THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
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POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR REPORT
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa; Region-building and Regional Integration on the continent; Africa and the European Union; the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 29 to 30 October 2012, on “The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group and the European Union (EU)”.

The Cape Town meeting focused on the potential for further strategic engagement between the 79-member ACP and the 28-member EU as the third five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 on trade, aid, and political cooperation approaches in 2015, and as the end of the 20-year span of Cotonou in 2020 draws nearer. The seminar also considered the impact of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the ACP and the EU on the trade, development, and region-building efforts of the Group’s member states; and crafted concrete recommendations in support of ACP institutional reform efforts and the broadening of future relations with new non-European partners.

1. The ACP/EU Historical and Trade Relationship

After the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the first European Development Fund (EDF), development cooperation between African and European countries was formalised through the Yaoundé I Convention, which was signed with 18 former African colonies in 1963, and renewed as Yaoundé II in 1969, when a separate association was also negotiated with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. With Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, Mauritius decided to join the Yaoundé Convention, and the remainder of the eligible Commonwealth countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific joined other sub-Saharan countries to agree partnership terms with Europe. The 1975 Lomé Convention was signed by nine EEC member states and 46 mostly former European colonies in the ACP regions, as well as Ethiopia and Liberia. However, unilateral preferential market access came increasingly under pressure after 1995, when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had granted a waiver to non-reciprocity since the start of the Lomé Convention in 1975. A new trade regime based on reciprocity was negotiated for the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.

Over half of the ACP countries still count among the world’s poorest, and primary products constitute the majority of their exports to the EU - a pattern of trade that diminishes in value for exporting countries in the long term. The ACP should support the establishment of industrial platforms to increase the manufacture and export of non-primary products, while EU assistance should place greater emphasis on helping developing countries to diversify their productive capacity and strengthen their ability to trade more competitively. The ACP should continue to identify real complementarities between member states and opportunities for South-South pooling of expertise, such as the lessons that Trinidad and Tobago could share with Ghana and Uganda in oil extraction.

2. The Past, Present, and Future of the ACP/EU Relationship

The ACP was established in 1975 with the aim of partnering the European Economic Community, now the European Union, to promote the sustainable development of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and to integrate them into the global economy. The ACP’s founding mandate further sought to foster unity among the Group’s members and to promote and consolidate their democratic governance. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the ACP and the EU seemed to continue this pursuit of a fairer world
order, although it proposed replacing the preferential non-reciprocal trade deals with ACP member states that had been previously implemented, with the free trade prescription of new Economic Partnership Agreements. The ACP and the EU account for 17 percent of the world’s population, creating a shared responsibility for global development. In addition, the diplomatic support offered by the ACP to the EU can provide political leverage in multilateral fora such as the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Since 2000, the EU has sought separate strategic partnerships for the three component regions of the ACP. The strategy for Africa was approved at the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007, but it was perceived as having been drawn up unilaterally and presented as a fait accompli to the African states. Several new EU members from Eastern and Central Europe object to a too generous funding of the ACP, which they see as competing with their own development needs. Furthermore, under the EU’s principle of ‘differentiation’, there are plans to exclude middle-income ACP countries from receiving aid despite their infrastructural deficits, widespread inequality, and large areas of poverty.

3. The EU and Africa: Trade and Regional Integration

The collective bargaining power of the ACP has been weakened by lengthy negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements. Critics have argued that the EPAs, though sold by the EU as development tools, will instead open important markets for Europe’s goods and services and promote its competitiveness, while improving its access to energy sources and raw materials in ACP states. Although the EU accounts for about 40 percent of Africa’s trade, the continent remains marginal for European imports and exports. To address such concerns, independent audits could be conducted on the EPAs to ensure their developmental content. The EU Commission often appears to predicate the terms of the EPAs on the outcomes of free trade negotiations being held at the World Trade Organisation, although there is little to indicate that the WTO itself is putting pressure on the EU on this matter. Furthermore, Brussels has often failed to align the comprehensive trade deals that it has sought with the integration efforts and development agendas of the Group’s six EPA regions – Central, West, Eastern, and Southern Africa; the Caribbean; and the Pacific. By 2012, only two regional EPAs had been created – one for the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and one for the East African Community (EAC). Only 16 out of 48 sub-Saharan African countries had signed or initialled EPAs by September 2013. The European Parliament’s move to extend the deadline for these agreements to 2016 would have allowed ACP members and regions time to reach fairer agreements. However, the EU Council rejected the Parliament’s position, and declared 30 September 2014 as the deadline for EPAs to be ratified, or for reasonable progress to have been made for ratification; failing which, alternative trading arrangements can be examined.

4. South Africa, the ACP, and the EU

South Africa joined the ACP in 1996, but only became a qualified member of Lomé in 1998 – able to participate fully in its institutions, but not in all its trade and aid benefits. Instead, Tshwane (Pretoria) signed a stand-alone Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 1999. Brussels has subsequently identified South Africa as one of the EU’s ten strategic partners globally. The consequent duality of market access arrangements in Southern Africa has complicated region-building efforts. Southern Africa’s fraught EPA negotiations have soured Tshwane’s relations with Europe, as well as with its smaller neighbours. In addition, South Africa and Namibia’s unwillingness to sign an interim regional EPA meant that it could not be implemented without breaking up the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) – although the experience has produced more concerted efforts for an inclusive final agreement.
While the EU remains South Africa’s largest trade partner, its share of the country’s trade declined from 50 percent in the mid-1990s to 26.5 percent in 2012, with China now the country’s largest bilateral commercial partner. South Africa’s inclusion in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc in 2011 represents an opportunity to diversify trade and financial links, but also a challenge in terms of balancing old and new ACP partnerships.

5. The EU/Africa Security Relationship

The Cotonou Agreement recognises the interdependence between security and development. It provides for political dialogue which has helped efforts to resolve crises in Togo, Guinea, and Niger. Under the Joint Africa/EU Strategy (JAES) of 2007, Brussels supports key African Union (AU) security organs and peacekeeping initiatives, and provided €550 million to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) between 2008 and 2013. However, fewer resources have been devoted to addressing the root causes of conflicts. For example, while the EU contributes 40 percent of the $1.7 billion budget of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), only $4 million of this sum has been made available for “quick-impact” development projects. Meanwhile, although the EU’s military interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006, and in Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) between 2008 and 2009 contributed to improvements on the ground, they also revealed weak institutional coordination within the EU, and between European and UN forces. In Sudan, the EU played a supporting role to the UN and the AU in the peace process that led to South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

6. Comparative Regional Integration: Caribbean and Pacific Perspectives

For the Caribbean, the trade aspect of Lomé was initially more important than aid flows in fostering development, because of the region’s higher per capita income compared with the rest of the ACP. However, neo-liberal economic concerns such as reciprocal market access dominated the Caribbean’s post-Cotonou negotiation of a regional EPA, at the expense of supply-side and broader development issues. The talks were further damaged by inadequate awareness of their scope (the Caribbean EPA of 2008 encompassed investment, competition, government procurement, and copyright issues that went beyond WTO compatibility); insufficient engagement with private-sector parties and civil society; and fears of repercussions if an agreement was not signed quickly. The EPA process also compromised the efforts of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to create a single market.

For the Pacific, the costs of addressing the lack of national capacity among the least developed island states of the region and their fragmented geography have not been fully taken into account in assessing development needs. Furthermore, the dominance of the wealthy economies of Australia and New Zealand has often distorted region-building efforts. Better EDF targeting and deeper integration is needed in the Pacific, and 13 regional initiatives have already been identified in the areas of economic growth and democratic governance.

7. Geo-Politics and Migration

The rise of China, Brazil, and India, and their voracious appetite for raw materials has led to increased investment and trade with the ACP, challenging the primacy of American and European economic ties with the developing world. The ACP needs to formulate an effective strategy on access to, and the development of, its raw materials by old and new trading partners. Although six of the ten fastest-growing economies in the world are now in Africa,
patterns of trade have changed little. Ninety percent of the continent’s exports to non-African developing countries consist of primary products – compared with 92 percent of exports to the US and 75 percent to the EU. Differences between the economic strategies of the BRICS members – particularly between China’s statist focus on extractive industries and infrastructure and India’s more commercially driven, private sector-led approach – could be leveraged by the ACP to enhance the developmental content of new trade deals.

The EU has tended to treat migration as a security issue, often complaining about the ‘threat’ that it poses, while ACP governments have often advocated focusing on the root causes of migration. Remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries are three times the size of official development assistance (ODA), and are expected to exceed $441 billion by 2014. The African Union has recognised the critical role that migrant communities play in their countries of origin, branding the African Diaspora as the continent’s ‘sixth region’.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town seminar:

1. South-South and triangular cooperation could enable the promotion of development and trade relationships based on comparative advantages. The ACP should leverage South Africa’s inclusion in the BRICS to connect to emerging patterns of trade and financial flows – although, given the BRICS’ lack of an institutional framework and the lack of cohesion among its members, the onus rests with the ACP to develop and implement a strategy of engagement with the bloc;

2. The profile of ACP reform efforts can be enhanced by linking them to implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the aspirations of the 2012 Rio+20 sustainable development agenda. The discussions about the ACP’s future should be deepened by fully engaging the private sector, civil society, and academia in all its regions;

3. The ACP should be using more think-tanks and experts from its own countries to generate new knowledge and policies. The Group should leverage its role as a centre of knowledge to inform EU strategies and support member states that have performed relatively well economically and can promote regional development;

4. ACP members must share best practices and lessons from the EPA negotiations. The most beneficial provisions agreed in talks in one region may be adopted by other ACP regions. Lessons from the complex and extensive TDCA between South Africa and the EU could also inform such negotiations;

5. Clear agendas and integrated plans need to be developed and led by strong ACP regional leaders and national champions in order to achieve fairer EPAs. Greater solidarity should be fostered among the Group’s governments, and they must pay their dues regularly to offset the body’s dependence on the EU;

6. The work of the ACP’s Inter-Regional Organisations Coordination Committee (IROCC) needs to be better supported by member states to ensure the effective sharing of experiences and lessons learned. In addition, greater public education on the EPAs and their impacts is needed to ensure proper civil society and private sector participation in the negotiation of these instruments;
7. All parties in EPA processes should pay greater attention to how these can be reviewed to support regional integration efforts. In the Caribbean, CARICOM summit decisions are often not implemented, underlining the need for the creation of more effective strategies to support regional integration and development. The Pacific region should opt for a policy of “damage control” in relation to EPAs: countries can either join Fiji and Papua New Guinea in the interim EPA or take up one of the alternative trading arrangements offered by the EU, although they should be offered compensatory funding in such cases as necessary.

8. The €57.5 billion of annual EU subsidies to European farmers restricts the market for African agricultural products, and Brussels should consider making compensatory payments to Africa accordingly. Pending final agreement at the WTO on free trade issues, which may take a long time to reach, the EU should look at abandoning all export subsidies as a condition for finalising EPAs;

9. The EU’s security efforts in Africa are more effective when it plays a supporting role to African actors, such as the AU and sub-regional organisations, as well as the UN. The EU should strengthen UN peacekeeping missions in Africa by participating directly in these under the world body’s command. Hybrid peacekeeping missions, modelled on UNAMID and under African leadership, should also be supported; and

10. The ACP needs to prepare comprehensive positions on peace and security, and engage the EU increasingly on these and related issues of governance through political dialogue. The Group should also engage on these concerns multilaterally – raising its profile at the UN in New York and Geneva, including at the Group of 77 (G-77), and at key global conferences.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 29 to 30 October 2012, on “The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group and the European Union (EU)”. This report is based on discussions at the meeting as well as further research. The main objective of the Cape Town meeting was to assess critically the nature of the relationship between the 79-member ACP Group and the 28-member EU; as well as the potential for their further strategic engagement. The policy seminar aimed, in particular, to assist the efforts of the ACP Secretariat and Ambassadorial Working Group on Future Perspectives to chart a new strategic direction for the organisation, as the third five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 on trade, aid, and political cooperation approaches in 2015, and as the end of the 20-year span of Cotonou in 2020 draws nearer. The October 2012 meeting drew on the participation of a wide range of about 30 leading policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors from ACP and EU countries. Leading ACP officials and ambassadors based in Brussels, as well as key South African and EU officials attended the seminar, which crafted concrete recommendations in support of the ACP Group’s institutional reform efforts and the broadening of future relations with new non-European partners.

CCR has significant experience of engaging on the topic of Africa/Europe relations with key stakeholders from both continents. In 2007 and 2008, the Centre convened two policy seminars on the Africa/EU relationship, from which two policy briefs and two longer policy reports were produced. In 2012, a 22-chapter CCR book, *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*, was published by Columbia University Press, Hurst, and Wits University Press. The October 2012 seminar thus sought to build on this work and to ensure that more African, Caribbean, and Pacific voices contribute meaningfully to critical debates affecting their own regions.

The membership of the ACP Group includes 48 countries from Africa, 16 from the Caribbean, and 15 from the Pacific. In June 2012, the ACP/EU Joint Council of Ministers approved the accession of South Sudan (which gained its independence in July 2011) to the Cotonou Agreement: the current framework for the Group’s development cooperation with Europe. The then-46 member ACP Group was established in 1975 with the aim of partnering the then-nine member European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union, to promote the sustainable development of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific; and to integrate them into the global economy on more equitable terms. The ACP’s founding mandate further sought...
to foster unity among its members, and to consolidate their democratic governance. The Group’s main policy organs consist of the Summit of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; and the Committee of Ambassadors. Its Brussels-based Secretariat oversees implementation of the Group’s decisions under Ghanaian Secretary-General Muhammad Mumuni (who succeeded compatriot Mohamed Ibn Chambas in March 2013). As part of an ongoing institutional reform process, the Secretariat is undergoing an administrative restructuring; developing a new vision, mission, and values statement; and seeking to transform itself into a knowledge-based, agenda-setting institution with enhanced financial viability (the EU still provides 50 percent of the ACP’s operational expenses).

In January 2011, the ACP launched an Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the ACP Group with the aim of positively influencing the third and final five-year review of Cotonou in 2015, and of reforming the organisation to enable it to engage more effectively in an international arena in which economic power is gradually shifting from the West to rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil. The relationship between the EU and the ACP is skewed towards Europe, which was reflected in the large gap between the Euro area’s combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $12.2 trillion in 2012 and the GDP of the ACP’s 79 states, which stood at an estimated $1.5 trillion. In addition, ACP/EU cooperation continues to be criticised for resembling a traditional “donor-recipient” relationship. Shifts in the European Union’s strategic priorities and difficult negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) mandated by Cotonou, have further strained relations between the two sides. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009, made no reference to the Cotonou Agreement as a legally binding accord in Europe’s external relations. The treaty also created a European External Action Service (EEAS) which divided the ACP area into separate geographic directorates: Asia and the Pacific; Africa; and Americas. Against this background, the ACP Ambassadorial Working Group – with a mandate until 2014 – has focused its policy development efforts on three key areas: 1) deepening the ACP/EU relationship; 2) outlining the potential and prospects of relations with additional partners, particularly within the context of South-South and/or triangular cooperation; and 3) political dialogue and engagement. Two sub-committees – one on the structure and functions of the ACP’s policy organs, the other on intra-ACP development cooperation - support the efforts of the working group.

More broadly, the ACP’s current reform process is also examining the continued relevance and achievements of the Group; identifying its comparative advantage in global politics; and reviewing the operation of its organs, in particular the ACP Secretariat. Areas that have been identified for urgent action include: the imperative for the ACP Group to speak with one voice; the need for its Committee of Ambassadors to have a formal political mandate outside the ACP/EU partnership agreement; the importance for the Secretariat of reversing its over-emphasis on Brussels and paying more focused attention to the ACP regions; and the need for the Secretariat to be more political in its agenda-setting and attract more high-level ACP representation to its meetings. In addition, there have been calls for the Group to work more closely with the new BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc; to nurture alliances within the global South in order to tackle issues such as trade and climate change more effectively; to gain greater visibility and leverage by coordinating its efforts better at

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the United Nations (UN) and other international fora; and to focus on current and new issues such as health, demographics, youth, migration, food security, cultural diversity, and intellectual property.

The five key objectives of the October 2012 CCR seminar were:

1. To develop concrete policy recommendations to strengthen the ACP Group’s efforts to adapt to contemporary political realities, while maintaining and strengthening its internal unity;

2. To analyse the evolution of the ACP/EU relationship since its inception in the areas of trade, development cooperation, peace and security, and institution-building, as well as the emergence of new issues such as migration, with a view to gaining a deeper understanding of its current drivers;

3. To consider the impact of Economic Partnership Agreements on the ACP/EU relationship and on region-building and regional integration efforts in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific;

4. To reflect on the comparative perspectives of the ACP’s three constituent regions to learn lessons for the Group as a whole, ahead of the 2015 review of Cotonou; and

5. To explore how the ACP Group can strengthen its historical ties with the European Union, while building new alliances with rising powers in the South, including the BRICS bloc, for the collective benefit of its disparate membership.
1. The ACP/EU Historical and Trade Relationship

The history of ACP/EU ties can offer lessons for the present and future of the relationship and for the ACP Group, in particular, as it reassesses its objectives and strategies. From the outset, the evolution of the ACP/EU relationship has followed an incremental logic, with the introduction over time of new and often controversial issues based on different economic, political, and normative imperatives.

Until 1975, development cooperation between Africa and Europe was driven by France, with Paris insisting that the European Economic Community’s founding Treaty of Rome (signed in 1957) include a provision for its overseas territories. The Rome Treaty also created the European Development Fund (EDF), subsequently launched in 1959 as the core instrument for channelling development aid to Europe’s overseas territories. The Gallic effort to preserve a privileged relationship with its former African empire found expression in the Yaoundé I Convention, which was signed with 18 former European – mainly French – colonies in Africa in 1963. The agreement was later renewed in 1969, when a separate, more limited association (without any aid provisions) was also negotiated with the English-speaking East African Community comprising Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The Yaoundé Conventions were criticised by key African leaders, including Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s Sekou Touré, as a ‘neo-colonial’ project to make Africa more economically dependent on Europe.

Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973 was key to transforming the relationship between Europe and Africa, in particular, from a primarily Francophone project into a more open and inclusive cooperation framework. Specifically, it paved the way towards the Lomé Conventions, which expanded the association to include more members of the Commonwealth in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions. Protocol 22 of Britain’s Treaty of Accession, signed in January 1972, provided for preserving the country’s ties with its former colonies in the ACP regions, though not with members of the old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) or the Asian Commonwealth (including India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). A number of European and Francophone African figures (such as Niger’s Hamani Diori) – the latter keen to preserve their privileges – would have preferred separate negotiations for the old ‘associates’ and new ‘associables’ in the ACP regions. However, a determined campaign by the ‘associables’, with vital support from European Commission officials, including, in particular, the French Development Commissioner, Claude Cheysson, was successful in winning support for collective negotiations from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as well as the Commonwealth. Subsequently, Lomé I was signed by nine EEC member states and 46 mostly former European colonies in the ACP regions, as well as Ethiopia and Liberia in 1975, marking the birth of the contemporary ACP/EU relationship and the Group itself, which was formally established by the Georgetown Agreement in the same year (although it had formed a negotiating bloc since 1973).

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7 The 18 countries included: French-administered Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon, and Togo; Belgian-administered DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi; Italian-administered Somalia; and Madagascar – together known as the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM).
During the Lomé I negotiations (1973-1975), trade issues played an important role in forging solidarity among the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries which led to the abandoning of the idea of a free trade area between advanced European economies and the developing countries of the ACP regions. For close observers of the ACP Group, this collective ‘spirit of Lomé’ remains the key to its strength. The principle of trade non-reciprocity – a hard won concession after eighteen months of talks – was vital to securing the agreement of a number of the ACP countries to the 1975 convention, which was subsequently renewed three times. Lomé I introduced the STABEX (Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation) system, intended to stabilise the export earnings of ACP countries by compensating them for shortfalls generated by fluctuations in the price or supply of agricultural commodities such as cocoa, coffee, tea, and groundnuts. Lomé II – signed in 1979 – set up the corresponding SYSMIN (Système de Développement du Potentiel Minier) system for underwriting export revenues from mineral resources. In the context of deteriorating economic conditions in the ACP regions – average annual GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, declined from four percent in 1970-1979 to 2.1 percent in 1980-1989 – Lomé III, which was negotiated by 1984, emphasised rural development, self-sufficiency, and food security. In 1989, Lomé IV became the first convention to cover a ten-year period, with a mid-term review in 1995, and stressing for the first time the promotion of human rights, democracy, and “good governance”. Under Lomé IV, the EEC – in dialogue with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – also supported contentious structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions.

Although the Lomé Conventions emphasised “partnership” – Lomé I, in particular, was promoted as a positive example of global interdependence – the ACP/EU relationship remained an unequal one. This became clear during the 1980s when the dependence of weakened ACP countries on European Development Fund resources undermined their negotiating position. Disillusionment was reinforced by the failure of the privileged relationship to guarantee or significantly increase the ACP countries’ share of the EEC market; and by bureaucratic delays in the timely disbursement of aid, as well as other grievances. Despite the Lomé regime, ACP countries’ share of the European Union market dropped from 6.7 percent in 1976 to 2.8 percent in 1994.

After unilateral preferential market access became a more contentious issue with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, and against the background of geo-strategic changes resulting from the end of the Cold War, the European Commission issued a green paper on ACP/EU relations in 1996. This paper proposed a new trade and development regime based on the more liberal, free-market prescriptions of the WTO. Subsequently, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 for a 20-year period and revised every five years, replaced trade non-reciprocity with Economic Partnership Agreements, to be negotiated with the ACP’s six EPA regions. It also replaced STABEX and SYSMIN with a support system – under Article 68 – that assists countries suffering shortfalls in revenue caused by short-term instability on an ad hoc basis. Economically weakened by the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and marginalised by the end of the Cold War by 1990, the ACP did not have the negotiating strength to resist Cotonou, regarded by critics as a reversal of the more progressive “spirit of Lomé.”

12 This term was coined by Adebayo Adedeji while serving as Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), a post he held between 1975 and 1991.
However, the failure of the ACP Group to negotiate a more beneficial partnership agreement also came from failures in its leadership; complexities in the institutional relationship with Europe; and an imbalance of powers between the ACP’s Committee of Ambassadors and its Secretariat. In addition, on the European side, there has been a shift in focus from partnership with the ACP to strategic partnership with Africa. At the same time, the European Council, which has tended to see the ACP as a marginal grouping and Lomé as a colonial relic, has grown in influence. An Africa-EU summit was held in Cairo in 2000 attended by 15 European and 45 African countries, which agreed to strengthen cooperation, promote Africa’s integration into the world economy; and support human rights, governance, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and sustainable development efforts on the continent. A second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 led to the adoption of a Joint Africa/EU Strategy (JAES), which sought to establish partnerships in the areas of development aid, security, and trade. This parallel European diplomacy on Africa has been accompanied by a focus on security which, though it is included in Article II of Cotonou, has not been a direct concern of the ACP. In 2004, Brussels set up an African Peace Facility (APF), through which it supports the African Union’s (AU) conflict resolution efforts: between 2004 and 2013, the EU provided more than €11 billion to these efforts through the APF.

While the current ACP/EU partnership agreement identifies poverty eradication, sustainable development, and the gradual integration of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries into the global economy as the main objectives of cooperation with Europe, this development nonetheless marks a significant normative shift from the Lomé regime, in particular by redefining the ACP/EU trade relationship through the removal of trade preferences. The Cotonou architecture is more comprehensive, and has political and development aid pillars, which include references to cooperation in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and mercenary activities, as well as to gender equality, sexual health, and poverty-related diseases. The Cotonou Agreement also identifies non-state actors – including the private sector, trade union organisations, and various forms of civil society – as economic and social partners in ACP/EU development cooperation.

In 2001, after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, Brussels launched the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative, whereby it unilaterally removed tariffs and quotas on all imports, except arms and three products – sugar, rice, and bananas – for which duties were phased out more gradually over a transition period, from 49 least developed countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations, of which 39 were ACP members. While the initiative improved market access and terms of trade for LDCs generally, a number of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries have not been able to benefit from the EBA, because they do not have the ability to trade competitively.

As both the ACP and the EU consider the future direction of the relationship, they should examine more closely the effectiveness of previous agreements as catalysts for economic growth and development in the ACP countries, and seek to identify areas for improvement. Over half of ACP countries still count among the world’s poorest, and primary products constitute the majority of their exports to Europe. In 2012, primary products made up 76.7 percent of EU imports from the ACP, with all the products included in the EBA initiative being agricultural products. Research shows that, in time, such a pattern of trade will lead to a decline in its value for

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exporting countries. In order for trade to be transformative and help promote economic development for its 79 (soon to be 80 with South Sudan’s application) members, the ACP should consider establishing industrial platforms to increase the manufacture and export of non-primary products. European assistance should also place greater emphasis on helping developing countries to diversify their productive capacity and strengthen their ability to trade more competitively. The European Parliament – given more power by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 – could also play a greater role in ACP/EU affairs, and help restore balance to the ACP Group’s negotiation positions with other EU institutions.
2. The Past, Present, and Future of the ACP/EU Relationship

The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group was established in 1975 with the aim of partnering the European Economic Community, now the 28-member European Union, to promote the sustainable development of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and to integrate them into the global economy on equitable terms.

The ACP’s founding mandate further sought to foster unity among the Group’s members; and to consolidate their democratic governance. The current 20-year Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the ACP and the EU set out to achieve a more equal trading regime, and proposed replacing the preferential non-reciprocal trade deals with ACP member states that had been previously implemented, with the free-trade prescriptions of Economic Partnership Agreements. However, as Cotonou enters its final funding cycle from 2014, and its end date of 2020 approaches, the ACP has acknowledged that it must reappraise and renew its role and has pushed for Brussels to do the same and reassess its relationship with the Group.

The ACP, which comprised 79 countries with a population of 973 million in 2013, includes mainly low and middle-income countries, as well as large free-market economies such as Nigeria and South Africa; socialist governments; oil exporters; small island states; land-locked countries; and Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone populations. The Group has historically found its strength in diversity – no state has ever left the ACP – and a shared commitment to redressing the geo-political marginalisation of its members; pursuing the human development of its populations; and seeking equity in international economic and trade relations. The Group has evolved as part of the ‘moral economy’ of a united Europe: the ACP and the EU account for 17 percent of the world’s population – more than 1 billion people – creating a shared responsibility for global development. In addition, the potential diplomatic support that can be offered by the ACP to the EU could provide political leverage at multilateral fora such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Since 2000, the EU has sought separate partnerships with the ACP’s three regions. In 2007, Brussels’ increasing emphasis on regionalism was reinforced by the approval of a Joint Africa/EU Strategy at an Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon. The creation of the strategy appeared to separate the terms of Europe’s engagement with Africa from its relationships with the Caribbean and the Pacific – a move opposed within the ACP. The Joint Africa/EU Strategy was further perceived as having been drawn up unilaterally in Brussels without due consultation with the Group’s national governments and Brussels-based secretariat, and then presented as a fait accompli to African states. The strategy is financed by the European Development Fund, which provides half of the ACP’s operational expenses (the rest is provided by the Group’s member states). The EDF has provided more than €22.7 billion during the present funding cycle (2008-2013), and has earmarked another €32 billion for the ACP between 2014 and 2020. Several EU members from Eastern and Central Europe such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who have joined the bloc since 2004, however object to a too generous funding of the ACP, which they see as competing with their own development needs.

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Uncertainty about the future of the strategic relationship between the EU and the ACP has been further exacerbated by tensions arising from negotiations to establish Economic Partnership Agreements. These continue on a bilateral and regional basis in most of Africa and the Pacific. However, between 2007 and 2009, a full regional EPA was agreed with the ACP’s Caribbean countries and an interim EPA was signed and has begun to be implemented in Eastern Africa. The flexibility and progressive approach demonstrated by China and the United States (US) in forging trade relations with ACP countries has contrasted sharply with Brussels’ dogmatism when negotiating EPAs - and highlights how Europe often fails to see its economic relationship with ACP countries as an opportunity to invest for long-term growth. Instead, the EU has frequently adopted a functionalist approach, negotiating trade deals on separate sub-regional and national bases and prioritising bilateral deals with middle-income countries. In addition, the Brussels-based ACP secretariat has been sidelined by EPA negotiations, shifting the management of trade relations to sub-regional and regional bodies at the expense of the ACP’s role as the coordinating body. The European Commission often appears to predicate the terms of the EPAs on the broader outcomes of free trade negotiations being held at the level of the World Trade Organisation, although the WTO’s leadership has not indicated that it is putting pressure on the EU over this issue. EPAs should not be imposed through fear and coercion. The European Parliament’s move to extend the deadline for these agreements to 2016 – although the Commission was insisting on an earlier deadline of 2014 – may allow the ACP’s six EPA regions (the Caribbean; the Pacific; and West, Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa) to reach agreements that are more fair and equitable.

Tensions between Brussels and the ACP Group have also been exacerbated by plans proposed under the EU’s principle of differentiation to withhold aid from ACP countries defined as “middle income” according to per capita share of gross domestic product. These plans form part of a new EU strategy for allocating aid that focuses on supporting the development of renewable energy sources, improving food security, building infrastructure, and promoting “good governance”. However, the premature removal of aid under the new strategy may hinder the attainment of internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) formulated by the United Nations to halve poverty by 2015, including Goal Eight to promote a “global partnership for development” of Middle-income countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, Fiji, and Jamaica continue to be plagued by widespread inequality, great income disparities, and huge pockets of endemic poverty. In addition, the per capita measure used by Brussels for defining “middle income”, which ranks 14 ACP countries as richer than Bulgaria and five as richer than EU countries such as Poland, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania, has been criticised for failing to take account of the infrastructural deficits in much of Africa, as well as the permanent and severe geographical handicaps faced by outermost regions such as the Pacific islands and small land-locked states in Africa. Countries that have performed relatively well economically – and can promote sub-regional development – should be supported on their growth paths, particularly through funding for their health and education sectors, and not punished for their successes. In addition, enhanced bilateral aid to lower income countries does not always lead to corresponding development benefits and can even sometimes result in unused surplus funds being returned to donors.

16 In order of wealth, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, Gabon, Mauritius, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Botswana, and Palau.
17 The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and St. Kitts and Nevis.
The ACP has a potentially important role as a centre of knowledge on development issues, informing EU strategies and supporting the efforts of member states in this area. The Group has identified real complementarities between member states – by matching food surpluses to food deficits – and opportunities for South-South sharing of expertise such as the lessons that Trinidad and Tobago could share with Ghana and Uganda in oil extraction; the advantages of the Cuban ‘model’ of health provision; and lessons that have been learned in relation to the production of biofuels and deforestation. Although the idea of an ACP free trade area has remained unrealised, member states have increasingly found common cause in managing technical barriers to trade and addressing new standards for exports. The Group’s members have also considered the establishment of a banking facility to enhance trade as an alternative to the European Investment Bank, which imposes excessively rigorous conditions on lending to developing countries. The ACP needs to focus on its core competencies as a provider of resources, experience, and policy expertise in relation to trade cooperation, and to reposition its Secretariat as more than a mere convenor of ministerial meetings. In support of this developmental role, the ACP should be using more think-tanks and expert consultants from its member countries, rather than mainly Europeans, to generate new knowledge and policies.

As the ACP assesses the challenges that it faces entering the final five years (2015-2020) of the Cotonou Agreement, it should seek to address the issues of South-South cooperation and the growing importance of the private sector, which are not always given sufficient weight in promoting development. In January 2011, the ACP, in collaboration with the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), hosted a symposium on South-South cooperation which included participation from the Development Cooperation Agencies of Brazil and India, as well as case studies from Cuba, Nigeria, and South Africa. In addition, a greater sense of solidarity should be fostered among the Group’s 79 member states, which should prioritise paying their dues regularly to offset the body’s financial dependence on the EU. The profile of ACP reform efforts could also be enhanced by linking them to implementation of the MDGs and to the aspirations of the 2012 Rio+20 sustainable development agenda. The ACP Group plans to work more closely with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) after 2015, and is seeking to promote the integration of key proposals on energy, agriculture, and poverty reduction from Agenda for Change – a 2011 European Commission report on increasing the impact of the EU’s development policy – into European Development Fund programming. The ACP needs, however, to promote an alternative to the ineffective ‘trickle-down’ model for development which has failed to address the extent to which fundamental inequalities within an economy can prevent the required comprehensive distribution of the gains of growth. Furthermore, the EDF – currently an inter-governmental agreement with its own management and resources – should remain outside the European Commission’s regular budget to provide predictability of funding. In addition, decisions about the disbursement of EDF funds should be made in consultation with the ACP rather than unilaterally by the EU alone.

Although the ACP and the EU jointly account for 17 percent of the world’s population, the relative demographics between the two blocs have shifted considerably since the Group’s creation at Georgetown, Guyana, in 1975: the EU’s population has shrunk from ten to six percent of the total world population, while the ACP’s has grown from seven to 11 percent. Brussels has emphasised that the aid burden per European has risen as a result and that concurrent strong growth in Africa, which had six of the world’s ten fastest growing economies between 2001 and 2010, places a greater obligation on the continent to contribute to its own growth.
development. This argument frames the EPAs as tools for achieving greater economic development which were implemented after the earlier privileged market access guaranteed by Lomé had failed to boost per capita incomes and trade for ACP states. However, since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and Europe’s greater focus on trade with Asia and Latin America, the ACP/EU partnership appears to have been downgraded in Brussels. In response to the new uncertainties arising from a changing EU, the ACP Group needs to diversify beyond its primary partnership with Brussels to embrace more extensive South-South links, build new alliances with the economies of Asia and Latin America, and leverage the competing attentions of countries such as China, India, Japan, the US, and Russia, in pursuit of its own economic interests. In addition, the ACP should seek to foster political will within the EU to forge a development agenda that exploits the synergies between European technical expertise and ACP resources. An ambassadorial working group was established by the ACP in 2011 to reassess and renew its role. A 14-member Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was also subsequently convened in 2013 "to strengthen the ACP and to provide guidance to the future". The discussions about the Group’s future should be deepened by fully engaging the private sector, civil society, and academia in all three ACP regions.

Looking beyond 2015, the ACP is seeking to prepare positions on peace, security, and the rule of law, and to engage the EU increasingly on these and related issues of human rights and governance through political dialogue, which is one of the three pillars – along with discussions on trade and aid – that define the Group’s mission. The role of the European Commission’s African Peace Facility – allocated €300 million for the three year period 2011-2013 under the current EDF – in preventing and managing conflicts should be carefully assessed. The ACP should also engage on its political, security, and trade concerns multilaterally, raising its profile at the UN in New York and Geneva, including at the Group of 77 (G-77), and at key global conferences.


3. The EU and Africa: Trade and Regional Integration

The Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885 provided a framework for the partition of Africa by a group of largely European states and triggered the occupation of the continent by British, French, German, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial administrations, which all sought the political, social and economic marginalisation of the continent’s inhabitants.²²

As colonial rule later receded, the Cold War provided opportunities for newly independent African states to extract important political and economic concessions from the United States and the Soviet Union from the 1960s, but also impacted negatively on governance in Africa due to external support for corrupt and oppressive regimes. The Cold War further escalated local conflicts through the direct or proxy involvement of its antagonists and their allies (for example, in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Angola). After the end of the Cold War by 1990, ideological allegiances were overtaken by pressing material concerns relating to trade and investment, aid, security, and conflict management. However, the changing world order was accompanied by Africa’s increasing economic marginalisation. The number of African countries receiving substantial European official development assistance (ODA) fell dramatically: by 1996-1997, only two of the top 15 recipients of EU aid were sub-Saharan African countries, compared with 13 in 1970-1974. In addition, by 2000, foreign investment on the continent dropped to a mere $6.1 billion, compared with $8.1 billion four years earlier, while Africa’s share of global trade plummeted from 2.7 percent in 1990 to just 2 percent in 2002. However, in the past decade, this marginalisation is being gradually reversed. Foreign investment levels rose sharply in 2001 to $13.8 billion, and reached $50 billion by 2012. Growth on the continent also averaged more than five percent between 2000 and 2010, with a concomitant rise in average incomes to more than $200 a month for over 300 million people. Africa further has large deposits of precious minerals and ten percent of the world’s energy reserves. In addition, standards of governance and human rights have generally improved, enhancing the continent’s status as a growing destination for foreign investment.²¹

The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 heralded a new trade and development regime based on reciprocity and enacted by Economic Partnership Agreements scheduled to come into force by 2008. Noble objectives were proclaimed in establishing the EPAs: sustainable development and integration into the global economy for ACP states; the establishment of a more equitable world order; the consolidation of solidarity between the ACP Group and Brussels; and the creation of peace and stability through the promotion of free and democratic societies. However, although the EU accounts for about 40 percent of Africa’s trade, the continent remains marginal for European imports and exports. In addition, despite the benefits of many European technological exports such as heavy machinery, the EPAs – particularly within the context of the EU’s Raw Materials Strategy – are perceived as having reproduced neo-colonial patterns of trade – African raw commodities for European finished products – that have had a damaging and deindustrialising effect on the continent’s economies.

²¹ This section draws from presentations made by John Akokpari and Peter Katjavivi at the CCR policy research seminar, “The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group and the European Union”, Cape Town, South Africa, 29-30 October 2012.
Furthermore, the collective bargaining power of the ACP in support of its aspirations for a partnership that promotes sustainable and globally integrated development has been weakened by lengthy negotiations between its member states and the EU on the EPAs. As well as posing a threat to the unity and cohesion of the ACP, these agreements have had a negative impact on the overall relationship. Fears about the Group’s marginalisation have been reinforced by the emergence of a parallel continental EU approach to Africa since 2000, with the convening of the Africa-EU summits in Cairo, Lisbon, and Tripoli in 2000, 2007, and 2010 respectively, and the subsequent adoption of the Joint Africa/EU Strategy. Furthermore, Brussels has often failed to align the comprehensive trade deals that it has sought with the integration efforts and development agendas of the ACP’s six EPA regions. Bilateral EPAs have, in fact, damaged integration efforts in Central, and Southern Africa despite their declaratory intent to strengthen regional cooperation. By 2012, only two regional EPAs had been created: one for the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), which is in reality 15 overlapping bilateral trade deals; and one for the East African Community (EAC). Notwithstanding, the priority given to such agreements by Brussels, only 16 out of 48 sub-Saharan African countries had signed or initialled EPAs by September 2013.24

In general, the EU has promoted a different interpretation of the development component of the EPAs from that advocated by the ACP. Critics have argued that the EPAs, though sold by Brussels as development tools, have instead been used to deliver European trade policies in a manner that is socially inequitable as well as environmentally and economically unsustainable, as part of a new ‘Global Europe’ agenda.25 In this context, the agreements have been used to open important markets for goods and services from the EU and to promote the bloc’s competitiveness, while improving European access to energy sources and raw materials in ACP states. The accords have also facilitated EU interventions in the policy space of developing countries and sub-regional and regional bodies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. In 2008, AU Ministers of Trade and Finance listed a series of key contentious issues raised by the EPAs, including: their ‘substantially all trade’ provisions; the proposed transition periods for tariff liberalisation; the ‘standstill’ clause; export taxes; the national treatment principle in goods; the safeguards and provisions for infant industries; the terms proposed for the free circulation of goods in relation to existing regional preference rules; most favoured nation status; non-execution clauses; and rules of origin. Furthermore, negotiations over new ‘WTO-plus’ trade conditions relating to competition, public procurement policies, services, and intellectual property; and the legal ramifications of these, have the potential to deprive ACP regions of the capacity to shape their own development. Particular concerns have also been raised over the WTO-plus tax and subsidy regimes proposed by the EPAs. The EU has agreed to negotiate on such points only with those countries that have an interest in WTO-plus issues – and to exclude these topics from discussions if countries object to their incorporation. Nevertheless, the European Commission continues to ban all export taxes even though the WTO still allows these for least developed countries. In addition, the €57.5 billion of annual EU subsidies to European farmers – including for the production of cotton – restricts the market for Africa’s agricultural products. Brussels should therefore consider making compensatory payments to African governments. Pending final multilateral agreement at the WTO on free trade issues, which may take a long time to reach, the EU should abandon all export subsidies as a condition for finalising EPAs. Independent audits should also be conducted on the agreements to ensure their developmental content, with a view to revising them accordingly.

24 The 16 countries are: Botswana; Burundi; Cameroon; Côte d’Ivoire; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Madagascar; Mauritius; Mozambique; Rwanda; Seychelles; Swaziland; Tanzania; Uganda; and Zimbabwe.
A formal acknowledgement of the need for flexibility on contentious issues relating to the EPAs has been provided by the European Union’s General Affairs and External Relations Council, various European governments in their separate capacities, and former EU Trade Commissioner and later EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Britain’s Catherine Ashton. However, critics of the general approach adopted by Brussels have noted that the EU has continued to adopt an overbearing stance towards EPA negotiations, and its ‘flexibility’ has been less than genuine in practice. In addition, European lawmakers and the European Commission have often appeared to adopt contradictory positions. The European Parliament’s move to extend the deadline for EPAs to 2016 – although the Commission was still insisting on an earlier deadline of 2014 – would have allowed ACP members and regions sufficient time to reach agreements that are more fair and equitable. However, the EU Council rejected the Parliament’s position, and declared 30 September 2014 as the deadline for EPAs to be ratified, or for reasonable progress to have been made for ratification; failing which, alternative trading arrangements can be examined.

Further steps to remove obstacles from the EPA negotiations may include adhering to the principle of mutual accountability in the drafting, implementation, and monitoring of agreed commitments. In addition, any trade, financial, and political commitments offered by the EU should be made properly in writing and should be binding on all parties. In order to deliver the benefits of an improved relationship with the ACP, Brussels should not impose unilateral deadlines on EPA negotiations, which have consequences that go far beyond ACP/EU trade relations to include the overall strategic relationship between the two sides; the prospects for region-building in the ACP; and the Group’s relations with third countries. The EU must respect and consider ACP positions, and it must not seek to ‘divide and rule’ its three regions. Clear agendas and integrated plans need to be developed and led by strong regional leaders and national champions among the ACP’s members in order to support their negotiating positions effectively in complex EPA talks. The Group should also share ‘best practices’ and lessons from the negotiations conducted by different regions. In particular, the most beneficial provisions agreed in talks in one EPA region can be adopted by other ACP EPA regions as demands in their own EPA negotiations. The EU should, as a matter of course, make the documents presented at the fourth African-EU summit in Brussels in April 2014 on their regional strategic partnerships relate to the parallel areas of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, particularly in areas such as trade and security.
4. South Africa, the ACP, and the EU

Elections in 1994 marked the end of apartheid and the introduction of democracy in South Africa. The continent’s largest economy subsequently joined the ACP in 1996, and requested full membership of the Lomé Convention.

However, the European Union argued that South Africa had a more industrialised, diversified, and competitive economy than a typical ACP country. Consequently, South Africa only became a qualified member of the Lomé Convention in 1998 – able to participate fully in its institutions, but not in all its trade and aid benefits. For example, the country was not given access to any grants, loans, or capital from the European Development Fund. Instead, Tshwane (Pretoria) signed a comprehensive stand-alone Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in October 1999, which entered into full force in May 2004. Brussels has subsequently identified South Africa as one of its ten strategic partners globally, and the South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan – the only such agreement with an African country – was signed in May 2007. However, with South Africa joining the BRICS bloc in 2011, the direction of this partnership remains uncertain. Crucially, the consequent duality of market access arrangements in Southern Africa has complicated region-building efforts.

In particular, Southern Africa’s fraught EPA negotiations have soured Tshwane’s relations with Europe, as well as with its smaller neighbours. With the mid-term review of the TDCA due in 2005, South Africa joined regional consultations on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA in 2004, with the dual objectives of strengthening regional integration in Southern Africa and harmonising its own trade arrangements with Europe. The SADC EPA group consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa, with the other eight SADC member states – the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – excluded, since they were able to negotiate terms in other regional EPA processes. Negotiations for a comprehensive EPA in Southern Africa were further complicated not only by South Africa’s TDCA with the EU, but also by its participation – alongside Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) – in the five-member Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which it dominates. South Africa makes up 92 percent of SACU’s combined gross domestic product. In March 2006, the SADC EPA group submitted a negotiating framework to the European Commission which responded one year later in March 2007, agreeing to the formal inclusion of South Africa in the EPA negotiations, but with a continued insistence on differentiating Tshwane from the sub-region.

During negotiations for an interim EPA, conducted under immense pressure over nine months between March and December 2007 (the WTO-agreed deadline), a number of SADC EPA countries – in particular, the least developed countries – agreed to initial an interim agreement, while Angola, South Africa, and Namibia held out for improved terms. Tshwane’s concerns centred on imbalances in the tariff concessions made by the EU and ACP countries; provisions related to industrial and agricultural policy that were more prohibitive than existing WTO rules; and the EU’s insistence on negotiating ‘new’ trade issues: competition, investment

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28 The European Union’s ten strategic partners are: Canada, Japan, the United States, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, and South Korea.
procurement; services; intellectual property; labour; and the environment. South Africa and Namibia’s
unwillingness to sign the interim regional EPA meant that the agreement could not be implemented without
breaking up the 113-year old Southern African Customs Union. However, this difficult experience has produced
more concerted efforts among the SADC EPA countries to re-establish a common negotiating position and
to move, with the EU, towards a less divisive, more inclusive final agreement.\textsuperscript{29} Discussions have centred on
market access negotiations (in particular, tariff concessions and rules of origin), addressing outstanding
concerns about the legal text of the agreement; and finalising ongoing services and investment negotiations
for those involved over a longer period. In September 2011, South Africa – in a significant concession – offered
to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the EU on geographical indications not only for wines and spirits but
also for 250 agricultural products.

All parties in EPA processes should pay more attention to how these can be reviewed to support regional
integration efforts in Africa. In this context, although the 1999 TDCA between South Africa and the EU is not
an EPA \textit{per se}, the extent and details of the deal could provide useful provisions that could form part of, or
inform, the negotiation of future EPAs. Africa is poised to become the next growth pole globally due to a rich
resource base, favourable demographics, and improved governance. It is the fastest-growing continent in the
world, with the International Monetary Fund estimating that regional economic growth will accelerate from
five percent in 2012 to 5.5 percent in 2013 and 5.7 percent in 2014.\textsuperscript{30} Africa also currently has the fastest growing
middle class of any region. However, the small size and fragmented nature of continental markets are a
significant deterrent to greater investment. Africa’s potential for high growth and sustained development
depends on effective regional integration. Growth also does not necessarily produce effective development,
and much of this is from a very low base.

The EU is South Africa’s largest trading and investment partner, which is, in turn, Brussels’ leading trade partner
in Africa. In 2012, imports from the EU constituted 24.4 percent of South Africa’s total imports, while exports to
the bloc made up 17.6 percent of the country’s total. However, this is an asymmetrical relationship. The ACP’s
richest member state is a major recipient of EU aid, with a total of €980 million committed for the period
2007-2013 (not including EU member states’ bilateral contributions).\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, South Africa’s exports only
accounted for 11 percent of the EU’s total imports in 2012, and Tshwane ranks far behind the US and China, as
well as Brazil, Russia, and India, as a trade partner to Brussels.\textsuperscript{32} New and emerging economies within the global
South are growing in importance for South Africa and the ACP, as well as Europe. Although the EU remains
South Africa’s main trading partner, its share of the country’s trade declined from 50 percent in the mid-1990s
to 26.5 percent in 2012, with China now Tshwane’s single largest bilateral commercial partner, accounting for
12.3 percent of its total trade in 2012.\textsuperscript{33} Starting from a low base, South Africa’s overall trade with the BRICS bloc
has grown steadily over the past few years, rising from $17.6 billion in 2008 to $29.4 billion by 2012.\textsuperscript{34} In this

\textsuperscript{29} See Richard Gibb, “The Southern African Customs Union: Promoting Stability through Dependence?” in Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and
\textsuperscript{30} International Monetary Fund, \textit{Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa: Building Momentum in a Multi-Speed World} (Washington, DC: IMF, 2013), p. II.
\textsuperscript{31} See Bertelsmann-Scott, “South Africa and the EU: Where Lies the Strategic Partnership?”.
\textsuperscript{32} European Commission, “South Africa: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”. Brussels, Belgium, 10 September 2013 (accessed at
\textsuperscript{33} European Commission, “South Africa”.
\textsuperscript{34} Presentation made by Rob Davies at the CCR public dialogue, “South Africa and the BRICS Group: Prospects for the Future”. Cape Town, South Africa,
respect, Tshwane’s inclusion in the BRICS grouping in 2011 represents an opportunity – for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions, as well as South Africa – to diversify trade and financial links, but also a challenge in terms of balancing old and new ACP partnerships.

Tshwane’s relationship with Brussels is wide-ranging, extending beyond trade, investment, and development cooperation to the political sphere, and based on the EU’s recognition of South Africa’s key role within the African Union, as well as SADC. The promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa is a key element of the South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, with an active political dialogue fostered through annual summits and ministerial-level meetings with the EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton (since November 2009), as well as high-level meetings on issues of common interest, including education, health, space; science and technology; and climate change. Six South Africa-EU summits were held between 2008 and 2013. Regionally, Brussels has supported Tshwane’s mediation role under the umbrella of SADC in Zimbabwe, and more recently, in Madagascar, although there has been some criticism within Southern Africa of the EU’s reluctance to lift sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe in 2002. Although the European Union agreed in July 2012 to suspend most sanctions against Harare once a credible referendum on a new Constitution had been held, these mainly remained in place in November 2013, after national elections in July 2013, which were won by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by Robert Mugabe. The polls received only a qualified endorsement from SADC – which described them as ‘free’, but refrained from calling them ‘fair’.

At the multilateral level, the EU acknowledged South Africa’s leadership at, and hosting of, the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or COP 17, held in the South African port city of Durban in November/December 2011, at which the US, China, and India – for the first time – agreed to be legally bound to cut their carbon emissions. At the Sixth South Africa-EU Summit, held in July 2013, the two parties highlighted a number of common concerns including employment creation; migration and mobility; maritime security; as well as the political situations in Zimbabwe, Mali, Madagascar, and Somalia. These are all critical issues for South Africa, and they may require the political and economic clout of the EU to promote a favourable outcome.

5. The EU/Africa Security Relationship

Since the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the European Union has sought to develop a common security policy, including the creation of EU battlegroups for rapid deployment in crises outside Europe at the request of the United Nations.

The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 recognises the interdependence between security and development. Article 8 of the agreement provides for political dialogue, which has helped efforts to resolve crises in Togo, Guinea, and Niger. However, while the 28-member EU is currently the world’s largest aid donor, and provided an estimated €55.1 billion in official development assistance in 2012, it lacks the capacity to play an effective military role in the promotion of peace and security in Africa, and its interventions on the continent have been small and limited, and achieved mixed results. For example, instability remains in the DRC and Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) despite small EU interventions in 2003 and 2006; and 2008/2009 respectively. The delivery of EU programmes to support reconstruction efforts in the DRC has also been impeded by bureaucratic rivalry between the European Commission and the European Council as well as inadequate resources – the EU mission in the eastern Congo was staffed by inexperienced personnel who often lacked sufficient local knowledge.

The EU’s security role in Africa should further be assessed in the historical context of a century of colonialism by the major European powers, which left a profound distrust and suspicion in Africa of European efforts to intervene in the continent’s affairs. Of Europe’s three major military powers (France, Britain, and Germany), Germany - along with the Nordic countries - has been the most cautious about the EU funding military missions in Africa, due in part to its reluctance to project military power after its defeat in 1945 and pacifist post-war constitution. In March 2011, Berlin, as an elected member of the UN Security Council, not only abstained on Resolution 1973 authorising the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led intervention in Libya, but also refused to participate in it. Since 1956, when Britain and France failed in their bid to annex the Suez Canal and reverse its nationalisation by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, London largely avoided intervening militarily on the continent, until its short-term, 800-strong intervention in Sierra Leone to support a crumbling UN mission in 2000. France, on the other hand, has actively pursued its parochial interests in Africa, and by 2013, had launched over 50 military interventions into Africa, supporting autocratic regimes in the DRC, Gabon, Togo, and the Central African Republic. Paris trained and armed the Hutu-led militias before the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which 800,000 people were killed, and according to critics, the subsequent French peacekeeping mission

- Operation Turquoise – helped perpetrators of the genocide to escape into the eastern Congo. Since then, however, France has sought multilateral UN and EU cover for its interventions in Africa, including in the DRC in 2003 and 2006, and Chad/Central African Republic between 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, both Paris and London have used their permanent membership of the UN Security Council to leverage control and influence over peacekeeping operations in African countries of strategic interest to them. Both countries draft all the UN Security Council resolutions for 11 of the 18 cases concerning Africa on the organ’s agenda in November 2013.40

The EU’s armed interventions into the DRC and in Chad/Central African Republic contributed to some improvement of the security situation on the ground, but also revealed weak institutional coordination both within the EU, and between European and UN forces. Intra-European disagreements – in particular, between France, Germany, and Britain – delayed the deployment of a European Union Force (EUFOR), in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) ahead of national polls. The EU mission only arrived in July 2006 (a scant two weeks before the first round of presidential elections), even though it had been mandated by the UN Security Council in December 2005. Later, in 2008, the EU was unable to reach consensus on a request by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, to deploy a bridging force in the eastern Congo until the arrival of UN peacekeepers. Meanwhile, the UN-mandated EU Force in Chad/CAR was the European Union’s most difficult mission logistically. Although 19 EU countries contributed troops to EUFOR in Chad/CAR, EU battlegroups were not deployed. Instead, France provided 2,000 out of the 3,700 EUFOR troops and bore most of the financial costs of the €150 million mission. Furthermore, cooperation between EUFOR Chad/CAR and the UN mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) was difficult, and critics regarded the European intervention primarily as a vehicle for promoting parochial French interests in the region, where security conditions – particularly in eastern Chad – worsened after the force’s departure.

The EU played a supporting peacemaking role in Sudan, where it assisted the efforts of the UN, the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the US, and Norway in the peace process that led to South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. However, Brussels must enhance its understanding of the complexity of peacemaking theatres in Africa, and should be prepared to defer not only to the UN, but also to African actors such as the AU and sub-regional organisations such as SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and IGAD. In addition to the backing that it provides to the AU, the EU should provide greater support to these sub-regional bodies, which often have a more comprehensive understanding of problems in their own neighbourhoods, and, in the case of ECOWAS, greater experience in peacekeeping than the AU and the EU. Between 2004 and 2013, Brussels – through the African Peace Facility – provided more than €1.1 billion for early response, capacity-building, and peace support operations in Africa, including to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).41 However, Brussels should improve the timely disbursement of resources for peacekeeping missions in Africa, especially after troops have been deployed, in order to improve outcomes on the ground. In the longer term, France, Britain, and other EU members must continue to support efforts to reform and democratise the UN Security Council to ensure stronger African representation. About

40 In 2013, France was the penholder on Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali, as well as the Central Africa Region and the Great Lakes Region. Britain was the penholder on Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Darfur. The US was the penholder on Liberia, Ahyei, South Sudan, and the Western Sahara. Togo was the penholder on Guinea-Bissau and West Africa, and Rwanda was the penholder on Peace and Security in Africa. See Security Council Report, “February 2013 Monthly Forecast”, Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Pen Holders for 2013, website page posted 31 January 2013 (accessed at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-02/subsidiary_chairs_and_pen_holders_for_2013.php).

75 percent of the UN’s peacekeepers were deployed in Africa in 2013, while 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations are focused on the continent. Yet, Africa remains one of only two regions in the world (the other being Latin America) without permanent representation with veto power on the world body’s most powerful organ.

In 2013, non-Africans headed five out of eight peacekeeping operations in Africa in Mali, the DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara. Greater African leadership and ownership of the continent’s peace and security challenges must be promoted. Hybrid peacekeeping missions, modelled on the 20,000-strong AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and under African leadership, should be encouraged on the continent in a genuine spirit of partnership. However, powerful members of the UN’s Security Council and its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are hostile to such missions. In December 2008, a report by a joint AU/UN panel, chaired by former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, recommended the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to support the continental organisation’s peacekeeping capacity and the use of UN-assessed funding for African-led interventions for up to six months, with the world body then asked to take over such missions. The EU should support the Prodi Report recommendations, which are yet to be implemented, and also strengthen peacekeeping missions in Africa by deploying its troops as “blue helmets” under UN command.

In 2013, the EU, with the US and China, is expected to contribute about 55 percent of the AU’s entire budget of $278 million. In line with the Joint Africa/EU Strategy of 2007, Brussels has provided €550 million for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) between 2008 and 2013; this includes the AU’s Panel of the Wise; its 15-member Peace and Security Council; a continental early warning system; and an African Standby Force (ASF). However, fewer resources have been devoted to addressing the root causes of conflicts. For example, while the EU contributes 40 percent of the $1.7 billion budget of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, only $4 million of this sum has been made available for “quick-impact” development projects. There is an urgent need to recognise the nexus between peace and development in order to consolidate stability and peace in post-conflict societies, and to avoid a relapse into violence. EU members, Britain and France, can help to promote consensus among the UN Security Council’s permanent five (P-5) veto-wielding members – the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain – in order to ensure a common and consistent approach towards security issues in Africa.

The EU has also provided support for security sector reform (SSR) efforts in the DRC as well as in Guinea-Bissau. However, these EU missions have lacked adequate capacity and resources, and faced criticism for poor coordination with the UN and bilateral donors. In November 2009, for example, the EU police mission in the DRC (EUPOL DRC) – mandated to support the restructuring of the Congolese police force – had a staff of only 32, covering a country the size of Western Europe. The EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC) deployed in the DRC since June 2005 to assist international efforts to integrate reformed former rebels into the Congolese army, was unable to coordinate international donors on the ground effectively, and often competed, rather than cooperated, with the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC. However, there was also a lack of political will by

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the Congolese government to tackle corruption and to coordinate its efforts with international partners. Meanwhile, the EU security sector programme in Guinea-Bissau between June 2008 and September 2010, tasked to help reduce the size of the country’s army, had only 27 advisors with a budget of €6 million. It was closed shortly after an army mutiny in April 2010, raising serious questions over the genuine nature of Europe’s commitment to resolving issues on the ground. Similarly, the EU’s anti-piracy naval mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia – ”Operation Atalanta”, focused solely on piracy attacks off the Somali coast without addressing the root causes of the crisis: the peacebuilding and state-building challenges in Somalia.
6. Comparative Regional Integration: Caribbean and Pacific Perspectives

The Caribbean Region

For the Caribbean, the trade aspect of the Lomé Treaty of 1975 was initially more important than aid flows in fostering economic development, because of the region’s higher per capita income compared with the rest of the ACP Group. However, although the non-reciprocal preferential access to European markets embodied in Lomé – in particular the protocols for sugar, bananas, rum, and rice – generated important revenue, they failed to promote significant expansion and diversification of exports from the Caribbean. The Caribbean share of the EU’s total imports, in fact, dropped from 0.5 percent to 0.3 percent from 1976 to 1992. Aid flows assumed greater importance in the 1980s when Caribbean countries experienced economic difficulties. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, the political leverage exerted by the global South, including by Caribbean states, weakened. Neo-liberal economic concerns such as reciprocal market access, which had increasingly featured in international trade negotiations following the establishment of the WTO in 1995, framed the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. For the Caribbean countries, the post-Cold War and post-WTO period has been marked by a series of disappointments with the EU, highlighted by the effective dismantling – through a series of WTO rulings – of European trade preferences for ACP bananas, which had a devastating impact on the economies of island states such as St Lucia which depended on exports of this fruit.

The ACP as a bloc lacked the bargaining power to counter the new emphasis on trade liberalisation as a mechanism to deliver development which had been promoted by a strengthened trade office at the European Union. This office was authorised to negotiate on behalf of the whole bloc after the European Economic Community was transformed into the EU in 1993. A neo-liberal economic approach dominated post-Cotonou negotiations of a regional EPA for the Caribbean at the expense of supply-side and broader development issues. The Caribbean EPA of 2008 encompassed investment, competition, government procurement, services, information technology, and copyright issues that went beyond WTO compatibility. The talks were further damaged by inadequate awareness of their scope; insufficient engagement with private-sector parties and civil society; and fears of repercussions unless an agreement was reached quickly. In addition, Caribbean concerns about losing revenues through tariff reductions and the need to protect the tourism sector, were ignored by Brussels. The limited inclusion of the private sector in talks created subsequent problems – for example, in Trinidad and Tobago, at least 600 jobs were lost as a result of the new trade terms agreed by the government in Port of Spain, according to local companies. Greater public education on the EPAs and their impacts is thus urgently needed to ensure proper civil society and private sector participation in the negotiation of these instruments.

Although the EPAs were promoted by the EU as a way to foster regional integration efforts among ACP members, those negotiated for the Caribbean, to an extent, supplanted the efforts made by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) under the 2006 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas to create a single market and greater integration, and imposed a regional model to which the Community’s members had not agreed. The EU deal is not with CARICOM itself, but with its 14 individual members and the Dominican Republic, which

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form a loose-knit alliance dubbed CARIFORUM. This forum, unlike CARICOM, has no juridical basis – thus further weakening the Caribbean side’s bargaining position. In signing the EPAs, national governments gave up their right to discriminate in favour of local firms in return for non-binding promises of private investment and development assistance, thus exacerbating the asymmetry in the power relations between the parties to these agreements. CARIFORUM’s role in representing regional interests is further restricted by its lack of ties with other neighbouring governments and regional bodies. In contrast, CARICOM has maintained a bilateral relationship with Cuba since 1976 – which has shaped its policy on the sugar trade – as well as multilateral ties across Latin America.

The EPA in the Caribbean has also been dogged by delays in establishing the governance structure for its implementation – which have impeded accountability to local private sector and civil society actors – as well as the high financial burden of the administrative machinery itself. These bureaucratic costs are deducted directly from the allocated EDF financing for the Cotonou framework, thus representing a corresponding reduction in the funds available for development cooperation. The Caribbean needs therefore to forge its own regional development agenda as a matter of urgency, and to adopt a proactive rather than reactive posture in relation to its regional EPA. For example, representation from the Caribbean led the European Commission to accept revisions sought by Guyana, before it signed the regional EPA in October 2008. CARICOM summit decisions are often not implemented, underlying the need for the creation of more effective strategies to support regional integration and development, including the promotion of mechanisms such as supranational legislation to support implementation of regionally-agreed decisions at the national level. The recommendations of CARICOM’s Technical Working Group on Governance, proposed in 2007, should be swiftly implemented in order to promote a joint Caribbean strategy that moves beyond being a mere tariff-reduction exercise to enhancing productivity and the development of services within member countries. CARICOM should also consider strengthening its relations with Haiti, and improve regional coordination of policing and security initiatives, as recommended in the 2007 working group report.

The Pacific Region

The costs of addressing the lack of national capacity among the small, least developed island states of the Pacific and their fragmented geography – including the great distances between them and their diseconomies of scale and isolation – have not been properly taken into account in assessing the region’s development needs. These challenges have also hampered regional integration efforts, which have been generally limited to reducing trade barriers among the islands and some attempts to create shared services. These initiatives have delivered insufficient benefits to justify their high costs. Furthermore, the dominance of the wealthy economies of Australia and New Zealand has often distorted region-building efforts in the Pacific. To counter the continued overbearing role of the US after the decolonisation of the Pacific from 1962, the newly independent countries formed their own association and then extended an invitation to Melbourne and Wellington to join. However, the late inclusion of the two rich countries in the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) in 1971 magnified the existing socio-economic inequalities and political divisions among the Pacific island states. The subsequent non-reciprocal trade regime established by the South Pacific Regional Trade Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) in 1981 produced mixed benefits and failed to develop trade in the region.

45 The 14 ACP members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are: Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; St Kitts and Nevis; St Lucia; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; and Trinidad and Tobago. Montserrat, a British overseas territory, is also a member of CARICOM.


47 The body was originally established as the South Pacific Forum in 1971, changing its name to the Pacific Island Forum in 2000 to reflect the geographic location of its members better.
In 2001, the 14 Forum Island Countries (FIC)\(^48\) in the PIF signed a Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) that excluded Australia and New Zealand, although this deal has not been implemented due to national capacity constraints. A new economic partnership agreement among all the members of the Pacific Island Forum – the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) – was also signed that year. Melbourne and Wellington financed PACER’s efforts to facilitate greater intra-regional trade, with supplementary funding provided by the EU’s regional indicative programme. Controversially, and under pressure from Australia and New Zealand, market access arrangements proposed under EPA negotiations with Europe have triggered clauses in PACER to start talks on a free trade area among the countries of the Pacific Island Forum. However, these PACER Plus negotiations have been impeded by differences between the Forum Island Countries on one side, and Australia and New Zealand on the other, over their divergent definitions of development. Talks have also been complicated by unhappiness among the smaller Pacific islands at being pressured into reaching agreement before having concluded their national consultations on the issues involved.

Differences over what is meant by “development” have also dogged relations between the Pacific Islands group in the ACP and the European Union. In the almost 40 years since Lomé I was signed in 1975, the relationship with the EU has failed to advance regional integration efforts in the Pacific significantly. Although European funding was provided to support the extension of regional shipping and air services, this took the form of capitalisation rather than subsidies. As a result, the Pacific Forum Line had to limit itself to a few key shipping routes, while the transformation of Fiji’s Air Pacific into a regional airline stalled due to its equity structure, and it remained solely a national carrier. After Economic Partnership Agreements were introduced under Cotonou in 2000, talks were hampered by the selective application of multilateral commitments – some of which represented WTO obligations, while others went further – by European Commission negotiators. In addition, despite the promotion of the EPAs as measures to enhance regional integration efforts, the EU refused to adopt a regional approach, preferring bilateral deals on some key issues such as fisheries, on which the Pacific countries have a comparative advantage. Brussels also blocked talks on migration, although this issue constitutes part of the trade in services envisaged by the EPAs. Given the limited technical support available to the Pacific side, and as the political will needed to continue the talks has flagged, it may be advisable for negotiators to adopt a pragmatic approach in order to bring the process to a conclusion. The Pacific region in the ACP should opt for a policy of “damage control” in relation to EPAs: countries can either join Fiji and Papua New Guinea in the interim EPA or take up one of the alternative trading arrangements offered by the EU, such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), GSP+, or Everything But Arms, although they should be offered compensatory funding in such cases.

Meanwhile, efforts have increased to reconfigure Pacific regionalism from dependence on Australia and New Zealand, which have played a dominant role. These include the creation of a Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) in 2012, which aims to incorporate all the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) recognised by the United Nations, thus strengthening links with the world body. Regional integration in the Pacific is also being promoted through efforts to strengthen sub-regional groupings including the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

\(^{48}\) The 14 Forum Island Countries are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

\(^{49}\) MSG comprises Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji.
(MSG), the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), the Micronesia group, and the Small Island States (SIS). In addition, 13 regional initiatives have been launched in the areas of economic growth and democratic governance. The need to integrate further around non-trade issues, and the importance of leveraging the region’s comparative advantages in relation to its leading role in the “blue economy” of the Pacific have also been recognised. The stewardship by the Pacific states of the world’s largest ocean could shape future European approaches to the region’s development, and promote better-targeted financing from the European Development Fund for projects in the areas of sea-bed mining, climate change, and global food and energy security.

Region-building Lessons

The commonalities of experience between the Caribbean and the Pacific regions in their efforts to reverse the EU’s promotion of market-access arrangements at the expense of their development concerns should be examined more closely. Lessons can also be learned from the EU’s own 2011 report produced by former Spanish finance and agriculture minister, Pedro Solbes Mira, on how best to integrate its “outermost” regions into a single market. This study identified the comparative advantages of Europe’s outer regions and how to compensate for their structural disadvantages by promoting them as “gateways” to Europe. In particular, the report considered the training, communications, humanitarian, and risk prevention approaches required to accomplish such integration. Inter-regional coordination mechanisms between the ACP’s six EPA regions need to be made more robust. Better planning that forges effective links between technical and political issues is also urgently required to support the negotiating position of the Group’s members and their promotion of regional perspectives in trade talks. In this regard, the work of the ACP’s Inter-Regional Organisations Coordination Committee (IROCC) should be better supported by member states to ensure the effective sharing of experiences and learning of lessons. The body, which was established to help states and regions to source and spend aid effectively, should strengthen its research capacity to provide informed advice and policy recommendations on key issues such as infant industry protection, and the implications of existing and new trade deals being promoted by Brussels (for example, on sugar). All parties in EPA processes should also pay greater attention to how these agreements can be reviewed to support regional integration efforts, with a particular view to aligning security and development efforts more closely.

50 PLG comprises the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, American Samoa, French Polynesia, and Tokelau.
51 Micronesia comprises the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau.
52 SIS comprises the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu.
7. Geo-Politics and Migration

The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa group

The rise of China, Brazil, and India, and their voracious appetite for raw materials has led to increased investment and trade with the ACP, challenging the primacy of American and European economic ties with the developing world. In 2012, the BRICS bloc accounted for more than 40 percent of the world’s population and about 25 percent of its GDP, with China having become the world’s second largest economy after the US. By 2040-2050, Brazil, Russia, India, and China’s combined share of world GDP could match that of the original Group of Seven (G-7) countries (the US, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Canada). Meanwhile, the “rising powers” of the South are also helping to drive growth in the world’s poorest countries, the vast majority of which are in the ACP.

Of the five BRICS countries, China is the dominant player in Africa, and in 2011, surpassed the US to become the continent’s leading bilateral trade partner. The BRICS’ countries total share of merchandise exports from Africa almost doubled from about 10 percent to 24 percent between 2000 and 2011, rising from $11.4 billion to $117.6 billion. This growing interest in Africa is reflected in the summit diplomacy of the emerging economies, which has started institutionalising their ties with the continent. Since its inception in Beijing, China, in October 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has convened every three years, with the fifth and most recent conference held in Beijing in July 2012. India has followed suit: New Delhi hosted the first India-Africa Forum summit meeting in April 2008, and the mechanism was institutionalised as a triennial process at the second meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2011. Although these burgeoning South-South partnerships are mainly driven by economic and commercial imperatives, they also have political and geo-strategic aspects, with India, Brazil, and South Africa seeking support from the ACP countries for their respective bids for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

The ACP needs to formulate an effective strategy on access to, and the development of, its raw materials by old and new trading partners. At the rhetorical level, the BRICS countries have tried to distinguish themselves from former colonial powers in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions by evoking the spirit of past South-South solidarity and by emphasising principles such as equality, independence, and partnership in their engagements. China and India, for example, have had close ties with the continent since the Asian-African Bandung Conference of 1955, and have played leading roles in the Non-Aligned Movement, which was created six years later. However, since the end of the Cold War by 1990, this engagement has been increasingly guided by economic rather than ideological concerns, in particular, the emerging economies’ strategic need for oil, minerals, and grain, which created a commodities boom for Africa. Although six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world were in Africa between 2001 and 2010, the continent’s patterns of trade have changed little. Both China and India, in particular, are resource-hungry giants. China, for example, is already the world’s largest energy consumer, while India and Brazil’s energy consumption is expected to grow even faster. About 90 percent of Africa’s exports to non-African developing countries consist of primary products – compared with 92 percent of exports to the US and 75 percent to the EU. The failure of the new BRICS commercial partners to transfer technology in support of economic diversification in Africa has also been criticised. Differences between the economic strategies of the

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BRICS members – particularly between Beijing’s statist focus on extractive industries and infrastructure, and New Delhi’s more commercially-driven, private sector-led approach – could be leveraged by the ACP to enhance the development content of new trade deals. Furthermore, the ACP’s relationship with the newly emerging economies of the South does not have to be established at the expense of its traditional ties with the EU. A key challenge for the ACP Group will be how to form new partnerships with the BRICS countries without alienating Brussels, which remains the world’s largest donor of official development assistance.

The onus remains on the ACP to establish consensus among its 79 members to craft a strategy of engagement with the BRICS countries which offers an opportunity for them to gain greater clout in international decision-making structures. South Africa, as a member of both the ACP and the BRICS blocs, as well as the Group of 20 (G-20), occupies an important bridging position. However, the ability of the ACP to leverage South Africa’s overlapping memberships will depend in large part on the capacity and willingness of Africa’s largest economy to be able to play such a role. The lack of cohesion within the BRICS – a relatively new political grouping that held its first summit only in 2009 – is an additional challenge for the ACP. Considerable doubts remain about whether the bloc can develop from a loose and informal alliance into an agenda-setting actor with a unified approach to critical issues. However, the agreement to establish a BRICS development bank at the Durban Summit in March 2013 indicates a concrete interest in lending institutional significance to this agenda, at least in the economic sphere. Nevertheless, even if the BRICS can come together as a collective agency, the body will continue to lack an institutional structure with which external actors can engage in the short- to medium-term. Critics have also argued that the divergent interests of the BRICS members within the context of a neo-liberal global economic order may detract from the bloc’s unity, and that the group must provide moral content to its formation if its members are to stay together.

Migration

The terms of the global debate on migration have shifted from regarding the phenomenon as a security threat to perceiving it as a development lever. Previously, the issue had been overlooked in the Millennium Development Goals launched by the UN in 2000. Attempts by the world body to organise an international conference on migration and development between 1994 and 1999 were shunned by most governments. Even cooperation between individual states on issues of international migration remained difficult, with many rich countries continuing to argue that their territorial sovereignty would be threatened by unmanaged migration, while countries in the South fear their socio-economic development potentially being undermined by a crippling “brain drain” to the North.

Despite these concerns, several bilateral, intra-regional, and inter-regional agreements have subsequently been reached on international migration, particularly following the establishment of a High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in the UN General Assembly in 2003-2004, and the subsequent appointment of a UN-backed Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005. In 2007, the first annual meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) met in Brussels. This state-led voluntary consultative process operates outside the UN system but is closely linked to the world body and is supported by the Global Migration Group (GMG), which comprises the major UN agencies. In 2010, the group issued recommendations for states on how to mainstream migration into their development planning. Cooperation has also grown on the issue within and between regional blocs of states. Thirteen Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) have been agreed. Although these RCPs initially focused on inter-state cooperation for migration control, they have recently become more development-oriented and have increasingly promoted
dialogue on international migration among blocs of states. In 2006, the African Union and the European Union issued a joint declaration on migration and development, which led to the creation of the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME). However, Brussels has not yet concluded similarly wide-ranging migration partnerships with the Caribbean or Pacific regions in the ACP.

The global reframing of international migration as a development issue over the past decade has provided states with a common language and the appearance of complementary interests. This new debate highlights the role of migration in redressing the poverty that can cause this phenomenon; the huge remittances that migrants can return to their countries of origin, which could reach $550 billion in 2013, and the critical role that diasporas can play in developing their countries of origin. The migration-as-development-lever approach also seeks to promote cooperation on circular migration for work, which enables temporary labour market needs in the EU to be met, while migrant workers can earn money and develop skills. Relations between the ACP and Europe are complex, as countries can be sending, receiving, or acting as transit countries for migrants. Sometimes, there is a combination of all three phenomena at play.

Furthermore, recent migration policies emphasise the development benefits of greater intra-regional freedom of movement, particularly within the global South. A total of 23 million migrants from the ACP live outside their own countries. Of these, 63 percent are resident in the South, although the relative importance of South-South migration varies widely within the ACP. Such movement accounts for 78 percent of all migration for Africans, but only 24 percent and 16 percent for those living in the Pacific and Caribbean regions respectively. In Africa, 90 percent of South-South migration is intra-regional. Furthermore, those migrating from ACP countries to Europe constitute a relatively small percentage of total migrants from the Group: only about 3.5 million, or 15 percent, have moved to the EU, compared to more than 19.5 million who have gone to live elsewhere, including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as countries within the ACP.

Nevertheless, for ACP states, access to European labour markets is not only critical to the nationals who seek entry, but also to family members at home and even to the budgets of countries of origin. It is estimated that remittances play an increasingly significant role in the GDP of ACP members, and hence to their development. According to the World Bank, remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries – expected to reach $414 billion by 2013 (up 6.3 percent over 2012) – are three times the size of official development assistance. Despite the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, which dampened international migration flows, it is estimated that such remittances will exceed $593 billion by 2014, of which $441 billion will flow to developing countries. The African Union has recognised the critical role that migrant communities play in their countries of origin, branding the African Diaspora as the continent’s “sixth region”.

However, the EU has tended to treat migration as a security issue, often complaining about the “threat” that it poses, while ACP governments have advocated focusing on the root causes of migration as these relate to issues of aid, trade, development, and human rights. These different perspectives have informed the debate.

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59 The World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 21.
60 See Andrew Geddes, ‘Migration and “Fortress Europe”’, in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa, pp. 405-418.
over Article 13 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which specifies that "the issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership." In 2008, the ACP issued a Resolution on Migration and Development which explicitly focused on the development role of international movements of people. The Group has established a migration facility and observatory near its Secretariat in Brussels to develop policy and research capacity on this issue. Since its public launch in October 2010, the ACP Observatory on Migration – funded by the EU, with financial support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UN Population Fund, and the government of Switzerland – has become a key resource for information and research on South-South mobility. The EU has also recognised the benefits of a development-oriented approach. Its Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 2011 acknowledges the beneficial impacts of migration and offers support to ACP initiatives on South-South migration as part of its “aid package” to the Group. In addition, by encouraging greater intra- and inter-regional migration within the global South, the EU is addressing the underlying economic causes for the international movement of people, facilitating alternative opportunities for migrants, and thus reducing migration pressure on Europe.

However, despite the acknowledged benefits of international migration, national interests still often trump those of blocs of states in seeking to control flows of migrants. For example, SADC’s 2005 Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons remains voluntary in its application and remains largely unratified. Furthermore, the racist and xenophobic treatment of migrants worldwide raises important questions of human rights that are often not properly addressed by national governments and regional institutions.

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8. Postscript

Since the CCR October 2012 seminar, the ACP has continued its efforts to reflect critically on the future of the Group, as well as its partnership with the EU, beyond 2020. The Seventh Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government was held on 13 and 14 December 2012, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, under the theme “The Future of the ACP Group in a Changing World: Challenges and Opportunities”.

The Sipopo Declaration, adopted at the Malabo summit in December 2012, reiterated the imperative to shape a more dynamic, innovative and cohesive ACP Group by which to engage the European Union in the 3rd 5-Year review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2015; and to transform the organisation fundamentally in order both to remain relevant for its members as well as to sustain itself as an influential actor on the global stage. Member states recognised the urgent need to strengthen intra-ACP development cooperation; diversify South-South partnerships; and address key issues including climate change, food security, rural development, and energy sustainability in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions. The Declaration also urged the EU to maintain the EDF outside the regular EU budget and to refrain from taking unilateral measures, while expressing concern about Brussels’ new development policy and the prospect of differentiation in the allocation of resources.62

At the Malabo Summit in December 2012, ACP leaders further recommended the establishment of a high-level panel, comprising heads of state and government drawn from the African Union, CARIFORUM, and the Pacific ACP states, as well as high-level EU representatives, and assisted by seven regional EPA experts. This panel was mandated to lend political impetus to negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements. However, these negotiations remained fraught throughout 2013. The EU effectively imposed a deadline of October 2014 for the conclusion of the regional processes by demanding that ACP countries that have signed interim EPAs implement the accords or risk losing their preferential access to the EU market. In June 2013, the ACP Council of Ministers was still calling for Brussels to accede to the creation of the proposed high-level panel on EPAs; as well as to the provision of mitigation measures; additional financial resources to cover EPA-related costs; greater flexibility on all outstanding contentious issues; and the exclusion of new issues unrelated to trade in the EPA negotiations.63

With concern unabated that the EU may no longer regard the ACP Group as a strategic priority, in March 2013, the ACP launched an Eminent Persons Group to review its prospects; to guide its future strategic direction beyond 2015; and to provide concrete recommendations to strengthen the organisation. The 12-member EPG, with a mandate until December 2014, is chaired by Nigeria’s former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and comprises high-level representatives from three ACP regions: the Dominican Republic’s former president, Leonel Fernández Reyna; Guyana’s former president, Bharrat Jagdeo; and Fiji’s former foreign affairs minister, Kaliopate Tavola. In October 2013, the group held its first stakeholders meeting in a series of six regional consultations involving government officials, parliamentarians, and civil society actors, as well as the private sector, in Apia, Samoa, to seek the region’s perspectives on the future purpose and practices of the ACP as an organisation, as well as to help define the regional consensus on the benefits for, and

63 “Resolution on Economic Partnership Agreements and Other Trade Matters”, adopted at the 97th session of the ACP Council of Ministers, held in Brussels, 1-5 June 2013 (available at http://www.acp.int/).
contributions of the Pacific within the ACP Group. The Pacific conference emphasised that its region-specific challenges – such as those related to climate change, fisheries, and natural resource development – must be addressed in any repositioning of the group, while recommending that the future ACP ought to be a more independent actor with multiple partners including the EU.\textsuperscript{64}

With negotiations for the third and final mid-term review of the Cotonou Agreement expected to start in February 2014, a similar process of reflection is under way on the European side involving the EU Commission and its External Action Service.\textsuperscript{64} However, it is increasingly unlikely that a 2015 review of Cotonou will take place as provided for, given forthcoming EU Parliamentary elections in May 2014 and the appointment of a new European Commission in January 2015, for which lobbying has already begun by EU political parties and member states. These preoccupations will hardly be conducive to the exchange of ‘negotiating memoranda’ by February 2014 and the launch of a serious process. The parties to Cotonou may instead seek to meet by 2017 to examine a Post-2020 ‘engagement’.

\textsuperscript{64} ‘Multifana Conclusion and Recommendations’, Pacific Conference on the Future Perspectives for the ACP Group beyond 2020, Apia Samoa, 17-19 October 2013 (available at http://www.epg.acp.int/).

\textsuperscript{65} See Geert Laporte and Gemma Piñol Puig, Re-inventing Pacific-EU Relations: With or Without the ACP? Briefing Note 56, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, October 2013 (available at http://www.ecdpm.org/).
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town seminar:

1. South-South and triangular cooperation could enable the promotion of development and trade relationships based on comparative advantages. The ACP should leverage South Africa's inclusion in the BRICS to connect to emerging patterns of trade and financial flows – although, given the BRICS' lack of an institutional framework and the lack of cohesion among its members, the onus rests with the ACP to develop and implement a strategy of engagement with the bloc;

2. The profile of ACP reform efforts can be enhanced by linking them to implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals and the aspirations of the 2012 Rio+20 sustainable development agenda. The discussions about the ACP's future should be deepened by fully engaging the private sector, civil society, and academia in all its regions;

3. The ACP should be using more think-tanks and experts from its own countries to generate new knowledge and policies. The Group should leverage its role as a centre of knowledge to inform EU strategies and support member states that have performed relatively well economically and can promote regional development;

4. ACP members must share best practices and lessons from the EPA negotiations. The most beneficial provisions agreed in talks in one region may be adopted by other ACP regions. Lessons from the complex and extensive TDCA between South Africa and the EU could also inform such negotiations;

5. Clear agendas and integrated plans need to be developed and led by strong ACP regional leaders and national champions in order to achieve fairer EPAs. Greater solidarity should be fostered among the Group's governments, and they must pay their dues regularly to offset the body's dependence on the EU;

6. The work of the ACP's Inter-Regional Organisations Coordination Committee needs to be better supported by member states to ensure the effective sharing of experiences and lessons learned. In addition, greater public education on the EPAs and their impacts is needed to ensure proper civil society and private sector participation in the negotiation of these instruments;

7. All parties in EPA processes should pay greater attention to how these can be reviewed to support regional integration efforts. In the Caribbean, CARICOM summit decisions are often not implemented, underlining the need for the creation of more effective strategies to support regional integration and development. The Pacific region should opt for a policy of 'damage control' in relation to EPAs: countries can either join Fiji and Papua New Guinea in the interim EPA or take up one of the alternative trading arrangements offered by the EU, although they should be offered compensatory funding in such cases as necessary;
8. The €57.5 billion of annual EU subsidies to European farmers restricts the market for African agricultural products, and Brussels should consider making compensatory payments to Africa accordingly. Pending final agreement at the WTO on free trade issues, which may take a long time to reach, the EU should look at abandoning all export subsidies as a condition for finalising EPAs;

9. The EU’s security efforts in Africa are more effective when it plays a supporting role to African actors, such as the AU and sub-regional organisations, as well as the UN. The EU should strengthen UN peacekeeping missions in Africa by participating directly in these under the world body’s command. Hybrid peacekeeping missions, modelled on UNAMID and under African leadership, should also be supported; and

10. The ACP needs to prepare comprehensive positions on peace and security, and engage the EU increasingly on these and related issues of governance through political dialogue. The Group should also engage on these concerns multilaterally - raising its profile at the UN in New York and Geneva, including at the Group of 77, and at key global conferences.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One: Monday, 29 October 2012

09.00-09.30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

09.30-11.00 Session I: The Past, Present, and Future of the ACP/EU Relationship

Chair: Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the African Union (AU)/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

Speakers: Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Secretary-General, The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group, Brussels, Belgium

“The ACP/EU Relationship: Problems, Progress, and Prospects”

Ambassador Patrick Gomes, Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union (EU), Brussels

“The ACP Ambassadorial Working Group on Future Perspectives of the ACP Group”

11.00-11.15 Coffee Break

11:15-12:45 Session II: The ACP/EU Historical and Trade Relationship

Chair: Ambassador Shirley Skerritt-Andrew, Head of Mission, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States and Missions to the European Union, Brussels

Speakers: Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Senior Information Official, European Commission

“A History of the ACP/EU Relationship”
Dr Garth le Pere, Senior Partner at DAJO Associates, Midrand, and Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria, South Africa

‘The ACP/EU Trade Relationship’

12.45-13.45 Lunch

13.45-15.15 Session III: The EU and Africa: Trade and Regional Integration

Chair: Dr Elisabeth Pape, Coordinator for Inter-Institutional Relations, Development and Cooperation Directorate, European Commission, Brussels

Speakers: Professor Peter Katjavivi, former Ambassador of Namibia to the European Union

‘The EPAs: An African Perspective’

Dr John Akokpari, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Cape Town

‘The EU and Africa: The Political Economy of Asymmetric Partnership’

15.15-15.30 Coffee Break

15.30-17.00 Session IV: South Africa, the ACP, and the EU

Chair: Mr Carlos Iglesias Puente, Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Brazil, Tshwane, South Africa

Speaker: Mr Xavier Carim, Deputy Director-General, International Trade and Economic Development Division, Department of Trade and Industry, Tshwane

‘South Africa, the ACP, and the EU’

Discussant: Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa, Tshwane
18.00-19.45 Public Dialogue to Launch the Book: *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman

Chair: Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Secretary-General, The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group, Brussels

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Senior Information Official, European Commission

Discussant: Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa, Tshwane

Day Two: Tuesday, 30 October 2012

09.15-10.45 Session V: The EU/Africa Strategic and Security Relationship

Chair: Dr Obadiah Mailafia, Chef de Cabinet, The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group, Brussels

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

“The EU/Africa Security Relationship”

Ambassador Torben Brylle, former European Union Special Representative for Sudan

“The EU’s Peacemaking Role in Sudan”

10.45-11.00 Coffee Break

11.00-12.30 Session VI: Comparative Regional Integration: Caribbean and Pacific Perspectives

Chair: Ambassador Margaret King-Rousseau, Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago to the European Union, Brussels
Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Gomes, Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union, Brussels

Presenting a paper on behalf of Dr Norman Girvan and Dr Annita Montoute, both of the University of the West Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

“The EU and the Caribbean”

Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola, former Foreign and Trade Minister of Fiji, and former Ambassador of Fiji to Brussels

“The EU and the Pacific”

12.30-13.30 Lunch

13.30-15.00 Session VII: Geo-Politics and Migration

Chair: Ambassador Pa’o Lutero, Ambassador of Samoa to the European Union, Brussels

Speakers: Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

“The ACP; the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Group; and the EU”

Professor Jonathan Crush, Chair, Global Migration and Development, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Balsille School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada; and Honorary Professor, University of Cape Town

“EU/ACP Migration Policy”

15.00-15.30 Coffee Break
15.30-16.00 Session VIII: Policy Recommendations and Producing the Book Volume

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Mr Mark Paterson, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

16.00-16.30 Session IX: The Way Forward: Policy Impact

Chair: Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur; and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

Speakers: Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Secretary-General, The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group, Brussels

Ambassador Patrick Gomes, Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union, Brussels
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo  
   Executive Director  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)  
   Cape Town, South Africa

2. Dr John Akokpari  
   Senior Lecturer  
   Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town  
   Cape Town, South Africa

3. Ambassador Torben Brylle  
   Former European Union (EU)  
   Special Representative for Sudan

4. Mr Xavier Carim  
   Deputy Director-General for International Trade and Economic Development  
   Department of Trade and Industry  
   Tshwane, South Africa

5. Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas  
   Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group  
   Brussels, Belgium

6. Mr Alexey Chitikov  
   Vice-Consul  
   Consulate-General of the Russian Federation  
   Cape Town, South Africa

7. Professor Jonathan Crush  
   Chair of Global Migration and Development Centre for International Governance Innovation, Balsille School of International Affairs  
   Waterloo, Canada

8. Professor Ibrahim Gambari  
   Former Joint Special Representative  
   African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

9. Ms Aseghedech Ghirmazion  
   Former Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation  
   Nairobi, Kenya

10. Ambassador Patrick Gomes  
    Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union  
    Brussels, Belgium

11. Ms Ethel Hamman  
    Partner  
    Horwath Zeller Karro Chartered Accountants  
    Cape Town, South Africa

12. Professor Peter Katjavivi  
    Former Ambassador of Namibia to the European Union

13. Ambassador Margaret King-Rousseau  
    Head of Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the European Union  
    Brussels, Belgium

14. Dr Garth le Pere  
    Extraordinary Professor of Political Science  
    University of Pretoria  
    South Africa

15. Dr Fatumanava Pa’olelei Luteru  
    Ambassador of Samoa to the European Union  
    Brussels, Belgium
16. Dr Obadiah Mailafia
  Chef de Cabinet of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group
  Brussels, Belgium

17. Honourable Buti Manamela
  Member of the South African Parliament
  Cape Town, South Africa

18. Mr Rui Nozes
  Counsellor
  European Union Delegation to South Africa
  Tshwane, South Africa

19. Dr Elisabeth Pape
  Coordinator for Inter-Institutional Relations Development and Cooperation
  European Commission
  Brussels, Belgium

20. Mr Mark Paterson
  Senior Project Officer
  Centre for Conflict Resolution
  Cape Town, South Africa

21. Mr Carlos Iglesias Puente
  Minister Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission
  Embassy of Brazil
  Tshwane, South Africa

22. Mr Alec Saayman
  Senior Manager: Finance
  Centre for Conflict Resolution
  Cape Town, South Africa

23. Mr Duncan Sebefelo
  Deputy Director: Europe
  South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation
  Tshwane, South Africa

24. Ambassador Shirley Skerritt-Andrew
  Head of Mission for the Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States and Missions to the European Union
  Brussels, Belgium

25. Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola
  Former Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Fiji; and former Ambassador of Fiji to Brussels, Belgium

26. Ambassador Roeland van de Geer
  Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa
  Tshwane, South Africa

27. Dr Kudrat Virk
  Senior Researcher
  Centre for Conflict Resolution
  Cape Town, South Africa

28. Mr Kaye Whiteman
  Former Senior Information Official at the European Commission
Annex III

List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AASM</td>
<td>Associated African States and Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP Group</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BLNS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CARIFORUM</td>
<td>Caribbean Forum</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EBA</td>
<td>Everything But Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund (EU)</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service (EU)</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPAs</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
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<td>EPG</td>
<td>Eminent Persons Group (ACP)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUPOL DRC</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>EU Security Sector Reform Mission (in the DRC)</td>
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<td>FIC</td>
<td>Forum Island Countries</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
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<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAMM</td>
<td>Global Approach to Migration and Mobility</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>GMG</td>
<td>Global Migration Group</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences</td>
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IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
IROCC: Inter-Regional Organisations Coordination Committee (ACP)
JAES: Joint Africa/EU Strategy
LDCs: Least developed countries
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
MINURCAT: UN Mission in the CAR and Chad
MME: Migration, Mobility, and Employment
MONUC: UN Organisation Mission in the DRC
MSG: Melanesian Spearhead Group
NAM: Non-Aligned Movement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
ODA: Official development assistance
OIF: Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
P-5: Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council
PACER: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PICTA: Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
PIDF: Pacific Islands Development Forum
PIF: Pacific Island Forum
PINA: Pacific Island News Association
PLG: Polynesian Leaders Group
PSIDS: Pacific Small Island Developing States
RCPs: Regional Consultative Processes
SACU: Southern African Customs Union
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SAPs: Structural adjustment programmes
SIS: Small Island States
SPARTECA: South Pacific Regional Trade Economic Cooperation Agreement
SSR: Security sector reform
STABEX: Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation
SYSMIN: Système de Développement du Potentiel Minier
TDCA: Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCTAD: UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP: UN Development Programme
UNECA: UN Economic Commission for Africa
UNFCCC: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNU: UN University
US: United States
WIDER: World Institute for Development Economics Research
WMD: Weapons of mass destruction
WTO: World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patrotic Front
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudelkaal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006 analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This subregional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, "ethnic cleansing" or crimes against humanity.

VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN AFRICA

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON? CHINA AND AFRICA
ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT SUPERPOWER

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO AFRO-EUROPA
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?
DEFINING AFRICA’S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and, analysed its global role.

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU), examined the AU's strategies to achieve socio-economic development; and, analysed its global role.

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region’s progress towards democracy, and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town on 13 and 14 May 2013 considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.
Notes
The 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group was established in 1975 with the aim of partnering the European Economic Community, now the 28-member European Union (EU), to promote the sustainable development of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, and to integrate them into the global economy on more equitable terms. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, convened about 30 leading policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to assess the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approaches in 2015. The seminar also sought to support the ACP Group’s institutional reform efforts and the broadening of future relations with new non-European partners such as China, Brazil, India, and Russia. Discussions focused on seven key themes: the ACP/EU historical and trade relationship; the past, present, and future of this relationship; the impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs); South Africa’s engagement with the ACP and the EU; the security dimension of the ACP/EU relationship; comparative regional integration in the Caribbean and the Pacific; and geo-politics and migration.