EISA RESEARCH REPORT No 15

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATISATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY REGION: THE WEAKEST LINK?

Khabele Matlosa

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATISATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY REGION: THE WEAKEST LINK?

BY
KHABELE MATLOSA

2005
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PREFACE

Multiparty democracy is becoming increasingly entrenched in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. A few SADC member states, including Botswana and Mauritius, boast long-enduring multiparty political systems implemented since their independence. Others have experienced a variety of mono-party systems (Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), military dictatorship (Lesotho), apartheid rule (Namibia and South Africa) or no-party dynastic regimes (Swaziland).

Since the 1990s, most SADC countries (bar Angola, the DRC and Swaziland) have undergone a phenomenal transition towards multiparty politics. Crucial as this political transition is, its exact impact on democracy remains a moot point. In both the academic and policy discourses today, a number of questions still require answers. For example:

- Has the current political transition enhanced democratic governance?
- Has the transition deepened democratic culture and practice?
- Has the transition improved the effectiveness of democratic institutions such as political parties?

EISA (formerly the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa) – under the theme ‘Consolidating democratic governance in the SADC region’ – is therefore undertaking a broad programme that attempts to answer these questions.

The first stage of the programme focused on political parties and attempted to answer whether the transition improved the effectiveness of democratic institutions, such as political parties. This component of the programme was undertaken jointly by EISA and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) between 2003 and 2004. It investigated the state of political parties in the democratisation process in the SADC region over the past decade. The main goal of the programme was to assess the role and effectiveness of political parties in the process of institutionalisation of democratic governance in each of the SADC countries. The specific objectives of the project were to:
• assess the general political and socio-economic context of each country and its possible impact on political parties;
• investigate the external regulatory and legislative environment in each country and its impact on the role and functions of political parties; and
• examine the internal functioning and structure of political parties and the impact of this on their institutional effectiveness.

There is no gainsaying that political parties play a critical role in the democratisation process. It is also incontrovertible that political parties are key to the institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy. Thus, sustainable democracy is dependent upon well-functioning and effective political parties. Each country context suggests that vibrant and robust political parties are crucial actors in articulating and aggregating diverse interests, providing visionary political leadership, recruiting and presenting candidates, and developing competing political and policy programmes upon which the electorate base their choices during elections.

Democracy is unthinkable without political parties and, conversely, political parties cannot add value to a political system under conditions of authoritarianism. Parties everywhere have the potential to be effective and accountable, but they face enormous challenges. The political context and the legal environment in which they function, as well as their systems of internal organisation, management and operation, require attention and are often in need of reform.

Although little comparative research has been conducted, it is clear that the external environment – the regulatory, financial, political and electoral spheres in which political parties grow and function – influences parties’ strategies and organisation. The external environment also has a fundamental impact on the capacity of parties to become more effective agents of democratisation.

The internal functioning of political parties determines how the social demands of different groups in society are represented in parliament. Candidates nominated for election are selected, supported and trained by their parties. In addition, parties put candidates in touch with voters and hold them accountable. In many instances, the electoral and political culture and
associated structures have allowed traditionally excluded groups – such as women, ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples and youth – to have only limited access to the political realm.

To address these issues, EISA and IDEA developed three questionnaires on: the country context; the external regulations and environment; and the internal functioning and structure of political parties. Country studies were undertaken by experts commissioned by EISA and IDEA. One of the main outputs of this project is a series of research reports, and this report forms an integral part of the series.

We extend our profound gratitude to the Swedish International Development Agency in Harare, Zimbabwe, the Royal Danish Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa and the Embassy of Finland in Pretoria, South Africa for their generous financial support, without which this programme would not have been possible.

We are also grateful to the following people who have played a crucial role at various stages of the project: Denis Kadima, EISA executive director; Abdalla Hamdok, director, IDEA Africa Regional Office; Julie Ballington, IDEA programme officer; Roger Hallhag, IDEA head, political parties; Per Nordlund, IDEA senior programme officer; Francesca Binda, IDEA, senior advisor, political parties; Claude Kabemba, EISA programme manager, research; Jackie Kalley, EISA publications officer; Grant Masterson, EISA research fellow; Sydney Letsholo, EISA research assistant; Maureen Moloi, EISA research intern; Selby Matloga, EISA research intern; and Nkgakong Mokonyane, EISA assistant programme administrator. We acknowledge the sterling effort they invested in the project.

Thanks are also due to the political party leaders who were interviewed and gave generously of their time.

Khabele Matlosa
Project coordinator and series editor
EISA
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<td><em>Alliance Sociale</em></td>
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<td>Basutoland African Congress</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td><em>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendelo</em> (Party of Democracy and Development)</td>
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<td>Congress of Democrats</td>
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<td>Conu</td>
<td>Congress for National Unity</td>
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<td>Cosatu</td>
<td>Congress for South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>Electoral management body</td>
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<td>MELS</td>
<td>Movement for Marx, Lenin, and Engels Party</td>
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<td>MFP</td>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
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<td>NADA</td>
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<td>PFD</td>
<td>Popular Front for Democracy</td>
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<td>PMSD</td>
<td>Parti Mauricien Social Democrat</td>
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<td>PPM</td>
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<td>Petra</td>
<td>People's Transformation Party</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
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<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
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<td>Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>US</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report sketches out historical and contemporary trends in respect of the internal functioning of political parties in Southern Africa. There is no doubt that political parties play a key role in the democratisation process. Furthermore, political parties are critical institutions upon which democratic governance is supposed to be anchored. It goes without saying, therefore, that if political parties are weak or suffer certain deficiencies in their operations, not only are they likely to fail to play their rightful role in the political system, but democracy itself is likely to suffer adverse repercussions.

This study investigates the internal functioning of parties in the context of the external environment within which these institutions operate. This external context includes the socio-economic and political environment of the Southern Africa states, as well as the legal and regulatory framework.

The first research question that we attempt to answer is: To what extent is internal democracy institutionalised in parties to make them agents of and champions for democracy? Taken together, the external environment and the internal organisation of parties largely make for either a disabling or enabling framework for internal party democracy. In essence this report therefore investigates the challenges facing political parties for entrenching and institutionalising intra-party democracy. We note that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region has undergone a democratic transition from the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s-80s (marked by mono-party, one-person and military regimes) towards a multiparty democratic dispensation since the early 1990s. There are, however, a few exceptions, namely Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland, which have not yet undergone the democratic transition, and Zimbabwe which seems to be experiencing democratic reversal since the last decade.

The second research question we attempt to answer is: If the majority of the SADC member states have indeed undergone a democratic transition at the national level, have the key institutions such as political parties also imbued a democratic culture and practice in respect of their internal organisation and their engagement with governance processes?
We recognise the positive trend of democratic transition at the national level of individual SADC states but suggest, however, that political parties still lag behind in terms of entrenching and institutionalising democracy within their own internal operations.

This leads to the third research question: Are political parties the weakest link within the evolving architecture of democratic governance in Southern Africa?

Intra-party democracy presents a serious challenge for political parties given their strategic position and role in the democratic governance process in the region. It should be noted that parties are basically drivers of a democratic process. If this observation is correct, then it goes without saying that drivers of a democratic project have to embrace democratic practice and culture themselves. But if the key drivers of democracy tend to be the weakest link in the process, either democratic deficits are compounded and/or democratic reversals are likely to occur.

During the era of one-party rule, the SADC region was marked by various forms of authoritarian governance both at the national level and within parties themselves. Centralisation of power was the order of the day in the running of national and party affairs. However, with the transition to multiparty democratic dispensations in the early 1990s, the political landscape of SADC member states changed quite dramatically and the governance realm began to be shaped by democratic ethos, culture and practice. Be that as it may, although at the level of the nation-state, political liberalisation paid dividends and improved the governance process, this positive trend has not sufficiently trickled down to the micro level of various key institutions such as political parties, even if the parties have improved their operations compared to the authoritarian era of yesteryear, marked by one-party regimes.

This report discusses these issues with a view to providing a broad regional context for the country studies. These studies were undertaken by a team of scholars who collected primary data that addresses the challenges facing political parties at two main levels: the external regulation of party operations; and the internal functioning of parties. Those country reports will also be
published in this series, teasing out in some detail the challenges facing parties in each country. This report therefore deliberately avoids a detailed blow-by-blow account of each country situation, remaining instead generic and casting the net wider with a view to drawing some comparative regional experiences and insights in respect of the challenges facing parties in institutionalising intra-party democracy.
This paper focuses specifically on the problem of intra-party democracy in the SADC region. The preface herein introduces this project, which was undertaken jointly by EISA and IDEA, as well as the rationale behind the initiative. The executive summary provides some indication of the problem under investigation and what seems to come out of the investigation. The research unravelled the problem of intra-party democracy, drawing from the political history of the SADC region and the contemporary democratic moment since the 1990s.

The next section centres on the contextual and conceptual framework for our understanding of political parties and democratisation. This is followed by a discussion on party systems and democratic transitions from the one-party to the multi-party era. We then present a case study of the paralysis and enfeeblement of parties in Malawi and the impact of this on democracy, and draw lessons for the SADC region as a whole.

The next section looks at the state of party politics and democracy in the region today, and is followed by a discussion of some key challenges confronting political parties in respect of entrenching and institutionalising intra-party democracy. We identify five major challenges for the enhancement of intra-party democracy in the SADC region, namely:

- leadership;
- primary elections and nominations;
- party funding;
- gender equality; and
- management and administration of the internal affairs of the party.

The final section presents our conclusions and recommendations.
THE CONTEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Before we delve into the debate, it is imperative to explain in a fairly sketchy fashion the meaning and significance of political parties for democratic governance. A political party is an organised group that is formed with the sole purpose of articulating and aggregating the interests of the group, contesting control over state power and government, and directing a country’s development process in line with its own ideological orientations and policy frameworks, as defined in its party manifesto. Hess provides a much simpler definition of political parties as:

‘groups of people who have joined forces to pursue their common political and social goals. Parties have been formed in all societies and states where the population actively participates in the political process. They enable the people thus organised – the party members – to articulate their political will and strive for the realisation of their political aims as a group.’

According to Maliyamkono and Kanyangolo ‘a political party is an organised association of people working together to compete for political office and promote agreed-upon policies’. Without political parties or in situations where parties are extremely weak and ineffective, politics is reduced to unbridled opportunism and the overt self-serving interests of individual politicians, which may derail the nation-building process and the democracy project. Cited in Kellman, Doherty posits that:

‘without strong political parties and political institutions that are accountable and effective, that can negotiate and articulate compromises to respond to conflicting demands, the door is effectively open to those populist leaders who will seek to bypass the institutions of government, especially a system of checks and balances, and the rule of law.’

Parties are among the most important organisations in modern democracies; ‘students of political parties have commonly associated them with democracy
itself. Democracy, it is argued, is a system of competitive political parties. The competitive electoral context in which several political parties organise the alternatives that face voters, is what identifies contemporary democracy. In large measure, political parties in theory ought to enhance citizen participation in the political process, broaden representation of various political opinions and ideologies in the governance process, ensure peaceful and democratic transfer of political power at both national and local/community levels, enhance accountability of governments and accord the necessary legitimacy to both the government of the day and the political system as a whole.

As political institutions, parties are distinct from interest or pressure groups in more ways than one. First, while interest or pressure groups aim to lobby and advocate for certain policy preferences, parties aim to turn their political manifestos into a vision for a country’s political and socio-economic future. Second, parties develop political programmes that aim to shape national policy once they win elections and form governments, while pressure groups develop their programmes in congruence with government programmes. Third, unlike pressure groups whose main preoccupation is to influence decisions of governments, parties aim to control and direct the state. Fourth, parties’ participation in the governance process especially through the legislature depends upon democratic election, while pressure groups do not derive their mandate from the electorate through a vote, but simply through a community of interest and public trust. Fifth, while political activity of parties tends to be overtly ideological in both form and content, activities of interest groups tend to be either non-ideological or at least covertly ideological in nature.

Citing Randall, Salih isolates four major functions of political parties namely:

- They endow regimes with legitimacy by providing ideologies, leadership or opportunities for political participation, or a combination of all three.
- They act as a medium for political recruitment, thus creating opportunities for upward social mobility.
- They provide opportunities for the formation of coalitions of powerful political interests to sustain government (interest
aggregation), have major influences on policies as a result of devising programmes, and supervise policy implementation and political socialisation or mobilisation of people to undertake self-help activities.

- They provide political stability in societies able to absorb increasing levels of political participation by the new social forces generated by modernisation.6

It is important, however, to highlight at the outset that while political parties do play a crucial role in a vibrant and thriving democracy, they can also become an obstacle to both democratic transition and democratic consolidation. In recent, fascinating research on political parties in Kenya, Alycia Kellman makes a plausible argument that:

> ‘the study of political parties and the institutional structures that support them is inherently related to the study of democracy. Political parties serve as the primary link between government and society. As such, they have a unique role in fostering democratic governance and ensuring that it is responsive to societal needs. If they fail in this role, true democracy has little chance of surviving.’7

Kellman then comes to the logical conclusion that ‘political parties must be conceptualised as instruments that can either work for, or against, democratic forces. Ideally, political parties “help turn citizen interests and demands into policies and laws” … . However, if they fail in this mission, the whole democratic experiment can disintegrate’.8

The specific roles and effectiveness of political parties in a democracy are essentially determined by, *inter alia*:

- the nature of the party system in place in a country;
- the nature of the electoral system in place in a country; and
- equally important, the effectiveness of a parliament in a given country.

A party system is important in determining exactly how political parties play the political game. There are basically four known party systems,
namely: one party; two-party or duopoly; a dominant party; and a multiparty system. The electoral system sets boundaries for parties’ electoral contest for the control of state power by setting out the institutional framework for elections and defining formulae for the calculation of votes into parliamentary seats. Evidence now abounds suggesting, in fact, that the two dominant electoral systems in Southern Africa, namely the British-style first-past-the-post (FPTP) and the proportional representation (PR) models, have their own distinctive impact on the nature of party organisation and party political representation in the legislature.9 Having contested elections, parties then undertake much of their political work in parliament; thus the effectiveness of any parliament also depends overwhelmingly upon the vibrancy of political parties. There are essentially two types of legislatures throughout the SADC region, namely: the unicameral and bicameral parliament.

As argued above, it is abundantly evident that political parties are central to both democratisation and democratic consolidation. Be that as it may, historically and in contemporary times, political trends in many developed and developing countries indicate that parties tend to fail to play a political role that enhances their intrinsic institutional and functional value to democratisation and democratic consolidation. This trend does not only compound the fragility of democratic experiments especially in Africa, but also denudes the significance and popularity of parties as primary links between governments and citizens in a society. Hence, Kellman poignantly observes that ‘while it is recognised that [political parties] can be crucial in the promotion of democracy, they [can equally be a hindrance] to its attainment as well’.10 Citing Doherty,11 Kellman further contends that ‘in emerging democracies worldwide, political parties are either weak, too personalistic, too constrained by oppressive governments, or too corrupt and out of touch to earn the respect of the public.’12

Evidence abounds suggesting that on a global scale in both developed and developing democracies there is a glaring and systematic decline of public confidence in political parties, and that in general mass parties are increasingly becoming obsolete. In a presentation on global challenges of democracy delivered during a workshop organised by EISA and International IDEA in December 2004, Roger Hallhag argued that while the support base of political parties in 13 West European democracies amounted to about 9.8%
of the electorate, by the late 1990s this figure had plummeted to a paltry 5.7% and is still falling.13 As Table 1 indicates, in terms of public trust and confidence, political parties are increasingly becoming an endangered species globally; more so in Latin America and new European democracies and relatively (comparatively) less so in East Asian democracies and African democracies, as the table depicts.

Table 1: Degree of public trust in political parties in emerging democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian democracies</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New European democracies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 African democracies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling parties</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, in all the emerging democracies, public trust for political parties is below 50%. However, in Africa there seems to be more public trust in ruling parties (46%) than in opposition parties (23%). This situation could be attributable to politics of patronage, which is more effectively dispensed to the public or targeted clients by ruling parties; and in turn the weakening and fragmentation of opposition parties, which also often lack effective strategies for presenting viable alternative policy frameworks to ruling parties.

Table 2 illustrates the degree of public trust in political parties in selected SADC member states out of the 15 selected African states in which Afrobarometer undertook its latest opinion survey, published in March 2004. From this data it is evident that ruling parties enjoy more support, confidence and trust than opposition parties. Table 2 illustrates the opinions of
respondents to the question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? The two categories that we are interested in for the purpose of this report are those dealing with ruling parties and opposition parties.

Table 2: Degree of public trust in political parties in the selected SADC countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>BOT</th>
<th>LES</th>
<th>MWI</th>
<th>MOZ</th>
<th>NAM</th>
<th>RSA</th>
<th>TAN</th>
<th>ZAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruling parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot / A very</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great deal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little bit /</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot / A very</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great deal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little bit /</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From Table 2, evidently, the popularity of ruling parties is much greater in Tanzania, Mozambique and Namibia than in Zambia, South Africa and Botswana. However, the irony of the figures for South Africa is that the degree of popularity of ruling and opposition parties does not seem to correlate with the electoral performance of the parties. The electoral outcomes in South Africa from 1994 to 2004 seem to suggest that the ruling party enjoys much more popularity than the study results would make us believe. In a sense, therefore, the popularity of the ruling party would rank around levels such as those in Mozambique and Namibia, given not only the similarity of these as dominant parties but also the liberation struggle factor they all possess.

The more parties become unpopular in the eyes of the public, the more their mandate as agents of democracies is likely to diminish. Part of the explanatory argument why parties tend to fail to become drivers of the democratic process
and also fail to democratise within themselves is precisely because, as Kellman rightly points out, they tend to have inevitable and inherent ‘oligarchic tendencies and are thus inherently undemocratic’. Thus, one of the major problems confronting political parties in their quest to become democratisers themselves is the embedded internal authoritarian culture which often combines with personality cults of leaders. In this vein, authoritarian culture and personality cult tend to breed a syndrome of bureaucratic oligarchy within parties. This bureaucratic oligarchy tends to become the main Achilles’ heel of political parties and denudes their mass character.

In his seminal treatise on political parties published in 1954, Maurice Duverger argues that while political parties are democratic institutions, they are oligarchic in nature. And because of this oligarchic tendency within parties, they increasingly distance themselves from the vocation of democratic participation, with deleterious consequences for their mass base.

In a Weberian sense, parties develop into modern bureaucratic organisations with defined structures and a clear hierarchy that informs the flow of information and decisions up and down. This bureaucratisation in turn defines subtle ways in which the party machinery in a sense also becomes, in a contradictory way in fact, both inclusive and exclusionary at the same time. The inclusion and exclusion dynamic in parties then centralises power in the hands of a small cabal of the party apparatchik in control of the organisation. Not only that. The centralisation of power marginalises the rank-and-file and support base of the party, and also breeds and/or reinforces personality cult, wherein the party leader becomes synonymous with the party and vice versa.

The centralised bureaucratic power and personality cult within parties are therefore the defining characteristics of their lack of internal democracy. Thus, once a party has developed into a full-fledged bureaucratic-rational organisation, power centralises systematically and personality cult becomes profoundly engrained. This is the heart of the matter in our understanding of the systematic failure and decline of parties in Africa as whole, and in Southern Africa in particular. Kellman sums it up in a simpler, albeit fairly perceptive, observation as follows:
‘... once a leadership position is attained, due to the amount of power, money and status over which the party is in control of, it inevitably develops oligarchic tendencies.’

Within the framework of the bureaucratic-oligarchic syndrome, client-patronage relations between the party leadership and the rank-and-file membership tend to develop, and this politics of patronage worsens the autocratic tendencies within parties. Salih reminds us that:

‘... the client-patron relationship is fundamentally a relationship of exchange in which a superior (or patron) provides security for an inferior (or client), and the client in turn provides support for the patron .... This relationship ... has two major drawbacks: 1) it is founded in the premise of inequality between patrons and clients, and the benefits accruing to each of them from the exchange may be very uneven indeed; 2) it may serve to intensify ethnic conflicts, though it is equally capable of adaptation so that each group gets a slice of the cake.’

In a nutshell, we have argued that besides the historical context that has tended to influence the nature and character of parties, five other related features tend to mark their operations namely:

- authoritarian culture;
- bureaucratisation;
- oligarchic personality cult;
- centralisation of power and marginalisation of the rank-and-file; and
- patronage politics.

We now turn the spotlight to a discussion on party systems and democratisation in Southern Africa.
PARTY SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: FROM ONE-PARTY TO MULTIPARTY REGIMES

One of the most fascinating political developments in the SADC region since the 1990s has surely been the transition from one-party to multiparty political dispensations. This transition has had a profound bearing on both the democracy project broadly speaking, and specifically on party systems and party organisation. It is only fair to observe that today more parties take part in political activities and governance processes of SADC countries and are thus able to contest state power through regular elections. This observation is validated by the party political competition for state power that marked multiparty elections in five SADC countries in 2004, namely: South Africa (April); Malawi (May); Botswana (October); Namibia (November); and Mozambique (December). Zimbabwe and Mauritius held their parliamentary elections in March and July 2005 respectively and Tanzania held its own in October of the same year.

Party organisation in most SADC states has been opened up to greater public scrutiny, even if almost all the parties still face critical challenges to democratise their internal management, operational, systemic and institutional arrangements. Whereas the political systems in the region were marked by centralisation through the adoption of the one-party rule and authoritarian political culture since the 1960s, major transformations are currently opening up the political market-place to broader contestation over state power, increased participation of the citizens in the political process and empowerment of disadvantaged social groups.

THE ONE-PARTY ERA: 1960s-1980s
In part, party development in Southern Africa, like elsewhere in the world, has been shaped and influenced by the peculiar historical circumstances in which parties emerged and evolved. Of crucial significance here is the colonial context within which political parties emerged and evolved, and undoubtedly that historical circumstance has also tended to make its own imprint on the nature and character of parties.
Salih captures this point quite poignantly and argues that political parties in Africa ‘emerged during colonial rule which was neither democratic nor legitimate. In a sense, African political parties emerged in a non-democratic setting, which to a large extent informed their practice during independence’.\(^{18}\)

The point needs to be made that immediately after political independence in the 1960s, the SADC countries adopted a relatively stable multiparty system ushered in by independence elections. Ironically, a number of these states made a U-turn around the mid-1960s, abandoning the multiparty framework and adopting the one-party system on grounds of the need to:

- focus attention on economic development;
- prioritise imperatives of nation-building and reconciliation following the decolonisation process; and
- lessen the intensity of politics perceived as divisive and thus inimical to the achievement of the two objectives above.

Table 3 (over page) illustrates that Lesotho’s post-independence political condition was marked by multipartism until 1970. Between 1970 and 1990, this trend suffered some reversals. However, the country seems to have regained its multiparty democratic credentials since 1993.

Table 4 demonstrates that Swaziland started off well on a political footing marked by political pluralism and party competition for state power in 1967 and 1972 respectively. But hopes for a multiparty democracy were dashed in 1973 when the country’s constitution was suspended and political parties were effectively banned – a condition that still prevails to date.

As Lesotho and Swaziland indicate, there have been cases where the relatively successful independence elections have been followed by dictatorial regimes that either stymied (\textit{de facto} one-partyism in Lesotho) or killed political parties (absolute monarchism in Swaziland).

There are also other cases where the immediate aftermath of political independence witnessed the institutionalisation of a \textit{de jure} one-partyism, despite the fact that the independence election had set the stage for
### Table 3: Election results in Lesotho, 1965-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main parties</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>108 162</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>103 050</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>42 837</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>259 825</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>152 907</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP (election annulled)</td>
<td>120 686</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>7 650</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>285 257</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>398 355</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>120 686</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>7 650</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>532 978</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>355 049</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>143 073</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>61 793</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>7 460</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>584 740</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>304 316</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>124 234</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>16 095</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>14 584</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>32 046</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>30 346</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LWP</td>
<td>7 788</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>6 890</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>6 330</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>3 985</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>554 386</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

multipartyism, as in Zambia (see tables 5 and 6) and Tanzania (see tables 7 and 8).

In a majority of countries where the mono-party tradition held sway, it was argued that the one-party regime was the most suited political system for the region, while the Western-type multiparty liberal democracy was generally perceived as antithetical to the challenges of development, nation building and reconciliation. Whatever the merits of argumentation in favour of the one-party rule of the 1960s-1980s, to all intents and purposes, this trend was part and parcel of the early institutionalisation of authoritarian rule of various sorts in the region.

It is worth noting that the most consistent and vehement proponent of the one-party political tradition was the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who argued strongly that ‘where there is one-party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be when you have two or more parties each representing only a section of the community’. The single party would not only exercise unfettered political hegemony over the state and society, it would also subsume organs of civil society such as trade unions and farmers’ associations under its hegemonic political wings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>Total number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INM</td>
<td>191 160</td>
<td>164 493</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNLC (Zwane)</td>
<td>48 744</td>
<td>38 554</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNLC (Samketti)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6 393</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUF</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Multiparty parliamentary elections in Zambia, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Main roll Total number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Reserved roll Total number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unip</td>
<td>570 612</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>6 177</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>251 963</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11 157</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>3 662</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Nohlen et al, op cit.

### Table 6: Multiparty elections in Zambia, 1968 and 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of votes</td>
<td>% of votes</td>
<td>No. of votes</td>
<td>% of votes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unip</td>
<td>657 764</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>314 725</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>228 277</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>947 777</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADA</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>1 695</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>12 619</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10 667</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Nohlen et al, op cit.

### Table 7: Tanzania election results, 1965-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1965 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1970 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1975 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanu</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Nohlen et al, op cit.
The one party regimes in the SADC region assumed two distinctive forms, namely *de facto* one-party rule and *de jure* one-party rule. With the exception of Swaziland, whose dominant political/dynastic elite has imposed the authoritarian absolute monarchy, a majority of independent SADC states embraced *de jure* one-party rule. These included Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zaire (present-day DRC), Zambia and Zimbabwe. Botswana and Mauritius have since independence managed to embrace and uphold a political culture of pluralism and political tolerance anchored on a relatively stable multiparty political landscape, predicated upon liberal democracy.

Generally, post-independent political developments in Lesotho have been marked by *de facto* one-party rule, which was interrupted by a military dictatorship. Only in the early 1990s did Lesotho experience a democratic transition that has assisted the country to re-institutionalise multiparty democracy. In Namibia and South Africa, the governance regimes and party organisation have been of a fairly different order due to the institutionalisation of apartheid and the liberation struggles that ensued over the years until the political transitions of 1990 and 1994 respectively.

In fact, it is also worth noting that the liberation movement tradition in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa has, to a large

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**Table 8: Tanzania election results, 1980-1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1980 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1985 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1990 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1995 Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR–Mageuzi</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>––</td>
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<td>––</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>––</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Nohlen et al, op cit.*
measure, had a considerable impact in terms of how political parties operate and behave today as they steer the governance process.\textsuperscript{22}

The principal import of the contributions by Baregu and Suttner in this debate around transition from liberation movements to political parties is basically to interrogate not just the political transformation in white settler colonial settings in SADC – which in turn brought about a democratic dispensation – but to go further and investigate the challenges facing former liberation movements as they undertake a complex process of transformation into political (ruling) parties. For his part, Salih posits that the liberation movements that transformed themselves into political parties,

\begin{quote}
‘behave like one-party systems, often blurring the distinction between party and the state. They continue to be an embodiment of nationalist/populist politics in which the person of the president and the liberation struggle are constant reminders for voters to stay the course. This has in many instances created a situation whereby the opposition forces, the media and even genuine critics were either silenced or forced to defect to the opposition.’\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

The one-party system of the 1960s-80s made its own distinctive imprint on the party organisation in most states, and, in particular, the extent to which parties embraced intra-party democracy. First, given the all-pervasive political culture of centralisation within the framework of one-party systems, political parties were also highly centralised. Second, this centralisation inculcated and fuelled personality cult politics wherein a party was often equated with the leader and vice versa. Thus, the party leader tended to be perceived as the institution itself, as the institution tended to be personified in the image of the leader, so to speak.

Third, both the centralisation and personality cult tendencies in the management of parties during the one-party era led to some form of authoritarian administration of parties, and in most instances it became difficult even to change the top leadership of the party. Often, elections for the party leadership became simple ceremonies for the crowning of founding fathers (hardly any mothers) and did not present an occasion for democratic contest for top positions within the party. Fourth, although most of the parties
argued that they were able to allow internal debate and free flow of divergent ideas, in practice, political tolerance within parties became non-existent at worst, and almost impossible at best. Fifth, although the parties had their own women’s wings, their structures did not exhibit gender equality at all as the women’s wings were not really meant for that purpose. The women’s wings were used within the framework of the patriarchal ideology mainly to mobilise women behind a predominantly male agenda.

THE MULTIPARTY ERA: 1990s TO DATE
Following the collapse of both the Cold War on a global scale and apartheid on a regional scale, we now live in a new political era in the SADC region, as elsewhere in the African continent. The political centralisation that had pervaded the region, assuming various forms such as mono-party, one person and military rule, has been increasingly replaced by political liberalisation and a political culture of pluralism.24

The demise of apartheid in South Africa was a crucial factor for the region’s transformation away from authoritarian rule (centralist and hegemonic political culture) towards multiparty political pluralism (decentralised and pluralist political culture). The apartheid-driven regional destabilisation of the 1970s and 1980s led to the militarisation of politics and provided part of the justification for one-party rule, which was linked to the nation-building project by the ruling elite. The one-party, it was argued, would forge a national unity required to face up to the external threat of apartheid aggression.

The ending of apartheid thus helped facilitate the process of political liberalisation. This phenomenal development which led, inter alia, to majority rule in both Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994), as well as the sustainable peace in Mozambique (1994), was also accompanied by internal political pressure in most Southern African states for democratic rule and democratisation mounted by civil society organisations (CSOs).

Despite their weaknesses and disjointed organisation, civil society ‘in the form of trade unions, women’s organisations, churches, civil and human rights groups, media associations, lawyers’ associations and other professional and non-professional groups’25 have contributed to the
emergence of a multiparty political pluralism in the region. It can therefore be argued today with certainty that most SADC states, with the exception of Angola, the DRC and Swaziland, have embraced the multiparty politics of a liberal democratic model. The three basic elements of liberal democracy are:

- a meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force;

- a highly inclusive level of participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and

- a high level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

Although the current debate in the region recognises the positive political advances that have come with the liberal democratic model for the nurturing of democratic governance, questions are now being posed as to its adequacy vis-à-vis the further entrenchment and consolidation of democracy. This is so because liberal democracy tends to emphasise political rights almost at the expense of socio-economic rights of citizens. Not only that, despite the liberal democratic model in the region, almost all the SADC countries today are characterised by what in political science is termed a ‘dominant party system’. The dominant party system has also manifested in Botswana’s stable liberal democracy where the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has ruled the country since 1996, as illustrated in Table 9.

The trend of a dominant party system, however, is not confined to Botswana’s long-enduring liberal democracy. Table 10 highlights this trend throughout the SADC region in terms of the dominance of the ruling party in the legislatures.

In the entire SADC region, the dominant party system assumes the following forms:
• electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged period (e.g. BDP, as shown in Table 3);
• dominance in the formation of governments (e.g. the legislature as in Table 4); and
• dominance in determining the public agenda.29

The dominant party system in Southern Africa is also symptomatic of the weakness, fragmentation and disorganisation of opposition parties.30

Linked to the dominant party syndrome in the SADC region is a new trend of out-going state presidents who, in a veiled Machiavellian fashion, manage

Table 9: Elections outcomes in Botswana, 1965-2004

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MELS</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

% of seats

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<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>BNF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MELS</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to retain the presidency of ruling parties, while handing over the reins of state power to secretary generals of ruling parties. This so-called Nyerere model, first experienced in Tanzania, has gained currency today. The former president of Zambia, Chiluba, attempted this strategy, but it later floundered as Levy Mwanawasa did not toe the line. The former president of Malawi, Bakili Muluzi, tried the same strategy after appointing Bingu wa Mutharika as his successor through the general election of May 2004.31 Less than a year following the 2004 election, bitter conflict has already ensued between Malawi’s former president Muluzi and current President Mutharika, as the next section vividly illustrates.

Table 10: Dominance of ruling parties within legislature and nature of representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ruling party</th>
<th>Main opposition party</th>
<th>Size of legislative</th>
<th>No of ruling party seats</th>
<th>% Ruling party seats</th>
<th>Appointed seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Unita</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>MMM/MSM/PMSD</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Swapo</td>
<td>COD</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EISA database
POWER STRUGGLE AND SUCCESSION POLITICS IN MALAWI’S RULING UDF: A CASE STUDY

The Malawi case study on faction-fighting and power tussles at the helm of party leadership is illustrative of three pervasive tendencies for party political organisation in the SADC region, namely:

• centralisation and personalisation of party management;
• political conflicts around leadership succession; and
• the pervasive political culture of patronage politics both with parties and at the level of the state machinery.

It was thus no surprise that the immediate aftermath of the general election of May 2004 in Malawi was marked by a tug-of-war between the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) party and the Malawian president, which reached its apogee in early 2005.

Through this tug-of-war, the ruling party’s dirty linen was exposed to the public domain with dire consequences for both the party and the presidency. The division presents a growing challenge for democracy in Southern Africa: the politics of succession and competing power centres. How should succession be managed? Should it be the prerogative of the party president or the party rank-and-file? Who then runs the country following an election? Is it the president of the party or the duly elected national president who runs a government and manages national affairs?

The attempted expulsion of the Malawian President, Bingu wa Mutharika, from his own ruling UDF and his subsequent resignation on 5 February 2005 are clearly symptomatic of this challenge for democratic governance in many SADC countries. The current crisis in Malawi highlights the importance of managing politics of succession in SADC as a whole, but more specifically in countries, such as Namibia, where former presidents have stepped down from state power but still retain the presidency within ruling parties, leaving statecraft in the hands of party secretary generals. This dilemma raises an important question: Who governs government? And by extension, who governs the country? Is it the party president or the national president?
The choice of Mutharika as UDF candidate to replace Muluzi may have been flawed in many respects for it had the distinctive hallmarks of pork-barrel politics. Muluzi hand-picked Mutharika and, given the pervasive patronage politics in Malawi, it is likely that Muluzi was expecting favours from Mutharika for having handed him the presidency on a silver platter, since he was a relatively new, less prominent member of the party.

This is not the first time that the SADC region finds itself in this predicament. In 2001, the then Zambian President, Chiluba, also hand-picked the current President Levy Mwanawasa, but retained the presidency of his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The relationship turned ugly when Mwanawasa started to distance himself from Chiluba and in the process became ‘his own man’, so to speak. Mwanawasa has been able to successfully emerge from Chiluba’s overbearing political shadow, to the extent that he has instituted a corruption investigation against the former president. Apparently taking his cue from his counterpart in neighbouring Zambia, soon after election as Malawian president, Mutharika also declared ‘a zero tolerance approach to corruption’ and promised to prosecute the suspects ‘regardless of their position’ in the previous or current government. Mutharika’s anti-corruption crusade seems to have worried the former president. Undoubtedly, having watched the political development in Zambia and the predicament that befell his colleague, Chiluba, Muluzi saw red in Mutharika’s anti-corruption campaign. This in part triggered the political tug-of-war, among other factors surely. Muluzi has also come out publicly to suggest that he supports anti-corruption efforts provided they do not turn out to amount to witch-hunting. He has also denounced any insinuation that he and his old regime were (are) corrupt.

Although serious divisions within the UDF apparently thwarted Muluzi’s attempt to expel the president from its ranks, Mutharika’s resignation has achieved the end result. A spokesperson for Muluzi in the UDF, Sam Mpasu, reported that the former president is apparently ‘excited about it’. Mutharika was elected president on the back of the UDF election ticket, and the constitutional authority of the president as a result of his resignation from the party is not clearly defined. Relations between the president and party structures have been poor since the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2004. The UDF failed to gain a majority of the parliamentary seats
(see Table 11) and Mutharika excluded senior members of the UDF from his cabinet in order to form a coalition government with two of Malawi’s opposition parties, the Republican Party (RP) and the Movement for Genuine Democracy (Mgode). Thus, in a sense, one of the proximate causes of the political tussle within the ruling party in Malawi is traceable to the nature of the election result that delivered a minority government for the country. According to Table 11, the party that won the parliamentary election (the UDF) ran home with a paltry 39% of the valid votes cast and claimed a mere 49 out of a total of 193 seats (25% of the total seats).

That the new Malawi government was indeed a minority government *par excellence* was further reinforced by the nature of the outcome of the

**Table 11: Malawi’s parliamentary election results, May 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes won</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aford</td>
<td>114 020</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conu</td>
<td>7 654</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>320 794</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgode</td>
<td>53 772</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>254 304</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petra</td>
<td>20 267</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>100 558</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>232 667</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>1 222 718</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>751 220</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUP</td>
<td>1 897</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafunde</td>
<td>11 778</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>2 494</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCD</td>
<td>9 875</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 104 018</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total number of seats is 193 but six constituencies were not contested

presidential race in which no single candidate came out with an electoral support above 50% (see Table 12). Mutharika won the presidential election on the UDF ticket on the basis of a minority vote of just 36%. Thus, in terms of both the parliamentary and presidential election outcomes, the Malawi general election of May 2004 produced a minority government, and this situation did not embolden the hand of the new president in governing the ruling party and the country. Consequently, in part, this also created a condition for the subsequent political struggle between the new state president and the party president.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>No. of votes won</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bingu wa Mutharika</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>1 119 738</td>
<td>35.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Tembo</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>846 457</td>
<td>27.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwanda Chakuamba</td>
<td>Mgwirizano</td>
<td>802 386</td>
<td>26.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Mpinganjira</td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>272 172</td>
<td>8.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Malewezi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>78 892</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3 119 645</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Khembo, op cit.*

On Sunday 30 January 2005, the national executive of the ruling UDF party met to discuss the expulsion of President Mutharika from the party structures. The meeting was ostensibly instigated by former President Bakili Muluzi, who stepped down as Malawi’s president after a constitutional limit of two-terms imposed by the constitution. Muluzi’s abortive political attempt to have the constitution amended to allow him to stand for a third time as president of Malawi was rejected by parliament. The ‘open term bill’ was narrowly rejected by parliament when 125 members of parliament (MPs) voted in favour of the amendment and 59 against; thus the bill was three votes short of the two-thirds majority required to pass such a constitutional amendment.
Having failed to amend the national constitution, Muluzi orchestrated changes to the UDF constitution, which allowed him to become national chairman of the UDF; a position that did not originally exist in the party. Currently, Muluzi combines the powers of the party president and those of the party chairman. With these positions and power within the party, Muluzi in theory outranks Mutharika at party level. Since government policies are mostly dominated by the ruling party policies, Mutharika’s attempted expulsion from the UDF was believed to demonstrate a deepening power struggle within the UDF over control of the party, but more importantly control of government between Muluzi and Mutharika. Muluzi’s main gripe with Mutharika – which in part led to the ruling UDF party mounting pressure on the latter – is that ‘he has shown disrespect to the party chairperson and formed parallel structures to the ruling party’.33

There is abundant evidence suggesting that this political pressure against the new president is linked to his anti-corruption crusade, which has tended to rub sensitive nerves within the ranks of the former regime, presided over by Muluzi who still clings tenaciously to the ruling party. Although the UDF ultimately failed to effect its threat to expel Mutharika, mainly due to internal division over the issue, political tensions between Muluzi and Mutharika remain. Following an abortive attempt to expel Mutharika on Sunday 30 and Monday 31 January 2005, the spokesperson of the party, Salule Masangwi, declared that:

‘we failed to come to a decision to expel the president and we resolved that we form a sub-committee to meet the president and iron out the differences…. But Mutharika refused to meet the party delegation on Monday on the grounds that the Sunday UDF meeting had rejected his supporters from two of UDF’s three provincial branches and had shown disrespect to him as head of state and government.’34

In reaction to the political pressure, and at the time when the UDF itself was toying with either the possibility of withdrawing from the government or instituting a process of impeachment through parliament, the president announced at a public rally commemorating a national anti-corruption day on Saturday 5 February that he was no longer a member of the UDF, effective
from that day. Unleashing a vitriolic attack on the former president, Mutharika indicated that Muluzi was power hungry and even alleged that Muluzi had made some attempts at assassinating him. He concluded by saying that, ‘I am not the puppet he thought I would be. I will hunt down all those who plundered the country’s economy,’ further suggesting that he inherited a system ‘infested with men and women who thrived on corruption. The UDF believes corruption must continue, the party condones corruption. Since he failed to extend his stay in office, Muluzi has tried to rule this country through remote control. I will not allow him to do this. If anyone wants to start a war in this country, I am ready to fight.’

In this situation that is marked by highly charged political tempers and mutual suspicion, Mutharika in one incident ‘arrested several members of a UDF delegation who had come to see him at State House, allegedly armed and intent, so he said, to assassinate him. This seems to have precipitated the confrontation between him and the party and forced him to resign from it. This left Malawi in the unique position of having a president severed from the ruling party.’ His ultimate resignation from the party appears to have been a pre-emptive strike against the UDF, in order to avoid the ignominy of expulsion.

Mutharika’s resignation from the party may necessitate fresh elections, although the possibility of the president forming a coalition government with opposition parties and independent MPs in the legislature cannot be ruled out. In fact, Mutharika ultimately established a new party called the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has automatically become a ruling party without recourse to a fresh election, more or less the same way as the experience of Lesotho in 1997. That political episode in Lesotho was quite interesting for both political scientists and constitutional lawyers alike, for the then ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) experienced a split in parliament which led to the emergence of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), resulting in the latter becoming a ruling party without recourse to a fresh election and the former becoming an opposition party despite having won the 1993 election overwhelmingly. As was the case in Lesotho in 1997, it is worth noting that although legally Mutharika will still remain the Malawi president under the leadership of a new party established in parliament – despite having resigned from the party whose ticket
steamrolled him into the presidency – there is no doubt that this new development presents Malawi with a constitutional crisis.

This constitutional crisis manifests itself in the form of a profound tension between the executive organ of the state that Mutharika firmly controls and the legislature upon which the UDF does have some political leverage. Consequently, recently the legislature blocked an attempt by President Mutharika to appoint a new police inspector-general. In the meantime, at the time of writing the UDF was considering tabling a motion in parliament for the impeachment of President Mutharika allegedly on six grounds including the:

- withdrawal of K1 million from the Consolidated Fund without parliament’s approval;
- appointment of chief secretary of the civil service in contravention of the Public (Civil) Service Act;
- dismissal of Joseph Aroni as inspector general of police without the approval of the Malawi Police Service;
- dismissal of the director of public prosecutions, Fahad Assani, before expiry of his term of office;
- appointment and removal of the army commander without Defence Council approval; and
- dismissal of 32 principal secretaries. 37

However, the UDF may not be able to pull the required support from other opposition parties in parliament to succeed in its bid for the impeachment.38 According to Khembo, opposition parties do not seem to have a common stance on the issue and there is no likelihood of a possible unity among them on the attempt to impeach President Mutharika. In fact, the main opposition party with a bigger share of parliamentary seats, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), has made it publicly known that it would not be party to the impeachment bid. This has in turn led to a rather lukewarm attitude towards this issue by the UDF, sensing that it may not be able to get the necessary vote to carry the proposed impeachment motion.

Whatever the outcome of the on-going political tussle between the executive and the legislature in Malawi, the current political crisis in the country is a
clear manifestation of the tension that has marked the relationship between the UDF and the presidency. This was to be expected, of course, given that the succession process before the 2004 election seemed rather untidy. Not only was Mutharika hand-picked by the outgoing President Muluzi, but the latter retained his leadership of the party in an attempt to continue governing the country by remote control. But, as has happened in Zambia following its 2001 election, Mutharika is attempting to stamp his full authority on Malawi’s national affairs, and in the process leaving no room for remote interference by the former president, Muluzi. As a consequence, the escalating tension between the ruling party and the presidency reached its political apogee with the attempt by the top party apparatchik to give Mutharika marching orders for allegedly failing to toe the party line. Even prior to Mutharika’s resignation from the party, it was obvious that enormous political damage had already been inflicted on the relationship between the ruling party and the presidency.

LESSONS FROM MALAWI’S CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The split between the UDF and Mutharika has the potential to seriously jeopardise political stability and Malawi’s fledgling democracy. It is imperative that the neighbouring countries in the SADC region learn important lessons from Malawi in respect of political succession and the dilemmas of dual power centres in governance, whereby the leadership of the ruling party is separated from the presidency. Quite obviously, this problem results in a bifurcation of the governance process, which inevitably leads to various types of tension and conflict between the party in power and the presidency.

A similar situation nearly happened in Mozambique where former President Joachim Chissano initially intended to retain the leadership of the ruling Frelimo party while relinquishing the state presidency in favour of Armando Guebuza, the party’s former secretary general. Mozambique went through the parliamentary and presidential election in December 2004 with Chissano as party president and Guebuza as secretary general. After the election, Chissano resigned his position as president of the party, thereby allowing Guebuza to assume both party presidency and state presidency as well as being the party’s secretary general. Much as this arrangement concentrates too much power in one individual, at least Mozambique has avoided a
possible constitutional/political crisis triggered by the bifurcation of power between party and state. Chissano resigned his party presidency on 4 March 2005. Consequently, the Central Committee of the Frelimo Party met on 7 March and elected Guebuza as the party president. According to the Mozambican News Agency:

‘Chissano made it clear that he was standing down in favour of Guebuza, who was elected President of Mozambique in December’s general elections. Thus, Frelimo maintains its tradition, established at independence in 1975, that the posts of President of the Republic and president of the party should be held by the same person.’39

Under the circumstances, Joachim Chissano is likely to be appointed honorary president of Frelimo during the party’s next congress in 2007. Although Mozambique seems to have handled the politics of succession differently, it is not yet evident whether the Malawi political drama is likely to be replicated in Namibia. However, an indisputable reality is that the dualism of power (party versus presidency) in the running of a nation’s affairs may not augur well for political stability and sustainable democratic governance.

The Malawi case study brings into sharp relief the complex problems around politics of succession and the interrelationships between party and state/government in the management of national affairs. In Namibia, the out-going president, Sam Nujoma, has appointed the country’s president-elect, Hefikepunye Pohamba, who won the presidential election of November 2004. Thus, Pohamba will become the state president in Namibia while Nujoma will remain the president of the ruling Swapo party. The new president will only take up the reins of state power after the 21 March 2005 elections. As in the case of Malawi, then, the key question to ponder over in Namibia is who exactly will govern the country: the president of the ruling party or the state president? And in case of differences between the two, whose word would reign supreme? Will this lead to the strangulation of the governance process and paralysis of government?

It is also possible that a similar trend is under way in Zimbabwe where President Robert Mugabe has made it publicly known that he will not contest
the forthcoming presidential election in that country in 2008. Consequently, the ruling Zanu-PF party congress in December 2004 elected a new vice-president. In a largely ethnically based political contestation, Joyce Mujuru (a Zezuru) won the battle over the Speaker of Parliament, Emmerson Mnangagwa (a Karanga), and grabbed the post left vacant following the death of Simon Muzenda about a year earlier in October 2003. It is highly possible that after the parliamentary elections of March 2005, President Mugabe will engineer constitutional reforms in Zimbabwe aimed at introducing the position of executive prime minister (the likely candidate being Joyce Mujuru), and the new arrangement would also entail a provision for a ceremonial president (that Mugabe is likely to assume), allowing Mugabe to retire gracefully while still remaining the Zanu-PF president.

The important point that we are making here is this: since the recent past, a new trend is unfolding in which former state presidents hang on to the top leadership positions of ruling parties while secretary generals take over the reins of state power. This tendency has the potential to strangle the governance process and paralyse governments in cases of disagreements and conflicts between the party presidents and state presidents. Thus, the implications of the so-called Nyerere model on democratic governance at the macro level of the nation and at the micro level of the party are to become clearer with time, but the outlook does not look bright, as the next section will demonstrate.
Although on the whole, challenges for the institutionalisation of intra-party democracy still confront many political parties in the SADC region, it should be noted that some improvements have occurred within parties since the onset of multiparty democratisation. In other words, the situation is qualitatively different from that which prevailed during the one-party era, although more still remains to be done. First, the political culture of centralisation which was a feature of the era of one-party rule has been generally jettisoned as the decentralisation within parties has become increasingly entrenched.

Political parties in a majority of SADC countries today are anchored more upon the strength of their provincial, district, community and village branches, even if enormous power and authority still rest with the party central committees in the national capitals. For instance, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa draws much of its strength from its provincial and community branches for its continued hegemony over the political landscape in that country, and this is further bolstered by its strategic alliance with the South African Communist Party and the main labour movement – the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

Second, decentralisation has also considerably reversed the deleterious politics of personality cult wherein a party was equated with the leader, and the strong leader was perceived as the embodiment of the party. This should not be read to mean that political parties do not have strong leaders, but rather that a majority of today’s political leaders are much more democratically minded in running party affairs than those of the one-party era (or the founding fathers). This explains in part why attempts by some leaders in the region (e.g. Frederick Chiluba, former president of Zambia, Bakili Muluzi, former president of Malawi and Sam Nujoma of Namibia) to manipulate the national constitution with a view to extending their term of office were foiled over the past couple of years. While Nujoma was able to extend his term of office at least once and thus amended the constitution, the other two leaders did not succeed in extending their term of office.
Third, both the decentralisation and institutionalisation of some democratic ethos within the management of parties during the current multiparty era have led to some form of democratic opening in the administration of parties, and in most instances this allows regular alternation of the top leadership of the party. So far, the change of party leadership within the ANC in South Africa has been a fairly smooth and less conflict-ridden affair, especially from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. So is the case in Botswana where in the recent past Sir Ketumile Masire smoothly handed over power to Festus Mogae. However, controversy surrounds the planned succession of Mogae by Ian Khama, former commander of the Botswana Defence Force. In Zimbabwe, both the top leadership of the party and that of the state is in the hands of one of the founding fathers of the ruling Zanu-PF and one of the pioneers of the country’s liberation struggle, Robert Mugabe. Although the leadership succession at the level of both the state and party has marked national debate in the country, it remains to be seen whether Zimbabwe will also follow the Nyerere model.

Fourth, policy debate within a majority of political parties in the region is, evidently, relatively much more democratic compared to the situation that prevailed during the one-party era. This suggests that there is probably more political tolerance within parties and more acceptance of divergent and diverse views and opinions.

Fifth, another key indicator in assessing the state of intra-party democracy in the SADC region relates to the extent to which female members of parties are allowed political space to compete and occupy leadership positions within parties. The slow progress made in enhancing gender equality in the top echelons of party machineries in the SADC region is arguably a critical proxy for the equally slow progress made in the promotion of gender equality in the composition of, and political representation in, parliaments and other key organs of the state.
KEY CHALLENGES FOR ENHANCING INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

As indicated earlier, political parties are an essential component of a working democracy and remain the key agents for democratic governance. This reality was emphasised strongly during a conference in Maputo, Mozambique, organised jointly by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the SADC Parliamentary Forum and FECIV (a Mozambican civic education NGO), held from 26 to 30 January 2004 under the theme ‘Government and Opposition – Roles, Rights and Responsibilities’. Many presentations at the conference underscored the point that political parties are a key ingredient for representative democracy. Broadly speaking, there are two main types of parties in a democratic set-up: ruling parties and opposition parties. A working democracy requires constructive engagement between ruling and opposition parties through dialogue and mutual cooperation, as opposed to antagonistic relations marked by instability and violent conflict.

It is not surprising therefore that the final statement of the conference participants at the Maputo conference referred to above concluded that there is need for an effective opposition capable of holding the executive and/or the ruling party to account for its policies through the presentation of an alternative policy framework as a government-in-waiting. But opposition does not exist solely to oppose everything and anything that is initiated by the ruling party; hence conference participants also urged opposition parties to ‘develop a consensus with government on issues of national importance and in the interest of national development’. Equally importantly, the Maputo conference emphasised the key role of political parties in deepening democracy, and proposed that in order to enhance this role:

• secretary-generals of SADC political parties should meet to achieve consensus on common norms of behaviour;
• there should be a code of conduct concerning the behaviour of parties in power; and
• there should be a SADC Inter-Party Forum.42

In a representative democracy, citizens are governed by their representatives
who are regularly subjected to periodic review through general and local government elections that either renew the mandate of the representatives or change such leadership through the ballot and not the bullet. It is in this regard that parties form the ‘heart’ of politics in a representative democracy, for they are the ones that aggregate interests and mobilise citizens through their manifestos and programmes. It is no exaggeration to observe that although there can be parties without democracy in a given country, there cannot be democracy without parties – Museveni’s experiment in Uganda with a no-party democracy notwithstanding. Put somewhat differently, most forms of governance without political parties tend to be either benign authoritarianism as in Uganda, or malign authoritarianism as in King Mswati’s Kingdom of Swaziland.

Given this, it is extremely important that political parties are well organised, sufficiently institutionalised and are able to provide a visionary leadership for their own countries. The robustness of any working democracy lies primarily in a dominant political culture as well as in the institutions upon which it has to be firmly anchored. Thus, political parties become key institutions for anchoring a working democracy and inculcating a democratic culture in society. While our celebration of democratic transition from one-party to multiparty democratic systems in the SADC region since the 1990s is both justifiable and understandable, we are still far off from celebrating an institutionalised culture of intra-party democracy. In other words, the challenge facing SADC today is to nurture and consolidate democracy at the national level and to strive to establish and institutionalise intra-party democracy. If the above prognosis is correct, then the challenges that confront political parties in terms of entrenching intra-party democracy are many and varied. Camay and Gordon persuasively argue that:

‘political competition is also severely limited when internal democracy is constrained. Many African political parties – especially dominant ones – engage in internal “dissent management” leading to autocracy. They restrict voices within the party and discipline MPs and other members who disagree with leadership positions. They exercise strict control over the selection of party officials and candidates for public office.’
For the purposes of this discussion, we focus on five challenges, namely:

- party leadership;
- party primary elections;
- party funding;
- gender equity within parties, and
- management and administration of the internal affairs of the party.

**PARTY LEADERSHIP**

Leadership of political parties is as political an issue as the organisations themselves. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness and vibrancy of any political party in respect of its contribution to a working democracy is heavily dependent upon its leadership. Thus, a party’s performance during and between regular general and local government elections is determined, among other things, by how visionary its leadership is. In a word, a party can rise or fall on the basis of the nature and character of its leadership cadre.

In most SADC countries the leadership issue still remains problematic. Leadership issues investigated by this EISA-IDEA regional programme on political parties reveal, among others, challenges facing parties around:

- election of leadership;
- internal structures, hierarchy and accountability mechanisms;
- ethical codes of conduct by both the leadership and party rank-and-file;
- programme/policy development;
- international and regional networking among parties;
- national coalition formations among parties;
- party relations with the electoral management bodies and CSOs; and
- parties’ communications strategies.

Data from the country studies suggests that political parties face daunting challenges for institutionalising accountable, transparent and visionary leadership that has the appropriate requisites for the inculcation of democratic culture and practice, both within the party and the nation at large. In other words, democracy both at the macro level of the nation and at the micro
level of the parties requires democrats, and it is therefore imperative that party leadership embraces democratic culture and practice.

**PRIMARY ELECTIONS AND CANDIDATE NOMINATIONS**

Primary elections form another important litmus test of the extent and degree of intra-party democracy. Often, the process of nomination of party candidates for purposes of contestation of state power during elections tends to be fraught with controversy and conflict due to the manner in which it is executed by the party leadership.

This regional political parties’ programme investigated the following issues around primary elections:

- eligibility criteria for party candidacy;
- election process and procedure for party candidacy; and
- the type of electoral system used to select party candidates.

Problems regarding primary elections cover, *inter alia*, whether the process emphasises centralised leadership control or if it allows for the party rank-and-file to influence the selection process. These problems, to be sure, are rife in almost all SADC countries, irrespective of the electoral model each one operates. However, it is much more glaring in those countries that operate the British-style FPTP electoral system, which easily allows candidates to contest elections in their independent capacity. The challenge revolves around the degree of openness when nominations for candidates are made. Parties need to open up to their rank-and-file membership for the collective ownership of nominations and party lists. In fact, it is desirable that an independent and impartial body is engaged and involved during party nominations and the drawing up of party lists. This ensures that the process is monitored and observed by an external impartial body, as in the case of the party list development process in South Africa, which is facilitated and observed by the Balloting and Electoral Services division of EISA for various political parties.

**PARTY FUNDING**

Party funding forms yet another important criterion for an assessment of the profundity of intra-party democracy in the SADC region. Previous
research shows that public funding for campaign purposes during elections is a crucial condition for democratic consolidation. The significance of public funding presumably has led a majority of SADC countries to endorse and constitutionalise public funding for (represented) political parties. It goes without saying that in the absence of access to resources, election campaigns and results can be a ‘one-party show’ that can undermine considerable and meaningful participation of the electorate.

Due to other compelling reasons – for example, ailing economies in SADC which handicap political party proceeds from membership fees and the unsustainability of external funding – public funding has indeed become a ‘burning issue’. By implication, not to address the issue of public funding would seriously undermine democratic consolidation in SADC. As Lodge seems to suggest, the issue of public funding is imperative in SADC in order to avoid a situation whereby, ‘efficiently and expensively administered elections’ become a one-party show. Lodge shows that there are five sources, which include ‘own governments, foreign donors, business, political party’s own business operations … and their membership and mass support’.

This regional survey of the state of political parties in Southern Africa investigated, among others, the following:

- sources of party funding;
- funding levels;
- income and expenditure levels;
- role of the NEC and local branches in the fundraising process;
- comparison of funding levels during and between elections;
- funding for women’s and youth wings;
- nature of fundraising strategies;
- parties’ asset bases; and
- parties’ financial reporting and accountability.

All said and done, the challenge for political parties is to ensure that public funds are used for the benefit of the citizenry in a transparent, accountable and responsive manner.

While public funding for political parties still remains problematic, an even
bigger problem relates to the private funding of parties. The five main problems in this regard revolve around the fact that:

- donations often come with strings attached;
- donations are never (or are hardly ever) publicly disclosed;
- donations are not (or hardly ever) regulated in the same way as public funding;
- in utilising private donations, parties are not accountable to either electoral management bodies or registration authorities; and
- private donations to parties also present a risk of undue influence of money on politics and the democratic process.

In a recent study undertaken by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the three possible options open to countries for the purposes of dealing with private funding for political parties are:

- a highly regulated system in which no private funding is allowed at all;
- a laissez faire system in which private funding is unregulated, as is the current situation in a number of SADC countries; and
- a middle ground option in which private funding is allowed, but within certain limits, and with a regulatory framework encompassing public disclosures and accountability by political parties.50

For International IDEA, global experiences suggest the existence of four options with regard to how private funding for political parties is handled:

- The autonomy option, which essentially treats parties as voluntary associations entitled to unregulated internal organisation and financial transactions (e.g. Sweden).
- The transparency option, which emphasises the right of citizens to know and their ability to judge party behaviour, including fundraising, income and expenditure as well as financial accountability (e.g. Germany).
• The advocacy option, which emphasises the need for the creation of a public agency whose main task would be to monitor and check the flow of funds to parties on behalf of the general public (e.g. the United States).
• The diversified regulation option, which is basically an admixture of interrelated strategies, including benign neglect, precise regulation, public incentives and occasional sanctions (e.g. Canada).  

It is evident from this discussion, especially from the various options for private funding from the Idasa and IDEA studies, that there are no easy and straightforward solutions to the complex issue of party funding.

GENDER EQUALITY WITHIN PARTIES AND THE LEGISLATURES
Gender equality is surely an integral principle for the entrenchment and institutionalisation of intra-party democracy. The Southern African experience in respect of women’s empowerment in both quantitative and qualitative terms is a mixed bag. The SADC member states took a positive step in 1997 when they signed the gender and development declaration in Blantyre, Malawi. The member states committed themselves individually and collectively to a number of policy measures, including:

- the achievement of equal gender representation in all key organs of the state and at least a 30% target of women in key political and decision-making structures by 2005;
- promoting women’s full access to and control over productive resources to reduce the level of poverty among women;
- repealing and reforming all laws, amending constitutions and changing social practices which still subject women to discrimination; and
- taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of violence against women and children.

The declaration was further reinforced and beefed up by the Addendum to the 1997 Declaration entitled The Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children, adopted by SADC in 1998. The 1998 Addendum commits the SADC member states to the following principles:
• A recognition that violence against women and children is a violation of fundamental human rights.
• An identification of various forms of violence against women and children in the SADC region.
• A concern that various forms of violence against women and children in SADC countries continues to increase, and a recognition that existing measures are inadequate.
• Recommendations for the adoption of measures in a number of areas, including enactment of legislation and legally binding SADC instruments, social, economic, cultural, and political interventions, service delivery, education, training and awareness programmes, integrated approaches, and budgetary allocations.\textsuperscript{54}

The signing of protocols and declarations by the political elite in the SADC region is one thing, and translating those political commitments into reality through deliberate policy reform measures and law reform to give meaning to protocols is quite another. Progress towards reaching the 30\% minimum target of women in key organs of the state, especially parliament, is not only mixed but points to a quiet resistance by the male-dominated political institutions.

Table 13 illustrates commendable progress made by almost all SADC member states in increasing women’s participation in the legislatures overall since 1997. However, only a few SADC states have managed to reach the minimum target of a 30\% threshold as per the SADC declaration.

Evidently, with the exception of Angola and the DRC, all the SADC countries made appreciable progress in increasing the number of women in their legislatures between 1997 and 2005. However, as much as this progress is commendable, it is worth noting too that the quantitative increase of women’s representation has not always been commensurate with the qualitative improvement of the power, authority and influence that they are accorded in these top positions in government. Besides, a majority of regional states have not managed to achieve the 30\% women’s representation in parliament which was the target for 2005. The only two countries that have even surpassed the 30\% threshold are Mozambique (36\%) and South Africa (32.8\%). Two other countries are very close to achieving the 30\% threshold,
namely Namibia (26.9%) and Tanzania (21.4%). While Namibia missed the boat with its general election of November 2004 (which could have been used as a golden opportunity to catch up on the gender equality commitment) Tanzania is likely to use its October 2005 election to achieve the gender target due to ‘the constitutional quota being raised from 20 to 30 percent’.55

The six worst performers in terms of women’s representation in parliament are Swaziland (10.8%), Botswana (11.1%), the DRC (11.4%), Lesotho (11.7%), Zambia (12.0%) and Malawi (13.6%). All six countries have achieved less than 50% of the benchmark set for 2005 in relation to women’s representation in parliament. Moderate performers that achieved at least 50% or more in terms of the 2005 gender target are Angola (15.0%), Mauritius (17.1) and

Table 13: Changes in women’s representation in parliaments (lower houses) in SADC since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/elections</th>
<th>Election years</th>
<th>1997 No. of women</th>
<th>1997 % of women</th>
<th>2005 No. of women</th>
<th>2005 % of women</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>(1992)</td>
<td>34/220</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>33/220</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>57/500</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>(1998;2002)</td>
<td>4/80</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14/120</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>(1999;2004)</td>
<td>9/171</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>26/191</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>+8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>(2001;2005)</td>
<td>5/65</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12/70</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>+9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>(1999;2004)</td>
<td>71/250</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>90/250</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>+7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>(1999;2004)</td>
<td>14/72</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21/78</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>+7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>(1999;2004)</td>
<td>111/400</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>131/400</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>(1998;2003)</td>
<td>2/65</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7/65</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>+7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>(2000)</td>
<td>45/275</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>63/295</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>+5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>(2001)</td>
<td>16/158</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>19/158</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>(2000;2005)</td>
<td>21/150</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>25/150</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zimbabwe (16.0%). One major factor, of interest to this study, that helps explain the picture above is that although political culture embedded in the ideology of patriarchy is responsible for poor performance in a number of SADC countries, equally important is the nature of the electoral system in place in each of these states.56

Poor performers tend to be countries that operate either the FPTP electoral system or the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. It is clear that the best performers operate the PR system, which has a tendency to enhance participation of various stakeholders in the political system, primarily through party lists. It could therefore be argued that there is clearly a positive correlation between the adoption and implementation of the PR electoral system and the enhancement of women’s participation in the legislature, although other creative measures (such as the quota system, the Zebra-list of candidates, etc.) are still called for to supplement this system and to achieve desirable results in the final analysis.

The challenge, therefore, is that parties must ensure broader inclusiveness at the higher echelons of their governance by bringing in more women in positions of leadership. Generally, both ruling parties and major opposition parties in the region are led by men, and executive committees are also dominated by men. We are yet to see women becoming leaders of ruling and opposition parties and not just cheerleaders. To this end, SADC member states should strive to achieve the benchmarks of the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development.

The political parties programme discussed here investigated the following gender dimensions of party organisation:

- formal internal quotas or special measures for women in leadership structures of the parties; and
- quotas or special measures for women for party candidacy.

Given that 2005 was the year that SADC member states had committed themselves to achieving a 30% target for women’s participation in key organs of government, this issue was expected to feature prominently during the annual summit of the organisation held in Gaborone, Botswana from 17-18
August 2005. Ironically, however, the heads of state and government did not reflect critically on the performance of member states in this regard. The summit was expected to review the performance of member states, recommit itself to new targets and review the 1997 declaration. Following the comprehensive audit of the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development that had been undertaken by Gender Links, the civil society forum that had been organised parallel to the SADC summit observed in its communiqué that ‘despite advances made in achieving gender equality in the region, women remain second class citizens in virtually every sphere: political, social and legal’.57 The forum then called upon the SADC heads of state and government to, among others:

- endorse the recommendation by the Council of Ministers to elevate the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development into a Protocol for Accelerating Gender Equality;
- endorse the recommendation by the Council of Ministers to raise the current target of 30% women in decision making to 50% by 2020; and
- encourage the traditional leadership and structures to address the issues of gender inequality and gender-based violence, which continue to make women and girls vulnerable.

One innovative strategy for enhancing women’s participation in politics is quotas. Quotas have proved a useful mechanism in closing the gender gap in the process of democratisation.58 Be that as it may, Kethusegile-Juru cautions that:

‘while quotas are desirable, they are not a panacea to ensuring women’s equal political participation and representation and that they need to be supported in various other ways. Also, quotas have been found to yield different results in different electoral systems at different levels. The region is currently engaged in exploring the best ways that quotas can be used to achieve the best results across the board.’59

There are two types of quotas. The first type is a voluntary party-based quota ‘usually introduced by political parties under their own initiative either
provided in the party policy documents and practices or because of the “goodwill” of the political leadership. The party is not bound by any legislation to implement the provision’.60 This is the most common type of quota system in the SADC region, which tends to cut across the various electoral models in use.

The second is a mandatory quota which is either legislated or constitutionally provided for. The former is ‘introduced through legislation that reserves a certain number of seats for women in political bodies and requires that all political parties have a certain number of women on their electoral ballot’.61 The latter is ‘provided for in the constitution, which is the highest law of the land and cannot be overridden by any statute. This quota is mandatory and binding on all political parties and the government of the day’.62 Thus far, only Lesotho and Tanzania have mandatory quotas for women. The former has a legislated quota for women at local government level (at least 30%) and the latter has a constitutional quota for women at both national (30%) and local government level (33%).

All said and done, despite the slow progress that the SADC region has made in advancing gender equality in politics both at the micro level of political parties and at the macro level of government institutions (especially parliament), it is widely accepted that this region is far ahead of other parts of the African continent on this front. In fact, globally the SADC region is second only to the social democratic Scandinavian countries in respect of women’s participation in parliament, as Table 14 illustrates.

Not only is the SADC region ranked second in the world in respect of women’s representation in parliaments, but its average is above the global average by about 4% and ahead of the sub-Saharan average by about 5%. However, as we emphasised earlier in this report, the fascination with impressive numbers has to be tempered by critical interrogation of whether the numbers are in reality translating into meaningful power, authority and influence that accords women the opportunity to become effective movers and shakers of the region’s governance system.

**MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PARTIES**

Management of the internal affairs of the party is an important yardstick for
Table 14: Regional averages of women in single or lower houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average (%)</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic countries</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa (SADC)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (excluding Nordic countries)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding SADC)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global average</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lowe Morna, op cit.

measuring the extent to which intra-party democracy is deepening in most SADC states. This issue is inextricably linked to the one around party leadership in some sense, but it is also dependent upon the ideological clarity and distinctiveness of each party, as well as the relevance of its manifesto and programme. The management of party affairs involves the day-to-day running of party affairs, building of national, provincial, district, community and village branches of parties, and the management of party resources, both moveable and immoveable. This also includes the development of manifestos and programmes, as well as the organisation of regular party meetings and conferences.

In those countries where the leadership of parties is rather autocratic, the management of parties obviously tends to be less transparent and accountable to the party rank-and-file. In those countries where the leadership is more open and fairly democratic, the management of parties tends to be more transparent and accountable. It is therefore imperative that parties strive for an efficient, transparent and accountable management of party affairs if intra-party democracy is to be established and institutionalised. Furthermore, effective and efficient management systems have to be put in place from the village/community branches up to the national structures of parties if their management is to be adequately improved.
CONCLUSION
Democracy at the macro level of a nation-state will remain a work-in-progress, always requiring refinement and reforms along the way. Similarly, intra-party democracy will remain a work-in-progress as parties continually build their institutional structures and their operational effectiveness. It is behind this thinking that we provide our conclusions and recommendations.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper teases out critical challenges confronting political parties in the SADC region in relation to the external environment for their existence and operations, but more specifically with regard to parties’ internal functioning, especially in respect of the entrenchment and institutionalisation of intra-party democracy.

We have canvassed the point that while at the macro level of a nation-state, various SADC member states have made considerable progress with regard to political liberalisation and democratisation, this is not the case when one considers political developments at the micro level of such political institutions as political parties. This critical observation resonates throughout the whole continent, and Salih aptly captures it when observing that ‘it is obvious that while the form of multi-party politics is sustainable in most African countries due to external pressures and development aid conditionality, the democratic content of African political parties is not’.63

It is worth reiterating the argument that while parties are a critical asset to a vibrant, dynamic and thriving democracy, they also have great potential to become a democratic liability. This is crucially dependent upon the manner in which they are organised and how they manage their internal and external affairs. It is in this vein that we have argued that the major Achilles’ heel of political parties in the SADC region centres on authoritarian traditions and personality cult – a combination of centralised bureaucratic oligarchy and entrenched leadership paralysis. This problem is compounded if the tendency for patronage politics also takes centre stage in the management of parties.

So the triple-tragedy of the internal functioning of parties that has compromised inner democracy centres on:

- autocratic bureaucracy;
- oligarchic personality cult; and
- pork-barrel politics.

This three-pronged challenge confronting intra-party democracy is clearly demonstrated in the power struggles unfolding in Malawi between the former president and the new one over control of the party and state machinery.
The current political developments in Malawi have important lessons for all the Southern African countries, but in particular for Namibia and Zimbabwe. In respect of the former, power bifurcation already exists wherein the party presidency is in the hands of the former head of state, and the current state president is merely the party secretary general. In the case of the latter, following the Zanu-PF electoral victory in March 2005, constitutional reforms are likely to follow which could lead to the current head of state increasingly relinquishing some presidential powers while retaining control over the party even before the 2008 presidential elections.

What we have also established firmly is that under the one-party regime, parties were generally run along the lines of a fairly centralised governance regime. We have also established that with the transition to a multiparty democratic dispensation since the 1990s, the political space has been opened for pluralism and unfettered party political competition for state power, and this is marked by the holding of regular multiparty elections in most SADC states, with the exception of Angola, the DRC and Swaziland. This transition has also been accompanied by some relative opening up within parties to allow some modicum of inclusivity, although serious challenges for intra-party democracy still remain if the commendable beginnings of the democratic transitions at the macro level of the nation are to trickle down to the micro level of political parties.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We have identified five major challenges that in part explain why political parties remain the weakest link in Southern Africa’s democracy project. These revolve mainly around party leadership, primary elections, party funding, gender equality/equity, and management and administration of the affairs of parties. This final section of the report provides recommendations of how political parties could address these challenges with a view to institutionalising internal democracy and improving on their political work.

PARTY LEADERSHIP

- The leadership of political parties must not only embrace democratic principles, but must also practice those principles. In other words, for parties to be agents of democracy, they must be led by democrats. The two most basic democratic principles for party leadership are:
  - respect for and protection of the party constitution; and
  - that leaders must be elected and their mandate renewed by the party members in accordance with the party constitution and rules and regulations.

- In order to be dynamic organisations that are able to sustain their operations both during and between elections, parties require visionary leadership. Leaders need to have a long-term vision of where the organisation is going and clear strategies of how it intends to get there. These strategies are then translated into the party manifesto, political programme and civic education or political education within the party. Visionary leadership ought to gauge constantly public perceptions about politics as a whole and attitudes towards their parties, and it is in this regard that they must utilise either their own opinion surveys or those undertaken by other organisations.

- The political leadership is charged with the mandate of developing and articulating the ideology and worldview of the party, which is essentially what makes the party what it is and what distinguishes it from other parties. The party ideology is also crucial for it points to the philosophical thrust of party policies, which would become government policies when such a party assumes state power.
The party leadership should at all times avoid parochial politics of the personality cult. It is one thing for a political leader to be charismatic, respected and adored – like such international political icons as the ANC’s Nelson Mandela – but it is quite another for a political leader to be revered and feared, as was the case in the MCP under President Kamudzu Banda.

Party leadership should run the party affairs in a transparent, accountable and participative manner. This would entail involving the national structures, provincial/district and local/village structures as much as possible in key decision-making processes.

Party leaders must act and be seen as unifying symbols for the party. To this end, leaders ought to be sufficiently skilled in preventing internal conflicts, mediating existing conflicts and transforming conflict into a dynamic that helps the party to discover and rediscover itself from time to time. Thus mediation and arbitration should be the principal approaches to resolving intra-party conflicts, with litigation through the courts of law being the option of last resort.

**PRIMARY ELECTIONS AND CANDIDATE NOMINATIONS**

In those countries that operate the FPTP electoral system, the views of the party members in each constituency should be taken seriously in the determination of the party candidates and their nomination to represent the party. To this extent, party headquarters must guide the process rather than imposing party candidates on the constituencies. This approach will help redress various conflicts that arise during primary elections, resulting in some party members opting out of the party and contesting elections as independent candidates and thus competing with their own parties. A glaring case in point here is the recent election in Zimbabwe where a former minister of information, Jonathan Moyo, contested an election as an independent candidate in the Tsholotsho constituency against his former party – the ruling Zanu-PF – and won the election. There are many similar cases throughout the Southern African region.

In those countries that operate the PR electoral system, deliberate efforts should be made to involve the party rank-and-file sufficiently in the determination of the party list in terms of who makes it to the list and
how the list is ordered and structured. There have been concerns raised in both South Africa and Namibia (to a lesser degree Mozambique) that party leadership tends to exercise overbearing and overwhelming power in the determination of the party list, leaving little room for party members at provinces and local branches/sub-branches to make meaningful input. This leads to disenchantment and disillusionment, that in part accounts for voter apathy and the political withdrawal of members.

- The openness required for primary elections should also be extended to the process of candidate nominations. There has to be a collective ownership of the nomination process by the party leadership and the rank-and-file.

- Parties should set up internal election units whose task would be to manage and administer intra-party elections the same way that electoral commissions manage and administer national and local government elections. These election units should develop some electoral rules and regulations that would ensure smooth and efficient primary elections and nomination of candidates.

- During both their regular conferences for the election of party leadership and primary elections, parties should strive to engage an independent and non-partisan entity to facilitate, monitor and observe their elections to ensure the credibility of the process and the legitimacy of the election outcome.

**PARTY FUNDING**

- Parties should exhort their general membership to pay their subscription fees on a regular basis. Ideally, the subscription fees ought to be graded according to each member’s income/salary, with those members earning more paying more and those earning less paying less. Given that subscriptions are not sufficient as a resource base for the party, members should also be encouraged to make donations to the party coffers.

- Party representatives in parliament and cabinet should be compelled by party regulations to make specified contributions to the party. Political parties should also be provided with public funds through the government
of the day, and such funding should aim at party development broadly (as in South Africa and Namibia) and not just confined to election campaign costs (as in Lesotho). The worst-case scenario is the one where there is absolutely no state funding for parties (as in Botswana and Mauritius, ironically the longest enduring and most stable liberal democracies in the SADC region).

- Political parties should seek private funding from companies both within and outside their countries to augment public funding. However, it is desirable that both public and private funding for parties be regulated by law in order to redress possible corrupting tendencies of money in politics.

- Parties should rely primarily on self-help in terms of resource mobilisation. This should include well-planned fundraising strategies and programmes that are implemented both during and between elections. The effectiveness of the fundraising strategies and programmes is likely to be highly dependent upon the extent to which the party is able to market itself and its vision to the broader public, even outside its own membership base.

- International alliances, partnerships and solidarity networks are crucial for resource mobilisation too. Parties should therefore strive to build alliances with other like-minded parties, organisations and foundations outside their own countries.

- Parties must institutionalise the practice of preparation of annual budgets and monitoring of annual income and expenditure. Income and expenditure for every financial year must balance. This practice should be accompanied by regular external auditing of the party’s financial accounts to ensure good corporate governance and to avoid possible cases of financial mismanagement, including corruption.

**Gender Equality within Parties**

- Women’s leagues within parties should be provided with adequate resources so that they mount programmes that would enhance women’s role in politics. However, resources alone are not enough for ensuring effective participation of women in party work.
Sufficient political space should be opened for women to contest and occupy leadership positions within the party. As women go up the political ladder of the party, the focus should not be merely on how many women have occupied what leadership positions, but rather on how much power, authority and influence they are accorded in steering the party vision.

- Parties must adopt regulated quotas for enhancing participation of women (such as 30% in the case of the ANC of South Africa) in various structures of the party.

- There should be legislated and constitutional quotas for women’s participation in both the legislature and local government structures. Such quotas should compel parties to follow suit.

- Party manifestos, political programmes and civic education programmes should espouse the democratic values of gender equality.

**MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PARTY AFFAIRS**

- A political party must have offices from which its national, provincial/district, constituency, branch and sub-branch leadership operates. Thus, the most basic requirement for effective management of a party is an office.

- It is imperative that party offices are adequately equipped with resources (financial, human, infrastructural and technological) to ensure that they deliver desirable results. For instance, we discovered through this study that most parties had major problems keeping reliable and up-to-date membership registers, did not have enough resources to engage full-time staff for party work, and did not have adequate capacity to develop budgets and monitor income and expenditure.

- The party must develop its basic tools of operation including: rules and regulations; a code of ethics and disciplinary procedures; standard policies and operational procedures; a party manifesto; a long-term strategic plan spanning five to ten years; and a party’s annual programme of action with time-bound targets and milestones as well as a clear division of labour. These tools will facilitate the political vibrancy that a party needs to survive and be actively engaged in a political system.
It is imperative that the party becomes a functioning machine at all its various levels. In other words, it is important that it is not only the national office that is active in achieving the vision of the party; all the other structures, up to the lowest sub-branch level, and resources should be availed for this to happen.

Parties must institutionalise a culture of holding regular meetings of party leadership. The national executive committee and committees at other lower levels down to the sub-branch level must hold regular meetings and the record of such meetings must be kept in the relevant offices. Regular meetings of the leadership at various levels are meant to oil the vibrancy of party work and sustain the morale of the party rank-and-file.

Besides their regular meetings, party leaders should also regularly organise public meetings aimed at advancing political education and outreach. This is meant to promote the visibility of the party so that the organisation is kept in the public eye during and between elections.

Parties must hold regular national conferences for reporting to the rank-and-file and renewal of the mandate for the leadership at various layers of the organisation.

Parties must make a concerted effort to establish and maintain working relationships and linkages with CSOs and policy think-tanks in order to ensure that their policies and programmes are politically relevant and socially responsive.

Parties must also strive to build collaborative working relationships with other like-minded parties within their own countries in the form of strategic alliances and coalitions where necessary, either during and/or between elections.

Parties must develop comprehensive and implementable recruitment and membership-drive strategies and action plans in order to make sure that party membership is continually expanded. Proper records of the membership of parties should be kept in order to gauge upward and downward fluctuations.
NOTES

6 Salih, op cit.
7 Kellman, op cit, p 10.
10 Kellman, op cit, p 13.
11 Doherty, op cit, p 29.
12 Kellman, op cit, p 13.
14 Kellman, op cit, p 14.
16 Kellman, op cit, p 14.
17 Salih, op cit, p 7.
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23 Salih, op cit, p 18.
24 Matlosa K, Caught between transition and democratic consolidation: Dilemmas of political change in Southern Africa, in Landsberg & Mackay op cit.


29 Ibid, p xxi.


32 Chirwa W, Not all is well between president and party in Malawi: Election post-mortem, Election Talk, No. 15, 25 August 2004.

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38 Interview with Nixon Khembo, University of Malawi, 4 April 2005.


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44 Camay & Gordon, op cit, p 6.


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49 Ibid.

50 Idasa, Regulation of Private Funding to Political Parties. Cape Town (mimeo), 2003, p 4.

54 Ibid.
57 Communique of the SADC Heads of State & Government Summit, Civil Society Forum Meeting, 14-16 August 2005.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, p 23.
62 Ibid.
63 Salih, op cit, p 355.
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APPENDICES
RESEARCH AND DIALOGUE ON
POLITICAL PARTIES PROGRAMME
APPENDIX 1:
COUNTRY CONTEXT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is the country’s record of holding free and fair general elections?

2. What is the record of freedom of association as regards forming political parties?

3. What is the country’s score on the Freedom House index for free and democratic countries? And thinking about changes over the past five years and reasons for the changes, please comment on the Freedom House score?

4. How free are parties to present candidates in national elections?

5. How, if at all, are political parties restricted in carrying out political or electoral activities?

6. What, if any, specific rules or code of conduct exist for the ruling party or ruling coalition? Provide copies.

7. What parties and independent candidates are represented in the national parliament (both chambers if applicable) according to the following model? (use Election Results Archive as one source) – % of votes; No. of seats in lower chamber; No. of seats in upper chamber; No. of seats held by women in lower chamber; No. of seats held by women in upper chamber

8. What, if any, reference do the policy documents of the ruling party/coalition and the biggest opposition party/coalition in parliament make to specific International Conventions on Human Rights? Provide examples of formulations where applicable.

9. What other significant – in size or otherwise important – political parties or political groups exist that are not represented in the national parliament? Indicate why they are significant (size, regional, exiled, influential diasporas, historical, non-parliamentary influence, armed, repressed group, etc.) and measurable national/regional strength (percentage of votes, opinion survey results etc.).

10. What is the total number of registered parties (if applicable)?

BASIC MEDIA STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

11. Briefly describe the media environment, including: whether political parties have equitable access to major media outlets; difference between paid and free media coverage for parties; access during an election campaign period and during normal times. Distinguish any differences between publicly and privately owned media.

12. What are the most important sources from which people say they access political information? Note source. If survey/poll data is available, if not – skip question. Television; Radio; Newspaper; The Internet; Friends; Other (please specify)

13. What is the level of literacy of the general population? Note source.

14. If survey/poll data is available, what is the percentage of the population which: Read daily newspapers (combined readership); Read other news print media at least weekly (readership); Have mobile/cellular telephones; Use the Internet?

15. If survey/poll data is available, what is the percentage of households which have access to: Television; Radio; landline telephones?
16. Apart from the constitution and direct party laws, are there any legal instruments or other circumstances that strongly impact the existence or functioning of political parties?

17. Which, if any, are the politically influential groups seeking to influence or maintain power through other means than electoral politics? (Mechanism used/ Intended influence/ Intended outcome)
   Business groups; Ethnic groups; Media; Military; Other non-governmental organisations (specify);
   Organised crime syndicates; Religious; Unions; Other (specify)

18. Are there mechanisms for public participation in government decision-making other than elections?
   Parliamentary public hearings; Referenda; User committees; Other (please specify)

19. Attempt a country nutshell description, a few paragraphs long, as an easy-read entry. Format:
   a. Population, capital, head(s) of state/government, term limit for president (if presidential system), are all seats in the national legislature elected or are some appointed – if so by whom, attempts to extend/remove term limits, constitutional arrangements, balance of power between branches of government (executive – legislature – judiciary), type of electoral system, and (if appropriate) if inherited from colonial power.
   b. Democracy since 19xx (and other recent years of great importance, like independence, system change, armed conflict, etc.). Last/next elections with (maximum) x years mandate. Restrictions on political parties (if any). Degree of respect for human rights (civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights) and rule of law. Freedom House Index. TI Corruption Index, UNDP Human Development Index.
   c. Governing party/coalition and leading opposition, degree of dominance/stability of political landscape. Important forces not standing in elections but shaping politics (business sectors, unions, religious, military, criminal, etc.). Any social or regional upheavals with political consequences. Relevant international/regional relations and membership, level of trust in political parties and government institutions (use survey data and barometer data where available).
   d. Economic and social level of development ($ GNP/capita, trade as % of GNP, Human Development Index, Income GINI Index, % of population in largest city (name if not capital)/urban areas, rural:urban ratio.
APPENDIX 2:
EXTERNAL REGULATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

LEGISLATION GOVERNING POLITICAL PARTIES

1. What legal provisions govern political parties and/or individual candidates for election? (Full Name / Year / Year of last amendment, if any / Main monitoring body)
   Specify full name, year and year of last amendment. Provide copies of all relevant legislation. (Legal provisions might include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the ones mentioned below.)
   Constitution; Political party law/Act that governs political parties; Electoral law/Code; Legislation governing Non-Governmental Organizations/societies; Legislation governing the access to media; Government decrees; Regulations with the force of law; Regulations without the force of law; Other laws or regulations that are important to how political parties and/or candidates operate (including financing, tax exemptions etc); Not applicable

2. How, if at all, are political parties defined in current legislation?

3. Which, if any, legal provisions govern the conditions for the founding of new political parties or coalitions? Please provide copies.

4. What are the requirements to register a political party at the national level? (As an association, not in order to contest an election) check all which apply.
   Establishment of (regional or local) party branches (specify); Monetary fee (specify in local currency); Registration with court (specify, including level of court); Signatures (specify); Other (specify); No specific registration requirements; Registration possible but not required

5. Which body (authority) decides on the registration of a political party?

6. What, if anything, can cause the de-registration of a political party? (Check all that apply and specify the body or person who has the authority to deregister a political party.)
   Anti-democratic policy; Bankruptcy or insolvency; Breach of Code of Conduct; Breach of Electoral law; Failure to meet gender quotas; Hate Speech; Inciteful activities; Non-payment of registration fee; Other (please write in and code ‘9’); Not applicable

7. What body/bodies are responsible for the administration, enforcement and sanctions of the legislation on political parties? Please note all different bodies and, if possible, provide contact details. (Note: It is possible that different bodies will be responsible for different aspects of enforcing laws and regulations.)
   Electoral Management Body; Regulatory body specially; Created for this purpose (specify); Government department(s) (specify); Normal courts/judicial system; Auditor; Other (please specify); Not applicable

8. Which sanctions, if any, have been applied to political parties in the last 10 years? Provide two or three detailed examples.

9. What legal rights and restrictions, if any, apply to political parties in relation to accessing media (include electronic and print)? Provide details for both public and private media.

10. In the absence of legal regulation, what if any, agreements between parties – or rules applied by the media – are upheld? Provide details for both public and private media.

INTERNAL PARTY FUNCTIONS

11. Which legal provisions, if any, govern the internal functioning of political parties? Provide copies.
12. Which legal provisions, if any, govern how a political party selects candidates for local, regional, national elections or presidential elections? Describe the provisions and specify the required role of party members, local branches, etc.

13. Which public body, if any, has the authority to be involved in the process of internal party s/election of candidates? Specify the role of the public body.

14. Which non-governmental organizations, if any, have a role in political primaries or congresses during candidate s/election? Provide name/s and describe the role of the NGO(s).

15. What legal provisions, if any, require political parties to include a certain number (or percentage) of male or female candidates on party lists? Describe what the requirement is, what level it is on, the possible sanctions and provide the reference and copies.

16. What legal provisions, if any, exist to encourage or provide incentives for political parties to include a certain number (or percentage) of male or female candidates? Describe the incentives, what level they are on and provide the reference and copies.

17. What legal provisions, if any, require political parties to include a certain number (or percentage) of persons from other groups as candidates (e.g. ethnic or religious or linguistic minorities, persons with disabilities)? Describe what the requirement is, what level it is on, the possible sanctions and provide the reference and copies.

18. What legal provisions, if any, exist to encourage or provide incentives for political parties to include a certain number (or percentage) of persons from other groups as candidates (e.g. ethnic or religious or linguistic minorities, persons with disabilities)? Describe the incentives, what level they are on and provide the reference and copies.

19. What other legal provisions, if any, govern any other aspect of internal party functioning? Describe and provide the reference and copies.

REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTIONS

20. What, if any, are the registration requirements for political parties which wish to contest elections? (Presidential Elections / Chamber 1 / Chamber 2 / Regional / Local) Check all that apply, and specify amounts, numbers and percentages where applicable.
   Deposit; Minimum number of candidates; Minimum number % of votes in previous election; Regional presence; Signatures; Others; No specific requirement for registration; Registration possible but not required

21. What are the requirements, if different from above, for political parties which wish to nominate candidates or lists of candidates for elections? (Presidential Elections / Chamber 1 / Chamber 2 / Regional / Local) Check all that apply, and specify amounts, numbers and percentages where applicable.
   Deposit; Minimum number of candidates; Minimum number % of votes in previous election; Regional presence; Signatures; Others; No specific requirement for registration; Registration possible but not required

22. What, if any, special requirements exist for the registration of new political parties to contest an election?

23. What are the legal qualifications to become a candidate in elections? (Presidential Elections / Chamber 1 / Chamber 2 / Regional / Local) Please specify all that apply and note differences for chamber(s) of the legislature, president, regional and local elections.
   Age; Bankruptcy or Insolvency; Citizenship; Citizenship of parents; Civil status; Country of birth;
24. In which elections, if any, can candidates not affiliated with a political party (independent) stand for election? Check all that apply.
   - Presidential
   - To chamber 1 of the national legislature
   - To chamber 2 of the national legislature
   - To regional councils
   - To local councils

25. What, if any, are the registration requirements for independent candidates who wish to stand for election? (Presidential Elections/ Chamber 1/ Chamber 2/ Regional/ Local)
   Check all that apply and specify amounts, numbers and percentages where applicable.
   - Deposit
   - Minimum number of candidates
   - Minimum number % of votes in previous election
   - Regional presence
   - Signatures
   - Others
   - No specific requirement for registration
   - Registration possible but not required

26. If a candidate withdraws her/his candidacy or dies before election day, but after registration, can the party substitute with a new candidate?
   - Yes, explain (include whether replacement candidate must be of the same sex and how late in the process a candidate can be replaced)
   - No
   - Not applicable
   - Other

27. Can a party remove a nominated and registered candidate without her/his consent?
   - Yes
   - No

28. Can a political party remove or replace an elected representative?
   - Yes (explain circumstances)
   - No

29. Is it possible for a member of parliament to leave the party with which s/he was elected and join another party or become an independent MP (floor-crossing)? If so, what becomes of the mandate/seat?
   - Possible to remain an MP – the mandate/seat remains with the individual until the next election
   - Not possible to remain an MP: the individual is replaced by a member of his/her former party (please specify how, including the replacement MP must be of the same sex)
   - A bi-election is held for the seat
   - The member of parliament leaves the legislature and the mandate/seat remains vacant
   - Other

30. How, if at all, are vacant mandate(s)/seats filled in between general elections?
   - Replacement by candidates on the party list
   - Other

ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND OBSERVATION

31. What, if any, additional rules of good conduct does the ruling party or coalition have to sign or adhere to? Is the ruling party required to observe rules of good conduct regarding incumbency? Explain contents and possible sanctions. Provide copy.

32. What, if any, rights do political parties have in relation to the Electoral Management Body?
   - Representation in the Electoral Management Body
   - Right to participate in meetings
   - Advisory capacity
   - Right to observe the proceedings of the EMB
   - Other

33. What, if any, rights do political parties have with regard to the activities in the polling station?
   - Describe, including if they form part of the polling station staff and/or if they are allowed to observe/witness the voting.
34. **What rights, if any, do political parties have in the process of vote counting?** Describe, including if they form part of vote counting staff and/or are allowed to observe/witness the counting.

35. **What rights, if any, do political parties have in the process of tabulation of votes and the collation of results?** Describe, including if they form part of the tabulation staff/committee, and/or if they are allowed to observe/witness the tabulation.

36. **What, if any, is the official campaign period?** Specify number of days/weeks and describe what is permitted or restricted during that time.

37. **What, if any, is the official period of campaign silence before election day?** Specify number of days/weeks and describe what is permitted or restricted during that time.

38. **What political party activities, if any, are prohibited during election day?**
APPENDIX 3:
INTERNAL FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURE QUESTIONNAIRE

FOUNDING OF PARTY
1. When and where (date and place(s)) was the party first founded?
2. When, if applicable, was the party first officially registered as a party?
3. What, if any, subsequent changes or party splits have taken place?
4. What was the original name of the party? If this name differs from the party’s current name, what were the circumstances of any changes in name?
5. How, in a few key words, does your party describes itself (right, left, pragmatic, conservative, liberal, socialist, green, religious, nationalist, social group, ethnic group etc.)?
6. Why was the party founded?
7. How was the party founded? Describe.
8. Which constituency or socio-economic group does/did the party’s founders claim(ed) to represent?
9. What was the initial participation or support of additional organisations to the party (i.e. ethnic, religious, military, business, civic groups, trade unions)?
10. Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?

INTERNAL STRUCTURE/ELECTION OF LEADERSHIP
11. What, if any, written organisational rules exist to guide the functioning and organization of the party? Provide copies. Constitution; Operational guidelines; Party Rulebook; Statutes; Other (please write in); No formal rules exist
12. What is the name of the national executive body in the party?
   a. Are there written rules and procedures for the regular s/election of members of this body? If yes provide copies. If no describe.
   b. By whom are they elected or appointed? (Elected / Appointed) The party leaders; The parliamentary party (ie the group/ caucus of the party’s members of the national legislature); Regional or state party branches; Local party branches; Delegates to a party congress; All or some party members; Auxiliary party groups; Affiliated party organizations; Other (please write in)
   c. If elected, how? Describe procedure.
   d. Are there formal internal party quotas for women on this body? If yes describe how applied, including number or proportion.
   e. Are there formal internal party quotas for youth, ethnic minorities or any other group on this body? If yes describe how applied, including number or proportion.
   f. Are the members in this body paid by the party? All paid; Some paid (explain); Unpaid (Voluntary)
13. Is there a written mandate (duties) for the national executive body above and/or distribution of power/tasks within the party leadership?
Yes (provide copies); No, but informal practices (describe); No mandate

14. What is the name of the next highest permanent body in this party?

a. By whom are they elected or appointed?
The national executive body described above; The party leader(s); The members of parliament/parliamentary caucus; Regional or state party branches; Local party branches; Delegates to a party congress; All or some party members; Auxiliary party groups; Affiliated party organizations; Other (please write in)

b. If elected, how? Describe procedure.

c. Are the members in this body paid by the party?
All paid; Some paid (explain); Unpaid (Voluntary)

15. What is the name of the most local branches in this party?

a. What is the normal geographic or other area of operation of the most local branch?

b. How is it formed and by whom is its leadership elected? Describe.

16. How often, if at all, does the party have a national conference/convention/congress?
Less often than once a year; Once a year; Twice a year; More than twice a year; Never (go to Q20)

17. Who attends the national party conference/convention, check all that apply?
The party leader(s); The parliamentary party (i.e. the group/caucus of the party’s members of the national legislature); Regional party delegates; Local party delegates; All or some party members; Auxiliary groups (youth wing, women’s wing etc); Affiliated party organizations (trade unions, employers’ federations etc); Other (please write in)

18. Are decisions by the national party conference/convention/congress …
Binding on the party executive; Advisory to the party executive; Other (please write in)?

19. Is this body the highest decision-making body of the political party?
Yes/No (specify which body is).

20. What, if any, written rules govern the s/election of the party president? Describe type of system used and provide copies of rules.

21. What, if any, formal process exists to monitor and regulate the ethical behaviour of political party officials? If board of ethics, explain structure, mandate and examples of activities and/or decisions.
Board of Ethics; Other formal process (specify); No formal processes, but informal norms and practices (specify); No process

22. Provide a description of the structure of sub-national/regional/local party units, women’s wings/associations, youth branches and other party groups.
How many branches; In all of the country; Autonomous; To whom do they report; How are leaders chosen; Main functions

Internal structure/election of leadership – additional comments

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

23. How does the party decide on its policy programme document, if it has one? Describe the process and provide copy of document.
24. Which of the following opinion-related resources, if any, does the party have access to? (Party has access / Check if party pays for resource) Check all that apply.

**Resources specific to the party:** Surveys among members, Opinion polling (not restricted to members);

**Public domain resources:** Public domain polling results, Surveys/barometers issued by other organisations; **Other resources.**

25. To what extent does the party use any of the following opinion-related resources when developing policy? (Uses a large extent / Uses a fair amount / Does not use very much / Does not use at all / Don’t know) Check all that apply.

**Resources specific to the party:** Surveys among members, Opinion polling (not restricted to members);

**Public domain resources:** Public domain polling results, Surveys/barometers issued by other organisations; **Other resources.**

26. How, if at all, can the party leadership be held accountable for not following party policy decisions? Describe the process, including to whom it is accountable and possible sanctions.

**Policy development – additional comments**

**MEMBERSHIP**

27. Is there a national membership register? If yes provide details of how it is maintained and what the role of local/regional branches is for maintaining their own registers.

28. How much, if anything, does the party charge as membership fee? If fixed amount please specify – per year – in local currency?

- A fixed amount;
- Amount dependent on member’s position in the party (EXPLAIN);
- Amount dependent on party branch (explain);
- Other (specify);
- Voluntary contribution;
- No membership fee.

29. How many members does the party have? (No. of individual party members / No. or % of women party members) Provide year and source of figures and indicate if real figures or estimates.

- Earliest available estimate;
- Latest available estimate;
- Year of maximum members.

30. How much has the party membership increased or declined over the past ten years, in percentage and total numbers? If ten-year figures do not exist, describe the general trends in membership, if possible with other figures.

31. What, if any, criteria/requirements exist to be eligible for membership? Describe, including the body/person who decides on admission as a member.

32. What, if any, formal rights come with membership?

- Discounts with merchants;
- Voting rights at party meetings;
- Other (please specify).

33. What, if any, responsibilities come with membership?

- Adherence to party statutes;
- Unpaid work;
- Other (please specify).

34. What process, if any, exists to discipline members who breach party rules? Describe the process and identify who takes the final decision.

35. How often, if at all, does the party communicate with its members? (From National Party / From Regional branches / From local branches)

- Electronic Newsletter;
- Paper Newsletter;
- Party Paper;
- Meetings;
- Public website;
- Membership restricted website;
- Other (write in)

36. How often, if at all, do members communicate with the party? (To National Party / To Regional branches / To local branches)

- Individual postal correspondence;
- Individual email correspondence;
- Petitions;
- Meetings;
- Other (please specify).
37. Which, if any, formal and written guidelines provide party members with an opportunity to express their opinions on party matters?
Guidelines (provide copies); No formal guidelines, although informal practices exist (describe including recent examples); No guidelines or practices

38. To whom does the party provide training? Check all that apply and describe type of training and at what level.
Campaign volunteers; Candidates; Elected members; General members; Party officials; Other (please write in); No training provided

39. How, if at all, does the party seek to recruit members between elections?

40. What efforts, if any, are made to engage activists/members in party activities between elections? Describe and provide examples.

Membership – additional comments

ELECTORAL ACTIVITY – CANDIDATES

41. What are the eligibility requirements established by the party rules to become s/elected as a presidential candidate? Check all that apply and specify each requirement.
Age; Belonging to a certain ethnic group; Certain position in the party; Coming from a certain geographical area; Membership in the party; Qualifications; Signatures; Other (please write in)

42. What is the process for s/election of party candidates for presidential elections? Describe the process, including who can propose and vote.

S/election of other candidates for election

43. What are the eligibility requirements established by the party rules to be selected as a party candidate for elections other than presidential? (Chamber 1 of national legislature/ Chamber 2 of national legislature/ Regional council/ assembly/ Local council/ assembly)
Check all that apply and specify each requirement.
Age; Belonging to a certain ethnic group; Certain position in the party; Coming from a certain geographical area; Membership in the party; Qualifications; Signatures; Other (please write in)

44. What are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 1 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election? Describe, including how candidates put their names forward, who/which party bodies are involved.

45. What, if different from above, are the party rules for the process by which candidates to chamber 2 of the national legislature are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election? Describe, including how candidates put their names forward, who/which party bodies are involved.

46. What, if different from above, are the party rules for the process by which candidates to regional councils/ assemblies are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election? Describe, including how candidates put their names forward, who/which party bodies are involved, and if the national party can decide on sub-national lists.

47. What, if different from above, are the party rules for the process by which candidates to local councils/ assemblies are recruited and then s/elected to stand for election? Describe, including how candidates put their names forward, who/which party bodies are involved, and if the national party can decide on sub-national lists.
48. What electoral system, if any, is used within the party to select its candidates? Describe and identify which type of system is used, including possible differences between levels.
   Plurality/majority; Proportional; Other (please write in); Not applicable – no election of candidates

49. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain number or percentage of candidates for nomination will be women?
   Quota – explain year introduced, percentage, placement on list or in constituency, women only shortlists; No quota; Previously – please explain year introduced and rescinded, percentage, placement on list or in constituency, women only shortlists; Other, including informal practices (please describe)

50. What, if any other, special measures have been adopted by the party to ensure that women are nominated in elections?
   Training for aspiring candidates; Financial incentives; Other (please specify); No other measures

51. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain percentage of candidates for nomination will be young people?
   Quota (please explain which groups, year introduced, percentage, placement on list or in constituency); No quota; Previously (please explain year introduced and rescinded, percentage, placement on list or in constituency); Other, including informal practices (please specify)

52. What, if any other, special measures have been adopted by the party to ensure that young people are nominated in elections?
   Training for aspiring candidates; Financial incentives; Other (please specify); No other measures

53. What, if any, is the quota voluntarily (not required by law) adopted by the party that a certain number or percentage of candidates for nomination be from any other group (not mentioned above)?
   Quota (please explain which groups, year introduced, percentage, placement on list or in constituency); No quota; Previously (please explain year introduced and rescinded, percentage, placement on list or in constituency); Other, including informal practices (please specify)

54. What, if any, are the limits on the number of times a candidate can hold an elected office on behalf of the political party? Please specify in number of terms and years.

55. If there are reserved seats for women, national minorities or other groups in the legislature, how are candidates selected by the party to fill them?
   A list of candidates is compiled (explain); Appointed (if so, by whom); Other (please specify); Not applicable

Electoral activities – candidates – additional comments

ELECTORAL ACTIVITY – CAMPAIGNS

56. Does the party produce election manifestos for election campaigns?
   Yes (provide copy)/ No

57. What is the process of development of party election manifestos?

58. What is the process of development of campaign strategy/operational plan?
   Yes (provide examples from recent campaigns)/ No

59. Are candidates (at all levels) expected to campaign on behalf of the party? Specify what is expected of the candidates.
   Yes, only on behalf of the party/ Yes, in additional to personal campaign/ No, only personal campaign

60. What presidential elections or elections to the national legislature, if any, has your party boycotted over the last 10-year period?
   Specify what national election, year and the reasons for boycott/ No
61. Has your party recognised, as legitimate, the officially declared winners of presidential elections or elections to the national legislature during the last 10 year period? 
Yes/No specify which winners (presidential or party) and the reason for not recognising them as legitimate.

62. What if any, non-partisan voter education or other civic training activities has the party undertaken during the last five years?

Electoral activities – campaigns – additional comments

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE PARTY

International contacts

63. Which, if any, Party Internationals or other international network of parties is the party affiliated with? (specify)
Party international. (The Christian Democrat-People’s Parties International, The International Democrat Union, The Liberal International, The Socialist International or other); Regional party organisation; Other (including non-partisan international organisations); No international affiliation.

64. Which, if any, sister parties from other countries does the party have contact with?

65. What is the nature of the relationship, if any, with sister parties from other countries (eg policy support, campaign support, training, public relations, funding)?

66. What regular contacts, if any, does the party have with international organisations or party foundations?

National contacts

67. What, if any, formal alliances/cooperation does the party have with other political parties in the country? (Eg common election platform)
Yes – specify/ No, but informal – specify/No

68. What, if any, formal relationships does the party have with the Election Management Body?
Represented as voting members of the EMB; Official observers on the EMB; Other formal relationship; Informal relationship; No relationship

69. What, if any, formal relations does the party have with national civil society organizations?
(Name of organization / Type of relationship / Key issues)
Describe the relationships including name of organization, type of cooperation, funding relationships etc.
Business interests; Corporations – specify; Trade Unions – specify; NGOs, movements, civil society organisations – specify; Religious groups – specify; Other – specify

70. What, if any, media outlets are owned by the party or party leadership, nationally or locally?

External relations of the party – additional comments

FUNDING

71. What, if any, are the spending limits for s/election contests or primaries established by the political party or in legal provisions? Please specify whether party rules or law and give amount in local currency.

72. What amount of funding, if any, are party candidates required to bring to the party in order to secure their candidacy? Specify amount in local currency.
73. **How is funding for campaign purposes distributed within the party?** Describe the distribution and who takes the decisions.

74. **What amount of funding, if any, do candidates receive from the party for their personal election campaigns once they are nominated?** Specify amount in local currency.

75. **What amount of campaign funds, if any, are individual candidates expected to raise for the campaign?** Please provide details.
   
a. Are the candidates expected to raise a specified amount?

b. How are those funds dispersed?

76. **Do local and regional branches raise funds for their own campaign activities?**

77. **What was the total income of the political party in the last election and non-election year respectively?** Specify in local currency.

78. **How much funding, if any, does the party provide to the women’s wing, youth wing, etc and do they have their own sources of income and budgets?** Specify in local currency.

79. **Which are the party’s main sources of income (amount and percentage)**
   
   (In last non-election year / Amount as % of total party income / In the last election year / Amount as % of total party income) Specify in local currency.

   *Public funding from the state; Membership fees; Income from fundraising activities and events; Individual donations; Trade union donations; Donations from associations (list principal donors); Other (please specify)*

80. **What, if any, strategies and methods for fundraising are used by the party?**

81. **What, if any, assets are held by the party (ie. businesses, buildings, etc)?** Specify which ones and if they generate income.

82. **Which are the main expenditures of the party?**
   
   (In last non-election year / Amount as % of total party income / In the last election year / Amount as % of total party income) Specify in local currency.

   *Publicity/propaganda; Salaries; Transportation; Public opinion research (polling/ policy development); National and regional meetings/congresses; Voter education; Election campaign; Other (please specify)*

83. **How, if at all, are regular financial reports of the party (and/or individual candidates) made public?**

84. **How, if at all, are campaign finance reports of the party (and individual candidates) made public?**

**Funding – additional comments**

**QUESTIONS FOR ALL INTERVIEWEES**

85. **What are the most important reasons for change (or lack of changes) in membership, in your opinion?** Please refer to Q30 on membership.

86. **How much influence, in your opinion, do the following bodies have in initiating policy changes or development?**
   
   (Great deal of influence / Fair amount of influence / Not very much influence / No influence at all / Don’t know) Please check that all apply.

   *Affiliated external organisations (trade unions etc); Auxiliary internal party organisations (women, youth etc); Delegates to party congress; Local party; National executive; Parliamentary party caucus/club; Party leader; Party members; Regional party; Significant party donors; Other (please specify)*
87. **How much, in your opinion, do the following bodies participate in debating major policy changes?** (Great deal of participation / Fair amount of participation / Not very much participation / No participation at all / Don’t know) Please check that all apply. 
Affiliated external organisations (trade unions etc); Auxiliary internal party organisations (women, youth etc); Delegates to party congress; Local party; National executive; Parliamentary party caucus/club; Party leader; Party members; Regional party; Significant party donors; Other (please specify)

88. **How much influence, in your opinion, do the following bodies have in finally deciding major policy changes?** (Absolute approval or veto power / Great deal of influence / Fair amount of influence / Not very much influence / No influence at all / Don’t know) 
Affiliated external organisations (trade unions etc); Auxiliary internal party organisations (women, youth etc); Cabinet ministers (if ruling party); Delegates to party congress; Local party; National executive; Parliamentary party caucus/club; Party leader; Party members; Regional party; Significant party donors; Other ((please specify)

**S/election of candidate**

89. **How much influence, in your opinion, do the following bodies have in finally deciding major policy changes?** (Absolute approval or veto power / Great deal of influence / Fair amount of influence / Not very much influence / No influence at all / Don’t know) 
Affiliated external organisations (trade unions etc); All party members; Auxiliary internal party organisations (women, youth etc); Delegates to party congress; Local party; National executive; Parliamentary party caucus/club; Party Leader; Party members; Regional party; Significant party donors; Other (please specify)

90. **To what extent do the following factors, in your opinion, affect positively the chances of candidates to get s/elected by the party?** (Very important/ Fairly important/ Not very important/ Not at all important/ Don’t know) 
Ability at public speaking; Closeness to party leader or senior party officials; Commitment to the campaign; Educational qualifications; Experience of holding party office; Local/regional connections with the community; Name recognition; Personal wealth; Business experience; Trade union experience; Many years of membership; Other (please specify)

**Additional comments**
ABOUT EISA

EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values, practices and enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA is currently the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is also the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

VISION

Realisation of effective and sustainable democratic governance in Southern Africa and beyond.

MISSION

To strengthen electoral processes, democratic governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other strategically targeted interventions.
VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

Key values and principles of governance that EISA believes in include:

- Regular free and fair elections
- Promoting democratic values
- Respect for fundamental human rights
- Due process of law/rule of law
- Constructive management of conflict
- Political tolerance
- Inclusive multiparty democracy
- Popular participation
- Transparency
- Gender equality
- Accountability
- Promoting electoral norms and standards

OBJECTIVES

- To nurture and consolidate democratic governance
- To build institutional capacity of regional and local actors through research, education, training, information and technical advice
- To ensure representation and participation of minorities in the governance process
- To strive for gender equality in the governance process
- To strengthen civil society organisations in the interest of sustainable democratic practice, and
- To build collaborative partnerships with relevant stakeholders in the governance process.

CORE ACTIVITIES

- Research
- Conferences, seminars and workshops
- Publishing
- Conducting elections and ballots
• Technical advice
• Capacity building
• Election observation
• Election evaluation
• Networking
• Voter/civic education
• Conflict management
• Educator and learner resource packs

PROGRAMMES

EISA’s core business revolves around three main programmes namely: Conflict Management, Democracy and Electoral Education; Electoral and Political Processes; and Balloting and Electoral Services.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL EDUCATION

This programme comprises various projects including voter education, democracy and human rights education; electoral observation; electoral staff training; electoral conflict management; capacity building; course design and citizen participation.

ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

This programme addresses areas such as technical assistance for electoral commissions, civil society organisations and political parties; coordination of election observation and monitoring missions; working towards the establishment of electoral norms and standards for the SADC region and providing technical support to both the SADC-ECF and the SADC-ESN.

BALLOTING AND ELECTORAL SERVICES

The programme enhances the credibility and legitimacy of organisational elections by providing independent and impartial electoral administration, management and consultancy services. The key activities include managing elections for political parties, trade unions, pension funds, medical aid societies, etc.
EISA’S SPECIAL PROJECTS INCLUDE:

- Rule of Law, which examines issues related to justice and human rights;
- Local Government, which aims to promote community participation in governance; and
- Political Parties, which aims to promote party development at strategic, organisational and structural levels through youth empowerment, leadership development and development of party coalitions.

EISA’S SUPPORT SERVICES INCLUDE:

- Research
- Publications
- Library
- Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

EISA PRODUCTS

- Books
- CD-ROMS
- Conference proceedings
- Election handbooks
- Occasional papers
- Election observer reports
- Research reports
- Country profiles
- Election updates
- Newsletters
- Voter education manuals
- Journal of African Elections
- Election database
ABOUT IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) was set up in 1995 as intergovernmental body located at the interface between researchers, practitioners and the donor community to promote dialogue, analyses and networking for the purpose of strengthening democratic processes and institutions. IDEA’s current programmes cover three thematic areas: Electoral Processes, Democracy and Conflict Management, and Political Participation. IDEA’s work in the area of electoral processes is the most developed and entails, among other things, the production of global knowledge and tools which cover issues such as electoral systems, representation and participation, and election administration. In 1997 IDEA produced a handbook on electoral systems which has been widely circulated and discussed and which informed electoral system reform processes in several countries. Recently, IDEA published the New IDEA Handbook on Electoral Design, adding material on the political context of electoral systems and the process of electoral system change to the explanation of different electoral systems and their effects contained in the original book.

This year (2005), IDEA is celebrating its 10th anniversary both at its Headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, and also at select venues around the world.

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