacekeepers and logistical support to MONUC, with South Africa contributing 1,268 personnel in 2012 to the successor mission, MONUSCO, as well as financial, human, and logistical support for the Congolese elections in 2006/2007. In addition, SADC’s access to local knowledge and its status as an African institution confers legitimacy on its conflict management efforts and those of external actors with which it partners. The organisation also needs to consider the changing nature of security concerns in the sub-region, in line with the changing patterns of the demand and supply of natural resources in Southern Africa. The DRC possesses huge quantities of many important minerals such as cobalt and coltan, which are essential to the production of a range of electronic devices and alloys, and are sought by international arms manufacturers, placing unique pressures on the country’s war economy.

SADC has recognised the need to establish institutional structures to engage in a robust approach to peacemaking and reconstruction in the Congo. In particular, it had established a joint peacebuilding office with the African Union in Kinshasa by 2010 to help to implement disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of fighters in the DRC in consultation with the Congolese government, the UN, and other external partners. However, SADC has also been accused of the selective application of its 2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Serious concerns about the credibility of the contested poll in the DRC in 2011 appeared to have been overlooked by SADC, which endorsed the country’s presidential and parliamentary elections through Jacob Zuma, as Chair of the Organ’s Troika at the time. The sub-regional body’s power to intervene decisively and collectively in the DRC has also been largely dictated by the reactive, rather than preventive, nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms that SADC has developed. Stability in the Congo is more likely to be provided by steps to bolster the authority of the national government than action to counter Rwandan incursions which may only fuel further instability. In February 2013, a long-awaited multilateral peace deal for the Congo was signed in Addis Ababa: the UN-initiated Peace, Security and Co-operation Framework for the DRC. After extensive lobbying and courting of relevant regional bodies including SADC, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the AU, the framework was signed by 11 countries: Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, Uganda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Congo-Brazzaville, as well as the DRC and South Africa. The 11+4 deal — 11 national signatories and

130 MONUC also faced serious allegations of involvement in plundering resources, running guns, and sexual exploitation.
four multilateral witnesses (SADC, the ICGLR, the AU, and the UN) — was hailed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as an “innovative and comprehensive approach” that would bring stability to the region. However, despite the agreement’s recognition of the crucial importance of a multilateral approach to conflict prevention in the Congo, it remained silent on the critical challenges of limited capacity in the DRC to ensure security and provide basic services, and on how best to involve all interested parties in the country in creating sustainable peace. Critics have noted that the agreement and the new UN-backed force represent little more than a “paracetamol solution”, alleviating the current pain without curing the root causes of conflict. Moreover, any future transition after the current Kabila government’s term comes to an end in 2016 needs to be closely monitored, as moves by the ruling Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD) to perpetuate itself in power without a proper electoral mandate could lead to renewed war in the Congo.

---

132 CCR, South Africa in Southern Africa.
2.4 SADC’s Peacemaking Role in Madagascar

A constitutional crisis in Madagascar was sparked by a military mutiny on 17 March 2009, which led to the country’s president, Marc Ravalomanana, ceding power and fleeing the island state. The mayor of Madagascar’s capital Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, was then offered the keys to the state house in his stead by the putschists. The following day, Zambia called for Madagascar’s suspension from SADC, and the African Union quickly added its voice to the outcry at the unconstitutional change of government, which its 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) described as a “coup” that should be met with sanctions. A meeting of the SADC Organ Troika held on 19 March 2009 also considered sanctions and the possibility of military intervention. Ravalomanana, who had orchestrated Madagascar’s entry into SADC in 2005, sought to lobby support from the organisation during a visit to Swaziland, where he was hosted by the country’s monarch and then Chair of the bloc’s Organ, King Mswati III. The monarch had previously mooted the idea of an intervention in Madagascar using SADC’s evolving peacekeeping brigade – SADCBRIG.133

However, Swaziland lacked the capacity for a sustained diplomatic initiative to resolve the crisis, and, while SADC stalled, mediation efforts led by the AU and the UN as part of an International Contact Group that had been created in April 2009 shifted the focus from the restoration of Ravalomanana to power to the creation of a mutually acceptable solution through an all-party dialogue. In June 2009, a SADC Summit held on 19 March 2009 also considered sanctions and the possibility of military intervention. Ravalomanana, who had orchestrated Madagascar’s entry into SADC in 2005, sought to lobby support from the organisation during a visit to Swaziland, where he was hosted by the country’s monarch and then Chair of the bloc’s Organ, King Mswati III. The monarch had previously mooted the idea of an intervention in Madagascar using SADC’s evolving peacekeeping brigade – SADCBRIG.133

A breakthrough seemed to have been reached in Maputo in August 2009, when a framework entailing complex transitional arrangements leading to elections scheduled for 2010 was agreed by Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, and two former presidents of Madagascar – Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. These latter ex-leaders were included in the talks on the basis that the constitutional crisis in the country echoed former coups and reflected important historical challenges to democratic governance in the island state that needed to be urgently addressed. However, the agreement facilitated by Chissano soon collapsed, as Rajoelina adopted an increasingly unilateral stance. He created a “unity” government of his own in September 2009, and sought to build on the concessions of his opponents while reneging on his own. In addition, no consensus could be reached on the modalities for the framework’s implementation. African leaders responded by using their influence at the UN to prevent Rajoelina from addressing the world body’s General Assembly in September 2009. Following the suspension of International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union, and United States (US) aid to Madagascar in 2009, the AU imposed sanctions on Rajoelina’s Haute Autorité de Transition (HAT) regime in March 2010.134 However, despite SADC’s suspension of Antananarivo from its meetings, the Community has imposed no further sanctions on the new HAT government.

133 This case study is informed by Cawthra, The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict; and ICG, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II).
After Rajoelina boycotted talks facilitated by Joaquim Chissano in Mozambique at the end of 2009 and snubbed a visit by the then-Chair of the AU Commission, Gabonese diplomat, Jean Ping, in January 2010, South Africa’s president Jacob Zuma became directly involved in mediation efforts. South Africa had originally supported Chissano’s appointment as SADC’s negotiator but was also seeking to boost its own credentials as a regional champion of conflict resolution in its successful campaign to win a second term on the UN Security Council in 2011/2012. Chissano’s initial mediation was relatively poorly resourced, and SADC’s subsequent negotiation efforts have relied heavily on Tshwane’s greater logistical, financial, and political clout. South Africa is the only SADC country other than Mauritius to retain an embassy in Madagascar, and supported the establishment of a SADC liaison office in the island state in November 2011. In addition, the sub-regional hegemon has hosted Ravalomanana’s political exile. The ousted president has extensive business interests throughout Southern Africa, where he remained in exile in August 2013 due to an in absentia conviction for ordering troops to fire on protesters in February 2009. South African mediation efforts led by its deputy foreign minister, Marius Fransman, resulted in the adoption of a Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar by key Malagasy stakeholders in September 2011, which provided for the return of political exiles and an implementation framework to allow for the holding of elections – although Ravalomanana’s return remained a contentious issue in 2013. Disagreements have also persisted over a SADC proposal that Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina should be dissuaded from standing at the forthcoming poll as a means of resolving the constitutional and political crisis in the island state. In May 2013, the Special Electoral Court (CES) of Madagascar validated the candidatures of Ratsiraka, Rajoelina, and former First Lady, Lalao Ravalomanana, for forthcoming presidential elections in a move condemned by the International Contact Group as illegal and against the agreed provisions of its Roadmap. As a result, the elections which had been scheduled to take place in July 2013 and cannot be held without international political and financial support, were indefinitely postponed. An AU- and SADC-led mission was dispatched to Antananarivo in July 2013 to communicate the ICG’s position on restoring constitutional order. In August 2013, a newly established electoral court barred Ratsiraka, Rajoelina, and Lalao Ravalomanana from standing for the presidency. Tshwane’s approach to its mediation role has been to include less powerful SADC partners in the process – in particular, Seychelles, where Zuma held key meetings with Ravalomanana and Rajoelina in July and August 2012. In addition, the mediation has engaged with the heads of the Malagasy armed forces, who could play a potentially decisive role in the outcome of presidential and legislative elections. A further complication in peacemaking efforts is the rivalry between South Africa and France, with the latter feeling a sense of possessiveness over its former French colony. Paris is widely perceived as supporting Rajoelina, although it continues to deny this.

South Africa’s term as Chair of the SADC Organ ended in August 2012, and its resulting reduced role in the Malagasy mediation was raised as an issue of concern that could potentially disrupt the progress of these talks. Such concern highlights the Community’s integral lack of capacity to support complex long-running peace talks. The adoption of a more institutionalised approach by SADC, including the establishment of a properly funded early warning and mediation unit within its Secretariat, and the provision of training to enhance

---

135 South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), “Budget Vote Speech of the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Honourable Marius Fransman, to the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation”, Wednesday 25 April, 2012.

136 After South Africa, at the request of authorities in Madagascar, had blocked an earlier attempt to return home in February 2011, Ravalomanana was turned back in mid-air in January 2012 after Malagasy ground control refused to give his flight from Johannesburg permission to land. See Nire Tolsi, “Ravalomanana’s Malagasy Return Up In The Air”, Mail and Guardian, 21 January 2012.


138 CCR, South Africa in Southern Africa.
democratic political control over sub-regional armed forces, could potentially enhance the bloc’s capabilities in this critical area and reduce its dependence on the political will and capacity of its more powerful member states. SADC has also been hampered in its engagement with Antananarivo by popular Malagasy misconceptions about the sub-regional bloc’s mandate. Exploiting a widespread lack of knowledge about the Community in Madagascar, Rajoelina has argued that the country’s membership of SADC was agreed by Ravalomanana to extend his personal influence, and contended that the sub-regional body’s response to his taking power – particularly Swaziland’s suggestion of a military intervention – represented a threat to the island state’s sovereignty. In order to win support for SADC’s efforts in Madagascar, the Community must work more closely with Malagasy civil society to explain its sub-regional role to the populace.

Building on the governance challenges, sub-regional dynamics, and SADC’s peacemaking efforts, the third and final section of this report will examine the constitution and role of key SADC organs: the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation and its executive Troika; the Summit of Heads of State and Government and its executive Troika; the Council of Ministers; the Ministerial Committees; the Executive Secretary; the Standing Committee of Senior Officials; and the National Committees within its 15 member states.

The two SADC Strategic Indicative Plans for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of 2004 and 2012 will also be assessed, before concluding the report with an examination of the challenges of creating an effective SADC Brigade to conduct peacekeeping operations, as well as an assessment of some of the key peacebuilding and state-building challenges in the SADC sub-region.

Region-building is linked to peace and security and cannot succeed without it. Similarly, peacebuilding cannot take place in one country in isolation, since conflicts often spill over into neighbouring states. Southern African countries that have experienced armed conflicts and political crises over the past four decades include Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. In 2004, SADC consolidated its peace and security agenda by adopting a Strategic Indicative Plan for its security Organ. The plan has devised strategies for security in four broad areas: politics; defence; state security; and public security, but has been criticised as vague and ineffectual. SADC has revised the SIPO policy document and launched it with sub-regional civil society and think-tanks following a consultation process in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 2012, as part of efforts to promote better security and governance in Southern Africa. This section will analyse the latest progress on SIPO and its implementation by the OPDSC.

In order to strengthen Southern Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, a SADC Brigade is being established as one of the five sub-regional brigades of an African Standby Force (ASF) being coordinated by the African Union. Training for the brigade is being organised by SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, as well as through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO), both based in Zimbabwe. However, many details about the effective functioning of SADCBRIG remain unclear. This report will clarify the present status and planned role of the Brigade and related elements of SADC’s security framework. Brief case studies of the DRC and Zimbabwe will also be used to illustrate the continuing challenges of peacebuilding and state-building in the SADC sub-region.

140 See CCR, Building Peace in Southern Africa, p.22.
3.1. Historical Background: From the Frontline States to SADC

Southern Africa’s evolving security architecture has its origins in the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which was created by the Frontline States (FLS) in 1976. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe comprised this group. Zimbabwe held the Chair of the FLS and played an integral role in the ISDSC which operated without a formal mandate or institutional framework. The main objective of the Frontline States was to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa and to end apartheid in South Africa. The FLS also played a key role in the struggle for the liberation of Angola and Mozambique after 1975. Following the Lusaka Declaration, the FLS was replaced in 1980 by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which consisted of nine states, with Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland joining the six FLS states. SADCC continued the fight against South Africa’s sub-regional destabilisation policy and proxy wars. Zimbabwe also provided vital military support to secure the Limpopo corridor linking South Africa, Swaziland, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to Maputo.142

Initially when the FLS was disbanded and replaced by SADCC and then subsequently by the Southern African Development Community in 1992, the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee was retained within the organisational structure. SADCC’s key military player between 1975 and 1990 was Zimbabwe. With the end of apartheid, South Africa joined SADC in 1994, and the organisation had to define a new role for itself in a post-apartheid era. However, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela differed strongly on the role of the SADC security organ in the organisation’s structure, thus rendering it ineffectual. Mugabe was not only one of the longest serving head of state in the Southern African sub-region, but had also acquired significant leadership status as the Chair of the FLS. In 1996, South Africa assumed the SADC Chair, having successfully progressed to democratic rule from its destructive past. The apartheid regime caused a reported one million deaths and $60 billion of damages in the 1980s alone, and distrust of even a black-led South African government remains high across the sub-region.143 The differences between Mugabe and Mandela over the chairing and functions of the SADC security organ divided Southern Africa, leaving SADC member states to choose between South Africa’s advocacy for the organ to be integrated into the sub-regional body and report to the SADC Summit of Heads of State, and Zimbabwe’s argument for an autonomous organ with its own summit.

In June 1996, at a SADC meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, a decision was taken to establish a security organ. However, the unresolved differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe delayed its institutionalisation, which was also hindered by the Angolan civil war and a governance crisis in Lesotho during 1996. SADC’s new security architecture was further challenged by Zimbabwe when it sent troops to the DRC, alongside Angola and Namibia, in 1998 and signed a mutual defence pact with all three states, even as other countries in the sub-region, including South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland, adopted a more diplomatic approach to resolving the crisis.

3.2. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security

SADC experienced many difficulties in the operationalisation of its mandate to establish a security organ. Although a security architecture was drafted by the organisation at its 1996 Summit, it could only come into force five years later in 2001. The objectives of the Organ are stipulated in SADC’s founding treaty of 1992. These objectives define the economic and political values of the institution and include the promotion of defence and security. As a sub-regional economic community, SADC is able legally to undertake security functions. Hence, in August 2001, at a Summit of Heads of State meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, the OPDS was restructured through the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, providing its members with an institutional framework to coordinate their policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence, and security.144

Since 1996, the Organ’s mandate has been to oversee conflict prevention; establish a sub-regional peacekeeping force; coordinate the foreign and security policies of its member states; strengthen democracy and human rights; and establish mutual defence. In 2003, a Mutual Defence Pact was signed obliging member states to develop individual and collective defence capabilities and to cooperate on military training. The Protocol for the Organ further empowers the organisation to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflicts such as civil wars, military coups, and gross human rights violations.

The basic structure of the OPDSC comprises: the Chair; the Troika; the Ministerial Committee (MC); the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.145 The Organ was also brought under the authority of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Chair, and became rotational from being solely chaired by one country: Zimbabwe. The Organ’s Troika system consists of three heads of state. In August 2013, the new Chair was Namibia; while Tanzania and Lesotho made up the rest of the Troika. The Organ was set up with its own sub-regional structures and mechanisms for decision-making: a small permanent Secretariat and an administrative unit that is based at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.

The main Secretariat also supports the Troika of SADC’s main assembly of heads of state. The SADC Troika system – sometimes referred to as the Double Troika – has an incumbent Chair, an incoming Chair who also deputises for the Chair for one year, and a previous Chair who can collectively take quick decisions on behalf of the organisation that are not taken at its regular policy meetings. The Summit of Heads of State and Government meets annually; while the Council of Ministers convenes biannually – in February to approve SADC annual budgets and also usually in August to prepare the Summit’s agenda.

The SADC Troika further functions at the level of the Standing Committee of Senior Officials comprising the permanent or principal secretaries in government offices and ministries. These authority levels are also paralleled in the Troika of the OPDSC. The Chair of the SADC Organ never holds the Chair of the SADC Summit simultaneously. The Organ is coordinated at the level of summits held by its Troika. The ministerial functions are dispersed to its Secretariat which also acts as an administrative unit.

---


committee, which reports to the Troika, makes the key decisions, and is comprised of ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public and state security, from each SADC member state. The Organ’s operational work is carried out through the two committees of senior officials: the ISPDC and the ISDSC. The functioning of the Organ is defined by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ of 2004 (revised in 2012) with a detailed programme of activities for the pursuit of key political, defence, public security sector, and state security objectives.

The administrative unit of the SADC Organ has typically had less than ten full-time staff members since 2003. The Organ has been expanded into a fifth directorate, headed by a chief director with three sub-divisions on politics and diplomacy; defence, security and strategic analysis; and an early warning and situation room. It thus has an entirely separate governing structure with its own Troika reporting to the SADC Summit. Persistent problems, however, still remain in the relationship between the Organ and the Secretariat. Staffing capacity also continues to be a challenge, with both the Organ and the Secretariat sharing the same support staff, but having entirely different governing structures, which work independently of each other.

Under SADC’s amended 2001 treaty, decision-making remained the province of the Summit of Heads of State, with little authority accorded the body’s Secretariat, thus creating a power vacuum between the Community’s annual Summits. The dismissal in 2000 of Kaire Mbuende from his post as SADC’s Executive Secretary – the Namibian scholar-diplomat was reputed to have shown too much independence in the role – has reinforced the view that Southern Africa’s leaders prefer a non-interventionist Secretariat. The Executive Secretary is expected primarily to implement the decisions made at the Summit of Heads of State, but lacks the capacity and the authority to enforce these. The important role played by the SADC Executive Secretary in relation to policy development and implementation thus requires urgent strengthening.

SADC leaders meet for talks in Maputo, Mozambique, in August 1999. (Photo by Gallo Images / Media 24 / Christiaan Kotze)
3.3. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ I (2004)

A SADC extraordinary meeting in Blantyre in January 2002 mandated its Organ to provide guidelines for its Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. By 2004, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ was created by SADC members focusing on four main areas: politics; defence; state security; and public security. Also approved, were the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the development of SIPO, establishing a Task Force comprising the Troika of members with a one-year rotating Chair to coordinate SADC’s security policy. SIPO provided a five-year strategic and activity guideline for implementing the OPDSC Protocol. This covered a range of objectives and activities. SIPO also developed additional policy documents such as the Mutual Defence Pact that was signed at the August 2003 SADC Summit. The plan, however, crucially did not have an implementation mechanism.

SIPO and SADC’s 2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) have both sought to provide a broad strategy for the implementation of the sub-regional body’s policies and programmes. Both initiatives, however, need to be further developed into coherent, practical, and complementary strategies. For example, SADC policymakers have acknowledged the role of civil society in Southern Africa’s security and governance architecture and have spelt out the scope for such participation in the SIPO document. The plan called for collaboration with sub-regional civil society in areas such as research, public debates, and seminars, as well as conflict prevention, management, and resolution. There is a strong civil society network in Southern Africa that has contributed to strengthening democratic governance and peacebuilding processes in the sub-region. SIPO’s objectives have, however, largely remained ideals that have proved difficult to implement as they lack clarity on modalities for civil society participation in SADC’s activities. Consequently, the majority of civil society actors in Southern Africa have raised concerns that SIPO has done little to improve their channels of engagement with the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.

SADC sought to consolidate its peace and security plan through SIPO, which is envisaged as an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda. SIPO envisages cooperation among member states in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. It also establishes a platform for cooperation to address a number of other defence and security issues, including: combating terrorism; countering trafficking in small arms; protecting strategic infrastructure; preventing stock theft; protecting wildlife; streamlining immigration legislation among member states; addressing refugee issues; enhancing law enforcement at sea; and providing joint border controls. However, despite the existence of SIPO and its associated institutions, Southern African states are still grappling with identifying and defining common threats facing the sub-region. Such processes could determine, for example, how SADC governments allocate funds for defence in their national budgets; how the organisation positions itself in relation to global powers; and how governments interact with external actors in bilateral and multilateral fora. This suggests that SADC should, through SIPO, spearhead participatory processes to articulate security priorities for the sub-region and how these are to be addressed.

See SADC (http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/). See also Adebajo, “The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU”, pp. 131-162.
Given the reality of limited financial and human resources, it is open to question whether SADC can implement the numerous and ambitious activities outlined in SIPO, let alone take on additional responsibilities in this important area. SIPO’s aims and other SADC objectives need to be linked more closely to an integrated plan of action and a streamlined list of priorities. SIPO and other key SADC policy instruments, such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation of 2001 and the sub-regional body’s Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, also need to be further developed into coherent programmes of implementation and monitoring.

3.4. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ II (2012)

In November 2012, SADC’s OPDSC launched its new peace and security structure - a five-year plan to develop the framework of SIPO II. The inaugural ceremony was conducted in Arusha, Tanzania. During his opening address at the launch of the Revised SIPO II, the host president, Jakaya Kikwete, noted that, while the structure of the plan was amended and “due and more attention” was paid to monitoring and evaluation, the content of the two documents were similar. The structure of the plan was expanded from four sectors in SIPO I to five in SIPO II, with the separation of the police sector from the public sector, in which it had previously been incorporated. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, “a review of the implementation of planned activities and the provision of information on a regular basis to stakeholders” was promised. Specific activities and outcomes are outlined for each of the objectives identified per sector, and each sector is now required to develop annual action plans.

The objectives for the political sector remain unchanged, with the exception of the development of common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern. This is to be linked to the objective of building common political values and institutions. While many of the activities for this sector were previously listed in SIPO I, those relating to the SADC Standby Force (in respect of the civilian component) and disaster risk reduction are now more clearly enunciated. The establishment of a sub-regional commission on human rights is not mentioned in the document. In fact, in the political sector, there is only one activity related to human rights which seeks to “encourage member states in the production of periodic reports on human rights issues to relevant bodies and SADC structures”.

The Organ still aims to work with research and academic institutions, specifically on foreign policy studies, and to this end, civil society institutions present in Arusha were requested to help create a sub-regional data-base from which SADC can source future partnerships.

A new challenge added to those faced by Southern Africa’s defence sector is maritime piracy. While the language has changed from defending the sub-region from military aggression, to contributing to Africa’s peace and security architecture, the drive to operationalise the SADC Brigade is clearly the priority for the Organ with regard to this sector. A second priority appears to be the conclusion and full implementation of a Mutual Defence Pact by member states. The new innovation in this sector is the proposed establishment of closer ties between the Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) and the Defence Intelligence Standing Committee (DISC).

SIPO II identifies six additional challenges facing the state security sector: climate change; transnational organised crime; illegal migration; maritime piracy; economic threats; and foreign interference. New strategies for this sector include sharing intelligence on “the unchanging behaviour of society with respect to HIV/AIDS”; as well as

---

149 This section has been prepared by Jill Kronenberg, CCR Research Assistant, who attended the Arusha meeting on SIPO in November 2012.

40 | GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA
on the observance of human rights; holding statutory meetings; and on the promotion of a community-based approach to domestic security. Partnerships with specific institutions are listed, as is the full operationalisation of the Regional Early Warning Centre, including capacitating its use of information technology.

SIPO II also provides a definition of what it regards as the public security sector in an attempt to set it aside from a new stand-alone policing sector. The plan aims "to provide and ensure services in law enforcement, public safety, corrections/prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, customs and refugees." Illegal migration, overcrowding in prisons, poaching, maritime piracy, and the smuggling of goods have been identified as new challenges for this sector. Two new objectives were also identified during the SIPO review: to develop capacity and incorporate prison officers into peacekeeping operations; and to enhance sub-regional capacity in respect of disaster risk management and coordination of sub-regional disaster responses and international humanitarian assistance. Finally, the newly created police sector under SIPO II appears to represent an attempt to harmonise the activities of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation with those of SIPO II. Like SIPO I, however, this new initiative appears to be unfocused and lacking proper prioritisation.

3.5 The SADC Brigade

The main responsibility of the SADC Organ is security cooperation for its member states based on principles of collective security and mutual defence. It also seeks to provide a framework for operationalising the SADC Brigade. The Protocol for the OPDSC empowers the Organ to deal with both inter-state and intra-state conflicts such as civil wars, military coups, or gross human rights abuses. In August 2003, a Mutual Defence Pact was signed committing member states to develop both individual and collective defence capabilities and to cooperate on defence training, research, and intelligence issues, although the pact has remained largely inoperative since its creation.

The 2007 SADC Summit launched the SADC Brigade to undertake sub-regional and multi-dimensional peace support operations. The Protocol on the OPDSC notes that security should be approached through peaceful cooperation, must enhance mutual security, and be able to manage humanitarian disasters. The SADC Standby Force is tasked to perform observation and monitoring missions; peace support missions; interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of member states; preventive deployment; peacebuilding; as well as post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation, and providing humanitarian assistance to conflict areas. The evolving force is, however, still a long way from being able to undertake any of these goals, and the deadline for its establishment has been postponed from 2010 to 2015.

SADC's Planning Element (PLANELM) was established at its Secretariat in 2005 as a key operational framework for the OPDSC, and takes guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Committee of Police Chiefs. A logistics base is being established in Botswana. SADC’s PLANELM will not be included in the deployed force, and member states will ensure that the pledged forces are available and have a level of training as outlined by, and comparable to, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe.152

SADC states have embarked on joint peace support exercises such as ‘Blue Hungwe’, ‘Blue Crane’, ‘Tanzanite’, and ‘Airborne Africa’. The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare had trained over 3,000 military officers from six SADC states before political differences led to a withdrawal of its funds by the Danish government in 2000. The RPTC has since restarted its activities following a decision to bring the centre under the umbrella of the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. In February 2009, the SADC Brigade completed a further military exercise in Angola. SADC’s Organ directorate has two organisations to support peacekeeping operations: the RPTC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation. The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre has been implementing SADCBRIG’s training programme. The centre will also be addressing the training capacity needs of multi-dimensional peace support missions. Training will further be provided to both police and civilian components. The RPTC’s training will be aligned with the SARPCCO to ensure proper cohesion.

SADC has experienced financial problems, with many of its members failing to keep their accounts current, resulting in a debt of $9 million in July 2001. The organisation still remains largely financed by external donors, with $51.5 million out of a $83.5 million 2011–2012 budget (61 percent) covered by foreign donors.153 The SADC standby

152 Saunders, “Peacekeeping: from the United Nations to the SADC Stand-by Force.”
force envisages a planning cell within its Secretariat in Botswana, and member states are expected to sustain its missions for three to six months, until the AU or the UN takes over funding. But the experience of SADC members, South Africa and Mozambique, with an AU-led peacekeeping mission in Burundi in 2003-2004 should give members pause for thought over such an uncertain arrangement. The AU mission was effectively taken over by the UN after a year due to financial and logistical problems. SADC announced the establishment of its standby peacekeeping brigade at its Lusaka Summit in August 2007, and plans to appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander to direct future peacekeeping missions. As a first test case of the SADC Brigade, the sub-regional body’s security Troika summit in Tanzania decided in December 2012 to deploy a 4,000-strong SADC Brigade to keep peace in the eastern Congolese city of Goma after the withdrawal of M23 rebels. The force consisting of troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi was subsequently deployed alongside the UN mission in the DRC in March 2013.

The relationship between the UN and African sub-regional organisations like SADC must be urgently clarified, as the world body could make up for some of SADC’s financial and logistical deficiencies. Then UN Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan’s, report of March 2005 to the UN General Assembly, “In Larger Freedom”, and the UN High-Level Panel report of December 2004 both advocated UN financial support for Africa’s regional bodies. Although there is still a lack of sufficient financial and political support for this plan within the powerful 15-member UN Security Council, SADC must ensure that the UN assumes its proper peacekeeping responsibilities on the continent, supporting and then taking over regional peacekeeping missions to ensure sufficient legitimacy and resources. Southern Africa must also be vigilant to ensure that the proposed UN/AU ten-year capacity-building plan of 2005 is implemented and expanded to sub-regional bodies like SADC, given the tendency, since 2002, of donors such as the Group of Eight industrialised countries (G8) to make similar, yet unfulfilled promises.

3.6. Peacebuilding and State-building

One of the key constraints on peacekeeping in the SADC sub-region has been the failure to undertake effective and sustained peacebuilding after conflicts, and to provide the necessary resources to try to ensure that countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and the DRC do not slide back into conflict. Peacebuilding, if effectively undertaken, can help avoid further peacekeeping interventions through early prevention of conflicts. Southern Africa was instrumental in pioneering international peacebuilding with “second generation” post-Cold War UN missions in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique between 1989 and 1992, in which efforts have been made to adopt a holistic approach to conflict resolution. Not only do peacebuilders employ diplomatic and military tools, they also focus on the political, social, and economic root causes of conflicts in societies emerging from civil war. Peacebuilding thus aims to promote not only political peace, but also social peace, and the redressing of economic inequalities that could lead to further conflict.

156 See Curtis and Dzinesa (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa.
Both the UN High-Level Panel report of 2004 and Kofi Annan’s 2005 report “In Larger Freedom” called for the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat in New York, which were both established in 2006. The Peacebuilding Commission aims to improve UN post-conflict planning, focusing particularly on establishing viable institutions; ensuring financing in the period between the end of hostilities and the convening of donor conferences; and improving the coordination of UN bodies and other key regional and global actors. The first Chair of the 31-member commission was Angola’s respected permanent representative to the UN, Ismael Gaspar Martins. SADC member, Tanzania, was also part of the body’s founding membership. The first seven years of the commission’s existence have, however, proved disappointing and have so far failed to match the great expectations at its birth that it would promote more effective peacebuilding in SADC countries such as Angola and the DRC.\footnote{157}

The huge scale of the challenges of peacebuilding is perhaps most graphically demonstrated by the Congo, a country the size of Western Europe with dilapidated infrastructure in which over three million people have died from 16 years of conflict despite the presence of a current 20,000-strong UN peacekeeping force since 1999. The international community spent $422 million on the election process in the DRC in 2006/2007 which some questioned could have been more effectively used for reviving state institutions and enabling the government to provide social services to the vast country.\footnote{158} These points were underlined by the fact that, in 2013, there were still more than two million internally displaced people in the DRC, mostly in Kivu and Orientale provinces.\footnote{159} The UN Security Council has not yet invested the requisite financial resources and political will to match the huge challenges in this country. The size of the challenges faced by the government was further illustrated by the fact that this country’s budget for 2007–2011 was $14 billion, half of which was sought from external donors. The Congo’s rich mineral resources contribute only about $40 million a year to government coffers, amidst widespread illegal mining.\footnote{160} Despite the huge problems in the DRC and the improved stability following the 2006 elections, the 2011 elections were deeply flawed, threatening future stability, even as the international community continued its frugal ways. Huge and urgent challenges like security sector reform remain largely unmet.\footnote{161}

Finally, the case of Zimbabwe also illustrates the enormous challenges of state-building. Financial support from external donors continues to fund important reconstruction projects and economic recovery plans in the country. An estimated $760 million of such assistance was estimated to have been disbursed in 2008 and 2009. The Government of National Unity established in 2009, however, said that it needed $10 billion a year for these reconstruction efforts. Contrary to widespread expectations within Zimbabwe following the signing of the GPA in 2008, the government failed to attract significant funds from Western donors and China. Donors have faced two key dilemmas: whether to provide humanitarian aid or long-term development assistance; and whether to channel funds through the state or through civil society. Recent external assistance has been disbursed mainly through non-governmental organisations and UN agencies, and not directly through the government, largely due to donor

concerns about poor governance; politically motivated violence; a reported failure to adhere to bilateral deals protecting external investments; and delays in implementing policies on issues agreed under the 2008 Global Political Agreement such as media freedom; respect for human rights and the rule of law; a land audit; and mining standards. Donor involvement has also demonstrated that sustainable recovery in Zimbabwe must be locally driven to be truly effective, and that sanctions, while easy to impose, are often hard to manage and even more difficult to remove. It is unclear whether these sanctions will be removed following the elections in July 2013 won by Robert Mugabe. Both Zimbabwe and the DRC underline the problems of reconstructing and rebuilding fragile states. SADC clearly lacks the financial resources and technical expertise to undertake such missions, and will have to devise effective strategies with key international actors to ensure that the root causes of conflicts are urgently tackled and that fragile countries do not slide back into conflicts in future as a result of ineffective peacebuilding and state-building.
Policy Recommendations

The following ten key policy recommendations emerge from this report:

1. More robust implementation of the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections is needed. Southern African countries should move from rhetoric to action and properly empower parliaments; ensure the independence of judiciaries; safeguard the autonomy of oversight institutions; and encourage free and independent media;

2. SADC member states must undertake public sector reform to ensure the effective delivery of basic social services to their citizens through, inter alia, the improved management of public finances; institutional capacity-building, particularly within national civil services; and, programmes to address corruption;

3. Individual countries, as well as SADC as a whole, need to create space for effective participation by civil society to promote democratic governance across the sub-region. Key structures, such as the National Committees that support the sub-regional bloc, must be strengthened and provided with more resources to enhance their role, functions, and visibility to non-state stakeholders. Greater efforts are also required to improve the channels of engagement of civil society actors with the SADC Secretariat. In this respect, SADC could benefit from sharing “best practices” with sub-regional organisations in other parts of Africa such as the Economic Community of West African States;

4. Non-governmental organisations in Southern Africa have financial and functional weaknesses that need to be urgently addressed. Efforts at collaboration have been constrained by in-fighting, competition, and disunity, and civil society therefore needs to organise itself more effectively, networking across borders and building a culture of cooperation, in order to engage more robustly with SADC;

5. Better coordinated, more collaborative efforts are required for a multi-dimensional and less ad hoc approach to peace and security in the SADC sub-region. A group of SADC elders – not including incumbent leaders who have other national priorities – could be established to oversee the implementation of the organisation’s peace accords;

6. While South Africa has greater technical, military, and financial resources than other SADC members, it has serious domestic socio-economic issues, and its political legitimacy is still questioned by some member states, making it imperative for Tshwane to act collectively rather than unilaterally in sub-regional peacemaking efforts;

7. A more institutionalised approach, including the establishment of a properly funded early warning and mediation unit within the SADC Secretariat and the provision of training to enhance democratic control over armed forces, could enhance the capacity of the organisation to support complex and long-running peace talks, while reducing its current dependence on the political will and capacity of its more powerful member states;
8. The role of the SADC Executive Secretary in policy development and implementation requires urgent strengthening;

9. SADC should spearhead participatory processes to articulate security priorities for the sub-region. Key policy instruments, such as the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, the 2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, the 2003 Mutual Defence Pact, and the 2012 SIPO, need to be linked more closely in an integrated plan of action and further developed into coherent implementation and monitoring programmes; and

10. SADC, alongside other African sub-regional organisations, must ensure that the UN assumes its proper peacekeeping and peacebuilding responsibilities on the continent, supporting and then taking over regional peacekeeping missions to ensure sufficient legitimacy and resources and adequately funding post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.
Annex I

SADC Organogram

Table Source: SADC Secretariat.
Annex II

List of Acronyms

AFP  
Agence France-Presse

AGF  
African Governance Forum

ANC  
African National Congress

AP  
Associated Press

APRM  
African Peer Review Mechanism

ASF  
African Standby Force

AU  
African Union

BBC  
British Broadcasting Corporation

BRICS  
Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa

CAR  
Central African Republic

CCR  
Centre for Conflict Resolution

CES  
Special Electoral Court

CNDP  
Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (DRC)

DBSA  
Development Bank of Southern Africa

DDR  
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration

DIRCO  
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)

DISC  
Defence Intelligence Standing Committee (SADC)

DRC  
Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECF  
Electoral Commissions Forum (of SADC countries)

ECOWAS  
Economic Community of West African States

EISA  
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (now the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa)

EU  
European Union

FARDC  
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

FES  
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

FLS  
Frontline States

G8  
Group of Eight industrialised countries

GDP  
Gross Domestic Product

GNU  
Government of National Unity (Zimbabwe)

GPA  
Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)

HAT  
Haute Autorité de Transition (Madagascar)

ICD  
Inter-Congolese Dialogue

ICG  
International Crisis Group

ICGLR  
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

IDPs  
Internally Displaced Persons

IMF  
International Monetary Fund

IRIN  
Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISDSC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (SADC Organ)
ISPDC Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (SADC Organ)
JOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
MC Ministerial Committee (SADC Organ)
MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MDC-T MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai (Zimbabwe)
MONUC UN Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
MP Member of Parliament
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OPDSC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SADC)
PEMMO Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation
PLANELM Planning Element (SADC)
PPRD Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (DRC)
PSC Peace and Security Council (AU)
REWIC Regional Early Warning Centre (SADC)
RISDP Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)
RPTC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC)
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG SADC Brigade
SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-CNGO SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
SAFAC Southern Africa Forum against Corruption
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SARPPCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation
SEAC SADC Electoral Advisory Council
SIPO Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SADC)
TOR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US United States
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This policy seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.

This seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy seminar held from 8 to 10 June 2008 in Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This seminar, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK:
STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to ‘reset’ the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa's region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.

VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN:
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU), assessed its peace and security efforts, compared it with the European Union (EU), examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socio-economic development, and analysed its global role.

VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

This policy advisory group seminar held in Johannesburg, South Africa, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the politics and reform of the Security Council, and how the African Group at the UN and the UN Peacebuilding Commission have shaped relations between the continent and the world body.
Notes
Notes
This report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region’s progress towards democracy, and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts — particularly in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Madagascar. The report adopts a similar, holistic approach, focusing on the governance issues that are the root causes of many sub-regional conflicts in Southern Africa; and assessing the tools of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding employed by SADC to tackle these challenges. It argues that appropriate early action in Southern Africa can help to prevent the escalation of disputes into open conflict, and in the case of fragile, war-affected countries, a relapse into renewed violence.