AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR SKILLED AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS

TOWARDS STRATEGIES AND INSTRUMENTS FOR SKILLS RETENTION AND UTILIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ACBF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
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AN ACBF OPERATIONS-BASED STUDY BY

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### Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBF</td>
<td>African Capacity Building Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union (formerly the OAU)</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Brain Drain</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIT</td>
<td>Communication and Information Technology</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department of Foreign and International Development, UK</td>
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<td>DMPs</td>
<td>Development Management Professionals</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations</td>
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<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDR</td>
<td>Institute for Development Research, Paris, France</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization, Geneva</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity (Now African Union)</td>
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<td>RQAN</td>
<td>Return of Qualified African Nationals</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAMP</td>
<td>Southern African Migration Project</td>
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<td>SANSA</td>
<td>South African Network of Skilled Africans</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACV</td>
<td>Transport Authority of Cape Verde (National Airline)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOKTEN</td>
<td>Transfer of know-how Through Expatriate Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine</td>
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<td>UMA</td>
<td>Maghreb Arab Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) wishes to enhance the continent’s knowledge of the state and competitiveness of Africa’s labor market and to guide in the design of strategies and instruments for strengthening skills retention and effective utilization of highly skilled African development management professionals in the diaspora. In preparation for the study to review the characteristics of the market for skilled African professionals, ACBF developed terms of reference (TORs) setting out the study’s objectives, scope and expected output. The TORs are quite broad and ambitious and could not be accomplished in a single study. Therefore, this report provides a summary of the results of the first preliminary study, and makes a set of recommendations designed to enable ACBF to make strategic choices about the way forward.

This study is based on a limited review of the literature, Internet search, and email contacts with individuals and institutions known to be actively involved in research or programming in the areas of African transnational migration. The studies reported here include continent-wide studies, country survey studies, case studies, and action programmes designed to reverse the brain drain. While this review is not comprehensive, it is considered representative of the wide range of migration issues and realities facing Africa.

Over the years, African transnational migration has evolved into a more complex and dynamic phenomenon fuelled by both push factors at home, and forces of globalization in the transit and receiving countries. While a new consensus is emerging as to the seriousness of the brain drain, especially for Africa with its limited capacity for economic, social and political development, there is less agreement as to the most effective ways to respond by way of policy or programmes. Most of the studies by international organizations (e.g. ILO, IOM, IDR) take the position that migration is not only inevitable, but it can also be beneficial both to the source and receiving countries. These studies tend to emphasize the important contributions of capital transfers. Studies by or for Africans, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the brain drain and other losses to the emigrant’s community, country of origin, or Africa as a whole.

Country specific studies reported in the report provide more detailed analysis of the effects of migration to the emigrants, their families, communities and country of origin. Taken together, these studies illustrate the range of experiences and responses to emigration by different countries. For example, while South Africa has accepted the seriousness of the loss of professionals due to emigration, and has responded with aggressive and proactive policies and programmes, Cape Verde is seeking to increase its levels of emigration. Survey research conducted at the University of Sussex focuses on West African migration and provides empirical evidence in support of the diaspora option, capital transfers, and the link between emigration, return and poverty alleviation through paid employment or small business development (self-employment).

This review did not find a single empirical study focused exclusively on African development management professionals (DMPs). The operational definition of DMP and associated professions or occupations remains unclear. Most likely, there is no
single labor market for all DMPs. As well, it is not clear which of the development management occupations are truly professional. Drawing on the literature on development policy and management, and using ACBF’s stated areas of competences, a list of possible DMPs has been developed and presented in this report as a basis for discussion and prioritization for subsequent studies.

This report provides a summary of various responses by various actors to the challenges of professional emigration. These responses are grouped into four broad categories of: (i) Diaspora options; (ii) regional initiatives, (iii) research initiatives, and (iv) government policy and programmes. Although the Diaspora options (e.g. RQAN, MIDA) have been tried since the 1970’s, and although they are most popular among international organizations and African governments, there is no conclusive empirical evidence about their cost effectiveness, sustainability, and net impact on the brain drain. As for government policy and programmes, South Africa has developed one of the most aggressive and proactive migration policy and programmes with possible wider implications for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, this report makes ten commendations for ACBF’s consideration and strategic choices for the next steps. While more work is definitely needed, the most effective way forward must be more strategic, focused, targeted, and informed by quality empirical evidence, lessons of experience, and political support and commitment.

The first set of recommendations calls for a clear operational definition and prioritization of DMPs and associated labor markets, and re-examination of the draft TORs in light of the new priorities. The second set of recommendations calls for a re-examination of existing approaches to the brain drain problems with the view to developing different and hopefully more innovative and effective approaches. Specifically, consideration should be given to approaches based on the idea that prevention is better than cure, micro approaches to problems of professional emigration, and national, sectoral or occupational rather than continent-wide approaches.

The third set of recommendations calls upon ACBF to develop carefully selected strategic partners with whom to undertake some of the tasks associated with the next steps forward. Finally, it is recommended that the Foundation should consider taking on the lead role as the African centre of excellence for knowledge management, clearing-house, central network and capacity building in all aspects relating to the management of migration of DMPs.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Research Project

The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) commissioned this project. The terms of reference (TORs) of this project including its objectives, scope, expected output and methodology are as summarized below. Full text of the TORs is in Annex I.

1.1 Summary of Terms of Reference

The African continent, relative to other developing regions, has a relatively thin labour market for well-trained and highly skilled African development management professionals. Improvements in the market condition are imperceptible due to a host of reasons, which include poor pricing of professional skills, low absorptive capacity of most African economies as a result of a weak and stunted private sector, and the coexistence of high unemployment in a number of professions with severe dearth of skills in others owing to the weak correlation between the competencies required by the productive sectors and tertiary educational institutions’ curricular. Other factors that explain the thinness of the labour market include the increasing difficulty in attracting and retaining skills that are in short supply as a result of wide differentials in incentives between Africa and the developed world and socio-political factors on the continent that have made skills retention and effective utilization of capacity extremely difficult. It is in this context that the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is undertaking a study to examine the factors that constrain the capacity of African labour market in attracting and retaining skilled professionals on the continent. The study is being conducted with a view to guiding the foundation on strategies and instruments by which it can effectively contribute to the retention of well trained and highly skilled African development management professionals, reversal of brain drain and the utilization of skilled African development managers in the diaspora in ACBF’s core competence areas. Central to the issues surrounding the market for skilled development management professionals in Africa are factors relating to the flight of human capital from the continent.¹

1.1.1 Objectives

In order to enhance the Foundation and other development agencies’ knowledge of the state and competitiveness of Africa’s labor market and guide the Foundation’s design of strategies and instruments for strengthening skills retention programs and effective utilization of highly skilled African development managers in the diaspora in its core competence areas, ACBF, is conducting a study to review the characteristics of the market for skilled African development management professionals. The specific objectives are to:

- Provide an extensive review of the literature on Africa’s brain drain, identify and rank factors that limit the capacity of Africa’s labor market in competitive

pricing, retention and effective utilization of skilled development management professionals on the continent.

- Profile the type of development management skills that have been most vulnerable to incentives offered by labor markets outside the continent and the sectors most affected by the flight of such skills from African countries.
- Assess the match between the professional skills and occupations of Africans in the Diaspora and the adequacy of the remuneration for their professional competence and experience in the area of development management.
- Assess the intensity of the present outflow of skilled development management professionals and the prospects of stemming the outflow or reversing skills flight over the period of the Millennium Development Goals (2015).
- Evaluate the effectiveness of past and present programs for the reversal of skills flight from the African continent.
- Recommend strategies and instruments by which the Foundation can effectively contribute to the retention of skilled African development management professionals, reversal of brain drain and the utilization of skilled Africans in the Diaspora in the areas in which the Foundation has core competencies.

1.1.2 Scope

The TORs call for a review of relevant country experiences as well as available data and information and carry out analyses that will:

- Provide a profile of the type of development management skills that have been most susceptible to the attraction of labor markets outside the continent.
- Identify and rank the main recipient countries of African development management professionals and the occupational distribution of the skills received by such countries.
- Assess the adequacy of the remuneration for skilled African development management professionals within the continent and the diaspora.
- Assess the capacity of African economies to absorb the supply of skilled development management professionals as well as the impact of unemployment on the pricing of skills and its contribution to skills flight from the continent.
- Identify the main sectors that have suffered the most losses in development management skills especially in the public and private sectors.
- Assess average level of compensation in the public and private sectors and thus for specific professions and skills (in the field of development management) on the continent and the impact it has on brain drain.
- Identify and assess the motives and factors that are responsible for the flight of development management professionals out of the continent.
- Assess the intensity of the present outflow of skilled professionals and the prospects of stemming the outflow or reversing skills flight over the next one and a half decades.
- Assess the effectiveness of past and present programs for the reversal of skills flight from the African continent.
- Make appropriate recommendations with respect to strategies and instruments by which the Foundation can effectively contribute to the retention of skilled development management professionals, reversal of brain drain and the utilization of skilled African development managers in the diaspora.
1.1.3 Expected Output
According to the TORS the expected output of this project will be a report based on assessments, observations and findings that will draw conclusions and present recommendations that would provide a guide to strategies and instruments for strengthening the Foundation’s knowledge of the characteristics of Africa’s labor market and the implications for the pricing of the type of competencies that it is strengthening. The recommendations will also provide a guide to interventions that will strengthen the Foundation’s role in the retention of skilled African development management professionals and the effective utilization of highly skilled African development managers in the Diaspora. Specifically, it would provide key recommendations on strategies and instruments for:

- Short, medium and long-term responses to factors, which limit the capacity of Africa’s labor market to appropriately price, retain and effectively utilize skilled African professionals in development management.
- Effective utilization of African development managers in the diaspora.
- Strengthening effectiveness of on-going programs to reverse the brain drain in Africa.
- Mainstreaming skills retention and effective utilization of professionals in development assistance programs.

The study objectives, scope and expected output are broad, ambitious, and could not be achieved in a single study. This report, therefore, is limited in scope, reporting only the findings of the first phase of the study, based on a representative but limited literature review. Specifically, this report provides a summary of the dynamic and evolving nature and magnitude of the brain drain problem in Africa, focuses on the meaning and dimensions of the development management professionals (DMPs), provides a summary and critique of current responses to the brain drain challenges, and outlines a possible action programme for the study’s next steps.

1.1.4 Methodology
Two consultants were contracted to undertake the initial phase of the study: one based in Africa (Nigeria) and the other overseas (Canada). This was done in order to achieve an effective division of labor in terms of data collection and analysis in Africa and globally. Methods used included a limited review of the literature, Internet search, and email contact of individuals and institutions known to be actively involved in research, writing policy, and programming in international migration. The individuals were then asked to suggest others (individuals and organizations) whom they thought would provide useful information for the study. Attempts were made to contact both academics and professionals in Europe as well as North America. Information on several country case studies was also collected.2

The methodology used suffers from several limitations. First, it must be pointed out that this study is limited to a review of available literature. This study offers no new empirical data on the question of African brain drain for development management professionals. Second, available data and information is biased in favor of bigger and

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2 In May 2003, e-mail contacts were made with Professors Richard Black, Sussex University; Alan M. Finlay, Dundee University; B. Lesley Lowell, Georgetown University; Jean-Baptiste Meyer, Institut de Recherche pour le developpement, Paris; Thomas Staubhan, University of Hamburg; Steven Vertovec, Oxford University; Michael White, Brunn University; Piyasiri Wickramasekara, ILO, Migration Branch; and African Diaspora.
high profile countries such as South Africa rather than the countries believed to be severely affected by the brain drain (e.g. The Sudan, Ghana, Uganda, Togo, Chad). Third, there are serious limitations with the quality and quantity of data and information on the international movement of professionals in and out of Africa. In reply to an earlier inquiry, one of the international experts wrote: “I am afraid it is not easy to find empirical materials on this subject” (P. Wickramasekara, May 10, 2003, personal correspondence). Still, the two consultants together have managed to collect enough data and information to be used as a basis for preliminary observations and directions for the next steps.

1.2 The Nature and Historical Evolution of the Problem
As the pictorial annals of ancient history show, black people have always emigrated out of Africa to other parts of the world, especially Asia, Europe, and the New World. Over the centuries, these migrations, some voluntary, others violently enforced, have always had complex and changing effects on the emigrants, their families, communities and nations left behind.

During and immediately after the colonial period, African emigrations were limited and primarily controlled by the major colonial powers. During World War II, most of the movements of people in support of war efforts were largely intra-continental.

The end of World War II generated its own global dynamics and economic reconstruction and development, leading to greater movements of natural persons. Western countries became interested in the brain drain as a public policy question because it was felt that skilled human capital, especially scientists and engineers were emigrating first from Europe and then Asia to the USA. Indeed, most of the early discussions of the brain drain question in the 1960’s and 1970’s were focused on these countries and regions (e.g. Germany, Great Britain, India, the Philippines, USA). During the period 1970’s – 1990’s, the brain drain debate almost disappeared as an issue of public policy because policy makers in these countries believed that the movement of natural persons between Western Europe and the USA was almost in balance.

However, during the same period, the brain drain question became a North-South issue because of the increasing imbalances in the movements of natural persons in favour of the North and at the detriment of the South. The debate was kept alive by policymakers in the South who used the United Nations system to voice their concerns. In 1973, the United Nations General Assembly requested that the Secretary General prepare a report on how the world would deal with the problem, and the following year, UNCTAD in Geneva issued a report dramatizing the magnitude of continuing brain drain flows from developing to developed countries. It should be noted in passing that the brain drain is not only international or between North and South. It can be local or internal between sectors or regions of the same country (e.g. private versus public sector; rural to urban or coastal regions), regional among neighbouring countries (e.g. South Africa and other

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3 The issue of the poor quality of data in international migration, in general, and African migration in particular has been identified by several researchers, including Bhorat, Meyer and Mlatsheni; (July, 2002), and Lindsay (October, 2001). Stephen Castles (2000) argued that emigration statistics tend to be incomplete and unreliable, especially in developing countries because of: a) reluctance of governments to monitor departures of their citizens, b) high costs of monitoring, c) lack of institutional capacity, d) difficulty of distinguishing between emigrants and people leaving for other purposes (e.g. study, medical treatment), e) high and growing levels of irregular or illegal migration, and f) lack of international uniformity in collecting data.
SADC countries), or South – South (e.g. Ugandan professionals working in Southern Africa). As well, the brain drain is not exclusively an African problem. Both developing (e.g. India, the Philippines) and developed (e.g. the U.K., Canada) countries experience different forms of brain drain involving different professions at different times.4

In February 1975, a conference of experts met at the Rockefeller Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy to discuss the human capital imbalances between the North and the South. Two of the key issues discussed at the conference were the idea of taxation of the brain drain migrants from the South, and the effects emigration has on the incentive and salary structure of the highly skilled professionals in the source (developing) countries. In addition to discussions of the practical problems of taxing brain drain migrants, the Conference also discussed the “ emulation model”, which attempts to explain how the brain drain affects the welfare of the population in the emigrant's source country. Both these ideas were discussed in detail by Bhagwati and Dellalfar.5

During the 1990’s, the brain drain, once again, became a hot topic and an issue of public concern among African policy makers. Several developments help explain the surge in interest and concern. First, during the 1970’s and 1980’s many African countries experienced periods of economic and political crises and conflicts leading to an exodus of emigrants out of the continent, mostly professionals. Second, the fall of the Soviet Union, globalization and the computer and information technology (CIT) revolution combined to increase attention on the plight of refugees, the protection of human rights, and freer movements of natural persons. Third, as the African governments started to implement various aspects of structural adjustment programs (SAP), political and economic liberalization, and other reform initiatives, they found themselves constrained by inadequate supply of skilled national professionals. At the same time, expatriates were found to be both expensive and unsatisfactory.6 In 1997, the African Ministers of Education, meeting in Abuja, called for a renewed interest in the brain drain as a policy and development issue, and the following year (1998), the report of the Presidential Task Force on the Brain Drain was submitted to President Babangida of Nigeria. More recently, a number of detailed studies and high profile stories in the media have renewed the brain drain debate in the SADC region. The government of South Africa has responded with a series of proactive policy measures following the publication of the Green Paper on International Migration (1997), the White Paper on International Migration (1999) and the draft Immigration bill (2000).7

Over the years, the brain drain debate has attracted different audiences for different reasons. At the same time, international migration has evolved into a complex and multidimensional phenomena. For example, emigration is no longer a simple event

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involving a single person making a one-in-a-lifetime decision to leave his or her native country to settle permanently in the receiving country. Rather, contemporary migration involves multiple decisions by individuals, families and even communities moving in and out of several receiving countries, including the original native country. This is particularly the case for young successful professionals who are globally mobile, connected, and for whom family and professional affiliations are more important than nationality or citizenship. At the same time, while a new consensus is beginning to emerge about the seriousness of the problem especially for Africa with its capacity limitations, there is less agreement as to the most effective ways to respond by way of policy and programmes. There are no proven strategies, policies, programmes or tools for reversing the brain drain.

1.3 Outline of the Report

This report is divided into seven sections. After this introduction the next section will present a review of key concepts used in this study. Section Three will present a brief review of the theoretical literature on the brain drain. Section Four will present a review of empirical literature and studies pertaining to brain drain in Africa. Section Five will discuss case studies of six selected countries including five in Africa and one a non-African country (the Philippines). Section Six will discuss some of the key international initiatives undertaken to address the brain drain situation in Africa. Lastly, Section Seven will present some of the main conclusions and recommendations of this study.
2. THE BRAIN DRAIN AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS

2.1 Brain Drain

Termed brain drain, human capital flight represents the loss of highly skilled professionals from a source country to a recipient country as a result of strong attractions associated with differentials in living conditions, opportunities for professional advancement, the existence of an environment that is conducive to peace and security, among a host of other factors. The term brain drain gained currency in the 1950s when it was used in reference to emigration to the United States of first-rate scientists from countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the former Soviet Union. Today, the concept is used more narrowly to denote the flight of highly skilled professionals and academics from developing to developed countries. (ACBF 2003, pp.1-2)

Oni (2003) following Aredo (2000) defines “brain drain” as the outflow of talented, trained and experienced people out of a country. He further views brain drain as “the loss of human capital, that is, loss of knowledge; it is simply intellectual haemorrhage (Chorafas 1968)” (Oni 2003, p.7).

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) sees the concept of brain drain as the “missing critical link” in the management of the African development process (see E/ECA/CM.22/12/Summary). As the ECA observed, the requirements of a well functioning economy include capacity building in macro-economic policy articulation and implementation, good institutions, efficient infrastructure maintenance all of which must interact to sustain productivity. The interaction among these elements is to be engineered by skilled personnel, the available stock of which is constantly being depleted by human capital flight from the continent (Oni 2003, p.7). However, Oni (2003) observes that:

...not all outflow of skilled manpower from developing countries can be regarded as brain drain. According to Aredo (2000), it is rather the out migration of skilled manpower from developing countries, trained with scarce resources and desperately needed for the management of the development process that can be described as brain drain. Thus, it is apt to state that brain drain is a special type of international migration (intellectual haemorrhage) of skilled professionals and knowledge from countries that are already deficient in these resources. (p.12)

The brain drain according to the United Nations definition can therefore be defined as a one-way movement of highly skilled people from developing countries to the developed countries that only benefit the industrialised (host) countries (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997). The above-mentioned description of brain drain is in fact very univocal. Brain drain is a much more multi-dimensional term. (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997).

As was already mentioned, brain drain is not a recent phenomenon. People have always moved between regions in a specific country or different nations for various reasons,
e.g., education, economic and/or political reasons. For example, Mda (1995) reports that KwaZulu-Natal professionals would prefer to stay in KwaZulu-Natal, but are moving to Gauteng to advance their careers.

Articles such as those written by Leistner (1993) and Muller (1991) on the loss of highly skilled professionals from other African countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Uganda to South Africa suggests that the United Nations definition of brain drain referred to above is one-dimensional. A brain drain does not just refer to a loss of skills from developing countries to developed countries, but can also refer to a loss of skills between developing countries. What makes this, such a contentious issue is that in today’s knowledge-based economy skills are a valuable commodity, therefore any loss of skills can seem quite threatening.

Kiggundu (1989) delineates three types of brain drain experienced by developing countries:

(a) “…international brain drain, in which case nationals of developing countries seek permanent employment in industrialized countries such as the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. It involves mostly highly trained and experienced professionals or academics whose skills are in high demand internationally.” (p.172)

This is the most popular type of brain drain discussed in the literature and the one most African managers and policy makers are concerned with.

(b) “…regional, whereby workers, usually young men, seek employment outside their country but within the same geographical regional. Examples include Southern African countries like Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique, whose workers leave for employment in South Africa;” (p.173)

(c) “…internal brain drain whereby human resource movements take place across sectors or regions within the same country. Examples include movements from rural to urban organizations, and from the public sector to the parastatal and then the foreign or indigenous private sector. This type of brain drain involves professionals, technicians, and kindered (PTK) as well as unskilled workers.” (p.173)

More recently, Kiggundu (2002) discusses the brain drain and brain gain in terms of the movements of natural persons as part of the global trade in services. He acknowledges the increasingly competitive nature of the global demand for talent, and the increasingly complex and dynamic movements of professionals across the globe as a result of globalization and openness. It is within this context that the causes of the African brain drain must be understood, and strategic responses developed and implemented.
2.2 The Magnitude of the African Brain Drain

Several studies have documented the magnitude of the problem of the loss of skilled African professionals through emigration. Although precise numbers are hard to come by, and although the net impact of such losses varies by country, region, sector, and over time, the following statements highlight the magnitude and implied impact of the problem:

1. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), between 1960 and 1975 an estimated 27,000 highly qualified Africans left the continent and emigrated to the west. The number increased to approximately 40,000 between 1975 and 1984, and then almost doubled by 1987, representing 30% of the highly skilled African human capital.

Again, in the five-year period 1985 – 1990 when many African countries embarked on the structural adjustment programme to manage their domestic economies that were in serious structural disequilibrium, the continent lost about 60,000 professionals. This trend has gotten worse as about 20,000 skilled people migrate out of the continent annually according to ECA statistics.

2. A World Bank study reported that some 70,000 highly qualified African scholars and experts leave their home countries every year to work abroad, often in the Triad (North America, Europe, and in the United Nations System). There are more African engineers working in the USA than those in the whole of Africa. According to studies done by Jean Baptiste Meyer of the Paris-based Institute for Development Research (IDR), in 1999, ten percent of foreign-born professionals working in France were born in Sub-Saharan Africa. The comparable future for the USA in 1997 was 2.7%.

3. The African born skilled professionals working abroad are five times more productive than their back home counterparts.

4. There are an estimated 20,000 scientists and engineers in Africa or 3.6 percent of the world’s scientific population, serving a population of over 600 million or about 10 percent of world population. At one time, Zambia had over 1600 medical doctors, by current counts; there are now only 400 in practice.

5. According to the UNDP 1993 Human Development Report, there were more than 21,000 Nigerian doctors practicing in the USA alone. Approximately 60% of Ghanaian doctors trained locally in the 1980s left the country, while in the Sudan 17% of doctors and dentists, 20% of university lectures and 30% of engineers in 1978 alone had gone to work abroad.

6. In 2000, Africa News reported that a skilled workers shortage would affect South Africa’s ability to fulfill economic growth targets over the next three to five years. A report by the South African Corporate Services estimated that the shortage of managerial and technical staff was between 350,000 and 500,000.
7. It is estimated that Africa spends about US $4 billion annually on recruiting some 100,000 skilled expatriates and consultants.\textsuperscript{9}

8. Although African countries, communities and villages are receiving increasing sums of remittances from emigrants working abroad, the general consensus is that remittance benefits do not compensate for the net loss of skilled African professional human capital. Reacting to the debate about the relative importance of remittances, Dr. Sako, Executive Secretary of the African Capacity Building Foundation wrote:

At the moment, what is needed in Africa is not evidence of relative benefits from brain drain-revenues generated by emigrant professionals relative to remittances they make to their source countries-but strategies for mitigating the effect in the short to medium term and substantial reduction in the outflow in the longer term. (Sako 2002: 5-10).

9. According to a recent World Bank Report (Adams and Page, 2003), both international migration (the share of a country’s population living abroad) and international remittances (the share of remittances in a country’s GDP) have a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty in the developing world. On average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population will lead to 1.6 per cent decline in poverty headcount.

10. African and other developing countries worry about the brain drain even though any output losses from migration of skilled workers may be more than offset by remittances and positive network effects on trade and investment. The leading African recipients of remittances as a percentage of GDP are Lesotho (26.5 %), Cape Verde (13.6 %), Morocco (9.7 %), and Uganda (8.5 %) (Ratha 2003, p.159). Global remittances come from the USA (30 %), Saudi Arabia (15 %) and Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland (8 % each).

Drawing on the experiences of other developing countries, Castles (2000) gave a more elaborate account of the effects of remittances when he wrote: “At the micro level, remittances have provided resources to improve agricultural enterprises or establish other types of enterprises. At the micro level, remittances have provided a substantial amount of foreign exchange… (emigrants) have often brought new skills as well as experience in a wide range of economic activities. However, without effective policies to maximize these benefits, resources have often gone into unproductive or unsuccessful ventures. The most common investment has been in small-scale enterprises in transport, catering, and other services with skills gained abroad often wasted for lack of relevant opportunities. What is more, by providing individuals escape from economic stagnation, emigration may well have reduced pressure for economic and social change.” (p.55).\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9} For details of these statistics, see World Markets Research Center (www.worldmarketsanalysis.com/InfFocus2002/articles/africa_braindrain.html). Accessed May 10, 2003.

Although the statistics on emigration and its effects are hard to verify, available evidence suggests that African loss of skilled professionals is a serious problem. The evidence also points to the conclusion that overall, the costs outweigh the benefits, and for most countries, the problem seems to be getting worse. Therefore, strategies are needed to gain a better understanding of the complexities and dynamics of the problem, and to develop mitigating strategies and effective policies and management tools.

A key question is the relationship between capacity and emigration. According to evidence from the field, the often-reported African lack of capacity for effective implementation of economic, social and political change and development may well be related to the loss of professional human capital through emigration. Although, losses due to other causes such as disease (HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB), conflict and war also play an important part in the loss of skilled professionals, professional brain drain and other emigration losses cannot be ignored.

2.3 Development Management Professionals

Focusing on development management professionals raises at least three definitional and operational questions. These questions, briefly discussed below, relate to what constitutes a labour market, what is a profession, and what is development management?

Is there a labor market for development management professionals in Africa, and if so what kind of market? Market refers to the availability of information about demand and supply for purposes of exchange or selling and buying. Specifically, market can be defined as a group of potential customers with similar needs who are willing to exchange something of value with sellers offering various goods and/or services so as to satisfy those needs. In terms of the labor market for development management professionals in Africa, here are some observations:

1. The sellers, development management professionals, are not a homogenous group, and do not offer identical or substitutable labor services. Rather, they cover a wide range of abilities, knowledge, skills and competencies. For example, as discussed below, (see Section 2.3.1), they range from economists to accountants, civil service managers and administrators, and political aids. This implies that there is no single clearly defined market for this range of occupational categories.

2. In countries where the government is the dominant employer, there may be one or only a few buyers. For example, there are very limited opportunities for macroeconomists and statisticians outside the public sector. Likewise, where the private sector is underdeveloped, the demand for microeconomists, and production managers is quite limited.

3. Information about demand, supply, and changes in the structure and composition of the labor market for development management professionals is generally not available or accessible either to the buyers or sellers. Most of the development management professionals do not belong to a professional association or trade union, which could provide labor market information, advise or support for collective and informed action.
Put together, these observations lead to the conclusion that, if there is a labor market for development management professionals in Africa, the market is imperfect and thin. Thin and imperfect markets do not allow the theoretical forces of demand and supply to operate, especially where the suppliers of labor are unorganized, and there are few or a single dominant buyer. Different countries or regions have different labor market characteristics. Therefore, as stated in the terms of reference above, before developing strategies and instruments for the effective return and utilization of development management professional emigrants, it is imperative first to gain a better understanding of the nature and dynamics of the labor market(s) which exists on the ground.

Up to now, the term professional has been used without definition or clarification. Yet, it is important to ask the question: What does the term professional mean? Studies focusing on engineers and medical doctors do not have to define professionalism because these are embedded in their training, certification, and continued membership in the profession. With development management occupations, however, it is not clear who is a professional and who is not. Some of the studies have avoided the issue by using formal educational attainment to differentiate among professionals, semi-professionals, and non-professionals. For example, the South African studies discussed below (see sections 4.3 and 5.2) use terms such as tertiary, graduate, masters, doctorate, and postdoctorate. Yet, professions are characterized by the following four attributes:

1. Rules of membership defining who gets in and who stays out. Membership has its privileges, rights and obligations.
2. A set of ethical values, ideology and standards based on the principle that professional conduct must be above personal interests.
3. A body of scientific knowledge associated with the discipline, its members: students, practitioners, researchers and educators who advance and disseminate the changing/advancing knowledge system and practice.
4. An organization, association or trade union for advancing the interests of the profession and its members, and regulating their professional conduct.

Professions are constantly changing and are constantly attempting to establish and defend their jurisdiction in the face of countervailing pressures from competitors, employers, educators, and other players in the external environment. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which the various occupational groupings associated with development management (see table 2.1) can be regarded as professional, using the four criteria above.\textsuperscript{11}

2.3.1 What is Development Management?

There is no universally accepted definition of development management and its component professions.\textsuperscript{12} In a very general sense, it could be argued that all human capital engaged in productive work directly or indirectly contribute to development and its management. Indeed, the Sussex studies in West Africa (see above) seem to imply


\textsuperscript{12} Even though we may not necessarily have a precise definition of Development Management Professionals, a working definition that includes professionals such as Economists, Political Scientists, Statisticians, Financial Management Specialists, Public Administrators, Planners, Policy Analysts and other development managers whose skills correspond to the capacity needs for contributing to the development process based on ACBF six core competence areas provides a useful working guide for the research.
that non-professional (non-elites, self-employed) emigrants contribute as much or even more to development and poverty alleviation than the elites, or those engaged in paid employment. Yet it is important to delineate management development and management development professionals from others in order to better understand and improve the behaviour of the market for skilled African management development professionals at home and in the Diaspora.

In a recent handbook on development policy and management, the authors identify two related component areas of development policy, and development management. They argue that policy development is concerned with strategic thinking and policy formulation in economic, social and environmental sectors. Development management, on the other hand, is concerned with implementation and practice dealing with its political context, public sector management, managing outside the central state, and managing at the project level. In their attempt to link development policy and development management, the authors wrote:

“Management of and for development takes many forms at many levels. At the international level it is largely tied to the implementation of aid policies. At the level of national government it may be seen broadly as the continuation of development administration -- perhaps with some injection of public sector management -- which in most developing countries itself evolved from systems of colonial administration. At “lower” levels development is promoted and managed through specific projects or longer-term programmes both by governments and various non-governmental agencies, with a vast number of local community initiatives by a range of civil society organizations.” (Clarke 2002, pp.8-9).13

Drawing on these and related materials, Table 2.3.1 provides a list of key professions associated with development management. It also provides the basic and applied disciplines, topics, sectors and levels at which development management is applied. In addition to drawing from the academic literature, the table also lists the six priority areas or core competencies for the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) as of the year 2002. Drawing from the combined information, ten broad professional categories are identified and listed in Table 2.3.1.

### Table 2.3.1: Key Professions in Development Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Basic Disciplines</strong></td>
<td><strong>A. Development Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>A. Priority Areas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social sciences</td>
<td>1. Economic policy</td>
<td>1. Economic policy analysis and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Physical sciences</td>
<td>2. Social policy</td>
<td>2. Financial management and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Biological sciences</td>
<td>3. Environment policy</td>
<td>3. Enhancement and monitoring of national statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Applied Disciplines</strong></td>
<td><strong>B. Development Management: Implementation and Practice</strong></td>
<td>4. Public administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic development</td>
<td>1. The political context</td>
<td>5. Policy analysis capacity of national parliaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Industrial engineering</td>
<td>2. Public sector management</td>
<td>6. Professionalization of the voices of the private sector and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Colonial history, administration</td>
<td>3. Managing outside the central state</td>
<td><strong>B. Derived Professions (DMPs)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International development/economics</td>
<td>4. Managing at the project level</td>
<td>1. Economists, bankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Knowledge/technology/transfer</td>
<td><strong>C. Topics</strong></td>
<td>2. Accountants, bankers, financial analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rural development</td>
<td>• Institutional development</td>
<td>3. Statisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cross-cultural studies</td>
<td>• Human resource management</td>
<td>4. Public sector managers, directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Topics</strong></td>
<td>• Service delivery and performance management</td>
<td>5. Administrators, diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional development</td>
<td>• Decentralization</td>
<td>6. Planners, policy analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human resource management</td>
<td><strong>D. Sectors</strong></td>
<td>7. NGO managers, professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Service delivery and performance management</td>
<td>• Agriculture</td>
<td>8. Political aids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decentralization</td>
<td>• Public sector</td>
<td>9. Functional/sectoral specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Sectors</strong></td>
<td>• Social sector</td>
<td>10. CIT specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agriculture</td>
<td>• Social services</td>
<td><strong>E. Levels</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public sector</td>
<td>• Industry and mining</td>
<td>• National, subnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social services</td>
<td>• Transport and communication</td>
<td>• Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Industry and mining</td>
<td>• Transport and communication</td>
<td>• Organizational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several observations can be made about the list of management development professionals listed in Table 2.3.1 above. First, the list covers a broad range from professions and occupations, ranging from accountants and economists to administrators and political aids. This suggests that most likely, these professions do not belong to the same or a single labor market. Second, tested against the criteria for professionalism listed above, one would expect a wide range of results. For example, while accountants, bankers, auditors and financial analysts would score high on professionalism, NGO managers, political aids, diplomats, and public sector managers and directors would probably score lower. Third, communication and information technology (CIT) specialists are included in the list though not specifically identified in the ACBF priority list because of their increasing importance and pervasiveness in development and its management. Finally, the list provides a basis for prioritizing future work relating to the market for skilled African management development professionals. For example, one would expect critical shortages in areas such as statistics, accounting, financial management and CIT specialists, but less pressure for political aids, administrators or NGO managers. These observations suggest that development management is not a
unitary concept, and development management professionals are not a homogenous professional group belonging to a single labor market.

Figure 2.3.1 provides pictorial images of the differentiation of emigrants into different professional groupings. Figure 2.3.1 divides total migration into professionals (however defined), and non-professionals. It then subdivides the professionals into four categories: mathematics, science, engineering, health, medical and life sciences (including agriculture), development management professions (DMPs), and others (e.g. artists, entertainers, soldiers, etc). The DMPs are further subdivided to reflect ACBF’s six priority competencies. As one moves from the top of Figure 2.3.1 (total migration) to the bottom (ACBF priority competencies), the amount of empirical work done on emigration and its effects on development declines. For example, while there are lots of studies on total migration, and several studies on the movement of professionals among scientists and engineers, there are hardly any studies on DMP in general or the ACBF priority cure competencies in particular. Therefore, Figure 2.3.1 provides an indication of possible priority areas for future empirical work – mainly at the bottom areas of the figure.
Figure 2.3.1 Classification of Studies of Migration by Professions

Total Migration

Professionals

Maths, Science and Engineering

Health, Medical and Life Sciences

Development Management Professionals (DMPs)

Non-Professionals

Others

ACBF Priority Core Competencies

Economic Management

Finance and Accountability

National Statistics

Public Admin. and Management

National Parliament

Private Sector and Civil Society Voices

Shaded = currently under-researched
4. A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

This section of the report discusses the theoretical literature that addresses three aspects of the (African) brain drain: (i) causes of the brain drain, (ii) impact of the brain drain, and (iii) general responses to the brain drain.

The main purposes of this discussion are twofold. First, is to link the key concepts presented in the previous section (i.e., brain drain and development management professionals) with factors responsible for the brain drain in Africa, its impacts (negative and positive) and general responses to the challenges posed by brain drain. Second, this discussion will highlight the body of knowledge that informs current policy positions, strategies, programmes, and tools.

3.2 On Causes of Brain Drain

The concept of development management as an institutionalized and a sustainable process implies a progressive transformation of society by people who because of their knowledge and technological know-how are able to manage the process of change. The theories of development and underdevelopment also hinge on the role that people endowed with unequal intellectual capabilities play in the development process. Consequently, the policy and process of engineering national development aspirations are a function of the availability of competent and skilled people who can package and implement good policies and programmes, and provide leadership at different levels of society and the economy.

While the supply of such skilled people in Africa can be said to be inadequate due to a number of constraints that hinder human resources development and capacity building (Oni, 1999a, 1999b), African countries continue to lose skilled development management professionals it so direly needs. Several reasons have been advanced to explain this loss of skilled professionals. Conventionally, sources responsible for brain drain have been grouped into “push” and “pull” factors. Moreover, these push and pull factors can be distinguished into economic, political and social factors.

Most studies on population migration tend to suggest generally that the economic welfare motive seems to be the major reason why people decide to move from one place to the other (United Nations, 1969, 1970; Toure and Fadayomi, 1992; Adepoju, 1983). The general theory is that both the “push and pull” factors of migration are implicitly or explicitly economic. As a rational person, a decision maker would normally wish to maximize his or her income and standard of living by responding to either the push or pull factors or both simultaneously. (Oni 2003)

(a) Economic Factors

To begin with, one of the key factors in the African brain drain is the low absorptive capacity. As such in most African economies this means that even the little quantity of skilled manpower may remain without jobs (ACBF, 2003). The second factor is the relative price of skilled labour between African and European or American labour markets; which has continued to attract skilled labour away from Africa. Thirdly, the underdevelopment of the private sector continues to serve as a push factor to influencing human capital flight from the continent.
Apart from the poor pay in the African labour market, the inappropriate structures of tertiary education also means that there exists an oversupply of skills relative to demand. According to Dudley Seers (1969) there has existed an international market for skilled manpower since the end of the Second World War. The ease of international travel and communication, since the end of the war has further universalized the world labour market. The availability and access of students from the less developed countries to scholarships abroad have also resulted in most instances to the problem of brain drain (Seers, 1969; Aredo, 2000; Mbanefoh, 1992). Imbalances in the quality and opportunities for advanced training and education between Africa and the rest of the world serve as additional initial pull for ambitious young Africans to go abroad. All these factors according to these three authors produce brain drain or the loss of skilled manpower in the poor countries.

The ACBF lists the following as the key economic factors responsible for African brain drain:

- Domestic mismanagement and inappropriate economic policies
- Poor and deteriorating socio-economic infrastructure
- High rate of unemployment, steeply rising cost of living and substantial decline in real incomes and wages due to hyperinflation and currency devaluation/depreciation.
- Drought, famine and the collapse of rural economy.
- Inadequate complementary capacity – trained support staff, equipment, facilities etc. – to facilitate optimum utilization of professional skills especially in the public sector.
- Frustration and demoralization of professionals arising from generally poor working conditions, nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and corruption especially in the public sector.

(ACBF 2003, pp.5-6)

(b) Socio-political Factors

As alluded to earlier, economic factors are not the only sources of African brain drain. Indeed, a number of studies have revealed that a multiplicity of factors could and have indeed combined to set in motion migration streams of experts from Africa. As such social, political and cultural factors too play a significant role. Highlighting the causes of brain drain in Africa, Emeagwali (2003) says:

The primary cause of external brain drain is the unreasonably low wages paid to African professionals. The contradiction is that we spend four billion dollars annually to recruit and pay 100,000 expatriates to work in Africa but we fail to spend a proportional amount to recruit the 250,000 African professionals now working outside Africa” (cited in Oni 2003, p.13)

On political reasons Emeagwali also says: Political instability increases the rates at which professionals emigrate from Africa. Many professionals emigrated during the brutal reigns of Idi Amin (Uganda) Mobutu (Zaire) and Sani Abacha (Nigeria). The war in Sudan between the Islamic north and the Christian south has led to the emigration of half of Sudanese professionals” (Oni 2003, p.13)

The ECA points to macro-economic distortions, balance of payment difficulties, adoption of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in many African countries as the economic conditions that led to the massive outmigration of African professionals from the continent in the mid 1980s. Again the high dependence of many African
countries on foreign technical assistance, and the resulting underutilization of indigenous engineers, architects, planners and managers often lead to the departure of the latter from Africa.

In sum, the ACBF lists the following as key factors:

- Political and social intolerance – persistent tussle over leadership succession, political repression, separatist irredentism and corruption, disillusionment: with political governance, internal conflicts and wars. For instance, in 1982, 22 nations had military rulers. By 1985, the 51 independent African states had suffered at least 60 military coups. For every successful coup, there had been at least one unsuccessful one. These created conditions for the flight of professionals, displacement of people and refugees.

- Political violence (and previously abrupt changes in government often by military coups), political persecution, wide spread use of political power for private gains, corruption and loss of confidence in government. Hopefully, the era of military regimes is gone for good in Africa. The process of democratization is taking roots in virtually all countries in the region.

- Repression of human rights, including academic and professional freedom and lack of political atmosphere conducive to free and open debate. Oftentimes, rather than negotiate, African governments have tended to resort to heavy-handed measures to address demands for better conditions of service by workers’ unions, including academic staff unions of African universities. Some have resorted to proscription of unions, confiscation of union’s assets, subjection of their leaders to harassment, dismissal from work, arrests and detention, and other forms of persecution. (ACBF 2003, p.6)

(c) It is a Combination of Factors

Following Adams and Dirllam (1968), Kiggundu (1989) identifies the following as some of the reasons for the brain drain from developing to industrialized countries: (1) salary and benefits differentials; (2) inadequate professional and career opportunities; (3) large technological gaps and inadequate or weak local technological capacity; (4) lack of willingness to change by the home country; (5) the relevance or applicability of foreign education, training, and attitudes; (6) discrimination; (7) political balkanization or instability; (8) lack of realistic and accurate human resources policies and plans; and (9) restrictive trade practices in the West causing artificial shortages of skilled professionals. (Kiggundu 1989, p.172)

Depending on the precise combination of factors involved, emigration can be perceived by those involved either as a positive step in search of new opportunities and experiences or as a reluctant, but unavoidable flight from one’s home country. Migration from one’s country is always the outcome of a balance between push and pull factors. Oyowe (1996) put it succinctly:

When a highly qualified professional chooses to leave his/her country for another, the person does so for one of several reasons, political or economic; peace and security for him/herself and his/her family; job satisfaction; better conditions of service; higher living standards; etc. Throughout history, countries and centers of excellence, which offer these attractions have received the largest number of professional migrants and these have, in turn, made substantial
contributions, not only to the growth of the economies of their host countries, but also to the scientific and technological advancement of humanity. The wave of German scientists that moved to the US after the Second World War, and their discoveries and inventions, come readily to mind. Thus, on a global level, the free movement and interaction of highly skilled people is a good thing. But the costs to the source countries of losing their professionals are huge – both in terms of development opportunities and lost investment. (cited in ACBF 2003, p.5)

(d) An Organizational Perspective of the Brain Drain

Taking an organizational rather than national perspective, Rosenblatt and Shaeffer (2001) define the brain drain as the exit of employees who hold any skill, competency, or personal attribute that may be considered a highly needed and valuable national community or organizational asset. The brain drain is embedded in the accumulated knowledge in human and intellectual capital of organizations, institutions, communities and nations. The dilemma, according to Rosenblatt and Shaeffer (2001) is that it is the skilled professionals and the talented managers – the very people most needed to effectively tackle decline or crisis – who tend to leave en mass in response to a debilitating and sustaining period of decline or crisis.

Rosenblatt and Shaeffer (2001) explain the brain drain in terms of individual worker attributes, organizations and environmental characteristics. During a period of decline or crisis, similar to those experienced by Africa, the country and its employing organizations will experience the brain drain when its employees are young, highly educated and possess skills in high demand. This will be particularly the case if the employing organizations have limited internal career opportunities, unbalanced workloads, and undifferentiated retention incentives, and the labour market opportunities are plentiful. Full-scale brain drain is triggered when these conditions are met at all the three levels: talented and marketable employees possessing critically needed skills are forced to emigrate due to dysfunctional organizational and management strategies and processes, while more attractive work opportunities abroad pull them away. This seems to have happened in Africa both before and after the crises associated with structural adjustment (SAP), military coups, and civil conflicts.

The brain drain takes place as a result of social influence by the leading employees who, as a result of increasing uncertainty caused by decline or crises, decide to emigrate only to be emulated by their referent others. This creates a bandwagon effect as well as a downward spiralling effect as subsequent waves of skilled emigrants bring the country’s institutions to decreasing levels of performance, reputation and resources, which in turn prompt others to emigrate. This seems to be what is currently taking place in crisis-ridden countries such as Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast. This vicious cycle must be broken in order for the country’s turn around initiative to succeed.

(e) A Comment on the Literature on the Sources of African Brain Drain

Although various studies have identified many causes of the brain drain in Africa, the literature is still limited in at least two areas. First, there has been no empirical attempt to identify the relative importance of the different causes of the brain drain for different professionals under different contextual factors. For example, are junior African professionals more likely to leave due to economic factors and career advancement limitations than the more experienced senior professionals who may be more concerned with opportunities for professional (and national) leadership and contributions? Are the
more senior professionals more susceptible to political pressures as a result of their high profile multiple roles in society? Are countries with strong and effective national professional associations and networking opportunities more likely to retain the related professionals than those with weak domestic professional associations and networking opportunities?

Second, the literature provides no empirical data as to the relative importance of the causes of the brain drain for different DMPs. For example, taking the current ACBF six professional priority areas (see Fig. 2.3.1) there is no information as to whether different pull and push factors operate differently to economists, accountants, bankers, financial analysts, political aids, or DMP managers. Detailed and specific knowledge in these two areas would provide better understanding of the dynamics of the African brain drain and lead to better informed and targeted responses to the professional haemorrhage.

3.3 Impacts of Brain Drain

The impacts of brain drain on source countries have been treated in theoretical literature mostly in terms of their negative effects. Nonetheless, positive effects have also been addressed.

As a negative process, the brain drain is deemed to constitute one of the most serious problems for African countries and their economic, political and social organizations. Kiggundu (1989) emphasizes the brain drain’s “detrimental effects on the organizations’ sustained capacity to perform their critical operating and strategic management tasks with efficiency and effectiveness” (p.172). At the national level, he notes that “the brain drain can be detrimental to the national, regional, sectoral, organizational or institutional capacity to formulate and implement development policies.” (Ibid) The brain drain negative impact is well captured by the ACBF in its statement that:

Concern about the phenomenon has been expressed at various levels and with different degrees of passion among academics, development practitioners, policy makers and development funding agencies among others. A growing number of notable economists and development practitioners hold the view that brain drain is largely a negative externality imposed on the (source) country; amounts to a zero-sum game, with the developed recipient countries getting richer at the expense of the source developing countries, which are getting poorer; at a policy level, the international community should intervene and show greater sense of concern to the issue by implementing strategies, which support international transfers that could compensate the source countries – for instance, a brain drain tax levied on recipient countries and whose revenues should be distributed internationally through development projects. (ACBF 2003, p.2)

The ACBF further observes:

For Africa, the phenomenon represents a major development constraint. It is a huge challenge to capacity building and skills retention on the continent. It represents a major challenge for sustained growth and development. Unless it is effectively addressed, the flight of skilled professionals and academics from Africa will severely undermine the prospects of successful transformation of the continent in the 21st century and the gains expected from the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative. (ACBF 2003, p.2)
3.3.1 The Brain Drain: The Central Role of Human Capital

According to Seers (1969) the decline in the production of technical professionals in the USA and U.K (demographic effect on educational enrollments) -- which led to the supply-demand gap for professional skills -- has further accentuated the demand for skilled technical manpower from Africa (Seers, 1969). Also contributing to the loss of human capital in Africa is the easy access of qualified Africans to global information about job opportunities for which many are very highly qualified.

Table 3.3.1: The Central Role of Human Capital in Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sound macro-econ policy</td>
<td>Human capital formation</td>
<td>Sustained growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oni (2003, p.8)

The central role of human capital formation, capacity building through skill upgrading and technological innovation and manpower utilization (Box B) is shown in the above table. The theory is simply this: the components of Box B interact and directly impact on the variables contained in boxes A and C. While human capital is necessary for developing and maintaining each of the attributes in Box A; Box C also cannot be achieved without a good quality and quantity of the human factors in B. When and where the stock and quality of B is weak, it is bound to affect both A and C and thus lead to slow growth, underdevelopment, poverty and marginalisation of the affected country.

Yet Africa’s main resource during the present millennium will remain the creativity and enterprise of its people. But as Africa continues to lose its best and brightest to the developed world, the continent is simultaneously being eroded of its very critical technological knowledge and development capacity that could put it right on to the global conveyor belt. Human capital flight, otherwise known as brain drain is a serious leakage from the African development management resource pool that must be plugged.

A structural approach to the problem of human capital flight has been adopted by a number of writers and researchers. Some of these writers (David-West, 1989; Mbanefoh, 1992; Aredo, 2000) have adopted different theoretical constructs within the same framework.

Mbanefoh, (1992) differentiates between the internationalist and what he calls the nationalist schools of thought. Relying on the work of Grubel and Scott (1966), her internationalist model therefore has its roots in the classical theory of the market for the factors of production.

The tradition of laissez-faire assumption of the internationalist school is that unrestricted migration of labour is a means of optimizing the allocation of human capital and other factors of production. Thus, to Mbanefoh, brain drain could be seen

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14 This section is drawn from Oni’s report (2003).
as a product of the globalisation of the world labour market (p.9). She therefore argues that for the internationalist,

... The world has become one market for highly qualified manpower. There is, therefore, no such thing as brain drain but only free movement of one factor of production. Such movement implies that labour simply locates in a country where it is most needed and where it will have the highest marginal productivity (pp. 9 – 10; cited in Oni 2003, p.9)

Extending the arguments of the internationalists further, Mbanefoh (1992) amplifies the argument of Baldwin (1970), which suggests that labour migration does not strip less developed countries (LDCs) of badly needed manpower, but relieves them of the surplus manpower which their labour markets cannot absorb. This position of the internationalist school is also strengthened when Mbanefoh summarises her views by stating that brain drain is beneficial to the individual migrant and the country of origin. To the individual, it provides him with the opportunity to escape from unemployment into a market where his skill can earn him an income. It also affords him a higher standard of living for himself, family and relations left behind at home. To the country the returned migrant eventually comes back with needed productive skills and knowledge that can benefit the local economy. (Oni 2003, pp.9-10)

The report of the Presidential Task Force on Brain Drain submitted to President Babangida (Nigeria) in 1989 adopted this neo-classical framework that is supported by the internationalist school. Some of the highlights of the report are that: human capital flight from Nigeria is advantageous to the country because it:

(i) facilitates the acquisition of additional skills by “drained” brains
(ii) increases foreign exchange (remittances)\(^{15}\)
(iii) enhances transfer or adaptation of technology
(iv) creates robust employment opportunities
(v) improves diplomatic relations for Nigeria.

Therefore based on only one leg of the structuralist frame of reference, the recommendation of the Task Force was implicitly in favour of encouraging the brain drain. (Oni 2003, p.10)

The other perspective (nationalist) of the brain drain phenomenon explains its disadvantage to the origin of brain migration. According to Aredo (2000) the neo-classical school introduced refinement to the classical theory of migration. The refinement recognizes the presence of winners and losers at the origin and destination of migration stream. Basically, it suggests that the migration of skilled workers from developing countries narrows inter-country wage differentials. The school suggests that the out-migration of skilled labour from developing countries helps to solve the problem of unemployment. It also raises wages which impact on the demand for goods and services thus raising household welfare in the poor countries. (Oni 2003, p.10)

However, the nationalist school or the center-periphery framework of analysis believes that human capital flight takes place between countries that are economically and

technologically unequal. This widens rather than narrows the development gap between them. The economy and development prospects of the sending country are therefore constrained by the lack of expert knowledge, entrepreneurs and good managers. Ghosh and Ghosh, (1982) also note that if structural problems remain unresolved and population growth is uncontrolled in the poor countries, out-migration of talent is most unlikely to solve the problem of labour market disequilibrium. Given the structural nature of the problems of the economic and technological backwardness of many LDCs, brain drain cannot be singled out as the main cause of the gap between the rich and poor countries (Aredo, 2000). (Oni 2003, p.11)

Interestingly, the structural framework of analysis and especially that which assumes the laissez faire perspective -- the policy implication of which is pro-brain drain a la the Nigerian report referred to earlier -- has been demolished. In his own opinion, Professor Tam David-West (1989) a virologist, social commentator and one time minister had observed that it is nonsense to talk of additional skills to be acquired by the drained brain. Those brains that leave Africa for the west “ are in fact the ultimate reference points of their new stations”. It is also ridiculous, David-West argues, to talk of improved foreign earnings without denominating this to specific beneficiary: the nation or the drained brains. Again, it is an illusion to believe that brain drain would facilitate the transfer of technology. No nation voluntarily transfers its technology just as the African witch doctor would not voluntarily give away his secrets. (Oni 2003, pp.11-12)

The employment opportunities argument is also not sound as when the professionals check out, the boots they leave back at home become too big for those left behind. It is germane to also point out that human capital flight is a major constraint on the intergenerational transfer of knowledge and ideas. This is costly for Africa as the world economy today is driven by a most critical engine: knowledge, which the continent does not have enough of. (Oni 2003, p.12)

The failure or refusal of many Africans who studied abroad to return to their home countries after completing their studies means that one in three African professionals ... live outside Africa. This means that African universities actually produce a third of their graduates for the labour market outside the continent. To quote Emeagwali (2003) again,

We are operating one third of African universities to satisfy the manpower needs of Great Britain and the United States so the African education budget is nothing but a supplement to the American education budget. In essence, Africa is giving developmental assistance to the wealthier nations which makes the rich nation richer and the poor nations poorer.

This is because it is the best, brightest, and most innovative professionals that migrate or fail to return after their training. Development management and ipso facto economic growth, modernization and globalisation are engineered by people with knowledge. Knowledge is development; lack of it is underdevelopment. Human capital loss is therefore a slow death for Africa. (Oni 2003, p.14)

3.3.2 Positive Effects of Brain Drain?
Traditionally, the literature on the benefits of brain drain to the source countries has considered the main benefits to include: (a) remittances to relatives back home, (b) skills and experience gained abroad and brought back by returnees, and, (c) the reduction of the underutilization of skills associated with imbalances between

In addition to the discussion on the traditional benefits associated with the brain drain, current studies provide further insights into the potential gains from brain drain that can accrue to source countries. (Stark et al., 1998; Mountford 1997) In contrast to the traditional discussion, where benefits considered are those that accrue after emigration, the current literature focuses on the benefits that may accrue prior to emigration. These benefits include enhanced human capital formation arising from incentives generated through the probability of emigration. In this view, a source country benefits from the brain drain when its citizens are induced to develop skills in anticipation of emigrating to higher prospect careers. However, whether these benefits do indeed occur and whether this process is in the best interest of the source countries is an open debate.

3.4 Responses to African Brain Drain

Over the decades, individuals, groups, institutions, communities, governments and the international community have responded to the challenges of transnational migration by undertaking initiatives designed to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits or reverse the losses. Most of these initiatives have been initiated or supported by the international community, but governments and individual emigrant groups have also been active. These initiatives are taken with a clear understanding that deliberate efforts need to be taken. Moreover, as the ACBF puts it:

… brain drain from the continent cannot be stopped by force or legislation. The issue has to be addressed both at national and regional levels. Africa must face up to the challenge of ending wars and other forms of conflicts, vigorously pursuing democratic processes to consolidate peace and good governance; enhancing professionalism in the public sector and implementing reward systems that encourage attraction and retention of high quality professionals, among others. Until these are done, as promised under the NEPAD initiative, the specter of human capital flight will continue to hang over the continent. (ACBF 2003, p.6)

Explaining why professionals emigrate and some of the measures taken to prevent the departure (and also induce the return) of professionals, Grubel and Scott (1977) observe that:

The small well-informed market, the low psychic cost of moving, the likelihood of persistent market disequilibria, the low cost of transportation relative to income … creation of prestigious endowed chairs at universities, invitations to individuals to serve as directors in industry, advisors to government agencies, parliamentary committees and cultural activities … these methods have in fact succeeded in some countries and have both prevented the departure and induced the return of some prominent scientists engineers, and professionals. (1977, pp.24-5)

In discussing solutions by developing countries to the brain drain problem, Adams and Dirlam (1968) suggest that these countries should: (1) raise and revise salary structures; (2) increase professional opportunities; (3) increase the receptivity to change; (4) reform the educational system and rationalize manpower policies; (5) promote regional economic integration and resist political balkanization; (6) eliminate discrimination and bigotry; and (7) remove trade restrictions of professional associations in the “pull”
(receiving) countries which create artificial human resources shortages. The causes of the brain drain are so complex that different countries must seek their own unique solutions based on a clear understanding of its causes and consequences. The international brain drain is the most difficult to resolve. (Kiggundu 1989, p.174)

Kiggundu (1989) also observes that to the extent that an important aspect of the brain drain in most developing countries is the low level of participation and utilization of women both in the management of organizations, and in the general development process, it is crucial that this dimension be taken into consideration. This underutilization is reflected in various ways. Kiggundu notes:

Women work long hours performing a variety of unpaid domestic jobs such as toiling on the family farm, raising children, preparing meals, fetching water and firewood, washing clothes, and looking after the general welfare of the family. However, their participation rate in paid employment, especially in management, professional, and technical jobs, remains very low indeed. In many of these countries, women have traditionally had limited access to income, wealth, and opportunities to participate in development activities such as education, credit, and senior political and administrative appointments. Even in matters where women have more knowledge and experience than men, they are often excluded from the making or implementation of important decisions. (Kiggundu 1989, p.175)

Kiggundu further argues that the “causes of the underutilization of women are not only economic; they are also deeply rooted in the social, cultural, and political ethos of society. They are often based on long-standing traditional religious, ethnic, racial, and tribal values, belief systems, and practices.” (Ibid) “Accordingly”, he suggest that

...solutions to the underutilization of women must be systemic and long-term, and must deal with society’s inherent gender biases. Practical programs must be directed especially at the men and women in these countries who are already in positions of power and influence and whose decisions directly affect present and future utilization of women in the development process. (Kiggundu 1989, p.175)

In addition to considering the involvement of women in development management, Kiggundu offers an organization-oriented solution, particularly with regard to human resource management (HRM). He posits that:

From an organizational point of view, the brain drain is a symptom of an ineffective HRM function and its solution therefore requires systematic management of the internal systems of the employing organizations (e.g., human resources, financial management) and the relevant factors in the external environment (e.g., political, social-cultural and technological). (see Kiggundu 1989, p.175)

As such Kiggundu suggests that:

Another solution is the development of more creative HRM programs. For example, a national carefully designed program of public/private sector personnel exchanges, whereby the participants are selected and paid on the basis of superior performance, can minimize the negative effects of the internal brain drain in the private sector. (Kiggundu 1989, p.175)
Additionally, Kiggundu recommends that developing countries develop effective programs to attract back their expatriate nationals as well as strive to better utilize foreign expatriates working in developing countries. In this regard he observes:

Ozgediz (1983) found that more than half of technical assistance to developing countries is spent on expatriates. In Botswana, although the number of expatriates as a percentage of total public service employment has declined from 8.5 percent one decade ago to 6 percent in 1982, they still occupy 51 percent of the professional and 29 percent of the technical positions. Moreover, here, as elsewhere in Africa and other low-income regions, they exert greater influence in managing and shaping the direction of these organizations, much more than their numbers would suggest. (Kiggundu 1989, pp176-7)

In a nutshell, the common responses to the African brain drain include:
1. The Diaspora options
2. Regional initiatives
3. Research initiatives, and
4. Government policy initiatives

Briefly, Diaspora options cover a wide range of initiatives all designed to turn the brain drain into a brain gain, by focusing emigrants in the Diaspora to return or redirect the services of their professional expertise to the development of the community or country of origin. Most Diaspora options are driven by the international community, especially the specialized agencies of the United Nations system working with national governments. Examples include TOKTEN, RQAN, and MIDA.

Regional initiatives, e.g., the Dakar Declaration, are aimed at what can be achieved at the regional, rather than national level. Research initiatives encompass several research programmes such as the Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa by the Sussex Center for Migration Research. Governmental policy initiatives include all such proactive public policy initiatives in response to a deteriorating migration situation.

The above four categories of responses are discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 6 below.
4. **A BRIEF REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE**

4.1 **Introduction**

It is not possible to undertake a comprehensive review of the literature of the international migration and its effects on the African labour market for professionals. Instead, we have undertaken a selective review of the literature focusing mainly on the more recent empirical studies, studies covering as much of the continent as possible, studies done by international organizations with access to data and information, and a few country case studies, used to illustrate specific issues, policies or programmes.

4.2 **The ILO Studies**

The International Migration Branch of the ILO, together with the British Department for International Development (DFID) have undertaken a series of empirical multi-country studies examining the impact and policy responses of migration of highly skilled persons from developing countries. Using 1990 data, the study found that developing countries experience losses of at least 10-30 percent of the highly educated workforce. Such losses are greater than the simple loss of investment in educating the emigrants and the immediate result is a reduction in economic growth for the developing country.

The study also identified several positive benefits that the brain drain can generate by way of feedback effects for the migrant source countries. The authors argued that whether a brain drain reduces the source country’s growth depends upon the degree to which its direct negative effects are offset by favourable economic and migratory feedback effects. They put forward the notion that there may be an optimal level of emigration or a “beneficial brain drain”. The various feedback effects include the return of out-migrants with enhanced experience, knowledge and work ethics, knowledge/technology transfer of expatriates who remain abroad, monetary remittances, and increased trade opportunities.

If there is an optimal level of emigration that stimulates the pursuit of higher education in source countries, and spurs economic growth, then African governments should choose to take advantage of high skilled emigrants. This calls for further empirical research, policy and practical considerations. Box 4.2.1 below provides a summary of eight policy responses to high skilled emigration, the Eight R’s. The policy responses listed in the box include the traditional ones (e.g. return of migrants, taxation, Diaspora options) as well as new ones (e.g. reutilization of repatriated capital), emphasizing the importance of creating an enabling environment for the effective utilization of repatriated capital resources. Finally, the study discusses several examples of regional initiatives to the brain drain, including the West African Migration and Development Plans, which are discussed below under the Dakar Declaration.

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### Box 4.2.1: Policy Responses to High Skilled Emigration: The “Eight R’s”

1. **Return of Migrants to their source country**  
The return of emigrants is one sure way to cultivate human capital for source countries, especially when there is value added from working abroad. Permanent return tends to be the focus of most such policies (kindred temporary return programs are under Diaspora Options below).

2. **Restriction of international mobility**  
Many developing countries have restrictive emigration policies that make it difficult for their nationals to take good jobs abroad. Most countries restrict the immigration of foreign nationals to protect their domestic workers from competition.

3. **Recruitment of international migrants**  
If there are domestic shortages of skilled workers, for any reason, why not court foreign workers? For example, the information technology revolution sparked a worldwide competition for workers: new policies worldwide ease numerical and “protective” regulations on admissions.

4. **Reparation for loss of human capital (tax)**  
A favourite but never implemented economic prescription in the 1970s, the idea is that developed countries either compensate source countries, or that emigrants directly submit taxes, to deal with externalities created by the immediate loss of human capital.

5. **Resourcing expatriates (Diaspora options)**  
Skilled emigrants abroad can be a significant resource, especially if ongoing contact between academic and private sector institutions is fostered. Government and private sector initiatives seek to increase communications, knowledge transfer, remittances, and investment.

6. **Retention through educational sector policies**  
Creating a highly educated workforce begins with strengthening domestic educational institutions. A viable system that encourages graduates to stay within the system, retains people, and ensures that the source country keeps its original investment in education.

7. **Retention through economic development**  
Giving people a reason to stay (or return) is doubtless the most effective policy for reducing emigration and the surest long-term means of boosting average human capital, as well as economic growth.

8. **Reutilization of repatriated capital**  
Providing a climate and institutional infrastructure and support to ensure that repatriated capital -- human, social, intellectual, financial, technological, managerial -- is effectively utilized in the source country for economic, political and social development for the benefit of all citizens.

**Source:** Based on B. Lindsay Lowell (2001), p.4.
4.3 ILO and DFID Study of South and Southern Africa

Most of the empirical work on international migration in Africa is focused on South Africa.18 Here the review is limited to the study jointly sponsored by the ILO and DFID. This study was motivated by the publication of the UK government (DFID) White Paper on International Development, which raised the concern that if African and other developing countries are to be successfully integrated into the global economy, a large outflow of skilled persons poses the threat of a brain drain, which can adversely impact growth and development. The White Paper clearly pointed out that developed countries -- the main recipients of African skilled professionals -- must be more sensitive to the impact of the brain drain on countries at different levels of development.19

The study, drawing on the work of the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) defined a skilled South African as “someone who is at least twenty years of age, who has completed high school and possesses a Technikon diploma or University degree from a recognized institution and is currently economically active”.20 Therefore, this and related SAMP studies do not focus exclusively on DMPs.

4.3.1 Study Findings

The key findings of the study are:

1. New estimates of the outflow of skilled persons from South Africa show emigration to be much higher than officially recorded.
2. The brain drain issue in South Africa in particular, and other African countries in general, has become a very big concern, a national, often emotional issue crystalling many anxieties about the future of the country and continent.
3. South Africa gives other SADC countries more skilled professionals than it receives, except Zimbabwe, which sends more skilled professionals to South Africa than it receives.
4. The UK is the destination of choice for most emigrants from South Africa and other SADC countries.
5. Statistics show that South African tertiary institutions are producing less graduates in critical areas of need for growth and development (e.g. engineering), and producing a growing number of graduates in fields where demand for these skills has not been growing -- thus the need to align national education and training with human capital requirements and migration.
6. Skilled emigrants contribute to intergenerational loss of the “gene pull”. According to the study, skilled professionals who emigrate are more likely to leave the country with dependents. These dependents, specifically the children of the primary income earner, have a high probability of also being skilled workers of the future. This future cohort of workers is also lost to the local

19 For the White Paper, see “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalization Work for the Poor” (DFID, 2000).
economy leading to a potentially larger number of educated professionals lost to the brain drain.

7. The study also found that as South Africa becomes more acutely aware of the negative impact of its brain drain to its economy and society, its aggressive and proactive responses are likely to have negative effects on other African countries with less aggressive and strategic migration policies and programmes.

4.3.2 Study Recommendations

The study made two main recommendations. First, African governments should cooperate with receiving countries to improve the quality of migration data and exchange of information as a basis for informed discussion, policy and programmes. Second, the study recommends supporting the mobilization of Diaspora resources to promote development in Africa.

4.4 The Sussex African Migration Research Project

At the University of Sussex, the Sussex Centre for Migration Research is undertaking an extensive program of research on the transnational migration, return and development in West Africa. Funded by DFID, and directed by Professor Richard Black, the objectives, context, key research hypotheses, and practical value of the research are summarized in Box 4.4.1 below. Although mainly focused on Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, individual research projects include other West African countries such as Senegal, Mali, Cape Verde, and ECOWAS as a region.21

Although the research programme has so far lead to several working papers, only two studies focused on Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire will be briefly reviewed here.22 These two studies were selected because of their objectives, methodology, and empirically based results. Both studies explore the extent to which the process of migration and return have contributed to development and poverty alleviation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire through the promotion of small businesses. They both examine the role of acquisition of human, social, and financial capital whilst the emigrants are abroad. One of the studies (Black, et al), discusses the extent to which public policy incentives and constraints have affected the promotion of small enterprises among returning migrants. These two studies provide empirical evidence on the Diaspora option, capital transfers (e.g. remittances), and the link between emigration, return and poverty alleviation through either self or paid employment.

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21 In March 2003, the centre organized and International Workshop on Migration and Poverty In West Africa and a number of papers were presented. Some of these papers were posted on the centre’s web site.
Box 4.4.2: Summary of The Sussex African Migration Research Project

**Title:** Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa: TRANSREDE Research Project.

**Sponsors:** UK Government (DFID)

**Institutional Home:** Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex

**Director:** Professor Richard Black (R.Black@sussex.ac.uk)

**Research Objectives:** The main purpose of this research is to examine the implications of international mobility for the meeting of international development targets, specifically the targets of poverty reduction and sustainable development.

To examine this relationship, it is important to break contemporary international migration down into a number of component parts. Most prominent amongst media representations of international migrants are predominantly poor, unskilled labour migrants and would be asylum-seekers, for whom a successful strategy of migration might be expected to have a direct and positive effect on alleviating poverty (through removing poor people from national poverty statistics, and providing remittances). Selective male migration may also enhance job opportunities for women and encourage the education of girls, impacting on gender-specific poverty rates. However, the migration of the highly-skilled -- the so-called “brain drain” – may also have a direct effect on these development targets, which may be positive or negative. For example, the removal of skilled manpower may limit governments’ ability to implement policy initiatives on poverty reduction. In contrast, their (probably larger) remittances may have an impact on employment generation for poor people. The return, or reengagement of either group with their home country may threaten the flow of remittances, but at the same time present opportunities for the mobilization of human, social and/or financial capital that can contribute to development targets. Each of these processes is amenable to investigation, and to a certain extent, quantification, through a variety of social science techniques.

**Context of the Research:** This study … [focuses] on Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, two cases that are particularly interesting because they illuminate contrasting historical and cultural backgrounds as well as contemporary political and economic contexts. They also present varied levels of skilled and unskilled migration. Historical and political linkages heavily influence the direction of flows. Thus whilst Ghana has traditionally been characterized by skilled and unskilled migration mainly to the United Kingdom, Cote d’Ivoire has provided mainly skilled and unskilled migrants to France. In practice, both countries are seeing an increasingly diverse range of destinations, including a strong increase in the numbers moving to the United States.

Comparing the empirical findings from these two case studies will allow the research team to critically analyse the commonalities and dissimilarities, and to appropriately illuminate this critical policy issue and its practical implications.

**Key Research Hypotheses:**

This study has three main hypotheses:

1. **The migrants’ experience abroad.** To what extent do migrants of different types acquire the ability or desire to contribute towards poverty reduction and development initiatives in their home communities whilst overseas? Is there gender selectively in the migratory process, and do women and men have different migratory experiences? Also, is there evidence of migrants or their associations engaging with initiatives to promote micro-enterprises, employment, or community development projects?

2. **The return and transfer of resources.** Why do migrants return? Is public policy significant in influencing return? Is permanent return a prerequisite for transfers of human, social and financial capital to occur? Where capital transfers do occur, are these invested in activities that address poverty for specific sections of the home population?

3. **The migrants’ experience on return.** How do migrants adapt and readjust back home? What
obstacles do they encounter in utilizing their newly acquired capital in their home economies and societies? What resistance do they face in the workplace, family, and social environments? What is their role in the design and implementation of policies or initiatives aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable development? What is their contribution to the development of micro and small-scale businesses, and/or employment creation for poor people? What is their contribution to promoting good governance and management excellence in the public and private spheres? How do the roles of skilled and unskilled returnees differ? Are there different impacts in rural and urban areas?

**Practical Value of the Research:** The potential contribution of African migrants’ in combating poverty, and promoting sustainable development activities in their countries of origin cannot be overstated. This consideration has led to the development of specific approaches to prevent the loss, and promote return of high-level manpower, as well as a more general concern amongst governments to reach out to their migrant Diasporas. However, few policy levers have been shown to be effective because their monetary, social, and political costs are generally very high. Some schemes have been conceived to attract highly skilled migrants back home by securing their employment for instance, and covering travel and shipment expenditures. It is assumed that highly skilled African migrants who have lived and worked abroad have an ‘added value’ (i.e., experience and training), and that their return is the way to realize this value. Yet their actual role in the development of their home economies and societies appears limited.

The retention of returned migrants is a particular challenge. Reintegration is an essential aspect of return migration, yet a well-paid job may be only a minimal aspect of this complex process. In fact, recent research findings show that the emigration and motives of highly skilled Africans are not necessarily linked to income differentials. Poor labour standards, an absence of career opportunities, and difficult socio-economic and political conditions are important push-factors. These are also important determinants of the reintegration process, and can considerably affect the propensity of both returned migrants, and those who stay abroad, to invest in activities that can reduce poverty and foster sustainable development. A better understanding of the patterns and dynamics of return migration and reintegration in the West African context is thus essential to alleviate the costs of financial and human capital transfers and ensure that the benefits are both maximized and sustained.


4.4.1 A Synopsis of Sussex Studies

These papers were also selected because they used sound methodology. Specifically, the studies used a combination of questionnaire-based interview surveys of returnees in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, and conducted in-depth and focused interviews in London and Paris. Although the overall methodology used in these studies is much more rigorous than what one commonly finds in migration research, there were several limitations. For example, the sample sizes were small (about 150 for each country), the data were cross-sectional self reports with no objective, longitudinal or archival data.

Here is a summary of the key empirical findings:

1. Migration, followed by a return to self employment and the creation of a small business can represent a potential strategy for poverty alleviation (even) when the returnees are less educated.
2. Compared to those in paid employment, self-employed returnees reported higher levels of income, assets, ownership, and standard of living. Self-employed returnees were therefore generally better off economically than those in paid employment even if they came from lower occupational groups and had less education before going abroad. They were also better off than those who did not migrate.
3. All returnees reported significant transfers of capital (financial, human and social). Specifically, for financial and certain kinds of human (e.g. work
experience) and social (e.g. professional contacts) capital, self-employed returnees reported greater transfer, or transfer among a greater number of people than for returnees in paid employment.

4. Women are underrepresented among highly skilled intercontinental migrants and returnees.

5. While older migrants (those who left Africa at least 20 years ago) went abroad to study overseas for courses not locally offered, the young generation is leaving primarily to study abroad because the quality of education has seriously worsened in their home country. This has significant implications for migration and return since young migrants are less likely to return to their native country.

6. More than two-thirds of the emigrants returned home with the expectation that they would have better professional opportunities than they had abroad.

7. Although emigrants returned to their native countries because of a sense of obligation to their country, community or family (older generation), a desire to contribute, be recognized in the social or professional community, and set up a business (Ghanaians more than Ivorians), they also reported the existence of the Diaspora glass ceiling. This is the realization, usually at mid career, that as emigrants, their chances of upward career or professional mobility abroad are limited. Accordingly, they choose to return to their native countries where, given overseas work experience, they perceive better opportunities for upward career, professional or managerial mobility.

   • The potential for governments or international institutions to influence return decisions is limited because of “migrants’ mistrust of government.”

Taken together, the empirical results of these two studies support the hypotheses relating to the significance of capital transfers (remittances, knowledge, skills and work experience). They also support the claim that the process of migration and return contribute to development and poverty alleviation. These results are stronger for self-employed returnees than for those in paid employment.
5. SELECT COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

5.1 Introduction

This section provides a brief description of specific country experiences with transnational migration, its effect and management. The six countries chosen are South Africa, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cape Verde and the Philippines. These six countries provide a range of contrasting experiences and responses to their respective changing realities of transnational migration. For example, while South Africa is experiencing serious loss of professionals through emigration and declining immigration, Cape Verde wants more of its nationals to emigrate because of the importance of migration to the national economy. Although the Philippines is not an African country, it is included here because it has one of the longest and most elaborate history of managing transnational migration. Over the years, the country has experimented with various policy options and undertaken institutional capacity building, specifically for migration management. Its experiences offer instructive lessons for African countries experiencing similar challenges of managing transnational migration and the brain drain.

It is expected that the total experiences of these country case studies reflect the realities and challenges of other African countries as they come to terms with their own transnational migrations in general, and the brain drain in particular. Information about these case studies is provided here as a basis for other countries to draw out lessons of experience relevant to their own realities.

5.2 South Africa

As Box 5.2.1 shows, South Africa has one of the most serious emigration problems among its professionals. Loss of skilled professionals directly and negatively affects its economy and society. Since 1994, there has been a high degree of public, media and official government acknowledgement of the key issues and challenges associated with high professional emigration and low migration levels. Accordingly, South Africa has one of the most proactive responses to the brain drain problem. Government has responded strategically with new and aggressive immigration policies, legislation, and programmes. The people of South Africa have responded by developing various Diaspora options such as SANSA, and the international community has responded with programs such as RQAN and MIDA (see Box 5.2.1).

This case study provides an example of a country aware of the negative impact of the loss of professionals through emigration, and taking collective action in the hope of turning the brain drain into a brain gain. The experiences gained here should be potentially useful for other countries facing similar emigration challenges. The country also provides fertile ground (e.g., baseline data) for tracing, monitoring, and evaluating the effectiveness of the various policy initiatives over the medium and long-term. It should be noted, however, that there is no empirical evidence pointing to the effectiveness of these initiatives in terms of reversing the brain drain in South Africa.

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23 The original research design called for coverage of more African country case studies. Unfortunately, practical limitations made this impossible.
**Box 5.2.1: South Africa: Brain Drain or Brain Gain?**

### Nature and magnitude of the Brain Drain Problem

South Africa is experiencing a significant and protracted period of brain drain of professionals, semi-professionals and technical personnel. Between 1989-97, a total of 233,609 South Africans emigrated, 41,000 of them professionals. In the period 1994-97 a total of 24,196 professionals emigrated. The brain drain has been increasing: post 1994, the annual emigration of professionals was 56 percent higher than for 1989-94. The brain drain, however, is not a recent phenomenon: pre-1994, South Africa experienced a substantial net emigration of professionals. The United Kingdom is the destination of choice, but three quarters of the emigrants go to five countries: UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

More than 77 percent of South African migrants to the USA have tertiary education. Over the last decade, an estimated 10,000 South Africans engaged in science and technology, and a similar number in health and medicine emigrated. The problem is double edged: high emigration; falling immigration. No separate figures are available for development management professionals (DMPs).

Emigration of professionals is likely to continue. A recent international survey of the well educated found that the likelihood of them remaining was lower for South Africa than any other country except Russia (*The Economist*, July 10, 1999, p.116). The movement of all occupations and of professional and semi-professional categories track each other very closely, suggesting that there are similar explanatory underlying factors for immigration. As of 1995, South Africa became a net supplier of professionals to the SADC region. A recent survey indicated that the majority of black professional emigrants are satisfied and optimistic about the future of South Africa.

South Africa continues to have significant shortages of skilled workers. Restrictions on the immigration of professionals and skilled workers serves therefore to retard development and to exacerbate inequalities. Countering emigration is far more difficult. There is a need for much further research on the factors that underlie current trends in the immigration and emigration of professional, semi-professional and skilled persons from South Africa.

### Drivers/Factors of Brain Drain in South Africa

Historically, South Africa has always relied on emigrants for its professional and semi-skilled labour market needs. For the first time since the World War II, by the mid-1990s South Africa was experiencing a significant and protracted period of brain drain of professionals, semi-professionals, and technical personnel. Key causes of the brain drain include:

1. Government policy, especially the strict enforcement of the Aliens Control Act by the Department of Home Affairs positively discouraging immigration. This was followed by amendments to the Act making it more difficult for skilled workers to obtain work in South Africa, and for prospective employers to recruit from abroad.

2. Aggressive recruitment campaigns by employers in countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and growing opportunities for South African professionals in the SADC region and elsewhere in Africa.

3. Perceived political and economic uncertainty following the end of apartheid in 1994.

4. Re-organization of the state services in the professional fields of health, science and education leading to declining government support in science, research and technology.

5. Race relations, leading at first to large numbers of white professionals emigrating, followed by blacks and professionals of other races.

6. Violence and crime high rate, especially in the major urban areas.

### Impacts of the Brain Drain

**(a) Costs**

South Africa continues to experience significant shortages of skilled workers. Emigration of graduates is lowering GDP by 0.37 percent per annum; R67.8 billion of investment in human capital left
South Africa in 1997. Excluding movements of physical assets, an estimated R11 billion left the country during the 1994-97 period.

Emigration accounts for 15 percent of staff turn-over. Assuming replacement costs of 30-35 percent of annual employment costs, total cost to the economy is about R2.5 billion per annum. Higher labour costs, shortages, lower productivity of professionals all impact negatively on South Africa’s global competitiveness.

(b) Benefits
See discussion of SANSA below.

Responses
1. Nation-wide public and media debate, awareness and education.
2. The Diaspora options: RQAN, MIDA, SANSA
3. On-going research, monitoring and evaluation
4. Cooperation with receiving countries, donors, international community
5. Proactive government policy on transnational migration
* These are explained below in details.

Sources
5.3 Cape Verde

South Africa and Cape Verde provide two widely contrasting experiences and strategies (see Box 5.3.1). While South Africa is a large country with a large and sophisticated, modern economy, Cape Verde is a small, Micro Island state with less than half a million inhabitants. While South Africa is concerned about loss of emigrants (and not attracting enough immigrants), Cape Verde wants more of its citizens to emigrate, work abroad, send remittances, and return as investors or retirees, receiving pensions from overseas. Faced with the traditional problems of an immigrant-dependant economy and society (e.g. crime, declining remittances, European restrictions on emigrants), the people and governments of Cape Verde have developed different strategies designed to facilitate continued commitment of the Diaspora through the transition to new forms of transnational attachment.

It should be noted that the strategies of these two countries are not inherently mutually exclusive. It is possible, and in some cases desirable for a country to respond strategically to the challenges of the loss of professionals through emigration, and at the same time facilitate transnational migration in those areas (e.g. transfers) beneficial to the country and its citizens. This duality of purpose may well be the essence of the management challenges of transnational migration for the twenty-first Century.
Box 5.3.1: Cape Verde: Emigration is not Enough

Nature and magnitude of Brain Drain
Cape Verde is the only West African country where the government’s position is that emigration levels are too low. The country is among the most migration-dependent countries in the world, and it has a very long history of intercontinental migration. Ethnic Cape Verdeans in the Diaspora outnumber the 430,000 inhabitants on the island. Men and women are almost equally represented among emigrants.

Migration plays an important role in the national economy. Before independence from Portugal (1975), Cape Verde was one of the poorest countries in Africa; today it is among the wealthiest with an income per capita of US $4,863 in 2000. Within sub-Saharan Africa, only Seychelles and Mauritius have a higher Human Development Index (HDI).

Impacts of Brain Drain
(a) Benefits
Remittances make up 13.2% of GDP, and 22% of the country’s current account, compared to 8% for foreign aid. About half of the country’s households receive remittances averaging US $100 per month, equivalent to the monthly wages of unskilled workers. Remittances come in three forms: Lump sums, monthly payments, and pensions. These are either invested in small businesses, agricultural land, house construction, or general living expenses. The emigrant investments are highly visible in the community, require minimal administration or expertise, and lie within the financial capacity of many returnees. Emigrants and those in the Diaspora are important to the country’s political development, and are increasingly involved in various development and investment projects.

A survey of students showed that those with families where one of the parents had worked abroad had considerably higher standard of living. The data show that having been an emigrant has a stronger positive effect on the Cape Verdeans’ material well being of the households than having secondary education.

(b) Challenges
Several challenges are associated with the changing dynamics of transnational migration. First, migration is associated with crime. In 2002, there were 500 deportees living in Cape Verde. Sixty percent of these were deported because of drug related and other crimes. Second, remittance transfers are significantly declining as a percentage of GDP from around 25% in the late 1970s to just over 10% in 2002. This is because first generation emigrants and pensioners are retiring and dying, and because European migration restrictions made it harder for new emigrants to leave. Second generation emigrants, with declining personal and family ties to the country, are remitting much less money. Third, as a member of ECOWAS, Cape Verde accepts citizens of member states (e.g. Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea) without visas. Most of them enter the country with the aim of traveling onwards to Europe via the Canary Islands. Consequently, this has created a market for people smuggling out of Cape Verde that is exclusively oriented towards mainland Africans.

Every year, an estimated 40% of the graduates remain in Portugal. Those who return find it difficult to start a professional career. Many are unable to find work they are qualified for, and those who do report frustration due to rigid hierarchies dominated by people with less formal education but who have acquired a certain standing and are weary of upwardly mobile university graduates from abroad.

Responses
The government and people of Cape Verde are fighting back with measures designed to overcome the challenges and maximize the benefits of transnational migration. Here is a list of some of the key initiatives:

1. Encouraging emigrants to stay abroad until they have saved enough, or earned pension rights.
2. Encourage emigrants to invest either by setting up own businesses, or buying shares in existing or privatized government corporations. The recent privatization of TACV, the national airline is an example, whereby 15% of the shares were reserved for emigrants.
3. Developing various professional websites for various government institutions linking with and building confidence with emigrants.
4. Encouraging emigrants to organize and finance development cooperation projects in Cape Verde.
5. Diaspora tourists: targeting tourists of Cape Verdean origin.

Encourage organized return of qualified emigrants through RQAN and MIDA. During 1996-2000, 52 people returned through the RQAN.

5.4: Brain Drain from Higher Education in Cameroon

With an initial academic staff of 21 in 1961/62, the number of lecturers in Cameroon grew to 544 in 1981/82 (an increase of 2490% in 20 years). In 1998, all the universities together had a total staff of 2019. However, owing to bad macro-economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s university education budget declined as shown in the table below:

Table 5.4.1: Ministry of Higher Education Budget as a Ratio of National Budget, Cameroon, 1991 - 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total State Budget Billion (CFA)</th>
<th>Allocation to Higher Education</th>
<th>% share of University to Total Education Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>613.343</td>
<td>10.947</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>415.284</td>
<td>20.257</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>638.424</td>
<td>16.127</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,230.000</td>
<td>15.479</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from Edokat, T. 2000. Effects of Brain Drain on Higher Education in Cameroon

Table 5.4.1 above gives some indication of the declining priority given to education in Cameroon in the 1990s. The percentage of the total national budget to higher education in Cameroon consistently declined from 1993 – 1997. According to Edokat (2000) there were no funds for research at all as even less than 5% of the very little budget for the six universities was meant for research, books and journal acquisition. Worse still was that 30% of the very small budget was meant for students’ welfare alone. The protests by lecturers in the 1980s over poor funding of education were followed in 1993 by government salary cuts in the universities and the civil service without cutting the salaries of the security services. This created a serious disincentive to teaching in the university. Many lecturers left to relocate overseas. A survey of 76 university lecturers reveal the following opinions (Edokat, 2002)

- 100% agreed that salaries were too low
- 89% were getting prepared to migrate
- 73% would still migrate even if salaries were increased
- 26% would still migrate in any case.

The survey further elicited opinions of the lecturers on policy suggestions. They suggested that better remuneration packages (higher salaries) are not enough; lecturers should also enjoy better conditions of work such as the supply of computers, equipment, and office refurbishment. They should also be able to teach smaller classes. Libraries should also be upgraded with up to date reading materials. Finally they suggested that the government should stop political victimization and oppression of dissenting opinion. The implication of the Cameroon survey was that the probability of human capital flight among the Cameroon intellectuals was and is still very high. The only thing keeping them at home is that they are awaiting the opportunities to move. The six universities in the country face serious shortage of lecturers. Some lecturers, in order to increase their take home pay take up part-time lectureships in other institutions. This affects their productivity and leads to low quality university graduates.
5.5 Brain Drain from Ethiopia

Ethiopia, like many poor countries in Africa, suffers from both low levels of human capital development and aggravated massive outflow of the limited stock of indigenous professionals. It is therefore difficult for the country to have the necessary human resources to implement the country’s development policies and programs.

In his paper on the Assessment of Brain Drain from Ethiopia, Dejene Aredo, (2000) attempts to give readers the features of brain drain from Ethiopia. According to the author, one important indicator of skilled labour availability in a country is the ratio of tertiary education graduates to 100,000 population. The 1996 ratio of graduates per 100,000 population in Ethiopia was 8.35. This shows that the production of people with high level education, skill and training in Ethiopia is very low. This reality is shown in the following table:

Table 5.5.1: Demand and Supply Gap of Degree Holders in Ethiopia, 1978/79 – 1998/89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Supply (s)</th>
<th>Demand (D)</th>
<th>S/D x 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>3,486</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Aredo (2000)

Table 5.5.1 above shows that the demand for graduates in Ethiopia, expressed by the requests of various employers to the Office of National Committee for Central Planning (ONCCCP) is much higher than the supply to the labour market.

Owing to the lack of resources for higher education and training from the government of Ethiopia, scholarships have remained the most important avenue for graduate studies abroad for many promising Ethiopian graduates. Unfortunately a large percentage of the migrant students never return home after they have qualified. For example, statistics from the records of the Education Policy Study of Ethiopia (1989: 423-424) showed that between 1975/76 and 1985/86 only 2,089 (59%) out of 3,551 Ethiopian students who went abroad to study returned home. The rest 41% of the scholars stayed back for economic, political, social and academic reasons (Aredo, p. 15).

During the same period:

Agriculture alone required 802 Ph.Ds, 1,247 MA/M.Sc. Degree holders and 3,758 BA/B.Sc degree holders. In addition, social services required 2,354 Ph.D degree holders 514 MA/M.Sc. degree graduates and 8,174 BA/B.Sc. degree graduates (Aredo 2000, p. 14).

While not indicated by profession, supply shortfalls over time have varied by profession. Serious shortages are felt in the health sector where the doctor/patient ratio is 1:70,000. The demand/supply ratios for degree holders in Accounting and
Management have been estimated to be 4.3:1 and 2.2:1 respectively. At the Addis-Ababa University, during the 1997/98 academic year, academic staff could cover only 60 per cent of the total required credit hours for the first semester.

Table 5.5.2: Number of Ethiopian Students Sent Overseas and Non-Returnees by Field of Specialisation 1968/69 – 1995/96.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Specialisation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Field specific ratio of non-returnees to leavers</th>
<th>Estimated No. of Non-returnees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>3,182</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering/Technology</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Science</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>4,325</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts &amp; Sports</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,357</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,425</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What Table 5.5.2 above shows is that more than a third of Ethiopian students who left for graduate studies abroad between 1968/69 and 1995/96 did not return home. On the average about 238 skilled Ethiopians who trained abroad did not return home annually. A majority of these non-returnee Ethiopians were in the fields of social sciences and engineering/technology which are critical to the management of the economy both in the country’s public and private sectors.

Table 5.5.3: Total Number of Graduate Ethiopian Students on Government and Private Sponsorship by Destination (1978/79 – 1995/96)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Continent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country specific ratio of Non-returnees to leavers</th>
<th>Estimated No. of Non-returnees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Europe</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europe and USSR</td>
<td>7,335</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>3,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,165</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,908</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More Ethiopian students migrated to the East European countries and the USSR during the period 1978/79 – 1995/96 than to any other country. Out of a total of 7,335 students who went to these countries for further studies, about half of them did not return. During that period, Ethiopia was under the political, cultural and ideological sphere of influence of the Soviet block countries. It is therefore understandable why
more students migrated to the Eastern European countries and the USSR where many of them finally chose to stay after their studies.

About ten per cent of the non-returnees went to North America and Western Europe. Because of the general problems of poverty, underdevelopment and the danger of political instability, other African countries were not attractive to the Ethiopian students. The total number of students who left to study in other African countries like Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania were only 50 out of which only 11 of them did not return home. They probably left for Europe or the United States of America.

Drawing on Aredo’s work, Oni (2003) summarizes the problems of human capital flight of four Ethiopian key national institutions. These are: Addis Ababa University (AAU), the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC), Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission (ESTC), and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). Table 5.6 provides the relevant summary data. For the Addis Ababa University, during the period 1981/82 – 1994/95, 35 % of the trainees did not return home. Of these, 43 % were in medicine, and 42 % were studying for their doctoral degrees. The university lost 42 per cent of its academic staff to Western Europe. These losses seriously affected the university’s ability to fulfil its academic and social responsibilities.

| **Table 5.5.4: Brain Drain from Four Major Institutions in Ethiopia** |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
|                           | AAU            | MEDAC          | ESTC            | DPPC           |
| **% of non-returnees**    | 35             | 38             | 41              | 23             |
| **Fields with highest % of non-returnees** | Medicine (43%) | -              | Technology (56%) | Technology (53%) |
| **Qualification with highest % of non-returnees** | Ph.D and specialization (42%) | M.A/M.Sc (50%) | Certificate Ph.D (100%) | M.A/M.Sc. (31%) |
| **Major host countries**  | West (42%)     | Europe (50%)  | West (94%)      | West Europe (62%) |
| **Major Donors**          | Institutions (68%) | SIDA (33%)    | N.A             | Government (62%) |

**Source:** See Aredo (2000) p. 19

The Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC) did not fare better than the university, as the total percentage of non-returnees between 1980/81 and 1996/97 was 38. The highest qualifications among this group were either the Master of Arts (M.A.) or Master of Science (M.Sc.). Again about 50% of these non-returnees had been sponsored for further studies in Western European countries. The Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission (ESTC) has always sponsored its staff for further studies abroad in order to build the necessary technological capacity for Ethiopia. Regrettably, all of those sent overseas for doctoral studies between 1986/87 and 1995/96 failed to return home. The case of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) in 1992/93 – 1995/96 was not different from any of the three institutions. The main reason for sending its staff abroad is for the Commission to have trained and qualified manpower to help the country to solve the humanitarian, social, psychological problems created by drought, war and other catastrophes. Unfortunately, about 53% with specialization in Technology failed to return. Like their counterparts from other institutions who also went for further studies, 62 per cent of them stayed back to Western Europe.
5.6 Nigeria: Brain Drain from the Health Sector

According to Nkechi Mbanefoh, Nigeria’s brain drain in the health sector started in the early 1980s. Her study covered three categories of medical staff – doctors, nurses and technologists in the University College Hospital (UCH). Drawing from the UCH records, Mbanefoh (1992) observed that there was massive exodus of medical personnel towards the end of 1989. For example, she notes:

…the Department of Surgery which had 23 lecturers/consultants in 1984 had as at April 1989 only 5 lecturers/consultants on the ground. Consequently the student intake to that Department fell from 279 in 1984 to 124 in 1989… Other Departments badly hit by the phenomenon were Orthorphino-laryncology and Anaesthesia with five and seven medical consultants in 1984 but were left with one and two respectively at the end of April 1989” (Mbanefoh, 1992, p.6).

The effects of the brain drain included a fall in the standard of medical education, increase in student failure rate, and loss of international recognition enjoyed hitherto by the medical and postgraduate medical schools at Ibadan. Resident doctors were not an adequate substitute because they need supervision from more experienced teaching staff.

Table 5.6.1: National Postgraduate Medical College of Nigeria; Success Rate in Examinations 1979 – 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Examination %</th>
<th>Part I Examination %</th>
<th>Part II Examination %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>40.08</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Mbanefoh, N. (1992) p. 8 Table 1.2

Table 5.6.1 above shows a steady decline in the success rates of postgraduate medical students from 1979 to 1988. For example, for the post graduate primary level examinations, the success rate fell from over 40 per cent in 1979 to just under 25 per cent in 1988. In other words, by the late 1980’s, more than three out of four postgraduate medical students failed their primary examinations. For subsequent examinations (Part I and II), the success rates were just under 35 per cent and over 50 per cent, respectively. These poor results are attributed to the acute shortage of qualified professors at the medical school.

In addition to using records from the UCH, Mbanefoh (1992) administered questionnaires to Nigerian emigrants who had returned to Ibadan for holidays and short visits. She collected 40 questionnaires from the migrants. Of these, 22 were consultant doctors, 10 nurses, and 8 medical laboratory technologists. Using a similar questionnaire, she also collected data from 109 non-migrants in the Ibadan area. This
sample consisted of 33 consultant doctors, 62 nurses and 14 medical laboratory technologists.

The emigrant sample was 65 per cent male, continuing the generally held view that most professional emigrants out of Africa are generally male. Ninety five per cent of the emigrants were between 40 and 59 years of age. Therefore, Nigeria was losing, through the brain drain, not junior, but senior and experienced medical professionals. The majority had acquired their initial medical qualifications before 1970. The majority (71.8%) had trained in Europe and America.

Asked why the health professionals had left or were planning to leave Nigeria, both samples ranked poor remuneration first. The general decline in the standard of living in Nigeria was ranked second, and the fall in the value of the national currency, the Naira, was given as the third most important reason for leaving. Lack of opportunities for promotion was ranked fourth. Clearly, according to the results of this survey, the main push factors for emigrating among Nigerian health professionals are essentially economic. Political, social, psychological and even professional considerations seem to have played little or not part in these professionals’ decision to emigrate.

5.7 A Comparison with a non-African Country: The Case of The Philippines

The Philippines provides yet a different type of experience with transnational migration for over 30 years (see Box 5.7.1). The country has come full circle from making overseas employment official government policy in 1974, to seeing emigration as a “national shame” in the late 1990’s. During this period, the government has developed policies, enacted laws and built institutional capacities both at home and abroad, designed to facilitate emigration, protect the welfare of emigrants while abroad, assist in the transfer of capital, and provide support to those returning home. By the late 1990’s, due in part to the Asian crisis, the levels of emigration and remittances both declined, and those emigrants still working abroad were subjected to various forms of abuse.
Box 5.7.1: Managing Emigration: The Philippine Experience

**Nature and Magnitude of Brain Drain in Philippines**

The Philippines is the contemporary labour exporter par excellence with over 4 million of its citizens scattered across the world. About half are permanent citizens mainly in the USA; others in the Gulf States, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. In 1994, a total of 565,000 Filipinos were recruited to work abroad, and 154,000 took jobs as sailors on foreign owned ships. Official remittances financed 50 percent of the country’s external trade deficit. Over 16 percent of Philippines households were receiving remittances in early 1990’s. Almost half of the emigrants were women largely from poor families/communities. In 2001, remittances made up 8.9 per cent of the country’s GDP (Ratha, 2003:159).

**Responses**

In 1974, overseas employment became official government policy. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was established to maintain “positive controls” over the private recruitment industry. Citizens seeking work abroad had to register with POEA, and received pre-emigration briefing and certification. Also, the Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration (OWWA) was set up to assist emigrant workers in emergencies and to protect them from exploitation. Limited staffing of labour attaches prevented effective protection of emigrants from exploitation and abuse. In the 1990s, relationships with Singapore, single largest employer of Filipino domestics, become strained, and the government tried to ban emigration to the city state without much success.

In 1995, the Philippines passed the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act to improve the welfare of overseas contract workers (OCWs). The act was designed to protect the dignity and human rights of Filipino emigrants. Rather than exporting Filipino labor, government policy changed to managing emigration flows and developing strategies for employment creation at home. This, plus the East Asian economic crisis (1997-98), reduced the outflow of unskilled emigrants. Remittances declined, thus causing hardships especially to the families of women emigrants from poorer regions of the country.

With the political liberation of the 1980s, Filipinos started to see emigration as a “national shame” reflecting badly on the country’s inability to take care of its own, and “betrayed” by those who export their energy, skills and human capital. In response, the category of Balikbayans -- people coming back home to the Philippines -- was created. Programs to facilitate their return include special travel documents, tax privileges, and import concessions. Official recognition of Diasporas restores the dignity of emigrants as legitimate and contributing members of their national community, economically, politically, socially and culturally. This facilitates the emergence of international networks linking emigrants to their country of origin.

In order for the country to achieve the benefits from migration, major initiatives are needed. These include sustaining national economic growth, more and better trained personnel, financial resources to protect the rights and welfare of the emigrants, and more education and training to enable Filipinos to keep pace with changes in the local, regional and global economy. These far-reaching suggestions imply that “efforts to manage emigration must be closely linked to economic and social development. Implementing such policies requires political will as well as institutional capacity for effective action”.

**Impact of the Brain Drain**

Has large-scale emigration contributed to economic development of the Philippines? While remittances have contributed to the development of micro enterprises and substantial foreign exchange, and while Filipinos have brought back new skills, experience and a more global mindset, without effective policies to maximize these benefits, resources have often gone into unproductive or unsuccessful ventures, and skills gained abroad often wasted for lack of relevant opportunities. Emigration may well have reduced pressures for economic and social change.

**Source**


One important lesson of experience from the Philippines is that efforts to manage emigration must be closely linked to economic, social and political development at home. This requires political will, institutional and human capacity development at all
levels of society. The Filipino experience provides instructive lessons for those African countries wishing to emulate aspects of the thirty-year emigration experiment.

5.8 What do we Learn from the Country Case Studies?

The above case studies cover five African countries of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, and one Asian country, the Philippines. Taken together, these case studies provide useful information about the challenges and opportunities of international migration, and the public policy responses needed to deal with the growing problems of the African brain drain. Some of this information can be used to draw out lessons of experience for other African countries facing similar brain drain problems. The following list represents some of the key lessons of experience derived from a synthesis of the six country case studies:

1. The case studies seem to confirm what is generally known that practically all African countries experience serious problems of out-migration, especially among its professionals, most of whom continue to emigrate to Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.

2. While the out-migrations are caused by both pull and push factors, the evidence from the country case studies points to the fact that the African countries have compelling economic and political push factors, which account for large numbers of professional emigrations.

3. There appears to be differences among African countries in terms of public awareness and strategic responsiveness to the challenges and opportunities of international migration. For example, South Africa, Cape Verde, and the Philippines appear to have developed more public awareness and initiated proactive government policies than Cameroon, Ethiopia and Nigeria. For these and similar countries, the first step to dealing with the challenges of the brain drain should be a campaign of public awareness and informed national debate.

4. The Ethiopian and Cameroonian case studies provide some data on the effects of the brain drain on the performance of specific national institutions in several sectors of the economy such as health, education and economic management. In all cases, it was shown that institutional performance declined in large part as a result of the emigration of qualified and experienced professionals. More and better-designed and controlled studies of this kind should be conducted to provide empirical evidence of the net negative consequences of the brain drain for the affected groups, organizations, institutions, sectors or communities.

5. As expected, the Nigerian case study confirms the seriousness of the brain drain problem among medical and health care workers in Africa. These problems must be seen in the light of the widespread problems of diseases such as AIDS/HIV, malaria and tuberculosis, which threaten the very survival of whole communities and nation states. Since diseases such as AIDS/HIV have taken on global significance, the brain drain in Africa is no longer an exclusively African problem. Rather, it is a global problem in need of a global response.
6. Evidence from Cape Verde, and the earlier experiences of the Philippines illustrate the dilemma some of the African countries face trying to reconcile the attractiveness of foreign receipts by way of remittances from emigrants, and the loss of thousands of professional nationals to foreign labour markets. For countries with a short history of receiving large sums of remittances, only an open and informed debate and research can provide the basis for resolving the dilemma with responsive and long-term public policy and programming.

7. The Philippines, though not an African country, provides a long history of public policy and international migration with lessons of experience potentially useful for African countries. The key lesson from the experience of Philippines is that foreign remittances and overseas employment are no substitute for sound domestic policies and programs for national economic, political and social development.

8. The case studies also highlight some of the weaknesses of current studies and approaches to the African brain drain. These studies used weak methodologies with opportunistic small samples, and no evidence of application of systemic sampling methods. Consequently, the empirical evidence is quite limited and hard to generalize to the wider population. Except for South Africa, there are no nation-wide surveys of emigration and migration. Although there are very strong intuitive feelings about the brain drain, only quality data and information can provide the basis for effective and sustaining responses.

9. European and American employers and recruitment firms must share some responsibility in promoting the African brain drain because through their aggressive advertising and recruitment drives, they create compelling pull factors, which African professionals find hard to resist.

10. Finally, the case studies show that studies of the African brain drain have not focused on the labour market(s) for development management professionals (DMPs). Nor have they focused on the ACBF’s six priority areas (see Figure 2.3.1). Although some of the studies have included economists and university professors (e.g., Cameroon, Ethiopia), most studies still focus on medical and health professionals, engineers and scientists. There is an urgent need to conduct research on the six ACBF priority areas in order to provide empirical evidence to inform future discussions, policy and programs especially in the related areas of capacity building.
6. Summary of Recent Responses to the Brain Drain Problem

6.1 Introduction
Over the decades, individuals, groups, institutions, communities, governments and the international community have responded to the challenges of transnational migration by undertaking initiatives designed to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits or reverse the losses. Most of these initiatives have been initiated or supported by the international community, but governments and individual emigrant groups have also been active.

It is not possible to review all initiatives taken to mitigate the negative effects of transnational emigration. Instead, the initiatives considered for this report fall under four broad categories. These are:

1. The Diaspora options
2. Regional initiatives
3. Research initiatives, and
4. Government policy initiatives

The Diaspora options, designed to mitigate or reverse the negative effects of the brain drain are the most common, and will be reviewed in greater details. One regional initiative, the Dakar Declaration will also be reviewed as an example of what can be achieved at the regional, rather than national level. Several research programmes such as the Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa by the Sussex Center for Migration Research have been reviewed above, and will not be repeated here. The South African and the Philippines case studies were used to illustrate proactive government policy initiatives in response to a deteriorating migration situation.

6.2 The Diaspora Options

Diaspora options cover a wide range of initiatives all designed to turn the brain drain into a brain gain, by focusing emigrants in the Diaspora to return or redirect the services of their professional expertise to the development of the community or country of origin. Most Diaspora options are driven by the international community, especially the specialized agencies of the United Nations system working with national governments. Examples include TOKTEN, RQAN, and MIDA (see below). According to Meyer, by 2001, at least 35 developing countries had set up highly skilled Diaspora networks with the purpose of recovering part of their expatriates’ talents through a remote mobilization of their skills. The most active African countries include Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria (North Africa), and Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa (SSA). South African SANSA programme is briefly discussed below.

6.2.1 Transfer of Know-how Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)

In the 1980’s, the UNDP initiated and managed the Transfer of Know-how Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program for developing countries. The purpose of the program was to recapture some of the experience of highly skilled expatriate professionals residing outside their countries of origin. The program targeted those nationals who had outstanding levels of expertise and who were able and willing to make their expertise available to institutions in their countries of origin. Consultations lasted between two weeks to three months and could be repeated in subsequent years.
By January 1988, 25 countries had participated for a total of 1850 consultant assignments. The most active African countries were Egypt, Uganda and Benin. The program was discontinued due to lack of funds and failure to demonstrate impact or effectiveness. 24

6.2.2 The Return of Qualified African Nationals Programme (RQAN)

In the 1980’s the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) program was developed with objectives similar to those of the earlier TOKTEN. Developed and managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), RQAN was designed to assist peaceful African countries, as apposed to “boiling countries” like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic, to reduce the gap between their undergoing economy and the fast growing international market by using services of their citizens in the Diaspora. The program attempted to offer assistance in returning and reintegrating emigrants to employment or self-employment in target or non-target African countries, in sectors of priority to the receiving country.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is an intergovernmental body responsible for the maximization of the benefits of migration to the individual and the countries concerned. The organization has four basic objectives which are to:

(i) Assist people and nations in meeting the operational challenges of migration;
(ii) Advance the understanding of the socio-economic, psychological and political issues related to the migration phenomenon;
(iii) Promote social and economic development through migration; and
(iv) Work towards effective respect of the dignity and well-being of migrants.

One major area in which the IOM has achieved success is in its programme of brain gain. The organization is aware that Africa is increasingly aware of the need to nurture, retain and regain their skilled human resources in the diaspora. It is also aware that many Africans living abroad have a strong desire to return home if they could be assisted to secure well paid jobs that are relevant to their training.

The IOM has therefore set up the Return of Qualified African Nationals Programme (RQAN). The RQAN which started in 1983 as a pilot programme with grants from the then European Commission and the U.S. Government succeeded in return of 503 Africans from overseas countries in 1983 – 1987; 619 (1987 – 1991) and 735 (1992 – 1999). The list of countries that have benefited from the RQAN programme are listed in Table 6.2.2.1 below. For the sixteen year period (1983-1999), the program returned a total of 1857 professionals to about fifteen African countries. This works out to an average of less than ten returnees per country per year.

24 For a discussion of the TOKTEN program, see Kiggundu, 1989:176
Table 6.2.2.1: Number of Returned Qualified Nationals to African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number: 503</td>
<td>Number: 619</td>
<td>Number: 735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe and Some</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-target countries</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>And some non-target</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM, July 1999

What the above table suggests is that the IOM programme can contribute progressively, albeit slowly to the return of skilled personnel to Africa.

Table 6.2.2.2: Specialisations of RQAN in Phases I, II and III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Specialisation</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Sciences and related occupations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Technology</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and Para-medical</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics, Social Sciences</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management, Administration</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: I.O.M July, 1999

The distribution of returnees by field of specialization is presented in Table 6.2.2.2 above. What is obvious is that qualified manpower in the fields of economics, social science, management and administration constitute the highest percentage (31%) of the returnees. This shows that almost one third of the returnees came back to fill posts in development management both in the public and private sectors.

The RQAN Program run through three four-year phases and facilitated the return and reintegration of over 2000 highly qualified and experienced nationals to eleven participating countries. The last phase (1995-1999) assisted a total of 787 professionals (25% women) to return to the public sector (54%), the private sector (40%) and to engage in independent activity (6%). The professional areas targeted were: management, social and legal services (27%), natural sciences and public health, education (17%), physical and mathematical sciences, engineering (15%) and senior executive level personnel (11%).
Like the TOKTEN before, the RQAN program was discontinued because it was too expensive. Participants also complained that the funds given to returning emigrants were not enough to make and sustain significant professional behavior.

6.2.3 The Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)

Drawing on the lessons learnt from RQAN, the International Organization for Emigration (IOM) has developed a new program called the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA). MIDA is “a capacity-building program, which helps to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. The overall objective of the MIDA program is to assist in strengthening the institutional capacity of African governments to manage and realize their development goals through the transfer of relevant skills, financial and other resources of Africans in the Diaspora for use in development programs in Africa.”

MIDA is implemented by the IOM working closely with African governments and regional organizations such as the African Union (formerly OAU), the African Development Bank (ADB), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Maghreb Arab Union (UMA), and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF).

(a) MIDA Great Lakes Program

Although MIDA is relatively new, a close look at one of its regional programs provides some insights and early lessons of experience regarding its implementation and effectiveness. The Great Lakes Program, funded by the Belgian government and executed by IOM, started in November 2001, and targeted the three key Great Lakes countries of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. The program is intended to make it possible for professionals who reside in Belgium to return to their respective Great Lakes home country and offer technical short-term assistance and expertise in technical fields including agriculture, banking, engineering, economics, environmental protection, and social and educational sciences. It was hoped that the cultural and linguistic affinity of the emigrants in the Diaspora would facilitate the transfer of skills and pave the way for more permanent relationships with national experts, as well as their homeland. The program was to serve as a strategy for responding to the needs and strengthening the human resource bases of participating African countries. In short, it was expected to turn the Great Lakes brain drain into a brain gain.

Table 6.2.3.1 below provides summary participation information as of November 2002. Only 262 Great Lakes professional emigrants living in Belgium had registered, the majority (123) from the DRC. Burundi had the highest participation rate of 28%, and Rwanda the lowest with one participant out of a total of 37 registered professionals. The majority of registered professionals were male (72%); perhaps reflecting the male-female representation in the African Diaspora professional population in Belgium and elsewhere. Additional information showed that 80% of all participants were involved in university teaching, and 60% had graduate degrees. In Burundi, 75% of the participants were assigned to the private sector.

---

Table 6.2.3.1: MIDA-Great Lakes Program Summary Information

**a) Registered Candidates (As of November 2001-November 2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b) Participants by Profession and Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burundi (N=28)</th>
<th>DRC (N=18)</th>
<th>Rwanda (N=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists (2)</td>
<td>Labor Specialist (1)</td>
<td>Physics teacher (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biostatistician (1)</td>
<td>Teaching Positions and Various Disciplines (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer engineers (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance/privatization (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management consultant (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professors (17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**b) Impact of MIDA**

Table 6.2.3.2 below provides a summary of the impact of the MIDA program by country according to the IOM self-evaluation report. During the one year evaluation period (November 2001-November 2002), Burundi enlisted 11 employers, 28 candidates, 1,371 beneficiaries and received technical support totalling 103 books, two computers and two software programs. Total savings in Euros were 16,260.00, which were used to address a number of outstanding financial issues. For example, at the Universite of Grand Lacs, the savings were used to hire new professors and additional staff. During the same period, the DRC registered six employers, 21 candidates, 1219 beneficiaries and received in technical support, 146 books, three computers, and one retro-projector. The program realized a total of Euros 6,560 in savings, and the money was used to pay for building repairs, back-pay for lab technicians, and professors who had not been paid in months. The impact was smallest for Rwanda where only one employer was registered for a single candidate, 106 beneficiaries and total savings of only Euros 850. For the three countries, the beneficiaries included students, teachers, farmers, civil servants, business executives, journalists, engineers, environmentalists and community development specialists. The self-evaluation report did not provide data on the beneficiaries’ self-report of the impact of the project’s intended benefits.
Table 6.2.3.2: Summary Impact of the MIDA Program by Country
(a) Burundi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employers</th>
<th>Number of candidates</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Savings in Euros</th>
<th>Technical support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universite de Ngozi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>525 students</td>
<td>4,200.00</td>
<td>1 translation software 47 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofide</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 technicians</td>
<td>980.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ville de Ngozi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26 environmentalists and community development specialists</td>
<td>1,040.00</td>
<td>5 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filieres SOGESTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19 CEO and CFO</td>
<td>3600.00</td>
<td>1 software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Good Governance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25 civil servants</td>
<td>500.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universite du Burundi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>457 students</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 computer 24 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERADER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36 farmers</td>
<td>850.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISABU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 technicians</td>
<td>600.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIDESO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 engineers</td>
<td>650.00</td>
<td>1 computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studio Ujambo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 journalists</td>
<td>1340.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universite des Grands Lacs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>267 students</td>
<td>2500.00</td>
<td>27 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,371</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,260.00</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employers</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Savings in Euros</th>
<th>Technical support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University de Kinshasa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>428 students</td>
<td>2,400.00</td>
<td>1 computer, 78 books, 1 retro-projector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institut Superieur des Techniques medicales (ISTM)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>305 students</td>
<td>600.00</td>
<td>14 books, 1 computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universite de Lubumbashi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>337 students, 12 engineers</td>
<td>2,400.00</td>
<td>1 computer, 33 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institut Superieur Pedagogique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>122 students</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre de Recherche</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 engineers, 5 technicians</td>
<td>840.00</td>
<td>13 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministere du Travail et de la Prevoyance sociale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 social security specialists</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,219</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,560.00</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid

(c) Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employers</th>
<th>Number of candidates</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Savings in Euros</th>
<th>Technical support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green Hills Academy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106 students</td>
<td>850.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td><strong>850</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.
Box 6.2.3.1 provides additional information from the self-evaluation report of the effectiveness of the MIDA program in the Great Lakes Region. Using a results-based program management approach, the Table provides information relating to program results (R), indicators of achievements (I), and detailed analysis of program effectiveness. The results, indicators and analysis of the effectiveness are provided for overall program objective, and four separate project purposes. For example, for the overall objective (see Box 6.2.3.1a) the Box shows the verifiable indicators for each of the three countries. Specifically, 66% of the candidates for Burundi, 45% for the DRC, and 3% for Rwanda have participated in the program. As for the analysis of program effectiveness, the Box provides qualitative statements, both positive and cautionary. The following statements summarize some of the results of the analysis of MIDA’s effectiveness in the three countries:

- Substantial results have been obtained in terms of capacity building.
- Some employers reported that the returnees contributed to the financial growth of their organizations through application of cost-saving measures. Most employers reported that the returnees contributed to improved performance of their organization.
- The demand for returnees is much higher than the supply, and due to budgetary constraints, MIDA cannot meet all demands.
- Some countries such as Rwanda are more interested in permanent returnees than temporary and short-term assignments, and are therefore reluctant to fully endorse the program.
- The returnees are mostly specialized and highly trained, but in Belgium, they are not necessarily working in their fields of specialization. MIDA gives them the opportunity to practice their skills in their native countries.
- Lines of collaboration with various partners are not well defined. Most agencies or representatives find MIDA interesting but remain quite non-committal.
- Compensation, incentives and working conditions should be improved in order to encourage long-term stays by the returnees.

Based on the results of the self-evaluation report, a number of recommendations were made for improving the administration and effectiveness of the program in the three participating countries. The following key recommendations were made by the report:

1. The MIDA program should be extended to enable candidates to return permanently to their countries of origins so that they may participate fully in national development and capacity building.
2. Mechanisms for the reception and re-integration of the returnees should be strengthened, including their financial participation so as to ensure smooth transition and local ownership of the program.
3. The existing political and economic uncertainties in the three countries, as well as their negative impact on the institutions should be taken into account in the determination of the program’s overall strategy and the duration of individual projects.
4. The program should focus on the medium and long-term interests of the returnees and participating countries, rather than on short term interventions.
5. More work (lobbying) is needed to attract more women into the program, and to gain more support from Rwanda.
Although the self-evaluation report cannot provide evidence of cause and effect, and although the report lacks empirical evidence of the impact of the program on institutional capacity building and performance, the methodology used in the report is more sophisticated than what is commonly found in similar studies of the brain drain in Africa. Of particular interest is the application of the results based management approach to program assessment and the use of quantified and verifiable results and indicators. With modifications, this methodology could be used for monitoring and evaluation of similar brain drain interventions in Africa.

6.2.3.1 Results-Based Matrix: Effectiveness of the MIDA Project in the Great Lakes Region

**Overall Objective:** To assist in strengthening the institutional capacities of African Governments to manage and realize their development goals through the transfer of relevant skills, financial and other resources of nationals of the three countries of the Great Lakes residing in Belgium so they can contribute to the development programs of their countries of origin.

**Box 6.2.3.1a Results-Based Matrix for Overall Objectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Results [R] &amp; Indicators of Achievement [I]</th>
<th>Verifiable Indicators</th>
<th>Analysis of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[I] Mobilization of resources, financial and others of members of the Diaspora from Burundi, DRC and Rwanda. Needs assessment in the countries of origin and matching of the two.</td>
<td>[I] – Burundi: 66% candidates, DRC: 45% of candidates have participated in the program. [I] – At least 80% of employers have indicated the transfer of skills has taken place 8 months after program commencement.</td>
<td>- Substantial results have been obtained in terms of capacity building and also some students were able to graduate after completing the missing classes. - Some employers state that the returnees contributed to the financial growth of their organizations through cost-saving measures. Furthermore, most employers reported that the returnees made the performance of the organization better.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project Purpose 1**: To identify skill needs in priority development areas or programs in target countries, which could be best met through skills, financial and other resources of the three countries’ nationals in Belgium.

**Box 6.2.3.1b Results-Based Matrix for Project Purpose 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results [R] &amp; Indicators of Achievement [I]</th>
<th>Verification of progress towards achieving results and towards indicators</th>
<th>Analysis of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[R]: An identification mission of skill needs was undertaken in the first and the last quarters of the year 2002 in the three countries.</td>
<td>[I]: At least 150 employers in the public and private sectors as well as civil society have provided their needs in terms of human resources.</td>
<td>The demand is much higher than the supply. Since most demands fall into more specialized categories and due to budgetary constraints which limit transfers to 11 per country, per year, it is difficult to meet all demands. Some countries such as Rwanda are more interested in permanent returns than temporary and short-term assignments ➔ some reluctance to fully endorse the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: A compilation of data in our database of skill needs in the countries of origin. Continuous feedback from the National Coordinators on this subject. Sectors in need in: Rwanda: education, science and technology, health and justice. Burundi: education, health and justice. DRC: education and health.</td>
<td>[R]: Field missions have been organized to collect information on the needs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: Three National Coordinators have been appointed by the Ministry of Labor, have been trained by IOM and have become fully operational in the field.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58
**Project Purpose 2:** To identify skills, financial and other resources of nationals of the three countries in Belgium available to participate in the development programs of their countries of origin.

**Box 6.2.3.1c Results-Based Matrix for Project Purpose 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results [R] &amp; Indicators of Achievement [I]</th>
<th>Verification of progress towards achieving results and towards indicators</th>
<th>Analysis of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[R]: Information sessions are continuously held with various associations and leading groups of the Diaspora in order to disseminate MIDA info. Posters are being placed in various strategic locations.</td>
<td>[R]: MIDA questionnaires are received daily in our office from candidates So far, unable to collect any information on financial resources of members of the Diaspora ➔ strong reluctance to commitment due to the political situation in the region.</td>
<td>A Selection Committee works with our office for pre-screening the candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: 260 nationals of the three countries have registered to participate in the MIDA program (see above details).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[R]: A database has been developed for the purpose of establishing lists of interested candidates.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: Possibility of virtual transfers in DRC by early next year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I] Contracts have been signed with two associations in Belgium in order to liase with various communities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project Purpose 3:** To match identified skill needs of target countries with appropriate skills, financial and other resources of nationals of the three countries residing in Belgium.

**Box 6.2.3.1d Results-Based Matrix for Project Purpose 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results [R] &amp; Indicators of Achievement [I]</th>
<th>Verification of progress towards achieving results and towards indicators</th>
<th>Analysis of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[R]: Transfers have become effective since June 25th, 2002.</td>
<td>[R]: Candidates match the skill needs formulated by various recipient structures in the three countries. Capacity building is effective; some structures are in the position of increasing their productivity thanks to MIDA. Some recipient organizations also report that the returnees have contributed to their financial growth through cost-saving measures.</td>
<td>Candidates are mostly specialized and highly trained individuals who clearly respond to the needs. Most of them do not work in their field in the host country. MIDA gives the opportunity to practice their skills. The impact of this program is unquestionable to the receiving structures. However, some of the assignments require constant follow-up that local staff, even if trained, cannot provide. Thus requiring sequential visits by the candidates. Due to budget constraints, only three visits per candidates are allowed. Virtual transfers will also be a good alternative. The demand is high but it is increasingly difficult to meet once again due to budgetary constraints. Sometimes, the response is slow from the structures in need, which can only delay the process and inconvenience the candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: Burundi: 24 (66%) transfers have been done. Rwanda: 1 transfer (3%) DRC: 15 transfers (45%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project purpose 4: To strengthen and build synergies between the three countries and private sector institutions as well as donors and other relevant agencies in the countries toward sustainable co-operative.

Box 6.2.3.1e Results-Based Matrix for Project Purpose 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results [R] &amp; Indicators of Achievement [I]</th>
<th>Verification of progress towards achieving results and towards indicators</th>
<th>Analysis of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[R]: Practical modalities to facilitate cooperation with other agencies such as UN bodies are under way. In DRC, IOM/Kinshasa will work with some units of the UNDP in order to strengthen MIDA activities in the countries.</td>
<td>[R]: For program ownership purposes, Rwanda has formally requested the EU to use US$ 1 million for MIDA.</td>
<td>Lines of collaboration with various partners are not well defined. That will require time and resources, thus delaying the whole process. Most agencies or representations of donor countries find MIDA interesting but remain quite non-committal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[R]: A Selection Committee has been established to steer program implementation in target countries.</td>
<td>[R]: Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Rwanda and DRC have appointed focal points for IOM activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]: As a result of increased understanding between Governments and IOM, Rwanda will request membership and Burundi will consider observer status.</td>
<td>[I]: Regular contacts are established with concerned Governments or with their representations in Brussels and Geneva.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to the relatively low participation numbers, the most critical experience of MIDA came from Rwanda. A review of the country’s experience concluded that despite the fact that Rwanda faces a serious shortage of professionals in various fields and despite the fact that the government is committed to encouraging its nationals to return home, members of the Rwanda community in Belgium have been very reluctant to enroll in the program. So far, IOM has sent only one candidate, a holder of a bachelors degree in physics who is training teachers and students at a private school. Furthermore, Rwandan candidates are not as highly skilled as is the case with the other two countries.

If the early experience of the MIDA Great Lakes program can be extrapolated to other MIDA programs, it is possible to speculate that the program may not be any more successful in achieving its objectives than its predecessor programs (TOKTEN, RQAN). Indeed, although MIDA is supposed to be more flexible and innovative, drawing on modern communication and information technology (CIT) including the internet and video conferencing, and although it is open to all three options of temporary return, virtual return, and economic return, it has some of the same elements, which contributed to the problems of the earlier Diaspora options (e.g. cost, sustainability). It is therefore imperative that the cost effectiveness and impact of Diaspora options in general, and MIDA in particular be determined before they can be advanced as practical and realistic options to the African brain drain. It is especially important that these initiatives demonstrate their contributions to the building and sustaining of capacity building for development management.
6.2.4 The South African Network of Skilled Africans (SANSA)

Launched at the end of 1998, the South African Network of Skilled Africans (SANSA) was set up as a global network of highly skilled South Africans to contribute their skills and expertise to the development process of their country, regardless of where in the world they live or work. SANSA is based on the idea that human capital need not be lost through physical mobility and that emigration can be potentially beneficial to the source country if physically dispersed professionals can be mobilized to multiply their expertise and make it available for development. By establishing socio-professional networks, supporters of SANSA wish to demonstrate that expatriation does not mean that the link with the home country has to be cut. They also hope to change the definition, size, and scope of the national labor market for skilled professionals.

As discussed above, South Africa has a serious shortage of skilled professionals mostly lost through emigration and low levels of migration. It is also the case that most South African professional emigrants are spatially concentrated, with almost 60% of all graduates located abroad concentrated in five English-speaking countries: The UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New-Zealand. All these five countries are globally connected with very good communication information technology, including the Internet, email, and video conferencing. These conditions make it relatively easy to establish and maintain a global network, electronically connected.

Prospective members were initially contacted by questionnaires from which a membership database was developed. Members are expected to make contributions in four related areas:

1. Receive South African students in their laboratories or training programs
2. Participate in training or research with South African counterparts
3. Facilitate business contacts, and
4. Initiate research and commercial projects

The successful implementation of SANSA required five initial steps:

1. designing a web page,
2. developing and sending out a questionnaire to prospective network members,
3. setting up the database,
4. receiving completed questionnaires either via email or post, and
5. inputting information and maintaining the database

The University of Cape Town provides the institutional home, intellectual, technological and administrative infrastructure and support for SANSA.

Within the first year of operation, SANSA’s database had 1800 registered members residing in 57 countries, on five continents, in over 800 different cities. Table 6.2.4 summarizes the initial membership returns by level of education and by field of expertise. The results show that SANSA members, and by implication South Africa’s professional emigrants, have attained high levels of formal education. More than one-third, and almost 50% of the members reported having doctorates and master’s degrees respectively. More than 80% reported having attained the first university degree. By all accounts, this is a very highly educated group of South Africans.

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The Table 6.2.4(b) also shows the breakdown of SANSA membership by field of expertise. The sample divides evenly between the traditional areas of professional emigration (health and natural sciences, engineering and technology), and the humanities, social and administrative sciences. It is important to note that almost 25% of the sample reported management and administration as their field of expertise.

Table 6.2.4: SANSA Membership

Table 6 (a) By Level of Education (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Doctorate</th>
<th>Doctorate</th>
<th>Masters</th>
<th>Honors</th>
<th>Post-Graduate Diploma</th>
<th>Bachelor</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Self-report questionnaire data. Percentages exceed 100 because of double counting.

Table 6 (b) By Field of Expertise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Expertise</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>% age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Health Science</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Engineering, Technology, Architecture</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Natural Sciences</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Humanities and Social Sciences</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Managerial and Administrative</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Arts, Sports and Related</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SANSA’s methods of outreach and data collection using the Internet may contain an inherent bias toward the more educated emigrants who are more likely to be globally connected.

Source: SANSA: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa. http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa
Email: sansa@hiddingh.uct.ac.za. Tel: 27 021 480-7176.

This, perhaps with some members belonging to the social sciences (another 22%), constitutes the area of expertise closest to development management as defined above (see Figure 2.3.1). The SANSA membership database provides a basis for estimating the proportion of professional emigrants belonging to the development management profession (DMPs) category as about between one-third and one-quarter. If these numbers could be verified by other surveys and for other countries, it would be possible to estimate more accurately the size and scope of the labor market for African development management professionals.

SANSA cannot be considered successful until it makes a link between its database membership and contributions to mitigating professional labor shortages in areas where it matters most for the South African economy and society. It is not enough to just have
a network of professionals. The database must be maintained and updated, members must connect with one another, and with relevant professionals back home, and they must have a sense of both contribution and fair inducement. Drawing on the experience of other developing countries with similar professional networks such as Columbia, it is clear that SANSA will need continuing political commitment, well planned financial and technical resources, and positive response and support from the wider South African society.

Should other African countries be encouraged to start similar networks of their own as a strategy for mitigating the loss of skilled professionals? It is too early to tell. Although at least two other countries-Nigeria and Kenya-have started similar networks, and some other 35 developing countries are known to have similar networks, there is no objective data to demonstrate the net positive impact these networks make either in changing the nature and composition of the labor market for development management professionals, or mitigating the losses of professional emigrants to their respective country’s, economy or society. More research is needed to assess the overall practical effectiveness of diaspora options such as SANSA.

On the other hand, SANSA is different from other Diaspora options discussed above. One important difference is that unlike RQAN and MIDA, SANSA is not driven by outside international organizations. Rather, it is a national initiative for and by South Africans. It is therefore much more home grown, and more likely to gain and sustain local acceptance and utilization. This provides a basis for comparing the effectiveness of different Diaspora options and drawing out lessons of experience for future applications, other countries, and defined labor markets for development management professionals.

6.3 The Dakar Declaration

In October 2000, the West African Ministerial Inter-regional conference on the participation of migrants in the development of their country of origin was held in Dakar, Senegal. The conference was organized by the IOM, and in attendance were 13 West African countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo), seven European countries (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland), and the United States. Also in attendance were four regional institutions (ECOWAS, UEMOA, European Union and OAU, now the African Union), international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

The following are some of the key observations, themes and conclusions of the conference:

1. Countries of origin, transit and host countries should closely co-operate to ensure better management of migration at local, regional and global levels.
2. There is inherent tension in the global migration system characterized by a combination of opposing forces such as increasing numbers of emigration and decreasing opportunities for migration, which require identification of underlying causes and proposals for appropriate solutions.

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3. Economic, social and political development of the migrants’ areas of origin is the most effective strategy for controlling excessive emigration.

4. The European Union advocated for “a global approach to migration that takes account of political aspects, human rights and developmental concerns in the home and host countries”, an approach aimed at “reducing poverty, improving peoples’ living conditions and creating job opportunities, preventing conflicts, strengthening democratic states and enforcing respect for human rights, especially the rights of minority groups, women and children”.

5. Participants emphasized the importance of social remittances (family allowances, retirement pension and health insurance) in return and reintegration programs for migrants, participation of immigrant generations in the development of their country of origin, and the role of migrants as active participants, mediators and partners in decision-making processes in matters concerning decentralized co-operation.

6. The conference also emphasized the need for assistance to be provided to African countries to build their institutional capacity for migration policy formulation as a means of establishing explicit and harmonized regional and global migration policies, their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This is particularly important because of the general belief that many, perhaps most, African countries do not have the necessary institutional capacity and human competencies. It is also relevant for the ACBF because of its mandate to work with African countries and regional institutions to build and sustain such capacities.

The Dakar conference is important for several reasons. First, it took a regional approach to migration and provides an example and possible approach for other regional institutions such as SADC, the East African Community (EAC) and the Great Lakes Region to do likewise. Second, it brought together source, transit, and major receiving countries to develop a shared understanding and common approach to the issues of global migration. Africa will need more similar approaches because global problems call for global responses. Third, the conference focused on the role emigrants can play in the development of their communities and countries of origin, not as passive victims, but active, proactive, and connected members of society. This is similar to the approach supporter of SANSA in South Africa have taken (see above). Clearly, more work is needed on practical and realistic strategies for the empowerment of emigrants as agents of change in their country of origin. Finally, the conference emphasized the need to build local, national and regional capacities and competencies for African countries to develop and implement migration policies and programs relevant for their needs.
Box 6.3.1 below summarizes the key recommendations made by the DAKAR Ministerial conference.

**Box 6.3.1: Key Recommendations made by the DAKAR Ministerial Conference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) that the West African States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Adopt the “Implementation and Follow-up” appended to the Dakar Declaration;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Establish follow-up mechanisms for the conclusions of this Conference in collaboration with IOM, ECOWAS and UEMOA;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) that the International Organization for Migration (IOM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>provide technical and institutional support for the implementation of the recommendations enshrined in this Declaration, in partnership with international, regional and sub-regional organizations and other partners at the national and local levels by:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Providing** support to projects initiated by migrants and to development programs for areas predisposed to international migration;

**Assisting** in training staff of regional and governmental organizations and associations, particularly in the formulation and implementation of policies, institutional systems, laws and administrative regulations concerning international migration;

**Providing** support to West African countries, regional and sub-regional organizations to enable them to launch a systematic information and research program on international migration;

**Assisting** in harmonizing, co-ordinating and integrating regional migration policies as well as co-operation at inter-regional and global levels;

**Supporting** efforts made by West African countries, to heighten awareness of the close inter-relationship between migration and development and to make adequate provision for the migration variable during the formulation of national development and regional integration policies;

**Contributing** to the technical and institutional capacity-building efforts of the West African States and regional organizations to enable them to settle the conflicts that cause large-scale movement of people and ensure a more effective use of the humanitarian assistance and development aid associated with migration management;

**Appealing** to development partners to provide for migrants’ concerns in their development programs.


The recommendations of the Dakar Declaration contain three important elements. First, they call upon member states to focus on follow-up and implementation of the ideas, suggestions and recommendations of the conference. Second, they emphasize the role the International Organization for Migration (IOM), working with other partners, must play to assist member states to build the necessary capacity for the effective implementation of the recommendations. Finally, the recommendations call upon the international community, including the major migrant receiving countries to integrate migrants’ issues and concerns into their development policies and programs.

Like all conferences, the Dakar conference has its limitations and weaknesses. As a conference, it is only a forum for deliberations without any guarantee that its recommendations will ever be implemented. Even with a separate document on the follow-up and implementation of the Dakar Declaration, there are no guarantees that effective implementation and follow-up will take place. Secondly, the conference did not focus on skilled African professional emigrants as such. No distinction was made between migration issues of the skilled professionals -- the core of the brain drain -- and
other types of migrants. No information or insights are provided about the nature, size, scope, and other aspects of the labor market for skilled West African professionals. Nor did the conference provide specific strategies needed to reutilize professional experts for the development of either their home country or the ECOWAS region as a whole. Almost three years after the conference, there is no empirical data or information about the extent and effectiveness with which the Dakar recommendations have been implemented by any of the participating partners.

October 2005 will mark the fifth anniversary of the Dakar Conference. This provides concerned partners the opportunity to organize Dakar II to revisit the issues raised in the first conference five years earlier and to assess progress, if any, challenges of follow-up and implementation, and to discuss new and emerging issues relevant to international migration in the context of recent changes in West Africa. ACBF may want to consider taking a leading role in mobilizing other partners for organizing the follow-up conference.
7. THE WAY FORWARD

7.1 Next Steps: Where Do We Go From Here?

The following observations and recommendations are based on the review of the literature above in consideration of what is considered necessary information requirements for the draft Terms of Reference. It should be noted, however that since the review is only representative rather than comprehensive, it is possible that these observations are based on incomplete or inaccurate information. They are presented here as a basis for ACBF’s internal discussion and strategic decisions and choices as to how to go forward. If additional empirical evidence becomes available, the observations and recommendations can be accordingly adjusted or revised.

(1) Need to Define, Operationalize and Prioritize DMPs.

Although some of the studies reviewed in this report differentiate professional from non-professional emigration and its consequences, no single empirical study was found that focused exclusively on Development Management Professionals (DMPs). The question of what constitutes DMPs remains unresolved. Available evidence seems to suggest rather strongly that there is no single labour market for all DMPs. Even when one takes ACBF’s areas of core competencies as the basis for defining DMPs, there is such a wide range of differences that it is unlikely they all belong to the same labour market.

There are differences in the seriousness of the shortages of skilled professionals among the six priority areas. For example, most African countries experience more serious skills shortages for accountants and financial analysts, statisticians, and experienced managers and executives than for political aids or NGO managers.

**Recommendation 1:** ACBF should make a strategic decision to define, operationalize and prioritize DMPs and associated labor markets. These strategic choices should guide and inform subsequent work relating to the market for skilled African development management professionals---the real Brain Drain and Brain Gain question.

(2) Problems with Existing Data

The review concluded that available empirical data is not adequate as a basis for meeting the information requirements of the TORs as they relate to DMPs. Available data are either incomplete, inaccurate, too aggregated or simply not available. Sample sizes are often too small, and most of the data is derived from self-report perceptual measures with little or no archival or “objective” impact data. None of the studies reviewed in this report used rigorous sampling methods.

The results of this review suggests rather strongly that for most African countries, available data on international migration in general, DMPs and associated labour markets do not allow for informed national debate and sustainable public policy development and implementation.

**Recommendation 2:** ACBF, working in partnership with national governments, regional organizations, and development partners should verify the problems and limitations of existing data, and if confirmed, should then decide on a strategy to collect or otherwise obtain the necessary data for subsequent phases of the study.
(3) Is the Continental Approach the Best Way to Go Forward?

Given differences in labor market characteristics and dynamics, awareness and responses across regions, countries, sectors and institutions, it may be necessary to re-think the continental approach to the DMP emigration study.

**Recommendation 3:** Rather then taking a continental approach, ACBF should consider the possibility of taking a more differentiated strategic approach by for example, targeting certain countries, sectors, or select DMP labor markets, and working with them on (e.g.) key success factors, implementation of effective response initiatives, or capacity building for sustaining political and community leadership and commitment. A bottom-up approach may yield more useable results for participating institutions, communities or countries.

(4) Knowledge Management/Clearing House

There does not appear to be a single African institution serving as a center of excellence, knowledge management or clearing house for data, information, case studies, lessons of experience, advice or wisdom relating to transnational migration in general, or better still, issues relevant to DMP. If the African brain drain problem is serious, getting worse and likely to stay with us for a long time, then a strong case can be made for a knowledge-based institutional African home. The review has also demonstrated that the brain drain, though serious, is not exclusively an African problem. Other developing and developed parts of the world experience or has experienced similar problems. Therefore, an African clearinghouse would also provide information and lessons of experience from other parts of the world.

In addition to mobilizing resources and political support it should also serve as a coordinating body with national and international organizations interested in, or actively involved in issues of the brain drain and transnational migration. Already, organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, UNDP, and the ILO are actively involved in funding, conducting studies, or implementing programs aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the brain drain. At the moment, most of this work remains largely uncoordinated, and the results and lessons of experience not readily available to African public policy makers.

**Recommendation 4:** ACBF may wish to consider establishing a knowledge-management, clearing house, center of excellence or central network for information and lessons of experience relating to the management of African DMPs at home and abroad. Information and lessons of experience should be made available to countries, governments and institutions as they increase their awareness of the challenges of transnational migration, and plan policies and programs for managing migration in general and the DMP brain drain/grain in particular.

(5) Level of National/Institutional Awareness

There is no conclusive evidence that all African governments and institutions have acquired a heightened level of awareness of the negative impact of DMP emigration on their economy and society. There is no information as to what different countries are doing to mitigate the negative effects and the degree to which such initiatives are
effective or ineffective. South Africa seems to stand alone in leading a concerned practical response by government and civil society. Other African countries need to consider proactive responses of their own.

**Recommendation 5:** Working with a select group of target countries, the ACBF may consider developing tailor-made public education and awareness programs for the most seriously affected countries so that such countries can engage the public and government to develop relevant proactive responses including building capacities for the effective management of international migration in general, and the market for DMPs in particular.

**(6) Prevention is Better than Cure**

Practically, all the studies reviewed focus on professionals as emigrants after they have left their country of origin. There seems to be little interest in studying professionals before they leave their country of origin. Yet, the idea that prevention is better and cheaper seems to apply here. The relevant question should be: What can Africa do to prevent the present and future stocks of DMPs from becoming emigrants? The emphasis should be on **stay**, not **return**.

**Recommendation 6:** ACBF should consider taking a lead in identifying like-minded partners to develop targeted and proactive strategies based on DMP prevention rather than cure.

**(7) Macro Manifestation of a Micro Problem**

Professional emigration has often been studied as a macro problem impacting countries, sectors or institutions (meso). Yet, in its origins, emigration is a very micro problem because the decision to or not to emigrate is made by individual professionals, sometimes with the help of their immediate family members. Therefore, understanding the decision making process, and developing strategies for reversing the outflows should be targeted at the micro (individual) and meso (institutional) levels rather than only at the macro (country, region, global) levels. For example, carefully targeted programs of professional support, employment and management practices, improved working and living conditions, personal sense of recognition and accomplishment, and contingent incentives may be as important, or even more important than government and international organization programs such as MIDA and RQAN.

**Recommendation 7:** ACBF should consider joining hands with others to investigate the effectiveness and experiment with micro and meso level DMP initiatives such as professionalization, leadership and management philosophy and practices, intrinsic, and extrinsic rewards and incentives, mentoring, career planning and management, public-private sector exchange of personnel, and early identification of exceptional talent. These micro and meso-level initiatives should be aimed at weakening the local push factors of emigration, and strengthening the professionals’ propensity to stay rather than emigrate.
(8) Biased Approaches
There appears to be evidence of implicit institutional bias among the sponsors and researchers dealing with issues of African emigration. Studies done by or for Western institutions or agencies tend to emphasize the positive consequences of emigration especially remittances and other transfers. Studies for and by African interests tend to emphasize the negative consequences of migration, especially the brain drain. There are very few sound empirical studies by independent researchers. With limited quality empirical data, it is still not possible to provide conclusive evidence on a number of issues. Besides, the truth most likely varies across time, space by type and level of DMP labour markets.

Recommendation 8: ACBF should be aware of this possible implicit institutional bias among existing studies. This awareness is important in using existing data, and selecting strategic partners for future work.

(9) Revisit and Prioritize Terms of Reference (TORs)
In the light of available information and sound empirical data, the terms of reference (TORs) for the study, taken together, are quite ambitious. There is no readily available data for most of the TORs, and since ACBF has only limited resources, the TORs may need to be re-examined in light of the results of the first recommendation above, and the Foundation’s areas of core competencies or strategic interests in this study.

Recommendation 9: Based on the results of the operational definition and priorities of DMPs, ACBF should revisit the TORs and establish priorities and sequencing among the TORs in line with its strategic interests, resources and/or mandate.

(10) New Partnerships for ACBF
Migration has become a global issue and with globalization, it is likely to become increasingly more complex and dynamic. Basic and applied research and programs to reverse the outflow are expensive with only mixed results. The work calls for high level of expertise, not readily available in Africa. Indeed, no single country or institution can go it alone. There is need for collaborative work with others.

Recommendation 10: As it decides on its next steps, the ACBF may wish to consider partnering with others and taking on the role of resource mobilizer or co-ordinate of interested parties among source, transit and receiving countries, professionals in the Diaspora, professionals still at home, professionals-in-training, professional associations, employers of professionals, etc, as they relate to priority DMPs and their respective labour markets. It is especially recommended that, as a partner institution, ACBF should develop strategic alliances with NEPAD, ECA, SADC and other regional organizations to develop joint programs of action in response to the serious priority problems of African DMP brain drain.

Partnership opportunities also exist with the United Nations agencies (e.g.,?) and other international organizations, such as the IOM, ILO, and the World Bank, which are already involved in various aspects of international migration. Development agencies of the major recipient countries such as DFID (UK), CIDA (Canada), and USAID (USA), and the ECDPM (the European Union) could also become strategic partners for ACBF’s future directions relating to the market for skilled African development management professionals.
WEBSITES:

Africa Brain Drain

African Brain Drain

Brain Drain, Brain Gain
http://www.maytree.com/PDF_Files/BrainDrain.pdf

Brain-Drain Migration: Background research paper prepared for the Green Paper on International Migration

Brain-drain and –gain in South Africa: Who loses, who gains?
http://www.nrf.ac.za/news/braindrain.stm

Brain drain: Colossal loss of investment for developing countries
http://www.euforic.org/courier/159e_oyo.htm

Brain Drain: Third World

The brain drain: Old myths, new realities

The Brain Gain: Skilled Migrants And Immigration Policy In Post-Apartheid South Africa

Nursing brain drain hurts Africa

SANSA: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa. http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa
Email: sansa@hiddingh.uct.ac.za. Tel: 27 021 480-7176.

Sussex Centre for Migration Research.
(www.geog.sussex.ac.uk/transrede/workshop-programme)

South Africa’s Brain Drain
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/dpa/monpaper/98-no7/sansa.htm

South African’s Brain Gain

World Markets Research Center
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Seers, D. 1969. The Brain Drain from Poor Countries, Communications Series 31, IDS University of Sussex.


UNITAR, 1971. The Brain Drain from Five Developing Countries: Cameroon – Colombia – Lebanon -- The Philippines -- Trinidad and Tobago, New York: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).


ANNEXES

Annex I: ACBF TORs (see page 6 for details of the title)
Annex II: Oni’s Report (see p.12)